Elections that Inspire: Effects of Black Mayors on Educational Attainment*

Jorge Ikawa† Clarice Martins‡ Pedro C. Sant'Anna§
Rogerio Santarrosa¶

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Abstract

We study the impact of the election of a Black mayor in Brazil on Black students' educational attainment. Using a regression discontinuity design in close elections, we find that Black students in municipalities where Black candidates won are more likely to register for the National High School Examination, attend university, and graduate. We find suggestive evidence that students' aspirations play a role: secondary/tertiary education is not a mayor's primary responsibility; Black mayors do not perform better in policies that affect our outcomes; and effects are strong for Black students from both public and private schools, while weaker for White students from public schools.
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†Insper. E-mail: JorgeNRI1@insper.edu.br
‡ESPM. E-mail: martins.clarice@gmail.com
§MIT Department of Economics. E-mail: p_stanna@mit.edu
¶Insper. E-mail: rogeriobs2@insper.edu.br

1 Introduction

Race and ethnicity are fundamental dimensions of worldwide social, economic, and political inequality. Racial disparities have been strikingly large and persistent in the United States (Derenoncourt et al., 2023; Derenoncourt and Montialoux, 2021; Chetty et al., 2020; Bayer and Charles, 2018), and have also been documented in many other settings such as the U.K. (Blackaby et al., 2002), Canada (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998), India (Hnatkovska et al., 2012; Deshpande, 2000), Latin America (Ñopo, 2012), and across the world (Alesina et al., 2016; Darity Jr and Nembhard, 2000).

Racial inequality is also pervasive in Brazil—the country with the largest Afro-descendent population outside of Africa (and just second in the world after Nigeria).[1] While over 55% of the Brazilian population self-declares as Black, the racial distribution of income and power in the country is far from egalitarian. Blacks are 14 percentage points less likely than Whites to have a university degree. Black workers earn, on average, 57.5% of White workers' earnings (IBGE, 2019). In politics, fewer than 30% of elected candidates to the federal legislative branch self-identify as Black, and fewer than one-third of mayors in the country are Black. Reducing these inequalities is a constant topic of policy debate in Brazil and other countries. In particular, understanding how racial inequalities across these domains interact may be crucial to reducing them.

How does political representation of the Black population impact educational choices and attainment among Black students? In this paper, we answer this question in the context of the election of Black candidates in Brazilian municipal elections and shed light on the mechanisms at play. Enhancing political representation can improve the prospects of the Black population through two main channels. First, Black politicians can implement policies that relatively favor their racial group.[2] Second, the visible display of an (otherwise highly underrepresented) Black leader may shape children's and parents' beliefs of what a Black individual can achieve. This role model effect may improve aspirations and affect educational decisions.

Estimating the effect of a Black candidate's victory is challenging because of the likely

[1] Throughout the paper (unless otherwise specified), we define Black individuals in Brazil as those who self-declare as either *preto* or *pardo*, following Brazil's statistical conventions and most of the sociological and economic literature about the country. We discuss Brazil's racial classification system in Section 2.

[2] This would be the case if Black and White populations have different policy preferences and if the politicians' decisions are not fully explained by their electorate preferences (as in a Downsian standard median voter model Downs, 1957), but also by their individual or group identity (as in a citizen-candidate model Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).

endogeneity of such victories. Indeed, municipalities where Black candidates are elected mayors are probably systematically different from municipalities where Black candidates are runner-ups—and even more different from municipalities where no Black person ran for mayor. To overcome this challenge, we use a regression discontinuity design comparing municipalities where, among the first two most-voted candidates, one identified as Black and the other as non-Black—which we call "interracial" elections. We then compare exclusively those municipalities that had interracial elections decided by a short margin.

Our sample includes elections from 2004 to 2016, totaling 3,966 unique municipality-election year pairs. To identify a candidate's race, we start by using the candidate's racial self-declaration provided to the Superior Electoral Court. As this information only started being collected in 2014, we first back out the racial identification of candidates from previous elections by matching candidates who ran for office both before and after 2014 (in which case their identification is their self-declared race after 2014). Next, for candidates who only appeared in the dataset before 2014, we obtained their races from Brazil's matched employer-employee dataset (RAIS), which comprises the universe of formal workers in the country. Identifying candidates' races in previous elections allows us to estimate the effects not only in the short run but also in the long run.

Regarding the research design's identifying assumptions, we document that municipalities in which a Black candidate won or lost an election by a small margin are extremely similar across a large set of variables, which reassures us about the validity of the RD design's continuity assumption. Although our design implies high similarity between treated and control municipalities, it does not necessarily guarantee that mayors would be similar in dimensions other than race. Indeed, candidates' race might be correlated with other variables that could affect our outcomes (Marshall, 2022). Hence, the effect we estimate should be understood as the effect of electing a Black candidate—this is the effect of a bundle of characteristics, most of which contribute to identifying a candidate as Black (as discussed by Sen and Wasow, 2016). We highlight that this is precisely the parameter of interest. Policies that increase the representation of Black candidates would also necessarily foster the characteristics associated with them, including their cultures, preferences, and backgrounds. Still, we assess the balance of candidate-level variables, and perhaps surprisingly, we find no significant differences for a wide range of characteristics, including demographic variables, political ideology, party, and experience.

We start by studying the effect of the election of a Black candidate in a close interracial election on the number of Black and White students who register for Brazil's National High School Examination (ENEM) by their municipality of residency. ENEM is a high-

stakes exam taken annually by millions of Brazilians that determines admission to several universities in the country. Registering for ENEM, therefore, signals that an individual aspires to increase their level of education, possibly by going to university. We find that the election of Black candidates as mayors increases the number of Black students who register for this exam by over 25%, two and three years after the election. The effect is persistent and large even after the end of the mayor's term, suggesting that the election of Black candidates has lasting effects. We do not find negative effects for White students. In fact, we obtain positive point estimates, ranging from non-significant to marginally significant. These results rule out that Black mayors favor Black students by crowding out White students. They also rule out the possibility that our findings are driven solely by changes in students' racial self-declaration.

Considering that registering for the ENEM is generally a personal decision, this result indicates that Black students in municipalities that elected a Black mayor are more willing to invest in their education. However, participating in the exam by itself does not guarantee an increase in education, as poor performance would not grant access to a university. Thus, to investigate whether electing a Black mayor increases educational attainment, we turn to higher education outcomes from Brazil's annual Higher Education Census. From this dataset, we obtain the universe of students enrolled in a university and their municipality of birth (which we match with our election data). We find that the election of a Black candidate increases both the number of Black students enrolling in the first year of a university major and their graduation rates. Once again, the effects are substantial and persist for up to eight years after the election. We also document that these students are not enrolling in low-return majors, as Black students in municipalities that elected Black mayors become more likely to enroll in public (generally more prestigious) universities and in high-return STEM majors compared to Black students in municipalities where Black candidates lost the election by a small margin.

After documenting the positive and sizeable effects of electing a Black mayor on educational choices (as measured by ENEM registration) and attainment (in terms of university graduation) among Black students from these municipalities, we turn to investigating mechanisms. Our setting is particularly suitable for this exercise. On the one hand, Black mayors could actively influence policies, for instance, by enhancing the quality of public education in the municipality and thereby leading students to achieve better educational outcomes. In Brazil, the mayor's responsibilities in education are limited to early childhood and elementary school. This fact suggests that a policy channel would unlikely explain the previous results, as they refer to older students. Still, using extensive administrative data on school

infrastructure, municipal education expenditure, reserved seats via affirmative action, and students' performance on standardized exams at different stages of their education, we document that this channel is indeed unlikely. We do not find significant effects of electing Black mayors on education infrastructure or the number of teachers and other employees in municipal schools. Similarly, Black students' performance in a national standardized exam (grades 5 and 9) does not improve in municipalities that elected Black candidates in close interracial elections. Our findings are corroborated by recent work from Estevan et al. (2023). They show that the election of Black candidates as mayors in close municipal elections in Brazil does not affect policies directed toward the Black population or the racial composition of municipal managers. These pieces of evidence suggest that policy changes are not likely to fully explain the results we document.

A second possibility, for which we find suggestive evidence in our data, is that the election of Black mayors shifted the aspirations of Black students through a role model effect. If someone's beliefs (for instance, about the returns to education) are shaped by the examples around them—and especially by those they identify with—it would be expected that Black individuals have, on average, lower beliefs and aspirations than Whites. If this is the case, those individuals might invest less in education, creating a trap of lower beliefs, aspirations, and investments, reinforcing racial inequalities (Genicot and Ray, 2020, 2017). In this context, a role model is "someone who influences the objectives, motivations, and decisions of a person, by acting as a model of behavior, a representation of what is possible, or as an inspiration" (Morgenroth et al., 2015). More specifically, contact with a role model with whom a person identifies (for instance, due to a shared identity such as race) may change this person's decisions on important aspects of life, such as investment in education, by providing an example of a feasible path.

Apart from showing the limited scope for mayors' direct policy influence, we provide some evidence for shifts in aspirations through a role-model effect. We show that the impact on ENEM registration is equally strong among Black students from private and public high schools. Students from private schools are unlikely to be directly affected by the mayor's decision, further suggesting that the aspirational channel may play a role. We also find no significant effects for White students from public schools, suggesting that our effects are not driven by the mayor's education interventions for more vulnerable populations. Finally, the effects we obtain last even after a Black mayor's mandate ends. This is consistent with a shift to a new equilibrium of education choices, driven by reductions in the inequality of aspirations (Genicot and Ray, 2020, 2017). Nevertheless, it is still possible that other mechanisms, such as differences in mayors' communication strategies or policies we do not

observe, are driving our results. Hence, we consider the aspirations channel as ultimately suggestive.

This paper relates to several strands in the literature. Extensive literature studies how the election of some underrepresented groups affects various outcomes. However, the racial dimension and the suggested underlying economic mechanisms are still understudied, with very few exceptions (Nye et al., 2015; Broockman, 2013; Hopkins and McCabe, 2012). This paper differs from these previous studies in at least three ways. First, it provides a more credible causal identification strategy by using a regression discontinuity design in close interracial elections for a relatively large sample of elections. Second, it is among the first papers to estimate the impact of the election of Black mayors in Brazil, a particularly relevant context given the country's intense racial inequality and its large Black population (56% of the country's population). Estevan et al. (2023) find no effects of the election of Black candidates on the composition of municipal managers and on policies implemented by the mayor. We extend the analysis by showing that the election of Black candidates can have a substantial effect on educational choices and attainment in the short and long run, despite the lack of policy changes. Third, we have extensively explored potential mechanisms underlying our findings and provide suggestive evidence on the channels at work.

This paper also contributes to the literature on role models and aspirations. The literature has shown evidence of role models in politics (Ajzenman et al., 2023; Gulino and Masera, 2023; Ajzenman, 2021) and the media (Riley, 2022; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Jensen and Oster, 2009; Chong and La Ferrara, 2009). Other papers show how female politicians affect women's aspirations and political attitudes (Arvate et al., 2021; Beaman et al., 2012, 2009), and how exposure to women who graduated in economics may affect female students' major decisions (Porter and Serra, 2019). Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been studied in the context of race, except for some evidence that matching same-race students and teachers (Edmonds, 2022; Gershenson et al., 2022; Fairlie et al., 2014; Dee, 2005) and same-race patients and doctors (Alsan et al., 2019) benefits Black individuals. In these papers, both active influences (such as culturally relevant pedagogy, ease of communication, or increased trust) and passive influences (such as providing an example) are at play. Hence, our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, unlike these previous studies, a mayor influences educational decisions without having any personal relationship with those who make them. Our findings also indicate that direct action through several policies is unlikely, though there can be other policies we do not observe. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first evidence of how Black political representation shapes the educational aspirations and attainment of Black students.

Finally, this paper is related to the literature on policies aimed at increasing access to higher education, particularly for Black students. This literature has focused mainly on the effects of affirmative action policies (Otero et al., 2023; Mello, 2022; Estevan et al., 2019). While this type of direct policy is fundamental to increasing access, this paper documents that increasing political representation also indirectly increases Black students' access to universities. Our results are informative for the debate regarding racial quotas in politics and their potential effects in reducing the massive racial inequality and its negative consequences.[3] What is more, our findings provide insights beyond political quotas. By highlighting that representation alone triggered higher and enduring investments in human capital by Black students (beyond direct actions from mayors), we provide support for the rationale of racial quotas in general. Short-run racial quotas can change representation in relevant positions in society, leading to long-run (more efficient) adjustments in aspirations and human capital investments.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the data and Brazil's institutional background; section 3 discusses the empirical methodology; section 4 shows the paper's main results; section 5 discusses the channels that may explain the results; finally, section 6 concludes.

2 Background and Data

This paper examines what happens when a Black candidate wins a municipal election in Brazil. Municipalities are the smallest political-administrative units in Brazil with autonomous elected governments. Elections occur every four years to elect a mayor (the chief of the municipality's executive branch).[4] This paper considers the results of four consecutive municipal elections: 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, elections are held in a single round under the simple plurality rule. In larger munic-

[3]The high level of racial inequality in Brazil and other countries—in education in particular—is a problem in itself and may have negative and lasting consequences for economic development. For instance, Hsieh et al. (2019) discuss how the misallocation of talent due to racial and gender discrimination may have substantially reduced the economic output of the United States between 1960 and 2010, while Cook et al. (2021) argue that systemic racism and sexism hinder innovation at every stage of this process, which has negative consequences not only for the individuals who directly suffer from these phenomena but also to the economy as a whole.

[4]Local and national elections are held on separate dates, two years apart. This separation makes the mayoral race the most salient contest at the local level and likely increases public attention toward mayoral candidates. Additionally, the Brazilian electoral system grants candidates free radio and television airtime to present their platforms during the 35 days preceding an election (Law No. 9,504, of September 1997, Art. 47). This exposure allows voters to become familiar not only with the eventual mayor-elect but also with other candidates for the position.

ipalities, mayors are elected by majority rule with a runoff. After providing some needed background on racial classifications in Brazil, we divide the data description into three blocks: electoral data (including the description of how we define a candidate's racial identity and the explanation for choosing these four election rounds); educational data (our outcomes); and administrative data from a large set of sources, which we use to study mechanisms and in validity tests.

2.1 Racial Classifications in Brazil. Racial relations in contemporary Brazil are a product of complex historical, sociological, and economic processes. The country received over 5 million enslaved Africans from 1500 to 1850 (ten times more than the United States), and was the last in the Americas to abolish slavery, in 1888 (Alencastro, 2018; Eltis, 2007). Despite the lack of formal segregation post-abolition and considerable miscegenation, racial inequalities and hierarchies have been persistent (França and Portella, 2023; Schwarcz, 2013).

The high level of racial mixing led to a relatively more fluid and ambiguous notion of race in Brazil than the United States, with racial identity associated both with phenotypic traits and ancestry (McGee, 2025; Telles, 2014). In official statistics from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), there are five recognized categories: *branco* (white), *indígena* (indigenous), *amarelo* (asian), *preto* (black), and *pardo* (mixed-race). Changes in racial self-identification have been documented across censuses (Miranda, 2015), and we explore this as a potential mechanism for our results in Section 5.

Despite the five statistical categories, the political and academic consensus in Brazil is to aggregate the *pardo* and *preto* categories into the *negro* (Black) category.[5] Indeed, all race-based affirmative action policies in the country target this larger group; official reports on racial inequality by IBGE often pool both statistical groups (e.g., IBGE, 2019); and most of the academic literature in the social sciences follows the same standard (e.g., França and Portella, 2023; Gerard et al., 2021; Hirata and Soares, 2020). Apart from being the standard, there are substantive reasons to pool *pretos* and *pardos* into the Black category. Empirically, *pardos* and *pretos* are closer to each other than to Whites in most (if not all) socio-economic indicators such as education, political representation, and income (Miller and Schmutte, 2023; Silva, 2000). For these reasons, throughout this study, we consider as Black those identified as either *preto* or *pardo*. We also define as "White" those identified either as *branco* or *amarelo*. Results are robust to excluding the Asian group, as it corresponds to very small shares of candidates and students. We also report results disaggregated by

[5]We adopt the convention of using "Black"—capitalized—to refer to the *negro* category, as it represents an identity group, and "black"—lower case—to refer to the statistical group *preto*. We capitalize "White" when referring to the social group for the same reason.

racial (statistical) category in the Appendix, confirming that results are similar for *pardos* and *pretos*.

