


# What is an Internal Firewall?

- Keep a fire from spreading from one part of the building to another (intranet).



# What Can a Firewall Do?

- A firewall is a focus for security decision
- A firewall can enforce security policy
- A firewall can log Internet activity efficiently
- A firewall limits your exposure

## What a Firewall Can't Do?

- A firewall can't protect you against malicious insiders
- A firewall can't protect you against backdoor connections (e.g., modem servers)
- A firewall can't protect against new threats
- A firewall can't protect against viruses

# Terminologies


- Firewall:
- Bastion host (main contact point)
- Packet filtering (or screening)
- Perimeter network (De-Militarized Zone; DMZ)
- Proxy server (application level relay)

Major approaches to build firewalls:

- Packet filtering
- Proxy services

# Packet Filtering

- Use screening router



# Screening

- Investigate:


- IP source (address, port)
- IP destination (address, port)
- Protocol (TCP, UDP, etc.)
- ICMP messages types

- Examples:

- Block all incoming connections except for SMTP
- Block all connections to or from certain systems you distrust
- Allow email and FTP services, but not others.

# Proxy Services

- Proxy client: a special client talks to proxy server.



# Proxy Server

- An application-level gateway
- SOCKS: a proxy construction toolkit.
  - convert current client/server applications into proxy versions.
  - most standard services equipped with proxying or support SOCKS.
- Trusted Information Systems Internet Firewall Toolkit (TIS FWTK): include proxy servers for protocols like telnet, ftp, http, ...etc.



# Hybrid Solution


- Packet filtering
    - more effective for telnet and smtp (purely filtering)
  - Proxy services
    - more effective for WWW or FTP (can do caching)
- ==> usually, a combination of both.

# Firewall Architecture

- Dual-Homed Host Architecture
- Screened Host Architecture
- Screened Subnet Architecture


# Dual-Homed Host Architecture

- Disable the routing function (block all IP packets)
- Only provide proxy services
- Problem: not for all applications



# Screened Host Architecture


- packet filtering in the router
  - allow certain services (from internal to outside)
  - disallow all connections from outside
- always through the bastion host (application level)
- Problem:
  - if attackers break in the bastion host, others expose to be attacked. E.g., in the bastion host, the intruder can watch all passwords or key information inside the network.





# Screened Subnet Architecture

- Add a perimeter network ==> need to pass two routers to break in.



# Components

- Perimeter:

- less trusted and more vulnerable services put in the perimeter network.
- intruded bastion host can only watch traffic. (So, assume that the traffic is not confidential.)

- Bastion host:

- Inbound services
  - ▶ SMTP servers, FTP servers, DNS servers, ...
- Outbound services
  - ▶ let internal host pass two routers to external hosts.
  - ▶ use bastion host as proxy servers.

## Components (cont.)

- Interior router (or called choke router)
  - Does most packet filtering
  - Outbound
    - ▶ Allow selected services, telnet, ftp, etc.
  - Inbound
    - ▶ Usually, allow services (e.g. SMTP) from bastion to internal.
- Exterior router (or called access router)
  - Does little packet filtering
    - ▶ But, fine to filter those filtered by interior router.
    - ▶ Usually provided by Internet provider (not so secure)
  - Key mission: don't allow forged IP address (e.g. bastion)



# Variations on Firewall Architectures

- Multiple bastion hosts
- Merging interior and exterior routers
- Merging bastion host and exterior router
- Multiple Exterior Routers
- Multiple Perimeter Networks
- Dual-Homed Hosts and Screened Subnets


But, it is dangerous to be:

- Multiple Interior Routers
- Merging bastion host and interior router

# Multiple bastion Hosts

## ● Reasons:


- Performance
  - ▶ E.g., Usenet News are resource-intensive and easily separated from others.
- Redundancy:
  - ▶ Fault tolerance: Some failed. Other can replace it.  
=> but only some services (DNS) allow to do this.
- Separate data
  - ▶ E.g., one http server for internal users and one http server for external users.  
(Make data more secure or manageable.)






# Merging Interior and Exterior Routers

- The only problem: only need to penetrate the router.



# Merging bastion and Exterior Router


- Usually for PPP or SLIP





# Merging bastion and Interior Router

- Intruded bastion host can see EVERYTHING.
- DANGEROUS!!!



# Multiple Interior Routers


- Bad Ideas!! Why?

- The perimeter network may become a route for one internal network to another, then expose internal data.
- More interior routers will increase break-in chances.
- Difficult to keep multiple interior routers correctly configured.

- What if the interior router is really a performance bottleneck?  
(Actually, rare.) Cases:

- More traffic on Interior than Exterior (must reconfig)
- Exterior is faster than Interior








# Multiple Interior Routers (Alternative)


- Another reason: organizational separation

Multiple internal networks:



# Multiple Internal Networks


- Backbone architecture:






# Multiple Exterior Routers

- Examples
  - Multiple connections to Internet (different ISPs)
  - A connection to Internet and another for other sites
- Security: A little easier to break in perimeter, but it is not serious.



# Multiple Perimeter Networks

- No serious security problem.
- Used when the company is really big.
- Non-sense for providing two lines



# Internal Firewalls

- Reasons:

- A test or lab network (might send weird messages)
- Less secure networks (e.g., for teaching)
- Network requiring more security (e.g., secret project, financial or grade data)

- Types

- Laboratory Networks
- Insecure Networks
- Extra-Secure Networks
- Joint-Venture Firewalls

# Lab Networks

- Why? May have horrible experience there.
- Configuration:
  - No exterior router and bastion hosts
  - Only need a packet filtering router
    - ▶ inbound (to the lab network) connections: Almost all ok.
    - ▶ outbound connections: only known safe ones.
  - If do testing routers,
    - ▶ disconnect the whole test networks.
    - ▶ Use a different routing protocol
    - ▶ Do not accept any routing updates
    - ▶ Specify which hosts the router will accept updates

# Insecure Networks

## ● Examples:

- dormitory network (most dangerous)
  - ▶ just viewed as exterior networks
- training network (less dangerous)
- demo network (less dangerous)
  - ▶ just use packet filtering router or a dual-homed host to prevent confidential traffic from flowing across those networks.
  - ▶ ask trusted users not to expose passwords or important information through there.
  - ▶ Usually, use a dual-homed host to send a warning message for crossing messages.

## Extra Secure Network

- Encrypting traffic
- Separate networks
  - No bastion host
  - A perimeter network is needed only for the most secret
- Cases:
  - Universities: try to put on different secure networks.
  - Government or companies: since most share the same network, use encrypted messages.



## Joint-Venture Firewalls (Extranet)

- Examples:
  - common data for Apple and IBM collaboration.
- Problems:
  - collaborators may steal information or break in.
  - Even if not competitors, they may find a way to their competitors.
- Factors (to decide how to do):
  - What you want to link for?
  - If just email or files, why not UUCP, etc?
  - Need a full work?

## What the Future Holds

- Extranet will get more important
- IPv6 will cause profound changes in firewalls
- ATM will have less security problems.