

# Fiscal Stimulus, Credit Frictions and the Amplification Effects of Small Firms<sup>\*</sup>

Pedro Juarros  
*Georgetown University*<sup>†</sup>

October 28, 2020

## Abstract

I study the role of firm size heterogeneity and credit frictions on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. This paper shows that the local fiscal multiplier increases with the share of small firms, implying multipliers of 0.95-2.15 in the interquantile range. At micro level, I find positive spillovers for small firms and neutral for large firms. Small firms increase operating revenues, investment and financing relative to large firms after an aggregate local fiscal stimulus. I interpret these findings with a two-firm open economy New Keynesian model with the financial accelerator mechanism. The model implies that a higher share of small firms also increases the national fiscal multiplier if monetary policy does not respond aggressively to fiscal shocks.

**Keywords:** *Fiscal stimulus, Firm size distribution, Financial Accelerator, Spillovers*  
*JEL classification:* E62, E52

---

<sup>\*</sup>Acknowledgments: I am indebted to my advisor Mark Huggett for his invaluable guidance, inspiration, and support. I thank Dan Cao, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Sole Martinez Peria and Guillermo Vuletin for their continued encouragement with this project. I am also grateful with Behzad Diba, Jose Maria Fanelli, Henry Hyatt, Daniel Heymann, Umberto Muratori, Jorge Puig, Rodimiro Rodrigo and Daniel Valderrama for helpful comments. All errors are my own.

<sup>†</sup>Georgetown University, Department of Economics, email: [pfj5@georgetown.edu](mailto:pfj5@georgetown.edu)

# 1 Introduction

The central question when evaluating the effects of government spending on GDP, is whether the fiscal multiplier is greater or lower than 1, or equivalently, the direction and strength of fiscal spillovers. I study the role of firm size heterogeneity and credit frictions on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Small firms are different from large firms: they are cyclically more sensitive, and exhibit different investment, revenues and financing dynamics along the business cycle (Fort et al., 2013; Dinlersoz et al., 2019); are typically more bank dependent and credit constrained (Beck et al., 2005); and conditional on surviving, grow faster and contribute disproportionately to output growth (Decker et al., 2014). Given this rich heterogeneity across firms: How does firm size heterogeneity affect the fiscal multiplier? Which firms are the most responsive to aggregate fiscal stimulus? Are fiscal spillover heterogeneous by firm size?

I document that the *local* fiscal multiplier increases with the share of small firms using cross sectional and time variation in national military procurement and the firm size distribution across metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the US. Figure 1(a) shows that the median *local* fiscal multiplier is 1.50 and increases with the share of small firms, implying multipliers of 0.95-2.15 in the interquantile range. To explain this fact, I combine local fiscal stimulus with firm level balance sheet information and identifying government contractors, I document positive fiscal spillovers for small firms and neutral for large firms. Figure 1(b) shows that within firms that did not receive a government contract, small firms increase operating revenues by 11 percentage points, investment by 5 percentage points and their financing by 7.5 percentage points relative to large firms in response to an aggregate *local* fiscal stimulus. This implies that small firms are more responsive to aggregate local fiscal stimulus than large firms.


To interpret this evidence I propose a heterogeneous firm credit channel of fiscal stimulus. I embed the “*financial accelerator*” mechanism in a New Keynesian open economy model with two types of firms that have different access to credit markets (Bernanke et al., 1998; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014). Small firms face a higher credit spread in equilibrium that is more sensitive to changes in firms’ balance sheets. The fiscal stimulus improves firms’ net worth, which reduces credit spreads of small firms, and relaxing borrowing constraints.<sup>1</sup> This boosts borrowing, investment and production; and amplifies endogenously the local fiscal multiplier. Calibrated to match cross-sectional and firm level

---

<sup>1</sup>I empirically document that local housing prices, the main collateral value of small firms, rise by 1.25% after a local fiscal stimulus (Bahaj et al., 2019; Auerbach et al., 2019).

US data, the model can account for 2/3 of the heterogeneous response in firms' investment. Moreover, the model explains 10-20% of the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the share of small firms.

**Figure 1: The local fiscal multiplier and firm size heterogeneity**



(a) The local fiscal multiplier

(b) Firms' responses

Note: Panel (a) displays the implied 1-year local fiscal multiplier along the distribution of the employment share of small firms in MSAs in US from Equation (1). Data for the share of small firms is from Business Dynamic Statistics. The government spending shock is identified with the cross-sectional variation of military spending across MSAs. Standard errors are clustered at MSA level. See Section 2 for details. Panel (b) shows the response of investment, operating revenues and financing for small firms relative to large firms that *did not receive* a military contract to a state-level military shock. Firm data is from ORBIS. See Equation (5).

I use the model to show that a higher *national* employment share of small firms also increase the *national* fiscal multiplier. The model implies that the *national* fiscal multiplier increases by 1.08% when the national employment share of small firms increases by 1%. Interestingly, this relationship is non-linear: it depends on the response of monetary policy to fiscal shocks (Woodford, 2011; Christiano et al., 2011). The larger the stabilization role of monetary policy, the lower the amplification effects of small firms on the national fiscal multiplier. When monetary policy does not rise the nominal interest rate fighting back the increase in inflation induced by the fiscal stimulus, real interest rate decline crowding-in consumption and investment, increasing the size of the national fiscal multiplier. The extreme case is the zero lower bound (ZLB). The aggregate effects of government spending depends on both, the firm size distribution where the stimulus takes place and monetary policy response.

In my empirical analysis, I estimate the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the firm size distribution exploiting regional variation in national military procurement across metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the US.<sup>2</sup> This method identifies an open economy local fis-

<sup>2</sup>Department of Defense (DOD) spending explains more than 50% of the discretionary spending of the

cal multiplier: it measures the effect of an increase in spending in one specific MSA within a monetary union *relative* to the response of all other MSAs (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014).<sup>3</sup> Military spending is potentially endogenous since military contracts are notably political, and firms politically connected can affect the allocation of spending (Choi et al., 2020). I use an IV strategy which exploits the heterogeneous sensitivity of MSA' military procurement to an increase in (aggregate) *federal* military spending. For the firm size distribution across MSAs, I use panel data from Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS).<sup>4</sup> The employment share of small firms will not be exogenous if firms in other MSAs changes their location, entry or exit decisions because of military spending. To avoid this endogeneity concern I instrument the share of small firms with a 20-year lagged in firm creation.<sup>5</sup> Results show that increasing the employment share of small firms by 1% above the average, increase the local fiscal multiplier by 4.3%, from 1.57 to 1.64.

To identify heterogeneous fiscal spillovers by firm size, its key to recognize that whom and when receive a government contract may be endogenous to firms' decisions.<sup>6</sup> This will bias the estimation of firm level responses.<sup>7</sup> To overcome this endogeneity, I use contract level data from *USAspending.org* to identify the contractors, match them with a firm panel data from ORBIS and exclude all firms that received any military contract during the sample period. Using ORBIS, with more than 7,600 non-financial small and large firms headquartered on the state where the fiscal stimulus takes place, I find that small firms are more responsive to aggregate local fiscal stimulus: their operating revenues, investment and financing increase more than those of large firms.<sup>8,9</sup> The main advantage of ORBIS is that it covers listed, unlisted, small and large firms.<sup>10</sup>

---

federal government and is the third largest component of government spending, representing 18% of total US budget. See Demyanyk et al. (2019) and Cox et al. (2020) for a detailed characterization of total government procurement.

<sup>3</sup>This spending increase is financed by taxing individuals in all MSAs.

<sup>4</sup>BDS is the public-release sample of statistics aggregated from the Census' Longitudinal Business Database.

<sup>5</sup>Gourio et al. (2016) show that firm entry shocks at state level have persistent effects, affecting GDP growth for at least 12 years. To be cautious, I use a 20-year lag in firm entry.

<sup>6</sup>Small firms are different from large firms and government contractors. See Section 3.

<sup>7</sup>Ferraz et al. (2015), Lee (2017), Goldman (2020) and Choi et al. (2020) study the direct effects of government spending at firm level using quasi-natural experiments to deal with this endogeneity.

<sup>8</sup>I do not exploit the geographic variation of DOD contracts at MSAs level because of data availability. Appendix B.1 shows that the local fiscal multiplier also increase with the share of small firms at state level, i.e. is robust to this geographic aggregation.

<sup>9</sup>Similarly, Cohen et al. (2011) and Kim and Nguyen (2020) study the response of public corporations in Compustat to government spending shocks headquartered in the state that received the fiscal stimulus.

<sup>10</sup>In addition to excluding government contractors, my regressions include firm fixed effect to control for

**Related literature.** I contribute to four strands of literature. First, Neoclassical and Keynesian theories mostly ignore the role of firm heterogeneity on the fiscal multiplier. They typically employ a representative firm assumption ([Baxter and King, 1993](#); [Burnside et al., 2004](#); [Galí et al., 2007](#)).<sup>11</sup> I show that the heterogeneous behavior of small and large firms affects the size of the fiscal multiplier.

Second, I contribute to the literature that studies the links between credit frictions, firm heterogeneity and aggregate fiscal shocks. Regardless of the renewed interest in fiscal policy and the focus on the interaction with the response of monetary policy and heterogeneity in households' credit constraints ([Woodford, 2011](#); [Christiano et al., 2011](#); [Hagedorn et al., 2019](#); [Auclert et al., 2018](#)), the literature neglects the role of credit market imperfections for firms' financing decisions ([Kaplan and Violante, 2014](#); [Farhi and Werning, 2016](#); [Demyanyk et al., 2019](#); [Corbi et al., 2019](#)). [Melina and Villa \(2014\)](#) and [Olivero et al. \(2019\)](#) document a negative relationship between credit spreads and aggregate government spending shocks, which lead to an increase in banks' lending. I show that the interaction between firm size and credit market imperfections, amplifies the fiscal multiplier.<sup>12</sup> [Auerbach et al. \(2020b\)](#) show that the interest rate on consumer loans decreases after a fiscal stimulus in a local economy, with a larger reduction for riskier loans. I emphasize that these effects are present at firm level, and are heterogeneous by firm size.

Third, my paper contributes to the empirical literature that estimates firms' level responses to fiscal stimulus. In the US, the focus has been exclusively on public and typically large firms from Compustat. [Goldman \(2020\)](#) finds that US listed firms that receive government contracts, increase capital expenditures and have larger access to bank loans, reporting strong positive spillover among listed firms through local supply chains. However, [Cohen et al. \(2011\)](#) document a reduction in capital expenditures and sales growth of public corporations in Compustat to local spending shocks. Similarly, [Kim and Nguyen \(2020\)](#) document negative effects that are particularly strong on smaller and financially constrained listed firms. Armed with administrative data, which includes small and large firms, and quasi-natural designs in Brazil and Korea, [Ferraz et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Lee \(2017\)](#) find that small and young firms which receive a procurement contract tend to grow faster

---

unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at firm level, state-year fixed effects to control for time varying omitted variables at state level and other shocks occurring at the same time; and firm level controls.

<sup>11</sup>[Ramey \(2019\)](#) and [Chodorow-Reich \(2019\)](#) review the literature on the closed economy and geographical cross-sectional fiscal multipliers.

<sup>12</sup>There is a rich literature which studies the role of heterogeneity in firms' credit frictions for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy ([Gertler and Gilchrist \(1994\)](#); [Bernanke et al. \(1998\)](#); [Ottonello and Winberry \(2018\)](#); [Cloyne et al. \(2019\)](#)).

than large firms. These results are stronger for financially constrained firms.<sup>13</sup> By using ORBIS and recognizing the differential responses of small and large firms to fiscal stimulus, I can reconcile the disagreement in the existing literature. To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers studying fiscal spillovers at firm level with both small and large firms.

Fourth, on the theory front I extend a standard open economy model with the financial accelerator including two types of firms with heterogeneous credit spreads. [Fernández-Villaverde \(2010\)](#) and [Carrillo and Poilly \(2013\)](#) show that financial frictions amplify the closed economy fiscal multiplier with a representative firm.<sup>14</sup> I contribute to this literature showing that firm heterogeneity amplifies the local fiscal multiplier. Furthermore, heterogeneity in firms' financial frictions interacts with monetary policy to determine the national fiscal multiplier. I find that small firms have the largest effect on the national fiscal multiplier when monetary policy does not respond to fiscal shocks.

**Road map.** Section 2 presents the macro empirical evidence on how firm heterogeneity affects the size of the local fiscal multiplier. Section 3 presents the firm level evidence on the differential response of small firms to aggregate local fiscal stimulus. Section 4 presents a quantitative model to evaluate the proposed mechanism. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

## 2 The local fiscal multiplier and small firms

This section presents how the local fiscal multiplier depends upon the firm size distribution. The empirical strategy uses a panel data set of output, government military spending and firm size characteristics across metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the US.<sup>15</sup>

### 2.1 Data

I use annual data on the geographical allocation of the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement contracts for 2000-2013 from [Demyanyk et al. \(2019\)](#) aggregated at metropoli-

---

<sup>13</sup>[Zwick and Mahon \(2017\)](#) using comprehensive micro data with many small and private firms and large US firms, find that small firms respond 95% more than large firms to investment tax incentives due to financial frictions.

<sup>14</sup>[Canzoneri et al. \(2016\)](#) show that fiscal multipliers are higher in recessions due to a counter-cyclical credit spread.