2.2 Electoral Data. Electoral data comes from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court, the highest body of the country's electoral justice system. We used data from the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 municipal elections. The data are at the candidate level and include information on candidates' characteristics (gender, age, occupation, political party, etc.) and the election (number of votes each candidate received, who was elected, etc.).[6]

A key variable in our analysis is candidates' racial identification. TSE started collecting information on self-declaration of race in the 2014 election. Thus, data on candidates' self-declared race is unavailable for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections. We circumvented this issue by imputing candidates' race based on the information reported in the 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections, in this order. If the candidate's race was unavailable in these elections, we also searched for it in RAIS, Brazil's matched employer-employee dataset, to impute it.[7] We used the candidate's CPF (Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas, the Brazilian Tax Identification Number), a unique identifier assigned to each Brazilian citizen, to search the RAIS database. RAIS is an annual dataset and comprises the universe of formal workers in the country. In both datasets, racial identity is selected from one of the five official IBGE categories, and, as discussed in the previous subsection, we consider Black those identified as *preto* or *pardo*. We also aggregate information on white and Asian individuals—results are robust to excluding the Asian group, as it represents a very small share of candidates.

Considering these procedures, our final dataset contains 3,966 interracial elections (on average, 990 municipalities per election year, or approximately 20% of Brazilian municipalities each year). Table 1 displays the racial distribution of winners and runner-ups in these elections. The number of interracial elections won by White or Black candidates is roughly the same—out of the 3,966 elections, 2,046 were won by a White candidate, against 1,920 by a Black candidate. Elections won by White or Black candidates are also distributed

[6]We do not include the 2020 election in the sample due to the unavailability of outcome data after this year. Moreover, in 2020, TSE instituted a rule mandating parties to allocate their public funds as well as radio and TV advertising time proportionately to the number of Black candidates in the party, raising concerns related to possible strategic changes in racial declarations in the 2020 election.

[7]We performed a validation exercise for the 2016 election and the RAIS data to check the similarity of racial information in these two sources. We report the results of this validation exercise in Appendix Table A.3. In more than 75% of cases, the racial classification of the candidate matched the two datasets, even though electoral data reports a self-declared race, while RAIS includes employer-reported race). In Appendix Table A.4, we also present the number of candidates by the source of the race variable, showing that the vast majority of cases in our data are self-reported data to the Electoral Justice.

widely across Brazil's territory, as shown in Figure 1 (which shows only elections decided by a margin of less than 15 percentage points). The figure shows that interracial municipal elections occurred in all 26 Brazilian states during our sample period. States in the North and Northeast have a relatively higher proportion of interracial elections, while states in the South have the lowest incidence of this type of election. Nevertheless, the figure also shows that the spatial distribution of elections won by a Black candidate is similar to that of a White candidate. This is important when we consider the identification assumptions of the regression discontinuity design method, which will be discussed more deeply in the next section.

Table 1: Distribution of interracial municipal elections by candidate's racial classification, Brazil (2004-2016)

Elected \ **Runner-up**	*Amarelo* (asian)	*Branco* (white)	*Pardo* (mixed-race)	*Preto* (black)	Total
Amarelo (asian)	-	-	39	6	45
Branco (white)	-	-	1881	120	2001
Pardo (mixed-race)	27	1767	-	-	1794
Preto (black)	0	126	-	-	126
Total	27	1893	1920	126	3966

Notes: The table displays the distribution of results, in terms of candidates' racial classification, of interracial municipal elections in Brazil from 2004 to 2016.

2.3 Educational Data. The Brazilian Constitution divides responsibility for education among federal, state, and municipal governments (Al-Samarrai and Lewis, 2021). Municipalities are responsible for providing elementary, primary, and lower secondary education (up to grade 9). State governments are primarily responsible for upper secondary education (grades 10-12), but in practice, they also operate in lower secondary or primary education when municipalities cannot fully afford it. Finally, the federal government focuses primarily on tertiary education (which, again, can also be provided by state governments).

The Brazilian Higher Education system comprises both public and private institutions. The majority of students (75%) are from private institutions, while the remainder are from federal (16%), state (8%), or municipal (1%) public universities. Federal and state institutions are free of charge and generally considered of higher quality (Mello, 2022). Until 2009, admissions to these public universities were based on specific entrance exams (*vestibular*) administered by each institution.

Starting in 2010, the federal government has implemented a centralized admissions sys-

Figure 1: Geographic distribution of close municipal interracial elections



(a) 2004 (b) 2008

(c) 2012 (d) 2016

Notes: The figures shows the spatial distribution of interracial municipal election across Brazil's territory. We focus on close elections, defined in these figures as the ones in which the margin of victory for either candidate is less than 15 percentage points.

tem: SISU (*Sistema de Seleção Unificada*). The SISU admission system is based solely on the student's National High School Examination (ENEM) performance. ENEM is an annual national standardized exam created in 1998 by the Ministry of Education for high school evaluation. Before 2010, it was modestly used by some public universities as bonus points in their admissions processes. After the creation of SISU, the importance of the ENEM exam has increased abruptly. It was reformulated to be more rigorous and to reflect the mandatory high school curriculum, covering Math, Humanities, Science, Language, and a written essay. Students take the ENEM exam around October/November of the year before they intend to start higher education. Registration for the exam generally occurs around May of each year.

Currently, millions of Brazilians take ENEM each year, including high school students, individuals who have previously completed secondary education but wish to pursue higher education, and even those who have left school. All federal universities in the country use the exam, as do many other public and private universities, as the primary (and in most cases,

the sole) criterion for college admissions. It is also an alternative way for students who have dropped out of school to obtain a high school diploma. Therefore, ENEM is an important, high-stakes exam for Brazilian students, representing the chance to invest in their education (either by entering university or signaling high school completion).

We use annual ENEM data from 2010 to 2023. We access the confidential dataset with unique individual identifiers, provided by the National Institute for Education Studies and Research (INEP), upon approval of research projects. The data is accessed exclusively in a secure data room. Importantly, we obtain an individual's racial declaration and municipality of residence. The variable of interest in this study is the number of (Black or White) people residing in each municipality who register for ENEM each year. Our analysis begins in 2010, as this is the first year for which individual-level data and racial identification are available.

Importantly, each student generally decides personally whether to take this exam. Hence, we expect that the decision to take or not to take the exam depends on the individual's belief about their chance of succeeding in a more academic path (college). If the election of a Black candidate leads to changes in beliefs about, or prospects of, returns to education among individuals who identify with that candidate, then we would expect an increase in ENEM registrations after such an election. The election of a Black mayor can therefore impact individuals beyond high school graduates. Indeed, those who previously completed secondary education can be motivated to pursue higher education, and high school dropouts may want to use ENEM to obtain their secondary education diploma. Hence, our preferred analyses include results for all ENEM applicants. We show that the results are similar when focusing on high school seniors in the Appendix.

We also use confidential microdata from the Higher Education Census from 2010-2023.[8] The dataset contains individual-level information on the universe of students enrolled in tertiary education. For our purposes, the data includes race and municipality of birth, student status (freshman, graduated, etc), program, and some university characteristics. Therefore, we are able to construct the total number of (Black and/or White) students born in each municipality enrolled (by status) in a university. We can also look at enrollment by program type (e.g., STEM careers).

We use students' unique identifiers and complement the information available in the Higher Education Census Dataset. First, for every missing value for the student's race, we search for the individual across all ENEM datasets from previous years (starting with the most recent) and impute the race from ENEM if a match is found. This procedure is adopted

[8]Initial year is 2010 for two reasons. First, we only have information on the municipality of birth from 2010 onwards. Second, it makes the Higher Education Census and ENEM results comparable.

because the ENEM dataset has considerably fewer missing observations for the race variable. Second, we apply the same procedure to impute any missing value for the municipality of birth, using the municipality of birth from ENEM when available, or the municipality of residence otherwise.[9]

2.4 Other Data. Finally, we use administrative and socioeconomic data at the municipality level. Data on municipalities' gross domestic product (GDP), literacy rate, and population are obtained from Brazil's Institute of Geography and Statistics; municipal annual expenditure by function is obtained from the System of Accounting and Fiscal Information of the Brazilian Public Sector. We also use individual-level biennial data from the National System of Basic Education Assessment (SAEB), which records standardized test scores of students in public schools from grades 5 and 9. These data are used to test the regression discontinuity hypothesis or to assess mechanisms in Section 5. See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of variables and sources.

3 Empirical Strategy

The main challenge in estimating the causal effect of the election of Black mayors on educational outcomes lies in the likely endogeneity of Black candidates' victories. Indeed, municipalities where a Black candidate is successful are probably systematically different from those in which Black candidates are not successful and even more different from those in which no viable candidate is Black. In Appendix Table A.2, we show that this is indeed the case: among all municipalities that had an interracial election in our sample, those in which a Black candidate was elected are systematically different than those in which a Black candidate lost. For instance, municipalities electing Black candidates are more likely to elect younger and more left-leaning candidates. Therefore, a simple comparison of outcomes between municipalities that elected Black candidates and the remaining municipalities would most certainly yield biased estimates for this causal effect.

To address this problem, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design, comparing close interracial elections, where a Black candidate either won or lost the election by a short margin against a White candidate. Intuitively, the idea behind this method is that the two groups of municipalities (and their winning candidates) should be similar across all other characteristics

[9]By imputing information from previous ENEM applicants, the share of observations with non-missing race increases from 66% to 82%. Similarly, the share of observations with non-missing municipality of birth increased from 75% to 91%.

correlated with the outcomes of interest; i.e., there should be no other discontinuities at the winning threshold relevant to educational outcomes. The key identifying assumption, in this case, is that the expected values of potential outcomes of municipalities that elected or did not elect a Black candidate as mayor are continuous at the threshold.

Formally, let $M_{it} \in [-1, 1]$ be the difference in vote share between a Black and White candidate in an election at municipality i in year $t \in \{2004, 2008, 2012, 2016\}$ in our sample. Note that, by convention, a Black candidate has won the election when $M_{it} \geq 0$. We consider a local linear regression specification, for municipalities with $M_i \in [-h, h]$ for some bandwidth h, of the form:

$$Y_{i,t+k} = \alpha + \beta_k B_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \delta B_{it} M_{it} + u_{i,t+k} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,t+k}$ is an outcome of interest for municipality i, k years after the election that happened at year t; B_{it} is an indicator equal to one if the election at municipality i and year t was won by a Black candidate; and $u_{i,t+k}$ is an idiosyncratic error. We are interested in the parameter β_k, the RD treatment effect—i.e., the average effect of electing a Black candidate k years after the election for a municipality-election year pair at the threshold $M_{it} = 0$.

For estimating the parameter β_k, we implement the estimator of Calonico et al. (2014), and report both the standard and bias-corrected estimates and standard errors. For most of our empirical exercises, we pool the data for all election years and run separate regressions for each k, i.e., for outcomes k years after the election. Bandwidths are also computed using the bandwidth selection method of Calonico et al. (2014). In our main results, we weight observations using a Triangular Kernel and include election-year fixed effects, but also report results with other Kernel choices, different bandwidths, and no fixed effects in the Appendix (results are highly robust to these specification choices). Finally, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, to account for potential autocorrelation in the errors for the same municipality in different election years.

Since our outcome variables are available for 2010-2023, and elections occur in 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016, each regression is run in a different sample. For instance, the effect of electing a Black mayor one year after the election is estimated using the 2012 and 2016 elections (and outcomes in 2013 and 2017). The effects for 2 to 5 years after the election are estimated using elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016. The effects for six and seven are estimated using all elections (2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016). Finally, the effects for eight years after the election are estimated using elections from 2004, 2008, and 2012. This limits the comparison of our results across periods. Still, the exercise is enlightening about the persistence and

long-run impact of Black mayors.

Finally, in our estimations based on the Higher Education Census outcomes, we remove the 2012 election from the data. The reason is that, specifically for this election, and only for this set of variables, there is a modest discontinuity in some of our pre-treatment outcomes. Therefore, we have decided to exclude this election to guarantee that none of our findings are driven by some random pre-treatment differences across municipalities in our sample.

3.1 Validity of Empirical Strategy Under the key identifying assumption of continuity of the expectation of potential outcomes at the winning vote threshold, we can identify the RD treatment effect, i.e., the effect of electing a Black mayor for municipalities exactly at the threshold $M_i = 0$.

This continuity assumption has two main testable implications: first, it must be that municipalities with a close interracial election won by a Black candidate (treated) and municipalities with a close interracial election won by a White candidate (control) do not exhibit any discontinuity in pre-treatment variables. To show that this is indeed the case, we conducted a series of balance tests on both municipal and candidate-level variables. Figure 2 reports theses tests, showing that the vast majority of variables are indeed continuous at the threshold. We also document that electing a Black mayor is not significantly associated with pre-treatment outcomes (available only for the 2012 and 2016 elections). Figure 1 also shows that treated and control municipalities have similar spatial distributions of close elections. This, along with the lack of meaningful discontinuities across the wide range of variables shown in Figure 2, reassures us of the validity of the RD design.

The second testable implication of the RD identification assumption is that there cannot be perfect sorting around the threshold, i.e., municipalities cannot perfectly manipulate whether they are treated or control. Theoretically, we do not expect such manipulation to occur, since municipal elections in Brazil are very competitive and it is hard to predict results in advance, especially in close elections. Therefore, no candidate can know for sure if he or she will win or lose the election. Despite this theoretical prediction, we test for data manipulation following Cattaneo et al. (2020). In our test, the null hypothesis is that the density of the running variable is continuous at the cutoff (specifically, that the density of candidates who self-declared as Black is continuous for candidates who won and lost close elections). Performing the test with our data, we obtain a p-value of 0.7668, indicating no evidence of manipulation of the cutoff side. Appendix Figure A.1 shows this test graphically.

Finally, in close-election RD designs that condition results on a candidate's characteristics—

Figure 2: Discontinuities on baseline variables



(a) Mayor's baseline characteristics

(b) Municipality's baseline characteristics

Notes: The figures show the estimated discontinuities and 95% confidence intervals on baseline variables between treated and control municipalities, using the local linear regression method from Calonico et al. (2014). For visual representation, all continuous variables are standardized. Pre-election outcomes are measured in the (standardized) log of the number of students. Estimation of the discontinuities for pre-election outcomes from the Higher Education Census (Enrollment to University and Graduation) excludes 2012 elections, as in the main analysis. Variable descriptions can be found on Appendix Table A.1.

as is the case in this paper—a relevant concern is that there could be other candidate's characteristics, correlated with the characteristic of interest (race), that work as compensating differentials to allow a candidate with the characteristic of interest to win (Marshall, 2022). For instance, if voters, on average, discriminate against Black candidates, a Black candidate who wins a close election could be systematically different from White candidates who win these elections, and our specification would identify not the effect of race but instead of these compensating differentials. For this reason, what we identify is the effect of electing a Black mayor—not the effect of race itself, as close elections do not (as-if) randomly assign race.

However, the evidence on the left-hand side panel of Figure 2 suggests that the race of a winning candidate is indeed uncorrelated with a vast array of other potentially relevant characteristics: Black candidates who win close elections are not more or less likely than their White counterparts to be female, married, or belong to specific parties. Moreover, Black and White candidates who win close interracial elections are equally likely to be incumbents, to have similar campaign expenditures, to have similar political experience (as measured by time since their first affiliation with a political party and by having previously

run for office), and to have similar levels of education. Therefore, we can rule out that the effects we estimate are due to several potential confounders, including candidates' political parties and ideologies.

Naturally, there could still be other unobservable characteristics correlated with race that take part in the effect we estimate. For this reason, we intentionally define our parameter of interest as the effect of electing a Black candidate. This is the parameter of interest for several reasons. First, from a policy perspective (for instance, to inform policies that incentivize Black politicians to run for mayor), we would indeed be interested in understanding the effects of electing a Black candidate, including the characteristics this entails. Our setting allows us to estimate precisely this effect.

