

Social transfer multipliers in developed and emerging countries: The role of hand-to-mouth consumers*

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Abstract

This paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of social transfer payments to individuals for a sample of 23 developed and Latin American countries. While the social transfer multiplier is 0.3 in developed countries, it is 0.9 in Latin American economies. We study the role of hand-to-mouth consumers, which have no access to financial markets and high marginal propensity to consume, as a first order factor to explain the heterogeneity in the size of social transfer multipliers. Using survey-based data from Global Findex, we first find that the average share of the population living hand-to-mouth is 23% in developed economies versus 60% in Latin American countries. We interpret this evidence with a two-agent New Keynesian model. We find that the difference on the share of hand-to-mouth consumers is able to explain 80%-90% of the difference in the estimated social transfer multipliers. We also document that the share of hand-to-mouth individuals in emerging countries is 47% which suggest that a bigger social transfer multiplier may be justified for this type of economies.

Keywords: fiscal transfer, social transfer, fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus, government spending, multiplier, hand-to-mouth, emerging markets.

JEL Classification: E62, E63.

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1 Introduction

The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy regained great interest since the Global Financial Crisis. This relevance has been recently redoubled as governments around the world evaluate the use of alternative fiscal instruments at their disposal to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.

A category of spending that has been receiving particularly growing attention is social transfers. Social transfers comprise both ongoing social protection programs and emergency policy responses. Ongoing social protection programs refer to the disbursement of government funds to individuals who meet certain eligibility criteria. The main categories include unemployment benefits, family programs, and pensions. Overall, social transfers have been increasing continuously over time mainly due to the impact of aging populations on pensions as well as a consequence of expanding family programs targeting the poor and most vulnerable households (especially in the emerging world). In fact, on average, social transfers currently account for more than 50 percent of primary government spending in developed countries and about 40 percent in emerging markets (Galeano et al., 2021). In terms of emergency social transfers, for example, some current policy responses to COVID-19 have proven to be among the largest in history.¹ In spite of this growing relevance, little is known about the effect that a \$1 change in social transfers has on the level of GDP –the so-called social transfer multiplier (STM, hereafter).

What is the current state of the literature on the size of the STM and the mechanism behind it? There are a handful of studies for developed countries and no evidence of any kind for emerging markets. Existing empirical studies vary among several critical dimensions including the identification strategy, scope of the social transfer metric, econometric methodology, and country(ies) analyzed. Therefore, it is no surprise that there is little agreement in terms of the size of the STM. Estimates of STMs range between zero and one (Gechert, 2015; Alesina et al., 2017; Parraga-Rodriguez, 2018; Gechert et al., 2020). Interestingly, among the few existing papers, there is a strong consensus that social transfer shocks affect output mainly through consumption rather than through investment (Alesina et al., 2017; Romer and Romer, 2016; Parraga-Rodriguez, 2018; Gechert et al., 2020; Pennings, 2020). This empirical fact points out that the primary mechanism behind the social transfer shock occurs through the government allocation of funds to agents with a high marginal propensity to consume, rather than through supply-side channels.

On the theoretical front, the literature has mainly relied on different variants of closed-economy two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) models which prompt consumption to play a dominant role in response to a social transfer shock (Monacelli and Perotti, 2011; Coenen et al., 2012; Giambattista and Pennings, 2017; Mehrotra, 2018). The distinctive and essential elements of this family of models

¹For example, the first phase of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in the United States included one-time tax rebates to individuals, expanded unemployment benefits, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) social transfers that represented about 586 billion dollars, or 2.8 percent of the GDP of 2019. This social transfers amount is similar to that spent on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (Oh and Reis, 2012).

are the existence of two types of agents that differ in their access to financial markets coupled with a fiscal authority capable of redistributing funds between these two groups of individuals.² While unconstrained Ricardian agents have access to financial markets and are, thus, able to smooth consumption, constrained hand-to-mouth (HtM, hereafter) individuals consume their entire income in each period and, consequently, have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The government collects lump-sum taxes from the Ricardian agents to pay for government purchases and social transfers to individuals. Naturally, if social transfers only reached Ricardian agents or if there were no HtM individuals, the STM would be equal to zero. The key to deliver a positive STM relies on social transfers actually reaching HtM individuals (i.e., the social transfer shock needs to redistribute funds from low- to high-marginal-propensity-to-consume agents) along with the existence of HtM agents (who help propagate the effect of the initial social transfer shock). Moreover, TANK models deliver STMs that are larger the higher the share of HtM agents in the population (which increases the average marginal propensity to consume of the economy) and the higher the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents (which increases the redistribution of funds from Ricardian to HtM agents). Among other relevant features, these models also allow monetary policy to be more or less accommodative (the zero lower bound being the extreme case) and fiscal policy to vary the degree of persistence of government spending shocks.

When studying the key determinants affecting the size of STMs, existing papers have focused on the importance of the persistence of the social transfer shock (Coenen et al., 2012; Romer and Romer, 2016; Alesina et al., 2017; Gechert et al., 2020; Pennings, 2020) and on the magnifying role of the more accommodative monetary policy on the STM (Coenen et al., 2012; Romer and Romer, 2016; Giambattista and Pennings, 2017; Mehrotra, 2018). Despite the above-mentioned progress, to the best of our knowledge, no study has focused on how the heterogeneity in the share of HtM agents and in the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents affect the size of STMs. Existing quantitative papers estimating STMs for the United States (Giambattista and Pennings, 2017; Pennings, 2020) discipline the share of HtM agents to one-third based on Kaplan et al. (2014). Kaplan et al. (2014) relied on household surveys for the United States and eight other developed countries to measure the share of HtM agents based on liquid net worth, finding modest heterogeneity among developed countries.³ Notably, no paper uses data to discipline the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents. It is generally assumed that social transfers solely reach HtM agents, which is referred to as perfect social transfers targeting. However, we document that this assumption does not hold, even in developed countries.

Since both the share of HtM agents and the share of social transfers actually reaching them

²The influential paper by Oh and Reis (2012) was the first to call the attention to the need to have heterogeneous agents coupled with redistribution arguments to deliver a positive STM.

³Kaplan et al. (2014) find that the shares of HtM households (expressed in percentage terms) are as follows: Australia (19), Canada (30), France (21), Germany (32), Italy (24), Spain (20), United Kingdom (33), and United States (31).

are first-order aspects of the mechanism embedded behind the effect of a social transfer shock, we address the limitations of the existing literature by considering their heterogeneity in a more global sample (considering developed and emerging economies alike). For this purpose, we focus on a sample of six Latin American countries and 17 developed economies. We decided to include emerging market economies, such as these six Latin American countries, because they offer an ideal laboratory to further understand the implications played by the allocation of social transfers and, especially, by HtM individuals with no access to financial markets.

In particular, we contribute to the growing literature on the size and acting mechanism of STMs on three specific fronts:

- We provide new empirical evidence on the size of STMs for a range of countries based on a consistent methodology. In particular, we use the well-known Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification strategy that imposes timing restrictions by assuming that while government spending changes are allowed to contemporaneously affect economic activity within the quarter, it takes the government at least one quarter to respond to developments in the state of the economy. Although the identification of exogenous shocks cannot escape most empirical studies, we make significant efforts to ameliorate endogeneity concerns and further guarantee the unanticipated within-the-quarter nature of the social transfer shock in the context of a local projections approach (Jorda, 2005; Stock and Watson, 2007). In particular, we instrument cumulative changes in social transfers at each time horizon $t+h$ using the residual at time t of a regression of changes in social transfers (excluding the unemployment insurance spending component) on the lags of a long list of macroeconomic variables including the changes of social transfers, GDP, total primary spending, fiscal revenues, and central bank interest rates. We exclude the unemployment insurance spending component from the social transfer metric used as instrument because of its inherent automatic and rapid response to developments in the state of the economy (McKay and Reis, 2016; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016; Galeano et al., 2021). We also perform several other exercises to reduce concerns about omitted variable bias. We find that the size of the STM is three times larger in Latin American countries than in developed economies. While the STM is on impact 0.3 in developed countries, it is 0.9 in Latin American economies. In line with existing empirical papers based on data for developed countries, both samples also show that the effect on output is mainly driven by private consumption whereas private investment remains largely unchanged. We also find that while the macroeconomic impact of social transfers is important in the short- and medium-term, it tends to weaken in the long-term. This is the first paper to provide evidence on the size and mechanism behind the aggregate STM for emerging markets.
- We provide novel empirical evidence on the share of HtM agents and the share of social transfers reaching them using survey-based dataset from Global Findex. We identify HtM

agents influenced by the work of Lusardi et al. (2011) as those who are not able to cope with a financial shock.⁴ The recipients of social transfers are identified directly from Global Findex. Two findings stand out from several interesting ones.⁵ First, the share of HtM agents is, on average, 23 percent in the sample of developed countries and 60 percent in the Latin American sample.⁶ Second, the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents is, on average, 25 percent in the developed sample and 65 percent in the sample of Latin American countries. That is to say, the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents is mostly a reflection of the share of HtM agents, rather than the result of a particular social transfers targeting ability. This result suggests that, at least when including all types of social transfers, the usual assumption that social transfers only reach HtM agents (known as perfect social transfers targeting) does not seem to hold. We also show that these empirical regularities equally hold for a sample of 99 developed and emerging countries.

- A calibrated standard two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model is able to match key STM empirical regularities identified before. Moreover, we show that about 80-90 percent of the large difference in the size of STMs previously identified is explained by the higher share of financially constrained individuals who live HtM in the Latin American sample relative to the developed countries. This crucial evidence on the quantitative effect of HtM arguments, coupled with the strong evidence supporting a larger share of HtM agents in emerging markets, suggests that a bigger STM may be justified for emerging market economies in general.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows the empirical estimates of STMs for both the developed and the Latin American samples. Section 3 presents the TANK model. Section 4 provides evidence that the share of HtM agents and the share of social transfers actually reaching them in emerging markets are much larger than in developed economies. Section 5 shows that a standard calibrated TANK model is able to match key empirical regularities shown in Section 2 in terms of the size, main macroeconomic variables involved, and temporal profile of the STM for both the developed and Latin American samples. Section 6 offers some final thoughts.

⁴As discussed in Kaplan et al. (2014), while the identification of HtM agents is different from those studies based on the agents' liquid wealth, the empirical evidence is notably similar in terms of the shares of population living HtM. This robust finding is also present in our study when relying on Global Findex. For example, for the United States, Kaplan et al. (2014) find a share of HtM ranging between 25 and 40, with their preferred estimate being one-third. Ours, using Global Findex, is 27 percent. Section 4 provides extensive evidence of these similarities.

⁵In light of the heated debate in developed countries about the so-called wealthy HtM individuals (i.e., those with significant amounts of illiquid assets like real estate properties, yet high marginal propensity to consume out of transitory changes in income), we find evidence that wealthy HtM individuals also exist in emerging markets. Yet, the HtM phenomenon in emerging markets is largely driven by poor HtM individuals.

