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# Trustable oracles towards trustable blockchains

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Mestrado Integrado em Engenharia Informática e Computação

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# **Abstract**



# Resumo





# Acknowledgements

Pedro Duarte da Costa



*“If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of Giants.”*

Isaac Newton



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# Abbreviations

SLR   Systematic Literature Review



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Once more, a technological revolution sparked in a not-yet-ready world. Just as the Internet invention brought us closer together and opened an unlimited virtual world of possibilities so does blockchain. The technology is still in its early development days and many different proposals are being worked on to improve its performance and scalability. Akin to the dotcom boom, a plethora of blockchain projects live on more expectations than results but ultimately blockchain could resolve the Internet's failed promise. To understand what is blockchain and why it is necessary we need to comprehend the social background around the time of its release. The Internet promised of a peer-to-peer connected world, however, financial incentives and technological challenges led to a centralized and non-privacy advocated virtual world. The increasing general concern regarding the privacy of personal information and the meddling of third parties in everyday online actions allied with the financial crash of 2008 lead to a new technological and social breakthrough.

Satoshi Nakamoto's introduced Bitcoin, in 2009 [?], and revolutionized money and currency, setting the first example of a digital asset which has no backing or intrinsic value and more importantly no centralized issuer or controller. In order to require no third party to verify each transaction and prevent double-spending, he introduced a distributed ledger mechanism now known as Blockchain.

### 1.1 Blockchain

Blockchain is a tool for distributed consensus, in a byzantine fault-tolerant approach, without requiring to trust in centralized parties. In this ledger, transactions are recorded in an ongoing chain, creating an immutable public record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. Anyone can become a node and leave and rejoin the network. Having incentives to work on the CPU intensive proof-of-work, extending the chain, and so, for as long as the majority of nodes are trustworthy, the longest and honest chain will thrive. The proof-of-work used on

## Introduction

Bitcoin is HashCash, proposed in 1997 by Adam Back, is a cryptographic hash-based proof-of-work algorithm that requires a selectable amount of work to compute, but the proof can be verified efficiently. Nodes can easily verify that a block is valid and that some effort was put in its creation. The proof-of-work difficulty can increase and decrease depending on the network size and capability, creating on average a block every 10 minutes, like a heartbeat.

In simpler terms, transactions are grouped in blocks and for each block there is a mathematical challenge (proof-of-work) which requires time and computational resources to be solved, guaranteeing that some effort is put into solving the challenge and therefore making it extremely hard to quickly manufacture false blocks. Each block has a hash, a signature, of the previous block linking all blocks in a single chain. Nodes always work on the longest chain, so as long as the majority of the nodes are honest and work in building correct blocks, which means they don't have double entries and transactions are legitimate, the biggest chain will grow and remain a trusted and distributed ledger.

Leveraging Blockchain, Bitcoin requires no personal information to exchange value, anyone can join the network and no central authority is needed. This opens an unlimited world of new scenarios for the use of blockchain.

## 1.2 Smart Contracts

In 2015, Ethereum was launched as an alternative protocol for building decentralized applications called smart contracts. Introduced as applications that run on the blockchain, smart contracts are self-verifying, self-executing and immutable contracts whose terms are directly written in lines of code which persist on the blockchain, promising to replace real-world contracts. Contracts are the building blocks of our identity, economy and society. They enforce agreements between multiple parties and ensure trust in the compliance of the rules of the agreement but traditional contracts lack automation and decentralization. Smart Contracts provide the ability to execute tamper-proof digital agreements, which are considered highly secure and highly reliable.

Smart contracts have a wide range of use cases. For example, they can be used in Supply Chains and Logistics. Smart contracts allow tracking product movement from the factory to the store shelves. Each intermediary signs a step of the contract which then the final consumer can analyse and have the guarantee of the origin of the product.

## 1.3 The Smart Contract Connectivity Problem

The Ethereum blockchain is designed to be entirely deterministic [?], meaning that if someone downloads the whole network history and replays it they should always end up with the same state. Bearing this in mind, smart contracts cannot directly query URLs for certain information since everyone must be able to independently validate the outcome of running a given contract making it impossible to guarantee that everyone would retrieve the same information since the internet is non-deterministic and changes over time. Determinism is necessary so that nodes can





Figure 1.1: Smart contract connectivity problem.

come to a consensus. In order for smart contracts to gain traction, they need access information of the real world, outside of the blockchain. For example, the current price of the US dollar. However smart contracts cannot directly query the internet for information due to the non-deterministic nature of the internet. Meaning that the information retrieved at some point in time cannot be entrusted to be available or equal in another point in the future, which may result in different states when validating smart contracts by querying the internet in different moments. Oracles solve the non-deterministic problem, of querying the internet, by inputting external information on the blockchain through a transaction making sure that the blockchain contains all the information required to verify itself.

## 1.4 Smart Contracts Space and Computation Limits

Another problem for smart contracts is performing long and costly operations in terms of computation and space. Several platforms are implementing smart contracts, also called DAPPs, Distributed Applications, namely Ethereum and EOS, among others.

On the Ethereum platform, smart contracts pay "Gas" to run. "Gas" is a unit that measures the amount of computation effort that certain operations require to execute. "Gas" is basically the fees paid to the network in order to execute an operation. Therefore, the longer the application runs the more "Gas" the smart contract as to pay.

EOS, on the opposite of Ethereum, works on an ownership model whereby users own and are entitled to the use of resources in proportion to their stake. Basically, instead of paying transaction fees, the owner who holds  $N$  tokens is entitled to  $N \cdot k$  transactions. While Ethereum rents out computational power on the network, EOS gives ownership of the resources in accordance with the amount of EOS held. The mentioned resources are RAM, corresponding to the used state on the network, CPU measuring the average consumption of computing resources and NET which measures used bandwidth. With increasing prices of EOS tokens, staking these resources becomes very costly.

All in all, either for users of smart contracts or the teams deploying them, keeping smart contracts efficient and performing a non-costly operation is the key. Nonetheless, sometimes applications require costly operations and outsourcing them to an oracle outside of the blockchain is the answer.

## 1.5 Oracles as a Solution

The solution to the smart contract connectivity problem and to outsourcing computation from the blockchain is the use of a secure blockchain middle-ware, mentioned before as, an oracle. Oracles can query data from APIs, data feeds, other blockchains or perform their own calculations and input that data on the smart contract. This way the blockchain has all the necessary information to verify the result of running a smart contract, and will always produce the same result, independently of the point in time in which that verification runs.

### 1.5.1 Authenticity Proofs

## 1.6 Motivation and Objectives

The research hereby exposed was proposed by Takai, a blockchain start-up born in Porto, Portugal with the purpose to be the first blockchain open innovation platform. Sponsored by Bright Pixel, an innovation hub and venture investment house, which supports promising startups in their early years. Taikai is building a platform that connects talent and entrepreneurs with the challenges of the corporate players, through the power of the sharing economy and blockchain trust. Taikai's project will serve as a proof-of-concept for the implementation of trustable oracles.

The growing interest in blockchain technology and especially in the potential of Smart Contracts together with the lack of research on trustable oracles creates a gap in the general adoption of blockchain by business and governments. This gap and the opportunity bestowed with the Taikai project provides the perfect context for pursuing the construction of a bridge to overcome the oracle trust problem and further empower existing and future blockchain projects.

The proposed objectives for this work are as follows:

- Identifying the necessary components for end-to-end reliability between smart contracts and outside blockchain information;



Figure 1.2: Oracle integration.

- Providing a general framework for guaranteeing oracle trust;
- Implementing a proof-of-concept in the Taikai project on the EOS blockchain;

## 1.7 Document Structure

## Introduction

## Chapter 2

# Blockchain Oracles

The topic of blockchain oracles is still unexplored territory mostly investigated by start-up companies and individuals thriving to solve a new problem. Therefore, research related to oracles is scarcely found on peer-reviewed publications but, nonetheless, is invaluable in such an early phase of the technology. Consequently, the state of the art cannot be complete without reviewing the work developed by the academia and also by start-ups, enterprises, governments and individuals.

### 2.1 Literature Review

To get an overview of academic research a systematic literature review was performed. It's main components and findings are described in this section.

A literature review allows scholars not to step on each other's shoes but to climb on each other's shoulders, meaning, not duplicating existing research and find the gaps and strive to discover something new. To conduct a non-biased, methodical and reproducible review, to the extent that a human can, it is necessary to clarify and identify at the beginning of the research its methodology, what are the data sources and what is the selection criteria.

The goal of this literature review is to get a sense of the corpus of existing works on the topic of blockchain oracles, and the directions and extent to which previous research has rendered significant results.

#### 2.1.1 Research Questions

First of all and to guide the focus of the research, the following research questions were defined:

- RQ1: What kind of blockchain oracles have been proposed?
- RQ2: What are the research trends on blockchain oracles?

*RQ1*, analyses the scope of existing blockchain oracles. The methodologies and technologies used, so as to understand how the oracle problem is tackled.

*RQ2*, tries to identify the direction that is proving to be the most effective. Analysing past solutions that never made it into production and solutions currently adopted.

### 2.1.2 Search Strategy and Data-sources

Figure 2.1, depicts the predefined review strategy used in order to achieve such a goal and maintain unbiased, transparent and reproducible research. These steps are inspired on the guidelines for performing a systematic review by Kitchenham et al., 2007 [KKC07].




Figure 2.1: Review strategy.

The first step, **Search Strategy**, compromises a preliminary search on several databases trying to optimize the query that best fits the research questions. After identifying the set of keywords that best describe the problem a full query is built and tested. Finally, we define and describe the steps to of the systematic review.

Once a satisfactory query is achieved, we proceed to the next step, **Study selection**, here we aggregate the studies from all databases and in the *Screening and cleaning* phase we remove papers written in other languages or duplicated.

Next, in the **Quality assessment** step we iteratively exclude papers that do not answers to any of the research questions. Initially analysing only the title, and alter the abstract and so on until a full read of the article seems worth it to take conclusions and respond to que research queries.

This leads to the **Data extraction** step, in which we take and summarize the findings after reading each paper.

So that later, in the **Data synthesis** step, we can summarize all the findings, infer some conclusions and answer the research questions.

Having defined the strategy for the systematic review and after testing some keywords on several databases, the author selected the following four electronic databases to query for relevant information:

- ACM Digital Library
- IEEE Xplore
- Scopus
- Google Scholar

The defined search query was the following:

```
((("blockchain" OR "block chain" OR "block-chain") AND ("oracles" OR "oracle" OR "middle-ware" OR "middleware" OR "middle ware" OR "datafeed" OR "data feed" OR "data-feed")))
```

This search query was used to comprise all the possible ways of referring to blockchain and oracles. Some scholars have investigated the oracle issue by simply calling them a middleware or data-feed since oracles can either be used as an intermediary that relays data or as the source of the data.

The search was performed on the 5th of February 2019 and revealed the results presented in Table 2.1.

Database	Filters	Results
ACM Digital Library	Title, abstract and keywords	34
IEEE Xplore	Title, abstract and index terms	24
Scopus	Title, abstract and keywords	57
Google Scholar	Title	8
<b>Total</b>		<b>123</b>

Table 2.1: Number of results and applied filters per database

Since the concept of smart contracts on the blockchain was only introduced in 2015, with the introduction of the Ethereum blockchain, only results after 2015 were considered, also, all

deduplicated papers were removed. Analysing the initial search results per year, in Figure 2.2, we can infer the growing popularity of oracle-related academic research. The year 2019 only comprises work done in the month of January since the search was performed at the beginning of February.




Figure 2.2: Resulting papers from search distributed per year

### 2.1.3 Study Selection and Quality Assessment

The process of exclusion is depicted in Figure 2.3 and all the information regarding the papers and in which phase they were excluded is transparently presented in Appendix A.