Second, given that a winning candidate's race is uncorrelated with several potential confounders, it becomes increasingly difficult to think of other characteristics that would act as a compensating differential and are not part of what makes a candidate be identified by citizens as Black. Indeed, following Sen and Wasow (2016), we conceptualize race as a "bundle of sticks," i.e., a socially constructed category that encompasses several elements (one of which might be skin color). Thus, under this conceptualization, we can be confident that we are identifying the policy-relevant effect of electing a Black mayor, and—given the lack of correlation between the winning candidate's race and several potential confounders—that this effect is approximately the effect of the bundle of characteristics that identify a candidate as Black.

4 Effects of Black Mayors on Education

Do Black mayors affect students' educational choices in their municipalities? This section presents the main results of the paper. We start by examining the effect of a Black mayor's election on registration for the National High School Examination (ENEM) in Brazil. This is our primary measure of the aspiration to pursue higher education. We then discuss higher education outcomes, which represent actual educational attainment.

4.1 ENEM Registration Table 2 shows estimates of the effect of the election of a Black mayor in a close interracial election on ENEM registration among Black and White students residing in the municipality in the following years. Outcomes are in logs.[10] All tables of results in this paper follow a similar pattern. For each outcome, we display RD estimates

[10]This addresses the significant variation in the population size of municipalities.

(computed following Calonico et al. (2014) as discussed in the previous section) for effects from one year $(t+1)$ to eight years $(t+8)$ after the election of interest. As explained in Section 3, each column (the number of years after the election for which we compute the outcomes) presents results from a different sample due to the time overlap between the outcome variables (2010-2023) and the election years (2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016). Since mayors in Brazil have four-year mandates, we can study both short-term (within the mandate) and long-term (after the mandate) effects. For each outcome and number of years after the election, we present both the standard RD estimate and the bias-corrected estimate with robust standard errors (in all cases, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level).

Table 2: Effect on ENEM Registration, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.14	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.30	0.40	0.42	0.48
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.312]	[0.037]	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Coef. (Robust)	0.17	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.46	0.47	0.54
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.297]	[0.035]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Effective Obs.	1579	2004	1955	1945	1944	2068	2027	1358
Bandwidth	0.147	0.142	0.137	0.136	0.136	0.117	0.114	0.126
Left $\bar{Y}$	237	200	190	219	171	167	176	241
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.08	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.28
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.558]	[0.089]	[0.090]	[0.074]	[0.068]	[0.041]	[0.028]	[0.066]
Coef. (Robust)	0.09	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.30	0.32
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.562]	[0.088]	[0.086]	[0.077]	[0.068]	[0.039]	[0.026]	[0.065]
Effective Obs.	1626	1973	1945	2015	1973	2399	2298	1420
Bandwidth	0.152	0.139	0.136	0.143	0.138	0.141	0.133	0.135
Left $\bar{Y}$	90	79	73	83	69	73	74	96

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students residing in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table 2 shows that, for Black students residing in the mayor's municipality, the election of a Black mayor causes a significant and substantial increase in ENEM registration, starting two years after the election. For the first year after the election, the estimate is also positive, but smaller and non-significant. The lack of findings in the first year highlights both the pre-treatment similarity of these municipalities and that the impact of Black mayors may require some time to manifest. This is clearly seen in the patterns shown in Appendix Figure A.2, which shows RD plots of ENEM registration by Black students for each year. For all other years in our time frame, effects are positive, statistically significant, and monotonically increasing, suggesting a lasting impact of electing a Black mayor on students of the same race choosing to take this national exam. Indeed, two years after the election, Black students from municipalities that elected a Black mayor in a close interracial election are 26% more likely to register for the ENEM than similar students in municipalities where a Black candidate lost; this difference increases to 40% six years after the election and gets closer to 50% eight years after it. The results are robust to several bandwidths and other specification choices (see Appendix B).

We compute the mean of the outcome variable (the log of the number of students), weighted by the triangular kernel used in the main RDD specification, within the bandwidth on the left side of the cutoff. We then report the transformed value (Left $\bar{Y}$) to obtain the expected absolute number of students in the control group. The magnitude of the effects is economically large, yet very plausible in our setting. A typical municipality would have around 200 Black ENEM takers. A 25% increase in the first couple of years, rising to 50% in eight years, corresponds to approximately 50 and 100 additional takers in the short and long run, respectively. Furthermore, in the early years of our analysis, fewer than half of high school graduates took the ENEM. Therefore, there was substantial room for growth, particularly among students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, during a period of university expansion that relied on the ENEM exams for admissions.

Such an increase in the estimated effects is robust to specification choices and also found in the remaining outcomes we analyze. This might reflect that the real effect is increasing over time or that the effects are heterogeneous across elections, as their composition differs between the short-term and long-term estimations. To disentangle such effects, we examine the election-year heterogeneity (Appendix Table A.7). As explained in Section 3, we cannot obtain estimates for all post-periods for each election year. The results are larger and mostly significant for the 2004 and 2008 elections. In the 2012 and 2016 elections, the results are smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant, but the estimated coefficients remain positive and economically sizable. This is consistent with the notion that Black mayors

were more impactful in earlier periods, when the underrepresentation of Black individuals in relevant, public, and prestigious positions in society was even more pronounced, and examples of Black mayors were especially rare.

Examining the within-election results for the 2012 and 2016 elections—those for which we obtain statistically significant estimates—we also observe that the effects grow over time. Thus, the overall increase in temporal effects reflects both stronger impacts in earlier elections and a gradual intensification of effects within the most affected election periods, showing that the election of Black mayors has lasting effects that go beyond the mayor's mandate.

Theoretically, the potential effects on White students are ambiguous. If the effects on Black students are coming from changes in students' self-declaration, we should expect a negative effect on the registration of White students. Similarly, we should observe a negative effect if Black mayors are reallocating resources towards Black students or whether Black mayors raise the aspirations of Black students while diminishing the aspirations of White students. On the other hand, White students could also benefit if Black mayors improve education in general, or if increases in Black students' aspirations have positive spillovers on their (White) peers.

Empirically, when we consider students who self-declare as White, we do not find the same large effects for the election of Black mayors on ENEM registration, as shown in Panel B of Table 2. The point estimates are positive but smaller than those for Black students, and marginally significant for most of the years we analyze (Appendix Figure A.3 reports the annual RD plots). Nevertheless, they are all positive, suggesting that the election of Black mayors may also have a positive (albeit smaller) effect on ENEM registration for White students. This result is reassuring, as it indicates that increased educational investment among Black students does not crowd out White students.

Figure 3 summarizes the results obtained in Table 2. We aggregate our observations at the municipal-election level and compute the annual average ENEM registration across the entire post-election period. The figure shows a clear discontinuity in the registration of Black students around the cutoff, while a smaller but positive effect for White students.

Appendix Table A.5 presents very similar results for the subgroup of students in their final year of high school. These findings suggest that the election of a Black mayor may stimulate greater interest in investing in human capital among both current students and the broader Black population.

Overall, we find that the election of Black candidates in close interracial elections increases ENEM registration among Black students residing in the municipality, with large

Figure 3: Effect on ENEM Registration, average over post-election years



(a) Black Students (b) White Students

Notes: The figure shows RD plots for the effect of electing Black mayors on the registration of Black (Figure 3a) and White (Figure 3b) students residing in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM). Outcomes are averages across all post-election years available in the sample. The box in the bottom-left corner of each plot reports bias-corrected RD estimates and robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses) for the respective effect.

and persistent effects over time, while (at least) does not affect White students to the same degree. Given that registering for ENEM is an exclusively personal decision, this effect suggests that Black students aspire to increase their educational attainment following the election of a Black candidate in their city. However, attempting to increase their education does not imply that these students are successful in doing so.[11] For instance, since ENEM is an exam used for admissions into higher education institutions, a bad performance in the exam would not grant a student access to university, so their educational level would remain fixed. Therefore, it is essential also to investigate the direct effects of electing a Black mayor on educational attainment. We do so in the following subsection, which examines the effect of electing a Black mayor on Black students' university enrollment and graduation rates.

4.2 Higher Education Table 3 shows that Black individuals born in a municipality where a Black candidate won an interracial close election are 38% more likely to be enrolled in the first year of a university course than Black individuals born in municipalities where a Black candidate lost such an election, three years after the election.[12] As with the ENEM results, effects are large, persistent over time, and statistically significant, with the election of Black mayors leading to a 60% increase in the number of Black students born in the

[11] Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11 show that the election of a Black mayor has no effect on average grades obtained by Black and White students (respectively) on ENEM. This suggests that, despite changes in the composition of those taking the exam (as more students choose to take it following the election of a Black candidate), the performance of either group does not decline on average.

[12] As explained in Section 3, in the analysis of this subsection, we remove the 2012 election from the data.

municipality enrolled in the first year of university eight years after the election. In the baseline, only about 40 Black students enroll in university. This reflects both the relatively small municipal populations in our RDD sample and the limited number of ENEM takers who go on to pursue higher education. These figures imply increases of around 15 and 24 additional first-year Black undergraduate students three and eight years after the election of a Black mayor, respectively.

Table 3: Effect on Enrollment in Higher Education, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.21	0.31	0.38	0.30	0.38	0.27	0.39	0.60
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.279]	[0.062]	[0.020]	[0.053]	[0.014]	[0.044]	[0.007]	[0.006]
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.34	0.43	0.32	0.41	0.30	0.43	0.68
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)
	[0.305]	[0.069]	[0.024]	[0.074]	[0.020]	[0.047]	[0.007]	[0.005]
Effective Obs.	1062	1517	1474	1585	1517	2199	1932	844
Bandwidth	0.165	0.157	0.151	0.169	0.157	0.195	0.155	0.135
Left $\bar{Y}$	39	22	32	38	40	35	42	36
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.21	0.24	0.29	0.26	0.31	0.17	0.27	0.23
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.273]	[0.132]	[0.069]	[0.106]	[0.038]	[0.218]	[0.072]	[0.309]
Coef. (Robust)	0.25	0.26	0.33	0.29	0.35	0.19	0.31	0.28
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.287]	[0.160]	[0.078]	[0.119]	[0.046]	[0.217]	[0.071]	[0.283]
Effective Obs.	1107	1639	1589	1635	1636	2262	1968	906
Bandwidth	0.177	0.179	0.169	0.179	0.178	0.208	0.159	0.151
Left $\bar{Y}$	20	14	19	21	27	22	29	22

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the number of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality enrolled in the first year of university for different numbers of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for the 2004, 2008, and 2016 elections. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Appendix Figure A.4 shows the RD plots over time. Again, we can see there is no clear discontinuity in the first period, but it appears clearly and strongly in the following periods. The absence of effects in the first period is consistent with the pre-treatment similarity of

Figure 4: Effect on Enrollment in Higher Education, average over post-election years



(a) Black Students (b) White Students

Notes: The figure shows RD plots for the effect of electing Black mayors on the number of Black (Figure 4a) and White (Figure 4b) students born in the municipality enrolled in the first year of university. Outcomes are averages across all post-election years available in the sample. The box in the bottom-left corner of each plot reports bias-corrected RD estimates and robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses) for the respective effect.

these municipalities, and with results becoming stronger after the decision to take ENEM is made. Interestingly, the first period with a positive and significant effect for this variable is two years after the election, suggesting that students are successful in their attempt to increase their educational attainment. ENEM is an exam taken in November or December of each year, allowing access to university in the next academic year (February - November). Therefore, the results from Tables 2 and 3 are consistent: after an increase in participation in the ENEM, if students are successful, we expect an increase in university enrollment to be lagged by 1 year. While we do observe some increase in university enrollment two years after the election, most of the effect starts to appear three years after it, consistent with an increase in ENEM registrations starting two years after the election. Still, the fact that university enrollment increases (slightly) before this moment can be explained by students entering university through other admission processes, or by Black students who took the ENEM in earlier years exerting more effort.

We obtain positive, but not consistently statistically significant, effects for White students (see Appendix Figure A.5 for yearly RD plots). Once again, this suggests that the election of Black mayors does not negatively affect White students.

Again, we aggregate all available years after the election and take the mean of our outcome variable. Figure 4 displays the main results. We observe a clear discontinuity in the enrollment of Black students in higher education, whereas the effect is less pronounced for White students.

Figure 5: Effect on Graduation from Higher Education, average over post-election years



(a) Black Students (b) White Students

Notes: The figure shows RD plots for the effect of electing Black mayors on the number of Black (Figure 5a) and White (Figure 5b) students born in the municipality graduating from university. Outcomes are averages across all post-election years available in the sample. The box in the bottom-left corner of each plot reports bias-corrected RD estimates and robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses) for the respective effect.

Do the newly enrolled Black students graduate from university? Table 4 shows that yes: the election of Black mayors increases the number of Black students graduating from university, with large and statistically significant effects across all periods starting in the second year after the election. This result is important, as it shows that the election of a Black mayor not only shifts the aspirations of Black students (which are captured by registration for ENEM); it also has palpable effects on the educational attainment of those students. As before, the effects on the graduation of White students are positive, but mostly not significant; still, the positive point estimates allow us to rule out significant negative effects (Appendix Figures A.6 and A.7 show the RD plots by period). Lastly, Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the RD estimates by averaging all post-election year observations.

Similar to the analysis conducted for the ENEM, we also examine the effects on higher education enrollment and graduation by election year (Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9). The results similarly indicate more pronounced effects in earlier periods, when Black individuals were more severely underrepresented. The estimated effects are larger, mostly statistically significant, and increasing for the 2004 and 2008 elections. In contrast, the effects for the 2016 election are not statistically significant, although they remain economically sizable.

Finally, one important question is whether students who attend university after the election of a Black candidate are graduating from high-quality programs that will increase their expected lifetime income. We present (in the Appendix) two pieces of evidence that suggest

Table 4: Effect on Graduation from University, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.20	0.30	0.35	0.29	0.36	0.29	0.36	0.53
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)
P-value	[0.262]	[0.046]	[0.034]	[0.055]	[0.021]	[0.043]	[0.017]	[0.013]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.34	0.39	0.32	0.41	0.34	0.41	0.61
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.255]	[0.053]	[0.036]	[0.070]	[0.024]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.009]
Effective Obs.	1184	1475	1396	1503	1487	1855	1801	749
Bandwidth	0.205	0.151	0.140	0.155	0.152	0.146	0.141	0.114
Left $\bar{Y}$	14	8	10	11	13	10	12	10
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.19	0.12	0.29	0.20	0.24	0.18	0.26	0.18
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.304]	[0.375]	[0.061]	[0.171]	[0.126]	[0.192]	[0.081]	[0.416]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.14	0.33	0.23	0.27	0.21	0.30	0.25
Std. Error	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.295]	[0.387]	[0.068]	[0.188]	[0.133]	[0.182]	[0.077]	[0.326]
Effective Obs.	1105	1746	1558	1687	1595	2100	1969	843
Bandwidth	0.176	0.203	0.164	0.190	0.171	0.177	0.159	0.135
Left $\bar{Y}$	8	6	6	7	8	7	8	9

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the number of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality graduating from university for different numbers of years before and after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for the 2004, 2008, and 2016 elections. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

the answer is yes. First, public universities in Brazil tend to offer higher-quality education (Mello, 2022). Appendix Table A.12 shows that the election of Black mayors increases enrollment of Black students in public universities, suggesting that these students are indeed going to universities that are, on average, good. Second, Table A.13 documents that Black students are also more likely to enroll in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) majors following the election of a Black candidate. Given that the wage premium for STEM majors in Brazil is estimated at around 12% (Machado et al., 2022), this result also suggests that Black students are not disproportionately enrolling in low-return majors.

4.3 Robustness We now report a series of robustness exercises that increase confidence in our results.

RD Specification choices Appendix B shows that the results discussed in this section are highly robust to several specification choices. For each outcome, we present results with different bandwidth choices (half and two-thirds of the optimal bandwidth), with a uniform rather than triangular Kernel, and without controlling for election year. Results remain extremely similar. Overall, point estimates using a uniform Kernel are slightly lower (but still significant) than those we report in the main text, indicating that effects are larger for municipalities closer to the threshold. We also estimate the effect of electing Black mayors on ENEM registration, excluding the 2012 election (Appendix Table B.7). Results are remarkably unchanged.