⁶This evidence is also in line with well-established, more macro/aggregate, evidence that emerging market economies have less financial depth, intermediation, and development than their developed counterparts (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2007). More recent micro-based evidence from individual spending data and local-based experiments also support, to different degrees of explicitness, the relevance of financial fragility on the marginal propensity to consume and on the size of local STMs (e.g., Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Egger et al., 2019; Pennings, 2020; Gerard et al., 2020).

2 Empirical evidence on the Social Transfer Multipliers

Social transfers comprise both ongoing social protection programs and emergency policy responses.⁷ Ongoing social protection programs refer to the disbursement of government funds to individuals who meet certain eligibility criteria. The main categories include unemployment benefits (transfers to unemployed individuals), family programs (transfers essentially to the poor and most vulnerable households), and pensions (mainly transfers to individuals after retirement). Social transfers represent a large component of government spending comprising more than 50 percent of primary government spending in developed countries and about 40 percent in emerging markets. By and large, the largest category of social transfers spending is pensions (accounting, on average, for more than 75 percent of social transfers), followed by family programs (about 20 percent, on average). Interestingly, in contrast to the emerging world’s long history of social protection in terms of social security and the most recent wave of family programs, unemployment insurance programs are rare in emerging countries (they simply do not exist or, if they do, they have negligible coverage). In terms of their short-term fluctuating nature, unemployment insurance spending is, by design, countercyclical (even at the quarterly frequency!).⁸ On the other hand, pensions and family programs spending tend to be more rigid and slow-moving in nature and are mainly driven by demographic and structural deep-rooted social problems, respectively.⁹

This section estimates STMs using unbalanced quarterly data for the period 1960:Q1 through 2019:Q4 for six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and 17 developed countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States).¹⁰

2.1 Identification strategy

We use the well-known Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification strategy that imposes timing restrictions by assuming that while government spending changes are allowed to contemporaneously affect economic activity (i.e., within the quarter), it takes the government at least one quarter to respond to developments in the state of the economy (e.g., Fatás and Mihov (2003), Galí et al. (2007), Corsetti et al. (2012), Ilzetzki et al. (2013), Huidrom et al. (2020)). We estimate the effect of innovations of social transfer shocks on economic growth using the single-equation approach proposed by Jorda (2005) and Stock and Watson (2007), which is based on linear local projections

⁷This paragraph significantly relies on Galeano et al. (2021). See their paper for a detailed discussion of social transfers basic trends, composition, rigidity, and business cyclical aspects of social transfers.

⁸In fact, the contemporaneous correlation between quarterly changes of real GDP and real unemployment insurance spending is -0.23 (statistically significant).

⁹In fact, the contemporaneous correlation between quarterly changes of real GDP and real pensions and family programs spending is 0.09 (statistically not significant).

¹⁰See Appendix 1 for description of data definitions, sources, and time coverage for each country.

(LP). The use of LP provides several advantages over the traditional structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methodology. Specifically, LP (i) can be estimated by single-regression techniques, (ii) are more robust to potential misspecifications, and (iii) can easily accommodate non-linear specifications that may be impractical in a multivariate SVAR context (a feature that proves to be crucial in this paper).¹¹

While the identification of exogenous shocks cannot escape most empirical studies, we make significant efforts to ameliorate endogeneity concerns and further guarantee the unanticipated within-the-quarter nature of the social transfer shock in the context of a local projections approach (Jorda, 2005; Stock and Watson, 2007). Our empirical strategy follows a three-step procedure. First, we estimate the unanticipated social transfer shocks (excluding the unemployment insurance spending component) using the residuals of the following regressions:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta ST_{i,t}^{wo\ ui} = & \sum_{l=1}^L \varsigma_l \Delta Y_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \psi_l \Delta ST_{i,t-l}^{wo\ ui} + \sum_{l=1}^L \eta_l \Delta G_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \zeta_l \Delta R_{i,t-l} + \\ & + \sum_{l=1}^L \xi_l \Delta int_{i,t-l} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{ST\ wo\ ui}, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

for each country i , where $\Delta X_{i,t} = (X_{i,t} - X_{i,t-1})/Y_{i,t}$ and X being real social transfers excluding the unemployment insurance spending component ($ST^{wo\ ui}$), real GDP (Y), real total primary spending (G), real fiscal revenues (R), or central bank interest rates (int).¹² We exclude the unemployment insurance spending component from the social transfer metric used as instrument because of its inherent automatic and rapid response to developments in the state of the economy (McKay and Reis, 2016; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016; Galeano et al., 2021).¹³

Second, once we identify the unanticipated social transfer shocks excluding the unemployment insurance spending component $\varepsilon_{i,t}^{ST\ wo\ ui}$, we use a local projections approach to find a cumulative impulse response function (IRF) representing the STM at different time horizons. This methodology allows us to directly project the behavioral reaction of GDP to the unanticipated social transfer shocks by computing estimates of the h -step-ahead cumulative average treatment effect on the GDP variable.¹⁴

¹¹We should note that Jorda’s LP method does not consistently dominate the standard SVAR method for calculating impulse responses of endogenous variables with contemporaneous effects. Since Jorda’s LP does not impose any restrictions linking the impulse responses at h and $h + 1$, estimates can display an erratic behavior due to the loss of efficiency. Additionally, the impulse responses sometimes display oscillations at longer horizons (Ramey, 2016). For these reasons, and to err on the safe side, we report estimates up to 8 quarters after social transfer shocks.

¹²The number of lags $L = 4$ is determined through log-likelihood ratio information criterion tests (see Hamilton (1994), pages 295-296). The same lag structure was recommended when using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQC).

¹³Interestingly, given the relatively small share of unemployment insurance spending on total social transfers we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the contemporaneous correlation between quarterly changes of real GDP and real social transfers excluding (or including) unemployment insurance spending are 0.09 (0.06); in both cases statistically not significant.

¹⁴This methodology provides a flexible alternative to VAR approaches. As described by Jorda (2005), linear projections can be estimated by simple regression techniques (IV in our case) and they are more robust to misspecification errors. Nonetheless, Ramey (2016) points out some limitations—e.g., impulse responses sometimes display oscillations at longer horizons (particularly after 16 quarters). Since, in this study, we are interested in the short- and

A common problem in the literature is matching the typical definition of a fiscal multiplier (i.e., total output change at step h divided by total expenditure change at step h) with the estimated steps of an IRF originated from an initial spending shock. To bypass this problem, we follow Ramey and Zubairy (2018) and use a two-step instrumental variable procedure. In the first stage, we find the predicted cumulative social transfers at each step h from the unanticipated social transfers shock excluding the unemployment insurance spending component in time t from the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta ST_{i,t+h} = & \xi_h \varepsilon_{i,t}^{ST}{}^{wo\ ui} + \sum_{l=0}^{h-1} f_{lh} \varepsilon_{i,t+h-l}^{ST}{}^{wo\ ui} + \sum_{l=1}^L k_l \Delta Y_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L m_l \Delta G_{i,t-l} + \\ & + \sum_{l=1}^L \lambda_l \Delta R_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \vartheta_l \Delta int_{i,t-l} + c_{i,h} + q_{t,h} + v_{i,t,h},\end{aligned}\quad (2)$$

where $c_{i,h}$ and $q_{t,h}$ represent country and time fixed effects, respectively.

In the second stage, we use the predicted values $\widehat{\Delta ST_{i,t+h}}$ from the previous expression to instrument the cumulative social transfers in a regression against GDP:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Y_{i,t+h} = & \beta_{1h}^{IV} \widehat{\Delta ST_{i,t+h}} + \beta_{2h}^{IV} \widehat{\Delta ST_{i,t+h}} \times LAC + \sum_{l=0}^{h-1} w_{lh} \varepsilon_{i,t+h-l}^{ST} + \sum_{l=1}^L \sigma_l \Delta Y_{i,t-l} + \\ & + \sum_{l=1}^L \eta_l \Delta G_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \zeta_l \Delta R_{i,t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \zeta_l \Delta int_{i,t-l} + c_{i,h} + q_{t,h} + \mu_{i,t,h},\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

where $\Delta X_{i,t+h} = (X_{i,h} - X_{i,t-1})/Y_{i,t-1}$. We use Teulings and Zubanov (2014) bias correction by including social transfer shocks nested between times t and h as controls. LAC is a dummy variable equal to one if the country belongs to the Latin American sample and zero otherwise. Estimators β_{1h}^{IV} and β_{2h}^{IV} in specification (3) represent the impulse response at each step h . By construction, each step in specification (3) also gives us the cumulative multiplier defined as the accumulated output divided by the accumulated spending in social transfers. Given our non-linear approach, the STM for a Latin American country would be determined by $\beta_{1h}^{IV} + \beta_{2h}^{IV}$, while for a developed economy, by β_{1h}^{IV} . Standard errors are drawn from a two-way cluster-robust covariance matrix.

Even though, in principle, one may argue that fiscal policy is more ad-hoc than other governmental policies (e.g., monetary policy), we also perform several additional exercises to reduce concerns about omitted variable bias. The results of these exercises are not reported for the sake of brevity and, especially, because our findings remain virtually unchanged.¹⁵ We winsorize the sample (rounding outliers to at 1 percent and 99 percent cutoff). We include other control variables such as country specific commodity prices, exchange rate regimes, and the level of debt (as percent of trend GDP). We also drop one country at a time and one year at a time.

medium-horizon effects of social transfers on output, we can safely disregard these drawbacks.

¹⁵These exercises are available upon request to authors.

2.2 Empirical findings

Based on the empirical strategy discussed in the previous subsection, Panels A and B in Figure 1 show the size of STMs in developed (blue color) and Latin American (red color) countries, respectively.¹⁶ Looking at our results, the size of the STM is much larger in Latin American countries than in developed economies, particularly in the short- and medium-term. While the STM in developed countries is 0.3 ($t=2.0$) on impact, it is 0.9 ($t=3.8$), in Latin American economies.¹⁷ In both sets of countries, the peak is reached after one quarter, coming to 0.5 ($t=1.5$) and 1.1 ($t=2.6$) in the developed and Latin American sets, respectively. After the first quarter, the output effects tend to decrease. In other words, while the temporal profile of the STM is similar in both set of countries, the size of the STM in Latin American countries is about three times larger during the short- and medium-term. The evidence of such large STM on a set of emerging markets –Latin American countries in this case– is novel and, to put it mildly, quite shocking, especially with respect to the more modest size of the STM obtained in developed economies. It is worth noting that the size of the STM for developed countries is similar to previous country-specific and panel-data-based empirical findings (e.g., Gechert, 2015; Romer and Romer, 2016; Alesina et al, 2017; Pennings, 2020).