<sup>15</sup>Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines an MSA as: "An area consisting of a core county or counties in which lies an urban area having a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the core counties as measured through commuting ties."

tan area level. They collect DD-350 and DD-1057 military procurement forms from US-Aspending.gov. These forms contain information about the total amount obligated and duration of the contract, and the name and location of the prime contractors.<sup>16</sup> For most of the contracts, information regarding the location where the majority of the work was actually performed is available. Relative to studies that exploit the cross-sectional variation of DOD contracts at state level to estimate state-level fiscal multipliers, this data allows me to reduce endogeneity concerns due to political lobby and omitted variable bias with the inclusion of MSA fixed effects, increasing the cross-sectional dimension from 50 states to 344 MSAs.<sup>17</sup> To measure the employment share of small firms across MSAs I use Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS). The BDS includes employment statistics by firm size operating in each MSA tabulated from micro data in the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD covers the universe of firms and establishments in the nonfarm business sector with at least one paid employee.<sup>18</sup> Small firms are those with less than 250 employees. Data for real GDP is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Appendix A.1 presents the summary statistics.

## 2.2 Econometric specification

I estimate the causal effect of firm size heterogeneity on the local fiscal multiplier using the following panel specification:

$$\frac{Y_{m,t+l} - Y_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} = \delta_m + \delta_{t+l} + \beta \frac{G_{m,t+l} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} + \gamma \frac{G_{m,t+l} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} \times (S_{m,t-1} - \bar{S}) + \eta S_{m,t-1} + \epsilon_{m,t+l} \quad (1)$$

$Y_{m,t}$  is real GDP for MSA  $m$  in year  $t$ ,  $G_{m,t}$  denotes federal military spending allocated to MSA  $m$  in year  $t$ ;  $S_{m,t-1}$  is the log-employment share of small firms ( $\times 100$ ) in MSA  $m$  a year before the fiscal stimulus takes place and represents the firm size structure of location  $m$  and  $\bar{S} = \sum_m \sum_t \frac{S_{m,t}}{n_m n_t}$  is its average across all MSA-year observations, with  $n_m$  denoting the number of MSAs and  $n_t$  the number of years in the sample.<sup>19</sup> I include the share of small firms itself ( $S_{m,t-1}$ ) and therefore, the interaction term captures the effect of the employment share of small firms on the local fiscal multiplier aside from the direct

<sup>16</sup>Modifications to existing contracts and de-obligation are observed. [Demyanyk et al. \(2019\)](#) voids contracts where obligations and de-obligations are within 0.5% of each other.

<sup>17</sup>For a further discussion of the construction of this dataset see [Demyanyk et al. \(2019\)](#).

<sup>18</sup>[Davis and Haltiwanger \(2019\)](#) using BDS data study how the young-firm activity shares move with local economic conditions, local house prices and credit supply.

<sup>19</sup>A similar specification is used by [Basso and Rachedi \(2018\)](#) to study the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the age structure across U.S. states.



effect that small firms may have on output. I add MSA fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across MSAs such as industry production structure (e.g. share of manufacturing). Lastly, time fixed effects control for aggregate shocks, such as national monetary policy and tax policy. Thus, the only possible confounding factors that may remain need to vary both across MSAs, and over time. I study the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the share of small firms at horizon  $l = 1, 2$ . Standard errors are clustered at MSA level.

In Equation (1) the coefficient  $\beta$  denotes the average local fiscal multiplier: it defines the dollar increase in real output following a one dollar increase in federal government spending in an MSA, with the average employment share of small firms. I de-mean the log-share of small firms only for interpretation purposes, but this does not affect the estimation of the firm-size sensitivity  $\gamma$  (see [Basso and Rachedi \(2018\)](#)).<sup>20</sup> The coefficient of interest is  $\gamma$ , which captures the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the firm size distribution. The interpretation is as follows: when the employment share of small firms increase by 1% above the average, the local fiscal multiplier would be  $\beta + \gamma$ . If  $\gamma > 0$ , a larger share of small firms increases the fiscal multiplier.

The challenge in the fiscal literature is that government spending is rarely exogenous, i.e. varies automatically along the cycle. In this case, military spending is potentially endogenous since DOD contracts are notably political. Therefore, I identify government spending shocks following the approach of [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#), which exploits the heterogeneous sensitivity of MSA' military procurement to an increase in (aggregate) *federal* military spending. The identification assumption relies on a weaker exogeneity restriction than that of previous studies that use military spending at national ([Ramey \(2011\)](#); [Burnside et al. \(2004\)](#)) or state level ([Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#); [Basso and Rachedi \(2018\)](#); [Dupor and Guerrero \(2017\)](#)): the U.S. as a country does not engage in aggregate military buildups or drawdowns (as the Iraq War), because a specific MSA (e.g. *San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA*) is experiencing or is expected to suffer a recession relative to the others (e.g. *Champaign-Urbana, IL*). To address this endogeneity problem, I use a two instruments IV approach, where the first stage estimates:

$$\frac{G_{m,t+l} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} = \alpha_m + \alpha_t + \phi \left( s_m \times \frac{G_{t+l} - G_{t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} \right) + \psi Z_{m,t-1} + \epsilon_{m,t} \quad (2)$$

where  $G_t$  is the aggregate federal military spending in period  $t$ ;  $s_m$  is MSA's average share

---

<sup>20</sup>As  $\bar{S}$  does not depend on  $m$  nor  $t$ , the specification is equivalent to  $\frac{Y_{m,t+l} - Y_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} = \delta_m + \delta_t + \theta \frac{G_{m,t+l} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} + \gamma \frac{G_{m,t+l} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} \times S_{m,t-1} + \eta S_{m,t-1} + \epsilon_{m,t}$ , with  $\theta = \beta + \gamma \bar{S}$ .



of DOD contract ( $G_{m,t}/G_t$ ) over the relevant period; and  $Z_{m,t-1}$  incorporates the instruments for the share of small firms and its interaction with changes in DOD spending. The instrument for local government spending relies on the variation of aggregate (federal) DOD spending, which by construction is orthogonal to the variation in the local economic activity that can shape the allocation of federal spending across MSAs ([Auerbach et al. \(2020a, 2019\)](#); [Demyanyk et al. \(2019\)](#)).

The identification of whether an MSA's firm size structure affects the local fiscal multiplier with location and time fixed effects comes from the variation of the share of small firms across MSAs and its changes over time. For instance, the dispersion in the employment share of small firms across MSAs in 2006 ranges from 33.4% to 73.5%, and 76% of MSAs changed their relative ranking by at least 10 positions between 2001 and 2013.<sup>21</sup>

I estimate the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the employment share of small firms using instrumental variables for both military spending and the share of small firms. The employment share of small firms in the MSA that received the fiscal stimulus will not be exogenous if firms change their location decisions and/or entry or exit decisions because of military spending. To avoid this endogeneity concern, I instrument the share of small firms with lagged employment share of new business. [Gourio et al. \(2016\)](#) presents evidence at state level that shocks to firm entry can have effects on GDP for as long as 12 years, dying out for longer horizons. For this reason, I use the employment share of new businesses that were born 20 years before the DOD spending shock takes place as an instrument for the employment share of small firms.

## 2.3 Results

Table 1 presents the first empirical fact: local fiscal stimulus gets amplified in MSAs with a larger employment share of small firms. Column (1) reports a one-year local multiplier equal to 1.57 for an MSA with the average employment share of small firms, in line with the cross-sectional multiplier literature ([Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#); [Chodorow-Reich \(2019\)](#)). The coefficient of interest,  $\gamma$ , is positive and significant, implying that a larger employment share of small firms increases the local fiscal multiplier. The interpretation is as follows: when the employment share of small firms increases by 1% above the mean, the one-year local fiscal multiplier increases from 1.57 to 1.64 ( $= 1.573 + 0.068$ ). Therefore the marginal effect of increasing the employment share of small firms by 1% on the fiscal multiplier is 4.32% ( $= 0.068/1.57$ ). Combining the estimated coefficients with

---

<sup>21</sup>And 25% of MSAs changed their relative ranking by more than 50 positions during the sample period.

the inter-quantile range in the distribution of the employment share of small firms over the sample period, the local fiscal multiplier varies between 0.95 and 2.15.<sup>22,23</sup> The first stage F-stat shows that instruments are relevant suggesting that the specification is well identified.

The output response at a 2-year horizon indicates even a larger sensitivity. Column (2) shows that the local multiplier increase by 5.34% when the employment share of small firms by 1% (from 1.44 to 1.52).<sup>24</sup>

**Table 1: The local fiscal multiplier: the role of small firms**

Output response	1-year (1)	2-years (2)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	1.573*** (0.369)	1.442*** (0.380)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.068** (0.028)	0.077** (0.038)
Emp share of Small ( $\eta$ )	0.101** (0.040)	0.077 (0.062)
Obs.	3,784	3,440
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes
Cluster SE	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat	18.41	22.78

Note: This table shows estimates of Equation (1). Small firms are defined as those with less than 250 employees. Sample period is 2001-2013 and includes 344 MSAs.\*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

**Exclusion Restriction.** The identification of the firm size sensitivity of local fiscal multipliers hinges on instrumenting the employment share of small firms with a 20-year lag in the employment share of new firms. The implicit exclusion restriction posits that, conditional on MSA and time fixed effects, whatever determines the cross-sectional variation in firm creation (i.e. startups) has no other long lasting effect on the size of fiscal multipliers 20 years later. The IV approach would not be valid if the sensitivity to federal government spending shocks - i.e.,  $s_m$  in Equation (2) - is related to MSA' firm creation 20 years later. Yet, in the data this correlation is -0.005 (p-value = 0.72). Regarding the

<sup>22</sup>Both multipliers are statistically significant at 5% level. The difference in multipliers across the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles is 1.20 and statistically significant at 1% level.

<sup>23</sup>Figure 1(a) in the introduction shows the heterogeneity in the one-year local fiscal multipliers.

<sup>24</sup>The impact of small firms at larger horizons are still positive but become not significant.

relevance of this IV, the first stage coefficient is 0.08 ( $p\text{-value} < 0.05$ ).

**Robustness.** Appendix A.2 evidences that the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the employment share of small firms is robust to an array of specifications and time-varying controls. Table 10 shows the OLS results with considerably lower multipliers, explained by attenuation bias and the fiscal foresight problem of government spending shocks. This table also shows that results are robust to controlling for MSA specific cyclical-ity, and small firms specific cyclical-ity. I also consider an alternative normalization which tests that the exploited variation is not driven by the secular trend in the reduction of the share of small firms. Appendix A.2 Table 11 tests that once the IV strategy is implemented, it does not remain a fiscal foresight problem; and MSA's output does not react to future military shocks (placebo test). The baseline specification includes MSA and time fixed effects that control for time-invariant and aggregate shocks such as MSA production structure. If time-variant omitted variables remain, controlling for dynamic time-MSA varying factors may reduce the bias due to other confounding factors at play. Table 11 shows that controlling for the lagged log share of manufacturing and construction in MSA's value added, house prices and unemployment rate do not change quantitatively nor significantly the effect of small firms on the local fiscal multiplier. Appendix A.2 Table 12 shows that results are robust to the definition of small firms, and highlight that the sensitivity of the multiplier depends on the overall MSA's firm size distribution. Lastly, Appendix A.2 Table 13 shows that the employment share of small firms also increases the response of earnings, wages and personal income.

**Local fiscal stimulus and firms' constraints.** The local fiscal multiplier increases with the employment share of small firms. Does the higher aggregate demand induced by the fiscal stimulus loosen firm level constraints? Is this particularly stronger for small firms? Young firms are born small because of borrowing constraints, uncertainty about their own productivity and ramp up period, and limited reputation that leads to challenges of building up a customer base. A natural conjecture is that a higher aggregate demand may help loosening these constraints amplifying the output response. For instance, if this is the case, the survival rate of credit constrained firms should increase as the financial wedge relaxes due to a countercyclical credit spread (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Table 2 shows that the exit rate decreases by 0.94% in MSAs hit by a fiscal stimulus relative to MSAs that did not receive the stimulus. Furthermore, the exit rate of small firms decrease by 1%. Conversely, the exit rate of large firms is not statistically affected.

Why does the survival rate of small firms increase when a fiscal stimulus occurs? Column (4) shows that housing prices increase by 1.25% in an MSA that receives a fiscal

stimulus. Larger values of firms' collateral may reduce information asymmetries between banks and borrowers allowing for higher leverage. These constraints are particularly relevant for small firms (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Adelino et al. (2015) and Bahaj et al. (2019) present evidence that housing is the main collateral value of small and young firms and therefore they are particularly sensitive to variations in house prices. This suggest that a collateral credit channel can be behind the amplification effects of small firms.

**Table 2: Fiscal stimulus increases survival rate of Small firms**

Dependent variable	Exit rate			Housing
	All	Small	Large	Prices
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	-0.936*	-1.006**	0.727	1.251*
	(0.495)	(0.441)	(1.720)	(0.681)
Obs.	3,784	3,784	3,784	3,652
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD Cluster	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat	6.742	6.742	6.742	7.791

Note: 1-year response. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$

### 3 The heterogeneous behaviour of Small and Large firms to fiscal stimulus

Which firms are the most responsive to fiscal stimulus? Are spillover effects heterogeneous by firm size? I study the heterogeneous behavior of small and large firms vis-a-vis an aggregate local fiscal stimulus. I focus on firms that **did not receive** a DOD contract to avoid endogeneity concerns of the direct effects, associated with whom and when received a stimulus. For this purpose, I merge 3 datasets: (i) balance sheet information of non-financial private and public firms from ORBIS database; (ii) firms that were granted DOD contracts from USAspending.gov; and (iii) local fiscal stimulus aggregated at state level. This section estimates  $\gamma^{micro}$  at the firm level and shows that this evidence is consistent with the macro evidence at MSA level: small firms are more responsive to local fiscal stimulus,  $\gamma^{micro} > 0$  and  $\gamma^{MSA} > 0$ .