Students' Municipality In the Higher Education Census, we only have information on the municipality of birth, not on the municipality of residence immediately prior to university enrollment, as is the case with the ENEM data. Relying on the municipality of birth may attenuate our effects if some students move to different places after birth and are not aware of who the mayor is in the municipality where they were born. While the choice to use the municipality of birth for Higher Education results is driven by data availability, many individuals still reside in their municipality of birth just before entering university. Moreover, even those who have moved may still be familiar with the local political context through family, friends, or other social ties. To gauge the degree of mobility, we use ENEM data and find that 63% of exam takers live in the same municipality as their birth municipality.[13] We also replicate our ENEM results using municipality of birth instead of residence (Appendix Table B.8). The results are slightly attenuated: standard errors slightly increase, and coefficient magnitudes decline modestly in the long run. Nonetheless, most estimates remain significant at 10% or 5% levels.

Definition of Black As discussed in Section 2.1, we define as Black those identified as either *pardo* (mixed-race) or *preto* (black), as is the usual practice in Brazilian statistics, political debate, and academic literature. Table A.6 shows that the main results we document are similarly present for students identified as both *pretos* and *pardos*. The point estimates for both samples are very close, and all qualitative conclusions are the same when the sample is split this way. Therefore, lumping the two racial categories together for students does not affect any of our findings. For politicians, we are unfortunately underpowered to study the effect of electing a mayor who self-declares as *preto*, as there are only 126 elections in our sample in which a self-declared *preto* candidate defeated a White candidate. One

[13] Statistics for the 2013-2023, as municipality of birth is not available for previous years.

might expect the effects in this case to be even more pronounced, given the likely higher salience of race and the smaller scope for ambiguous perceptions of the winning candidate's race.[14] Finally, Appendix Table B.9 reports our main results excluding candidates whose racial classification was imputed from RAIS (about 25% of elections). Coefficient estimates remain positive and large, but lose significance due to the smaller sample of close elections. The loss of significance is also explained by the fact that a substantial share of the estimated effects are from earlier elections, precisely those most affected by the exclusion of race data imputed via RAIS.

Differences in Discontinuities Finally, for our main outcomes, we also test whether the RD coefficients in the post-election years are statistically distinguishable from those before the election. As explained in Section 3, these estimates are obtained from different samples (elections). Even though there is no reason to expect municipalities to differ in the pre-election outcomes (and we show this is indeed not the case in Figure 2, Panel b), we report in Appendix Table B.10 a test of differences between the RD estimate in each post-election year and the RD estimate in the pre-election year, showing that differences are increasing over time and largely consistent with the overall findings.

5 Mechanisms

In the previous section, we saw that the election of a Black mayor in a close interracial election increases the registration of Black students in Brazil's National High School Examination (ENEM) and, subsequently, increases the enrollment and graduation of Black students from the university. What are, however, the mechanisms behind these results? In this section, we investigate this question by considering the evidence for several alternative explanations of the results described.

One hypothesis is that a role model effect explains the results: the election of a Black candidate as mayor changes individuals' beliefs about their chances of succeeding on paths they previously considered infeasible, thereby increasing investment in education. As noted in the literature on role models and aspirations (e.g., Serra, 2022), we would expect this effect to be stronger among Black students, who are more likely to identify with the mayor. Another possibility is that, once elected, the mayor changes policies favorable to the municipality's Black population. In the context of the ENEM or higher education results, Black mayors could invest in education or policies focusing on racial equality. Third, given the

[14] Woo-Mora (2025) shows that, in Latin America, racial disparities are increasing in perceived skin tone, which suggests that victories of candidates self-declared as *pretos* might have even stronger effects.

potential fluidity of racial identity (Davenport, 2020), it is relevant to consider changes in self-identification.

In what follows, we provide some evidence for each of these alternative explanations and argue that shifts in aspirations likely played a role in the phenomenon we have documented. Nevertheless, it is impossible to exhaustively test all potential mechanisms, so other channels—such as differences in mayors' communication strategies or policies we do not observe—could still be driving our results. Therefore, one should interpret this section's results as suggesting that shifts in aspirations partially explain our results, not as a definitive test of this hypothesis.

5.1 Changes in Racial Identification The first channel that could be (at least partially) explaining the results from section 4 is the possibility that the election of a Black candidate as mayor changes some individuals' racial self-declaration. The success of a Black candidate may cause some people to reflect on their racial identification. In this case, students who would take the exam regardless of the election outcome could change their self-declared race after a Black candidate is elected. As a result, we would observe more Black students taking the exam or enrolling in a university.

This identity channel is interesting and potentially relevant, given that racial classifications in Brazil are fluid and known to change (De Micheli, 2021; Miranda, 2015; Telles, 2014). However, it is unlikely to explain all the results. If it did, we would expect to see a reduction in the number of White students proportional to the increase in Black students for each of the outcomes we analyze. Such a reduction in White students' participation in ENEM or enrollment in university does not happen, as shown in the previous section. If anything, we document increases for White students. Therefore, even if electing a Black mayor changes the racial self-identification of some students, this compositional change cannot fully explain our results.

Our data also allows us to provide quantitative evidence of racial reclassification, though the data quality limits this exercise. We link students who register for ENEM to their high school or elementary school enrollment data from the School Census. Matching is done using the student's unique identifier (CPF). In the School Census, we observe students' race as reported by school administrators—thus, race is usually not self-reported but rather reported by a school administrator or a parent. We then construct variables for changes in racial identification between the one self-report in ENEM registration and the last race classification of the same student in the School Census before the election of interest. We estimate our RD regression on the number of students registering for ENEM who change

their racial declaration from White to Black, from Black to White, and on net.

Appendix Table A.14 displays the results. Overall, we find that electing a Black mayor in a close election leads to changes in racial identification, but in both directions: for instance, two years after the election, students are 25% more likely to have changed their racial identification from White to Black and 24% to have changed it from Black to White. On net, as shown in Panels C and D of the table, we do not observe significant differences in racial self-identification relative to their reported race on the School Census. If anything, in the later years of the sample, we see a slight increase in the net number of students who self-declare as White. These results help rule out the possibility that changes in self-identification drive our results, but should be interpreted with caution: reported race in the School Census is measured with significant error and does not necessarily reflect self-identification.

5.2 Educational Policies A second potential explanation for the results in the previous section is that a Black mayor, once elected, adopts policies that foment education, particularly for Black students. In this section, we show that this is not the case—at least, not to the extent and timing that would be necessary to explain the results in Section 4.

First, as detailed in the Background Section, while municipalities in Brazil are relatively autonomous government units, mayors' educational responsibilities are focused on early childhood and primary education.[15] Therefore, one would not expect mayors to affect the quality of education at the high school level or university (this paper's focus), which is generally the responsibility of states.

Indeed, several pieces of evidence—summarized in Table 5—indicate that electing Black mayors does not significantly affect the average level of education provided at the municipality. First, using data from Brazil's annual school census, we construct three municipality-level indices of municipal education quality. The first index, of School Infrastructure, combines information on the proportion of municipal schools with access to different educational resources: libraries, reading rooms, science laboratories, access to the internet, and computer labs. The second index considers the proportion of municipal schools with access to basic infrastructure, including water, sewage systems, electricity, and daily meals for students. Finally, the third index focuses on school personnel, combining information on the number of teachers per educational level and the number of non-teaching employees in municipal schools. Together, the three indices map a wide range of quality indicators that could be

[15]This is determined in Brazil's Constitution, on article 30, subparagraph VI, which states that it is among the municipality's competencies to *"maintain, with the technical and financial cooperation of the Union and states, pre-school and elementary school education."* (Brazil, 1988). For a detailed discussion on the federative organization of education policy in Brazil, see Abrucio (2010).

affected by educational policies.

For all three indices, we find that the election of a Black mayor in a close interracial election has no effect. If anything, there are small, marginally significant negative effects for the Educational Infrastructure index. The estimates related to the remaining two indices are consistently null. These results suggest that electing a Black mayor does not significantly improve the quality of education in the municipality, at least within the time horizon we analyze. Given mayors' constitutional competencies, even if such improvements were to occur, they would likely affect younger students, who would still be far from university.

The fourth panel of Table 5, however, shows that there seems to be an increase in the expenditure on education in municipalities that elect a Black mayor. Data on municipal annual expenditure by function come from the System of Accounting and Fiscal Information of the Brazilian Public Sector (FINBRA). Point estimates are positive across all years but mostly non-significant, except for four and eight years after the election. In these two years, we find a sizeable increase in educational expenditure, not accompanied by improvements in school quality, as shown before. Notably, the years in question (four and eight years past the election) are also election years. Thus, one potential explanation for the increase in expenditure on education and culture is a demand-side one: following the election of a Black candidate, constituents may demand better educational quality and, given electoral incentives, the increase in expenditure occurs precisely in electoral years. Even if this is not the explanation for this result, the fact that the increase in educational and cultural expenditure occurs later than the effects from Section 4 and is not accompanied by improvements in education points to the conclusion that they do not explain the increased ENEM registrations and university enrollment.

Nevertheless, our measures of educational quality, based on infrastructure and personnel information, may not fully capture all dimensions of quality. Therefore, the bottom two panels of Table 5 present RD estimates of the effect of electing a Black mayor on Black students' performance on the System of Evaluation of Basic Education (SAEB) standardized test, taken at the end of the 9th grade (when students are approximately 14 years old). Exam grades are standardized. Analyzing Table 5, we see that the election of a Black mayor does not affect Black students' exam performance in Portuguese or Math (the two measured competencies). If anything, performance decreases seven years after the election. Appendix Tables A.15 and A.16 also document no effects for a similar exam taken in the 5th grade and for White students (both in the 5th and 9th grades). As mentioned in Section 4, we also find null effects of the election of Black candidates on ENEM performance (see Appendix Table A.10), further indicating that the quality of education offered in the municipality

remains unchanged. Therefore, we can confidently rule out that Black mayors elected in close interracial elections have a large impact on the quality of education offered in the municipality, which makes this an unlikely explanation for the increase in ENEM registration and university enrollment previously documented.

In the Brazilian context, another critical educational policy related to the participation of Black students is race-based affirmative action in university admissions (Otero et al., 2023; Estevan et al., 2019; Telles and Paixão, 2013). In our setting, this policy operates through race- or income-based seat reservations in university admissions. Importantly, public universities are administered at the federal or state level, so mayors do not have direct power over affirmative action in university admissions. However, they could still indirectly affect the supply of affirmative action seats. To test this hypothesis, we use data from the Higher Education Census to create an indicator equal to one if a municipality has a university course with reserved seats due to affirmative action. Appendix Table A.17 shows that the election of Black mayors in close elections does not affect the likelihood that a municipality has affirmative action in university admissions, indicating that Black mayors also do not affect this policy margin.

5.3 Other Policies A Black mayor could still invest in other policies—not directly related to education—but that potentially improve students' educational outcomes in the municipality. To study this possibility, we use data from the Survey on Basic Municipal Information (MUNIC). We construct an indicator of whether municipalities adopt policies regarding racial equality and discrimination. Results, reported in Appendix Table A.18, indicate that, while there is some (noisily measured) increase in the adoption of such policies by Black mayors, this increase begins after the increase in ENEM registrations. This rules out the adoption of such policies as a full explanation for our results.

We further investigate whether there has been a major change in the municipality's income or employment, which could explain our results. In Appendix Table A.19, we show that the election of a Black mayor does not affect municipal GDP per capita, the average wage of formal workers, or wages of Black workers in particular. In addition, we do not find any significant change in the employment of the general population or Black workers in particular (Appendix Table A.20). We also find no effect on the hiring of Black workers in the municipal public sector. These results are entirely consistent with Estevan et al. (2023), who study the effect of the election of Black mayors on the racial composition of municipal managers and racial policies in Brazil and do not find any significant effect. Overall, these results indicate that, at least within the time frame we analyze, the increases in educational

Table 5: Mechanisms, RD Estimates

	Dependent variable: Educational Infrastructure (index)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	-0.16	-0.15	-0.13
Std. Error	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
P-value	[0.210]	[0.255]	[0.355]	[0.410]	[0.369]	[0.081]	[0.099]	[0.268]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1787	2027	2008	913	912	1195	1201	828
Bandwidth	0.175	0.144	0.142	0.115	0.115	0.108	0.109	0.13
	Basic School Infrastructure (index)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.08	0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.05
Std. Error	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)
P-value	[0.164]	[0.253]	[0.564]	[0.955]	[0.716]	[0.796]	[0.304]	[0.491]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1418	1878	2027	1106	1112	1453	1375	942
Bandwidth	0.128	0.129	0.144	0.149	0.15	0.139	0.128	0.162
	School Employees and Teachers (index)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Std. Error	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
P-value	[0.463]	[0.104]	[0.158]	[0.050]	[0.078]	[0.229]	[0.563]	[0.330]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1309	1463	1548	821	892	1125	1401	994
Bandwidth	0.117	0.096	0.103	0.1	0.112	0.099	0.132	0.177
	Expenditure on Education and Culture							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.11	0.22	0.16	0.54	0.28	0.18	0.24	0.56
Std. Error	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.359]	[0.065]	[0.213]	[0.037]	[0.048]	[0.203]	[0.032]	[0.001]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1496	1856	1915	890	971	1570	1591	811
Bandwidth	0.142	0.131	0.137	0.121	0.128	0.166	0.167	0.139
	Proficiency in Portuguese, Black Students, 9th grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.04		-0.02		-0.00		-0.07	
Std. Error	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
P-value	[0.381]		[0.628]		[0.978]		[0.108]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1643		2208		1004		1226	
Bandwidth	0.157		0.17		0.13		0.114	
	Proficiency in Math, Black Students, 9th grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.03		-0.01		-0.01		-0.09	
Std. Error	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
P-value	[0.527]		[0.762]		[0.902]		[0.050]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1658		2174		998		1155	
Bandwidth	0.159		0.165		0.129		0.107	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on several outcomes. The first three outcomes are indices computed following Anderson (2008) using school-level data from Brazil's yearly School Census—for details, see Appendix Table A.1. The fourth outcome, expenditure on education and culture (log) comes from the System of Accounting and Fiscal Information of the Brazilian Public Sector (FINBRA). The last two variables are the average (standardized) grades of Black students born in the municipality in the SAEB exam (in Portuguese and Maths, respectively). Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. For each regression, we only report the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last two rows in each Panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

investment we document are not a response to rising income or labor demand.

5.4 Black Mayors as Role Models One factor that may contribute to the persistence of sharp racial inequalities is differences in beliefs and aspirations. If someone's beliefs (for instance, about the returns to education) are shaped by the examples they have around them—and especially by the examples of those they identify with—, it would be expected that Black individuals have, on average, lower beliefs and aspirations than Whites. If this is the case, those individuals might invest less in education and political participation, creating a trap of low beliefs, low aspirations, and low investments that reinforce racial inequalities (Genicot and Ray, 2017, 2020).

In this scenario, elected and now publicly visible Black mayors may serve as role models for Black students. A role model can influence someone by acting as an example of what is possible to do or achieve, and even as an inspiration (Morgenroth et al., 2015). More specifically, the contact with a role model with whom a person identifies—in our setting, someone from the same race—may change a person's beliefs about the possibilities and potential outcomes of her decisions. As a result, it can change real behavior, such as investments in education or career decisions.

Separating the effect of changes in aspiration from any direct policy or service provided by the mayor is challenging. Nevertheless, we do the following exercise. Our ENEM dataset contains information on whether high school students are enrolled in public or private schools. Typically, students from private schools come from wealthier families, while public school students are relatively poorer and would benefit more from the mayor's performance. If our results are driven by the mayor's policies and services targeted to more vulnerable populations, we should also observe strong results for White students coming from public schools. Meanwhile, if our results are mainly from a role model effect, we could also observe responses from Black students even if they are enrolled in private schools.

Table 6 shows the results of this empirical exercise. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a robust and sizeable effect of the election of Black mayors on the ENEM take-up of Black students from private schools. These effects are even larger than those found for Black students in public schools. Furthermore, the effects for White students from public schools are mostly non-significant. These findings suggest that the racial dimension is more determinant of our results than the school background—which is more consistent with a role model effect for the Black population than a policy action oriented towards lower-income public service users.