FIGURE 1

As it has been common in this literature, we now analyze which are the main macroeconomic variables involved behind the findings of Panels A and B in Figure 1. Panels C and D in Figure 1 show multiplier estimates, now measuring the effect of social transfers on private consumption. Panels E and F show similar multiplier estimates focusing on the impact on private investment.¹⁸ The empirical findings are quite clear: the output effect observed in Panels A and B are driven by the response of consumption (Panels C and D) as opposed to the statistically insignificant response of investment (Panels E and F). This is true for both developed and Latin American countries. While there is no previous empirical evidence for emerging markets in regards to the relative response in consumption and investment to a social transfers shock, the response estimated for developed countries matches that of previous studies (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2016).

¹⁶Recall that the STM measures the effect of a \$1 change in social transfers on the level of GDP. For example, a STM of 0.7 indicates that an increase in social transfers of \$1 increases GDP by \$0.7.

¹⁷It is worth noting that if one had not excluded the unemployment insurance spending component from specifications (2) and (3), the estimated STM would have been slightly lower, especially for developed countries (STM would have been 0.25 instead of 0.3). This upward bias, especially for the of group of countries with a relatively large presence of unemployment insurance mechanisms, would have wrongfully indicated that the impact of social transfers have less of a positive impact on the economy because of the automatic (and countercyclical!) within the quarter nature of this shock absorber program.

¹⁸These multipliers were estimated the same way as described above for the output multiplier—just changing the dependent variable.

3 Model

We examine the effects of social transfers on output in a closed-economy two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model with two types of agents that differ in their access to financial markets and, therefore, have different marginal propensity to consume. Subsections 3.1 to 3.5 present the model. We follow the Giambattista and Pennings (2017) version of the TANK model very closely. Subsection 3.6 discusses the link between the share of HtM agents and the share of social transfers reaching them which, in turn, helps determine the degree of social transfers targeting. Lastly, Subsection 3.7 shows the STM analytical result of a simplified version of the model which highlights the most salient determinants affecting the size of the STM, including the role played by the share of HtM agents and the share of social transfers reaching them.

3.1 The households' problem

There are two types of households: a Ricardian household, and a HtM household, with population shares $(1 - \alpha)$ and α , respectively.

3.1.1 The Ricardian household's problem

There is a unit mass of individuals, $i \in [0, 1]$, within the Ricardian household (agent 1). These individuals supply differentiated labor inputs to intermediate-goods producers and only differ in their ability to change their nominal wage each period (as wages are sticky à la Calvo). The Ricardian household has access to buy/sell non-contingent bonds in the financial markets (which allows its members to smooth consumption over time) and owns the capital in the economy (which is rented by its members to intermediate-goods firms). Consumption is equalized across individuals within the household due to the existence of Arrow securities (i.e., markets are complete within the household). Each individual at the Ricardian household solves the following problem:

$$\underset{c_{1,t}, b_t, I_t, L_{1,t}(i)}{Max} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\ln(c_{1,t}) - \frac{L_{1,t}(i)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right], \quad (4)$$

subject to the following budget, capital accumulation, and labor demand constraints:

$$c_{1,t} + I_t + b_t = w_{1,t}(i)L_{1,t}(i) + MPK_t K_{t-1} + (R_{t-1}/\pi_t) b_{t-1} + \Pi_t - Tax_{1,t} + (1 - \theta)Tr_t, \quad (5)$$

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + [1 - S(I_t/I_{t-1})] I_t, \quad (6)$$

$$L_{1,t}(i) = (W_{1,t}^*(i)/W_{1,t})^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{1,t}, \quad (7)$$

where β is the intertemporal discount factor, c_t is real consumption, $L_t(i)$ is desired labor hours, φ^{-1} is the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply, I_t is investment, $-b_t$ is real debt, real wages are defined as $w_t(i) = W_t(i)/P_t$, MPK_t is the real gross rate of return on capital, R_{t-1}/π_t is the real interest rate, Π_t are profits from retailers, ε_w is the sticky wage elasticity, $Tax_{1,t}$ is the lump-sum

tax paid to the government, Tr_t are the lump-sum social transfers received from the government by both households, $\theta \in [0, 1]$ captures the share of social transfers reaching the HtM household, and, consequently, $(1 - \theta)$ identifies the share of social transfers “leaking out” to the Ricardian household. If $\theta < 1$, then part of the lump-sum taxes paid by the Ricardian household comes back, also in a lump-sum manner, in the form of social transfers. It is also assumed that the capital adjustment cost follows the expression $S(I_t/I_{t-1})$, where $S(1) = S'(1) = 0$ and $S''(1) > 0$ in steady-state.

3.1.2 The HtM household’s problem

There is a unit mass of individuals, $i \in [0, 1]$, within the HtM household (agent 2). Unlike the Ricardian household, the HtM household is financially constrained (i.e., it cannot lend or borrow) and, consequently, it consumes its entire income each period. Each individual at the HtM household solves the following problem:

$$\underset{c_{2,t}, L_{2,t}(i)}{\text{Max}} \quad E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\ln(c_{2,t}) - \frac{L_{2,t}(i)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right], \quad (8)$$

subject to the following budget and labor demand constraints:

$$c_{2,t} = w_{2,t}(i)L_{2,t}(i) + \theta Tr_t, \quad (9)$$

$$L_{2,t}(i) = (W_{2,t}^*(i)/W_{2,t})^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{2,t}. \quad (10)$$

where, as previously explained, $\theta \in [0, 1]$ captures the share of social transfers reaching the HtM household. On one extreme, when $\theta = 1$, all social transfers reach HtM agents and there are no social transfers “leaking out” to the Ricardian individuals. On the other extreme, when $\theta = 0$, no social transfers reach HtM individuals and all social transfers “leak out” to the Ricardian agents.

3.2 The firms’ problem and sticky prices

There is a continuum unit measure of competitive intermediate-goods producers that rent capital from the Ricardian household and hire differentiated labor inputs from both Ricardian and HtM households, aggregating labor through a Cobb-Douglas production function $Y_t = K_t^\mu L_t^{1-\mu}$, where $L_t = L_{1,t}^{1-\alpha} L_{2,t}^\alpha$.¹⁹ Retailers convert intermediate goods into final goods. Final output, Y_t^f , is produced by a continuum unit of retailers, l , who buy differentiated intermediate goods, Y_t , at price P^{int} in a competitive market, differentiate it at no cost, and sell a variety of final output, $Y_{l,t}$, at price $P_{l,t}$. Aggregate final output and prices are $Y_t^f = (\int_0^1 Y_{l,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dl)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ and $P_t = (\int_0^1 P_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} dl)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$, where $\sigma > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution among varieties. Each retailer takes into account that it may not be able to change their price with probability γ_p when choosing the optimal price. Then

¹⁹ Giambatista and Pennings (2017) show in their Online Appendix 2.1 that when labor across Ricardian and HtM households are perfect substitutes and also coupled with the existence of a labor union, as in Galí et al (2007), the exact same allocations and multipliers are achieved as in the Cobb-Douglas specification. See Giambatista and Pennings (2017) for further details of this equivalence.

prices are sticky à la Calvo and retailers face a downward sloping demand curve for their variety. This optimization problem leads to a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve $\hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \kappa \hat{X}_t$, where a hat (\wedge) denotes a log deviation from steady-state. Variables π and $X = \sigma / (\sigma - 1)$ represent the inflation rate and average mark-up. The parameter $\kappa = (1 - \gamma_p)(1 - \beta\gamma_p)/\gamma_p$ captures the slope of the Phillips curve that determines the responsiveness of inflation and output to demand shocks. The higher the price stickiness (i.e., the larger γ_p) the more firms are not able to change prices to the desired level and, therefore, demand shocks generate a larger response on output. When prices are flexible (i.e., $\gamma_p = 0$ or $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$), demand shocks only affect prices.

The relative price of intermediate goods is defined as the inverse of the retailer's average markup, $P_t^{int}/P_t = 1/X_t$. Then, the marginal product of labor and capital in terms of intermediate goods must be divided by the markup to generate the real marginal product.²⁰ Aggregate real wages are then given by $w_{1t} = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \mu)(1/X_t)(Y_t/L_{1,t})$ and $w_{2t} = \alpha(1 - \mu)(1/X_t)(Y_t/L_{2,t})$.

In steady state, the HtM household receives a share α of labor income, due to the Cobb-Douglas specification. In order to simplify the steady state, it is assumed that the HtM household receives a transfer α of capital income and retailer's profits and pays a share α of government spending. Therefore, the HtM household accounts for a share α of total consumption.

3.3 Sticky wages

Workers are able to set their wages at a steady-state markup above their marginal rate of substitution $\mu_w = \epsilon_w / (\epsilon_w - 1)$, which implies that individuals have market power in their labor supply decisions. The labour supply of Ricardian and HtM households are composites of differentiated labor inputs: $L_{1,t} = \int_0^1 L_{1,t}(i) di$ and $L_{2,t} = \int_0^1 L_{2,t}(i) di$, respectively. Each individual of the Ricardian and HtM households can reset their nominal wage with constant probability $1 - \gamma_w$ in each period. Hence, the (nominal) wage decision of a HtM member i at time $t = 0$ is to choose $W_{2,0}^*(i)$ to maximize (8) subject to (10) and other constraints, taking a lower adjusted discount factor $\beta_2 = \gamma_w \beta$ which incorporates the fact that $W_{2,0}^*(i)$ can be reset in the future. The problem is analogous for the Ricardian individuals. This optimization problem leads to a New Keynesian wage Phillips curve $\hat{\pi}_{k,t}^w = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{k,t+1}^w - \lambda \hat{\mu}_{i,t}^w$, where $\lambda = (1 - \gamma_w)(1 - \gamma_w \beta)/\gamma_w(1 + \varphi\epsilon)$ is the slope of the wage Phillips curve that determines the reaction of wage inflation (and then labor income) to demand shocks, $k = 1, 2$.

3.4 Monetary policy

The Central Bank follows (in a log-linearized form) a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing (ϕ_R) that reacts to deviations of inflation (ϕ_π) and output (ϕ_Y) from steady state:

²⁰ Deviations of Y_t^f from Y_t are second order in the neighbourhood of the steady state, and so in the first-order approximation we have $Y_t^f = Y_t$.

$$\hat{R}_t = \phi_R \hat{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \phi_R)(\phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_Y \hat{Y}_t), \quad (11)$$

where $\hat{R}_t = \ln R_t - \ln R_{ss}$ is the log-deviation of the gross nominal interest rate from steady state.

