Management of Asymmetric keys

Problems to solve

Ensure proper and correct use of asymmetric key pairs

Privacy of private keys

- To ensure authenticity
- To prevent the repudiation of digital signatures

Correct distribution of public keys

- To ensure confidentiality
- To ensure the correct validation of digital signatures

Problems to solve

Temporal evolution of entity <-> key pair mappings

To tackle catastrophic occurrences

- e.g. loss of private keys

To tackle normal exploitation requirements

- e.g. refresh of key pairs for reducing impersonation risks

when the physical bounds in real world change => Keys must change

Alguém ficou desempregado!!!

we need to change private keys ...

Lo não pode estar hardcoded ...

Problems to solve

Ensure a proper generation of key pairs

Random generation of secret values

- So that they cannot be easily predicted

Increase efficiency without reducing security

- Make security mechanisms more useful
- Increase performance

Goals

Key pair generation
- When and how should they be generated

Handling of private keys
- How do I maintain them private

Distribution of public keys
- How are they correctly distributed worldwide

Lifetime of key pairs
- When will they expire
- Until when should they be used
- How can I check the obsolesce of a key pair

when a bound in real world change!

↳ is not expired but it is obsolent

Generation of key pairs: Design principles

Good random generators for producing secrets

Result is indistinguishable from noise
- All values have equal probability
- No patterns resulting from the iteration number or previous values

Example: Bernoulli ½ generator
- Memoryless generator
- P(b=1) = P(b=0) = ½
- Coin toss

+ ε negligible

Generation of key pairs: Design principles

Facilitate without compromising security

Efficient public keys

- Few 1 bits, typically 2k+1 values (3, 17, 65537)
- Accelerates operations with public keys
  - Cost is proportional to the number of 1 bits
- No security issues

Generation of key pairs: Design principles

Self-generation of private keys

Maximizes privacy as no other party will be able to use a given private key

- Only the owner has the key
- Even better: The owner doesn't have the key, but may use the key

Principle can be relaxed when not involving signature generation

- Where there are not issues related with non-repudiation

Handling of private keys

Correctness

we need to verify the Key!

The private key represents a subject

- e.g., a citizen, a service
- Its compromise must be minimized
- Physically secure backup copies can exist in some cases

The access path to the private key must be controlled

- Access protection with password or PIN
- Correctness of applications that use it

Handling of private keys

Confinement

The signer should not know is Key

Protection of the private key inside a (reduced) security domain (ex. cryptographic token)

- The token generates key pairs
- The token exports the public key but never the private key
- The token internally encrypts/decrypts with the private key

Example: SmartCards

- We ask the SmartCard to cipher/decipher something
- The private key never leaves the SmartCard



Distribution of public keys

Distribution to all senders of confidential data

- Manual
- Using a shared secret
- Ad-hoc using digital certificates

Distribution to all receivers of digital signatures

- Manual
- Ad-hoc using digital certificates

Distribution of public keys

Problem:
How to ensure the correctness of the public key?

Trustworthy dissemination of public keys

- Trust paths / graphs
- If A trusts K_X^+, and B trusts A, then B trusts K_X^+
- Certification hierarchies / graphs
  - With the trust relations expressed between entities
  - Certification is unidirectional!



Public key (digital) certificates

Digital Document issued by a Certification Authority (CA)



Binds a public key to an entity

- Person, server or service

Are public documents

- Do not contain private information, only public one
- Can have additional binding information (URL, Name, email, etc.)

Are cryptographically secure

- Digitally signed by the issuer, cannot be changed

Public key (digital) certificates

Can be used to distribute public keys in a trustworthy way

A certificate receiver can validate it in many ways

- With the CA's public key
- Can also validate the identification
- Validate the validity (with a pre-defined public key)
- Validate is the key is being properly used

• We trust the Certificate Authority !
⇒ we trust their keys !

A certificate receiver trusts the behavior of the CA

- Therefore, will trust the documents they sign
- When a CA associates a certificate to A
  - If the receiver trusts the CA
  - Then it will trust that the association of A is correct



Public key (digital) certificates

X.509v3 standard

- Mandatory fields
  - Version
  - Subject
  - Public key
  - Dates (issuing, deadline)
  - Issuer
  - Signature
  - etc.
- Extensions
  - Critical or non-critical

PKCS #6

- Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard

Binary formats

- ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation)
  - DER, CER, BER, etc.
- PKCS #7
  - Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard
- PKCS #12
  - Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard

Other formats

- PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail)
- base64 encoding of X.509

Key pair usage

The public certificate binds the key pair to a usage profile

- Private keys are seldom multi-purpose

Typical usage profiles

- Authentication / key distribution
  - Digital signature, Key encipherment, Data encipherment, Key agreement
- Document signing
  - Digital signature, Non-repudiation
- Certificate issuing (exclusively for CAs)
  - Certificate signing, CRL signing
- Timestamping (exclusively for TSAs)