The study selection process initially started with a pool of 123 papers from the previously stated online databases. As described on Figure 2.1, the selection and quality assessment comprised four stages:

- Stage 1: Screening and cleaning duplicated articles or articles that were not in English.
- Stage 2: Exclusion by carefully reading the title but most importantly the abstract. After this stage, only 13 of the 91 non-duplicated papers were either describing specific trustable oracle implementations or mentioning the use of oracles.
- Stage 3: Analysing the introduction and conclusions in order to remove papers which do not describe an implementation of a trustable oracle or a protocol to overcome the trust in oracles.
- Stage 4: Full article reading to assess if the final bucket of articles answers the research questions.

### 2.1.4 Data extraction and Data Synthesis

The following process resulted in three articles and two theses that approach varying problems in implementing and guaranteeing trust in oracles.






Figure 2.3: Screening stages.

Town Crier (TC) [?], leverages trusted hardware, specifically Intel SGX<sup>1</sup>, to scrape HTTPS-enabled websites and serve source-authenticated data to smart contracts. TC architecture involves a TC contract on the blockchain that receives datagram requests from a client contract and communicates those request to a TC server which then retrieves an answer from a data source through an HTTPS connection.

Astraea [?] proposes a decentralized oracle network with submitters, voters and certifiers, in which voters play a low-risk game and certifies a high-risk game with associated resources. Using game theory incentive structure as a means to keep the players honest.

Gilroy Gordon [?] proposes a protocol for oracle sensor data authenticity and integrity to an IoT devices network with low computational resources. Using sets of public and private keys to authenticate that the oracle sensor data actually was originated by that oracle even if the information needs to pass by several oracles before being consumed by the application.

Francisco Monroy [?] defines a gambling protocol based on incentives and assuming that every entity involved has the objective to maximize their profit. The protocol overcomes the trust in a single Oracle by polling a network of 7 oracles from a large network of available oracles, they will

<sup>1</sup>Intel Corporation. Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK. <https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx-sdk>, 2019

then stake their money on a specific bet and only receive their investment back if the majority of the oracles vote in the same winner. Creating, therefore, incentives for Oracle good behaviour.

J. Eberhardt [?] does not propose a specific method but analyses existing solutions and defines a systematic classification for existing trustable off-chain computation oracles. The authors identify the following off-chain computation oracles approaches:

- *Verifiable off-chain Computation*, a technique where a prover executes a computation and then publishes the result including a cryptographic proof attesting the computation's correctness to the blockchain. An on-chain verifier then verifies the proof and persists the result in case of success. Identified existing solutions are zkSNARKs, Bulletproofs and zkSTARKs. zkSNARKs require a setup phase which is more expensive than naive execution. After the setup, however, proof size and verification complexity are extremely small and independent of circuit complexity. This amortization makes zkSNARKs especially efficient for computations executed repeatedly, which is usually the case for off-chain state transitions. While zkSTARKs and Bulletproofs require no setup, proof size and verification complexity grow with circuit complexity, which limits applicability.
- *Secure Multiparty Computation*, SMPCs, enable a set of nodes to compute functions on secret data in a way that none of the nodes ever has access to the data in its entirety. Identifies Enigma, which proposes a privacy-preserving decentralized computation platform based on multiple parties where a blockchain stores a publicly verifiable audit trail. However, current SMPC protocols add too much overhead for them to be practical. Hence, Enigma now relies on Trusted Execution Environments.
- *Enclave-based Computation*, EbC, relying on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) to execute computations off-chain. Identified existing solutions are Enigma and Ekiden which present two different implementations of EbCs. In Enigma, programs can either be executed on-chain or in enclaves that are distributed across a separate off-chain network. An Enigma-specific scripting language allows developers to mark objects as private and hence, enforce off-chain computation. In contrast to Enigma, Ekiden does not allow on-chain computation but instead, the blockchain is solely used as persistent state storage.
- *Incentive-driven Off-chain Computation*, IOC, relies on incentive mechanisms applied to motivate off-chain computation and guarantee computational correctness. IOCs inherit two critical design issues: (1) keep verifiers motivated to validate solutions and (2) reduce computational effort for the on-chain judge. The paper identifies TrueBit, as the first IOC implementation, proposing solutions for both challenges. As verifiers would stop validating if solvers only published correct solutions, TrueBit enforces solvers to provide erroneous solutions from time to time and offers a reward to the verifiers for finding them.

## 2.2 Commercial Products and Projects

To search for existing commercial products and projects, Google, a search engine and Medium, a platform for blog posting used widely by developers and the start-up community, were used as a means to find new projects or solutions for the oracle trust problem. Using these two tools a lot of projects were found trying to solve the oracle trust problem and are solely documented on white-papers or on the companies' website documentation page. This kind of literature cannot be found in peer-reviewed databases, but can nonetheless provide invaluable information and is therefore worth being analysed.

The results of this search revealed a wide range of projects and protocols with varying degrees of decentralization or authenticity. A short explanation of each will be detailed here:

- Oraclize.it [?], provides Authenticity Proofs for the data it fetches guaranteeing that the original data-source is genuine and untampered and can even make use of several data sources in order to gather trustable data, but its centralized model does not guarantee an always available service.
- ChainLink[?], describes a decentralized network of oracles that can query multiple sources in order to avoid dependency of a sole oracle which can be prone to fail and also to gather knowledge from multiple sources to obtain a more reliable result. ChainLink is also considering implementing, in the future, authenticity proofs and make use of trusted hardware, as of now it requires users to trust in the ChainLink nodes to behave correctly.
- SchellingCoin protocol incentivizes a decentralized network of oracles to perform computation by rewarding participants who submit results that are closest to the median of all submitted results in a commit-reveal process.
- TrueBit, introduces a system of solvers and verifier. Solvers are compensated for performing computation and verifiers are compensated for detecting errors in solutions submitted by solvers.

## 2.3 Summary and Conclusions

Summing up, this research highlighted two main types of oracles. The first is **Data-Carrier oracles**, whose main purpose is relaying query results from a trusted data source to a smart contract. The second is **Computation Oracles**, which not only relay query results but also perform the relevant computation themselves. Computation oracles can be used as building blocks to construct off-chain computation markets. A summary of the results is described in Table 2.2.

Two main conclusions come from both academic and non-academic research.

First of all, there is a clear lack of academic research on the topic of creating trustable oracles. Town Crier proposes a solution for relaying data securely but requiring specific hardware. Astraea and the work done by [?] uses incentives and game theory as a means for good oracle behaviour

Name	Type	Distributed Network	Achieves trust through
Town Crier	Data carrier	No	Trusted hardware signed attestations
Astraea	Data carrier	Yes	Game theory incentives
[?]	Computation	Yes	Sets of public and private keys
[?]	Data carrier	Yes	Incentive based
TrueBit	Computation	Yes	Incentive based
Oraclize.it	Data carrier	No	TLSNotary <a href="#">3.2.1</a>
ChainLink	Data carrier	Yes	Query multiple sources
SchellingCoin	Computation	Yes	Incentive based

Table 2.2: Summary of oracle projects/research.

but does not provide complete trust in edge cases in which pursuing erratic behaviour may be worth it.

The work done by [?] is very promising in the field of Internet of Things for oracle sensor authentication but can only guarantee that data was generated by a specific sensor but the approach cannot be generalised for other oracle scenarios.

Secondly, even though the main research on trustable oracles is being pursued by startups or sole developers all the existing projects seem to be blockchain specific or in very early phases and not yet ready to be generally adopted.

The literature review points out the lack of research done by the academic in trying to solve one of the most important motives for blockchain general adoption. Only second, maybe, to scalability. The oracle trust problem, efficiently solved, opens doors to the contracts of the futures. Start-ups and sole developers are for now the main force in solving this problem which launches the challenge and motivation for the next chapter of this research.

## Chapter 3

# Authenticity Proofs

In this chapter, the author takes a deep dive into existing authenticity mechanisms, in terms of their applicability and limitations.

In the context of today's Web, we are accustomed to trusting that a certain website or data is originated from the expected source due to the general adoption of the HTTPS protocol. An extension of the HTTP protocol which creates an encrypted and authenticated channel between the client and the web-server providing the requested information. Then it becomes a matter of whether we trust the source or not, but no doubts are raised as for the channel through which we received it.

Unfortunately, in the context of blockchain, the most used, available and trusted protocols do not have a direct way of communicating with HTTPS enabled services and therefore obtain authenticated data. This creates the need for a trusted service to input that information, but trusting in a third-party service requires it to provide irrefutable proof of its honesty.

Oracles, currently resort to two main techniques to prove their honesty. (1) Authenticity proofs, which is a software or hardware generated cryptographic proof during or after an execution that can later be used to prove the integrity and honesty of the execution or of the provided data. (2) Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) which add another layer of security by isolating the application code from the environment in which it ran, and may also provide cryptographic proof of their honest behaviour.

### 3.1 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

A Trusted Execution Environment is a secure computational environment that is strongly isolated from the main operating system. It provides application isolation, integrity and memory confidentiality. Sensitive data is stored, processed and protected from the main operating system or network. This isolation is accomplished through software and hardware-enforced mechanism. TEE runs a small operating system which exposes a minimal interface to the running application

and therefore reduces the attack surface. Advanced TEE embeds unique identities that allow to verify the device authenticity and can be used to generate proofs of the device honest execution.

Examples of TEEs are Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) <sup>1</sup> and ARM Trustzone-based Secure Elements <sup>2</sup>, the latter is commonly found on smartphones. Another example is Trusty <sup>3</sup>, a secure Operating System (OS) that provides a TEE for Android. It is isolated from the rest of the system by both hardware and software. Trusty's isolation protects it from malicious apps installed by the user and potential vulnerabilities that may be discovered in Android.

## 3.2 Authenticity Proofs Mechanisms

Several authenticity mechanisms have been developed and, as described in the state-of-the-art revision, most oracles as a service providers use authenticity proofs to prove their honest behaviour. However, these proofs are not infallible and the details or their implementation are not always transparent or do not provide the disclosed level of trust. I will deep dive on the most common proofs and discuss their implementation and applicability.

### 3.2.1 TLSNotary

TLSNotary is a mechanism for independently audited HTTPS (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure) sessions. Allowing clients to provide evidence to a third party auditor that certain web traffic occurred between himself and the server. This mechanism takes leverage of the TLS (Transport Layer Security) <sup>4</sup> handshake protocol to create an irrefutable proof, as long as the auditor trusts the server's public key, by splitting the TLS master secret <sup>5</sup> between three parties: the server, the auditee and the auditor.

The algorithm allows an auditor to verify some part of a session by withholding a small part of the secret data used to set up the HTTPS connection while allowing the client to conduct an HTTPS session normally. The auditor never fully possesses, at any time, any of the session keys and therefore cannot decrypt any sensitive information and can only verify that certain traffic did occur.

#### 3.2.1.1 How it works

TLSNotary modifies the TLS handshake protocol on the client side by leveraging some properties of TLS 1.0 and 1.1. More specifically the pseudorandom function (PRF) used in the TLS 1.0 RFC 2246.

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<sup>1</sup>More information on Intel SGX can be found here: <https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx/sdk>

<sup>2</sup>ARM whitepaper on ARM Trustzone-based TEE can be found here: <https://www.arm.com/files/pdf/TrustZone-and-FIDO-white-paper.pdf>

<sup>3</sup>More information on Trusty can be found here: <https://source.android.com/security/trusty>

<sup>4</sup>Information on the TLS protocol can be found here: <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt>

<sup>5</sup>The master secret is used, when generating keys and MAC secrets, as an entropy source, and the random values provide unencrypted salt material and IVs for exportable ciphers.