We also examine heterogeneity by the previous mayor's racial identity. On the one hand,

Table 6: ENEM Registration by Type of High School, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log) - Public High School							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.12	0.27	0.30	0.27	0.22	0.36	0.47	0.45
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.428]	[0.038]	[0.024]	[0.043]	[0.081]	[0.005]	[0.001]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1620	1999	1922	1994	2169	2186	1996	1451
Bandwidth	0.151	0.142	0.134	0.141	0.158	0.125	0.112	0.138
Left $\bar{Y}$	59	49	46	40	37	39	38	45
	Panel B: Black students (log) - Private High School							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.10	0.35	0.21	0.17	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.41
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.634]	[0.041]	[0.274]	[0.342]	[0.085]	[0.038]	[0.054]	[0.070]
Effective Obs.	1057	1394	1232	1343	1378	1430	1462	935
Bandwidth	0.151	0.138	0.142	0.149	0.155	0.120	0.140	0.134
Left $\bar{Y}$	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4
	Panel C: White students (log) - Public High School							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.03	0.20	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.21	0.28	0.18
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.16)
P-value	[0.826]	[0.132]	[0.133]	[0.268]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.025]	[0.256]
Effective Obs.	1651	1979	2061	2167	2130	2533	2391	1486
Bandwidth	0.154	0.140	0.147	0.158	0.154	0.152	0.141	0.144
Left $\bar{Y}$	20	18	16	14	14	15	15	16
	Panel D: White students (log) - Private High School							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.07	0.26	-0.10	0.05	0.20	0.20	0.12	0.11
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.751]	[0.142]	[0.584]	[0.772]	[0.255]	[0.241]	[0.505]	[0.632]
Effective Obs.	1102	1425	1338	1416	1495	1638	1525	977
Bandwidth	0.159	0.143	0.158	0.160	0.177	0.142	0.149	0.143
Left $\bar{Y}$	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	5

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panels A and B) and White (Panels C and D) students residing in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. The table further shows heterogeneity by type of High School in which students were enrolled: either Public (Panels A and C) or Private (Panels B and D). The analysis is, therefore, restricted to students enrolled in High School at the moment they were taking the exam (the only group of students for whom we have type of High School information). Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. For each regression, we only report the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

having a previous Black mayor could amplify the effects if a subsequent Black mayor further reinforces individuals' beliefs or continues the policy trajectory initiated by their predecessor. On the other hand, the effect may be stronger in municipalities with no prior experience of a Black mayor, where such an election may represent a more substantial shock to beliefs or policy shift. Unfortunately, because racial identification is available for only a subset of our data, the number of interracial elections for which we can observe the previous mayor's race is considerably smaller. This limitation becomes even more pronounced when we split the sample for the heterogeneity analysis in the RD design. Despite these constraints, we conducted the heterogeneity test using all post-period observations. We do not find any significant differences (Appendix Figure A.8).

Finally, while showing that the election of a Black mayor has long-lasting effects is relevant in its own right, it does not fully clarify the underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, a mayor could implement policies that have enduring impacts on the education of future generations (although we were unable to find evidence in this direction). On the other hand, the persistence of the effects is also consistent with a shift in equilibrium in which Black individuals persistently update their beliefs about the returns to education. For instance, parents may update their beliefs about the returns to education of their Black children and invest more in their education. In fact, using Brazilian data, Rangel (2015) finds that, in mixed families, light-skinned children are more likely to receive formal education than their dark-skinned siblings, even after accounting for both observed and unobserved parental characteristics.[16]

These findings have implications beyond political representation. They support the rationale of racial quotas in general, in which short-term incentives for disadvantaged groups can have persistent and long-term impacts and enhance efficiency. As a result, these role models' visibility could help reduce racial gaps by encouraging Black individuals to invest more in human capital.

6 Conclusion

We present evidence of what happens after a Black candidate wins a close interracial municipal election in Brazil. We find that electing a Black candidate as mayor increases the

[16]The lasting effects in our setting also cannot be explained by the initial mayor (or another Black mayor) staying in office for an additional mandate. We find that electing a Black mayor in a close interracial election *decreases* the probability of a Black mayor being elected in the next electoral cycle (4 years later) by 12 p.p. (Appendix Table A.21). This is consistent with previous literature establishing an incumbency disadvantage in mayoral elections in Brazil (Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017).

number of students who register for Brazil's National High School Examination (ENEM). It also increases the number of Black students enrolling and graduating from university.

Both results are quantitatively meaningful and persistent: for ENEM, we estimate an increase in registration of approximately 25 percent two years after the election. These effects last even after the end of the mayor's mandate and are consistently large and significant years after the election. At the same time, we estimate smaller, positive, and marginally significant effects for White students, suggesting that, at the very least, the increase in educational attainment for Black students does not crowd out White students.

Regardless of the mechanisms, we show that political representation has a strong effect on educational investment in a context of significant racial discrimination. This effect alone has meaningful policy implications. On the theoretical mechanisms, results could be consistent with policy changes, a role model channel, or both. We do not completely rule out a policy channel, but find suggestive evidence that our results are at least partially explained by a role model effect: the election of a Black candidate signals to the municipality's population that successful career paths are viable to Black individuals, which incentivizes investment in education for individuals who identify with the mayor. We document no evidence that the election of a Black mayor increases the quality of education (and other relevant outcomes) provided in the municipality, and find strong effects on Black students not directly targeted by municipal policies (high school students and those from private institutions).

This result is relevant for several reasons. First, we show that racial representation in politics has positive effects both on educational aspirations and attainment of Black students, potentially reducing racial gaps in education. Moreover, with respect to mechanisms, the results suggest that positive examples—or role models—may be an important determinant of behavior and relevant life choices. The nonexistence of such role models may reinforce inequalities that are already stark in countries such as Brazil.

More broadly, this paper's results may inform the debate over policies that incentivize Black candidates' entry into politics, such as quotas or financial incentives. This topic has been hotly debated in recent Brazilian elections. The results discussed here illustrate a way in which the election of Black candidates may be beneficial to society, which can be constructed as an argument in favor of such policies. Moreover, given the suggestive evidence for the role model effect, our results have implications beyond politics. It adds up in favor of policies aiming to increase the representation of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (e.g., racial quotas in university or employment admissions). Our findings also suggest that this can improve efficiency as it does not crowd out investments from non-targeted groups.

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Online Appendix to: "Elections that Inspire: Effects of Black Mayors on Educational Attainment"

Jorge Ikawa Clarice Martins Pedro C. Sant'Anna
Rogerio Santarrosa

November 17, 2025

A Additional Figures and Tables

A.1 Description of Variables

Table A.1: Description of Variables

Variable	Description	Source	Years
Norte, Nordeste, Centro-Oeste, Sudeste and Sul region	Brazil's geographical macro-regions	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
GDP	Municipal Gross Domestic Product	IBGE	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
Estimated Population	Municipality's Estimated Population	IBGE	2003, 2006, 2011, 2015
Illiteracy rate	Municipality's illiteracy rate among population above 15 years old	Brazilian Census	2000, 2010
% Self-declared Black	Percentage of municipality's population self-declared as Black	Brazilian Census	2000, 2010
Gender (1=Female)	Winning candidate's gender	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Married (1=Yes)	Winning candidate's marrital status	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Age in election day	Winning candidate's age	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Right-wing party	Winning candidate belongs to one of the following parties: DEM, PP, PSL, PRP, PSC, PSDC, PRTB, or PR	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Left-wing party	Winning candidate belongs to one of the following parties: PT, PDT, PSB, PC do B, PSOL, PSTU, PCB, PCO, REDE	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Continued on next page

Table A.1: Description of Variables (Continued)

Variable	Description	Source	Years
PT, PSDB, PMDB	Winning candidate belongs to PT (Worker's party), PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), and PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), respectively	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Incumbent	Winning candidate was the previous mayor	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Campaign Expenditure	Winning candidate's campaign expenditure	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Value of Assets	Winning candidate's assets as declared to the Electoral Justice	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Time since first affiliation	Time passed (years) since the winning candidate's first affiliation to a political party	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Previously ran for office	Indicator equal to one if winning candidate had previously ran for office (since 1998)	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Education	Indicators for winning candidate's highest level of education	TSE	2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Students enrollment in ENEM	Number of students (from a given race) residing in the municipality who enrolled for the National High School Examination (ENEM)	INEP	2010-2023
ENEM Grades, by Subject	Standardized Test Scores by Subject in ENEM	INEP	2010-2023
Students enrollment/graduation in university	Number of students born in the municipality who were enrolled/graduated university	Higher Education Census	2010-2023
Expenditure on Education/Culture	Municipality's expenditure commited to education at the fiscal year	FINBRA	2010-2019

Continued on next page

Table A.1: Description of Variables (Continued)

Variable	Description	Source	Years
School Infrastructure Index	Index computed following Anderson (2008) using the following variables (municipality level): fraction of municipal schools with a library or reading room; with a sciences laboratory; with access to the internet; and with a computer lab	School Census	2010-2019
Basic School Infrastructure Index	Index computed following Anderson (2008) using the following variables (municipality level): fraction of municipal schools with access to water; access to sewage systems; access to electricity; and providing meals to students	School Census	2010-2019
School Infrastructure Index	Index computed following Anderson (2008) using the following variables (municipality level): average number of Pre-School Teachers in municipal schools; average number of Elementary Teachers in municipal schools; average number of High School teachers in municipal schools; average number of Employees in municipal schools (including non-teaching staff)	School Census	2010-2019
Adoption of Policies on Racial Equality and Discrimination	Indicator constructed from MUNIC data equal to one if a municipality reported, in a given year, to adopt (at least) one of the following policies: policies, programs or actions promoting racial equality; (existence of) Municipal Council of Racial Equality; Educational Secretary adopts actions aimed at combating discrimination in schools; health of the Black population and the fight against racism are part of the education of health workers.	MUNIC	2011, 2014, 2018, 2019

Continued on next page

Table A.1: Description of Variables (Continued)

Variable	**Description**	**Source**	**Years**
Proficiency in Portuguese/Math, 9th and 5th grades	Standardized test scores obtained from a national assessment covering 5th and 9th grade students of public schools and a sample of private schools.	SAEB/INEP	2011, 2013, 2015, 2017

Notes: Acronymins of data sources: Brazil's Superior Electoral Court (TSE); Brazilian Institute of Gepgraphy and Statistics (IBGE); National Institute of Research on Education Anísio Teixeira (INEP); Survey on Basic Municipal Information (MUNIC); System of Accounting and Fiscal Information of the Brazilian Public Sector (FINBRA).

A.2 Density test

Figure A.1: Density test and histogram of vote margin of black candidates



Notes: The figure shows the histogram for the margin of victory of Black candidates, defined as the difference in vote share between a Black candidate and a white candidate, and a local polynomial density estimate and robust bias-corrected confidence intervals computed as described in Cattaneo et al. (2020).

A.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample of interracial municipal elections (2004-2016)

	White Mayor		Black Mayor		
	Mean	Obs	Mean	Obs	p-value
Mayor's characteristics					
Gender (1=Female)	0.14	2045	0.11	1921	0.005
Married (1=Yes)	0.24	2045	0.27	1921	0.046
Age in election day	48.09	2000	46.98	1886	0.001
Right-wing party	0.21	2045	0.19	1921	0.050
Left-wing party	0.22	2045	0.26	1921	0.001
Workers' Party (PT)	0.069	2045	0.11	1921	0.000
Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)	0.12	2045	0.13	1921	0.517
Brazilian Democratic Movement Part (PMDB)	0.19	2045	0.16	1921	0.003
Incumbent	0.27	2045	0.24	1919	0.050
Elementary School (incomplete)	0.068	2045	0.073	1921	0.546
Elementary School (complete)	0.06	2045	0.068	1921	0.302
High School (incomplete)	0.031	2045	0.03	1921	0.766
High School (complete)	0.26	2045	0.28	1921	0.215
University (incomplete)	0.073	2045	0.063	1921	0.195
University (complete)	0.50	2045	0.49	1921	0.245
Municipality's Characteristics					
Norte Region	0.13	2045	0.13	1921	0.906
Nordeste Region	0.49	2045	0.51	1921	0.193
Centro-Oeste Region	0.11	2045	0.10	1921	0.349
Sudeste Region	0.22	2045	0.21	1921	0.562
Sul Region	0.047	2045	0.044	1921	0.684
GDP (t-1), R$ 1,000	506,438	2045	578,221	1921	0.410
Estimated Population (t-1)	35,348	2045	38,054	1921	0.489
Illiteracy rate (previous census)	0.22	2045	0.23	1921	0.655
Proportion of population self-declared as Black (previous census)	0.63	2040	0.63	1918	0.195
Expenditure on Education (2016)	15,037,851	1981	15,862,608	1865	0.557
Expenditure on Culture (2016)	548,798	1893	558,897	1806	0.905
Proportion of Municipal Schools with Library or Reading Room (t-1)	0.23	2045	0.23	1920	0.939
Proportion of Municipal Schools with Internet Access (t-1)	0.29	2010	0.28	1888	0.182
Proportion of Municipal Schools with Science Laboratory (t-1)	0.015	2045	0.016	1920	0.816
Outcomes in t-1					
Black Students registered in ENEM (t-1)	1030.79	1323	890.96	1239	0.492
White Students registered in ENEM (t-1)	427.96	1323	386.24	1239	0.571
Black Students enrolled in University (t-1)	451.09	1322	399.66	1236	0.672
White Students enrolled in University (t-1)	281.47	1322	250.73	1236	0.610
Black Freshman Students enrolled in University (t-1)	198.71	1322	171.22	1236	0.604
White Freshman Students enrolled in University (t-1)	114.96	1322	106.33	1236	0.727
Black Students Graduating from University (t-1)	54.19	1322	46.86	1236	0.611
White Students Graduating from University (t-1)	38.39	1322	34.68	1236	0.639
Black Students enrolled in Public University (t-1)	145.67	1322	129.49	1236	0.679
Black Freshman Students enrolled in Public University (t-1)	48.93	1322	45.15	1236	0.755
White Students enrolled in Public University (t-1)	85.46	1322	73.74	1236	0.561
White Freshman Students enrolled in Public University (t-1)	28.05	1322	27.84	1236	0.975
Black Students enrolled in STEM courses (t-1)	78.94	1322	73.23	1236	0.812
Black Freshman Students enrolled in STEM courses (t-1)	35.83	1322	32.85	1236	0.776
White Students enrolled in STEM courses (t-1)	57.28	1322	54.66	1236	0.849
White Freshman Students enrolled in STEM courses (t-1)	23.50	1322	23.48	1236	0.996

Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics for several variables at the mayor and/or municipal level. The reported p-value is the p-value of a difference of means test between the municipalities where a White and a Black candidate were elected, with null hypothesis that the mean of the variable for both groups are equal.

A.4 Details on Candidates' Racial Classification

Table A.3: Candidates' racial self-identification and RAIS racial classification, Black and Non-Black, 2016

TSE \ RAIS	Non-Black	Black
Non-Black	3502	606
Black	779	829

Notes: The table displays the results of a validation exercise between the self-reported race in the 2016 election and the data collected from RAIS (Black and Non-Black).

Table A.4: Origin of candidates' racial information, 2004-2016

	Original data	TSE 2014	TSE 2016	TSE 2018	RAIS
Elected	1614	168	1135	103	946
Runner-up	1614	206	1200	34	912

Notes: The table displays the origin of candidates' racial information since the availability of this data from the TSE started in the 2014 election.

