

# Formal Analysis of Real-World Security Protocols

Lecture 4: Verification Theory (Part 1)


# This lecture


Tamarin Workflow


Dependency Graphs


Constraint Systems


# The Tamarin prover























### **Semantics**

### · Transition relation

- $S = [a] \rightarrow_R ((S \setminus \# I) \cup \# r)$ , where
  - $\cdot$  / -[  $\alpha$ ] $\rightarrow r$  is a ground instance of a rule in R, and
  - $I \subseteq^{\#} S$  wrt the equational theory

### Executions

•  $execs(R) = \{ [] \neg [a_1] \rightarrow ... \neg [a_n] \rightarrow S_n \mid \forall n. Fr(n) \text{ appears only once on the right-hand side of the rule } \}$ 

### Traces

- $traces(R) = \{ [a_1, \dots, a_n] \mid [] \neg [a_1] \rightarrow \dots \neg [a_n] \rightarrow S_n \in execs(R) \}$
- · Question: Can we reach a specific state (encoded by actions)?



MSR	Alternative syntax
<pre>rule r1:     [ Fr(~a), Fr(~k) ]    &gt;     [ St(~a, ~k)     , Out(enc(~a,~k))     , Key(~k) ]</pre>	$\frac{\operatorname{Fr}(a)  \operatorname{Fr}(k)}{\operatorname{St}(a,k)  \operatorname{Out}(\operatorname{enc}(a,k))  \operatorname{Key}(k)}$
rule r2:     [ St(a, k)     , In( <a, a="">) ]    [ Fin(a, k) ]-&gt;     [ ]</a,>	$\frac{\mathrm{St}(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{k}) - \mathrm{In}(\langle \mathrm{a},\mathrm{a} \rangle)}{[\mathrm{Fin}(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{k})]}$
rule r3:     [ Key(k) ]    [ Rev(k) ]->     [ Out(k) ]	$\frac{\mathrm{Key}(k)}{\mathrm{Out}(k)}[\mathrm{Rev}(k)]$
<pre>// Fin(a, k) is reachable lemma trace: exists-trace     " Ex a k #i . Fin(a, k)@i "</pre>	$\exists a, k (Fin(a, k))$



MSR Instances	Resulting State
$\overline{\mathrm{Fr(a)}}$	{Fr(a)} <sup>#</sup>
$\overline{{ m Fr}({ m k})}$	${Fr(a), Fr(k)}^{\sharp}$
$\frac{\operatorname{Fr}(a) \operatorname{Fr}(k)}{\operatorname{St}(a,k) \operatorname{Out}(\operatorname{enc}(a,k)) \operatorname{Key}(k)}$	$\{St(a,k), Out(enc(a,k)), Key(k)\}^{\sharp}$
$\frac{\mathrm{Key}(k)}{\mathrm{Out}(k)}[\mathrm{Rev}(k)]$	$\{St(a,k), Out(enc(a,k)), Out(k)\}^{\sharp}$
$\frac{\mathrm{Out}(k)}{\mathrm{K}(k)}$	$\{St(a,k), Out(enc(a,k)), K(k)\}^{\sharp}$
$\frac{\mathrm{Out}(\mathrm{enc}(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{k}))}{\mathrm{K}(\mathrm{enc}(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{k}))}$	{St(a,k), K(enc(a,k)), K(k)} <sup>#</sup>
$\frac{\mathrm{K}(\mathrm{enc}(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{k}))  \mathrm{K}(\mathrm{k})}{\mathrm{K}(\mathrm{a})}$	{St(a,k), K(enc(a,k)), K(k), K(a)} <sup>#</sup>
$rac{ ext{K(a)}   ext{K(a)}}{ ext{K($\langle$a,a$\angle$)}}$	${\left\{St(a,k),K(enc(a,k)),K(k),K(a),K(\langle\mathbf{a},\mathbf{a}\rangle)\right\}}^{\sharp}}$
$\frac{\mathrm{K}(\langle \mathrm{a}, \mathrm{a} \rangle)}{\mathrm{In}(\langle \mathrm{a}, \mathrm{a} \rangle)}[\mathrm{K}(\langle \mathrm{a}, \mathrm{a} \rangle)]$	$\{ St(a,k), K(enc(a,k)), K(k), K(a), K(\langle \mathtt{a},\mathtt{a}\rangle), In(\langle \mathtt{a},\mathtt{a}\rangle) \}^{\sharp}$
$\frac{\operatorname{St}(\operatorname{a},\operatorname{k}) - \operatorname{In}(\langle \operatorname{a},\operatorname{a} \rangle)}{\operatorname{Fin}(\operatorname{a},\operatorname{k})}$	$\{K(enc(a,k)), K(k), K(a), K(\langle a, a \rangle)\}^{\sharp}$


