

THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM AND GALVESTON

I. CONTEXT

The First World War began in 1914 as a conflict between the major European powers. Several events and developments contributed to the onset of hostilities, including the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists, a complex and unstable structure of international relationships, and a tendency towards over-militarization in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. While historians have debated which of these causes was the most compelling, there is a general consensus that Germany's emergence as a military and industrial force after its unification in 1871 emboldened the nation to pursue greater political standing through overly aggressive diplomatic maneuvering.¹

Leading up to the war, most of Europe split into two factions: the Allied Powers, which included France, Britain, and Russia; and the Central Powers, which included Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the Austro-Hungarian army invaded Serbia in July 28, 1914, Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germany responded by declaring war on Russia and France. Germany's plans for invading France required their troops to march through Belgium, an ally of Britain. On August 3, Britain declared war on Germany in response to the aggression.² After a tumultuous week and a flurry of diplomatic maneuvers, nearly all of Europe was at war.

If people alive in 1914 had been surprised by the rapid turn of events, they would have been bewildered and immensely disheartened to witness this "tragic and unnecessary conflict"³ spread across the globe and reach a deadly, unrelenting stalemate over the following three years. With each passing month, the scale of the conflict broadened—ultimately it involved distant

countries Japan, China, Brazil, and others—and the desperation and desolation of trench warfare intensified.

The American public and government officials watched closely as the war expanded. In 1914, President Woodrow Wilson declared the necessity of remaining “impartial in fact, as well as in name.”⁴ Circumstances tested this sentiment; the U.S. economy relied heavily on exports to European markets. As the armies fought on land, both Britain and Germany sought to gain strategic advantages through their navies, and their efforts jeopardized the accessibility of shipping lanes. Immediately after the war began, Britain imposed a very effective blockade upon the Central Powers, limiting their access to foodstuffs and war supplies. Many of those supplies would have come from the U.S. and due to the blockade, the U.S. could only sell its goods in Allied markets. In turn, Germany moved to nullify Britain’s advantage through submarine warfare. The Germans used their unmatched fleet of U-Boats to strike any ships carrying supplies to Allied countries. Famously, the strategy resulted in the sinking of the RMS *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915 and the deaths of 1198 people, including 128 American citizens.⁵

A debate over America’s role in the war loomed. Interventionists decried the *Lusitania* affair and the effects of the war on the American economy, and urged America’s entrance in the war as a means to tip the scales in favor of the Allies. Isolationists, upholding an enduring American tradition, expounded the prudence of allowing European powers to settle their own disputes. As the division between opposing sentiments hardened between 1914 and 1917, the possibility of consensus diminished. For his part, President Wilson genuinely opposed sending American soldiers to Europe⁶ and based his 1914 re-election campaign on the slogan “He kept us out of war.”⁷ He felt that America’s greatest role would lie in negotiating a peace agreement and re-establishing stability after the conflict.⁸ As F.E. Smith, Lord Chancellor in post-war Britain

later expressed, “The United States were in fact kicked into war against the strong and almost frenzied efforts of President Wilson. The kick that did it was the Zimmermann telegram.”⁹

II. OVERVIEW

In January 1917, the German government drafted the following message for delivery to German Ambassador to Mexico Heinrich von Eckhardt:

“We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, unite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President’s attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace.”¹⁰

Given technological capabilities of the time and the difficulties of wartime communication, the German government had limited options for transporting such a message to the office of

President Venustiano Carranza in Mexico City. The simplest alternative would have been to deliver the message by hand to Carranza's envoy to Germany. However, the envoy was visiting Switzerland at the time and, regardless, German diplomats did not trust his translator.¹¹ The Germans also considered using a submarine to deliver the message to Washington D.C., where the German Ambassador to the U.S. Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff would then transmit the message via telegraph to Mexico City. Regrettably, military officials determined that they could not spare a submarine for such a mission.¹² With other options ruled out, the only viable method for getting the message to Mexico City was transatlantic telegraph.

The Telegraph Industry

After the first successful transatlantic cable installation in 1858,¹³ telegraph infrastructure had undergone major advances on both sides of the ocean. In the U.S., telegraph companies emerged and consolidated through the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The Texas and Red River Telegraph Company was the first telegraph operation in Galveston, opening an office in the city in 1854.¹⁴ Two years later, the Texas and New Orleans Telegraph Company began construction on a telegraph wire connecting Galveston to San Antonio.¹⁵ Technological capabilities increased in 1859-60 when a line installed along a new railroad bridge established the first permanent telegraph connection in the state.¹⁶ The South-Western Telegraph Company later purchased the line and extended it to New Orleans before ultimately being absorbed by Western Union.