### 3.1 Data

I build an annual US firm level panel data from ORBIS and state military spending from 1997-2016. I use data from ORBIS, a commercial database distributed by Bureau van Dijk, containing basic firm-level balance sheet information with the advantage that it includes data on small and large, and unlisted and listed firms.<sup>25</sup> I study the behavior of operating revenues, investment, short-term, long-term and total financing of more than 7,600 non-financial firms headquartered on the state where the *local* fiscal stimulus takes place.<sup>26,27</sup> Appendix B.2 presents variables definition and descriptive statistics of each variable used in the estimation.<sup>28</sup> The local stimulus shock at state level is from [Dupon and Guerrero \(2017\)](#), who update [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#) military spending until 2014.<sup>29</sup> I extend the military procurement spending until 2016 aggregating the DOD contract level data from USAspending.gov at state level.

The DOD buys goods and services directly from specific firms. This can bias any inference from firm behavior, given the endogeneity and selection concerns of which firms received a military contract and when. In order to deal with it I *excluded all firms that received at least one DOD contract during the sample period*.<sup>30</sup> The goal here is to exclude the direct and endogenous effects of DOD contracts on firms' behavior, and focus on spillover effects of aggregate spending shocks.<sup>31</sup> Table (3) shows that small firms are different from large firms and government contractors. This motivates the study of the differential impacts of fiscal stimulus on these firms. Small firms grow faster than large firms and contractors, are less leveraged and face higher borrowing costs.<sup>32</sup> Appendix B.4 shows that firms that received a DOD contract and were excluded from the sample, were mostly large (76%

---

<sup>25</sup>I drop duplicates and double reporting for the same firm and states with less than 10 firms in the sample period and drop the top and bottom 2% of outliers for each variable.

<sup>26</sup>A similar approach is followed by [Cohen et al. \(2011\)](#) to study the response of public corporations in Compustat to seniority-linked government spending shocks headquartered in the congressman state. [Kim and Nguyen \(2020\)](#) use the same approach matching corporations' headquarter in Compustat with population revision census shocks at state level.

<sup>27</sup>As I said in the Introduction, I do not exploit the geographic variation of DOD contracts at MSAs level because of data availability. Appendix B.1 shows that Section 2 results are robust to this level of geographic aggregation.

<sup>28</sup>Appendix B.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis by state.

<sup>29</sup>As a robustness, I extended [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#) data from 2006 to 2016 using USAspending.org database. Results are robust.

<sup>30</sup>I excluded DOD contractors for the whole sample period, no matter when the contract was granted.

<sup>31</sup>[Ferraz et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Lee \(2017\)](#) exploit randomness in the procurement process in Brazil and Korea to estimate causally the *direct* effect of government spending on firm behaviour.

<sup>32</sup>Proxy by financial expenses over total liabilities.

were listed firms and only 19% were small firms), produced manufacturing goods (58%) and represent around 10% of total firms in the sample.

**Table 3: Small firms are different from large firms and military contractors**

	Small	Large	Contractors
Employment	43	1,836	1,965
Log Total Assets	15.32	19.33	19.41
Growth Op. Revenues (%)	11.28	10.75	8.51
Investment	-0.02	0.08	0.07
Leverage	0.52	0.57	0.50
Financial leverage	0.20	0.28	0.22
Borrowing cost (%)	4.82	3.30	2.73

### 3.2 Firm level econometric specification

I study the average firms' response to local fiscal stimulus, estimating the following:

$$\Delta y_{i,s,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta \frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}} + \eta D_{s,t-2} + \theta X_{i,s,t-2} + \epsilon_{i,s,t} \quad (3)$$

where  $\Delta y_{i,s,t}$  is the two-year log change of operating revenues and fixed assets for firm  $i$  located in state  $s$  at time  $t$ . Firms' investment is defined as the log change in fixed assets; and firms' operating revenues are net sales plus other operating revenues.  $\frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}}$  is the local fiscal stimulus normalized by state GDP. In order to control for other shocks that can occur in the same state,  $D_{s,t-2}$  include state level controls such as GDP growth and the change in state taxes.  $X_{i,s,t-2}$  controls for firm level characteristics such as the log of total assets and profitability to account for changes in firm growth and creditworthiness, respectively. [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#) show that the two-year change captures the dynamic effects of government spending on output in a parsimonious way. Finally, I include firm and time fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for time invariant firm-specific trends such as their industry sector (e.g. manufacturing). Time fixed effects control for aggregate (national) shocks common to all firms such as the stance of monetary policy or federal tax policy. Standard errors are clustered at state level, allowing the error term to be correlated across firms within a state.

Military spending is subject to endogeneity concerns as discussed in previous section given that firms politically connected can alter the allocation of DOD contracts ([Choi et al.](#)

(2020)). To address this endogeneity problem I follow a standard IV approach for the identification of the shock, and exclude firms that did receive a contract:

$$\frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}} = s_s \times \frac{G_t - G_{t-2}}{Y_{t-2}}$$

where  $s_s$  is the average share of national DOD spending received by state  $s$  ( $G_{s,t}/G_t$ ) over 1990-1996. Again the instrument relies on the heterogeneous sensitivity of states to aggregate variation of federal DOD contracts, exogenous to local economic activity.

To investigate the heterogeneous response of small and large firms to local fiscal stimulus, I include an interaction term between firm size and the government spending shock:

$$\Delta y_{i,s,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta \frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}} + \gamma \frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}} \times Small_{i,s,t-2} + \eta D_{s,t-2} + \theta X_{i,s,t-2} + \epsilon_{i,s,t} \quad (4)$$

where  $Small_{i,s,t-2}$  is a dummy that takes value 1 if firms before the fiscal stimulus have less than 250 employees (i.e. firm size is predetermined and exogenous at the moment of the shock).

By using firm-level data and including firm fixed effects, regression (3) and (4) allows me to mitigate concerns about reverse causation and unobserved firm-level factors driving firms' responses to fiscal stimulus. However, the concerns about estimates being potentially biased by time-varying omitted variables remains. I therefore focus on within state-year variation in firms' behavior across small and large firms. I estimate the following regression with state-year ( $\alpha_{s,t}$ ) and firm fixed effects ( $\alpha_i$ ):

$$\Delta y_{i,s,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{s,t} + \gamma \frac{G_{s,t} - G_{s,t-2}}{Y_{s,t-2}} \times Small_{i,s,t-2} + \theta X_{i,s,t-2} + \epsilon_{i,s,t} \quad (5)$$

Note that Equation (5) is only able to estimate the differential response of small relative to large firms to an aggregate *local* fiscal stimulus.

### 3.3 Results

Table 4 reports that for the average firm, a local fiscal stimulus increases operating revenues and decreases investment, though evidence is not statistically significant (see columns (1) and (3)).<sup>33</sup> However, when I take into account the heterogeneous response by firm size, small firms increase their operating revenues by 10.7 percentage points and

<sup>33</sup>These results are in line with Cohen et al. (2011) and Kim and Nguyen (2020), who find a reduction of capital expenditures for large public corporations after government spending shocks.



investment by 4.8 percentage points relative to large firms in response to an aggregate local DOD shock (see columns (2) and (4)). Large firms are barely affected (negative but not significant). Therefore, within firms that did not receive a DOD contract, there is a differential response to local fiscal stimulus by firm size. I interpret these findings as evidence of *positive spillovers* for small firms and neutral for large firms. This evidence is in line with the aggregate evidence at MSA level presented in Section 2, which focuses on the share of small-firms activity.

**Table 4: Heterogeneous Firms' responses to Local Fiscal stimulus**

	Operating Revenues growth			Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta G$	1.804 (2.384)	-0.990 (2.610)		-1.205 (2.675)	-2.519 (2.509)	
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$		10.737** (4.508)	11.168** (4.552)		4.848** (2.307)	4.978** (2.173)
$\Delta GDP$	0.092 (0.185)	0.085 (0.181)		0.138 (0.129)	0.136 (0.129)	
$\Delta Taxes$	-0.128** (0.058)	-0.129** (0.059)		-0.087 (0.059)	-0.088 (0.058)	
Small	0.055*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.025)	0.015 (0.026)	0.016 (0.025)
Total Assets	-0.177*** (0.007)	-0.177*** (0.008)	-0.173*** (0.007)	-0.327*** (0.008)	-0.327*** (0.008)	-0.326*** (0.007)
Profitability	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.097*** (0.019)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
State $\times$ Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Obs	59,412	59,412	59,412	61,011	61,011	61,011
Cluster SE	State	State	State	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	9.435	4.882	45.64	9.338	4.845	41.88

Note: Data is from ORBIS. Firms that received a DOD contract during the sample period were excluded. Small firms are those with less than 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

These results are robust to controlling for state-year fixed effects, which address concerns about time-varying omitted variable bias. Column (3) and (6) show that small firms increase investment by 5 percentage points *relative* to large firms and operating revenues by 11.2 percentage points. The fact that small firms respond to higher government spend-

ing by increasing investment, reflects that easing credit constraints are worth studying as a plausible mechanism.

**Robustness.** Appendix B shows that these results are robust. Table 18 shows that results are similar if I include government contractors, with the exception that investment in this case is not statistically significant. One can ask, Is it firms' size or firms' financial position that drives heterogeneous firms' responses? Tables 20 and 23 in Appendix B test if responses are heterogeneous across firms above and below the median leverage and liquidity position before the shock. Results show that there is no differential impact of local fiscal stimulus across firms' debt or liquidity position. These results are confirmed when Tables 21 and 24 in Appendix B test for heterogeneous responses including firm size coupled with either firm leverage or firm liquidity. Results show that there is a differential impact of local fiscal stimulus only across firm size. Lastly, there may be concerns about sample selection of firms that entry and exit my sample. Table 19 in Appendix B keeps only those firms that remain in the sample for at least 5 years and results are robust.

### 3.4 Fiscal stimulus and firms' use of external financing

Credit spreads are countercyclical. During booms firms' balance sheets improve, have better growth opportunities and higher collateral values, all of which leads firms to raise investment and borrowing (Bahaj et al. (2019)).<sup>34</sup> How does the use of external financing of small firms react to fiscal stimulus? This subsection provides evidence that expansionary government spending loosens borrowing constraints of small firms.

I focus now on firms' financing decisions after a local fiscal stimulus takes place. I define financing as the log change in total liabilities and short-term financing as current liabilities with maturity below one year.<sup>35</sup> As a proxy of the interest rate, I construct an implicit borrowing cost variable defined as the change in financial expenses over total liabilities. Table 5 reports the results. Relative to large firms, small businesses increase financing by 7.5 percentage points. Financing decisions for the average firm that did not receive a DOD contract are not statistically affected.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup>Appendix B.5 shows that investment and financial expenses of small firms are more sensible to aggregate output growth.

<sup>35</sup>There may be concerns about the focus on total liabilities and not directly on total debt or bank loans. The reason of doing this is data availability (sample size is reduced by half). Nevertheless, Appendix B.7 shows that the results for the reduced sample with detailed breakdown of financial debt (total, bank loans and long-term debt) remain unchanged (responses are quantitatively larger but much less precisely estimated).

<sup>36</sup>Appendix B.8 shows that this evidence is robust if we decompose small firms between those that have

Small firms may face borrowing constraints. A higher aggregate demand can help relaxing these constraints, reducing borrowers' perceived default risk due to an increase in firms' cash flows and the value of pledgable collateral. Local fiscal stimulus triggers a countercyclical credit spread ([Auerbach et al. \(2020a\)](#)). This leads to an increase in investment by small firms, endogenously propagating the effects of fiscal stimulus. Column (8) and (9) show that the implicit borrowing costs decrease for small firms.

**Table 5: Fiscal stimulus and firms' use of external finance**

	Total financing growth			Short-term financing growth			$\Delta$ Finan Exp/Liab.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta G$	0.758 (2.550)	-1.265 (2.062)		-0.429 (2.385)	-2.043 (2.709)		0.123 (0.317)	0.245 (0.318)	
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$		7.302** (2.851)	7.550** (2.624)		5.829** (2.429)	6.800** (2.740)		-0.619** (0.296)	-0.670** (0.297)
$\Delta GDP$	-0.011 (0.116)	-0.015 (0.116)		0.033 (0.097)	0.030 (0.096)		-0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	
$\Delta Taxes$	-0.068 (0.051)	-0.070 (0.050)		-0.034 (0.051)	-0.035 (0.050)		0.015* (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	
Small	0.017 (0.015)	0.011 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.032** (0.013)	0.074** (0.031)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Total Assets	-0.204*** (0.009)	-0.204*** (0.009)	-0.203*** (0.009)	-0.186*** (0.006)	0.006*** (0.006)	-0.184*** (0.007)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Profitability	0.061*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.008)	0.065*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
State $\times$ Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Obs	62,054	62,054	62,054	62,054	62,054	62,054	38,916	38,916	38,916
Cluster SE	State	State	State	State	State	State	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	9.265	4.836	43.15	9.265	4.836	43.15	10.460	5.444	43.18

Note: Data is from ORBIS. Firms that received a DOD contract during the sample period were excluded. Small firms are defined as those with less than 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

This evidence points to a relaxation of borrowing constraint as a mechanism behind the larger real effects of fiscal stimulus on small firms. Given that demand for credit increases after a spending shock, I conjecture here that the equilibrium level of credit increases due to a reduction of the borrowers' perceived default risk.<sup>37</sup>

less than 100 employees and those that have between 100 and 250 employees.