## Authenticity Proofs

$$PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_{MD5}(S1, label + seed) \otimes P_{SHA-1}(S2, label + seed) \quad (3.1)$$

This function compromises two secrets, S1 and S2. The auditor and auditee will independently generate random bytes of data, S1 and S2, respectively.

The auditee applies P\_MD5 to S1, generating 48 bytes:

$$H_1 = H_{1,1} \parallel H_{1,2} \quad (3.2)$$

The auditor applies P\_SHA-1 to S2, generating 48 bytes:

$$H_2 = H_{2,1} \parallel H_{2,2} \quad (3.3)$$

The auditor and auditee then exchange H21 and H12 allowing each other to construct different halves of the master secret, M2 and M1, respectively.

$$M_2 = H_{1,2} \parallel H_{2,2} \quad (3.4)$$

$$M_1 = H_{2,1} \parallel H_{1,1} \quad (3.5)$$

The auditee and auditor calculate X and Y, respectively.

$$X = P_{MD5}(M_1) \quad (3.6)$$

$$Y = P_{SHA-1}(M_2) \quad (3.7)$$

The auditor sends sufficient bytes from Y to the auditee so that it can compute the necessary encryption keys and client mac key to send the request to the server.

Then the server response is received, but not decrypted, and the network traffic is logged and a hash of the traffic is computed and set to the auditor as commitment.

Only then, does the auditor send the remaining bytes of Y to the auditee and this allows him to calculate the server mac key and safely execute the regular TLS decryption and authentication steps.

This complex sequence of calculations prevents the auditee from creating a fake version of the post-handshake traffic from the server since he did not have in his possession the server-mac-write-secret to decrypt and authenticate the initially requested data.

A more detailed flow and explanation can be consulted in the TLSNotary white-paper [TLS14].

### 3.2.1.2 Limitations

TLSNotary provides some capabilities to attest TLS connections but comes with several limitations. Firstly, TLSNotary supports only TLS 1.0 or 1.1, the properties mentioned before are not present in TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and the former are considered less secure versions of TLS. Secondly, TLSNotary depends on RSA Key exchange, which does not provide forward secrecy. Thirdly, TLSNotary uses MD5 and SHA-1 functions, which are now considered deprecated. Finally and

most importantly, TLSNotary requires trusting in a third party in most of its implementations, such as in Oraclize [Ora], and being an interactive proof there is no way to verify the TLSNotary proof unless you were performing the role of the auditor during the retrieval. Oraclize, runs an auditor node on Amazon Web Services (AWS), claiming that this implementation is secure as far as AWS is trusted, simply moving the trust to a larger central entity. It also only allows the existence of one auditor in which we must trust, TLSNotary will not be a suitable solution if more than one auditor is required.

### 3.2.1.3 Conclusions

The TLSNotary proof is promising due to be software based and is, as of this moment, the most spoken of authenticity proof. However, it's applicability is increasingly getting limited due to the deployment of new TLS versions and the assurances provided by the proof current implementations, which simply move the trust to a bigger entity. Therefore, it should not be considered a reliable authentication method for future implementations.

## 3.2.2 Android Proof

In the oracle context, the Android Proof<sup>6</sup> results from Oraclize research and development efforts. It takes leverage of SafetyNet software attestation and Android Hardware Attestation to provision a secure and auditable environment to fetch authenticated data.

### 3.2.2.1 SafetyNet Attestation

SafetyNet<sup>7</sup>, developed by Google, is an API service that allows assessing the Android device in which an app is running on. It provides a cryptographically-signed attestation, assessing the integrity of the device, looking at the software and hardware environment for integrity issues. By returning an SHA-256 hash of the application that called the SafetyNet API it allows assessing if the application running on the device has not been tampered with by comparing the application SHA-256 hash with its publicly available and distributed open-source code.

### 3.2.2.2 Android Hardware Attestation

Since Android Nougat<sup>8</sup>, developers are able to generate an hardware attestation object with details regarding the device unique key stored in the Android Hardware KeyStore<sup>9</sup>. The attestation object is signed by a special attestation key kept on the device and the root certificate used by that key is a known Google certificate. This guarantees that the hardware running the code has not been tampered with.

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<sup>6</sup>Documented explanation of the proof can be found here: [https://provable.xyz/papers/android\\_proof-rev2.pdf](https://provable.xyz/papers/android_proof-rev2.pdf)

<sup>7</sup>Further described on the google developer page: <https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation.html>

<sup>8</sup><https://www.android.com/versions/nougat-7-0/>

<sup>9</sup>Further explanation can be found here: <https://source.android.com/security/keystore/>



### 3.2.2.3 How it works

The application running on the Android device, on its first run, creates a NIST-256p key pair, containing the Hardware Attestation Object to prove the integrity of the key, using the Android Hardware KeyStore.

When a request is sent to the Android device, it starts an HTTPS connection and the entire HTTP response is retrieved. The response's SHA256 hash is signed using the hardware attested key pair created on the application start. A call to SafetyNet API is then issued to attest the SHA-256 hash of the application package running on the device, which should be open-source and public available and distributed, guaranteeing the application integrity and therefore that no change has occurred on the HTTP response before it was signed and its hash used in the SafetyNet request.

SafetyNet then returns an attestation response in the JSON Web Signature format (JWS) that guarantees the integrity of the application running, the integrity of the system in which the application ran and that both the HTTPS request and the signing process using the initially created and attested key has taken place in the application issuing the SafetyNet request.

The SafetyNet JWS response and the HTTP response is sent back for off-chain verification and validation.

### 3.2.2.4 Conclusions

The Android proof is a far more complex and in-depth authenticity proof in comparison to TLSNotary. It provides strong guarantees of software and hardware integrity as well as of the requested data. Nonetheless, it relies on a centralized authority, Google, to develop a secure Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), used by Android to generate private keys, and to maintain SafetyNet security sophisticated enough to offer good guarantees of the device and application integrity. A bottleneck in this approach can be the required use of a physical Android device, limiting the scalability context of this approach, but nonetheless, as long as Google is trustworthy it is a very secure model.

## 3.2.3 Ledger Proof

The ledger proof is based on the use of a specific trusted environment, the Ledger Nano S <sup>10</sup> and Ledger Blue <sup>11</sup>, developed by a French company to secure crypto assets safely. This device provides an attestation for its authenticity and code integrity.

### 3.2.3.1 How it works

This device implements several layers of hardware and software to prove the security of its execution. These devices run specific software, BOLOS <sup>12</sup> (Blockchain Open Ledger Operating

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<sup>10</sup><https://shop.ledger.com/products/ledger-nano-s>

<sup>11</sup><https://shop.ledger.com/products/ledger-blue>

<sup>12</sup>Specific information regarding BOLOS can be found here: <https://ledger.readthedocs.io/en/0/bolos/index.html>

System), which has an SDK that enables developers to build application which can be installed on the hardware. BOLOS exposes a set of kernel-level APIs which allows running secure cryptographic operations as well as attest the device and the code running on it. The later is very useful as it allows to run code in a secure manner and provides an attestation for the code. An application can ask the kernel to produce a signed hash of the application binary code. A special attesting key is used in this process and is safely controlled by the kernel, away from attacks attempts by any application code. With this, the ledger proof leverages both the device attesting and code attesting features to prove that the applications are running on a TEE of a ledger device.

### 3.2.3.2 Conclusions

Currently, the ledger proof is used by Oraclize to provide true random data to a smart contract. But its use can be extended to other computation operations that may require to run outside of the blockchain as long as there is support in terms of computational and memory capacity by the ledger device. The device also lacks a direct connection to the internet and therefore cannot be used to query data from the internet.

### 3.2.4 TLS-N

TLS-N [RWG<sup>+</sup>17a], is the first privacy preserving TLS extension that is efficient and most importantly provides non-repudiation <sup>13</sup>. TLS-N does not require the use of a third-party or any trusted hardware and is an extension to the TLS 1.3 protocol. In comparison to other implementations such as TLSNotary which rely on deprecated versions, is up to date to the current technologies. It guarantees non-repudiation, not only in a single TLS message exchange but also in a conversation compromising several messages. It allows, with an additional computation overhead, to obfuscate certain parts of the conversation (such as passwords or other sensitive information) while keeping its trust model intact.

In the TLS-N model, there is no need to trust in a single auditor, such as in TLSNotary, since the proofs are non-interactive and can be inspected by anyone, at any point in time, without having to trust in a single auditor honesty.

#### 3.2.4.1 How it works

TLs-N requires the web server (generator) and the client (requester) to have both support for the protocol.

Initially, both generator and requester establish a TLS connection and negotiate the TLS-N parameters in the handshake. The generator stores the state of the conversation which comprises a hash value incorporating all previous records, an ordering vector and the time stamp from the start of the session.

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<sup>13</sup>Non-repudiation refers to a state of affairs in which the authenticity of something cannot be challenged, meaning that there is absolute guarantee that something happened the way that it is stated.

## Authenticity Proofs

The protocol ends when the requester sends a request for evidence. The evidence is composed of a window of the exchanged ordered messages signed by the generator. The window begins right after the handshake, this prevents Content Omission Attacks, depicted on Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Content Omission Attack - The left figure shows the original and the right figure the signed conversation.

Image extracted from [RWG<sup>+</sup>17b]

In this situation the evidence collection only starts after the first request is done, and another request is asked right after (this one, inside the window collection, Req y on the image) and the response for the first request is assumed to be the response to the second one. Only this two messages are stored in the evidence window, since context is missing in the signed conversation, the response 123 appears to belong to request y which is incorrect. Therefore, TLS-N always starts right after the TLS handshake. The correct TLS-N flow is presented on Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: Simplified Overview of TLS-N.

Image extracted from [RWG<sup>+</sup>17b]

To generate a small proof independently of the number of messages, TLS-N uses merkle trees [Mer79] to create a chain of messages' hashes and then returns only the last hash, which to be created requires all the previous hashes. This ensures a small storage overhead per TLS session.

### **3.2.4.2 Conclusions**

TLS-N was designed with the oracle trust problem in mind, the generated proof is small enough to be evaluated on-chain on a smart-contract. The only drawback is that the smart contracts cannot verify TLS signatures based on the web-PKI (public-key infrastructure) and therefore the contract must have the generator public key.

TLS-N is, therefore, a promising solution to the oracle trust problem being the only major drawback requiring the data providers to adopt the TLS-N protocol.

## **3.3 Summary and conclusions**

## Chapter 4

# Problem Statement

Smart contracts power a decentralized world of automation and trust-less commitments. Companies, groups and individuals are able to automate tasks and contracts but in the current ecosystem, smart contracts are still very much limited to the information available in the blockchain. Therefore, connecting with the outside world requires a trusted authority to input in the blockchain the required information upon request from the smart contract. This trusted authority is generally called an oracle.

As explained before, the deterministic nature of blockchain does not allow smart contracts to directly query a data-feed for information. In this context, oracles help connecting smart contracts to the world outside of the blockchain. The problem here is to trust the oracle service to not behave maliciously and undermine the trust provided by the blockchain consensus mechanisms. Blockchain technology can be trusted to behave correctly even in byzantine environments, but the oracle service does not abide by the same rules and therefore some workings must be put into action to ensure the oracle's response credibility.

As seen in Chapter 2, current solutions to the oracle problem use complex techniques to achieve a certain desired level of trust. Some use complicated trusted hardware others incentive-based mechanisms or authenticity proofs, but neither of these are simple and fully trusted approaches and they add extra complexity from the developer side.

The oracle problem is neither simple nor has a single solution, but its importance in powering greater applications for smart contracts is undeniable. Their need arises from the following three factors.

- **Smart contract empowerment** - Providing smart contracts with trustable information from outside of the blockchain is decisive to gain general adoption and practicality.
- **Cost optimization** - Blockchain operations tend to be quite expensive, therefore, the oracle solution should introduce a lower overhead cost as possible.

