

# Introduction to Network Awareness

**Mestrado Integrado em  
Engenharia de Computadores e Telemática  
DETI-UA**



# Awareness

- **Direct Awareness**
  - By direct observation.
- **Indirect Awareness**
  - By analysis of reactions to events.
- **Awareness by Correlation**
  - Joint analysis of multiple sources of data to detect hidden patterns and relations.
  - Big Data Problem.
- **Awareness by Prediction**
  - Detection of patterns over time.
  - Black Swan Problem!
- Its all an **Inference, Validation, Correction** loop.



# Network Awareness (1)

- Ability to effectively **Acquire Data** by **Monitoring** networks and systems to:
  - ◆ Optimize services,
  - ◆ Detect and counter-act anomalous activity/events.
- **Analyze/Process** data to know and characterize
  - ◆ Network entities,
    - ➔ An entity should be understood as a person, a group, a terminal, a server, an application, etc...
  - ◆ Data flows,
  - ◆ Services and users perception of service.



# Network Awareness (2)

- All data sources are acceptable.
  - Never assume data irrelevance!
- Data may be:
  - Quantitative.
    - ➔ Allows for statistical analysis and may serve as machine learning training input.
    - ➔ e.g., number of packets, number of flows, number of contacted machines, etc...
  - Qualitative.
    - ➔ Can be transformed to quantitative data by counting techniques and statistical characterization
    - ➔ e.g., error message X, address Y contacted, packet of type Z, etc...






# Network Awareness (3)

- Time is relevant.
  - ♦ Relative and absolute.
  - ♦ An event occurs in a specific time instant, and it is part of a sequence of events.
- Timescale(s) of analysis must:
  - ♦ Include the target characteristics,
  - ♦ Allow the perception of the event in time for a response.
- Data may be re-scaled for multiple analysis purposes.



# Network Awareness Steps

- Data acquisition.
- Data processing.
  - Creation of time sequences with different counting intervals (minimum timescales).
  - Creation of time sequences with different statistical metrics (larger timescales).
- Creation of entities' behavior profiles.
  - Usually time dependent.
- Classification of entities' behaviors.
  - Identification/classification.
  - Anomaly detection.




# Network Attack Vectors



# Type of Attacks (1)

- Objectives:
  - Fun and/or hacking reputation
  - Political purposes
  - Military purposes
  - Economical purposes
  - Other?
- Technical objectives:
  - Operation disruption
  - For data interception
  - Both
    - Disruption to intercept!
    - Intercept to disrupt!





# Type of Attacks (2)

- Technical objectives:

- Operation disruption.

- ➔ (Distributed) Denial-of-Service.

- Resources hijack.

- ➔ Spam,

- ➔ Crypt-currency mining/masternodes,

- ➔ Platform to other attacks!

- Data interception/stealing.

- ➔ Personal data

- As final goal,

- Or as tool to achieve more value information!

- ➔ Technical data,


- Usually used to achieve more value information!

- ➔ Commercial data


- Digital objects, financial and/or engineering plans, ...

- Disruption may be used to achieve interception!

- Interception may be used to achieve disruption (operational or commercial)!



# Attack Phases



# by Physical Interaction

- Ethernet ports at public/unprotected locations
  - With VLAN separation
  - Without VLAN separation
  - Protected by 802.1X
- Network taps at public/unprotected locations
- Network devices access
  - Unprotected serial/console ports, USB ports, etc...
- USB ports (short time access)
  - Long time objectives
    - Trojan/root kits injection.
  - Short time objectives
    - Device data acquisition (contacts, messages, sms, etc...)
- Sitting down at a terminal or with a device!
- Other?



# Illicit usage of Ethernet ports

- Common protection:



- VLAN separation/isolation.
- 802.1X.

- Unused ports

- VLAN separation/isolation and/or 802.1x may be enough to mitigate more dangerous attacks (L2 or L3 access to internal machines).
- Switches MAC flooding attacks and Network overload (Local DoS) are possible.

- In use ports

- Using an inline device it is possible to break 802.1X using terminal/user authentication.
  - ➔ Traffic pass-through.
  - ➔ After 802.1X authentication performs inline MAC spoofing.
- Allows for traffic snooping, injection, and MITM attacks.





