


# Smartcards



<https://pplware.sapo.pt/informacao/saiba-como-renovar-online-o-seu-cartao-de-cidadao/>


<https://knowtechie.com/security-matters-5-benefits-of-contactless-smart-cards/>

# Smartcard:

## Definition


▷ Card with computing processing capabilities

- ♦ CPU
- ♦ ROM
- ♦ EEPROM
- ♦ RAM




▷ Interface

- ♦ With contact
- ♦ Contactless



# Smartcard: Components



## ▷ CPU

- ♦ 8/16 bit
- ♦ Crypto-coprocessor (opt.)

## ▷ ROM

- ♦ Operating system
- ♦ Communication
- ♦ Cryptographic algorithms

## ▷ EEPROM

- ♦ File system
  - Programs / applications
  - Keys / passwords

## ▷ RAM

- ♦ Transient data
  - Erased on power off

## ▷ Mechanical contacts


- ♦ ISO 7816-2
  - Power
  - Soft reset
  - Clock
  - Half duplex I/O

## ▷ Physical security

- ♦ Tamperproof case
- ♦ Resistance to side-channel attacks

# Smartcard applications:

## Communication protocol stack



# T=0 and T=1

## ▷ T=0

- ◆ Each byte transmitted separately
- ◆ Slower


## ▷ T=1

- ◆ Blocks of bytes transmitted
- ◆ Faster

## ▷ ATR (ISO 7816-3)

- ◆ Response of the card to a reset operation
- ◆ Reports the protocol expected by the card

# APDU (ISO 7816-4)



## ▷ Command APDU

- ♦ CLA (1 byte)
  - Class of the instruction
- ♦ INS (1 byte)
  - Command
- ♦ P1 and P2 (2 bytes)
  - Command-specific parameters
- ♦ Lc
  - Length of the optional command data
- ♦ Le
  - Length of data expected in subsequent Response APDU
  - Zero (0) means all data available

## ▷ Response APDU

- ♦ SW1 and SW2 (2 bytes)
  - Status bytes
  - 0x9000 means SUCCESS

# Encoding objects in smartcards:

## TLV and ASN.1 BER

- ▷ Tag-Length-Value (TLV)
  - ◆ Object description with a tag value, the length of its contents and the contents
  - ◆ Each element of TLV is encoded according with ASN.1 BER
- ▷ Values can contain other TLV objects
  - ◆ The structure can be recursive

# Smartcard:


## File system (1/3)

### ▷ File identification

- ♦ Name or number

### ▷ File types

- ♦ Master File (MF)
  - File system root, ID 0x3F00
- ♦ Dedicated File (DF)
  - Similar to a directory
  - Can contain other EFs or DF
- ♦ Elementary File (EF)
  - Ordinary data file
  - File size fixed and determined when created






# Smartcard:

## File system (2/3)

### ▷ File system types


- ♦ **Transparent**

- Data blocks identified by offset + length




- ♦ **Fixed records**

- Indexed records




- ♦ **Variable records**

- Indexed records



- ♦ **Cyclic**

- Read pointer, write pointer
- Cyclic increments



# Smartcard:

## File system (3/3)

### ▷ Access control

- ♦ No restrictions

- ♦ Protected

- The file access APDU must contain a MAC computed with a key shared between the card and the off-card application

- ♦ External authentication

- The file access APDU is only allowed if the card already checked the existence of a common shared key with the off-card application
- Previous login


# Java cards

## ▶ Smartcards that run Java Applets

- ♦ That use the JCRE
- ♦ The JCRE runs on top of a native OS

## ▶ JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment)

- ♦ Java Virtual Machine
- ♦ Card Executive
  - Card management
  - Communications
- ♦ Java Card Framework
  - Library functions




# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (1/6)

### ▷ External authentication

- ♦ The smartcard authenticates the off-card application
- ♦ Challenge-response protocol with random number
  - Initiated by the off-card application




# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (2/6)

### ▷ Internal authentication

- ♦ The off-card application authenticates the smartcard
- ♦ Challenge-response protocol with random number and key number
  - Initiated by the off-card application



# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (3/6)


### ▷ Secure messaging

- ♦ Protect data read from the smartcard
- ♦ Protect data written into the smartcard
- ♦ Protection forms
  - Authentication with MAC
  - Authentication with MAC and data encryption


# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (4/6)

### ▷ Authenticated readings




### ▷ Authenticated writings




# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (5/6)

### ▷ Authenticated and confidential readings



### ▷ Authenticated and confidential writings







# Smartcard:

## Cryptographic protocols (6/6)

### ▷ Session key derivation



### ▷ Session key uploading



# OpenCard Framework (OCF)

- ▷ Goal: facilitate the development of smartcard-based solutions
  - ♦ Make the parts of the solution, typically provided by different parties, independent of each other
  - ♦ <https://www.openscdp.org/ocf>
- ▷ Parties:
  - ♦ Card issuer
    - Card initialization, personalization and issuing
  - ♦ Card OS provider
    - Basic, lowest level card behavior
  - ♦ Card reader / terminal provider
    - Interfaces that deal with reading from and writing into cards
  - ♦ Application / service provider
    - Development of off-card (and possibly on-card) applications

# Cryptographic services

▷ Ciphers

▷ Digest functions

▷ Key generation

▷ Key management

- ◆ Key import

- ◆ Key export

▷ Digital signatures

- ◆ Generation

- ◆ Verification

▷ Management of public key certificates

- ◆ Generation


- ◆ Verification

# Cryptographic services: Middleware

- ▷ Libraries that bridge the gap between functionalities of smartcards and high-level applications
- ▷ Some standard approaches:
  - ♦ **PKCS #11**
    - Cryptographic Token Interface Standard (Cryptoki)
    - Defined by RSA Security Inc.
  - ♦ **PKCS #15**
    - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard
    - Defined by RSA Security Inc.
  - ♦ **CAPI CSP**
    - CryptoAPI Cryptographic Service Provider
    - Defined by Microsoft for Windows systems
  - ♦ **PC/SC**
    - Personal computer/smartcard
    - Standard framework for smartcard access on Windows systems


# PKCS #11:

## Cryptoki middleware integration



# PKCS #11:

## Cryptoki object hierarchy



# PKCS #11:

## Cryptoki sessions

### ▷ Logical connections between applications and tokens

- ♦ R/O and R/W sessions
- ♦ Session owners

- Public
- User
- Security Officer (SO)

### ▷ Operations on open sessions

- ♦ Administrative
  - Login/logout
- ♦ Object management
  - Create / destroy an object on the token
- ♦ Cryptographic

### ▷ Session objects


- ♦ Transient objects created during sessions

### ▷ Lifetime of sessions

- ♦ Usually for a single operation on the token

# PKCS #11:

## Cryptoki R/O sessions login/logout



### ▷ R/O public session

- ♦ Read-only access to public token objects
- ♦ Read/write access to public session objects


### ▷ R/O user functions

- ♦ Read-only access to all token objects (public or private)
- ♦ Read/write access to all session objects (public or private)



# PKCS #11:

## Cryptoki R/W sessions login/logout



### ▷ R/W public session

- ♦ Read/write access to all public objects


### ▷ R/W SO functions

- ♦ Read/write access only to public objects on the token
  - Not to private objects
- ♦ The SO can set the normal user's PIN

### ▷ R/W user functions

- ♦ Read/write access to all objects

# Cartão de Cidadão: Middleware for Unix (Linux/MacOS)



# Cartão de Cidadão: Middleware for Windows