A.5 RD Plots of Main Results

Figure A.2: Effect on ENEM Registration among Black Students



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

Figure A.3: Effect on ENEM Registration among White Students



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

Figure A.4: Effect on the number of first-year Black students in University



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

Figure A.5: Effect on the number of first-year White students in University



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

Figure A.6: Effect on the number of Black students graduating from University



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

Figure A.7: Effect on the number of White students graduating from University



(a) $t+1$



(b) $t+2$



(c) $t+3$



(d) $t+4$



(e) $t+5$



(f) $t+6$



(g) $t+7$



(h) $t+8$

A.6 ENEM results for High-School Seniors Only

Table A.5: ENEM Registration, High School Seniors Only, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.11	0.26	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.35	0.34	0.36
Std. Error	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
P-value	[0.392]	[0.025]	[0.015]	[0.027]	[0.048]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.006]
Coef. (Robust)	0.13	0.30	0.32	0.28	0.26	0.39	0.39	0.40
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
P-value	[0.369]	[0.023]	[0.015]	[0.025]	[0.041]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.005]
Effective Obs.	1637	1979	1954	2037	2052	2109	2076	1573
Bandwidth	0.153	0.140	0.137	0.145	0.146	0.120	0.117	0.157
Left $\bar{Y}$	63	56	54	58	52	55	56	65
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.05	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.19
Std. Error	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)
P-value	[0.706]	[0.079]	[0.101]	[0.127]	[0.047]	[0.060]	[0.045]	[0.166]
Coef. (Robust)	0.06	0.24	0.22	0.19	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.21
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)
P-value	[0.686]	[0.074]	[0.104]	[0.144]	[0.057]	[0.056]	[0.046]	[0.192]
Effective Obs.	1640	1962	2009	2141	2077	2487	2460	1473
Bandwidth	0.153	0.138	0.143	0.155	0.149	0.148	0.145	0.142
Left $\bar{Y}$	23	22	20	21	20	23	23	24

Notes: The table reports results from Table 2, keeping only high school seniors. It reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students residing in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

A.7 Main results by Black racial categories

Table A.6: Main Results for Black students, disaggregated by *preto* and *pardo* students

	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+4	t+5	t+6	t+7	t+8
Panel A: ENEM Registration (*pretos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.07	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.46	0.56
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)
P-value	[0.666]	[0.066]	[0.060]	[0.050]	[0.045]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1663	2027	1973	2023	1943	2199	2063	1377
Bandwidth	0.156	0.144	0.138	0.144	0.136	0.126	0.116	0.128
Left $\bar{Y}$	37	31	30	34	27	26	28	37
Panel B: ENEM Registration (*pardos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.19	0.29	0.33	0.32	0.35	0.46	0.46	0.53
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.239]	[0.037]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Effective Obs.	1553	2005	1945	1950	1978	2057	2057	1380
Bandwidth	0.144	0.142	0.136	0.136	0.139	0.116	0.116	0.129
Left $\bar{Y}$	193	164	155	179	140	137	144	197
Panel C: Enrollment in Higher Educ (*pretos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.26	0.22	0.41	0.36	0.40	0.46	0.45	0.67
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.221]	[0.147]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.015]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1053	1634	1436	1675	1637	1746	1863	864
Bandwidth	0.163	0.178	0.146	0.187	0.179	0.135	0.148	0.139
Left $\bar{Y}$	6	4	5	6	6	6	7	6
Panel D: Enrollment in Higher Educ (*pardos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.35	0.41	0.31	0.41	0.28	0.41	0.66
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.295]	[0.060]	[0.030]	[0.086]	[0.021]	[0.058]	[0.011]	[0.007]
Effective Obs.	1073	1516	1500	1573	1530	2211	1933	826
Bandwidth	0.168	0.157	0.155	0.167	0.159	0.197	0.155	0.130
Left $\bar{Y}$	33	18	27	32	34	29	35	29
Panel E: Graduation from Higher Educ (*pretos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.26	0.22	0.31	0.25	0.41	0.35	0.38	0.41
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)
P-value	[0.138]	[0.072]	[0.017]	[0.058]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.028]
Effective Obs.	1067	1663	1515	1582	1466	1717	1826	851
Bandwidth	0.167	0.184	0.157	0.168	0.149	0.132	0.143	0.136
Left $\bar{Y}$	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Panel F: Graduation from Higher Educ (*pardos*, log)								
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.34	0.36	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.41	0.56
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.241]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.069]	[0.053]	[0.057]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Effective Obs.	1208	1473	1407	1501	1591	1832	1766	749
Bandwidth	0.215	0.151	0.142	0.155	0.170	0.144	0.137	0.114
Left $\bar{Y}$	11	7	8	9	11	9	10	8

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for our three main outcomes—ENEM registration, enrollment in Higher Education, and graduation from Higher Education—split by students declared as *pretos* (black) and *pardos* (mixed-race). For a discussion on racial categories in Brazil, see Section 2. Each column represents estimates from a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (which occurred at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first row of each panel reports estimates using the bias-corrected estimator from Calonico et al. (2014), while the last three rows report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), effective number of observations, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

A.8 Heterogeneity and Effects by Election Year

Figure A.8: Heterogeneity by previous mayor's race



Table A.7: ENEM Results by Election, Black Students (log), RD Estimates

	Panel A: 2004 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)						0.76	0.90	0.85
Std. Error						(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.37)
P-value						[0.024]	[0.011]	[0.021]
Effective Obs.						437	355	330
Bandwidth						0.158	0.117	0.108
Left $\bar{Y}$						131	180	199
	Panel B: 2008 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)		0.52	0.70	0.71	0.62	0.71	0.73	0.73
Std. Error		(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
P-value		[0.031]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Effective Obs.		571	497	500	528	484	494	488
Bandwidth		0.202	0.159	0.164	0.180	0.151	0.158	0.154
Left $\bar{Y}$		115	156	175	232	295	266	314
	Panel C: 2012 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.15	0.18	0.17
Std. Error	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)
P-value	[0.556]	[0.616]	[0.580]	[0.589]	[0.449]	[0.583]	[0.524]	[0.528]
Effective Obs.	596	594	591	590	590	590	592	584
Bandwidth	0.142	0.142	0.140	0.140	0.139	0.138	0.140	0.137
Left $\bar{Y}$	231	295	270	322	277	241	196	228
	Panel D: 2016 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.20	0.23	0.22	
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	
P-value	[0.363]	[0.388]	[0.360]	[0.379]	[0.284]	[0.206]	[0.235]	
Effective Obs.	1078	1089	1089	1099	1107	1065	1054	
Bandwidth	0.169	0.173	0.173	0.175	0.177	0.166	0.163	
Left $\bar{Y}$	242	211	173	197	110	117	139	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on Black students' registration to ENEM. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). We report the bias-corrected estimator and robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.8: Enrollment in Higher Education Results by Election, Black Students (log), RD Estimates

	Panel A: 2004 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)						0.40	0.79	0.72
Std. Error						(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.41)
P-value						[0.353]	[0.055]	[0.081]
Effective Obs.						351	351	354
Bandwidth						0.114	0.114	0.116
Left $\bar{Y}$						8	20	31
	Panel B: 2008 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)		0.46	0.44	0.49	0.56	0.53	0.44	0.69
Std. Error		(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.31)
P-value		[0.094]	[0.099]	[0.071]	[0.039]	[0.061]	[0.123]	[0.025]
Effective Obs.		516	546	510	505	521	519	470
Bandwidth		0.172	0.192	0.169	0.166	0.176	0.175	0.143
Left $\bar{Y}$		6	19	26	31	40	38	40
	Panel C: 2016 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.24	0.32	0.22	0.30	0.25	0.28	
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	
P-value	[0.305]	[0.321]	[0.187]	[0.330]	[0.178]	[0.249]	[0.183]	
Effective Obs.	1062	1089	1086	1115	1083	1111	1124	
Bandwidth	0.165	0.173	0.171	0.180	0.171	0.178	0.183	
Left $\bar{Y}$	39	41	42	45	47	60	61	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on Black students' enrollment as first-year students in University. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). We report the bias-corrected estimator and robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.9: Graduation Results by Election, Black Students (log), RD Estimates

	Panel A: 2004 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)						0.23	0.53	0.69
Std. Error						(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.38)
P-value						[0.519]	[0.127]	[0.074]
Effective Obs.						342	356	313
Bandwidth						0.113	0.118	0.099
Left $\bar{Y}$						3	5	6
	Panel B: 2008 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)		0.21	0.37	0.32	0.47	0.35	0.61	0.51
Std. Error		(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.28)
P-value		[0.338]	[0.153]	[0.197]	[0.086]	[0.224]	[0.051]	[0.071]
Effective Obs.		586	527	535	512	539	428	498
Bandwidth		0.220	0.179	0.184	0.169	0.187	0.125	0.162
Left $\bar{Y}$		2	4	5	7	10	13	16
	Panel C: 2016 Election							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.30	0.33	0.28	0.34	0.27	0.29	
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	
P-value	[0.255]	[0.182]	[0.158]	[0.221]	[0.127]	[0.209]	[0.187]	
Effective Obs.	1184	1073	1040	1065	1074	1148	1160	
Bandwidth	0.205	0.168	0.160	0.166	0.169	0.191	0.194	
Left $\bar{Y}$	14	15	15	15	17	17	17	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on Black students' graduation from University. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). We report the bias-corrected estimator and robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

A.9 Additional Outcomes

Table A.10: Effect on ENEM grades, Black students, RD Estimates

	ENEM Grades, Natural Sciences							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02
Std. Error	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
P-value	[0.469]	[0.955]	[0.767]	[0.607]	[0.801]	[0.106]	[0.114]	[0.434]
Effective Obs.	1799	2402	2484	2556	2391	2580	2968	1588
Bandwidth	0.177	0.190	0.202	0.217	0.188	0.156	0.200	0.160
	ENEM Grades, Humanities							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
P-value	[0.624]	[0.364]	[0.793]	[0.760]	[0.476]	[0.273]	[0.139]	[0.550]
Effective Obs.	1926	2282	2471	2393	2502	2688	2770	1593
Bandwidth	0.205	0.172	0.199	0.189	0.205	0.166	0.175	0.161
	ENEM Grades, Languages							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.02
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.319]	[0.460]	[0.972]	[0.346]	[0.588]	[0.338]	[0.343]	[0.591]
Effective Obs.	1837	2234	2309	2488	2382	2770	2639	1273
Bandwidth	0.184	0.165	0.176	0.203	0.187	0.175	0.161	0.116
	ENEM Grades, Math							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.03
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
P-value	[0.351]	[0.735]	[0.700]	[0.989]	[0.946]	[0.360]	[0.659]	[0.380]
Effective Obs.	1754	2346	2480	2546	2369	2691	2639	1486
Bandwidth	0.169	0.181	0.201	0.215	0.184	0.167	0.161	0.144
	ENEM Grades, Essay							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01
Std. Error	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
P-value	[0.426]	[0.631]	[0.698]	[0.891]	[0.924]	[0.315]	[0.309]	[0.518]
Effective Obs.	1774	2337	2348	2417	2215	2442	2447	1867
Bandwidth	0.174	0.180	0.181	0.192	0.164	0.145	0.145	0.220
	ENEM Grades, Average Score							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.03	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
P-value	[0.338]	[0.884]	[0.894]	[0.720]	[0.818]	[0.263]	[0.349]	[0.327]
Effective Obs.	1942	2273	2398	2566	2342	2544	2691	1688
Bandwidth	0.210	0.171	0.189	0.219	0.180	0.153	0.166	0.178

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on Black students' standardized ENEM grades in each one of the five subjects. Each column represents estimates from a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (which occurred at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. We report the bias-corrected estimator and robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last two rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and the effective sample size. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.11: Effect on ENEM grades, White students, RD Estimates

	ENEM Grades, Natural Sciences							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.03
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.556]	[0.915]	[0.894]	[0.428]	[0.236]	[0.266]	[0.313]	[0.409]
Effective Obs.	1697	2285	2272	2149	2170	2758	2958	1455
Bandwidth	0.162	0.173	0.171	0.156	0.159	0.174	0.199	0.140
	ENEM Grades, Humanities							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.733]	[0.859]	[0.658]	[0.488]	[0.221]	[0.736]	[0.293]	[0.840]
Effective Obs.	1934	2090	2362	2127	2260	2637	2682	1437
Bandwidth	0.207	0.150	0.183	0.154	0.169	0.162	0.165	0.137
	ENEM Grades, Languages							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01
Std. Error	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
P-value	[0.595]	[0.860]	[0.817]	[0.733]	[0.650]	[0.649]	[0.558]	[0.781]
Effective Obs.	1792	2179	2425	2193	2270	2719	2772	1406
Bandwidth	0.176	0.159	0.193	0.162	0.171	0.170	0.175	0.132
	ENEM Grades, Math							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.03
Std. Error	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.602]	[0.495]	[0.932]	[0.843]	[0.193]	[0.346]	[0.653]	[0.466]
Effective Obs.	1752	2052	2183	2112	2213	2839	3092	1314
Bandwidth	0.169	0.146	0.160	0.152	0.164	0.184	0.221	0.122
	ENEM Grades, Essay							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.02
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.117]	[0.237]	[0.626]	[0.906]	[0.402]	[0.408]	[0.343]	[0.599]
Effective Obs.	1745	1892	2100	2054	2229	2747	2482	1513
Bandwidth	0.168	0.131	0.150	0.147	0.165	0.173	0.148	0.147
	ENEM Grades, Average Score							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.03
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.566]	[0.606]	[0.943]	[0.999]	[0.299]	[0.372]	[0.541]	[0.572]
Effective Obs.	1934	2004	2136	2070	2236	2793	2747	1373
Bandwidth	0.208	0.142	0.154	0.148	0.167	0.178	0.172	0.128

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on White students' standardized ENEM grades in each one of the five subjects. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. We report the bias-corrected estimator and robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last two rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and the effective sample size. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.12: Effect on number of students enrolled in public universities, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.33	0.27	0.47	0.33	0.42	0.28	0.33	0.37
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.096]	[0.079]	[0.005]	[0.029]	[0.010]	[0.032]	[0.018]	[0.067]
Coef. (Robust)	0.38	0.30	0.53	0.37	0.47	0.31	0.37	0.43
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.095]	[0.083]	[0.005]	[0.036]	[0.010]	[0.038]	[0.016]	[0.060]
Effective Obs.	1040	1488	1334	1542	1401	2096	2100	924
Bandwidth	0.160	0.153	0.132	0.162	0.141	0.176	0.177	0.156
Left $\bar{Y}$	9	5	7	7	7	6	8	10
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.24	0.08	0.28	0.19	0.28	0.17	0.35	0.24
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.183]	[0.531]	[0.073]	[0.176]	[0.055]	[0.203]	[0.020]	[0.270]
Coef. (Robust)	0.28	0.09	0.32	0.22	0.32	0.19	0.40	0.32
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.188]	[0.533]	[0.077]	[0.165]	[0.054]	[0.229]	[0.016]	[0.208]
Effective Obs.	1068	1746	1535	1752	1659	2060	1735	829
Bandwidth	0.167	0.203	0.160	0.204	0.183	0.171	0.134	0.131
Left $\bar{Y}$	4	3	3	4	4	3	5	5

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the number of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality enrolled in public universities for different numbers of years before and after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.13: Effect on number of students enrolled in STEM majors, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.27	0.26	0.36	0.29	0.38	0.38	0.35	0.53
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.134]	[0.045]	[0.009]	[0.030]	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.012]	[0.016]
Coef. (Robust)	0.31	0.29	0.41	0.32	0.43	0.43	0.39	0.61
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.142]	[0.053]	[0.009]	[0.033]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.014]	[0.011]
Effective Obs.	1044	1606	1640	1717	1453	1914	1862	761
Bandwidth	0.161	0.173	0.180	0.197	0.148	0.152	0.147	0.117
Left $\bar{Y}$	5	3	4	5	5	5	6	6
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.26	0.18	0.31	0.25	0.30	0.19	0.19	0.13
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.138]	[0.173]	[0.027]	[0.064]	[0.042]	[0.141]	[0.182]	[0.514]
Coef. (Robust)	0.30	0.21	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.22	0.22	0.16
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.135]	[0.164]	[0.030]	[0.062]	[0.055]	[0.141]	[0.165]	[0.488]
Effective Obs.	1048	1618	1606	1706	1590	2085	1952	895
Bandwidth	0.162	0.175	0.174	0.194	0.170	0.176	0.158	0.147
Left $\bar{Y}$	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	4

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the number of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality enrolled in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) majors for different numbers of years before and after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.14: Effect on Racial Declaration, RD Estimates

	Panel A: Changes in race declaration, White to Black (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.18	0.25	0.23
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.113]	[0.048]	[0.051]	[0.079]	[0.046]	[0.128]	[0.039]	[0.118]
Effective Obs.	1498	1998	1935	1907	1925	2300	2245	1454
Bandwidth	0.137	0.142	0.135	0.132	0.135	0.134	0.129	0.139
	Panel B: Change in race declaration, Black to White (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.32	0.30	0.37	0.45
Std. Error	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)
P-value	[0.123]	[0.052]	[0.044]	[0.029]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.001]	[0.004]
Effective Obs.	1521	1889	1938	2006	1918	2297	2283	1265
Bandwidth	0.140	0.131	0.135	0.142	0.134	0.133	0.131	0.116
	Panel C: Net changes in racial declaration, relative to baseline number of Black students							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.07	0.02	-0.03	-0.08
Std. Error	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.767]	[0.654]	[0.591]	[0.969]	[0.073]	[0.664]	[0.465]	[0.059]
Effective Obs.	1677	2106	1902	2100	2051	2510	2239	1274
Bandwidth	0.160	0.152	0.133	0.151	0.147	0.152	0.129	0.118
	Panel D: Net changes in racial declaration, relative to total baseline number of students							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04
Std. Error	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
P-value	[0.288]	[0.634]	[0.790]	[0.423]	[0.368]	[0.187]	[0.292]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1762	2470	2191	2178	2256	2393	2765	1264
Bandwidth	0.171	0.200	0.161	0.159	0.168	0.141	0.175	0.115