Launched in New York in 1851, Western Union had spread quickly across the nation. The company first reached Texas in 1866 and by 1874, it controlled 89 out of the 105 telegraph offices in the state.¹⁷ In practice, Western Union expanded its reach internationally through

cooperative agreements with other telegraph companies that owned and maintained telegraph lines. In one instance, James A. Scrymser, who had served in the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War before organizing telegraph companies in the 1870s and 1880s, secured an agreement to handle all of Western Union's traffic to Mexico.¹⁸ One of Scrymser's interests, the Mexican Telegraph Company, was based in Brownsville and opened a Galveston office at 21st and Strand.¹⁹ In 1881 and 1889, the company laid its first two cables across the Gulf of Mexico, connecting Galveston to Tampico and Vera Cruz.²⁰ They branded their service as the *via Galveston* route. By 1893, the company boasted access to 17 countries *via Galveston*, claimed to be capable of transferring messages between London and Mexico in less than fifteen minutes, and accurately asserted that it had "practically a monopoly of direct telegraphic communication between the United States, Mexico, and Central and South America."²¹

The trans-gulf cables entered Galveston buried beneath the sand near 19th Street.²² In the nineteenth century, a small equipment building stood on the beach near the junction point.²³ The building is not well-documented, though its identification as a "battery and equipment shack"²⁴ indicates a role in the amplification of signals sent to and received from Mexico. The 1900 Galveston Hurricane destroyed the original building and the company replaced it with a new building at 1819 Avenue O.²⁵ The cables remained buried beneath the Galveston Seawall, which the city constructed to protect the island from future hurricanes.

The Mexican Telegraph Company thrived during the first half of the twentieth century. It replaced one of the trans-Gulf lines in 1905 and the other in 1930. Western Union purchased the company in 1926 and by the time the Galveston telegraph office closed in 1949, it had operated continuously for 66 years, sending 2000 messages daily.²⁶

Sending the Telegram

European countries also had burgeoning telegraph industries in the early twentieth century. Germany would have used its own transatlantic cable to transmit the Zimmermann telegram to Ambassador Bernstorff in Washington had Britain not cut Germany's cables at the beginning of the war.²⁷ Conveniently, the U.S. State Department allowed Germany to send encoded diplomatic messages to Bernstorff using American cables beginning in 1914.²⁸ The Americans assumed, or hoped, that such correspondence would strictly concern instructions for peace negotiations. Thus, on January 16, 1917, when German diplomat Max Montgelas delivered the encrypted message to U.S. Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard, the latter forwarded the cable without documenting any suspicions. From Berlin, the text traveled to American offices in Copenhagen and London before finally reaching Washington on the same day. Bernstorff immediately deciphered the code and re-enciphered using a different codebook (Ambassador Eckhardt in Mexico City did not possess the codebook required to understand the original message).

At the time, the only method for sending a telegraph from Washington to Mexico City was to send it commercially by Western Union. For the cost of \$85.27, Western Union transmitted the cable by way of the Mexican Telegraph Company's trans-gulf cables.²⁹ On January 16, the same day the message Montgelas gave the message to Gerard in Berlin, the Mexican Telegraph Company office in Galveston received the encoded message from Washington and retransmitted it to Mexico.

As the message proceeded across North America, no one in Galveston nor anywhere else in the United States was aware of its subversive contents. And perhaps the government and public would have remained ignorant had it not been for the skill and discretion of British

intelligence officials, who had been eavesdropping on all incoming and outgoing cables from the U.S. embassy in London since May 1915.³⁰ An office known as “Room 40,” led by Admiral William Reginald Hall, intercepted the message as it passed through London, recognized its importance, and decoded its contents. Seeking to avoid the awkward disclosure of its practice of eavesdropping on a potential ally (and preferring to continue the practice unhindered), Hall and his team manufactured a second “discovery” of the telegram through the bribery of a telegraph operator in Mexico.³¹ After weeks preparing an official story for how they acquired the telegram, Hall gave a copy to the U.S. embassy in London on February 19.³²

Germany’s Motivation

During the twentieth century, many historians concluded that the Zimmermann telegram represented “the manifestation of a long-standing master plan to challenge the United States in the western hemisphere.”³³ However, recent analysis concludes that the German entreaty to Mexico was not the embodiment of a carefully crafted strategy to weaken American domination of the western hemisphere and to allow for greater German influence. In reality, it was just one demonstration of a broad, at times haphazard policy developed by Germany at the beginning of the war to encourage insurgent groups to pester and distract Allied powers.