- **Keeping trust standards** - As blockchain technology creates a trust-less environment, oracles should as well keep up with the level of trust in their functioning.

### 4.1 Proposal

With this thesis, the author intends to lay the foundations for the development and architecture of trustable oracle systems that will power several smart contract use cases.

The author believes that by describing, in a trust-guided manner, multiple patterns and examples where they are being applied or possible use cases not yet documented creates a guided model that helps future cases to have a systematic approach to which architecture will fit the best. The architecture and design of blockchain oracles is still very much unexplored territory, specially in terms of academia research but also in the industry, and therefore this thesis approaches it broadly and investigates possible approaches and their trade-offs so that later studies can be developed on the specifics of each architecture.

Furthermore, in Chapter 6, the author presents a possible implementation of a self-hosted oracle. After analysing the state of the art in oracle development and the specifics of used authenticity proofs, the author believes that the best way to achieve trust in an oracle is to deploy one instead of relying on a third-party. The described approach, when in comparison to deployed solutions in the industry reduces operations costs, increases trust and empowers the contract with purpose built oracles. The author will demonstrate that deploying an oracle, can be more trivial than at first seems, and that trust in its operation is directly the trust in one's code and no more measures (authenticity proofs) are needed. These measures usually add a considerable extra cost and constrain the developer.

### 4.2 Desiderata

This section describes the architectures that will be investigated. Some are already seen in oracle-as-a-service providers others not yet but can be explored in a self-hosted manner. They intend to open way to how oracles are developed and how they tackle different points of trust and scenarios.

To better discuss the purpose and usability of each architecture, the following subsections explain the use cases of each solution.

#### 4.2.1 Use Case 1: Oracle as a Service w/ Single Data Feed

A smart contract developer needs to obtain information from an API source without having the trouble to develop and launch its own oracle whilst having some guarantees of the origin of the information. Mainly, this scenario is focusing on fast-time to market, untampered data and cost is not a problem.

#### **4.2.2 Use Case 2: Oracle as a Service w/ Multiple Data Feeds**

This scenario iterates on the previous one but focuses on data veracity. It can happen that the owner of the smart contract can not trust a single entity to provide the data. Either because he wants that no single entity can have a say on the final result of the contract or because the requested data may not have a discrete value and the best answer is the median of multiple values.

#### **4.2.3 Use Case 3: Single-Party Self Hosted Oracle**

This use case takes a different approach from the previous ones. Instead of fast-time to market the main focus here is trusting the oracle provider to behave correctly. The smart contract output will only affect a single party or multiple parties which are non competing and therefore trust someone to run the oracle. In such scenario, costs can be reduced, with increasing developer workload, by not using any authenticity proofs and the oracle can be further customised to handle a specific contract requirement.

#### **4.2.4 Use Case 4: Multi-Party Self Hosted Oracle**

Iterating on the previous use-case, this scenario adds a new trust problem. When competing parties deploy depend on the behaviour of the same smart contract. For example, in a bet, all parties want to have the same say in the final result as all of them have something to gain and to lose in the result inputted by the oracle. Therefore, some mechanism must ensure that several oracles and a predefined agreed quorum can be used to ensure that no party can cheat on the final result of the smart contract.

As this scenario, seems to be the least described in current literature but has the possibility of being applied to a plethora of use cases, for example betting contracts, logistic chains with competing companies and so on, an implementation is demonstrated on [Chapter 6](#).

### **4.3 Conclusions**

This project aims to pave the way for oracle and smart contract development. It does not try to come up with a new authenticity proof which adds extra complexity for the common smart contract developer, but instead guide the developer to a solution accordingly to the problem necessities. As well as, providing a simple but yet effective implementation of a self-hosted oracle so as to have a simple skeleton to which the developer can iterate upon and adapt to the specific smart contract needs.

## Problem Statement



## Chapter 5

# Trustable Oracles

At this point, a definition, of what trust in an oracle is, seems appropriate. Trust has a lot of meanings, depending on the needs of all the parties involved. I will model several levels of trust and the requirements and fallacies of each model as well as its application and drawbacks.

Starting from an absolute trust scenario, in this model, the end user, being the smart contract which receives information provided by the oracle, has complete assurances from both the veracity of the data provided by the data source, as well as, undeniable proof that the oracle did not tamper with the relayed information. This scenario points out two main points of failure, either maliciously or unintentionally.

The first component which can be faulty or compromised is the data source. Assuring that the information provided is correct does not have a straightforward answer. What correct means is open to interpretation. For example, if the data source is an IoT sensor, which is prone to failures, being correct is relative. The sensor needs to be perfectly calibrated and accurate. In this case, using several sensors and averaging its values or removing outliers would solve its correctness. Another example could be an API that returns the current value of the EUR in USD. In this scenario, a party that would benefit from a higher conversion than the real one could coerce or attack the data-source into providing a favourable value. The answer here can also be using several data sources. Another solution would be to use a highly trusted entity such as the European Central Bank (ECB) which can be a lot harder to coerce or attack and having a signature from the ECB that backs the provided data. Choosing what type of data-source to use has a huge impact on the trust fullness of the provided data not to mention architecture centralization when using a source such as the ECB. All in all, the end user will have to understand the requirements and level of trust necessary.

The second, and most relevant for analysis, is the oracle service used. Oracles are a necessary part of the process since the other option would be having the data providers adapting to the blockchain which does not seem to be a realistic option at the moment. Therefore we must trust an oracle or a group of oracles. Two main options are available, either trusting a third-party oracle or

self-deploying an oracle. In the first scenario, three variables take part in the level of trust. Firstly the third-party oracle, if paid for, has the monetary incentive to be honest, since a bad record of dishonesty would have the service losing credibility and therefore clients. Secondly, by using proofs the oracle can establish its legitimacy, as long as, the proofs can undoubtedly be trusted and verifiable by the smart contract, I will later analyse in depth this issue. Finally, oracle execution transparency by using open-source code and having means for being audited. Additionally, to guaranteeing single oracle integrity, it may be in the interest of the user to use several oracles either to provide service availability or to increase trust by combining the result from different oracle services.

### 5.1 Oracle Architectures

Having analysed what trust means, it is evident that no short definition is appropriate and that it depends on the stakeholder beliefs. Hence, several architectural models for what a trustable system arise. Varying in decentralization and complexity. Each model satisfies different requirements, such as performance, security and decentralization. In this section, I will describe several possible architectures and point out use cases and compromises for each model.

### 5.2 Oracle as a Service w/ Single Data Feed.

#### 5.2.1 Context

Connecting smart contracts with information provided by data-feeds, which do not, by themselves, input the required information on the blockchain requires the use of a trusted oracle. Developing and maintaining a oracle may be prohibitive in terms of cost and desired time to market. Outsourcing such service would be desirable in this context, it may not be in the interest of the company to specialize in the secure development of oracles.

#### 5.2.2 Example

#### 5.2.3 Problem

How can a non-blockchain company keep up with the fast pace of industry while maintaining trust in its services? It is critical to be able to quickly build a smart contract and connect it with the needed information. How can a company do so, without allocating human resources into to the development of yet another service and simply focus on its business logic?

#### 5.2.4 Forces

- **Fast time to market** - Not having to assemble a team or allocate resources into a developing a new product which will only serve as component of the main product being developed.




Figure 5.1: Oracle as a Service w/ Single Data Feed.

- **Keeping trust standards** - The company focus is not the development and securement of the oracle service and may not have enough resources to keep the oracle as secure and reliable as the underlying blockchain.

### 5.2.5 Solution

Oracle as a service, come as a quick and efficient solution for fast moving companies and individuals. Providing easy integration between a smart contract and a data-feed by means of specific function calls and/or libraries. Theses services are per-request fee-based and can be cheaper comparing to assembling a team dedicated to the development and maintainance of an oracle. The fee-based system increases the trust in the service as being honest is crucial to their business model. Additionally, this services usully provide authenticity proofs which serve as another layer of trust in the service. In the Chapter 4 I deep dive on the subject of the proofs.

### **5.2.6 Example Resolved**

### **5.2.7 Resulting Context**

This solution results in an architecture that compromises two points of trust. The first being the data-feed itself. No guarantees are given that the data provided is reliable and the smart contract owner must, therefore, to the best of his knowledge, select a data-feed in which, by the operator size or record of good behaviour, he can trust.

The second point of failure is the oracle service itself. Although smart contracts, in the resulting context, have access to the information from the outside, that is only possible due to the use of a third party to honestly relay the data. In this architecture, if the oracle simply relays the data, then no trust model can be achieved as the oracle good behaviour is not tested against. As this would not be a feasible architecture the existing services provide authenticity proofs to guarantee, to a certain level, their honest behaviour. The problem here is on how are these proofs generated, can they be verified on-chain or only off-chain and who is making, or providing, the verification tools. In Chapter 4 I deep dive on these questions and techniques. Another reason to trust in the service can be the monetary incentive for good behaviour. By paying the oracle for each request, that becomes the oracle service business model, an extensive record of good behaviour is crucial for business prosperity and therefore a good enough incentive for honestly conveying the requested data. In this context, if the authenticity proofs provide enough assurances for the smart contract creator and he trusts in the selected data-feed to provide the required data, then this model can satisfy its needs in terms of trust, as well as, performance since it only queries one data-feed and uses only one oracle. By not having any consensus mechanism and exchanging the least amount of messages it can both achieve greater performance and a lower cost. But this lower cost and higher performance architecture by itself is prone to failure due to lack of decentralization and does not guarantee service availability which could lead to a failure in the smart contract to obtain the requested information.

### **5.2.8 Known Uses**

## **5.3 Oracle as a Service w/ Multiple Data Feeds.**

### **5.3.1 Context**

Sometimes an answer to a contract request cannot be truly accepted unless several sources confirm it. Either because it is unwise to trust in a single identity or because there might not be a single true answer but only an answer that is accepted by a selected majority.

### 5.3.2 Example

### 5.3.3 Problem

The previous architecture specified a single point of failure on the data-source layer. A contract with high requirements in terms of availability cannot rely on using a single data-source, as doing so would void the contract when the service providing that data is down or taken down. In terms of trust, certain contracts may also require that several services provide an answer and then have a consensus between all the received answers. This cannot be achieved by querying a single source and therefore the oracle service must be able to query several sources and either define the resulting answer or provide all the responses to the smart contract and let the smart contract resolve to a final answer.

### 5.3.4 Forces

- **Data-feed fault tolerance** - Ensuring that a contract can follow through even if a data provider is down by querying another provider.
- **Trusting data** - By querying several data sources there is a higher trust on the veracity of the data.

### 5.3.5 Solution

The oracle service should have a mechanism to query several data-sources during a specified timeframe. And have a predefined consensus mechanism that would require to have  $m$  of  $n$  data-sources providing the possible answers and reduce them to a final answer to the smart contract.

### 5.3.6 Example Resolved

### 5.3.7 Resulting Context

In this context, the layer of trust regarding the data-feed is almost eliminated by having the ability to choose from several data providers and therefore not relying on a source of truth. It also provides a higher system availability, as the oracle/smart contract can have some degree of redundancy in the data providers selection.

### 5.3.8 Known Uses

## 5.4 Single-Party Self Hosted Oracle.

### 5.4.1 Context

Although the use of Oracles as a Service allows for a low product time to market by not having to take care of the development, maintenance and deployment of the oracle service it usually leads to less flexibility in the oracle design, vendor lock-in and fees charged by the vendor. If the product




Figure 5.2: Oracle as a Service w/ Multiple Data Feeds.

requirements do not allow for the specified challenges or the trust levels required by the contract are more than what the oracle vendor can provide it may be a solution to deploy its own oracle. A company with its own developing team capable of allocating resources for the development of the oracle or a single developer who does not want to incur in the oracle vendor fees will benefit from their own deployment in terms of cost and most importantly in regard to trusting the oracle behaviour.