<sup>37</sup>Appendix C.1 using the narrative approach of [Ramey \(2011\)](#) to identify government spending news, I present evidence that at the aggregate level government spending shocks increase business loans and reduce

**Taking stock of the evidence.** Section 2 documents that the local fiscal multiplier increases with the employment share of small firms,  $\gamma^{MSA} > 0$ . Quantitatively, increasing the employment share of small firms by 1% above the average implies a 4.32% larger one-year local fiscal multiplier. Furthermore, the survival rate of small firms and local housing prices increase. This evidence leads to conjecture that small firm constraints may loosen after a government spending shock. Section 3 using firm level data shows that, within firms that did not receive a direct military contract, the investment response of small firms is around 5 percentage points larger than of large firms,  $\gamma^{micro} > 0$ . At the same time, small firms improve their balance sheets, increasing earnings by more than 11 percentage points relative to large firms. This increase in investment and earnings is accompanied by an increase of 7.5 percentage points in borrowing and a reduction of borrowing costs. I document positive spillovers for small firms and neutral for large firms. This evidence is qualitatively consistent with the financial accelerator mechanism. Next section develops a model to quantitatively evaluate how much of the empirical evidence can be explained by this mechanism.

## 4 The Model

This section develops a framework to interpret the role of firm heterogeneity and financial frictions on the local fiscal multiplier. I embed the financial accelerator mechanism with endogenous countercyclical credit spread ala [Bernanke et al. \(1998\)](#) in a model of government spending within a monetary union and two firms, small and large, that face heterogeneous cost of external finance ([Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#)).<sup>38</sup> The model consists of two regions that belong to a monetary and fiscal union: "home" and the "rest of the union". There are 5 types of agents: households, entrepreneurs (firms), retailers, capital goods' producers and a government with a fiscal and monetary authority.

---

the bank prime loan. Bank loans are the main source of funding of small firms. Appendix C.2 shows that these results are robust to using Survey of Professional Forecast errors. Results are in line with [Melina and Villa \(2014\)](#) and [Olivero et al. \(2019\)](#).

<sup>38</sup>[Corsetti et al. \(2013\)](#) study the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy in a small open economy with fixed exchange rate in a similar spirit of [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#).

## 4.1 Entrepreneurs

The key role in this model is played by firms, here relabeled as entrepreneurs. There are two types of risk neutral entrepreneurs,  $s$  for small and  $l$  for large, who are perfectly competitive and produce two different intermediate outputs. These two types of entrepreneurs differ in the riskiness of their investment projects, leverage and credit spreads. Entrepreneurs have to borrow funds from lenders in order to finance their purchases of capital goods from capital producing firms. Entrepreneur  $i$  of type  $j = s, l$  has available net worth,  $N_{jt+1}^i$  and to finance the difference between its capital expenditures and its net worth, the entrepreneur needs to borrow funds  $B_{jt+1}^i$ :

$$B_{jt+1}^i = P_{jkt} K_{jt+1}^i - N_{jt+1}^i \quad (6)$$

$K_{jt+1}^i$  is the capital stock,  $P_{jkt}$  is the price of capital expressed in terms of the home final goods, and  $\frac{P_{jkt} K_{jt+1}^i}{N_{jt+1}^i}$  is the leverage of entrepreneur  $i$  of type  $j = s, l$ . Entrepreneurs' net worth is defined as the borrowers' liquid assets plus collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obligations. The production function of entrepreneur  $i$  in the home region  $h$  and type  $j = s, l$  is constant return to scale and given by:

$$y_{hjt}^i = (L_{jt}^i)^\alpha (K_{jt}^i)^{1-\alpha} \quad (7)$$

Each type of investment project is subject in each period to a random idiosyncratic productivity shock  $\omega^i$ . This shock comes from a log-normal distribution,  $\ln \omega_j \sim F(\frac{-\sigma_{\omega,j}^2}{2}, \sigma_{\omega,j}^2)$  and has a different  $\sigma_{\omega,j}^2$  for each type of firm  $j = s, l$ .  $E(\omega) = 1$  and  $F(\omega)$  is the CDF. The financial friction comes from an asymmetric information problem: it is assumed that the realization of  $\omega^i$  is private information to the entrepreneur. In order to learn this value, the lender has to pay a monitoring cost  $\mu^j$ , which is a fraction of the entrepreneur's remaining assets. The optimal contract between lenders and an entrepreneur specifies a cutoff value for  $\omega$ , denoted as  $\bar{\omega}_t^i$ , the value of which it is contingent upon the realization of shocks at  $t$ . Entrepreneurs with  $\omega_t^i \geq \bar{\omega}_t^i$  will pay back their debts  $Z_t^i B_t^i$  and retain profits equal to  $\omega_t^i R_t^{K,i} P_{kt} K_{t-1}^i - Z_t^i B_t^i$ , where  $Z_t^i$  is the non-default contract interest rate and  $R_t^{K,i}$  is the return on capital. If  $\omega_t^i < \bar{\omega}_t^i$  the firm goes bankrupt, it is monitored and lenders keep what is left  $(1-\mu)\omega_t^i R_t^{K,i} P_{kt} K_{t-1}^i$ . The optimal contract implies that solvent firms will not be monitored and specifies the state-contingent rate  $Z_t^i$ , which in aggregate terms is linked

to  $\bar{\omega}_t$  as:<sup>39</sup>

$$\bar{\omega}_t R_t^K P_{k,t-1} K_t = Z_t B_t \quad (8)$$

The timing of events is as follows. At the end of  $t-1$ , there is a pool of entrepreneurs, whose equity is  $N_t$  on aggregate. Those firms choose the optimal value of capital  $K_t$  and hence the level of borrowing  $B_t$ . The ex-post return on capital ( $R_t^K$ ) is not known yet, since the government spending shock has not materialized, which will affect  $\bar{\omega}_t$ . As the cut off value depends on the existence of aggregate uncertainty ( $G_t$  shocks),  $\bar{\omega}_t$  is not known and the risky loan rate  $Z_t$  is linked to macroeconomic conditions. Entrepreneurs make their decision based on  $E_{t-1}\bar{\omega}_t$  and subject to the lenders' participation constraint. Formally, entrepreneurs solve the following optimization problem (E1):

$$\underset{\{K_t, E_{t-1}\bar{\omega}_t\}}{Max} E_{t-1} \int_{\bar{\omega}_t}^{\infty} [\omega R_t^K P_{kt} K_{t-1} - Z_t B_t] dF(\omega) = E_{t-1} [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t)] R_t^K P_{k,t-1} K_t \quad (9)$$

subject to,

$$R_t(P_{k,t-1} K_t - N_t) = [\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t) - \mu A(\bar{\omega}_t)] R_t^K P_{k,t-1} K_t \quad (10)$$

where  $\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t) \equiv \bar{\omega}_t \int_{\bar{\omega}_t}^{\infty} f(\omega) d\omega + \int_0^{\bar{\omega}_t} \omega f(\omega) d\omega$  and  $A(\bar{\omega}_t) \equiv \int_0^{\bar{\omega}_t} \omega f(\omega) d\omega$ .  $R_t$  is the risk-free gross interest rate and  $R_t(P_{k,t-1} K_t - N_t)$  captures the opportunity cost of the lenders (riskless loan). In equilibrium, this must be equal to the return on a risky loan ( $\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t)$ ) net of monitoring costs ( $A\mu(\bar{\omega}_t)$ ).

The moment the  $G_t$  shock arrives,  $R_t^K$  is pinned down jointly with  $\bar{\omega}_t$  and  $Z_t$ . As lenders are perfectly competitive,  $\bar{\omega}_t$  solves the zero-profit condition (10). Note that zero profit condition lenders (10) can be interpreted as an economy-wide loan supply curve of the following form:

$$E_t \left[ \frac{R_{t+1}^K}{R_{t+1}} \right] = E_t \left[ \frac{1}{\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) - \mu A(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{P_{kt} K_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} \right)^{-1} \right) \right] \quad (11)$$

that implies that capital expenditures are proportional to the net worth of entrepreneurs.

The behavior of the demand for capital and return of capital depends on the evolution of entrepreneurs' net worth  $N_{t+1}$ , which relies on entrepreneurs' earnings, net of interest payments to lenders. In order to endow entrepreneurs with some initial capital,

---

<sup>39</sup>The index  $i$  has dropped because the optimal contract is homogeneous and standardized for all entrepreneurs of the same type. This aggregation is possible due to constant returns to scale of the entrepreneurial production function, i.i.d assumption of  $\omega_t^i$  as well as the constant number of entrepreneurs in the economy, their risk neutrality and perfect competitiveness.

it is assumed that they also work and receive income  $W_t^e$ . Total labor input is supplied by households and entrepreneurs, aggregated in the following form:

$$L_t = (H_t^e)^\Omega (H_t)^{1-\Omega} \quad (12)$$

where the working hours of entrepreneurs  $H_t^e$  are normalized to 1 and  $\Omega$  is the entrepreneurs' share in total labor.<sup>40</sup> Entrepreneurs' consumption is defined as:

$$C_t^e = (1 - \gamma_s) V_t \quad (13)$$

where  $\gamma_s$  is the entrepreneurs' constant probability of surviving to the next period (and  $1 - \gamma_s$  the death rate). To keep the number of entrepreneurs constant every period, firms that have defaulted are replaced by new ones.  $V_t$  is the aggregate ex-post profit of entrepreneurial firms, equal to the gross return on their capital less debts of the solvent firms and total monitoring costs:

$$V_t = R_t^K P_{k,t-1} K_t - \left( R_t + \frac{\mu \int_0^{\bar{\omega}_t} \omega dF(\omega) R_t^K P_{k,t-1} K_t}{P_{k,t-1} K_t - N_t} \right) (P_{k,t-1} K_t - N_t) \quad (14)$$

The net worth of the entrepreneurs for the next period is then the equity held by entrepreneurs that survive plus labor income of their own work:

$$N_{t+1} = \gamma_s V_t + W_t^e \quad (15)$$

Lastly, optimal labor decisions require that real wages are equal for both types of firms  $j = s, l$  within a region,

$$W_t X_t = \alpha(1 - \Omega) \frac{y_{jt}}{H_{jt}} \quad \text{and} \quad W_t^e X_t = \alpha \Omega \frac{y_{jt}}{H_{jt}} \quad (16)$$

and  $X_t$  is the gross mark-up of retail goods over wholesale goods and  $1/X_t$  is then the relative price of wholesale goods. Entrepreneurs sell their output to retailers.

There are two different intermediate goods, one produced by a small firm and the other produced by the large firm. These intermediate goods are combined in a CES aggregator to a single wholesale good as follow:

$$Y_{Ht} = [a Y_{Hl,t}^\rho + (1 - a) Y_{Hs,t}^\rho]^{1/\rho} \quad (17)$$

where  $Y_{Hl,t} = \int_i y_{h,l,t}^i di$  and  $Y_{Hs,t} = \int_i y_{h,s,t}^i di$  and  $H$  denotes the home region. The elasticity of substitution between small and large firms goods producer is denoted by  $\rho$  and  $a$  is the output share of large firms in aggregate output.

---

<sup>40</sup>Entrepreneurs supply their unit of labor inelastically and I assume that  $\Omega = 0.01$  in order to show that this modification to the standard production function does not have first order effects.



From (11), the price of capital differs across firms but optimal portfolio decisions requires:

$$E_t[(R_{H,l,t+1}^K - R_{H,s,t+1}^K)\beta U_{Ct+1}/U_{Ct}] = 0 \quad (18)$$

$$E_t[(R_{F,l,t+1}^K - R_{F,s,t+1}^K)\beta U_{Ct+1}^*/U_{Ct}^*] = 0 \quad (19)$$

where

$$E_t(R_{t+1}^K) = E_t \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha) \frac{Y_{Hjt+1}}{X_{t+1} K_{jt+1}} \frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} - (1-\delta) \tilde{P}_{jkt+1}}{P_{kt}} \right] \quad (20)$$

$$\text{and } \frac{P_{lt}}{P_t} = a \left( \frac{Y_{Ht}}{Y_{Hlt}} \right)^{\rho-1} \text{ and } \frac{P_{st}}{P_t} = (1-a) \left( \frac{Y_{Ht}}{Y_{Hst}} \right)^{\rho-1}.$$

## 4.2 Capital Producers

Entrepreneurs use capital from production but do not permanently own it. They purchase it from perfectly competitive capital producers at the end of time  $t-1$ , use it in production and re-sell the undepreciated part  $(1-\delta)K_t$  at time  $t$ . Capital is firm-type specific,  $j = s, l$ . Capital producers purchase investment goods,  $I_t$  and old capital to produce new capital goods that will be sold to entrepreneurs solving (C1):

$$\underset{\{K_{jt}, I_{jt}\}}{\text{Max}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [P_{jkt} K_{jt+1} - I_{jt} - \tilde{P}_{jkt} K_{jt}] \quad (21)$$

subject to,

$$K_{jt+1} = \phi_j \left( \frac{I_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \right) K_{jt} + (1-\delta) K_{jt} \quad (22)$$

where the adjustment cost is an increasing and concave function ( $\phi'(\cdot) \geq 0$ ,  $\phi''(\cdot) \leq 0$ ,  $\phi(0) = 0$ ) and  $\tilde{P}_{jkt}$  is the price of capital of previously-installed capital.<sup>41</sup> The link between the price of capital and investment is due to capital adjustment costs. Optimality conditions require that the price of a unit of capital in terms of the home goods is given by,

$$P_{jkt} = \left[ \phi'_j \left( \frac{I_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \right) \right]^{-1} \quad (23)$$

$$\tilde{P}_{jkt} = \left[ (1-\delta) + \phi_j \left( \frac{I_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \right) - \phi'_j \left( \frac{I_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \right) \frac{I_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \right] P_{jkt} \quad (24)$$

---

<sup>41</sup>Pancrazi et al. (2016) show that the approximation of the previously installed capital with the newly installed capital has first order equilibrium distortions when  $\delta > 0$ . I follow their suggested correction.