While the Mexican proposal was considered a disastrous blunder almost immediately, the strategy of subversion also provided the Germans with some minor and substantial diplomatic victories. They fomented opposition in Ireland and India, both controlled by Britain. They successfully lobbied the Ottoman Empire, which bordered both Russia and British-occupied territory in the Middle East, to join the war on the side of the Central Powers. Most significantly, under Arthur Zimmermann’s leadership, the German government supported Russian

revolutionary groups, included one led by Vladimir Lenin. Returning to Russia in the fall of 1917 after a period of exile in Switzerland, Lenin led the Bolshevik Revolution and withdrew Russia from the war.³⁴

With their diplomatic successes in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the German government had reason to feel some level of optimism about the Mexican proposal. However, that confidence alone does not fully account for the rationale behind the telegram. Zimmermann's primary motivation related to Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.³⁵

By the beginning of 1917, Germany's frustration at having failed to gain a victory in land warfare led them to press their advantage at sea. While their army was outnumbered even before America's entry into the war, Germany's navy had an unmatched fleet of 111 operational U-Boats by the time they declared their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Under a new, aggressive strategy, U-Boat commanders threatened to strike any ships, even those of neutral nations, they encountered in the Atlantic. The announcement amounted to a transference of leadership within Germany from civilian officials to military officers, who knew that the policy would antagonize the U.S. but believed that aggressive submarine attacks would end the war before the Americans would have time to mobilize.³⁶ Admiral Edouard von Capelle underscored the sentiments of the German Imperial Navy when he stated, "They will not even come because our submarines will sink them. Thus America from a military point of view means nothing, and again nothing and for a third time nothing."³⁷

In January, Arthur Zimmermann learned of the pending unrestricted submarine warfare declaration and immediately recognized its deleterious consequences for German diplomacy. Historian Thomas Boghardt suggests that in the midst of "frantic efforts" to prepare for the

announcement, Zimmermann signed the now-famous telegram bearing his name without giving sufficient attention to the draft. The original author, in both word and concept, was Hans Arthur von Kemnitz, a minor foreign officer responsible for Latin American and East Asian affairs. Kemnitz conjured the proposal primarily as a means for opening a dialogue with Japan, which was allied with Britain and France but fostered suspicions of the United States. Neither Kemnitz nor Zimmermann believed that Carranza could actually make military advances in the United States, but they viewed Mexico as a potential intermediary in a more important alliance with Japan. They hoped that, in the meantime, Mexican troops could delay the potential mobilization of American troops long enough for Germany to end the war following the announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare. For his part, Carranza did receive the telegram and responded with some interest, but records give no indication that he seriously considered war against the United States.³⁸

American Response

After President Wilson received a copy of the telegram on February 25, 1917, he abandoned his hopes of securing a negotiated settlement to end the war. In an understanding with the president, Secretary of State Robert Lansing discretely delivered a copy of the message to Associated Press correspondent Edwin Milton Hood on February 28. On the morning of March 1, the telegram made the front page of nearly every major newspaper in the country.³⁹ In the *Galveston Daily News*, coverage of the telegram dominated the first days of March.⁴⁰ In a March 3 column, the newspaper, betraying an ardently interventionist slant, argued that,⁴¹

“The lesson of this revelation is so clear that no one can mistake it. Even the pacifists must see the folly of half measures, and even the agents and sympathizers of Germany in this country must not be convinced that their efforts to restrain and fetter the president must have all the consequences, if not the purposes, of disloyalty.”

In the one hundred years since the telegram’s transmission, interception, and publication, historians have debated the extent of its impacts. Opinions generally converged towards the view that the telegram was a fundamental catalyst for America’s entrance into the war, similar in its impact to the bombing of Pearl Harbor 24 years later.⁴² However, the timeline of events during the first months of 1917 indicates that the telegram may not have been the decisive factor.