## 5.4.2 Example

## 5.4.3 Problem

Currently, oracle behaviour is neither easy to check nor fully transparent and trustable. As seen in Chapter 4, verifying oracles authenticity proofs sometimes cannot be done on-chain, resulting in a contract being executed with an incorrect proof which is only later verified but the contract is irreversible adding not much to oracle trustability except the ability to cancel future contracts. Proofs also add complexity to the smart contract code which will result in slower contract development and more importantly in higher contract costs. Most blockchains charge contracts by either CPU,

memory and network use, or even all of these, and therefore receiving the proof and verifying it on-chain will increase the cost of running a contract.

### 5.4.4 Forces

- **Higher trust on oracle behaviour** - Oracle good behaviour is usually backed by authenticity proofs which are expensive to check on-chain or don't bring much value to the contract when verified off-chain since the current contract already executed its code with tampered data.
- **Lower smart contract costs** - Checking authenticity proofs leads to higher contract deployment costs, as the proof can be long and computationally expensive.
- **Lower smart contract complexity** - Verifying authenticity proofs on chain requires the developer to have sufficient knowledge to write the verifying functions.

### 5.4.5 Solution

A solution to trusting an oracle service is to deploy our own oracle service. Surely, doing so incurs in technical expenses for programming, deploying and maintaining the oracle, however, does not require to trust in a third party but only on our ability to maintain the necessary level of security in our own oracle. Additionally, it will free the smart contract owner from the fees charged by the oracle provider and allow for further flexibility in adapting the oracle to new sources of information. Furthermore, it will also lead to simpler and cheaper smart contracts by not requiring the use of authenticity proofs in regards to the oracle behaviour, as the developer knows exactly what the oracle is running under the hood.

### 5.4.6 Example Resolved

### 5.4.7 Resulting Context

With this solution we almost remove the second layer of trust, trusting in the oracle service. Nonetheless, we move the trust to the developer ability in coding a secure and reliable oracle. The main benefit is not requiring to have the overhead expense of using, understanding and verifying the authenticity proofs required for a trustable use of Oracles as a service.

### 5.4.8 Known Uses

## 5.5 Multi-Party Self Hosted Oracle.

### 5.5.1 Context

In some cases, competing parties may rely on a smart contract to keep track of some value with interest to them, therefore, it may be a requirement that several of these parties take part in the




Figure 5.3: Single-Party Self Hosted Oracle.

process of providing the data to the smart contract. It may also be the case, that if a single oracle is the source of truth of a smart contract, then the easiest way to attack the smart contract is by attacking the central point of failure, the oracle. In both of these cases, the oracle singularity needs to be tackled.

## 5.5.2 Example

## 5.5.3 Problem

This context raises two problems, oracle consensus and availability. Whoever owns the oracle providing the data to the smart contract holds the smart contract and therefore can influence the execution of the contract, in which several competing parties rely upon. In terms of availability, a single oracle creates a single point of failure in case of an attack or system failure.

## 5.5.4 Forces

- **Oracle decentralization** - connecting a smart contract to data through a single node, creates the problem that smart contracts intend to avoid, a single point of failure. With a single oracle, a smart contract is only as reliable as that one oracle.






Figure 5.4: Multi-Party Self Hosted Oracle.

- **Oracle ownership decentralization** - having one party control the oracle network centralizes the power to manipulate all the contracts relying on the information provided by that network of oracles.

## 5.5.5 Solution

The most beneficial and simple solution, here, is having each interested party launching their own oracle and having all oracles communicating between themselves with a mechanism for consensus. The consensus mechanism would vary from case to case, and from how critical the smart contract solution is. To increase the level of trust in each party, each node would sign their response and be able to launch only one node. With this, once one of the nodes had collected all the signatures than it would provide the contract with the requested information. Also, a party would not be able to gain control over the network of oracles by launching more nodes than the remaining stakeholders. However, the consensus algorithm should never require that all nodes provide a response since that would again create a weak network in which by tacking down one oracle the whole system would fail.

### 5.5.6 Example Resolved

### 5.5.7 Resulting Context

With this context, we bring the same trust level given by blockchain technology to the oracle service. Resulting in a decentralized network with no single party running it and every stakeholder has the same weight in providing the data. This context, however, is only suitable for previously defined user groups, with an agreed minimum necessary quorum for consensus and known public keys of all nodes.

In a community context, this approach is not suitable since nodes would be able to join and leave making it harder to achieve a predefined consensus. Involved parties would be able to launch more than one node, resulting in some parties being able to take over the minimum consensus quorum and overpower the network unless some proof-of-work mechanism is implemented. This would also result in a context of wisdom of the crowd, in which the most effective way of controlling a correct answer would be by implementing some incentives mechanism such as [ABV<sup>+</sup>18]. The problem around incentives is that they do not guarantee that, in edge cases, with enough incentives, the network will provide a wrong answer if justifiable. Although, as far as the author is concerned, no other mechanism is available when dealing with wisdom-of-the-crowd information.

### 5.5.8 Known Uses

## 5.6 Summary and Conclusions

The described patterns represent different trust level requirements and forces. Each resolve a specific issue and may create another. When the trust requirements increase so does the gap from idea to market and development costs. Each architecture involves trading cost and flexibility with trust.

Figure 5.5 depicts a possible simple flow of thought when choosing the previous defined pattern that better fits a specific need.

First the decision maker must look at the smart contract needs and decide if the level of trust and audibility provided by an oracle service is sufficient. If so, then can he trust the data source or is there a need for several data providers? Leaving two patterns, 5.2 and 5.3. If he cannot trust any existing oracle service, either because the existing proofs are too expensive to verify, or cannot be verified in the contract or just don't provide the necessary audibility, among others, whatever the reason he needs to think if he has the, either monetary and human, to build his own oracle service. If not, and with increasing costs due to per-request fees, he may choose to use multiple oracle services and then perform some consensus mechanism on the smart contract. If he can then build and maintain its own oracle service he must ask himself the question, Who will use this oracle? How many different and maybe competing parties rely on the smart contract to which the oracle will provide data. If there is only one stakeholder of the smart contract and he runs the oracle, then a perfect system of trust is achieved since outside the blockchain he controls every part of the process, resulting in the pattern 5.4. However if a smart contract has several stakeholders then, no

## Trustable Oracles




Figure 5.5: Oracle patter selection flow.

single party should control the oracle and there must be a mechanism to deploy several oracles to power the smart contract while achieving consensus outside of the blockchain and only providing the smart contract with the final result. This reduces smart contract costs while allowing every stakeholder to have a say in the data provided to the smart contract, pattern 5.5.



## Chapter 6

# Self-hosted Oracle Implementation

In this Chapter I present a possible implementation of a multi-purpose self-hosted oracle. Multi-purpose since it will be able to query a requested API and return a specific value from the answer of that API, allowing to be used by several contracts which require different information and different sources. Self-hosted, as its code is available for anyone to copy and use for their own purpose and not having to rely on an oracle-as-a-service product by deploying their own version of the oracle.

As far as the author has searched, at the moment there is no clear explanation on how to implement your own oracle and therefore on how to power smart-contracts to query the web. Creating, therefore, a need for such a clear and detailed explanation as it will be presented in this section.

In principle, the described oracle is intended to be used by single entities or competing parties. Meaning, that it requires a list of predefined oracles and a predefined minimum quorum. Therefore, is not open to a community in which oracles can leave and join the network. The rationale behind this decision is that if it were to be open to a community the decision power in the final result would be dependent on who could launch the most oracles, solving this issue would require the use of strategies, such as, proof-of-work which would become a different issue that the one the author is trying to solve. In this setup, competing parties which may not trust each other, would be able to power their contracts by having each party launching one oracle, and therefore having all the same power of decision. Has the list of the oracles address is in the open on the oracle smart contract, there is no way for a party to cheat in their voting power.

### 6.1 Oracle Overview

The oracle comprises two main components, the on-chain oracle and the off-chain oracle. Figure 6.1 depicts the general architecture and a simplified version of the messages exchanged.

The on-chain oracle is a smart contract that functions as a bridge between a client smart contract that needs information from the web and the oracle service that will query the web. This oracle has a whitelist of oracle addresses which are trusted by the oracle to query the web and has

## Self-hosted Oracle Implementation




Figure 6.1: Self-hosted architecture.

the necessary functions to create events that will trigger API calls and reach a consensus and the necessary data structures to store the requests and the agreed answer.

The off-chain oracle, or oracles, are services that continuously listen to specific events emitted by the oracle smart contract. Upon listening to a *NewRequest* event query the specified API and key and return a single value to the smart contract by means of a new transaction.

This architecture allows for the use of several oracle nodes and the use of minimum voting quorums to achieve higher levels of trust, include more parties or increase service availability. However, the higher the number of oracles the higher the cost per transaction. Table 6.2 shows the cost of each query in euro using different numbers of oracles<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>Each test was composed of 110 requests using the same settings (Gas Price of 20 Gwei) except for the number of oracles. The result shown is the average cost of each request.




Figure 6.2: Cost per query using a consensus of 2/3, Queried Google Finance on the 22th of May, 2019.

## 6.2 Component analysis

### 6.2.1 On-Chain Oracle

The on-chain oracle is a smart contract that has an array which stores the requests made to the contract. Hard-coded in the contract is the predefined minimum quorum, which is the minimum number of equal answers needed to trust in the declaration of a final result. This minimum quorum will be used in all requests to the contract. Also hard-coded are the white-listed addresses of oracles that the contract will accept transactions to update requests.

Having the addresses and minimum quorum hard-coded on the oracle smart contract is not a software anti-pattern but rather an imposition on the contract terms. Doing so allows all parties who depend on this oracle to previously know that the oracle will always query those addresses and therefore they cannot be later altered for the benefit of one or more parties.

The code for the on-chain oracle can be found in the appendix B and due to its small size can be easily interpreted. Nonetheless, an explanation of its logic is detailed bellow.

#### 6.2.1.1 Creating a request

Initially the request structure 6.2.1.1 only contains the URL which will be queried by the off-chain oracle and the attribute to return in the json API response.

```

1  struct Request {
2      uint id;                //request id
3      string urlToQuery;      //API url
4      string attributeToFetch; //json attribute (key) to retrieve in the
                               response

```

## Self-hosted Oracle Implementation

```
5  string agreedValue;                //value from key
6  mapping(uint => string) answers;    //answers provided by the oracles
7  mapping(address => uint) quorum;    //oracles which will query the answer (1=
    oracle hasn't voted, 2=oracle has voted)
8  }
```

A client smart contract calls the public function *createRequest* passing the url to query and the attribute from the api response that it needs to retrieve. This will add a new request to the array of requests in the oracle smart contract, initializing the list of trusted off-chain oracles addresses, the quorum. This list is composed of the addresses of the accounts which are trusted to add their input by creating transactions to the on-chain oracle contract.

The mapping of each address to an unsigned int is initialized at one, due to the fact that by default a mapping contains all possible addresses initialized at zero. By marking an address at one we explicitly set the trusted addresses so that later we can filter messages whose sender was previously marked with one.

Finally, an the *NewRequest* event [6.2.1.1](#) is emitted so as to alert the off-chain oracles of the existence of a new request.

```
1  event NewRequest (
2      uint id,
3      string urlToQuery,
4      string attributeToFetch
5  );
```

### 6.2.1.2 Reaching consensus

Each off-chain oracle, upon listening to the *NewRequest* event will query the specified API and call the *updateRequest* function on the on-chain oracle contract passing the id of the request and the value it retrieved from the API. The calling of the function is done by means of inputting a new transaction on the blockchain addressed to the smart contract, this will make the requested information available on the blockchain to be used by the contract.