### 4.3 Retailers

There is a continuum of retailers who buy output from entrepreneurs in a competitive market and costlessly differentiate them into varieties of final output. To account for nominal rigidities, I assume the existence of a monopolistically competitive retail sector subject to a price-setting decision à la Calvo. Let  $Y_t(z)$  be the quantity of output sold by retailer  $z$ , measured in units of wholesale goods, and let  $P_t(z)$  be the nominal price. The total final usable good,  $Y_t^f$  is the following composite:  $Y_t^f = \left[ \int_0^1 Y_t(z)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$ ,  $\theta > 0$  is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties. Lastly, the demand for retailer  $z$  is  $Y_t(z) = \left( \frac{P_t(z)}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t^f$ . Final output can be either transformed into a single type of consumption good, invested or consumed by the government, or used up in monitoring costs. As these retailers have market power and therefore make non-zero profits, profits are returned to households in a lump-sum form.

Retailers have a probability  $1 - \epsilon$  of changing their price each period. Retailers set their optimal prices so that in expectation, discounted marginal revenue equals discounted marginal cost, given the constraint that the nominal price is fixed with probability  $\epsilon$ . Appendix D1 shows that this optimization problem yields a standard home and foreign Phillips curve.

### 4.4 Households

The home region has a continuum of household types indexed by  $x$ . Households decide to consume home and foreign goods, to supply labor and invest their savings in a financial intermediary that pays the risk-free interest rate. A household's type specifies the type of labor supplied by that household. Home households of type  $x$  solves the following problem (H1),

$$\underset{\{C_{t+j}, H_{t+j}(x), D_{t+j}\}}{Max} E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j U(C_{t+j}, H_{t+j}(x)) \quad (25)$$

subject to,

$$P_t C_t + D_{t+1}(x) = W_t(x) H_t(x) + R_t D_t(x) - T_t + \Pi_t \quad (26)$$

$D_{t+1}$  are deposits at a financial intermediary,<sup>42</sup>  $R_t$  is the risk-free interest rate,  $P_t$  is a price index that gives a consumer the minimum price of a unit of the composite consumption

---

<sup>42</sup>In equilibrium, household deposits at intermediaries are equal to total loanable funds supplied to entrepreneurs:  $D_{t+1} = B_{t+1}$ .

good  $C_t$ ,  $W_t$  is the real wage rate received for working  $H_t$  hours by household type  $x$ ,  $T_t$  are lump-sum taxes collected by the federal fiscal authority and lastly  $\Pi_t$  are profits from home intermediate producers.

The composite consumption good is an index given by,

$$C_t = \left[ \phi_H^{1/\eta} C_{Ht}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \phi_F^{1/\eta} C_{Ft}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right] \quad (27)$$

$\phi_H$  and  $\phi_F$  denote households' relative preference for home and foreign goods. I normalize and set these preferences as  $\phi_H + \phi_F = 1$ .  $C_{Ht}$  and  $C_{Ft}$  are consumption of composites home and foreign goods and  $\eta > 0$  is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.

$$C_{Ht} = \left[ \int_0^1 c_{ht}(z)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dz \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \quad \text{and} \quad C_{Ft} = \left[ \int_0^1 c_{ft}(z)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dz \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \quad (28)$$

$\theta > 0$  is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties.  $c_{ht}(z)$  and  $c_{ft}(z)$  denote the consumption variety  $z$  of home and foreign produced goods, respectively. Goods markets are completely integrated across regions, and therefore home and foreign consumers face the same prices.

Households minimize the cost of buying the consumption basket  $C_t$ . These optimal decisions imply demand curves for home and foreign goods, and for each of the differentiated products of the form:

$$C_{Ht} = \phi_H C_t \left( \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \quad \text{and} \quad C_{Ft} = \phi_F C_t \left( \frac{P_{Ft}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \quad (29)$$

$$c_{ht}(z) = C_{Ht} \left( \frac{p_{ht}(z)}{P_{Ht}} \right)^{-\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad c_{ft}(z) = C_{Ft} \left( \frac{p_{ft}(z)}{P_{Ft}} \right)^{-\theta} \quad (30)$$

where

$$P_{Ht} = \left[ \int_0^1 p_{ht}(z)^{1-\theta} dz \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \quad \text{and} \quad P_{Ft} = \left[ \int_0^1 p_{ft}(z)^{1-\theta} dz \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \quad (31)$$

and

$$P_t = \left[ \phi_H P_{Ht}^{1-\eta} + \phi_F P_{Ft}^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad (32)$$

The problem of the foreign household is defined analogously.

## 4.5 The Government

There is a federal government that runs a balanced budget, purchasing goods and collecting lump-sum taxes in both home and foreign regions,

$$nP_{Ht}G_{Ht} + (1-n)P_{Ft}G_{Ft} = T_t \quad (33)$$

where  $n$  is the relative size of the home region,  $P_{Ht}$  is the home relative price of home goods and  $G_{Ht}$  is the per capita government purchases of home consumption goods. Lump-sum taxes are defined as  $T_t = nT_{Ht} + (1 - n)T_{Ft}$ . I assume that government demand mimic the private demand for differentiated goods:

$$g_{ht}(z) = G_{Ht} \left( \frac{p_{ht}(z)}{P_{Ht}} \right)^{-\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad g_{ft}(z) = G_{Ft} \left( \frac{p_{ft}(z)}{P_{Ft}} \right)^{-\theta} \quad (34)$$

The policy experiment consists in an increase in government spending in the home region financed with an increase in federal lump-sum taxes ([Farhi and Werning \(2016\)](#)).

The Monetary authority follows a standard Taylor rule for the country's nominal interest rate (in linearised form),

$$\hat{R}_t = (1 - \rho_R)(\phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_Y \hat{Y}_t) + \rho_R \hat{R}_{t-1} \quad (35)$$

where  $\rho_R$  denotes the degree of interest rate smoothing,  $\phi_\pi$  is the response to the weighted average deviation of national inflation from target and  $\phi_Y$  is the reaction to (weighted average) national output gap. Lastly,  $\hat{\pi}_t = n\hat{\pi}_{Ht} + (1 - n)\hat{\pi}_{Ft}$  and  $\hat{Y}_t = n\hat{Y}_{Ht} + (1 - n)\hat{Y}_{Ft}$ , where a variable with a hat ( $\wedge$ ) is expressed as deviations of steady state values.

## 4.6 Equilibrium

**Definition.** Given  $F_j(\omega)$ , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and price functions,  $\{C_{it}, C_{it}^e, H_{ijt}, D_{it}, W_{it}, Y_{ijt}, K_{ij,t+1}, B_{ijt}, P_{kijt}, R_{ij,t+1}^K, R_{t+1}, G_{it}, T_t, \bar{\omega}_{ijt}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ , for  $i = H, F$  and  $j = s, l$  such that:

1. Households solve  $H1$  for  $i = H, F$ ;
2. Entrepreneur  $j$  solves  $E1$  for  $i = H, F$ ;
3. Capital producers solve  $C1$  for  $i = H, F$ ;
4. Government budget constraint:  $nP_{Ht}G_{Ht} + (1 - n)P_{Ft}G_{Ft} = T_t$ ;
5. Goods markets clears:  $Y_t = nY_{Ht} + (1 - n)Y_{Ft}$ ;  $Y_{it} = C_{it} + I_{it} + G_{it}$ ,  
 $C_t = [n(C_{it} + C_{it}^e) + (1 - n)(C_{it}^* + C_{it}^{e*})]$ ;  $I_t = [nI_{it} + (1 - n)I_{it}^*]$
6. Bond market clears:  $\sum_j (Q_{ijt}K_{ij,t+1} - N_{ij,t+1}) = \sum_j B_{ij,t+1} = D_{it+1}$

## 4.7 Calibration

I consider the utility function from [Greenwood et al. \(1988\)](#) (i.e. GHH preferences), where consumption and labor are complements. [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#) point out that these preferences help matching the average local fiscal multiplier within this framework:

$$U(C_t, H_t) = \frac{(C_t - \chi H_t^{1+\nu^{-1}} / (1 + \nu^{-1}))^{1-\sigma^{-1}}}{1 - \sigma^{-1}} \quad (36)$$

Table 6 summarizes the parametrization of the model. A period in the model corresponds to a quarter. I choose parameter values to match cross-sectional moments of US local economies and heterogeneity by firm size using BDS and ORBIS. For the rest of the parameters I follow [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#) and [Bernanke et al. \(1998\)](#). I set  $\sigma = 1$  and  $\nu = 1$ , which capture the Frisch-elasticity. The subjective discount factor,  $\beta$ , is set such that it matches an annual nominal interest rate of 2%. The elasticity of substitution across varieties is  $\theta = 7$ , and the substitution between home and foreign goods is  $\eta = 2$ . The frequency of price change is set to  $\epsilon = 0.75$ , which implies that retailers change prices once a year on average. The labor share is equal to  $\alpha = 0.65$ , and therefore the capital share is 0.35. The quarterly depreciation rate is  $\delta = 0.02$ . The home bias for the average MSA is set to  $\phi_H = 0.66$  from [Dupor et al. \(2018\)](#) who use the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) for 2012. The size of the average MSA is  $n = 1\%$  calibrated from BEA.

In terms of the policy parameters, the persistence of the government spending shock is set to 0.95, following [Basso and Rachedi \(2018\)](#) which estimate an AR(1) process with state level data until 2015. The conduct of the monetary policy is calibrated using the estimated Taylor rule by [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2014\)](#).<sup>43</sup>

Using BDS, I set the average employment share of small firms across MSAs over the sample period equal to 46% and the average exit rate (i) for small and large firms to 7% and 1% on average, respectively. From ORBIS, I calibrate the (ii) credit spread of small and large firms at 3% and 1%, respectively. Leverage (iii) is calibrated to match ORBIS ratio of assets to liabilities for small and large firms, 2.08 and 2.32 respectively (see Table (3)). I follow [Bernanke et al. \(1998\)](#) and calibrate the entrepreneurial labor share equal to 0.01 (iv). Lastly, using (i)-(iv) I solve for steady state values for  $\sigma_{\omega_j}$ ,  $\bar{\omega}_j$ ,  $\mu_j$  and  $\gamma_{sj}$  for  $j = s, l$ . The heterogeneous capital adjustment costs are calibrated such that the dispersion in firm level investment matches ORBIS data: 18.69 vs 14.34 for small firms and 4.37 vs 4.27 for large firms. I choose an elasticity of substitution between small and large produced goods

<sup>43</sup>I set the response of monetary policy to the output gap equal to zero,  $\phi_Y = 0$ , in order to make a counterfactual exercise clear. Please see Section 4.9.

equal to 0.5.

**Table 6: Calibration**

		Target/Source	All	
Discount factor	$\beta$	2% $i^n$	0.995	
Elast. of substitution between home and foreign goods	$\eta$	NS14'	2	
Elast. of substitution across varieties	$\theta$	NS14'	7	
Calvo parameter	$\epsilon$	NS14'	0.75	
Labor share	$\alpha$		0.65	
Depreciation	$\delta$		0.02	
Relative size of avg. MSA	$n$	BEA	0.01	
Home bias	$\phi_H$	Dupor et al, 19'	0.66	
Taylor rule	$(\phi_\pi, \phi_Y, \phi_R)$	NS14'	(1.5, 0, 0.8)	
Gov. Spending, Shock persistence	$(G/Y, \delta)$	Basso&Rachedi, 20'	(0.20, 0.95)	
<b>Financial Accelerator &amp; Firm size</b>		Target/Source	Small	Large
Emp. share		BDS	46%	54%
Steady-state risk spread (annual) ( $^m$ )	$R^K / R$	ORBIS	3%	1%
Business failure (annual) ( $^m$ )	$F(\bar{\omega})$	BDS	7%	1%
Leverage ratio ( $^m$ )	$B/N$	ORBIS	0.52	0.57
Entrepreneurial Labor share ( $^m$ )	$\Omega$	BGG99'	0.01	0.01
Capital Adjustment Cost	$\phi$	$(\sigma_s^I, \sigma_l^I)_{ORBIS}$	0.10	0.50
Standard error of idiosyncratic shock*	$\sigma_\omega$		0.300	0.197
Threshold value of idiosyncratic shock*	$\bar{\omega}$		0.457	0.568
Monitoring cost*	$\mu$		0.091	0.134
Survival rate of entrepreneurs*	$\gamma_s$		0.979	0.988
Elast. of risk premium wrt leverage	$\nu$	Deduced at SS	0.045	0.025
Elast. of substitution between small and large	$\rho$		0.50	

## 4.8 Results

This section uses the model to compare  $\gamma^{micro}$  and  $\gamma^{MSA}$  estimated in Sections 2 and 3 with the the same objects estimated using model generated data.