Germany announced their intention to use submarine attacks without discretion on February 1, but President Wilson would not see a copy of the Zimmermann telegram until the end of the month (even though British intelligence officials had decoded it in January). His actions during the interim period demonstrate that unrestricted submarine warfare prompted him to escalate preparations for war before he knew about Germany’s overture to Mexico. First, on February 3 he recalled ambassador James G. Gerard from Berlin, an action which seems to have surprised Zimmermann despite his preparations for the diplomatic fallout from the unrestricted submarine warfare announcement. Second, Wilson intended to ask Congress for the authority to arm merchant ships as early as February 22.⁴³ In fact, by the time he received the telegram, he had already started preparing for a likely contentious congressional battle between interventionist and isolationist factions.

Congress debated America's response to unrestricted submarine warfare on March 1, the same day that *The Galveston Daily News* and other newspapers printed the Zimmermann telegram. The initial impact was tremendous. The House of Representatives approved Wilson's request to arm merchant ships by a margin of 403 to 14. However, an alliance of isolationists and pro-war Republicans (who feared giving Wilson, a democrat, too much authority) successfully filibustered the bill in the Senate. On March 9, Wilson circumvented the Senate opposition by issuing an executive order to arm the ships.⁴⁴

Reviews of newspaper articles reveal that the exposure of the Zimmermann telegram similarly failed to unify public opinion. The idea of a Japanese-Mexican alliance against the U.S. may have seemed farfetched, but it was certainly not unthinkable. In fact, a film released on January 14, just weeks prior, capitalized on such a scenario. *Patria*, produced by William Randolph Hearst, depicts a Japanese invasion the U.S. by way of Mexico.⁴⁵ However, the film and virulent newspaper columns similar to that of the March 3 *Galveston Daily News* seem to have invigorated existing interventionist sentiments rather than to have swayed isolationists. In Thomas Boghardt's words, "a small but vocal group of isolationist papers remained unimpressed...and dismissed the implied territorial threat as chimerical."⁴⁶

Even if the repercussions of the Zimmermann telegram were not decisively influential for Congress or the public, the ordeal persuaded the President Wilson that peace with Germany was not possible. Whereas the February 1 unrestricted submarine warfare declaration had caused Wilson to take steps towards war, the telegram hastened the process. After U-Boats sank American merchant ships on March 12, 17, 18, and 19, taking American lives in the process, momentum towards war was unstoppable. In his April 2 war message to Congress, Wilson cited the Zimmermann note as part of his rationale.⁴⁷

Due to the continued subterfuge of British intelligence officials and the complaisance of U.S. leaders, the American public did not learn of the true circumstances of the telegram's interception until much later in the twentieth century. Admiral Hall fostered a myth that Germany had transmitted the message by Washington via radio signal so as to obfuscate Britain's surveillance of American telegraph lines. Every version of the story was accurate in at least one aspect—that Western Union had sent the message from Washington to Mexico City. In Galveston, people eventually recognized the implication that it must have traveled through the city. Possibly confused by the fact that the U.S. Navy opened a censorship office in May 1917,⁴⁸ stories exaggerating Galveston's role in the telegram's interception persisted during the twentieth century.⁴⁹

The Mexican Telegraph Company closed the Galveston office in 1949 after Mexico nationalized its telegraph operations. No longer capable of serving its purpose, the company disappeared into the massive corporate structure of Western Union, which had acquired the business in 1926. The Schneider Building, which housed the company's headquarters and still stands at 21st and Strand, predates the company's founding and it has since housed numerous other businesses. The small equipment and battery building left behind at 1819 Avenue O, however, is an artifact of the Mexican Telegraph Company, early telegraph operations in Texas, and the Zimmermann telegram. In all likelihood, this small building, which housed batteries and equipment for transmission to and from Mexico, was the location for the retransmission of the Zimmermann telegram to Mexico in January 1917.

After the war, the small building remained on its original site at 1819 Avenue O. For much of the twentieth century, Italian immigrant Pompeo Urbani operated a grocery store on the site and utilized the building. In early 1995, with the building was in danger of demolition,

preservationists Fred and Pat Burns cooperated with Galveston Historical Foundation to relocate it to land behind the Michel B. Menard House at 1605 33rd Street, where it still stands.