# **Dependency**

**Graphs** 



### **Dependency graph intuition**

- Constraints represent the minimal requirements for a valid solution
- Dependency graphs are used to abstractly represent constraints on traces
  - · Each node instance is a rule
  - Edges connecting nodes represent facts being consumed
- Tamarin tries to prove that at least one trace instantiates the graph and produce a counterexample



# Dependency graph definition

Let E be an equational theory and R be a set of multiset rewriting rules. We say that dg = (I, D) is a dependency graph modulo E for R if  $I \in (ginsts(R \cup \{FRESH\}))^*, D \subseteq \mathbb{N}^2 \times \mathbb{N}^2$ , and dg satisfies the following conditions:

- **DG1** For every edge  $(i, u) \mapsto (j, v) \in D$ , it holds that i < j and the conclusion fact of (i, u) is equal modulo E to the premise fact of (j, v).
- **DG2** Every premise of dg has exactly one incoming edge.
- **DG3** Every linear conclusion of dg has at most one outgoing edge.
- **DG4** The FRESH rule instances in *I* are unique.



### Dependency graphs and traces

- Dependency graphs provide us with an alternative formulation of the multiset rewriting semantics given in the previous lectures
- We exploit this alternative semantic in our backwards reachability analysis by incrementally constructing dependency graphs instead of (action-)traces.
- Theorem: for every multiset rewriting system R and every equational theory E, holds that:

$$traces_E(R) =_E trace(dg) \mid dg \in dgraphs_E(R)$$

# Finding traces

- Goal: Derive constraints from the multiset rewriting rules and properties to prove that at least one possible trace exists
- Constraint solving (intuition):
  - 1. Create an empty constraint system
  - 2. Add node constraints corresponding to the actions in the formula
    - e.g., not Ex A(x): add rules that contain A(x)
    - · If variables are used, consider them free
  - 3. Add premise constraints for the nodes we added in the previous step
  - 4. Continue adding node and edge constraints (with equal variables) until we can construct a trace

$$PE := \left\{ \frac{Fr(a) \ Fr(k)}{St(a,k) \ Out(enc(a,k)) \ Key(k)} \right\}$$

$$\cup \left\{ \frac{St(a,k) \ In(\langle a,a \rangle)}{[Fin(a,k)]} [Fin(a,k)] \right\}$$

$$\cup \left\{ \frac{Key(k)}{Out(k)} [Rev(k)] \right\}$$

$$MD := \left\{ \frac{Out(x)}{K(x)}, \ \frac{K(x)}{In(x)} [K(x)], \ \overline{K(x:pub)} \right\}$$

$$\cup \left\{ \frac{Fr(x:fresh)}{K(x:fresh)} K(x:fresh) \right\}$$

$$\cup \left\{ \frac{K(x_1) \dots K(x_k)}{K(f(x_1 \dots x_k))} | f \in \Sigma^k \right\}$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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12



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
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


· There is only one possible source for St(a,k)

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} Fr(a) & Fr(k) \\ \hline Out(enc(a,k)) & Key(k) & St(a,k) \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline$$

- · There is only one possible source for St(a,k)
- There is no rule that produces  $\mathtt{Out}(\langle a,a\rangle)$  so it must come from the attacker. How did the attacker construct it? Multiple options!

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
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$$\frac{Fr(a) \quad Fr(k)}{Out(enc(a,k)) \quad Key(k)} \quad \frac{K(enc(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1)) \quad K(k_1)}{K(dec(enc(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1),k_1))} \\ \frac{Fr(a) \quad Fr(k)}{Out(enc(a,k)) \quad Key(k) \quad St(a,k)} \quad \frac{K(\langle a,a\rangle)}{In(\langle a,a\rangle)} [K(\langle a,a\rangle)] \\ \frac{St(a,k) \quad In(\langle a,a\rangle)}{[Fin(a,k)]} [Fin(a,k)]$$