Public key certificates have an extension for this

- Key usage (critical)

Certification Authorities (CA)

Organizations that manage public key certificates
- Companies, not for profit organizations or governmental
- Have the task of validating the relation between key and identity

Define policies and mechanisms for:
- Issuing certificates
- Revoking certificates
- Distributing certificates
- Issuing and distributing the corresponding private keys

Manage certificate revocation lists
- Lists of revoked certificates
- Programmatic interfaces to verify the current state of a certificate

Trusted Certification Authorities

Intermediate CAs: CAs certified by other trusted CAs
- Using a certificate
- Enable the creation of certification hierarchies

Trusted anchor (or certification root)
- One that has a trusted public key
- Usually implemented by self-certified certificates
  - Issuer = Subject
- Manual distribution
  - e.g., within browsers code (Firefox, Chrome, etc.), OS, distribution...




Certificate Viewer: "www.ua.pt"
General Details
This certificate has been verified for the following uses:
SSL Client Certificate
SSL Server Certificate
Issued To
Common Name (CN) www.ua.pt
Organization (O) Universidade de Aveiro
Organizational Unit (OU) sTIC
Serial Number 06:B4:17:0C:D7:EF:AC:9F:A3:79:9A:78:0E:7E:5A:8C
Issued By
Common Name (CN) TERENA SSL CA 3
Organization (O) TERENA
Organizational Unit (OU) <Not Part Of Certificate>
Period of Validity
Begins On May 27, 2019
Expires On June 3, 2021
Fingerprints
SHA-256 Fingerprint 6C:BA:BD:A1:7E:A9:8D:EA:7B:18:22:44:EC:71:D5:41:4D:08:D4:A6:FC:48:1B:3C:9B:05:EB:DA:69:A6:A5:EE
SHA1 Fingerprint 17:79:15:B5:0E:E0:34:51:2D:FA:DE:DF:77:1E:E1:0A:B3:4B:2F:2B
Close
For University of Aveiro
I trust this?
Issued by!
End-entity certificate (host)
(certificate issued by a CA)


Certificate Viewer: "www.ua.pt"
General Details
Certificate Hierarchy
DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
TERENA SSL CA 3
www.ua.pt
Certificate Fields
www.ua.pt
Certificate
Version
Serial Number
Certificate Signature Algorithm
Issuer
Validity
Subject
Subject Public Key Info
Subject Public Key Algorithm
Field Value
CN = www.ua.pt → Domain of website
OU = sTIC → Organization unit
O = Universidade de Aveiro → Organization
L = Aveiro → Local
C = PT → Country
Export...
Close


Certificate Viewer: "TERENA SSL CA 3"
General Details
This certificate has been verified for the following uses:
SSL Certificate Authority
Issued To
Common Name (CN) TERENA SSL CA 3
Organization (O) TERENA
Organizational Unit (OU) <Not Part Of Certificate>
Serial Number 08:70:BC:C5:AF:3F:DB:95:9A:91:CB:6A:EE:EF:E4:65
Issued By
Common Name (CN) DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
Organization (O) DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit (OU) www.digicert.com
Period of Validity
Begins On November 18, 2014
Expires On November 18, 2024
Fingerprints
SHA-256 Fingerprint BE:B8:EF:E9:B1:A7:3C:84:1B:37:5A:90:E5:FF:F8:04:88:48:E3:A2:AF:66:F6:C4:DD:7B:93:8D:6F:E8:C5:D8
SHA1 Fingerprint 77:B9:9B:B2:BD:75:22:E1:7E:C0:99:EA:71:77:51:6F:27:78:7C:AD
Close
Root CA
Now, I trust this...
UA
Terena SSL CA3
DigiCert
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
Certificate Viewer: "TERENA SSL CA 3"
General Details
This certificate has been verified for the following uses:
SSL Certificate Authority
Issued To
Common Name (CN) TERENA SSL CA 3
Organization (O) TERENA
Organizational Unit (OU) <Not Part Of Certificate>
Serial Number 08:70:BC:C5:AF:3F:DB:95:9A:91:CB:6A:EE:EF:E4:65
Issued By
Common Name (CN) DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
Organization (O) DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit (OU) www.digicert.com
Period of Validity
Begins On November 18, 2014
Expires On November 18, 2024
Fingerprints
SHA-256 Fingerprint BE:B8:EF:E9:B1:A7:3C:84:1B:37:5A:90:E5:FF:F8:04:88:48:E3:A2:AF:66:F6:C4:DD:7B:93:8D:6F:E8:C5:D8
SHA1 Fingerprint 77:B9:9B:B2:BD:75:22:E1:7E:C0:99:EA:71:77:51:6F:27:78:7C:AD
Close
Intermediate CA
(CA certificate issued by another CA)
© André Zúquete, João P
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

Refreshing of asymmetric key pairs

Key pairs should have a limited lifetime

- Because private keys can be lost or discovered
- To implement a regular update policy