III. SIGNIFICANCE

Contrary to Edouard von Capelle's assertion that, America's military meant "nothing," the entry of the United States was one of the turning points of the war. By March of 1918, 318,000 American men had reached France and U-Boats had failed to kill a single incoming American soldier during oceanic transport. The U.S. Army as a whole grew from 107,641 soldiers in early 1917 to 4,000,000 by the end of the war. A total of 24,000,000 Americans registered for the draft in 1917 and 1918. According to senior German military leader Erich Ludendorff, the arrival of so many Americans arriving at the front engendered a sense of "looming defeat" in the German army. One by one, the Central Powers fell until Germany finally surrendered in November 1918.⁵⁰ In all, ten million soldiers died during the war, including 125,000 Americans (75,000 were victims of the flu epidemic).⁵¹ As a result of the war, the German, Russian, Ottoman, and Hapsburg Empires all ended, reshaping the political map of Europe, and the United States ascended to prominence as a global power.⁵²

People across the world had begun to bear the burden of the war's immense and dreadful consequences well before Germany transmitted the Zimmermann telegram. However, some direct and long-term consequences of the episode are apparent. First, while the United States had already begun preparing to enter the war after Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, publicity of the telegram accelerated the process and afforded pro-war advocates with an effective propaganda item. Additionally, the telegram generally weakened ties between

German Americans, who had composed a strong segment of the non-interventionist faction, and their home country.⁵³

Most significantly, the Zimmermann telegram underscored for all nations the necessity of developing strong intelligence operations. World War I as a whole marked the first substantial demonstrations of the value of code-breaking. While the singular telegram and the skills of British intelligence officers have achieved greater fame, Austria-Hungary, France, and Germany each established “first-rate cryptanalytic services” of their own.⁵⁴ In fact, Germany was capable of reading American diplomatic cables to and from Berlin. In Britain, Admiral Hall’s remarkable success set the stage for expanded intelligence operations and the growth of a “para-intelligence network” and “quasi-secret state” after the war.⁵⁵ The gift of the intercepted message from Britain to the U.S. also marks a pivotal step in the formation of the “special relationship” that has characterized the two nations’ diplomatic interactions, including cooperation in intelligence efforts, ever since.

The outlined effects of the Zimmermann telegram directly relate to the World War I’s most significant outcome: World War II. When a new Germany, led by Hitler and joined by new allies including Japan, threatened to dominate the globe, American efforts to halt the aggression relied upon a framework developed in 1917 and 1918. Fundamental to these efforts were conditions implicated in the Zimmermann telegram scandal: enhanced intelligence operations, strong alliances, and public relations campaigns to mobilize all segments of the diverse American community to participate in the war effort.

IV. IMAGES

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM
NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED

Fast Day Message	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Day Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>
Night Message	<input type="checkbox"/>
Night Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>

Patrons should specify the class of service desired. OTHERWISE THE TELEGRAM WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS A FAST DAY MESSAGE.

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to:

GERMAN LEGATION
MEXICO CITY

via Galveston

JAN 19 1917

862.2019/521

130	13042	13401	8501	115	3528	416	17214	6491	11310
18147	18222	21560	10247	11518	23677	13805	3494	14938	
98092	5905	11311	10392	10371	0302	21290	5161	39695	
23571	17504	11269	18276	18101	0317	0228	17694	4473	
24284	22200	19452	21589	67893	5509	13918	8958	12137	
1333	4725	4458	5905	17106	13851	4458	17149	14471	6706
13850	12224	6929	14991	7382	15857	67893	14218	36477	
5870	17553	67893	5870	5454	16102	15217	22801	17138	
21001	17388	7446	23638	18222	6719	14331	15021	23845	
3158	23552	22096	21604	4797	9497	22464	20855	4377	
23610	18140	22260	5905	13347	20420	39689	13732	20607	
6929	5275	18507	52282	1340	22049	13339	11265	22295	
10439	14814	4178	6992	8784	7632	7357	6926	52282	11267
21100	21272	9346	9559	22464	15874	18502	18500	15857	
2188	5376	7381	98092	16127	13486	9350	9220	76036	14219
5144	2831	17920	11347	17142	11264	7667	7762	15099	9110
10482	97550	3509	3670						

BERNSTORFF.

Charge German Embassy.

Figure 1 - The encoded Zimmermann telegram sent by German Ambassador to the U.S. Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff from Washington to Mexico City via Western Union. (Zimmermann Telegram as received by the German Ambassador to Mexico. Record Group 39: General Records of the Department of State, 1756 – 1979. National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives Identifier 302025.