First, using the average calibration for the employment share of small firms (46%) between 2000 and 2013, I study the differential response in investment between small and large firms,  $\gamma^{micro}$ , to a federally financed increase in government spending in the home region ( $G_H$ ) relative to the differential response of small and large firms in the foreign region, as estimated in Equation (5). Table (7) shows that the model generates a differential response of 3.14% versus almost 5% in the data (column (6) in Table (4)). This implies that the model can account for about 2/3 of the heterogeneous response of investment between small and large firms. The financial accelerator mechanism matches quantitatively well the differential response of investment documented in the data.

Can the model quantitatively match the effect of the employment share of small firms on the local fiscal multiplier,  $\gamma^{MSA}$ ? I estimate Equation (1) used in Section 2 with model

generated data:

$$\frac{Y_{m,t+1} - Y_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} = \beta \frac{G_{m,t+1} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} + \gamma^{MSA} \frac{G_{m,t+1} - G_{m,t-1}}{Y_{m,t-1}} \times (S_{m,t-1} - \bar{S}) + \eta S_{m,t-1} + \delta_m + \delta_t + \epsilon_{m,t}$$

$\beta$  is the local fiscal multiplier for the MSA that has the average employment share of small firms. Given that the model is symmetric, i.e. has the same share of small firms in both regions, I estimate  $\beta$  running the above equation using the average employment share of small firms. Table (7) shows that  $\beta$  is equal to 1.70, which overestimates but is not too far from the size of the one-year average local fiscal multiplier of 1.57 found in Section 2. The model can match quantitatively well the average local fiscal multiplier. However this is not new, this is a feature of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) model, which I follow.

As the model is symmetric and does not have heterogeneous share of small firms ( $S_m$ ) and government spending ( $G_m$ ) across regions, I compute  $\gamma^{MSA}$  as the average difference in  $\beta$ s of two regressions. These  $\beta$ s differ in the employment share of small firms by 1% across the range of  $S_m$  and  $G_m$  observed in the data.<sup>44</sup> Table (7) shows that  $\gamma^{MSA} = 0.010$  versus 0.068 in the data, implying that increasing the employment share of small firms by 1%, increases the local fiscal multiplier by 0.59%, versus 4.32% in the empirical results. The model can account for 10-20% of the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the share of small firms.

**Table 7:** Local fiscal multipliers: the role of small firms

		Data	Model
Difference in Investment response ( $\gamma^{micro}$ )		4.978	3.142
<b>Investment: Ratio of Model-Data explained</b>		<b>63.1%</b>	
Average Local Output Fiscal Multiplier	$\beta$	1.573	1.705
Sensitivity wrt Small firms	$\gamma^{MSA}$	0.068	0.010
$\Delta$ Local Multiplier of 1% increase in Share of Small	$\gamma/\beta$	4.32%	0.59%
Local Fiscal Multiplier: Ratio of Model-Data explained		<b>13.7%</b>	
[Min; Max]		[10.3%; 17.1%]	

## 4.9 Small firms and the national fiscal multiplier

Policymakers and the fiscal literature focus on national multipliers. Even though I have not estimated the effects of the employment share of small firms on the national

<sup>44</sup>Specifically,  $\gamma^{MSA} = \text{Mean}(\beta_{g,s+1} - \beta_{g,s})$ , with  $g = G^{min}, \dots, G^{max}$  and  $s = S^{min}, \dots, S^{max}$ .



multiplier, the model can produce such multiplier given that it accounts for general equilibrium effects. I use the model to ask the following question: Does a larger share of small firms also increase the national aggregate fiscal multiplier? In other words, is  $\gamma^{nat} > 0$ ?

With model generated data using the baseline calibration, I run the following regression aggregating output and the employment share of small firms across regions. I calculate how national output changes in response to a symmetric government spending shock in both, home and foreign regions; and how this statistic changes with the employment share of small firms.

$$\frac{Y_{t+1}^{nat} - Y_{t-1}^{nat}}{Y_{t-1}^{nat}} = \beta^{nat} \frac{G_{t+1}^{nat} - G_{t-1}^{nat}}{Y_{t-1}^{nat}} + \gamma^{nat} \frac{G_{t+1}^{nat} - G_{t-1}^{nat}}{Y_{t-1}^{nat}} \times (S_{t-1}^{nat} - \bar{S}^{nat}) + \eta S_{t-1}^{nat} + \epsilon_t$$

As before,  $\beta^{nat}$  is the national fiscal multiplier in an economy with the average national employment share of small firms. To compute the effect of the share of small firms on the national fiscal multiplier, I change the share of small firms by 1% and therefore define  $\gamma^{nat} = \beta_{\bar{S}+1}^{nat} - \beta_{\bar{S}}^{nat}$ . Table (8) presents the results:  $\beta^{nat}$  is 0.277 and increases with the share of small firms,  $\gamma^{nat} = 0.003$ . This implies that increasing the employment share of small firms by 1%, rises the national fiscal multiplier by 1.08%.


**Table 8:** National fiscal multipliers: the role of small firms

		Model
National Fiscal Multiplier	$\beta^{nat}$	0.277
Sensitivity wrt Small firms	$\gamma^{nat}$	0.003
$\Delta$ National Multiplier of 1% increase in Share of Small	$\gamma/\beta$	1.08%

National policies such as the common monetary policy and federal tax policy affect the size of the national fiscal multiplier. The agreement in the literature is that more accommodative monetary policies increase the national fiscal multiplier. The extreme case is the zero lower bound, where the fiscal multiplier can be significantly large (Christiano et al., 2011). The reason for this result is that if the central bank does not increase the nominal interest rate after a fiscal stimulus, inflation goes up and the real interest rate goes down, crowding-in consumption and investment. Next, I ask: How does the employment share of small firms interact with the stance of monetary policy for the national fiscal multiplier? Figure (2) shows that the relationship between the share of small firms and the national multiplier is a function of how aggressive monetary policy reacts to fiscal shocks ( $\gamma^{nat} = f(\phi_\pi)$ ). The larger the stabilization role of monetary policy ( $\phi_\pi$ ), the smaller the role of the financial accelerator, and therefore, the role of small firms on the

national fiscal multiplier. The model predicts that the amplification effects of small firms on the *national* fiscal multiplier are larger at the ZLB.

**Figure 2:** National fiscal multipliers, Small firms and Monetary policy



## 5 Conclusions

How does the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus depend on the composition of firms where the stimulus takes place? The composition of firms where the fiscal stimulus takes place is key to the design of fiscal packages aiming to stabilize the economy. This paper presents evidence of a firm size-dependent multiplier where the heterogeneous behaviour of small and large firms shapes the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. The fiscal multiplier increases with the share of small firms in the economy. A financial accelerator channel of fiscal stimulus is emphasized, where the aggregate effects of government spending depends on the distribution of financial constraints that firms face, which can vary over time. The propagation of government spending shocks through the interaction of firm heterogeneity and credit markets, restrict the class of models able to match the empirical evidence presented here. Lastly, I show that the spillover effects of demand shocks can be sizable on small firms.

Further research is needed to improve our understanding of the links between firms and households decisions for the amplification of fiscal stimulus. Recent contributions bring the complex network structure between consumption and production into the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy ([Patterson et al. \(2019\)](#); [Bouakez et al. \(2020\)](#)).

## References

- Adelino, M., Schoar, A., and Severino, F. (2015). House prices, collateral, and self-employment. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 117(2):288–306.
- Auclert, A., Rognlie, M., and Straub, L. (2018). The intertemporal keynesian cross. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Auerbach, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., and Murphy, D. (2020a). Local fiscal multipliers and fiscal spillovers in the usa. *IMF Economic Review*, 68(1):195–229.
- Auerbach, A. J., Gorodnichenko, Y., and Murphy, D. (2019). Macroeconomic frameworks. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Auerbach, A. J., Gorodnichenko, Y., and Murphy, D. (2020b). Effects of fiscal policy on credit markets. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Bahaj, S., Pinter, G., Foulis, A., and Surico, P. (2019). Employment and the collateral channel of monetary policy.
- Basso, H. S. and Rachedi, O. (2018). The young, the old, and the government: demographics and fiscal multipliers.
- Baxter, M. and King, R. G. (1993). Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. *The American Economic Review*, pages 315–334.
- Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth: does firm size matter? *The journal of finance*, 60(1):137–177.
- Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1998). The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Bouakez, H., Rachedi, O., and Santoro, E. (2020). The government spending multiplier in a multi-sector economy.
- Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. (2004). Fiscal shocks and their consequences. *Journal of Economic theory*, 115(1):89–117.
- Canzoneri, M., Collard, F., Dellas, H., and Diba, B. (2016). Fiscal multipliers in recessions. *The Economic Journal*, 126(590):75–108.
- Carrillo, J. A. and Poilly, C. (2013). How do financial frictions affect the spending multiplier during a liquidity trap? *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 16(2):296–311.

- Chodorow-Reich, G. (2019). Geographic cross-sectional fiscal spending multipliers: What have we learned? *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 11(2):1–34.
- Choi, J., Penciakova, V., and Saffie, F. (2020). Political connections, allocation of stimulus spending, and the fiscal multiplier.
- Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., and Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the government spending multiplier large? *Journal of Political Economy*, 119(1):78–121.
- Cloyne, J., Huber, K., Ilzetzi, E., and Kleven, H. (2019). The effect of house prices on household borrowing: a new approach. *American Economic Review*, 109(6):2104–36.
- Cohen, L., Coval, J., and Malloy, C. (2011). Do powerful politicians cause corporate downsizing? *Journal of Political Economy*, 119(6):1015–1060.
- Corbi, R., Papaioannou, E., and Surico, P. (2019). Regional transfer multipliers. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(5):1901–1934.
- Corsetti, G., Kuester, K., and Müller, G. J. (2013). Floats pegs and the transmission of fiscal policy. *Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies no. 17*.
- Cox, L., Müller, G. J., Pasten, E., Schoenle, R., and Weber, M. (2020). Big g. *Fama-Miller Working Paper*.
- Davis, S. J. and Haltiwanger, J. C. (2019). Dynamism diminished: The role of housing markets and credit conditions. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Decker, R., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R., and Miranda, J. (2014). The role of entrepreneurship in us job creation and economic dynamism. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(3):3–24.
- Demyanyk, Y., Loutskina, E., and Murphy, D. (2019). Fiscal stimulus and consumer debt. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 101(4):728–741.
- Dinlersoz, E., Kalemli-Özcan, Hyatt, H., and Penciakova, V. (2019). Leverage over the firm life cycle, firm growth, and aggregate fluctuations.
- Dupor, B. and Guerrero, R. (2017). Local and aggregate fiscal policy multipliers. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 92:16–30.
- Dupor, B., Karabarbounis, M., Kudlyak, M., and Mehkari, M. (2018). Regional consumption responses and the aggregate fiscal multiplier. *Available at SSRN 3131248*.

- Farhi, E. and Werning, I. (2016). Fiscal multipliers: Liquidity traps and currency unions. In *Handbook of Macroeconomics*, volume 2, pages 2417–2492. Elsevier.
- Fernández-Villaverde, J. (2010). Fiscal policy in a model with financial frictions. *American Economic Review*, 100(2):35–40.
- Ferraz, C., Finan, F., and Szerman, D. (2015). Procuring firm growth: the effects of government purchases on firm dynamics. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Fort, T. C., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R. S., and Miranda, J. (2013). How firms respond to business cycles: The role of firm age and firm size. *IMF Economic Review*, 61(3):520–559.
- Galí, J., López-Salido, J. D., and Vallés, J. (2007). Understanding the effects of government spending on consumption. *Journal of the european economic association*, 5(1):227–270.
- Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S. (1994). Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small manufacturing firms. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109(2):309–340.
- Goldman, J. (2020). Government as customer of last resort: The stabilizing effects of government purchases on firms. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 33(2):610–643.
- Gourio, F., Messer, T., and Siemer, M. (2016). Firm entry and macroeconomic dynamics: a state-level analysis. *American Economic Review*, 106(5):214–18.
- Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., and Huffman, G. W. (1988). Investment, capacity utilization, and the real business cycle. *The American Economic Review*, pages 402–417.
- Hagedorn, M., Manovskii, I., and Mitman, K. (2019). The fiscal multiplier. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Kaplan, G. and Violante, G. L. (2014). A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments. *Econometrica*, 82(4):1199–1239.
- Kim, T. and Nguyen, Q. H. (2020). The effect of public spending on private investment. *Review of Finance*, 24(2):415–451.
- Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit cycles. *Journal of political economy*, 105(2):211–248.
- Lee, M. (2017). Government purchases, firm growth and industry dynamics. *University of San Diego (mimeo)*.

- Melina, G. and Villa, S. (2014). Fiscal policy and lending relationships. *Economic Inquiry*, 52(2):696–712.
- Nakamura, E. and Steinsson, J. (2014). Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: Evidence from us regions. *American Economic Review*, 104(3):753–92.
- Olivero, M. P. et al. (2019). Fiscal policy and credit spreads: Evidence from a svar. *Economics Bulletin*, 39(2):1393–1403.
- Ottonello, P. and Winberry, T. (2018). Financial heterogeneity and the investment channel of monetary policy. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Pancrazi, R., Seoane, H. D., and Vukotic, M. (2016). The price of capital and the financial accelerator. *Economics Letters*, 149:86–89.
- Patterson, C. et al. (2019). The matching multiplier and the amplification of recessions. In *2019 Meeting Papers*, volume 95. Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ramey, V. A. (2011). Can government purchases stimulate the economy? *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(3):673–85.
- Ramey, V. A. (2019). Ten years after the financial crisis: What have we learned from the renaissance in fiscal research? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(2):89–114.
- Woodford, M. (2011). Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 3(1):1–35.
- Zwick, E. and Mahon, J. (2017). Tax policy and heterogeneous investment behavior. *American Economic Review*, 107(1):217–48.