The on-chain oracle contract, will first check if the transaction came from the whitelisted oracle addresses and if so, mark, that for this specific request this oracle has inputted his answer. Then it will save the answer on the list of answers for that request and count how many answers are on the list that match the current answer. If the count matches the minimum quorum set on the contract, the oracle contract will set a final agreed value for that request, meaning that at least a specified minimum number of oracles have provided the same answer and so it can be trusted to be the correct answer. This will emit a *UpdatedRequest* event [6.2.1.2](#) that will alert who ever made that request that an agreement was reached on its answer.



```
1  event UpdatedRequest (
2      uint id,
3      string urlToQuery,
4      string attributeToFetch,
5      string agreedValue
6  );
```

### 6.2.2 Off-Chain Oracle

The off-chain oracle is a service that continuously listens to the events emitted by the on-chain oracle contract, more specifically to the *NewRequest* event.

For this proof-of-concept the author used a node.js service, detailed in Appendix C, which upon new requests queries a specified API and returns a value to the smart contract by means of a transaction.

In order to create these transactions we connect to the Ethereum blockchain, using web3.js<sup>2</sup>, an Ethereum JavaScript API, and configure the accounts which will add the transactions with the answers to the requests to the smart contract. These accounts are the ones whose account addresses are specified on the white-listed list of addresses on the on-chain oracle. The detailed code can be found on Appendix D.

The off-chain oracle is very versatile, as it can be written in any language, that is supported by the Ethereum API. It can be worked upon to easily integrate new APIs or further logic and features without requiring any changes to the smart contract, as long as it respects the contract callback requirements.

## 6.3 Summary and Conclusions

This oracle implementation, although simple, is a versatile proof-of-concept which can already be applied to multiple smart-contracts in different scenarios. Since it allows to query any supported API and to choose which field the client smart contract needs. Limited only in accepting requests to APIs which return an answer in JSON format and also to only one value, but those limitations are only from the developer perspective and can easily be removed. This allows to achieve a desired simplicity that does not constrain the current model to a single use case. Rather, the code base can be used to add new features accordingly to the needs of each case without requiring big and breaking changes, being therefore a great starting point tackling the biggest problems when creating an oracle from scratch.

Having explained the versatility of this approach we have to consider the cost and benefits of being self deployed. Firstly, by using a self-deployed oracle, no extra-fees<sup>3</sup> are charged by a third

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<sup>2</sup><https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/>

<sup>3</sup><https://docs.oraclize.it/#pricing>

party. To be clear, the cost of making a request to an oracle-as-a-service provider is composed of making the call to the oracle smart-contract, meaning its execution, plus an extra-fee for using the service. Secondly, trust is maintained since we know exactly the code that is being executed, even in an environment of competing parties, since all parties can launch an oracle and have the same say in its final result. Thirdly, cost can be easily optimized, since cost in a smart-contract is proportional to the amount of executed code, the developer has full access to edit and improve the on-chain oracle contract and therefore can improve the cost of each transaction/answer from the oracle to the oracle contract. Whereas in a third-party service the on-chain oracle contract code is managed by the service to whom we pay. Since, third-parties usually use authenticity proofs as evidence of their honesty, those proofs will add an extra cost to the transaction. Nonetheless, there are some possible extra costs not taken into account in this analysis which are relate to the maintenance and deployment of the off-chain oracle, something that is taken care by the third-party oracle provider. However, this off-chain oracle can be also be self deployed or even if deployed on a cloud provider the cost is insignificant in comparison to the cost of each request made to the on-chain oracle as demonstrated in figure 6.2.

All in all, this Chapter alongside the corresponding Appendixes, [B](#) [C](#) [D](#), present a simple but effective way of deploying a oracle platform, on-chain and off-chain, that easily abd cost effectively can support and further empower existing and future smart-contract scenarios with trust in mind.

## Chapter 7

# Validation

In this Chapter, the author validates the proposed statements in the Chapter 4 and to what extent they accomplish the proposed challenge.

Initially, the author compares the defined architectures with existing solutions and how broadly they describe all possible scenarios.

Then, the implemented solution in comparison to the state of the art, as well as its applicability, use case scenarios and limitations.

### 7.1 Oracle Architectures

#### 7.1.1 Use Case 1: Oracle as a Service w/ Single Data Feed

#### 7.1.2 Use Case 2: Oracle as a Service w/ Multiple Data Feeds

#### 7.1.3 Use Case 3: Single-Party Self Hosted Oracle

#### 7.1.4 Use Case 4: Multi-Party Self Hosted Oracle

### 7.2 Self-hosted Oracle Implementation

The author, proposes three main characteristics of its implementation comparing to the current existing oracle-as-a-service solutions. Reduced costs, higher trust and higher contract empowerment.

#### 7.2.1 Reduced costs

In this context, cost per query compromises multiple dimensions. Firstly, the cost of querying the oracle and inputting the result in the contract which correspond to the execution of the contract code and is therefore directly related to the amount of code that needs to run. Secondly, underlying

## Validation

Datasource	Base price	Proof type			
		None	TLSNotary	Android	Ledger
URL	0.01\$	+0.0\$	+0.04\$	+0.04\$	N/A
WolframAlpha	0.03\$	+0.0\$	N/A	N/A	N/A
IPFS	0.01\$	+0.0\$	N/A	N/A	N/A
random	0.05\$	+0.0\$	N/A	N/A	+0.0\$
computation	0.50\$	+0.0\$	+0.04\$	+0.04\$	N/A

Table 7.1: Oraclize fees in USD

fees imposed by the third-party service. And finally, a cost of less importance relative to the former ones, the cost of the off-chain oracle service that will query the API.

Analysing the first one, the contract executing cost paid by the caller that is not much that the developer of the smart contract can do to optimize this cost since its fully managed by the third-party service. Hence, on a self-deployed oracle, cost can be further optimized by modelling a single purpose oracle for the smart contract needs which will inherently run less code due to its simplicity. Also, on a self-hosted oracle there is no need to add the over-head of authenticity proofs which either verified on chain or partially stored off-chain lead to higher transaction costs.

Secondly, existing services are for-profit companies and therefore require an extra-payment for their service. Oraclize.it adds an extra fee paid in dollars, depicted on table 7.1, that depends on the datasource and authenticity proof used. Chainlink requires that every request is paid using its token LINK whose value depends on the current market price. In a self-deployed oracle approach none of this fees are present lowering therefore to lower costs.

Finally, in a self-deployed oracle scenario there are inherent costs of running the off-chain oracle which are taken care on a third-party service. Although the cost per transaction of the service depends on the platform in which the service will be deployed it can be assumed that in comparison to the fees or, even more, to the cost of executing the smart contract code this cost is risible. Solutions such as AWS Lambda <sup>1</sup> that offer 1M requests and 400,000 GB-SECONDS of compute time per month for free in their free tier <sup>2</sup>, and even in a scaling scenario each requests costs \$0.0000002. Therefore, this cost is not considered throughout this dissertation due to its small size in comparison with the previous analysed ones.

### 7.2.2 Higher trust

Trust is defined as having complete certainty that the provided answer is corrected or was indeed the one provided by the API. In the self-hosted oracle scenario both can be achieved. The first proposition, that the answer is correct, can be maximized by using multiple oracles and a quorum so that multiple sources can confirm the requested result. With minor alterations the oracle could receive more than one URL and maximize even more the trust in the result by querying multiple

<sup>1</sup><https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/>

<sup>2</sup><https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/pricing/> queried on the 29th of May 2019.

sources. The second, that the API actually return that value is achieved since the off-chain oracle is fully controlled by the parties interested in the result of the smart-contract and therefore know exactly the code being executed.

This approach, comparing to the state-of-the-art found solutions, although simple provides higher guarantees that the smart contract will receive the desired answer. In the current existing solutions, trust is ultimately achieved through the use of authenticity proofs, which, as analysed in Chapter 3, do not provide the necessary guarantees. Either by not being able to be analysed on the chain contract, and can only be later inspected. And also, their implementations can be dubious, as they are being managed by a third party and always require to trust in a higher entity such as the service where they are being deployed.

### **7.2.3 Higher contract empowerment**

The presented implementation, provides a great starting point to be worked upon and tailored to a specific contract needs. At the moment, can already work with any JSON API and therefore be used in a wide range of applications. Being able to use and tailor, with minimum effort, the existing boiler plate and adapt to its needs. When using third-party services there's no such flexibility. Even in terms of which blockchain you can deploy the contract, some services are not yet available on some blockchains' mainnet, and features available are totally dependent on the oracle service provider.

## Validation

## **Chapter 8**

# **Conclusions and Future Work**

The oracle trust problem, is still rather recent, having emerged in 2015 with the deployment of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. The systematic literature review, as far as it has been performed, and the non-academia research review reveal that most of the research and development is being done by the growing and excited blockchain community. Mostly by startups and single interested researchers.

Solving the trust problem and creating a standard for a secure middle-ware between blockchains and outside world information and application provides limitless range of future applications in terms of contracts. Creating, therefore, the grounds and the motivation for the work that will be developed on this thesis.

I hope that the work that will be developed in investigating the necessary requirements and research how oracle trust can be achieved allied with a proof-of-concept implementation on the Taikai projects will solidify the academia position on newly and ground breaking technologies such as the blockchain.

## Conclusions and Future Work



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## REFERENCES

## **Appendix A**

3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
			Duplicate	ACM	2016	Weaver: A High-performance, Transactional Graph Database Based on Refinable Timestamps	Ayush Dubey and Greg D. Hill and Robert Escriva and Emin G&#252;n Sirer
			Duplicate	ACM	2016	Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts	Fan Zhang and Ethan Cecchetti and Kyle Croman and Ari Juels and Elaine Shi
			Duplicate	ACM	2016	Proof of Luck: An Efficient Blockchain Consensus Protocol	Mitar Milutinovic and Warren He and Howard Wu and Maxinder Kanwal
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	PlaTIBART: A Platform for Transactive IoT Blockchain Applications with Repeatable Testing	Michael A. Walker and Abhishek Dubey and Aron Laszka and Douglas C. Schmidt
			Duplicate	ACM	2018	Ouroboros Genesis: Composable Proof-of-Stake Blockchains with Dynamic Availability	Christian Badertscher and Peter Ga&#382;i and Aggelos Kiayias and Alexander Russell and Vassilis Zikas
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	On the Design of Communication and Transaction Anonymity in Blockchain-based Transactive Micro-grids	Jonatan Bergquist and Aron Laszka and Monika Sturm and Abhishek Dubey
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain	Rafael Pass and Elaine Shi
			Duplicate	ACM	2018	ContractFuzzer: Fuzzing Smart Contracts for Vulnerability Detection	Bo Jiang and Ye Liu and W. K. Chan
			Duplicate	ACM	2016	Bringing Secure Bitcoin Transactions to Your Smartphone	Davide Frey and Marc X. Makkes and Pierre-Louis Roman and Fran&#231;ois Ta&#239;ani and Spyros Voulgaris
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	Blackchain: Scalability for Resource-constrained Accountable Vehicle-to-x Communication	Rens W. van der Heijden and Felix Engelmann and David M&#246;ding and Franziska Sch&#246;nig and Frank Kargl