# Network Tapping

- Switch rogue mirror ports.
  - ◆ Allows for traffic snooping and injection, no MITM attacks.
  - ◆ Solution: Constant monitoring of configuration changes on network devices.
- Ethernet cable tap
  - ◆ Allows for traffic snooping and injection, no MITM attacks.
  - ◆ Solution: Electrical variations. Maybe...?
- Optical cable tap
  - ◆ Allows for traffic snooping and injection, no MITM attacks.
  - ◆ Solution: Quantum cryptography



# Wireless

## • Rogue APs

- ◆ WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK are not compromised.
  - Unless device associates to networks with (fake) SSID of known networks with different credentials and/or secure protocols.
    - Decision to connect based only on stored SSID and not other parameters.
- ◆ WPA Enterprise and WPA2 Enterprise security may be compromised on 2<sup>nd</sup> phase authentication.
  - Credentials not recoverable (maybe with MSCHAPv2).
  - Permits “accept everyone” strategy for MITM attacks.
- ◆ Open+Web-based authentication are very vulnerable.
  - Fake entry portals.
- ◆ Allows DoS.
  - Force user to search other networks. Make user choose insecure/fake network.

## • Wireless Interception (possible injection).

## • Electromagnetic effects

- ◆ Wireless mice, keyboards, ...
  - Solution: additional information to scramble data.

## • By Sound

- ◆ Keystrokes sounds.

## • Jamming

- ◆ Pure disruption, or
- ◆ Disruption to activate secondary channels (more easily compromised).




E300 elect



# Remote Software Installation or Service Activation

- Attacks to routing (MP-BGP)
- E-mail
  - Office macros
  - Executables
- Social Networking
- Software downloadable
  - Sources:
    - ➔ Cracks
    - ➔ Non-certified software stores
    - ➔ ...
- Attacks:
  - Ransomware
  - Trojan Horse



# Distributed DoS

- Multiple slow/small devices generating traffic to a target
  - TCP vs. UDP
- Purpose of disruption
  - By political/economical/"reputation"
  - Redirection to other service/location?
- Solution at target
  - Load-balancers
  - For TCP, maybe its possible to survive making active (with licit client validation) session resets (server/firewalls)
    - ➔ White list solution, for completed session negotiation
  - For UDP/DNS, block requests for known external relay/redirection DNS servers (blocks attack amplification, IP target spoofing)
    - ➔ Doesn't work with large botnets and direct requests to target
- Solution at source
  - Anomalous behaviors detection
    - ➔ Low traffic variations hard to detect
    - ➔ Time and periodicity changes are easier to detect
    - ➔ Destinations of traffic changes
    - ➔ With "really low" data rates is impossible to detect





# Data Acquisition



# Core and End-to-End Monitoring

## End-to-end measurements

- delay
- jitter
- throughput
- losses
- BW reservations
- reserved paths validation


## Demands per destination

- global
- per service/app
- per QoS usage


## End-points/users

## Core configurations


- Node awareness
  - Service awareness
- ## Nodes performance
- ## Links performance
- ## Routing
- ## QoS agreements
- ## MPLS paths
- ## BW reservations
- ## Security



# Node Monitoring




# End-User/Host/App Monitoring






# Server/Service/Cloud Monitoring



# Overtime Monitoring



# Data Sources

- SNMP

- ♦ Used to acquire knowledge about current states of nodes/links/servers.
- ♦ Local information. May be used to extrapolate to global information.
- ♦ (Often) Requires the usage of vendor specific MIBs.

- Flow exporting

- ♦ Used to characterize users/services in terms of amount of traffic and traffic destinations.
- ♦ Medium and large time-scale information.
- ♦ Protocols: Cisco NetFlow, IPFIX – Standard, Juniper jFlow, and sFlow

- Packet Captures / RAW statistics / DPI vs. SPI

- ♦ Used to characterize users/services in small time-scales.
- ♦ Requires distributed dedicated probes.

- Access Server/Device logs and/or CLI access.

- ♦ Used to acquire knowledge about past and current state.

- Active measurements

- ♦ Introduces entropy on network and requires (for many measurements) precise clock synchronization
- ♦ E.g., one-way delay/jitter, round-trip delay/jitter.