Revocation list

Problem

- Certificates can be freely copied and distributed
- The universe of holders of certificates is unknown
  - Therefore, we cannot contact them to eliminate specific certificates

If the key was compromised in the valid period we cannot say that it was compromised

Solutions

- Certificates with a validity period (not before, not after)
- Certificate revocation lists
  - To revoke certificates before expiring their validity

Solution

Certificate revocation lists (CRL)

Revocation Lists ... ↑ Revocation

Base or delta

- Complete / differences

Signed lists of certificates (identifiers) prematurely invalidated

- Must be regularly consulted by certificate holders
- OCSP protocol for single certificate validation
  - RFC 2560 → standard
- Can tell the revocation reason

incomplete, but valid

The CA must sign the Revogation List

RFC 3280

unspecified (0)
keyCompromise (1)
CACompromise (2)
affiliationChanged (3)
superseded (4)
cessationOfOperation (5)
certificateHold (6)

removeFromCRL (8)
privilegeWithdrawn (9)
AACompromise (10)

Publication and distribution of CRLs

- Each CA keeps its CRL and allows public access to it

CRL and Delta CRL



✗ Not used

OCSP - Online Certificate Status Protocol

Online Certificate Status Protocol

OCSP → one check per certificate!

HTTP-based protocol to assert certificate status
- Request includes the certificate serial number
- Response states if the certificate is revoked
  - Response is signed by the CA and has a validity
- One check per certificate

Response is signed by the CA and has a validity

How to validate without downloading the full updated CRL

Requires lower bandwidth to clients → so we do not need to download the full CRL
- One check per certificate instead of a bulk download of the CRL

Involves higher bandwidth to CAs
- One check per certificate
- Privacy issues as the CA will know that a certificate is being used



OCSP stapling
- Including a recently signed timestamp in the server response to assert validity
- Reduces verification delay and load on CA
- Avoids privacy issues

Solution → Mas os CA agora sabem quando e quantos acederam aquele serviço...

Distribution of public key certificates

Transparent (integrated with systems or applications)
- Directory systems
  - Large scale (ex. X.500 through LDAP)
  - Organizational (ex. Windows 2000 Active Directory (AD), Manually (UA IDP))
- On-line: within protocols using certificates for peer authentication
  - eg. secure communication protocols (TLS, IPSec, etc.)
  - eg. digital signatures within MIME mail messages or within documents



Explicit (voluntarily triggered by users)
- User request to a service for getting a required certificate
  - eg. request sent by e-mail
  - eg. access to a personal HTTP page

PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) (1/2)

Infrastructure for enabling a proper use of asymmetric keys and public key certificates

Creation of asymmetric key pairs for each enrolled entity new website => new key pair

- Enrolment policies
- Key pair generation policies

Creation and distribution of public key certificates

- Enrolment policies
- Definition of certificate attributes

PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) (2/2)

Definition and use of certification chains (or paths)

- Insertion in a certification hierarchy
- Certification of other CAs

Update, publication and consultation of CRLs

- Policies for revoking certificates
- CRL distribution services
- OCSP services

#standards → well known and defined

Use of data structures and protocols enabling inter-operation among components / services / people

PKI Example: Citizen Card

Enrollment
- In loco, personal enrolment

Multiple key pairs per person
- One for authentication
- One for signing data
- Both generated inside smartcard, not exportable
- Both require a PIN to be used in each operation

Certification path
- Uses a well-known, widely distributed root certificate
  - GTE Cyber Trust Global Root
- PT root CA below GTE
- CC root CA below PT root CA
- CC Authentication CA and CC signature CA below CC root CA

Certificate usage (authorized)
- Authentication
  - SSL Client Certificate, Email (Netscape cert. type)
  - Signing, Key Agreement (key usage)
- Signature
  - Email (Netscape cert. type)
  - Non-repudiation (key usage)

CRLs
- Signature certificate revoked by default
  - Revocation is removed if the CC owner explicitly requires the usage of CC digital signatures
- All certificates are revoked upon a owner request
  - Requires a revocation PIN
- CRL distribution points explicitly mentioned in each certificate

Certificate Pinning

If attacker has access to trusted Root, it can impersonate every entity
- Manipulate a trusted CA into issuing certificate (unlikely)
- Inject custom CA certificates in the victim's database (likely)

Certificate Pinning: add the fingerprint of the PubK to the source code
- Fingerprint is a hash (e.g. SHA256)

Validation process:
- Certificate must be valid according to local rules
- Certificate must have a public they with the given fingerprint

Certification Transparency (RFC 6962)

Problems

- CAs can be compromised (e.g., DigiNotar)
  - By attackers
  - By governments, etc.
- Compromise is difficult to detect
  - Result in the change of assumptions associated to the behavior of the CA
  - Owner will selfdom know

Definition: a global system records all public certificates created

- Ensure that only a single certificate has the correct roots
- Stores the entire certification chain of each certificate
- Presents this information for auditing
  - Organizations or ad-hoc by the end users