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$$\frac{K(\operatorname{enc}(\operatorname{enc}(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1),k_2)) - K(k_2)}{K(\operatorname{dec}(\operatorname{enc}(\operatorname{enc}(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1),k_2)) - K(k_2)} \\ \frac{K(\operatorname{enc}(\operatorname{enc}(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1),k_2)) - K(k_1)}{K(\operatorname{dec}(\operatorname{enc}(\langle a,a\rangle,k_1),k_1))} \\ \frac{Fr(a) - Fr(k)}{\operatorname{Out}(\operatorname{enc}(a,k)) - \operatorname{Key}(k) - \operatorname{St}(a,k)} - \frac{K(\langle a,a\rangle)}{\operatorname{In}(\langle a,a\rangle)} [K(\langle a,a\rangle)] \\ \frac{\operatorname{St}(a,k) - \operatorname{In}(\langle a,a\rangle)}{\operatorname{St}(a,k)} [\operatorname{Fin}(a,k)]$$




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# Systems

**Constraint** 

### **Construction and deconstruction**

We need to prevent the attacker from performing unnecessary steps

- · No need to first construct, then deconstruct
  - e.g., attacker learns m and k, then applies enc(m, k), then applies dec(enc(m, k), k)
- · For compound (non-atomic) terms, the attacker can either
  - · construct them, or
  - · learn them from an Out() fact
- · We can use this!
  - When considering the possibility that a term was deconstructed, there
    must be a chain from an Out() to the K() fact



### Attacker deduction through (de)construction

### **Construction rules:**

$$\frac{K^{\uparrow}(x:\text{pub})}{K^{\uparrow}(x:\text{pub})}[K^{\uparrow}(x:\text{pub})] \qquad \frac{Fr(x:\text{fresh})}{K^{\uparrow}(x:\text{fresh})}[K^{\uparrow}(x:\text{fresh})] \qquad \frac{K^{\uparrow}(x)}{K^{\uparrow}(h(x))}[K^{\uparrow}(h(x))]$$

$$\frac{K^{\uparrow}(x) \quad K^{\uparrow}(y)}{K^{\uparrow}(\text{enc}(x,y))}[K^{\uparrow}(\text{enc}(x,y))] \qquad \frac{K^{\uparrow}(x) \quad K^{\uparrow}(y)}{K^{\uparrow}(\text{dec}(x,y))}[K^{\uparrow}(\text{dec}(x,y))]$$

$$\frac{K^{\uparrow}(x) \quad K^{\uparrow}(y)}{K^{\uparrow}(\langle x,y \rangle)}[K^{\uparrow}(\langle x,y \rangle)] \qquad \frac{K^{\uparrow}(x)}{K^{\uparrow}(\text{fst}(x))}[K^{\uparrow}(\text{fst}(x))] \qquad \frac{K^{\uparrow}(x)}{K^{\uparrow}(\text{snd}(x))}[K^{\uparrow}(\text{snd}(x))]$$

### **Deconstruction rules:**

$$\frac{K^{\downarrow}(\langle x,y\rangle)}{K^{\downarrow}(x)} - \frac{K^{\downarrow}(\langle x,y\rangle)}{K^{\downarrow}(y)} - \frac{K^{\downarrow}(\operatorname{enc}(x,y)) - K^{\uparrow}(y)}{K^{\downarrow}(x)}$$



### Message deduction: (de)construction

### Communication rules:

$$\text{Irecv}\frac{\operatorname{Out}(x)}{\operatorname{K}^{\downarrow}(x)} \quad \text{Isend}\frac{\operatorname{K}^{\uparrow}(x)}{\operatorname{In}(x)}[\operatorname{K}(x)]$$

### Coerce rule:

Coerce 
$$\frac{K^{\downarrow}(x)}{K^{\uparrow}(x)}[K^{\uparrow}(x)]$$

# Summary



- · We now know how to model..
  - ..protocol behavior as multiset rewriting rules
  - ..protocol properties as first-order logic formulas
- We also have an intuition of Tamarin's workflow and how to represent the system as dependency graphs
- · In the next lecture, we will talk more about constraint solving



**Recommended reading**: [Bas+25, Ch. 6–6.5], [Sch+12]

- [Bas+25] D. Basin, C. Cremers, J. Dreier, and R. Sasse. Modeling and Analyzing Security Protocols with Tamarin: A Comprehensive Guide. Draft vo.9.5. May 2025.
- [Sch+12] B. Schmidt, S. Meier, C. Cremers, and D. Basin. **Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties.** In: 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations
  Symposium. 2012.