3.5 Fiscal policy

The Government runs a balanced budget such that unproductive government purchases and social transfers are financed through lump-sum taxes on the Ricardian agents each period:

$$Tax_{1,t} = Tr_t + G_t. \quad (12)$$

As taxes are levied on the unconstrained agents, the timing of the taxes does not affect the multiplier due to Ricardian equivalence. The paths for $\hat{T}r_t$ and \hat{G}_t (where a hat (\wedge) for taxes, social transfers, and government purchases denotes a deviation from steady-state as a share of GDP) are exogenous and follow an AR(1) process $\hat{T}r_{t+1} = \rho \hat{T}r_t + e_{Tr,t+1}$ and $\hat{G}_{t+1} = \rho \hat{G}_t + e_{G,t+1}$ where $e_{Tr,t+1}$ and $e_{G,t+1}$ are a zero-mean i.i.d shock and ρ captures the persistence of the spending shocks. The model is closed by the standard aggregate resource constraint $Y_t = c_{1,t} + c_{2,t} + I_t + G_t$.

3.6 Social transfers targeting

A key aspect of the model is that the marginal propensity to consume of HtM agents (who are financially constrained and cannot lend or borrow) is larger than that of Ricardian agents (who have access to financial markets). This difference makes the fiscal allocation of social transfers between these two types of agents of special relevance and it is captured in the model by the parameter $\theta \in [0, 1]$. The larger the θ , the larger the share of social transfers reaching the HtM agents (see equation 9) and the lower the “leak out” to the Ricardian agents (see equation 5).

Interestingly, the parameter θ does not differentiate whether the social transfers actually reach HtM agents as the result of (i) a special effort by the fiscal authority (either discretionary and/or in terms of social transfer design) to particularly target those HtM agents as opposed to Ricardian agents or, rather, (ii) as the result of the mere existence and representation of HtM individuals in the population (e.g., in an economy largely populated by HtM agents it should be, in principle, quite easy to reach them extensively even without any targeted effort). For this purpose, we decompose θ into two components. One component aims at measuring the social transfers targeting (STT , hereafter) effort, which is defined as the ability to reach HtM agents beyond their share of the population α . That is to say, $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha$. A second component captures the share of HtM agents in the population (captured by parameter α). For example, a high value of θ (e.g., $\theta = 0.8$) could reflect a high prevalence of HtM agents (e.g., $\alpha = 0.8$) coupled with zero targeting (i.e., $STT = 0$) or, on the other hand, be the result of a low prevalence of HtM agents (e.g., $\alpha = 0.2$) along with an important targeting effort in identifying and reaching HtM agents (e.g., $STT = 0.6$). Moreover, social transfers targeting could, in principle, be “misdirected” showing a negative impact in terms

of its targeting (i.e., $STT < 0$) when $\alpha > \theta$. As discussed in the introduction, the current literature generally assumes that social transfers solely reach HtM agents (i.e., $\theta = 1$), which is referred to as perfect social transfers targeting (i.e., $STT = 1 - \alpha$).

While through the lens of the TANK model, understanding the driving forces behind θ (either the fiscal effort in targeting or the result of a larger prevalence of HtM agents) does not seem to be of particular interest, this distinction is relevant both from a conceptual and fiscal policy point of view. While HtM agents' prevalence, α , is a structural parameter considered to be outside of the fiscal policy scope and more related to the degree of economic and financial development as well as economic policies in the financial sector, social transfers targeting (STT) is a key aspect of fiscal policy. Moreover, while a large θ driven by a large α (the extreme case being $\theta = \alpha$ and $STT = 0$), shows that social transfers are able to reach HtM agents “effortlessly” as a byproduct of having too many HtM individuals, a large θ driven by large efforts in social transfers targeting (i.e., $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha \gg 0$) indicates that a certain targeting effort is able to explicitly identify and reach those agents that are actually financially constrained. In fact, Section 4 shows cross-country evidence supporting that, when considering all types of social transfers, the share of social transfers reaching the HtM agents, θ , is, by and large, reflecting the prevalence of HtM agents, α , and less so social transfers targeting, STT .

3.7 Analytical STM from a simplified model

In this subsection, we show an analytical expression for the STM considering a simplified version of the model which makes the STM constant over time:²¹

$$STM \equiv \frac{dY}{dTr} = \theta \left[(1 - \alpha) + \Gamma \frac{\kappa(\varphi + 1)}{(1 - \rho\beta)} \right]^{-1} > 0 \quad (13)$$

where $\Gamma = [(1 - \alpha)(\phi_\pi - \rho) / (1 - \rho)] - [\alpha(1 - \rho\beta) / \kappa] > 0$. From STM expression (13) it is straightforward to show that: (i) $dSTM/d\phi_\pi < 0$ (a larger ϕ_π makes Ricardian agents cut their consumption more as the real interest rate goes up), (ii) $dSTM/d\varphi^{-1} > 0$ (due to larger labor supply effects), (iii) $dSTM/d\rho < 0$ (because a lower ρ reduces the need of Ricardian agents to cut their consumption due to lower labor supply effects), (iv) $dSTM/d\gamma_p > 0$ (demand shocks have larger effects on output rather than on prices), (v) $dSTM/d\alpha > 0$ (mainly because a larger share of HtM agents, α , increase the average marginal propensity to consume of the economy), (vi) $dSTM/d\theta > 0$ (as social transfers particularly reach those HtM agents with high marginal propensity to consume).²²

²¹In particular, following Giambattista and Pennings (2017), it is assumed flexible wages ($\lambda \rightarrow \infty$), no capital ($\mu \rightarrow 0$), no steady state government spending ($G_{ss} = 0$), a simplified Taylor rule where nominal interest rates only respond to contemporaneous inflation ($\phi_R = 0$ and $\phi_Y = 0$), a wage subsidy in steady-state equal to $s_{ss} = X_{ss} - 1$, that the Taylor principle holds ($\phi_\pi > 1$), and that the HtM share is not too high ($\alpha < (2 + \varphi)^{-1}$).

²²It is worth noting that the empirical evidence obtained from properly adding interaction terms to empirical specification (3) with respect to country-varying variables ρ , α , and θ (see Sections 4 and 5 for measurement details) deliver the model-based sign estimates. Results are not shown for brevity.

It is important to note that while having a larger share of HtM agents, α , or a bigger share of social transfers reaching the HtM agents, θ , increases the size of the STM, these increases are in and of itself associated with lower and higher levels of well-being, respectively. Why? Because a larger α points to more individuals not being able to smooth consumption, whereas a bigger θ depicts more social transfers being allocated to constrained individuals. In other words, while having a larger α amplifies the effect of a social transfer shock, it is not something that, naturally, should be commended as desirable.

4 The share of HtM individuals and the share of social transfer reaching them in data

Given the nature of our contribution, it is essential to be able to measure the share of HtM individuals, α , as well as the share of social transfers reaching them, θ . As discussed in the introduction, no paper disciplines the share of social transfers reaching HtM agents, θ , by data. It is generally assumed that social transfers solely reach HtM agents (i.e., $\theta = 1$), which is referred to as perfect social transfers targeting. Regarding the share of HtM agents, α , quantitative papers estimating STMs for the United States (Giambattista and Pennings, 2017; Pennings, 2020) discipline the share of HtM agents to one-third based on Kaplan et al. (2014). There have been two main strategies to identify HtM agents in the United States and other developed countries.

A first group of studies relies on survey data on household portfolios, with an emphasis on savings, net worth, and the liquidity of assets (e.g., Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Kaplan et al., 2014; Aguiar et al. 2020). In their seminal paper, Kaplan et al. (2014) find that between 25 and 40 percent of United States households are HtM, with their preferred estimate being one-third. Of all HtM households, about one-third are poor HtM (who hold little or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth) and two-thirds are wealthy HtM (who also hold little or no liquid wealth but have significant amounts of illiquid assets on their balance sheets, led by real estate properties). Just like the poor HtM households, wealthy HtM households have a large marginal propensity to consume out of small transitory income shocks (Kreiner et al. 2012; Broda and Parker, 2014; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2014). Kaplan et al. (2014) also measure the shares of HtM households (expressed in percentage terms) for eight other developed countries finding modest heterogeneity among developed countries: Australia (19), Canada (30), France (21), Germany (32), Italy (24), Spain (20), and United Kingdom (33).

A second group of studies notes that holding assets is not the only means to cope with an unexpected financial shock. For example, individuals can also have access to credit or depend on the help of family and friends, among many other ways and margins to cope with a financial shock. These studies rely on surveys based on self-assessed measures of one's capacity to deal with financial shocks, regardless of whether the source of funds is the respondent's own assets, capacity to borrow,

a network of family and friends, or something else (e.g., Johnson and Widdows, 1985; Worthington, 2004; Lusardi et al., 2011; Vandone et al., 2011; Brunetti et al., 2016). For example, in an influential paper, Lusardi et al. (2011) conducted a survey for a total of 9,148 individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 in the United States (where 2,148 individuals were surveyed) and other seven developed countries (with about 1,000 respondents per country) between June and September of 2009. Their essential strategy to identify financially fragile households relied on the following question: “How confident are you that you could come up with \$2,000 if an unexpected need arose within the next month?” The \$2,000 figure is chosen because it is of the same order of magnitude as the cost of an unanticipated major car repair, a large co-payment on a medical expense, a legal expense, or a home repair. For the survey conducted in the United States, 22 percent of households responded with certainty that they would not be able to come up with the funds and some other 28 percent reported that they would probably not be able to come up with those funds.

4.1 Database used

We use individual-level data from the World Bank’s Global Findex which is a comprehensive database on how individuals 15 years old and above save, borrow, make payments, and manage financial risk. The data are collected in partnership with Gallup through nationally-representative surveys of more than 150,000 adults in over 140 economies (i.e., covers about 1,000 individuals per country as in Lusardi et al. 2011). Global Findex has been published every three years since 2011. We use its latest survey for the year 2017 because it allows one to identify all types of social transfers. Previous surveys of 2011 and 2014 did not include public pensions (this is of particular importance for our paper because the empirical evidence shown in Section 2 includes all types of social transfers). The country samples were designed to be nationally representative and were subsequently weighted to reflect each country’s population. Given the focus on emerging markets and developed countries, we exclude from our descriptive analysis what the IMF classifies as “low-income developing countries.” In total, we end up with 99 countries (including those 23 countries of our developed and Latin American sample). In particular, the Global Findex database includes two sets of questions to each surveyed individual which are essential for our purposes of measuring α and θ :

- Question FIN24 asks: “Now, imagine that you have an emergency and you need to pay [1/20 of GNI per capita in local currency]. Is it possible or not possible that you could come up with [1/20 of GNI per capita in local currency] within the next month?” The possible answers were “yes” or “no”.²³ We use this question, like in the second group of studies which rely on self-assessed measures of capacity to deal with financial shocks, to calculate the share of HtM individuals, α .

²³In the case of the United States, this 1/20 of GNI per capita in local currency for the year 2017 was equivalent to 2,380 dollars which is very similar to Lusardi et al. (2011).