## A Appendix: MSA Evidence

### A.1 MSA level data - Summary Statistics

**Table 9: Summary statistics**

Variable	Mean	SD	p25	p50	p75
GDP growth (%)	1.71	4.11	-0.35	1.67	3.77
DOD spending growth (%)	0.10	1.16	-0.06	0.01	0.15
Ratio DOD spending over GDP (%)	1.36	2.71	0.15	0.45	1.42
Employment share of SMEs (Emp < 250) (%)	46.27	6.56	41.85	45.35	49.87
Employment share of Small (Emp < 100) (%)	37.77	6.06	33.64	36.70	41.08

Note: This table reports summary statistics for core variables of interest used in this study. The data covers 344 MSAs.

### A.2 Results at MSA level - Robustness

**Table 10: The local fiscal multiplier: Robustness**

Output response	OLS	$(S_{m,t-1} - \bar{S}_t)$	No IV Share Small	MSA specific Cyclicality	National specific Cyclicality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	0.213*** (0.079)	1.689*** (0.425)	1.476*** (0.405)	1.334*** (0.263)	1.640*** (0.359)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.007 (0.004)	0.076** (0.035)	0.048** (0.024)	0.046** (0.022)	0.073*** (0.025)
Emp share of Small ( $\eta$ )	0.123*** (0.037)	0.010** (0.040)	0.106*** (0.039)	0.027 (0.040)	0.081 (0.054)
Lag GDP growth				0.432** (0.184)	
Lag GDP growth $\times$ Emp share of Small				0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.008)
Obs.	3,748	3,748	3,748	3,440	3,440
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster SE	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat		15.88	20.70	17.58	17.49

Note: Sample period is 2001-2013 and includes 344 MSAs. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .



**Table 11: The local fiscal multiplier: Robustness adding MSAs' time-varying controls**

Output response	Lagged GDP growth (1)	Control Unemp. rate (2)	Control Share Manuf. (3)	Control Share Constr. (4)	Control House Prices (5)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	0.002 (0.195)	1.463*** (0.333)	1.446*** (0.315)	1.404*** (0.321)	1.506*** (0.378)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.020 (0.021)	0.078*** (0.024)	0.063** (0.027)	0.071*** (0.026)	0.070** (0.028)
Emp share of Small ( $\eta$ )	0.074*** (0.025)	0.108** (0.042)	0.099** (0.040)	0.106** (0.043)	0.103** (0.040)
Control ( $X_{m,t-1}$ )		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.002* (0.014)
Obs.	3,440	3,608	3,734	3,327	3,674
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster SE	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat	17.18	22.26	38.20	31.09	17.07

Note: Sample period is 2001-2013 and includes 344 MSAs. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 12: The local fiscal multiplier: Robustness - Definitions of Small firms**

Output response	Small < 50 (1)	Small < 100 (2)	Young < 5 (3)	Large > 1000 (4)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	1.460*** (0.379)	1.519*** (0.364)	1.201*** (0.257)	1.065*** (0.388)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.042** (0.019)	0.053** (0.022)	0.029*** (0.009)	-0.052† (0.032)
Emp share of <i>Small</i> <sub>50</sub>	0.125*** (0.041)			
Emp share of <i>Small</i> <sub>100</sub>		0.102** (0.043)		
Emp share of <i>Young</i> <sub>5</sub>			-0.017 (0.013)	
Emp share of <i>Large</i> <sub>1000</sub>				-0.009 (0.041)
Obs.	3,748	3,748	3,748	3,748
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster SE	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat	15.78	17.10	7.89	6.46

Note: Sample period is 2001-2013 and includes 344 MSAs. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 13: The local fiscal multiplier: Impact on other outcome variables**

Response of	Earnings (1)	Wages (2)	Personal Income (3)	Unempl rate (4)	Dividends, Int. & rent (5)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	2.154*** (0.440)	1.934*** (0.404)	1.058*** (0.258)	-2.113** (0.834)	0.691** (0.321)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.078** (0.033)	0.096*** (0.025)	0.036* (0.020)	-0.019 (0.076)	0.044 (0.033)
Emp share of Small ( $\eta$ )	0.105** (0.040)	0.075** (0.038)	0.045 (0.028)	0.179 (0.160)	-0.078 (0.048)
Obs.	3,748	3,748	3,748	3,608	3,748
MSA and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster SE	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA	MSA
1st Stage F-stat	18.41	18.41	18.41	21.83	18.41

Note: Sample period is 2001-2013 and includes 344 MSAs. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

## B Appendix: Robustness Micro level evidence

### B.1 Results at State level

Figure 3: Aggregate effects of firm heterogeneity - State level Evidence



Note: The figure display the sensitivity of the local fiscal multiplier to the firm size distribution at state level. Sample period is 1977-2014. Data for the share of small business is from Business Dynamic Statistics. The government spending shock is identified with the cross-sectional variation of DoD spending across US states from [Dupor and Guerrero \(2017\)](#).

Table 14: The local fiscal multiplier: the role of small business

Dependent variable	Output		Earnings	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military contracts ( $\beta$ )	2.260*** (0.559)	2.126*** (0.512)	1.713*** (0.393)	1.600*** (0.381)
Military contracts $\times$ Emp share of Small ( $\gamma$ )	0.190** (0.074)		0.092** (0.042)	
Military contracts $\times$ # Business share of Small ( $\gamma$ )		4.398*** (1.026)		1.589** (0.712)
Emp share of Small ( $\eta$ )	-0.153** (0.075)		-0.115** (0.056)	
#Business share of Small ( $\eta$ )		-3.918 (2.417)		-0.346 (1.733)
Obs.	1,759	1,800	1,759	1,800
R2	0.285	0.258	0.526	0.522
State and Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

\*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$

## B.2 Firm level data - ORBIS

**Table 15:** Descriptive Statistics: ORBIS 1997-2016 - 7,635 firms & 60,054 obs.

Variable	Definition	Obs.	Mean	Median	SD	p25	p75
$\Delta Sales$	Log change in operating turnover	59,596	0.161	0.095	0.560	-0.088	0.343
Investment	Log change in fixed assets	61,111	0.150	0.055	0.679	-0.152	0.383
$\Delta Work. Capital$	Growth in Net Current assets (how much capital is used by day to day activities)	55,485	-0.003	-0.042	1.087	-0.487	0.413
$\Delta Financing$	Log change in total financing, defined as current liabilities (Loans+Creditors+Other current liab) + long-term liabilities (Long term financial debts + other long term liab. and provisions))	62,054	0.167	0.078	0.555	-0.137	0.397
$\Delta ST-Financing$	Log change in short-term debt (with maturity less or equal than a year)	62,054	0.159	0.104	0.570	-0.154	0.421
$\Delta \frac{FinExp}{Liab}$	Change in all financial expenses such as interest charges, write-off financial assets over total liabilities	38,916	0.234	-0.011	5.505	-1.447	1.631
Total Assets <sub>-2</sub>	Log of total assets	62,054	18.422	18.457	2.438	16.739	20.144
Profitability <sub>-2</sub>	EBIT (Gross profit-Other operating expenses) over total assets	62,054	-0.119	0.048	0.807	-0.072	0.103
Small	Dummy equal to 1 if Employment is less than 100	62,054	0.189	0.000	0.391	0.000	0.000
Medium	Dummy equal to 1 if Employment is less than 250	62,054	0.307	0.000	0.461	0.000	1.000
$\Delta G$	Military Procurement growth over State GDP	62,054	0.001	0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.002
$\Delta GDP$	State GDP growth	62,054	0.050	0.046	0.049	0.021	0.083
$\Delta Taxes$	State Total Tax Collection	62,054	0.043	0.058	0.086	-0.001	0.095

### B.3 ORBIS: Descriptive Statistics by State

State	Obs.	$\Delta$ Sales	Investment	$\Delta$ Work. Capital	$\Delta$ Financing	$\Delta$ ST-Financing	$\frac{FinExp}{Finan-2}$
AL	309	0.046	0.043	-0.156	0.060	0.048	0.050
AR	332	0.091	0.118	-0.036	0.103	0.072	0.046
AZ	902	0.216	0.157	-0.044	0.187	0.179	0.085
CA	10,277	0.201	0.186	0.051	0.195	0.190	0.090
CO	2,171	0.228	0.197	-0.091	0.249	0.233	0.099
CT	1,235	0.114	0.141	-0.015	0.131	0.145	0.074
DE	604	0.169	0.150	0.019	0.197	0.204	0.087
FL	3,193	0.166	0.146	0.001	0.184	0.182	0.091
GA	1,669	0.124	0.120	-0.042	0.138	0.137	0.076
HI	122	0.048	0.020	-0.215	0.070	0.096	0.039
IA	318	0.047	0.098	-0.022	0.102	0.095	0.052
ID	169	0.244	0.147	-0.051	0.163	0.129	0.092
IL	2,392	0.102	0.102	0.002	0.113	0.104	0.070
IN	691	0.118	0.149	0.060	0.113	0.115	0.067
KS	484	0.100	0.072	-0.095	0.124	0.101	0.072
KY	396	0.103	0.110	0.091	0.127	0.079	0.063
LA	396	0.166	0.152	-0.028	0.196	0.170	0.074
MA	2,812	0.203	0.197	0.066	0.187	0.172	0.090
MD	1,000	0.203	0.211	-0.002	0.178	0.205	0.073
MI	946	0.075	0.082	-0.025	0.098	0.110	0.056
MN	1,570	0.143	0.130	0.005	0.133	0.123	0.070
MO	912	0.106	0.133	-0.046	0.146	0.122	0.057
MS	142	0.104	0.130	-0.069	0.147	0.130	0.058
NC	1,249	0.134	0.111	-0.022	0.131	0.128	0.072
NE	155	0.120	0.186	0.180	0.228	0.185	0.077
NH	195	0.101	0.093	0.046	0.125	0.107	0.079
NJ	2,884	0.141	0.112	0.010	0.137	0.136	0.079
NV	1,127	0.235	0.210	-0.121	0.244	0.289	0.111
NY	4,861	0.140	0.128	-0.007	0.147	0.141	0.077
OH	2,140	0.072	0.072	-0.017	0.095	0.073	0.055
OK	638	0.250	0.221	-0.089	0.255	0.191	0.073
OR	587	0.102	0.083	0.053	0.096	0.095	0.071
PA	2,349	0.160	0.151	0.032	0.158	0.156	0.069
RI	208	0.128	0.100	-0.052	0.158	0.108	0.087
SC	285	0.104	0.072	-0.099	0.088	0.098	0.049
TN	927	0.159	0.168	-0.003	0.174	0.164	0.064
TX	7,051	0.181	0.168	-0.033	0.197	0.182	0.075
UT	566	0.210	0.148	0.100	0.176	0.184	0.119
VA	1,623	0.161	0.170	-0.042	0.151	0.133	0.068
VT	111	0.124	0.117	-0.225	0.150	0.115	0.066
WA	1,162	0.225	0.203	0.016	0.227	0.194	0.093
WI	894	0.105	0.092	-0.023	0.097	0.096	0.044

## B.4 DOD Contractors

**Table 16:** *Descriptive Statistics: DOD Contractors*

Obs	13,762 (12.12%)	
Firms	847 (7.2%)	
Share of Small (< 100)	9.7%	
Share of SME (< 250)	18.9%	
Share of Listed	75.9%	
Manufacturing (20-39)	57.8%	
Services (70-89)	19.6%	
Trans., Commun., Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Ss (40-49)	10.6%	
Wholesale (50-51)	4.7%	
Retail (52-59)	3.9%	
Mining (1-9)	1.8%	
	Mean	Median
Employment	6,240.5	1,965
Profitability ( $EBIT/TA_{-2}$ )	-0.001	0.071
Log Total Assets	19.235	19.314
Leverage	0.56	0.50
Financial Exp/Liab <sub>2</sub> (%)	4.25	2.73

## B.5 Cyclicalilty of Small versus Large firms

**Table 17:** *Cyclicalilty of Firm's Investment and Financial Expenses*

Firm size	Investment	Financial Expenses
Small	0.043*** (0.002)	-0.083*** (0.024)
Large	0.019*** (0.001)	-0.070*** (0.013)
All	0.028*** (0.001)	-0.074*** (0.012)

Note: This table shows the linear combination of  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  coefficients of the following regression:  $y_{it} - y_{i,t-1} = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta GDP_{t,t-1}^{agg} + \beta_2 \Delta GDP_{t,t-1}^{agg} Small_{i,t-1} + Small_{i,t-1} + \theta X_{i,t-1} + \psi \Delta GDP_{t-1,t-2}^{agg} + \epsilon_{it}$ , with  $y$  = Investment and ( $\frac{Finan.Exp}{Liab}$ ). Standard errors in parenthesis.\*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

## B.6 Robustness: Firm level results

**Table 18: Robustness: Including Government Contractors**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$	11.230*** (2.924)	3.809 (2.722)	8.044*** (2.615)
Small	0.047*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.022)	0.003 (0.016)
Log Total Assets	-0.172*** (0.007)	-0.321*** (0.007)	-0.200*** (0.010)
Profitability	-0.010 (0.014)	0.140*** (0.018)	0.074*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	70,708	72,343	73,556
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	42.94	42.50	44.02