**Table A.1 continued from previous page**

3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	A General Framework for Blockchain Analytics	Massimo Bartoletti and Stefano Lande and Livio Pompianu and Andrea Bracciali
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	EPBC: Efficient Public Blockchain Client for Lightweight Users	Lei Xu and Lin Chen and Zhimin Gao and Shouhuai Xu and Weidong Shi
			Duplicate	ACM	2016	Blockchains and the Logic of Accountability: Keynote Address	Maurice Herlihy and Mark Moir
			Duplicate	ACM	2017	A Byzantine Fault-tolerant Ordering Service for the Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Platform	Alysson Bessani and Jo&#227;o Sousa and Marko Vukoli&#263;
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Zero-Trust Hierarchical Management in IoT	M. Samaniego; R. Deters
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Secure Pub-Sub: Blockchain-Based Fair Payment With Reputation for Reliable Cyber Physical Sys- tems	Y. Zhao; Y. Li; Q. Mu; B. Yang; Y. Yu
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Secure Attribute-Based Signature Scheme With Multiple Authorities for Blockchain in Electronic Health Records Systems	R. Guo; H. Shi; Q. Zhao; D. Zheng
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Privacy Improvement Architecture for IoT	E. Kak; R. Orji; J. Pry; K. Sofranko; R. Lomotey; R. Deters
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Distributed Solar Self-Consumption and Blockchain Solar Energy Exchanges on the Public Grid Within an Energy Community	C. Plaza; J. Gil; F. de Chezelles; K. A. Strang
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Confidential Business Process Execution on Blockchain	B. Carminati; C. Rondanini; E. Ferrari

**Table A.1 continued from previous page**

3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	ChainFS: Blockchain-Secured Cloud Storage	Y. Tang; Q. Zou; J. Chen; K. Li; C. A. Kamhoua; K. Kwiat; L. Njilla
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Blockchain-Based IoT-Cloud Authorization and Delegation	N. Tapas; G. Merlino; F. Longo
			Duplicate	IEEE	2017	Blockchain world - Do you need a blockchain? This chart will tell you if the technology can solve your problem	M. E. Peck
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Blockchain as a Platform for Secure Inter-Organizational Business Processes	B. Carminati; E. Ferrari; C. Rondanini
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	Analysis of Security in Blockchain: Case Study in 51%-Attack Detecting	C. Ye; G. Li; H. Cai; Y. Gu; A. Fukuda
			Duplicate	IEEE	2018	An ID-Based Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme and Its Application in Blockchain	Q. Lin; H. Yan; Z. Huang; W. Chen; J. Shen; Y. Tang
			Duplicate	IEEE	2019	A New Lattice-Based Signature Scheme in Post-Quantum Blockchain Network	C. Li; X. Chen; Y. Chen; Y. Hou; J. Li
			Duplicate	Scopus	2017	Towards an economic analysis of routing in payment channel networks	Engelmann, F., Kopp, H., Kargl, F., Glaser, F., Weinhardt, C.
			Duplicate	Scopus	2018	13th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2017	[No author name available]
			Duplicate	Scopus	2017	VIBES: Fast blockchain simulations for large-scale peer-to-peer networks	Stoykov, L., Zhang, K., Jacobsen, H.-A.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
			Duplicate	Scopus	2017	HyperPubSub: a decentralized, permissioned, publish/subscribe service using blockchains	Zupan, N., Zhang, K., Jacobsen, H.-A.
			Duplicate	Scopus	2018	Blockchain as a platform for secure inter-organizational business processes	Carminati, B., Ferrari, E., Rondanini, C.
		-		ACM	2017	Towards an Economic Analysis of Routing in Payment Channel Networks	Felix Engelmann and Henning Kopp and Frank Kargl and Florian Glaser and Christof Weinhardt
		-		ACM	2017	VIBES: Fast Blockchain Simulations for Large-scale Peer-to-peer Networks: Demo	Lyubomir Stoykov and Kaiwen Zhang and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		ACM	2018	StreamChain: Do Blockchains Need Blocks?	Zsolt Istv&#225;n and Alessandro Sorniotti and Marko Vukoli&#263;
		-		ACM	2018	Sol2Js: Translating Solidity Contracts into Javascript for Hyperledger Fabric	Muhammad Ahmad Zafar and Falak Sher and Muhammad Umar Janjua and Salman Baset
		-		ACM	2018	Scaling Byzantine Consensus: A Broad Analysis	Christian Berger and Hans P. Reiser
		-		ACM	2018	Resource Fairness and Prioritization of Transactions in Permissioned Blockchain Systems (Industry Track)	Seep Goel and Abhishek Singh and Rachit Garg and Mudit Verma and Praveen Jayachandran
		-		ACM	2018	Powering Software Sustainability with Blockchain	Omar Badreddin
		-		ACM	2017	Hyperpubsub: A Decentralized, Permissioned, Publish/Subscribe Service Using Blockchains: Demo	Nejc Zupan and Kaiwen Zhang and Hans-Arno Jacobsen

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		ACM	2017	How Blockchains Can Help Legal Metrology	Wilson S. Melo,Jr and Alysson Bessani and Luiz F. R. C. Carmo
		-		ACM	2018	eVIBES: Configurable and Interactive Ethereum Blockchain Simulation Framework	Aditya Deshpande and Pezhman Nasirifard and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		ACM	2018	EVA: Fair and Auditable Electric Vehicle Charging Service Using Blockchain	Jelena Pajic and Jos&#233; Rivera and Kaiwen Zhang and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		ACM	2018	Deconstructing Blockchains: Concepts, Systems, and Insights	Kaiwen Zhang and Roman Vitenberg and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		ACM	2018	CIDDS: A Configurable and Distributed DAG-based Distributed Ledger Simulation Framework	Mohamed Riswan Abdul Lathif and Pezhman Nasirifard and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		ACM	2018	Blockchains for Business Process Management - Challenges and Opportunities	
		-		ACM	2018	Blockchain Landscape and AI Renaissance: The Bright Path Forward	Hans-Arno Jacobsen and Mohammad Sadoghi and Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei and Roman Vitenberg and Kaiwen Zhang
		-		ACM	2018	A Federated Low-Power WAN for the Internet of Things	Mehdi Bezahaf and Ga&#235;tan Cathelain and Tony Ducrocq
		-		ACM	2018	Authenticated Modular Maps in Haskell	Victor Cacciari Miraldo and Harold Carr and Alex Kogan and Mark Moir and Maurice Herlihy



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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		ACM	2018	Attack and Vulnerability Simulation Framework for Bitcoin-like Blockchain Technologies	Fabian Sch&#252;ssler and Pezhman Nasirifard and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
		-		Google Shoolar	2017	Blockchain Oracles-Einsatz der Blockchain-Technologie für Offline-Anwendungen	A Hoppe
		-		Google Shoolar	2018	Blockchain Coupled Oracle Fusion	D Satpathy
		-		Google Shoolar	2018	Blockchain and Consensus from Proofs of Work without Random Oracles	JA Garay, A Kiayias, G Panagiotakos
		-		Google Shoolar	2018	Blockchain across Oracle: Understand the details and implications of the Blockchain for Oracle developers and customers	R van Mölken
		-		IEEE	2018	Understanding Blockchain Technology: The Costs and Benefits of Decentralization	
		-		IEEE	2018	Towards Application Portability on Blockchains	K. Shudo; R. Kanda; K. Saito
		-		IEEE	2017	Secure one-time biometric tokens for non-repudiable multi-party transactions	K. Nandakumar; N. Rath; S. Pankanti; S. Darnell
		-		IEEE	2017	Multiclouds in an Enterprise – a Love-Hate Relationship	M. Yousif
		-		IEEE	2019	Leveraging the Capabilities of Industry 4.0 for Improving Energy Efficiency in Smart Factories	N. Mohamed; J. Al-Jaroodi; S. Lazarova-Molnar
		-		IEEE	2017	Fostering consumers' energy market through smart contracts	I. Kounelis; G. Steri; R. Giuliani; D. Geneiatakis; R. Neisse; I. Nai-Fovino

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		IEEE	2018	ChainMOB: Mobility Analytics on Blockchain	B. Nasrulin; M. Muzammal; Q. Qu
		-		IEEE	2016	Blockchains and the logic of accountability	M. Herlihy; M. Moir
		-		IEEE	2018	Blockchain Based Security Framework for IoT Implementations	K. N. Krishnan; R. Jenu; T. Joseph; M. L. Silpa
		-		IEEE	2018	Blockchain Based Vehicular Data Management	R. Sharma; S. Chakraborty
		-		Scopus	2016	Weaver: A high-performance, transactional graph database based on refinable timestamps	Dubey, A., Hill, G.D., Sireer, E.G., Escriva, R.
		-		Scopus	2018	Towards a smart contract-based, decentralized, public-key infrastructure	Patsonakis, C., Samari, K., Roussopoulos, M., Kiayias, A.
		-		Scopus	2016	SysTEX 2016 - 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution, colocated with ACM/I-FIP/USENIX Middleware 2016	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	Systematic performance evaluation using component-in-the-loop approach	Kocsis, I., Klenik, A., Pataricza, A., Telek, M., De��, F., Cseh, D.
		-		Scopus	2018	Synchronized aggregate signatures from the RSA assumption	Hohenberger, S., Waters, B.
		-		Scopus	2018	Simple proofs of sequential work	Cohen, B., Pietrzak, K.
		-		Scopus	2017	SERIAL 2017 - 1st Workshop on Scalable and Resilient Infrastructures for Distributed Ledgers, Colocated with ACM/I-FIP/USENIX Middleware 2017 Conference	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	Security of the blockchain against long delay attack	Wei, P., Yuan, Q., Zheng, Y.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		Scopus	2018	Secure Pub-Sub: Blockchain-Based Fair Payment with Reputation for Reliable Cyber Physical Systems	Zhao, Y., Li, Y., Mu, Q., Yang, B., Yu, Y.
		-		Scopus	2018	Secure Attribute-Based Signature Scheme with Multiple Authorities for Blockchain in Electronic Health Records Systems	Guo, R., Shi, H., Zhao, Q., Zheng, D.
		-		Scopus	2017	RingCT 2.0: A compact accumulator-based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency Monero	Sun, S.-F., Au, M.H., Liu, J.K., Yuen, T.H.
		-		Scopus	2016	Proof of Luck: An efficient blockchain consensus protocol	Milutinovic, M., He, W., Wu, H., Kanwal, M.
		-		Scopus	2018	Privacy improvement architecture for IoT	Kak, E., Orji, R., Pry, J., Sofranko, K., Lomotey, R.K., Deters, R.
		-		Scopus	2017	PlaTIBART: A Platform for Transactive IoT blockchain applications with repeatable testing	Walker, M.A., Dubey, A., Laszka, A., Schmidt, D.C.
		-		Scopus	2017	Overcoming Cryptographic Impossibility Results Using Blockchains	Goyal, R., Goyal, V.
		-		Scopus	2018	Ouroboros praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain	David, B., Gaži, P., Kiayias, A., Russell, A.
		-		Scopus	2017	On the design of communication and transaction anonymity in blockchain-based transactive micro-grids	Bergquist, J., Laszka, A., Sturm, M., Dubey, A.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		Scopus	2017	Middleware 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 Middleware Posters and Demos 2017: Proceedings of the Posters and Demos Session of the 18th International Middleware Conference	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2017	M4IoT 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Middleware and Applications for the Internet of Things 4th Edition and 2nd Federated Event with the MoTA Workshop, Part of Middleware 2017 Conference	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	IoT BDS 2018 - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Internet of Things, Big Data and Security	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	Introducing the new paradigm of Social Dispersed Computing: Applications, Technologies and Challenges	García-Valls, M., Dubey, A., Botti, V.
		-		Scopus	2017	FruitChains: A fair blockchain	Pass, R., Shi, E.
		-		Scopus	2017	EPBC: Efficient Public Blockchain Client for Lightweight Users	Xu, L., Chen, L., Gao, Z., Xu, S., Shi, W.
		-		Scopus	2018	Distributed Solar Self-Consumption and Blockchain Solar Energy Exchanges on the Public Grid Within an Energy Community	Plaza, C., Gil, J., De Chezelles, F., Strang, K.A.
		-		Scopus	2018	Designing blockchain-based SIEM 3.0 system	Miloslavskaya, N.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		Scopus	2018	ChainFS: Blockchain-Secured Cloud Storage	Tang, Y., Zou, Q., Chen, J., Li, K., Kamhoua, C.A., Kwiat, K., Njilla, L.
		-		Scopus	2016	Bringing secure Bitcoin transactions to your smart-phone	Frey, D., Makkes, M.X., Roman, P.-L., Taïani, F., Voulgaris, S.
		-		Scopus	2015	Blockchain-based model for social transactions processing	Sarr, I., Naacke, H., Gueye, I.
		-		Scopus	2018	Blockchain-Based IoT-cloud authorization and delegation	Tapas, N., Merlino, G., Longo, F.
		-		Scopus	2017	Blockchain world - Do you need a blockchain? This chart will tell you if the technology can solve your problem	Peck, M.E.
		-		Scopus	2017	Blockchain: Scalability for resource-constrained accountable vehicle-to-x communication	Van Der Heijden, R.W., Engelmann, F., Mödinger, D., Schöning, F., Kargl, F.
		-		Scopus	2017	Beyond hellman's time-memory trade-offs with applications to proofs of space	Abusalah, H., Alwen, J., Cohen, B., Khilko, D., Pietrzak, K., Reyzin, L.
		-		Scopus	2017	Analysis of the blockchain protocol in asynchronous networks	Pass, R., Seeman, L., Shelat, A.
		-		Scopus	2018	Analysis of security in blockchain: Case study in 51%-attack detecting	Ye, C., Li, G., Cai, H., Gu, Y., Fukuda, A.
		-		Scopus	2018	An integrated platform for the Internet of Things based on an open source ecosystem	Li, Y.Q.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		Scopus	2018	An ID-Based Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme and Its Application in Blockchain	Lin, Q., Yan, H., Huang, Z., Chen, W., Shen, J., Tang, Y.
		-		Scopus	2019	A New Lattice-Based Signature Scheme in Post-Quantum Blockchain Network	Li, C.-Y., Chen, X.-B., Chen, Y.-L., Hou, Y.-Y., Li, J.
		-		Scopus	2017	A general framework for blockchain analytics	Bartoletti, M., Lande, S., Pompianu, L., Bracciali, A.
		-		Scopus	2018	A critical look at cryptogovernance of the real world: Challenges for spatial representation and uncertainty on the blockchain	Adams, B., Tomko, M.
		-		Scopus	2017	A byzantine fault-tolerant ordering service for the hyperledger fabric blockchain platform (Short Paper)	Bessani, A., Sousa, J., Vukolić, M.
		-		Scopus	2017	4th International Conference on Future Data and Security Engineering, FDSE 2017	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	3rd International Conference on Internet of Things, ICIOT 2018 Held as Part of the Services Conference Federation, SCF 2018	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2017	36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2017	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2018	21 - Bringing down the complexity: Fast composable protocols for card games without secret state	David, B., Dowsley, R., Larangeira, M.