- Questions FIN37 and FIN38 ask if “[i]n the past 12 months, have you, personally, received any financial support from the government? This money could include payments for educational or medical expenses, unemployment benefits, subsidy payments, or any kind of social benefits. Please do not include wages or any payments related to work” and “[i]n the past 12 months, have you, personally, received a pension from the government, military, or public sector?”, respectively. The possible answers were “yes” or “no”. We use these question to identify the share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals, θ .

4.2 Share of HtM individuals is more than twice as large in emerging markets

Figure 2 shows the share of HtM individuals, α , in each country. Red bars depict emerging markets while blue bars indicate developed countries. For ease of reading, countries with labels correspond to those used in our sample of six Latin American and 17 developed ones. The visual impression is striking: a majority of blue bars lie to the left of the figure and the majority of red bars lie to the right (indicating a larger share of HtM individuals in emerging countries). In fact, the average share of HtM individuals is twice as large in emerging countries as in developed countries (47.5 percent vs. 23.8 percent, with a statistically significant difference). For our sample of six Latin American countries, the average share of HtM individuals is even larger, reaching 60 percent.²⁴

FIGURE 2

While using a different period of coverage, measure, and identification strategy, this evidence seems to match fairly well that of country-specific studies. For example, for Mexico, we find that 72 percent of individuals are HtM and Cugat (2019) finds that for years 2016-2018 about 58 percent of Mexican households have no access to formal financial markets. For the United States, we find that 27 percent of individuals are HtM and Kaplan et al. (2014) find that for the period 1989-2010 between 25 and 40 percent of American households are HtM, with their preferred estimate being one-third. For Korea, we find that 20 percent of individuals are HtM and Song (2019) finds that for the period 2012-2017 between 25 and 30 percent of households are HtM. For Japan, we find that 18 percent of individuals are HtM and Hara et al. (2016) find, following Kaplan et al. (2014)’s approach, that the share of HtM is about 13 percent for the years 1989-2009.

Appendix 3 provides further evidence regarding key characteristics about the nature and main characteristics of HtM and non-HtM. First, it shows evidence that while a vast majority of non-HtM individuals in the developed world would rely on savings to cope with a financial shock, the top source of funding of individuals living in emerging markets would be aid from family, relatives,

²⁴It is worth noting that the Global Findex survey of 2014 would reach virtually identical results regarding the share of HtM individuals, α , with emerging (developed) countries showing slightly lower (higher) values of α , of about 2 percentage points.

and friends. Furthermore, in both set of countries, few individuals would rely on selling assets for providing support, so illiquid wealth (such as real estate properties) does not seem to be important for dealing with a financial shock. Second, and using information on whether individuals have a standing property loan, there is strong evidence that wealthy HtM individuals are also present in emerging markets (and not solely in developed countries). Interestingly, yet not surprisingly, while wealthy HtM represent an important share of all HtM individuals in developed countries, it is less the case in emerging markets where the HtM phenomenon is largely driven by poor HtM individuals. Lastly, this appendix analyzes whether the capacity to deal with a financial shock varies across several plausible relevant economic and demographic, individual and household, characteristics. As in previous studies relying on data from developed countries, individuals living in households with higher income, greater educational attainment, male, and employed show a higher capacity to deal with a financial shock, both in developed and in emerging countries (with even similar predicting capacity values among these groups of countries).

4.3 Evidence on allocation of social transfers

Figure 3 shows the share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals, θ . This is the first study showing evidence about this very important aspect of social transfer fiscal policy.²⁵ There is a much larger share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals in emerging countries. In fact, the average share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals is about twice as large in emerging countries as it is in developed countries (45.7 percent vs. 23.4 percent, with a statistically significant difference). For our sample of six Latin American countries, the average share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals is even larger, achieving 64.6 percent.

FIGURE 3

Figure 4 shows the relationship between the share of HtM individuals, α , (x-axis), and the share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals, θ , (y-axis). Most countries, both developed and emerging, lie very closely to the 45 degree line, implying that the higher the share of HtM individuals, the higher the share of social transfers that reach HtM individuals.²⁶ Alternatively, Figure 5 shows the relationship between the share of HtM individuals, α , (x-axis), and social transfers targeting, STT , (y-axis), depicting no systematic relationship between STT (recall $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha$) and α .²⁷ In other words, when considering the universe of all types of social transfers, countries' ability to reach

²⁵Naturally, there is a large related micro-literature focusing on how specific social programs can reach and impact vulnerable people based on their income levels, poverty status, and other socioeconomic/demographic aspects (e.g., Grosh, 1992; Gasparini et al., 2013; Cruces and Gasparini, 2012).

²⁶In fact, and based on a simple regression of θ against α , we cannot reject the hypothesis that such a coefficient equals statistically one for the whole sample of countries (as well as for industrial and emerging markets separately).

²⁷Based on a simple regression of STT against α , we cannot reject the hypothesis that such a coefficient equals statistically zero for the whole sample of countries (as well as for industrial and emerging markets separately).

HtM individuals seems to mainly reflect the prevalence of HtM individuals, α , as opposed to a fiscal targeting effort aimed to reach HtM individuals beyond their population representation. Therefore, social transfers in emerging markets are able to reach those HtM individuals mainly because a large part of its population is in the HtM group as opposed to a particularly exceptional targeting of social transfers. The same lack of evidence of high-quality social transfers targeting holds also true in developed countries.

FIGURES 4 AND 5

5 Quantitative results from the TANK model

Armed with the ability to measure α and θ , we now proceed to solve the TANK model presented in Section 3 numerically in order to analyze the extent to which a standard calibrated TANK model is able to match key empirical regularities shown in Section 2 in terms of the size, main macroeconomic variables involved, and temporal profile of the STM for both the developed and the Latin American samples.²⁸ Initially, in our benchmark calibration, and in order to direct our attention to the role played by α and θ , we calibrate the rest of parameters based on values frequently used in the literature for developed countries. Later, we also allow other parameter values (other than α and θ) to be calibrated for Latin American countries and find, indeed, very similar results to our benchmark calibration due to the actual dominant role played by α and θ . Some parameter calibration values deserve special attention. A key mechanism in the literature on fiscal multipliers is the reaction of the nominal interest rate to inflation and output gaps by central banks (i.e., parameters ϕ_π and ϕ_Y in the Taylor rule of equation 11). We follow Iacoviello (2005) in choosing a value of $\phi_\pi = 1.27$, $\phi_Y = 0.13$, and $\phi_R = 0.73$. The persistence parameter $\rho = 0.86$ is based on our own estimates.²⁹ The rest of parameter values are selected as follows: Frisch elasticity $\varphi^{-1} = 1$ (as in Christiano et al., 2005), discount rate $\beta = 0.995$, Calvo probabilities $\gamma_p = \gamma_w = 0.75$ (from Barattieri et al., 2014), sticky wage elasticity $\varepsilon_w = 20.50$ (matching 5% unemployment rate), steady-state government purchases $G_{ss} = 0.20$ (from World Development Indicators), steady-state capital adjustment cost $S'' = 1.5$ (from Altig et al., 2011) as well as depreciation rate $\delta = 0.016$, average mark-up $X = 1.10$, and capital share $\mu = 0.30$ (in order to match K/Y from KLEMS). Measurement and sources of data regarding parameters α and θ were discussed in detail in Section 4. In particular, we take the average α and θ for each sample in the Latin American and developed groups (i.e., $\alpha_{Developed} = 0.23$, $\theta_{Developed} = 0.25$, $\alpha_{Latin\ America} = 0.60$, $\theta_{Latin\ America} = 0.65$).³⁰

²⁸We would like to thank Steven Pennings for sharing the Dynare code from Giambattista and Pennings (2017).

²⁹In particular, we estimate autorregressive social transfers growth regressions with a time trend for each country. The reported parameter ρ represents the median autorregressive coefficient for the entire sample of countries. It is worth noting that while the median point estimates are slightly different for the developed (0.87) and Latin American samples (0.84), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are statistically the same.

³⁰It is also worth noting that the standard deviation of α within each sample of countries is relatively low: 7 percent and 9 percent in Latin American and industrial countries, respectively. On the contrary, for the joint sample it is 17 percent. The equivalent percentages for θ are 7 and 10 for Latin American and industrial countries, respectively. On

Figure 6 compares STMs, on impact, from the calibrated TANK model (dotted bars) with the empirical estimates shown previously in Section 2 (solid bars). Panel A shows the size of STMs both for the developed and Latin American countries. Panel B presents the difference in STMs between these two groups. Panel A shows that the calibrated TANK model is largely able to account for the observed empirical evidence. The TANK model delivers much larger STMs for the Latin American sample than for the developed one. The quantitative STM delivered by the model on impact is 0.21 in developed countries and 0.92 in the Latin American sample. Notably, these results are well within the reported 90 percent statistical range associated with the empirical STM estimates which are associated with STM point estimates of 0.31 in developed countries and 0.90 in the Latin American sample.³¹ As observed in the empirical estimates, most of the macroeconomic effect of the social transfer shock is driven by the reaction of private consumption as opposed to private investment. In other words, much like the findings of papers focused on developed countries, the effect on output mainly occurs through consumption while private investment remains virtually unchanged. Panel B shows, now focusing on the difference in size of STMs, that findings from Panel A imply that the model also accounts for the observed differences between these two groups of countries. For example, the difference in the effect of social transfers on output based on the model is 0.71 (second dotted grey bar) which is well within the reported 90 percent statistical range associated with the empirical evidence of 0.58 (first solid grey bar).

FIGURE 6

Four other aspects of the quantitative results are worth noting. First, the long-run multiplier is also about 4 times larger in Latin American countries (with a STM equal to 0.15) than in the developed sample (with a STM of 0.04).³² Second, as shown in Figure 7, the model is also able to match quite well the temporal profile depicted in the empirical estimates of Section 2. In fact, the rank-correlations observed in GDP, consumption, and investment between the quantitative results of the model and the empirical estimates range between 0.73 and 0.95 (in all cases statistically significant). Panel A shows that the STM is, on impact, four times larger in Latin American countries than in developed economies. Panel B shows that in the aftermath of the social transfer shock, private consumption increases (especially in Latin American countries) to the detriment of investment. This is naturally the result of Ricardian agents having a special double task, to pay lump-sum taxes as well as to be the investors of this economy. Therefore, a social transfer shock

the contrary, for the joint sample it is 18 percent.

³¹As a reference, if one had used the usual assumption in the literature that social transfers only reach HtM agents, known as perfect social transfers targeting (i.e., $\theta = 1$), the implied quantitative STMs would have been much larger and disconnected with our empirical estimates. In particular, the quantitative STMs would have been 0.83 for the developed countries and 1.42 for the Latin American economies.

³²The long-run multiplier is defined as the discounted sum of changes in output divided by the discounted sum of changes in social transfers.

which increases the need to raise taxes induces Ricardian agents to reduce investment in order to cope with the new taxes. Since the Latin American economies have a much lower share of Ricardian agents than their developed counterparts, such a temporal shift of components of GDP is amplified in this group of emerging markets.