**Table 19: Sample Selection - Firms that were in the sample for more than 5 years**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$	11.311** (4.487)	6.520** (2.525)	9.009** (3.404)
Small	0.043*** (0.012)	0.006 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.019)
Log Total Assets	-0.162*** (0.005)	-0.305*** (0.008)	-0.194*** (0.010)
Profitability	-0.033 (0.020)	0.163*** (0.023)	0.086*** (0.011)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	49,270	50,185	50,687
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	38.84	38.64	39.75

**Table 20: Firm's size or firm's leverage?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times$ High Leverage ( $\gamma$ )	1.703 (1.321)	1.322 (3.154)	-2.821 (1.712)
DHigh Leverage	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.085*** (0.007)	-0.399*** (0.014)
Small	0.052*** (0.012)	0.016 (0.023)	0.004 (0.011)
Log Total Assets	-0.179*** (0.008)	-0.340*** (0.009)	-0.240*** (0.006)
Profitability	-0.045*** (0.013)	0.138*** (0.024)	0.042*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,234	60,826	61,778
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	40.69	40.48	40.77

**Table 21: Firm's size or firm's leverage?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times$ High Leverage	2.115 (1.334)	1.591 (3.106)	-2.596 (1.774)
$\Delta G \times$ Small ( $\gamma$ )	10.114** (4.578)	5.729** (2.164)	5.277** (2.561)
DHigh Leverage	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.085*** (0.007)	-0.399*** (0.013)
Small	0.043*** (0.013)	0.012 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.012)
Log Total Assets	-0.180*** (0.008)	-0.340*** (0.009)	-0.240*** (0.006)
Profitability	-0.045*** (0.013)	0.138*** (0.024)	0.042*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,234	60,826	61,778
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	21.02	20.99	21.67



**Table 22: Firm's size or firm's leverage?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times$ High Leverage	3.637** (1.366)	2.892 (3.684)	-1.896 (1.531)
$\Delta G \times$ Small ( $\gamma$ )	12.156*** (3.554)	8.364*** (2.985)	5.336** (2.380)
$\Delta G \times$ Small $\times$ High Leverage	-4.412 (4.244)	-6.607 (5.414)	0.125 (4.068)
High Leverage	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.094*** (0.009)	-0.371*** (0.013)
Small	0.064*** (0.014)	0.000 (0.024)	0.033** (0.013)
High Leverage $\times$ Small	-0.053*** (0.019)	0.030 (0.023)	-0.085*** (0.019)
Log Total Assets	-0.181*** (0.008)	-0.340*** (0.009)	-0.243*** (0.006)
Profitability	-0.047*** (0.013)	0.139*** (0.024)	0.039*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,234	60,826	61,778
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	14.18	14.10	14.45

**Table 23: Firm's size or firm's liquidity?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Low Liquidity } (\gamma)$	<b>-3.016**</b> (1.289)	<b>0.791</b> (2.777)	<b>-1.937</b> (2.303)
DLow Liquidity	-0.048*** (0.006)	-0.219*** (0.015)	-0.144*** (0.012)
Small	0.052*** (0.012)	0.014 (0.025)	0.014 (0.015)
Log Total Assets	-0.172*** (0.008)	-0.320*** (0.007)	-0.200*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.020 (0.013)	0.095*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.007)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	58,598	60,164	61,167
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	41.32	41.30	41.58

**Table 24: Firm's size or firm's liquidity?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Low Liquidity}$	<b>-2.086</b> (1.362)	<b>1.236</b> (2.297)	<b>-1.206</b> (2.313)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$	<b>10.691**</b> (4.774)	<b>4.381*</b> (2.257)	<b>7.056***</b> (2.468)
DLow Liquidity	-0.048*** (0.006)	-0.219*** (0.015)	-0.144*** (0.012)
Small	0.043*** (0.013)	0.011 (0.025)	0.008 (0.016)
Log Total Assets	-0.172*** (0.008)	-0.321*** (0.007)	-0.200*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.020 (0.013)	0.095*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.007)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	58,598	60,164	61,167
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	21.29	21.52	22.11

**Table 25: Firm's size or firm's liquidity?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times$ Low Liquidity	1.596 (2.220)	4.041 (3.937)	0.526 (2.768)
$\Delta G \times$ Small ( $\gamma$ )	17.314*** (6.174)	8.747 (5.393)	9.827** (3.789)
$\Delta G \times$ Small $\times$ Low Liquidity	-13.531** (5.053)	-8.777 (9.271)	-5.753 (4.821)
Low Liquidity	-0.038*** (0.006)	-0.201*** (0.010)	-0.137*** (0.009)
Small	0.058*** (0.017)	0.035 (0.031)	0.017 (0.023)
Low Liquidity $\times$ Small	-0.035* (0.019)	-0.058** (0.026)	-0.021 (0.021)
Log Total Assets	-0.173*** (0.008)	-0.322*** (0.007)	-0.200*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.021 (0.013)	0.095*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.007)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	58,598	60,164	61,167
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	14.74	14.22	14.35

**Table 26: Firm's size or Manufacturing Industries?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Manufacturing } (\gamma)$	6.491*** (2.015)	8.902** (4.285)	6.189** (2.569)
Small	0.055*** (0.012)	0.020 (0.025)	0.016 (0.015)
Log Total Assets	-0.173*** (0.007)	-0.326*** (0.007)	-0.203*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.021 (0.014)	0.096*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,411	60,010	62,054
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	44.57	44.65	45.16

**Table 27: Firm's size or Manufacturing Industries?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Manufacturing}$	5.878*** (1.792)	8.610** (4.237)	5.696** (2.575)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$	10.716** (4.446)	4.218* (2.187)	7.041** (2.667)
Small	0.047*** (0.013)	0.016 (0.025)	0.010 (0.017)
Log Total Assets	-0.173*** (0.007)	-0.326*** (0.007)	-0.203*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.021 (0.013)	0.096*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,411	60,010	62,054
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	20.54	20.45	20.93

**Table 28: Firm's size or Manufacturing Industries?**

	Op. Revenues growth (1)	Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets) (2)	Total Financing growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Manufacturing}$	7.401** (1.587)	5.141* (2.418)	5.056** (2.121)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small } (\gamma)$	13.514*** (4.951)	-7.435 (6.856)	5.638 (4.428)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small} \times \text{Manufacturing}$	-5.959 (5.318)	18.582* (10.067)	1.637 (6.240)
Small	0.073*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.026)	0.030 (0.020)
Small $\times$ Manufacturing	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.091** (0.037)	-0.034 (0.024)
Log Total Assets	-0.173*** (0.007)	-0.325*** (0.007)	-0.203*** (0.009)
Profitability	-0.021 (0.013)	0.095*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.008)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,411	60,010	62,054
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	13.98	14.05	14.56

## B.7 Robustness from ORBIS - Loans and Long-term debt

Table 29: Fiscal stimulus and Firm's use of external finance

	Total debt growth (1)	Long-term debt growth (2)	Short-term debt growth (3)	$\Delta$ Fin.Exp/Debt (4)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small}$	18.848*** (6.824)	10.386* (5.923)	8.981† (5.397)	-0.677 (1.403)
Small	-0.016 (0.036)	0.001 (0.030)	0.015 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.005)
Total Assets	-0.250*** (0.014)	-0.263*** (0.016)	-0.137*** (0.012)	0.015*** (0.003)
Profitability	0.078*** (0.017)	0.045*** (0.015)	0.062*** (0.017)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	35,076	46,946	37,852	23,377
Cluster SE	State	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	48.44	44.22	46.57	49.76

Note: Data is from ORBIS. Direct contractors that received a DOD contracts during sample period were excluded. Small firms are defined as those with less than 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ ; †:  $p < 0.15$

## B.8 Robustness from ORBIS - Small and Medium firms

**Table 30: Heterogeneous Firms' responses to Fiscal stimulus**

	Operating Revenues growth		Investment ( $\Delta$ Fixed Assets)		Working capital growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta G$	1.804 (2.392)	-1.631 (2.753)	-1.202 (2.657)	-3.275 (2.370)	0.594 (5.189)	-0.954 (5.618)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small}_{100}$		11.078** (4.309)		1.195 (4.098)		12.702** (5.585)
$\Delta G \times \text{Medium}_{100-249}$		13.041*** (3.997)		12.601*** (3.224)		-2.337 (7.599)
$\Delta GDP$	0.084 (0.183)	0.076 (0.179)	0.136 (0.129)	0.130 (0.130)	-0.126 (0.199)	-0.129 (0.198)
$\Delta Taxes$	-0.125** (0.059)	-0.127** (0.061)	-0.086 (0.059)	-0.090 (0.059)	-0.190 (0.139)	-0.191 (0.137)
$\text{Small}_{100}$	0.114*** (0.028)	0.102*** (0.027)	0.033 (0.043)	0.030 (0.045)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.033)
$\text{Medium}_{100-249}$	0.097*** (0.013)	0.088*** (0.014)	0.036 (0.023)	0.027 (0.024)	0.014 (0.035)	0.016 (0.033)
Total Assets	-0.169*** (0.007)	-0.170*** (0.007)	-0.325*** (0.008)	-0.326*** (0.008)	-0.217*** (0.028)	-0.217*** (0.028)
Profitability	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.075*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.10)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,412	59,412	61,011	61,011	55,069	55,069
Cluster SE	State	State	State	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	9.420	3.292	9.321	3.280	9.286	3.276

Note: Data from ORBIS. Small and Medium firms are defined as those with less than 100 and 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 31: Heterogeneous Firms' responses to Fiscal stimulus**

	Operating Revenues growth (1)	Investment (2)	Working capital growth (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small}_{100}$	11.773** (4.474)	1.727 (3.949)	11.494* (6.668)
$\Delta G \times \text{Medium}_{100-249}$	12.847*** (3.883)	12.461*** (3.310)	-1.724 (7.753)
$\text{Small}_{100}$	0.104*** (0.027)	0.024 (0.046)	-0.021 (0.032)
$\text{Medium}_{100-249}$	0.090*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.022)	0.020 (0.033)
Total Assets	-0.166*** (0.007)	-0.325*** (0.008)	-0.216*** (0.028)
Profitability	-0.022 (0.013)	0.096*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.009)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	59,412	61,011	55,069
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	22.89	23.05	24.52

Note: Data from ORBIS. Small and Medium firms are defined as those with less than 100 and 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .



**Table 32: Fiscal stimulus and Firm's use of external finance**

	Total financing growth		Short-term financing growth		$\Delta$ Finan Exp/Liab	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta G$	0.774 (2.545)	-1.860 (2.005)	-0.441 (2.383)	-2.279 (2.704)	0.115 (0.312)	0.252 (0.302)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small}_{100}$		8.691** (3.782)		6.884*** (2.420)		-0.731 (0.606)
$\Delta G \times \text{Medium}_{100-250}$		8.778** (3.273)		5.314** (2.329)		-0.535 (0.627)
$\Delta GDP$	-0.011 (0.117)	-0.017 (0.116)	0.028 (0.097)	0.024 (0.096)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)
$\Delta Taxes$	-0.068 (0.051)	-0.071 (0.050)	-0.032 (0.050)	-0.034 (0.050)	0.015* (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)
$\text{Small}_{100}$	0.025 (0.033)	0.017 (0.036)	0.081** (0.031)	0.074** (0.031)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
$\text{Medium}_{100-250}$	0.008 (0.020)	0.002 (0.022)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.054*** (0.017)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Total Assets	-0.203*** (0.011)	-0.204*** (0.011)	-0.180*** (0.007)	-0.181*** (0.007)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Profitability	0.061*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	62,054	62,054	62,054	62,054	38,916	38,916
Cluster SE	State	State	State	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	9.248	3.279	9.248	3.279	10.460	5.444

Note: Data from ORBIS. Small and Medium firms are defined as those with less than 100 and 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 33: Fiscal stimulus and Firm's use of external finance**


	Total financing growth (1)	Short-term financing growth (2)	$\Delta$ Finan Exp/Liab (3)
$\Delta G \times \text{Small}_{100}$	9.198** (3.694)	7.938*** (2.685)	-0.407 (0.679)
$\Delta G \times \text{Medium}_{100-250}$	8.721** (3.241)	6.236** (2.599)	-0.590 (0.424)
$\text{Small}_{100}$	0.014 (0.036)	0.072** (0.031)	0.002 (0.003)
$\text{Medium}_{100-250}$	0.003 (0.021)	0.054*** (0.017)	0.002* (0.001)
Total Assets	-0.203*** (0.011)	-0.179*** (0.007)	0.005*** (0.001)
Profitability	0.060*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	62,054	62,054	38,220
Cluster SE	State	State	State
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F	23.80	23.80	20.39

Note: Data from ORBIS. Small and Medium firms are defined as those with less than 100 and 250 employees. Sample period is 1997-2016. \*\*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*:  $p < 0.05$ ; \*:  $p < 0.1$ .

## C Appendix: Aggregate Fiscal stimulus and Credit spreads


### C.1 Appendix: SVAR - Defense News shocks and Credit markets

Figure 4: IRF to a (Ramey) Defense News Shock: 1948Q1 - 2008Q4



## C.2 Appendix: SVAR - SPF shock and Credit markets

Figure 5: IRF of a SPF errors shock: 1966Q3-2007Q4



(a) House Prices

(b) Bank loan rate

Note: SVAR includes SPF errors, log real per capita Gov. spending, Taxes, GDP, log real House prices and bank loan rate. Standard errors come from 500 Montecarlo simulations (linear and quadratic trends and 4 lags are included).