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
		-		Scopus	2018	13th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2017	[No author name available]
		-		Scopus	2017	11th International Conference on Provable Security, ProvSec 2017	[No author name available]
	-	pass		ACM	2018	Towards Solving the Data Availability Problem for Sharded Ethereum	Daniel Sel and Kaiwen Zhang and Hans-Arno Jacobsen
	-	pass		Google Shoolar	2018	Trusted agent blockchain oracle	MD Jackson
	-	pass		IEEE	2018	Towards Distributed SLA Management with Smart Contracts and Blockchain	R. B. Uriarte; R. de Nicola; K. Kritikos
	-	pass		Scopus	2018	Zero-trust hierarchical management in IoT	Samaniego, M., Deters, R.
	-	pass		Scopus	2018	The interface between blockchain and the real world	Damjan, M.
	-	pass		Scopus	2018	Ouroboros genesis: Composable proof-of-stake blockchains with dynamic availability	Badertscher, C., Gaži, P., Kiayias, A., Russell, A., Zikas, V.
	-	pass		Scopus	2018	ContractFuzzer: Fuzzing smart contracts for vulnerability detection	Jiang, B., Liu, Y., Chan, W.K.
-	pass	pass		Scopus	2018	Confidential Business Process Execution on Blockchain	Carminati, B., Rondonini, C., Ferrari, E.
pass	pass	pass		ACM	2018	Off-chaining Models and Approaches to Off-chain Computations	Jacob Eberhardt and Jonathan Heiss

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3rd screen	2nd screen	1st Screen	Remove Duplicates	Source	Year	Title	Authors
pass	pass	pass		Google Shoolar	2018	Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle	J Adler, R Berryhill, A Veneris, Z Poulos, N Veira. . .
pass	pass	pass		Google Shoolar	2017	Provenance and authentication of oracle sensor data with block chain lightweight wireless network au- thentication scheme for constrained oracle sensors	G Gordon
pass	pass	pass		Google Shoolar	2018	Bitcoin gambling using distributed oracles in the blockchain	FJA Montoto Monroy
pass	pass	pass		Scopus	2016	Town crier: An authenticated data feed for smart contracts	Zhang, F., Cecchetti, E., Croman, K., Juels, A., Shi, E.



## Appendix B

# On-Chain Oracle Code

```
1  pragma solidity >=0.4.21 <0.6.0;
2
3  contract Oracle {
4      Request[] requests; //list of requests made to the contract
5      uint currentId = 0; //increasing request id
6      uint minQuorum = 2; //minimum number of responses to receive before declaring
       final result
7      uint totalOracleCount = 3; // Hardcoded oracle count
8
9      // defines a general api request
10     struct Request {
11         uint id; //request id
12         string urlToQuery; //API url
13         string attributeToFetch; //json attribute (key) to retrieve in
       the response
14         string agreedValue; //value from key
15         mapping(uint => string) answers; //answers provided by the oracles
16         mapping(address => uint) quorum; //oracles which will query the answer
       (1=oracle hasn't voted, 2=oracle has voted)
17     }
18
19     //event that triggers oracle outside of the blockchain
20     event NewRequest (
21         uint id,
22         string urlToQuery,
23         string attributeToFetch
24     );
25
26     //triggered when there's a consensus on the final result
27     event UpdatedRequest (
28         uint id,
29         string urlToQuery,
30         string attributeToFetch,
```

## On-Chain Oracle Code

```
31     string agreedValue
32 );
33
34 function createRequest (
35     string memory _urlToQuery,
36     string memory _attributeToFetch
37 )
38 public
39 {
40     uint lenght = requests.push(Request(currentId, _urlToQuery,
41 _attributeToFetch, ""));
42     Request storage r = requests[lenght-1];
43
44     // Hardcoded oracles address
45     r.quorum[address(0x6c2339b46F41a06f09CA0051ddAD54D1e582bA77)] = 1;
46     r.quorum[address(0xb5346CF224c02186606e5f89EACC21eC25398077)] = 1;
47     r.quorum[address(0xa2997F1CA363D11a0a35bB1Ac0Ff7849bc13e914)] = 1;
48
49     // launch an event to be detected by oracle outside of blockchain
50     emit NewRequest (
51         currentId,
52         _urlToQuery,
53         _attributeToFetch
54     );
55
56     // increase request id
57     currentId++;
58 }
59
60 //called by the oracle to record its answer
61 function updateRequest (
62     uint _id,
63     string memory _valueRetrieved
64 ) public {
65     Request storage currRequest = requests[_id];
66
67     //check if oracle is in the list of trusted oracles
68     //and if the oracle hasn't voted yet
69     if(currRequest.quorum[address(msg.sender)] == 1){
70
71         //marking that this address has voted
72         currRequest.quorum[msg.sender] = 2;
73
74         //iterate through "array" of answers until a position is free and save
75         the retrieved value
76         uint tmpI = 0;
77         bool found = false;
78         while(!found) {
```

## On-Chain Oracle Code

```
78         //find first empty slot
79         if(bytes(currRequest.answers[tmpI]).length == 0){
80             found = true;
81             currRequest.answers[tmpI] = _valueRetrieved;
82         }
83         tmpI++;
84     }
85
86     uint currentQuorum = 0;
87
88     //iterate through oracle list and check if enough oracles (minimum quorum)
89     //have voted the same answer has the current one
90     for(uint i = 0; i < totalOracleCount; i++){
91         bytes memory a = bytes(currRequest.answers[i]);
92         bytes memory b = bytes(_valueRetrieved);
93
94         if(keccak256(a) == keccak256(b)){
95             currentQuorum++;
96             if(currentQuorum >= minQuorum){
97                 currRequest.agreedValue = _valueRetrieved;
98                 emit UpdatedRequest (
99                     currRequest.id,
100                     currRequest.urlToQuery,
101                     currRequest.attributeToFetch,
102                     currRequest.agreedValue
103                 );
104             }
105         }
106     }
107 }
108 }
109 }
```



## Appendix C

# Off-Chain Oracle Code

```
1   require("dotenv").config();
2
3   import request from "request-promise-native";
4
5   import {
6     updateRequest,
7     newRequest
8   } from "./ethereum";
9
10  const start = () => {
11
12    newRequest((error, result) => {
13
14      let options = {
15        uri: result.args.urlToQuery,
16        json: true
17      };
18
19      request(options)
20        .then(parseData(result))
21        .then(updateRequest)
22        .catch(error);
23    });
24  };
25
26  const parseData = result => (body) => {
27    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
28      let id, valueRetrieved;
29      try {
30        id = result.args.id;
31        valueRetrieved = (body[result.args.attributeToFetch] || 0).toString
32      } catch (error) {
```

## Off-Chain Oracle Code

```
33         reject(error);
34         return;
35     }
36     resolve({
37         id,
38         valueRetrieved
39     });
40 });
41 };
42
43 export default start;
```

## Appendix D

# Off-chain ethereum connection - ethereum.js

```
1 require("dotenv").config();
2
3 import Web3 from "web3";
4
5
6 const web3 = new Web3(new Web3.providers.HttpProvider(process.env.
  WEB3_PROVIDER_ADDRESS));
7 const abi = JSON.parse(process.env.ABI);
8 const address = process.env.CONTRACT_ADDRESS;
9 const contract = web3.eth.contract(abi).at(address);
10
11 const account = () => {
12   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
13     web3.eth.getAccounts((err, accounts) => {
14       if (err === null) {
15         resolve(accounts[process.env.ACCOUNT_NUMBER]);
16       } else {
17         reject(err);
18       }
19     });
20   });
21 };
22
23 export const updateRequest = ({
24   id,
25   valueRetrieved
26 }) => {
27   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
28     account().then(account => {
29       contract.updateRequest(id, valueRetrieved, {
30         from: account,
```

## Off-chain ethereum connection - ethereum.js

```
31     gas: 60000000
32   }, (err, res) => {
33     if (err === null) {
34       resolve(res);
35     } else {
36       reject(err);
37     }
38   });
39   }).catch(error => reject(error));
40 });
41 };
42
43 export const createRequest = ({
44   urlToQuery,
45   attributeToFetch
46 }) => {
47   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
48     account().then(account => {
49       contract.createRequest(urlToQuery, attributeToFetch, {
50         from: account,
51         gas: 60000000
52       }, (err, res) => {
53         if (err === null) {
54           resolve(res);
55         } else {
56           reject(err);
57         }
58       });
59     }).catch(error => reject(error));
60   });
61 };
62
63 export const newRequest = (callback) => {
64   contract.NewRequest((error, result) => callback(error, result));
65 };
66
67 export const updatedRequest = (callback) => {
68   contract.UpdatedRequest((error, result) => callback(error, result));
69 };
```