FIGURE 7

Third, we now analyze how much of the difference in the effect of social transfers on output depicted by the model (i.e., 0.71) reflects the prevalence of HtM individuals, α , vis-à-vis the fiscal targeting effort aimed to reach HtM individuals beyond their population representation as depicted by the STT (recall that $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha$). Recall that while the share of HtM agents, α , is a structural parameter considered to be outside of the fiscal policy scope and more related to the degree of economic and financial development as well as economic policies in the financial sector, social transfer targeting, STT , is a key aspect of fiscal policy, especially determined by θ . Naturally, since in the benchmark parametrization only α and θ are allowed to vary, these two mechanisms jointly account, by design, for all the difference in the effect of social transfers on output depicted by the model. Also recall that, as discussed in Subsection 4.3, based on a large sample of countries, generally $\alpha \approx \theta$, which in turn implies that $STT \approx 0$. That is to say, when considering the universe of all types of social transfers, countries' ability to reach HtM individuals seems to mainly reflect the prevalence of HtM individuals, α , as opposed to a fiscal targeting effort aimed to reach HtM individuals beyond their population representation (i.e., there is very little social transfer targeting). This global regularity does not escape to our developed and Latin American samples where $\alpha_{Developed} = 0.23$, $\alpha_{Latin\ American} = 0.60$, $STT_{Developed} = 0.02$ and $STT_{Latin\ American} = 0.05$. While Latin American countries have a much larger share of HtM individuals, α , than developed countries, social transfers targeting, STT , is very similar across both samples of countries.³³ It should prove no surprise then that while the difference in the share of HtM individuals, α , explains 91 percent of the STM size difference between developed and Latin American countries, the share of social transfers reaching them, STT , explains 9 percent of such difference.³⁴ In other words, when considering all types of social transfers, Latin American countries depict large STMs mainly as a consequence of having, unfortunately, a large part of its population being HtM individuals as opposed to a particularly exceptional targeting of social transfers.³⁵

Lastly, we now allow other parameter values (other than α and θ) to be calibrated for Latin

³³It is also worth noting that the standard deviation of STT within each sample of countries is relatively low: 2.9 percent and 2.2 percent in Latin American and developed countries, respectively. The same holds true when using the joint sample: 2.6 percent.

³⁴Using the baseline calibration for developed economies, the counterfactual multiplier when the economy has $\alpha_{Latin\ American} = 0.60$ and $STT_{Latin\ American} = 0.05$ (i.e. $\theta_{Latin\ American} = 0.65$) is equal to $STM = 0.65$. Therefore, it explains 91 percent of the difference: $(0.71 - 0.65)/0.71 * 100 = 91$. The remaining 9 percent difference in the STM is explained by the fact that $STT_{Latin\ American} = 0.05$.

³⁵Appendix 4 shows on-impact STMs values using our benchmark calibration and combinations of α and θ which are allowed to vary between 0 and 1. This exercise provides additional insights as to the relative importance of α vis-à-vis θ driving large STMs.

American countries. In particular we follow De Mello and Moccero (2011) who find more accommodative Taylor rules in Latin America (in particular, $\phi_\pi = 1.19$, $\phi_Y = 0.01$, and $\phi_R = 0.61$). Other parameter values are selected as follows for Latin American countries: discount rate $\beta = 0.988$, sticky wage elasticity $\varepsilon_w = 10.50$ (matching 10% unemployment rate), steady-state government purchases $G_{ss} = 0.19$ (from World Development Indicators), and capital share $\mu = 0.35$ (in order to match K/Y from KLEMS). Since macroeconomic and inflation volatility is larger in emerging markets, the price-setting behavior in those countries is less rigid (see Barros et al., 2009, for Brazil). For this reason, we calibrate a higher frequency of price adjustments in developing countries (1.5 times a year relative to once a year in the developed world). This implies Calvo probabilities $\gamma_p = \gamma_w = 0.625$. Based on this alternative calibration exercise, the quantitative STM delivered by the model on impact is 0.84 in the Latin American sample, only 0.08 smaller than the benchmark calibration. Moreover, the prevalence of HtM individuals, α , and the fiscal targeting effort aimed to reach HtM individuals beyond their population representation, STT , help explains about 80 and 8 percent, respectively, of the overall difference in the effect of social transfers on output depicted by the model (i.e., 0.71). This implies that about 12 percent of the overall difference in the effect of social transfers on output depicted by the model (i.e., 0.71) is explained by other parameter differences between developed and Latin American countries.³⁶

To sum up, a standard calibrated TANK model is able to match key STM empirical regularities shown in Section 2 in terms of the crucial role of the higher share of financially constrained individuals who live HtM in the Latin American sample relative to the developed countries has in explaining the the large difference in the size of STMs previously estimated as well as regarding the main macroeconomic variables involved, and temporal profile for both the developed and Latin American samples.

6 Final thoughts

Based on novel empirical evidence and quantitative results, we have shown the critical implications of having large shares of financially constrained individuals on the size of the STM. A larger share of individuals living hand-to-mouth causes social transfer shocks to easily reach individuals with a high marginal propensity to consume which, in turn, increases aggregate consumption and output. For this reason, the effect on output is mainly driven by consumption while investment remains mostly unchanged. These findings coupled with the evidence supporting a larger share of HtM agents in emerging markets (beyond that of our six Latin American countries), suggest that a larger STM may be justified for emerging market economies in general.

Two further reflections emerge from our analysis, especially when translating our findings into

³⁶In particular, 6 percent is due to differences in monetary policy, 4 percent given by heterogeneity in nominal rigidities and 2 percent of the difference by others factors.

fiscal policy action. First, given the large size that the STM can achieve especially in emerging markets, social transfers emerge as a natural fiscal policy tool to help vulnerable families who are financially constrained and at the same time help the economy to recover faster. In this sense, social transfers seem to provide an inclusive manner to deal with temporary and deep recessions, like during the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, because most of the effect of a social transfer shock impacts the economy especially in the short- and medium-run (as opposed to having truly long-lasting effects) and through private consumption (as opposed to via increasing the economy's productive capacity and investment), this type of fiscal policy tool is far from ideal to increase long-term growth and productivity.

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
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
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Figure 1. Social transfer multipliers:
Empirical estimation for Latin American and developed countries


**Panel A. Effect on GDP
in developed countries**




**Panel B. Effect on GDP
in Latin American countries**




**Panel C. Effect on private consumption
in developed countries**




**Panel D. Effect on private consumption
in Latin American countries**



**Panel E. Effect on investment
in developed countries**



**Panel F. Effect on investment
in Latin American countries**



Notes: The STM measures the effect of a \$1 change in social transfers on the level of GDP (Panels A and B), consumption (Panels C and D), and investment (Panels E and F). Dark, medium, and light areas show standard errors at 68, 90, and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure 2. Country share of hand-to-mouth individuals




Figure 3. Country share of social transfers reaching hand-to-mouth individuals






Figure 4. Country share of social transfers reaching hand-to-mouth individuals vs. share of hand-to-mouth individuals




Notes: Authors' calculation based on Global Findex database.

Figure 5. Country social transfers targeting vs. share of hand-to-mouth individuals




Notes: Authors' calculation based on Global Findex database.

Figure 6. Social transfer multipliers:
Empirical estimation versus model quantitative results
Panel A. Size of social transfer multipliers




Panel B. Difference in size of social transfer multipliers



Notes: Standard errors depict 90 percent statistical significance error bands.

Figure 7. Social transfer multipliers: Model quantitative results



Appendices

Appendix 1. Data definitions and sources

All series are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. If they are not seasonally adjusted from the original source, we apply a seasonal adjustment following the U.S. Census Bureau's X-13ARIMA-SEATSX-13. All series are expressed in millions of national currency, in constant prices, deflated using the implicit GDP deflator derived from quarterly national accounts for each country.³⁷

GDP, private consumption, private investment (gross fixed capital formation to be precise), and GDP deflator sources: Argentina (Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales, INDEC), Brazil (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE), Chile (Banco Central de Chile), Colombia (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE), Mexico (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, INEGI), Peru (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, BCRP), United States (Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), and European countries (Eurostat [Last update: 16.09.19. Extracted on: 17.09.19]).

Social transfers sources: Argentina (Dirección Nacional de Política Fiscal y de Ingresos. Subsecretaría de Programación Macroeconómica. Secretaría de Política Económica, Ministerio de Hacienda), Brazil (STN, IBGE, IPEA e BCB), Chile (Dirección de Presupuestos (DIPRES) / Banco Central de Chile), Colombia (Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público), Mexico (Dirección General de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública. Unidad de Planeación Económica de la Hacienda Pública.), Peru (Government Finance Statistics (GFS) - IMF), United States (Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), and European countries (Eurostat [Last update: 19.07.19. Extracted on: 17.09.19]).

Total government spending and revenues: Argentina (Ministerio de Economía en base a datos de la Secretaría de Hacienda), Brazil (STN, IBGE, IPEA e BCB), Chile (Dirección de Presupuestos (DIPRES) / Banco Central de Chile), Colombia (Dirección General de Política Macroeconómica, Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público), Mexico (Dirección General de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública. Unidad de Planeación Económica de la Hacienda Pública.), Peru (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Banco de la Nación), United States (Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), and European countries (Eurostat [Last update: 19.07.19. Extracted on: 17.09.19]).

Central bank interest rates: Global Financial Data and central banks' websites.

Sample period to the estimation of social transfer multipliers: Argentina (2004Q1-2019Q4), Austria (2001Q1-2019Q1), Belgium (1995Q1-2019Q1), Brazil (2010Q1-2019Q4), Chile (2005Q1-2019Q4), Colombia (2000Q1-2018Q4), Denmark (1999Q1-2019Q1), Finland (1999Q1-2019Q1), France (1980Q1-2019Q1), Germany (2002Q1-2019Q1), Greece (1999Q1-2019Q1), Ireland (2002Q1-2019Q1), Italy (1999Q1-2019Q1), Luxembourg (2015Q1-2019Q1), Mexico (2007Q1-2019Q1), Netherlands (1999Q1-2019Q1), Norway (2002Q1-2019Q1), Peru (1995Q1-2018Q4), Portugal (1999Q1-2019Q1), Spain (1995Q1-2019Q1), Sweden (1995Q1-2019Q1), United Kingdom (1987Q1-2019Q1), and United States (1960Q1-2019Q4).

³⁷IMF (2017). Quarterly National Accounts Manual. Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund, 2017 Edition, Washington, D.C.

Appendix 2. Country share of HtM individuals, share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals, and social transfers targeting

Table A.2.1 shows the country share of HtM individuals (α), share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals (θ), and social transfers targeting (STT) from Global Findex (based on its latest survey for the year 2017).