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on changes in racial declaration. We link students' self-declared race during ENEM registration with their racial classification in the year before the election, obtained from the School Census. Race in the school census is reported by the school admin, parents, or students themselves. Panels A and B show the log changes in the number of students' self-declared race in ENEM relative to the reported race in the pre-election school census (from White to Black and from Black to White, respectively). Panels C and D show net changes in racial declaration. For net changes, we code changes to White as -1, and changes to Black as +1. We report results relative to the number of Black students in the pre-election school census (Panel C) or relative to all students in the municipality and in-sample(Panel D). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The coefficients use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014, 2015). The last two rows in each Panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and the effective number of observations. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.15: Effect on Proficiency in Portuguese and Mathematics, 5th grade students, RD Estimates

	Dependent variable: Proficiency in Portuguese, Black Students, 5th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.05		-0.02		-0.02		0.00	
Std. Error	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.06)	
P-value	[0.349]		[0.666]		[0.723]		[0.933]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1734		2342		937		1370	
Bandwidth	0.168		0.186		0.121		0.131	
	Proficiency in Math, Black Students, 5th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.05		-0.03		-0.05		0.02	
Std. Error	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.06)	
P-value	[0.353]		[0.402]		[0.491]		[0.720]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1712		2478		851		1435	
Bandwidth	0.165		0.21		0.107		0.141	
	Proficiency in Portuguese, White Students, 5th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.12		0.00		-0.06		-0.04	
Std. Error	(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.07)	
P-value	[0.081]		[0.991]		[0.445]		[0.619]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1562		2399		850		1238	
Bandwidth	0.146		0.194		0.107		0.115	
	Proficiency in Math, White Students, 5th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.09		-0.00		-0.04		-0.04	
Std. Error	(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.07)	
P-value	[0.155]		[0.939]		[0.630]		[0.593]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1652		2358		877		1219	
Bandwidth	0.157		0.189		0.111		0.113	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on students' proficiency in Portuguese and Mathematics in the 5th grade, as measured by the standardized test from the System of Evaluation of Basic Education (SAEB). Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first set of results (first three rows) uses the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set (rows 4 to 6) uses the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last two rows report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.16: Effect on Proficiency in Portuguese and Mathematics, 9th grade, White students, RD Estimates

	Proficiency in Math, White Students, 9th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.04		-0.01		0.01		-0.10	
Std. Error	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
P-value	[0.467]		[0.776]		[0.899]		[0.074]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1707		2030		1037		1165	
Bandwidth	0.165		0.149		0.137		0.109	
	Proficiency in Portuguese, White Students, 9th Grade (SAEB)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.02		-0.02		0.01		-0.08	
Std. Error	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
P-value	[0.706]		[0.697]		[0.880]		[0.141]	
Total Obs. (Effective)	1778		2021		1296		1480	
Bandwidth	0.177		0.149		0.201		0.148	

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on White students' proficiency in Portuguese and Mathematics in the 9th grade, as measured by the standardized test from the System of Evaluation of Basic Education (SAEB). Results for Black students are on Table 5 in the main text. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first set of results (first three rows) uses the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set (rows 4 to 6) uses the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last two rows report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.17: Effect on Reservation Policies in Higher Education, RD Estimates

	Municipality offers courses with quota reservations							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.07	0.01
Std. Error	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)
P-value	[0.517]	[0.524]	[0.407]	[0.404]	[0.382]	[0.785]	[0.291]	[0.940]
Effective Obs.	816	789	775	928	1080	1258	1211	589
Bandwidth	0.195	0.156	0.144	0.165	0.152	0.164	0.146	0.125
Left $\bar{Y}$	0.347	0.337	0.322	0.324	0.336	0.336	0.332	0.404
	Students admitted under the quota system (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.34	0.43	0.37	0.31	0.34	0.21	0.26	0.16
Std. Error	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.51)
P-value	[0.361]	[0.285]	[0.368]	[0.415]	[0.356]	[0.531]	[0.435]	[0.752]
Effective Obs.	878	823	841	920	1109	1269	1284	586
Bandwidth	0.232	0.168	0.158	0.163	0.157	0.166	0.157	0.125
Left $\bar{Y}$	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the municipality's supply of reserved seats for minority students in Higher Education. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The estimates were obtained using the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014, 2015). The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.18: Effect on Policies on Racial Equality and Discrimination, RD Estimates

Any Racial Policy	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+6**	**t+7**
Coef.	-0.06	0.08	0.05	0.11
Std. Error	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
P-value	[0.131]	[0.099]	[0.270]	[0.079]
Coef. (Robust)	-0.06	0.09	0.05	0.12
Std. Error	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
P-value	[0.183]	[0.086]	[0.293]	[0.104]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1734	1595	1163	936
Bandwidth	0.166	0.17	0.164	0.128

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the municipality's adoption of policies on racial equality and discrimination. Data comes from the Survey of Basic Municipal Information (see Table A.1 for details). Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first set of results (first three rows) uses the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set (rows 4 to 6) uses the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last two rows report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.19: Effect on Municipal GDP per capita and Wages, RD Estimates

	Per Capita GDP (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.05	0.01	0	-0.01	0.02	-0.10	-0.07	-0.08
Std. Error	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
P-value	[0.445]	[0.801]	[0.956]	[0.823]	[0.798]	[0.212]	[0.356]	[0.273]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1591	2372	2089	2081	2162	1390	1467	1608
Bandwidth	0.148	0.184	0.149	0.149	0.157	0.130	0.142	0.164
	Average monthly wage (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0	0	-0.01	-0.03	-0.09	-0.05	-0.04	0.02
Std. Error	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
P-value	[0.858]	[0.814]	[0.547]	[0.228]	[0.021]	[0.057]	[0.134]	[0.536]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1891	2015	1798	914	827	1112	1214	936
Bandwidth	0.194	0.143	0.123	0.115	0.102	0.097	0.110	0.159
	Average monthly wage, Black workers (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.06	0.02	0	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	0
Std. Error	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
P-value	[0.030]	[0.302]	[0.889]	[0.141]	[0.285]	[0.582]	[0.666]	[0.979]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1652	2536	2399	945	1143	1361	1516	901
Bandwidth	0.156	0.213	0.190	0.120	0.160	0.127	0.148	0.149

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on different municipal economic outcomes. In the first Panel, the outcome is the log of municipal GDP per capita. In the last two panels, the outcomes are the average monthly wage for all workers and for Blacks only in the municipality. They are obtained from the RAIS dataset. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. For each regression, we only report the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last two rows in each Panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.20: Effect on Employment, RD Estimates

	Number of workers							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	897.62	1348.63	1361.19	1716.22	1825.79	1355.14	1362.18	1627.47
Std. Error	(2082.78)	(1759.79)	(1726.42)	(2562.3)	(2586.71)	(2455.83)	(2446.88)	(3028.08)
P-value	[0.666]	[0.443]	[0.430]	[0.503]	[0.480]	[0.581]	[0.578]	[0.591]
Total Obs. (Effective)	937	1156	1154	608	610	929	973	703
Bandwidth	0.079	0.072	0.072	0.07	0.07	0.079	0.083	0.107
	Number of Black workers							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	737.52	748.78	710.85	436.85	489.52	600.85	553.42	65.01
Std. Error	(888.9)	(690.62)	(663.02)	(788.61)	(804.99)	(941.81)	(995.36)	(1392.15)
P-value	[0.407]	[0.278]	[0.284]	[0.580]	[0.543]	[0.523]	[0.578]	[0.963]
Total Obs. (Effective)	894	1113	1102	569	572	866	929	723
Bandwidth	0.074	0.069	0.069	0.065	0.065	0.074	0.079	0.111
	Number of workers in the Municipal Public Sector							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	65.91	226.87	190.88	321.74	336.9	269.54	264.19	318.06
Std. Error	(141.98)	(131.67)	(129.1)	(189.89)	(210.71)	(184.2)	(179.75)	(225.8)
P-value	[0.642]	[0.085]	[0.139]	[0.090]	[0.110]	[0.143]	[0.142]	[0.159]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1269	1469	1559	691	711	1039	1135	711
Bandwidth	0.112	0.096	0.103	0.082	0.084	0.09	0.1	0.108
	Number of Black workers in the Municipal Public Sector							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	8.52	23.02	15.06	26.69	11.26	19.41	12.52	24.12
Std. Error	(18.92)	(13.23)	(18.72)	(21.5)	(20.31)	(25.4)	(33.62)	(47.45)
P-value	[0.652]	[0.082]	[0.421]	[0.214]	[0.579]	[0.445]	[0.709]	[0.611]
Total Obs. (Effective)	1452	1489	2280	1107	1069	1613	1726	936
Bandwidth	0.131	0.098	0.172	0.15	0.142	0.164	0.187	0.16

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on municipal employment. Outcomes are from RAIS and include all formal workers in the municipality. The outcomes are (i) total number of workers; (ii) total number of Black workers; (iii) total number of municipal public employees; and (iv) total number of Black municipal employees. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. For each regression, we only report the bias-corrected estimator suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). The last two rows in each Panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table A.21: Effect on the likelihood of electing a Black Mayor in the Next Election, RD Estimates

	Election Cycle		
Black Candidate Elected	**Next**	**Two Later**	**Three Later**
Coef.	-0.12	-0.07	0.08
Std. Error	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
P-value	[0.005]	[0.164]	[0.232]
Coef. (Robust)	-0.13	-0.08	0.09
Std. Error	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
P-value	[0.005]	[0.231]	[0.266]
Total Obs. (Effective)	2264	1471	917
Bandwidth	0.137	0.151	0.154

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the likelihood a Black candidate is elected in a subsequent election. Data on candidates' race is obtained in the same way as in our main sample (either from direct self-reports or imputing from RAIS) for all municipalities, in the municipal elections from 2008 to 2020. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes in an election that happened k election cycles after the original election. Estimates are obtained by pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The last two rows in each Panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression) and effective number of observations in each regression. Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

B Robustness of Main Results

Table B.1: Robustness: ENEM Registration of Black Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.22	0.40	0.43	0.39	0.42	0.52	0.53	0.67
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.254]	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.017]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]
Coef. (Robust)	0.30	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.33	0.49	0.53	0.67
Std. Error	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.27)
P-value	[0.251]	[0.115]	[0.080]	[0.136]	[0.138]	[0.031]	[0.018]	[0.013]
Effective Obs.	885	1138	1101	1092	1090	1157	1116	763
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.073	0.071	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.059	0.057	0.063
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.15	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.51	0.52	0.62
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)
P-value	[0.368]	[0.026]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Coef. (Robust)	0.30	0.45	0.49	0.42	0.44	0.54	0.57	0.72
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.201]	[0.026]	[0.016]	[0.034]	[0.027]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1130	1446	1400	1394	1392	1488	1445	988
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.098	0.095	0.091	0.091	0.090	0.078	0.076	0.084
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.09	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.22	0.36	0.33	0.29
Std. Error	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)
P-value	[0.465]	[0.088]	[0.061]	[0.022]	[0.052]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.034]
Coef. (Robust)	0.11	0.22	0.24	0.28	0.24	0.40	0.37	0.32
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.430]	[0.082]	[0.059]	[0.028]	[0.056]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.030]
Effective Obs.	1663	2099	2079	1989	2029	2003	2128	1526
Bandwidth	0.157	0.150	0.149	0.140	0.144	0.112	0.121	0.149
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.14	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.32	0.44	0.43	0.41
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
P-value	[0.313]	[0.046]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.016]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.003]
Coef. (Robust)	0.17	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.49	0.48	0.46
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.295]	[0.045]	[0.024]	[0.026]	[0.015]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.003]
Effective Obs.	1581	1989	1911	1911	1890	2008	2019	1617
Bandwidth	0.147	0.141	0.133	0.133	0.131	0.113	0.113	0.165
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.2: Robustness: ENEM Registration of White Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.16	0.35	0.38	0.35	0.39	0.40	0.45	0.38
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.388]	[0.040]	[0.028]	[0.032]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.058]
Coef. (Robust)	0.22	0.32	0.37	0.35	0.39	0.48	0.51	0.43
Std. Error	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.390]	[0.181]	[0.122]	[0.133]	[0.091]	[0.028]	[0.021]	[0.103]
Effective Obs.	911	1114	1090	1147	1114	1363	1290	808
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.076	0.069	0.068	0.071	0.069	0.071	0.066	0.067
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.11	0.29	0.30	0.28	0.31	0.32	0.37	0.34
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)
P-value	[0.519]	[0.056]	[0.046]	[0.054]	[0.032]	[0.021]	[0.008]	[0.057]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.41	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.50	0.54	0.44
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.322]	[0.057]	[0.036]	[0.042]	[0.024]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.072]
Effective Obs.	1163	1415	1392	1454	1415	1742	1652	1040
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.101	0.092	0.091	0.095	0.092	0.094	0.089	0.090
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.04	0.21	0.15	0.17	0.21	0.13	0.15	0.22
Std. Error	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.721]	[0.072]	[0.184]	[0.135]	[0.064]	[0.215]	[0.150]	[0.137]
Coef. (Robust)	0.05	0.22	0.16	0.18	0.22	0.14	0.14	0.25
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.701]	[0.099]	[0.210]	[0.149]	[0.081]	[0.245]	[0.232]	[0.135]
Effective Obs.	1685	1963	2056	2058	2004	2571	2466	1274
Bandwidth	0.159	0.138	0.146	0.147	0.142	0.155	0.146	0.116
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.08	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.28
Std. Error	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)
P-value	[0.557]	[0.097]	[0.087]	[0.075]	[0.068]	[0.041]	[0.033]	[0.065]
Coef. (Robust)	0.09	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.32
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)
P-value	[0.566]	[0.099]	[0.083]	[0.080]	[0.069]	[0.040]	[0.033]	[0.066]
Effective Obs.	1624	1955	1911	1980	1945	2379	2335	1455
Bandwidth	0.151	0.137	0.133	0.140	0.136	0.139	0.136	0.139
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.3: Robustness: Enrollment in Higher Education by Black Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.31	0.46	0.57	0.49	0.54	0.45	0.59	0.83
Std. Error	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.30)
P-value	[0.257]	[0.036]	[0.011]	[0.018]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.005]
Coef. (Robust)	0.41	0.55	0.57	0.56	0.53	0.58	0.65	0.87
Std. Error	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.42)
	[0.314]	[0.089]	[0.077]	[0.061]	[0.080]	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.038]
Effective Obs.	595	872	844	920	872	1339	1116	487
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.083	0.079	0.076	0.085	0.079	0.097	0.077	0.068
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.25	0.39	0.47	0.38	0.45	0.39	0.49	0.77
Std. Error	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.288]	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.035]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Coef. (Robust)	0.37	0.56	0.66	0.59	0.62	0.54	0.70	0.92
Std. Error	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.38)
P-value	[0.284]	[0.047]	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.020]	[0.013]	[0.004]	[0.015]
Effective Obs.	759	1104	1054	1164	1104	1701	1407	624
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.110	0.105	0.101	0.113	0.105	0.130	0.103	0.090
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.25	0.31	0.29	0.24	0.35	0.18	0.20	0.54
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.236]	[0.053]	[0.072]	[0.129]	[0.022]	[0.177]	[0.129]	[0.023]
Coef. (Robust)	0.28	0.33	0.31	0.24	0.36	0.20	0.23	0.62
Std. Error	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.264]	[0.069]	[0.086]	[0.187]	[0.043]	[0.185]	[0.129]	[0.017]
Effective Obs.	813	1398	1418	1416	1329	2058	2024	653
Bandwidth	0.121	0.141	0.144	0.143	0.131	0.171	0.166	0.096
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.21	0.29	0.37	0.30	0.37	0.42	0.46	0.61
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.279]	[0.120]	[0.027]	[0.057]	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.32	0.42	0.32	0.41	0.47	0.52	0.68
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.305]	[0.129]	[0.031]	[0.077]	[0.021]	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.005]
Effective Obs.	1062	1537	1475	1582	1516	1933	1724	870
Bandwidth	0.165	0.160	0.151	0.168	0.157	0.155	0.133	0.140
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.4: Robustness: Enrollment in Higher Education by White Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.49	0.48	0.55	0.55	0.52	0.35	0.50	0.43
Std. Error	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.29)
P-value	[0.076]	[0.022]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.048]	[0.012]	[0.143]
Coef. (Robust)	0.75	0.65	0.72	0.86	0.67	0.57	0.63	0.50
Std. Error	(0.41)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.40)
P-value	[0.069]	[0.033]	[0.024]	[0.008]	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.026]	[0.212]
Effective Obs.	626	968	921	963	962	1414	1142	533
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.089	0.090	0.085	0.089	0.089	0.104	0.079	0.075
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.32	0.34	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.29	0.39	0.34
Std. Error	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.174]	[0.065]	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.021]	[0.068]	[0.027]	[0.202]
Coef. (Robust)	0.69	0.64	0.72	0.77	0.65	0.46	0.65	0.55
Std. Error	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.36)
P-value	[0.049]	[0.014]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.038]	[0.010]	[0.130]
Effective Obs.	801	1216	1164	1212	1210	1785	1439	676
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.118	0.119	0.113	0.119	0.119	0.139	0.106	0.101
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.23	0.19	0.24	0.18	0.33	0.15	0.27	0.21
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.24)
P-value	[0.255]	[0.249]	[0.130]	[0.252]	[0.038]	[0.291]	[0.072]	[0.392]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.17	0.27	0.20	0.33	0.16	0.28	0.25
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.27)
P-value	[0.330]	[0.365]	[0.123]	[0.271]	[0.073]	[0.303]	[0.100]	[0.357]
Effective Obs.	910	1321	1516	1491	1337	1977	1762	727
Bandwidth	0.137	0.130	0.157	0.153	0.133	0.160	0.137	0.112
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.21	0.22	0.29	0.26	0.32	0.23	0.27	0.23
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.273]	[0.176]	[0.072]	[0.106]	[0.040]	[0.123]	[0.070]	[0.309]
Coef. (Robust)	0.25	0.24	0.33	0.29	0.35	0.26	0.31	0.28
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.287]	[0.204]	[0.081]	[0.119]	[0.048]	[0.130]	[0.070]	[0.285]
Effective Obs.	1107	1685	1583	1634	1630	2155	2027	905
Bandwidth	0.177	0.188	0.168	0.178	0.177	0.187	0.167	0.150
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.5: Robustness: Graduation from Higher Education by Black Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.31	0.40	0.48	0.38	0.48	0.41	0.49	0.68
Std. Error	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)
P-value	[0.199]	[0.051]	[0.029]	[0.062]	[0.021]	[0.039]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Coef. (Robust)	0.55	0.38	0.47	0.42	0.50	0.44	0.48	0.70
Std. Error	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.38)
P-value	[0.116]	[0.188]	[0.132]	[0.139]	[0.096]	[0.117]	[0.101]	[0.066]
Effective Obs.	714	845	789	865	849	1055	1021	416
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.103	0.076	0.070	0.078	0.076	0.073	0.070	0.057
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.25	0.35	0.42	0.32	0.42	0.34	0.43	0.69
Std. Error	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.225]	[0.051]	[0.032]	[0.079]	[0.025]	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.006]
Coef. (Robust)	0.41	0.44	0.54	0.45	0.55	0.48	0.56	0.72
Std. Error	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.35)
P-value	[0.171]	[0.088]	[0.051]	[0.080]	[0.038]	[0.053]	[0.031]	[0.040]
Effective Obs.	910	1055	996	1088	1070	1339	1300	536
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.137	0.101	0.094	0.104	0.102	0.097	0.094	0.076
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.25	0.24	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.26	0.53
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.204]	[0.100]	[0.052]	[0.040]	[0.036]	[0.048]	[0.066]	[0.021]
Coef. (Robust)	0.26	0.26	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.28	0.63
Std. Error	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.255]	[0.118]	[0.078]	[0.058]	[0.048]	[0.061]	[0.079]	[0.012]
Effective Obs.	905	1420	1259	1342	1412	1663	1850	606
Bandwidth	0.136	0.144	0.124	0.134	0.143	0.127	0.146	0.085
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.20	0.28	0.32	0.28	0.35	0.32	0.39	0.60
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.262]	[0.100]	[0.062]	[0.079]	[0.029]	[0.034]	[0.012]	[0.007]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.31	0.37	0.31	0.40	0.36	0.44	0.69
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.255]	[0.109]	[0.067]	[0.097]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.011]	[0.005]
Effective Obs.	1184	1503	1432	1511	1481	1979	1898	759
Bandwidth	0.205	0.155	0.145	0.156	0.152	0.161	0.151	0.116
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.6: Robustness: Graduation from Higher Education by White Students