<https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann/#documents>. Accessed October 5, 2016).




Figure 2 - An 1893 image published by All America Cables, Inc., owned by James A. Scrymser, who also owned the Central and South American Telegraph Company and the Mexican Telegraph Company. All of Western Union's telegraph traffic to Mexico went through Galveston. (The Central & South American Telegraph Co. Via Galveston. New York: All America Cables, Inc., 1893. Hathi Trust, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/009605026>. Accessed October 5, 2016).



Figure 3 – The Central and South American Telegraph Office in Barranco, Peru, 1893. (The Central & South American Telegraph Co. Via Galveston. 1893. Hathi Trust).




Figure 4 - An 1893 image published by All America Cables, Inc. illustrating the two trans-Gulf cables connecting Galveston to Mexico. (The Central & South American Telegraph Co. Via Galveston. 1893. Hathi Trust).




Figure 5 - An 1889 Sanborn Fire Insurance Map, with and arrow indicating the location of the pre-1900 Hurricane Mexican Telegraph Company equipment building near the Gulf of Mexico on 19th Street. (Dolph Briscoe Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.)




Figure 6 - A 1912 Sanborn Fire Insurance Map, with and arrow indicating the location of the post-1900 Hurricane Mexican Telegraph Company equipment building at 1819 Avenue O. (Dolph Briscoe Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.)



*Figure 7 – Clockwise from top left: **Arthur Zimmermann**, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, signatory and namesake of the Zimmermann telegram; **Hans Arthur von Kemnitz**, a German foreign service officer and author of the telegram; **James W. Gerard**, U.S. Ambassador to Germany who sent the telegram from Berlin to Washington, unaware of its encoded content; **Admiral William Reginald Hall**, Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence, which intercepted and decoded the telegram. (Wikimedia Commons, <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. Accessed October 5, 2016. All Wikimedia images are public domain).*

V. SOURCES

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- ³ Keegan, *The First World War*, 3.
- ⁴ Heyman, *World War I*, 63.
- ⁵ Heyman, *World War I*, 49, 63-65.
- ⁶ Keegan, *The First World War*, 373.
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- ³⁴ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 29-30, 178, 229.
- ³⁵ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 65, 201-202.
- ³⁶ Heyman, *World War I*, 65-66; Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 246.

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- ³⁷ Keegan, *The First World War*, 372.
- ³⁸ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 57, 65-67, 74, 217-218, 245.
- ³⁹ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 6, 135, 141-142.
- ⁴⁰ "Germany Urged that Japan and Mexico Prepare for War on the United States," *The Galveston Daily News*; Thursday, March 1, 1917, p. 1. Web *Newspaper Archive*. <http://www.newspaperarchive.com>. Accessed September 27, 2016; "Congress Aroused by Disclosure Gives Support to the President," *The Galveston Daily News*; Friday March 3, 2016, p. 1. Web. *Newspaper Archive*. <http://www.newspaperarchive.com>. Accessed September 27, 2016; "Germany's Conspiracy Against the United States," *The Galveston Daily News*; Friday, March 2, 1917, p. 4. Web. *Newspaper Archive*. <http://www.newspaperarchive.com>. Accessed September 27, 2016.
- ⁴¹ "Germany's Conspiracy," *The Galveston Daily News*, March 2, 1917.
- ⁴² Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 14.
- ⁴³ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 78-79, 137-138.
- ⁴⁴ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 146-147.
- ⁴⁵ Tuchman, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 59.
- ⁴⁶ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 165.
- ⁴⁷ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 138, 182, 184, 251.
- ⁴⁸ "Cable Messages are Now Being Censored," *The Galveston Daily News*; Wednesday, May 9, 1917, p. 8. Web. *Newspaper Archive*. <http://www.newspaperarchive.com>. Accessed October 4, 2016.
- ⁴⁹ "Native Islander has Vivid Memories," *The Galveston Daily News*; Sunday Morning, February 24, 1980, p. 8-L. Web. *Newspaper Archive*. <http://www.newspaperarchive.com>. Accessed October 4, 2016.
- ⁵⁰ Keegan, *The First World War*, 372-373, 411-419.
- ⁵¹ Heyman, *World War I*, 65.
- ⁵² Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 7.
- ⁵³ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 179, 248-250.
- ⁵⁴ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 248.
- ⁵⁵ Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, 248.