TABLE A.2.1

Appendix 3. Basic facts of HtM and non-HtM individuals

On top of questions FIN24, FIN37, and FIN38 (already discussed in the main text, sub-section 4.1), in this Appendix, we also used the following questions from Global Findex Data to help characterize basic relevant facts of HtM and non-HtM individuals:

- Question FIN25 (which is included in the financial resilience section) asks the surveyed individual in case of responding positive to FIN24 “What would be the main source of money that you would use to come up with [1/20 of GNI per capita in local currency] within the next month?” The possible answers being one of the following: “savings”, “family, relatives, or friends” or “money from working”, “borrowing from a bank, employer, or private lender”, “selling assets”, or “some other source”. We use this question to show that while savings is the most important (yet hardly the single) mechanism to cope with a financial shock in the developed world, it is more limited in emerging markets where “family, relatives, or friends” seem to be more relevant. We also show that selling assets is not very relevant either in developed or emerging markets supporting that illiquid wealth does not seem to be very relevant in dealing with a financial shock.
- Question FIN19 (which is included in the borrowing section) asks the surveyed individual “[d]o you, by yourself or together with someone else, currently have a loan you took out from a bank or another type of formal financial institution to purchase a home, apartment, or land?”, respectively. The possible answers being “yes” or “no”. We use this question to provide an insight regarding the so-called wealthy HtM individuals identified in previous studies for developed countries. In particular, we distinguish HtM individuals into those having a property loan (as a proxy of a particular type of relevant wealthy HtM individual) and those not having a property loan (as a proxy of the so-called poor HtM).
- Individual characteristic variables regarding income, educational attainment, age, sex, and labor status, in particular depending on whether the individual is part of the workforce and his/her employment status.

3.1. How relevant are individual savings to deal with a financial shock?

Figure A.3.1 shows the main source of funds non-HtM individuals report would use to deal with a financial shock. In line with the literature available for developed countries which relies on liquid wealth (as opposed to total wealth which also includes illiquid assets, e.g. houses), individuals from this set of countries would mainly rely on savings (see blue bars in Panel A) and very little on selling assets (see blue bars in Panel E). In fact, the main reliance of non-HtM individuals on savings as a source to cope with a financial shock in developed economies is of 59.3 percent, distantly followed by funds originating from family, relatives, or friends (with an average of 16 percent) and money

from working (with an average of 12.9 percent). On the other hand, selling assets as a main source of funding is supported only by 1.4 percent of non-HtM individuals.

FIGURE A.3.1

Notably, while still important, savings are much less relevant in emerging markets. In fact, the funds originating from family, relatives, or friends are, on average, 36.6 percent (i.e., more than twice of that depicted in developed countries), followed by savings and money from work (representing 28.3 and 24.2 percent, respectively). It is also worth noting that, in emerging markets, the share of non-HtM individuals asserting to the selling of assets to deal with a financial shock is also very low and virtually identical to that observed in the developed economies. On average, only 1.5 percent of non-HtM individuals in emerging markets would rely on selling assets which, in turn, also support that liquid wealth seems to be more relevant in dealing with a financial shock in this part of the world.

3.2. Wealthy HtM individuals: Does this kind also exist in emerging markets?

We now explore the relevance of wealthy HtM arguments outside the developed world. Unfortunately, we do not have rich portfolio data. However, we can identify whether HtM individuals have a real estate property loan or not. While not ideal, this is very relevant information because, as discussed in great detail in Kaplan et al. (2014), housing wealth is an important source of wealth behind wealthy HtM and because between 50 and 70 percent of owner-occupied homes have a mortgage in developed countries.³⁸ For example, Kaplan et al. (2014) find that HtM households due to “only house wealth” is about 6 percent of all households in the United States and 2 percent in Germany.

Panels A and B in Figure A.3.2 split the share of HtM individuals reported in Figure 2, into those who have a standing property loan and those who do not. Making a stretch in the use of the words, we refer to the share of wealthy HtM (α_W) and poor HtM (α_P). Panel A shows that, like in the developed world, wealthy HtM individuals are also present in emerging markets. On average, the share of wealthy HtM is 4.1 and 3.6 in developed and emerging markets, respectively.³⁹ Interestingly, yet not surprising, Panel B in Figure A.3.2 shows that while wealthy HtM constitute a relevant share of the population in developed countries, it is less so in emerging markets where the HtM phenomenon is largely driven by poor HtM individuals. On average, the share of poor HtM is 17.1 and 39.1 in developed and emerging markets, respectively.

FIGURE A.3.2

2.3. Main characteristics of HtM individuals

We now analyze whether the capacity to deal with a financial shock varies across several plausible relevant economic and demographic individual and household characteristics available in Global Findex. Table A.3.1 shows the share of HtM individuals by household income quintile, education level, age, sex, and labor status, in particular depending on whether the individual is part of

³⁸See, for example, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-many-homeowners-have-paid-off-their-mortgages/> and <https://www.statista.com/statistics/957803/homeowners-with-and-without-an-outstanding-mortgage-in-eu-28-per-country/#:~:text=An%20average%20of,like%20the%20Netherlands%20and%20Sweden..>

³⁹It is worth noting that our findings based on a not ideal measure are quite similar to those relying on more sophisticated analysis for industrial countries like in Kaplan et al. (2014). For example, Panel A reports that in Figure A.3.2 the share of HtM individuals with property loan is 4.6 percent in the United States and 1.5 percent in Germany.

the workforce and his/her employment status. Table A.3.2 reports marginal effects from probit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is HtM and 0 if he/she is not HtM; both one-characteristic-at-a-time and all of them jointly. Both tables report these relevant data for all countries as well as for emerging and developed countries separately.

TABLE A.3.1 AND TABLE A.3.2

The findings support that individuals with higher household income, greater educational attainment, male, and employed report a higher capacity to deal with a financial shock, both in developed and emerging countries (with even similar R^2 values among these groups). The main discrepancy between developed and emerging countries is related to the relevance of age. While in emerging markets the older the individual, the lower their capacity to deal with a financial shock, in developed countries, respondents aged 15 to 34 report themselves as being more financially vulnerable. All in all, the relevance of this set of economic and demographic characteristics as well as their ability to predict HtM individuals is comparable to previous studies. These findings are broadly consistent with those of other studies focusing on the developed world (e.g., Lusardi et al., 2011). Moreover, if one also included all possible interactions among these economic and demographic characteristics, the R^2 would reach about one-third (regression results are not shown for the sake of brevity).

Appendix 4. Additional insights regarding the relative importance of α vis-à-vis θ driving large STMs

Table A.4.1 shows on-impact STMs values using our benchmark calibration and combinations of α and θ which are allowed to vary between 0 and 1 in 0.05 intervals. The shaded cells indicate combinations of α and θ such that $STT < 0$. Recall that since $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha$, then $STT < 0$ implies that $\alpha > \theta$.

TABLE A.4.1

This exercise provides additional insights as to the relative importance of α vis-a-vis θ driving large STMs. In particular, the results show that it is not feasible to obtain truly large on-impact STMs (e.g., $STM > 1$) for low to moderate values of the share of HtM individuals, α , (e.g., $\alpha < 0.4$). This implies that, in spite of important social transfers targeting efforts, even if θ was the maximum possible (i.e., $\theta = 1$), in order to be able to achieve truly large on-impact STM, there exists the need to have large propagation forces via high average marginal propensity to consume, which can only be achieved by having a relatively large share of HtM individuals, α . In the extreme, for a sufficiently high share of HtM individuals, α , (e.g., $\alpha > 0.8$) it is possible to have truly large STMs even when θ is low enough such that $STT < 0$. This quantitative importance of the share of HtM individuals, α , provides another relevant dimension as to how to rationalize its practical importance in determining the size of STM in Latin America as well as in other emerging market economies with high prevalence of HtM individuals.

Figure A.2.1. Country share of HtM individuals (α), share of social transfers reaching HtM individuals (θ), and social transfers targeting (STT)

Country	α	θ	STT	Our Sample	Country	α	θ	STT	Our Sample
Albania	47.1	58.2	11.2	0	Kuwait	55.0	48.9	-6.1	0
Algeria	33.4	33.2	-0.2	0	Latvia	40.4	41.1	0.8	0
Argentina	64.5	70.7	6.2	1	Lebanon	18.4	11.3	-7.1	0
Armenia	56.6	67.5	10.9	0	Libya	28.7	24.9	-3.8	0
Australia	19.2	23.3	4.1	0	Lithuania	28.0	32.6	4.7	0
Austria	22.9	28.0	5.1	1	Luxembourg	21.1	24.8	3.7	1
Azerbaijan	43.5	46.4	3.0	0	Macedonia, FYR	25.4	27.2	1.8	0
Bahrain	43.5	48.1	4.6	0	Malaysia	61.1	56.9	-4.2	0
Belarus	30.9	33.6	2.8	0	Malta	23.2	23.6	0.4	0
Belgium	29.9	29.3	-0.6	1	Mauritius	56.5	68.8	12.3	0
Bolivia	29.1	39.6	10.5	0	Mexico	71.8	75.8	4.0	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	26.1	33.4	7.3	0	Mongolia	45.3	51.5	6.3	0
Botswana	78.4	72.9	-5.5	0	Montenegro	21.9	30.8	8.9	0
Brazil	53.9	56.6	2.7	1	Morocco	51.7	36.5	-15.2	0
Bulgaria	32.9	57.1	24.2	0	Namibia	63.7	57.5	-6.2	0
Canada	16.0	16.1	0.1	0	Netherlands	21.6	26.0	4.4	1
Chile	56.6	64.8	8.2	1	New Zealand	18.6	25.1	6.5	0
China	38.9	44.7	5.8	0	Norway	7.0	6.5	-0.4	1
Colombia	62.8	62.1	-0.7	1	Pakistan	51.5	66.4	14.9	0
Costa Rica	54.0	58.7	4.7	0	Panama	55.8	60.3	4.5	0
Croatia	47.3	52.2	4.9	0	Paraguay	44.7	57.7	13.0	0
Cyprus	35.8	43.2	7.4	0	Peru	51.6	57.7	6.0	1
Czech Republic	36.4	48.4	12.0	0	Philippines	48.5	48.2	-0.3	0
Denmark	13.9	15.6	1.8	1	Poland	60.5	62.8	2.2	0
Dominican Republic	47.7	51.9	4.2	0	Portugal	43.2	46.0	2.8	1
Ecuador	56.1	63.3	7.2	0	Romania	31.4	38.8	7.4	0
Egypt, Arab Rep.	59.7	60.7	1.0	0	Russian Federation	39.9	47.6	7.7	0
El Salvador	55.6	37.1	-18.5	0	Saudi Arabia	51.6	45.3	-6.3	0
Estonia	27.3	31.6	4.2	0	Serbia	24.9	35.6	10.7	0
Finland	12.9	14.2	1.3	1	Singapore	28.7	38.3	9.6	0
France	24.4	29.4	5.0	1	Slovak Republic	27.8	33.2	5.4	0
Gabon	68.9	54.7	-14.2	0	Slovenia	27.3	36.0	8.7	0
Georgia	52.1	60.2	8.1	0	South Africa	70.7	74.3	3.6	0
Germany	11.7	18.5	6.8	1	Spain	18.1	16.8	-1.3	1
Greece	43.9	48.2	4.3	1	Sri Lanka	58.6	60.0	1.4	0
Guatemala	55.8	56.0	0.2	0	Sweden	9.8	11.3	1.5	1
Hong Kong SAR, China	25.9	37.7	11.8	0	Switzerland	17.6	14.0	-3.6	0
Hungary	44.7	46.9	2.2	0	Taiwan, China	38.2	39.2	1.0	0
India	53.4	53.3	-0.1	0	Thailand	48.0	53.8	5.9	0
Indonesia	51.7	49.3	-2.4	0	Trinidad and Tobago	39.2	39.1	0.0	0
Iran, Islamic Rep.	61.4	64.0	2.6	0	Tunisia	60.2	63.2	3.0	0
Iraq	58.9	49.8	-9.1	0	Turkey	32.9	29.5	-3.4	0
Ireland	29.6	31.7	2.2	1	Turkmenistan	25.8	15.0	-10.8	0
Israel	16.9	15.6	-1.3	0	Ukraine	23.3	27.3	3.9	0
Italy	28.9	28.3	-0.6	1	United Arab Emirates	46.7	60.5	13.8	0
Japan	19.1	18.9	-0.2	0	United Kingdom	18.9	22.1	3.1	1
Jordan	33.2	36.6	3.5	0	United States	26.9	28.8	1.9	1
Kazakhstan	49.7	50.4	0.8	0	Uruguay	51.6	65.4	13.8	0
Korea, Rep.	19.9	22.1	2.3	0	Venezuela, RB	53.1	49.2	-3.9	0
Kosovo	23.2	29.2	6.1	0					