	Half of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.43	0.30	0.52	0.42	0.51	0.36	0.51	0.34
Std. Error	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.29)
P-value	[0.103]	[0.103]	[0.014]	[0.035]	[0.015]	[0.047]	[0.010]	[0.249]
Coef. (Robust)	0.66	0.52	0.57	0.65	0.76	0.48	0.69	0.46
Std. Error	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.39)
P-value	[0.091]	[0.050]	[0.064]	[0.024]	[0.014]	[0.068]	[0.016]	[0.234]
Effective Obs.	621	1068	902	1008	930	1240	1143	485
Bandwidth (h/2)	0.088	0.101	0.082	0.095	0.085	0.088	0.079	0.067
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Two-thirds of Optimal Bandwidth							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.30	0.20	0.41	0.29	0.37	0.27	0.37	0.30
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.26)
P-value	[0.189]	[0.215]	[0.029]	[0.091]	[0.046]	[0.096]	[0.035]	[0.245]
Coef. (Robust)	0.60	0.44	0.64	0.58	0.71	0.47	0.69	0.42
Std. Error	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.36)
P-value	[0.075]	[0.057]	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.008]	[0.040]	[0.006]	[0.239]
Effective Obs.	798	1354	1139	1285	1170	1562	1440	623
Bandwidth (2h/3)	0.118	0.135	0.109	0.127	0.114	0.118	0.106	0.090
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Uniform Kernel							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.21	0.11	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.08	0.16	0.13
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.278]	[0.471]	[0.110]	[0.142]	[0.191]	[0.522]	[0.250]	[0.553]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.11	0.26	0.25	0.21	0.10	0.17	0.18
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.318]	[0.524]	[0.149]	[0.156]	[0.269]	[0.482]	[0.293]	[0.474]
Effective Obs.	906	1501	1333	1396	1337	2053	1867	723
Bandwidth	0.136	0.155	0.132	0.141	0.133	0.170	0.148	0.111
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform	Uniform
Election-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Without Election-Year Fixed Effects							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.19	0.11	0.28	0.20	0.24	0.16	0.27	0.22
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.304]	[0.427]	[0.075]	[0.181]	[0.133]	[0.220]	[0.064]	[0.333]
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.14	0.32	0.22	0.27	0.19	0.32	0.29
Std. Error	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.295]	[0.410]	[0.081]	[0.195]	[0.140]	[0.204]	[0.061]	[0.255]
Effective Obs.	1105	1800	1557	1700	1600	2227	1999	838
Bandwidth	0.176	0.218	0.164	0.192	0.171	0.200	0.163	0.133
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Election-Year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Table B.7: Effect on ENEM Registration, RD Estimates, Excluding 2012

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.15	0.27	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.40	0.40	0.77
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.336]	[0.033]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Coef. (Robust)	0.17	0.30	0.35	0.34	0.33	0.44	0.44	0.85
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.21)
P-value	[0.363]	[0.034]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Effective Obs.	1078	1693	1573	1630	1682	2030	2027	748
Bandwidth	0.169	0.191	0.167	0.177	0.188	0.167	0.167	0.114
Left $\bar{Y}$	242	173	167	190	141	153	176	249
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.14	0.32	0.34	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.33	0.39
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)
P-value	[0.383]	[0.029]	[0.019]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.012]	[0.040]
Coef. (Robust)	0.17	0.36	0.38	0.35	0.34	0.32	0.37	0.42
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)
P-value	[0.361]	[0.032]	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.013]	[0.051]
Effective Obs.	1078	1454	1415	1494	1472	1936	1874	945
Bandwidth	0.170	0.149	0.143	0.154	0.150	0.155	0.149	0.163
Left $\bar{Y}$	86	67	65	73	60	71	77	110

Notes: The table reports results from Table 2, excluding 2012 elections. It reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students residing in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for the 2004, 2008, and 2016 elections. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table B.8: Effect on ENEM Registration, RD Estimates, Using Municipality of Birth

	Panel A: Black students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.30	0.26	0.28	0.24	0.33	0.36	0.32	0.30
Std. Error	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)
P-value	[0.078]	[0.124]	[0.081]	[0.119]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.025]	[0.095]
Coef. (Robust)	0.34	0.30	0.32	0.28	0.37	0.40	0.36	0.34
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.20)
P-value	[0.082]	[0.129]	[0.081]	[0.108]	[0.017]	[0.010]	[0.024]	[0.086]
Effective Obs.	1767	1753	1756	1818	2225	2194	2104	1251
Bandwidth	0.173	0.170	0.170	0.181	0.165	0.162	0.151	0.187
Left $\bar{Y}$	163	163	152	181	131	133	138	215
	Panel B: White students (log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef.	0.22	0.18	0.25	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.28
Std. Error	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)
P-value	[0.160]	[0.264]	[0.117]	[0.180]	[0.085]	[0.036]	[0.068]	[0.128]
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.19	0.29	0.22	0.29	0.35	0.28	0.33
Std. Error	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)
P-value	[0.191]	[0.295]	[0.121]	[0.191]	[0.077]	[0.034]	[0.069]	[0.122]
Effective Obs.	1845	1888	1661	1793	2051	2012	2106	1100
Bandwidth	0.188	0.197	0.158	0.176	0.146	0.143	0.151	0.147
Left $\bar{Y}$	62	61	55	64	53	54	54	75

Notes: The table reports results from Table 2, using municipality of birth instead of residence. It reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table B.9: Effect on Education Attainment, RD Estimates, Excluding RAIS imputation

	Panel A: ENEM Registration (Black students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.02	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.25	0.26	0.36
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.32)
P-value	[0.910]	[0.537]	[0.487]	[0.587]	[0.398]	[0.135]	[0.119]	[0.267]
Effective Obs.	1312	1467	1448	1460	1446	1436	1430	434
Bandwidth	0.157	0.158	0.156	0.157	0.155	0.141	0.140	0.114
Left $\bar{Y}$	262	235	209	240	159	167	182	347
	Panel B: ENEM Registration (White students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	-0.03	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.08	0.19	0.21	0.23
Std. Error	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.32)
P-value	[0.887]	[0.571]	[0.443]	[0.685]	[0.633]	[0.272]	[0.224]	[0.470]
Effective Obs.	1292	1378	1355	1435	1395	1432	1414	443
Bandwidth	0.154	0.146	0.143	0.153	0.149	0.140	0.138	0.118
Left $\bar{Y}$	96	86	75	85	65	71	76	131
	Panel C: Enrollment in Higher Educ (Black students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.24	0.23	0.32	0.23	0.30	0.36	0.29	0.97
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.49)
P-value	[0.305]	[0.298]	[0.143]	[0.253]	[0.128]	[0.065]	[0.135]	[0.046]
Effective Obs.	1062	1241	1253	1320	1278	1408	1386	214
Bandwidth	0.165	0.170	0.175	0.191	0.180	0.182	0.177	0.126
Left $\bar{Y}$	39	34	40	44	47	51	57	51
	Panel D: Enrollment in Higher Educ (White students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.25	0.25	0.32	0.28	0.31	0.25	0.36	0.78
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.55)
P-value	[0.287]	[0.227]	[0.145]	[0.207]	[0.124]	[0.199]	[0.092]	[0.155]
Effective Obs.	1107	1325	1220	1281	1246	1474	1332	231
Bandwidth	0.177	0.192	0.166	0.180	0.172	0.200	0.166	0.137
Left $\bar{Y}$	20	19	22	23	32	30	39	34
	Panel E: Graduation from Higher Educ (Black students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.28	0.33	0.35	0.34	0.96
Std. Error	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.47)
P-value	[0.255]	[0.164]	[0.143]	[0.170]	[0.106]	[0.094]	[0.106]	[0.041]
Effective Obs.	1184	1200	1185	1235	1249	1291	1332	210
Bandwidth	0.205	0.162	0.159	0.169	0.173	0.158	0.167	0.119
Left $\bar{Y}$	14	12	14	14	16	14	16	15
	Panel F: Graduation from Higher Educ (White students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
Coef. (Robust)	0.23	0.17	0.42	0.26	0.18	0.25	0.30	0.60
Std. Error	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.57)
P-value	[0.295]	[0.418]	[0.053]	[0.201]	[0.368]	[0.183]	[0.149]	[0.291]
Effective Obs.	1105	1268	1173	1336	1341	1473	1364	226
Bandwidth	0.176	0.177	0.157	0.195	0.196	0.200	0.173	0.132
Left $\bar{Y}$	8	8	8	8	9	9	10	13

Notes: The table reports RD estimates for the effect of the election of a Black mayor on the participation of Black (Panel A) and White (Panel B) students born in the municipality on the National High School Examination (ENEM), for different number of years after the election. Each column represents estimates for a different regression with outcomes k years after the election (that happened at year t). Estimates are obtained pooling municipality-year pairs for elections between 2004 and 2016. The first three rows in each panel use the conventional Calonico et al. (2014, 2015) RD estimator, while the second set of rows (rows 4 to 6) use the bias-corrected estimator suggested by the same authors. The last three rows of each panel report the bandwidth (computed optimally for each regression), the effective sample size, and the mean of the outcome variable for units to the left of the bandwidth, weighted by a triangular kernel and transformed back from logs to levels using exp(.). Regressions include election-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.

Table B.10: Difference in Discontinuities between periods $t+k$ and $t-1$

	Panel A: ENEM Registration (Black Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	-0.05	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.24	0.25	0.32
Std. Error	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)
P-value	[0.834]	[0.707]	[0.629]	[0.637]	[0.546]	[0.283]	[0.271]	[0.197]
	Panel B: ENEM Registration (White Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	-0.00	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.22
Std. Error	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
P-value	[0.984]	[0.491]	[0.500]	[0.508]	[0.458]	[0.433]	[0.364]	[0.335]
	Panel C: Enrollment in Higher Educ (Black Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	-0.04	0.07	0.15	0.05	0.14	0.02	0.16	0.40
Std. Error	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.40)
P-value	[0.917]	[0.834]	[0.633]	[0.884]	[0.653]	[0.936]	[0.597]	[0.316]
	Panel D: Enrollment in Higher Educ (White Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.02	0.07	-0.09	0.03	-0.00
Std. Error	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.37)
P-value	[0.926]	[0.951]	[0.881]	[0.960]	[0.821]	[0.783]	[0.924]	[0.998]
	Panel E: Graduation from Higher Educ (Black Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	0.03	0.14	0.20	0.12	0.21	0.14	0.21	0.41
Std. Error	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.34)
P-value	[0.916]	[0.642]	[0.502]	[0.670]	[0.478]	[0.609]	[0.459]	[0.227]
	Panel F: Graduation from Higher Educ (White Students, log)							
	t+1	**t+2**	**t+3**	**t+4**	**t+5**	**t+6**	**t+7**	**t+8**
$\Delta_{RD}(t+k;t-1)$	-0.01	-0.10	0.09	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.06	0.00
Std. Error	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.35)
P-value	[0.980]	[0.734]	[0.774]	[0.958]	[0.912]	[0.914]	[0.848]	[0.990]

Notes: The table presents estimates of differences between the estimated RD effect in year $t+k$ and year $t-1$ for the six main outcomes in the paper. For each period $t+k$ ($k \in \{1,\ldots,8\}$), we estimate the difference between discontinuities at that period and the period before the election. Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 bootstrap draws) are reported in parentheses, and corresponding p-values in brackets.