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Citizenship: Iranian

Research Interests: Behavioral Economics, Micro Theory, Decision Theory, Experimental Economics

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Toronto — 2026 (Expected)
Committee: Yoram Halevy (supervisor), Marcin Peski, Colin Stewart

M.Sc in Economics, Sharif University of Thechnology — 2020

B.Sc in Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Thechnology — 2017
Minor in Computer Science

Research

Correlation-sensitive multi-utility model
(Job Market Paper)
Anticipated Regret
(with David Dillenberger, Yoram Halevy, Johannes Hoelzemann, Gideon Nave)
Explanatory power of a reference-dependant expected utility model
(Second year Paper)

Academic Experience

Teaching Experience — 2022 - 2023

- ECO 326: Advanced Economic Theory - Micro

Teaching Assistant — 2021 - present

- ECO 200: Microeconomic Theory
- ECO 316: Applied Game Theory

Research Assistant — 2021 - 2022

- Xianwen Shi: Proofreading
- Anton Tsoy: Proofreading

Languages

English, Farsi (native), French (beginner)
Programming languages: Stata, R, Python, MATLAB, C++

References

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Abstracts

Correlation-sensitive Multi-utility Mode

(Job Market Paper)

This paper provides an axiomatization of a general correlation-sensitive model of decision making under uncertainty without requiring completeness of preferences. The model is represented by a correlation-sensitive multi-utility framework. The axioms underlying the characterization are reflexivity, monotonicity, strong independence, and continuity. Whereas Lanzani (2022)'s result employs completeness, strong independence, and Archimedean continuity, the present approach replaces completeness with reflexivity and monotonicity, thereby accommodating incomplete preferences. When transitivity is additionally imposed, the model collapses to the expected multi-utility representation, Dubra et al. (2004). These results establish a unified axiomatic foundation for correlation-sensitive models and clarify the roles of incompleteness and transitivity in shaping preference representation under uncertainty.

Anticipated Regret

(with David Dillenberger, Yoram Halevy, Johannes Hoelzemann, Gideon Nave)

A well-known phenomenon in the decision science literature (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982, and Fishburn 1982) is that anticipated regret affects choices and valuations. We analyze Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) famous decision problem of the certainty effect – a special case of the common ratio effect ´a la Allais (1953) as well as extensively documented probability insensitivity in mid-ranges. We propose that these phenomena are, in fact, manifestations of anticipated regret; offer a behavioral definition of anticipated regret without committing to a specific functional representation; and document evidence of anticipated regret in a controlled lab setting. We find that more than half of our participants exhibit strict Certainty Effect, and about two-fifths of them exhibit aversion to anticipated regret.

Explanatory power of a reference-dependent EU model

(Second year paper)

Using functional forms, we describe different aspects of the decision-making process. These functions are assumed to represent subjective evaluations for different options in a given choice set. When options are uncertain, these functions become more complicated. Features of the functions are derived from subjects' behaviors to transform the functional forms into a descriptive model of how people evaluate or compare objects.

The purpose is to demonstrate that there are other ways to represent subjects' behaviors, using functional features. We want to find out whether the Expected Utility Model's violations can be explained by a shift in the reference point. The shift depends on the characteristics of the choice set. We use the cumulative prospect theory model as a measure that addresses the expected utility model violations for every binary choice set.