Notes: See Section 4 for definitions and details. Source: Global Findex 2017.

Figure A.3.1. Main source of money to deal with a financial shock. Percent of non-hand-to-mouth individuals




Figure A.3.2. Share of HtM individuals with and without property loans




Table A.3.1. Share of hand-to-mouth individuals, by economic and demographic characteristics. Percent of respondents

	All (1)	Emerging (2)	Developed (3)
<i>Unconditional average</i>	37.9	43.0	17.8
<i>Individual and household characteristics</i>			
<i>Household income</i>			
Quintile 1	58.5	63.4	37.0
Quintile 2	47.0	53.0	23.1
Quintile 3	39.3	45.4	15.7
Quintile 4	31.9	36.8	13.1
Quintile 5	20.9	24.4	7.6
<i>Education</i>			
Primary or less	57.8	60.2	33.1
Secondary	35.7	40.1	19.6
Tertiary or more	17.9	21.9	8.7
<i>Age</i>			
15 to 34	38.9	41.6	21.7
35 to 54	36.7	41.3	17.4
55 to 64	37.2	44.2	15.5
65 and older	38.8	49.5	16.1
<i>Sex</i>			
Male	32.7	37.4	15.4
Female	42.3	47.7	20.0
<i>Workforce</i>			
No	44.9	50.6	20.6
Yes	33.5	38.0	16.1
<i>Employment status</i>			
Not employed	48.8	53.7	23.2
Employed	27.4	31.9	14.4

Table A.3.2. Probit regressions explaining HtM individual category with economic and demographic characteristics

	One characteristic at-a-time			All characteristics jointly		
	All (1)	Emerging (2)	Developed (3)	All (4)	Emerging (5)	Developed (6)
<i>Individual and household characteristics</i>						
<i>Household income (omitted category: quintile 3)</i>						
Quintile 1	0.52*** [39.0]	0.48*** [33.0]	0.70*** [21.6]	0.46*** [32.3]	0.41*** [26.3]	0.63*** [18.7]
Quintile 2	0.11*** [16.9]	0.10*** [14.6]	0.14*** [8.8]	0.09*** [13.8]	0.09*** [11.7]	0.12*** [7.4]
Quintile 4	-0.06*** [-17.3]	-0.06*** [-17.0]	-0.04*** [-4.2]	-0.04*** [-12.7]	-0.05*** [-12.6]	-0.03*** [-3.1]
Quintile 5	-0.12*** [-46.1]	-0.12*** [-44.5]	-0.09*** [-13.1]	-0.09*** [-33.9]	-0.10*** [-32.6]	-0.07*** [-9.7]
R ²	0.07	0.07	0.06			
<i>Education (omitted category: secondary)</i>						
Primary or less	0.51*** [48.5]	0.52*** [47.0]	0.37*** [12.1]	0.34*** [30.0]	0.34*** [27.5]	0.33*** [10.1]
Tertiary or more	-0.54*** [-45.0]	-0.55*** [-40.4]	-0.52*** [-20.0]	-0.37*** [-28.6]	-0.37*** [-25.6]	-0.35*** [-12.5]
R ²	0.08	0.07	0.04			
<i>Age (omitted category: 35 to 54)</i>						
15 to 34	-0.02** [-2.5]	-0.05*** [-4.8]	0.18*** [6.6]	-0.02** [-2.3]	-0.04*** [-3.1]	0.06* [1.9]
55 to 64	0.10*** [8.0]	0.14*** [9.5]	-0.04 [-1.2]	0.04*** [3.0]	0.06*** [3.9]	-0.04 [-1.2]
65 and older	0.24*** [19.5]	0.33*** [23.0]	-0.01 [-0.2]	0.01 [0.6]	0.09*** [5.2]	-0.22*** [-6.1]
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01			
<i>Sex (omitted category: male)</i>						
Female	0.25*** [30.0]	0.26*** [28.8]	0.19*** [9.1]	0.15*** [16.2]	0.15*** [15.2]	0.12*** [5.7]
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01			
<i>Workforce (omitted category: No)</i>						
Yes	-0.33*** [-39.5]	-0.36*** [-39.3]	-0.18*** [-8.5]	0.03*** [2.6]	0.04*** [2.7]	-0.03 [-0.8]
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.01			
<i>Employment status (omitted category: not employed)</i>						
Employed	-0.51*** [-59.0]	-0.55*** [-58.0]	-0.31*** [-14.8]	-0.33*** [-28.3]	-0.34*** [-27.6]	-0.25*** [-8.1]
R ²	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.14	0.14	0.09

Table A.4.1. On-impact STMs values using benchmark calibration and combinations of α and θ which are allowed to vary between 0 and 1

$\alpha \setminus \theta$	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40	0.45	0.50	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.85	0.90	0.95	1.00
0.0001	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.20	0.23	0.26	0.29	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.46	0.49	0.52	0.56	0.59	0.62	0.65
0.05	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.14	0.17	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.34	0.38	0.41	0.45	0.48	0.51	0.55	0.58	0.62	0.65	0.69
0.10	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.14	0.18	0.22	0.25	0.29	0.32	0.36	0.40	0.43	0.47	0.50	0.54	0.58	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.72
0.15	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.27	0.30	0.34	0.38	0.42	0.45	0.49	0.53	0.57	0.61	0.64	0.68	0.72	0.76
0.20	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.20	0.24	0.28	0.32	0.36	0.40	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.56	0.60	0.64	0.68	0.72	0.76	0.80
0.25	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.30	0.34	0.38	0.42	0.47	0.51	0.55	0.59	0.63	0.68	0.72	0.76	0.80	0.85
0.30	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.18	0.22	0.27	0.31	0.36	0.40	0.45	0.49	0.54	0.58	0.63	0.67	0.72	0.76	0.81	0.85	0.90
0.35	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.14	0.19	0.24	0.29	0.34	0.38	0.43	0.48	0.53	0.57	0.62	0.67	0.72	0.77	0.81	0.86	0.91	0.96
0.40	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.21	0.26	0.31	0.36	0.41	0.46	0.51	0.56	0.62	0.67	0.72	0.77	0.82	0.87	0.92	0.97	1.03
0.45	0.00	0.06	0.11	0.17	0.22	0.28	0.33	0.39	0.44	0.50	0.55	0.61	0.66	0.72	0.77	0.83	0.88	0.94	0.99	1.05	1.10
0.50	0.00	0.06	0.12	0.18	0.24	0.30	0.36	0.42	0.48	0.54	0.60	0.66	0.72	0.78	0.84	0.89	0.95	1.01	1.07	1.13	1.19
0.55	0.00	0.06	0.13	0.19	0.26	0.32	0.39	0.45	0.52	0.58	0.65	0.71	0.78	0.84	0.91	0.97	1.04	1.10	1.17	1.23	1.30
0.60	0.00	0.07	0.14	0.21	0.29	0.36	0.43	0.50	0.57	0.64	0.71	0.78	0.86	0.93	1.00	1.07	1.14	1.21	1.28	1.35	1.43
0.65	0.00	0.08	0.16	0.24	0.32	0.39	0.47	0.55	0.63	0.71	0.79	0.87	0.95	1.03	1.10	1.18	1.26	1.34	1.42	1.50	1.58
0.70	0.00	0.09	0.18	0.26	0.35	0.44	0.53	0.62	0.71	0.79	0.88	0.97	1.06	1.15	1.24	1.32	1.41	1.50	1.59	1.68	1.77
0.75	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.91	2.01
0.80	0.00	0.12	0.23	0.35	0.46	0.58	0.70	0.81	0.93	1.04	1.16	1.28	1.39	1.51	1.62	1.74	1.85	1.97	2.09	2.20	2.32
0.85	0.00	0.14	0.27	0.41	0.55	0.69	0.82	0.96	1.10	1.24	1.37	1.51	1.65	1.79	1.92	2.06	2.20	2.33	2.47	2.61	2.75
0.90	0.00	0.17	0.34	0.51	0.67	0.84	1.01	1.18	1.35	1.52	1.68	1.85	2.02	2.19	2.36	2.53	2.69	2.86	3.03	3.20	3.37
0.95	0.00	0.22	0.44	0.65	0.87	1.09	1.31	1.52	1.74	1.96	2.18	2.40	2.61	2.83	3.05	3.27	3.48	3.70	3.92	4.14	4.35
0.9999	0.00	0.31	0.62	0.93	1.24	1.54	1.85	2.16	2.47	2.78	3.09	3.40	3.71	4.02	4.32	4.63	4.94	5.25	5.56	5.87	6.18

Notes: Since the STM is not defined for $\alpha=0.00$ and $\alpha=1.00$, we selected $\alpha=0.0001$ and $\alpha=0.9999$, respectively. The shaded cells indicate combinations of α and θ such that $STT < 0$. Recall that since $STT \equiv \theta - \alpha$, then $STT < 0$ implies that $\alpha > \theta$.