

# Replication of Buera & Shin (2013)

## Implementation with Howard Policy Improvement and Histograms

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## 1 The Economic Environment

The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents of measure one. Agents are heterogeneous in their asset holdings  $a$  and entrepreneurial ability  $z$ .

### 1.1 Preferences and Shocks

Agents maximize expected lifetime utility:

$$U_0 = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \quad (1)$$

Entrepreneurial ability  $z$  follows a reset process. In each period, with probability  $\psi$ , the ability remains constant:  $z_{t+1} = z_t$ . With probability  $1 - \psi$ , a new ability is drawn  $z' \sim \pi(z)$  from a Pareto distribution:

$$P(Z \leq z) = 1 - z^{-\eta}, \quad z \in [1, \infty) \quad (2)$$

To simulate distortions in the pre-reform state, agents are subject to idiosyncratic output wedges  $\tau \in \{\tau^+, \tau^-\}$ . The probability of being in the high-tax state  $\tau^+$  is conditional on  $z$ :  $P(\tau = \tau^+ | z) = 1 - e^{-qz}$ .

## 2 Firm Decisions and Optimal Production

Entrepreneurs operate a technology  $y = z(k^\alpha l^{1-\alpha})^{1-\nu}$ . They face a collateral constraint  $k \leq \lambda a$ .

### 2.1 Analytical Solutions for Firm Decisions

Given  $(w, r, a, z)$ , the entrepreneur's problem is solved in two stages. 1. **Conditional Labor Demand:** For any  $k$ , the optimal labor  $l^*(k, z)$  solves the first-order condition  $\partial\pi/\partial l = 0$ :

$$l^*(k, z) = \left[ \frac{(1-\nu)(1-\alpha)z}{w} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-(1-\alpha)(1-\nu)}} k^{\frac{\alpha(1-\nu)}{1-(1-\alpha)(1-\nu)}} \quad (3)$$

2. **Optimal Capital:** Substituting  $l^*$  into the profit function yields a concave function  $\pi(k)$ . The unconstrained optimal capital  $k^{unc}$  is found where  $\partial\pi/\partial k = 0$ . The actual capital choice is capped by the leverage limit:

$$k^*(a, z) = \min\{k^{unc}(z, w, r), \lambda a\} \quad (4)$$

The total income of an agent is  $i(a, z; w, r) = \max\{\pi(a, z, k^*, l^*), w\} + (1+r)a$ .

## 3 State Space Discretization

The state space  $\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{Z}$  is discretized for numerical implementation.

### 3.1 Asset Grid

To capture the high curvature of the value function near the borrowing constraint, a power-spaced grid for  $a \in [a_{min}, a_{max}]$  is used:

$$a_i = a_{min} + (a_{max} - a_{min}) \left( \frac{i}{N_a - 1} \right)^p, \quad i \in \{0, \dots, N_a - 1\} \quad (5)$$

where  $p = 2$  provides a dense cluster of points at low asset levels.

### 3.2 Ability Grid

The Pareto distribution  $\pi(z)$  is sampled into  $N_z$  bins of equal probability. Let  $u$  be a uniform random variable. The grid points are midpoints of probability intervals  $[F(z_j), F(z_{j+1})]$  where  $F$  is the Pareto CDF:

$$z_j = (1 - \bar{u}_j)^{-1/\eta}, \quad \bar{u}_j = \frac{j + 0.5}{N_z} \cdot u_{max} \quad (6)$$

## 4 Numerical Value Function Iteration

The value function  $V(a, z)$  is solved on the discretized grid using an optimized iterative process.

### 4.1 Initialization

The initial guess  $V^{(0)}$  is set to the utility of consuming the current income forever at the lowest grid point, providing a stable starting point for the iteration:

$$V^{(0)}(a_i, z_j) = \frac{u(i(a_i, z_j) - a_0)}{1 - \beta} \quad (7)$$

### 4.2 Expectation Splitting

To compute the continuation value  $\mathbb{E}[V(a', z')|z]$ , the algorithm splits the expectation to exploit the discrete nature of the reset process. Before making decisions, the "reset" expectation  $\bar{V}(a')$  is pre-calculated:

$$\bar{V}(a') = \sum_j \pi_j V(a', z_j) \quad (8)$$

The specific continuation value for state  $(a, z)$  becomes a weighted average of the current ability's value and the reset value:

$$\text{Cont}(a', z) = \psi V(a', z) + (1 - \psi) \bar{V}(a') \quad (9)$$

### 4.3 Howard Policy Improvement

The Bellman operator  $T(V)$  is computationally expensive due to the maximization step. Howard's improvement reduces the number of maximizations by iterating on a fixed policy  $\sigma(a, z)$ .

1. **Policy Step:** Solve for  $\sigma(a, z) = \arg \max_{a'} \{u(c) + \beta \text{Cont}(a', z)\}$ .
2. **Value Step:** For a fixed  $\sigma$ , iterate  $N_{how}$  times:

$$V^{(m+1)}(a, z) = u(i(a, z) - \sigma(a, z)) + \beta [\psi V^{(m)}(\sigma(a, z), z) + (1 - \psi) \bar{V}^{(m)}(\sigma(a, z))] \quad (10)$$

This significantly speeds up convergence as the Value Step is a linear operation<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>In principle, the value of a fixed policy  $\sigma$  can be solved in closed form as  $V_\sigma = (I - \beta P_\sigma)^{-1} U_\sigma$ , where  $P_\sigma$  is the transition matrix of the state space. However, for a grid size of  $N_a N_z \approx 36,000$ , the memory and computational overhead of inverting a  $P_\sigma$  matrix with  $1.3 \times 10^9$  elements makes the iterative successive approximation approach more efficient in terms of CPU cache and memory.

#### 4.4 Possible Improvements: Continuous Choice via Interpolation

A significant enhancement to the discrete grid search is to allow for a continuous asset choice  $a' \in [a_{min}, i]$ . This is implemented by replacing the discrete maximization with a continuous optimizer and interpolating the continuation value:

$$a^*(a, z) = \arg \max_{a' \in [a_{min}, i]} \{u(i - a') + \beta \mathcal{I}(\text{Cont}, a', z)\} \quad (11)$$

where  $\mathcal{I}$  is an interpolating function (e.g., linear or cubic spline). Mathematically, this smooths the aggregate supply and demand functions  $K_d(r)$  and  $L_d(w)$ , eliminating the "step" artifacts inherent in discrete grids and improving the convergence of the bisection algorithms in the general equilibrium solver.

#### 4.5 Coupled VFI for Distortions

In the pre-reform state, the economy features idiosyncratic distortions  $\tau \in \{\tau^+, \tau^-\}$ . The solver maintains two coupled value functions  $V^+(a, z)$  and  $V^-(a, z)$ . The expectation  $\bar{V}(a')$  now accounts for the probability  $p(z) = P(\tau = \tau^+ | z)$ :

$$\bar{V}(a') = \sum_j \pi_j [p(z_j)V^+(a', z_j) + (1 - p(z_j))V^-(a', z_j)] \quad (12)$$

The decision for an agent in state  $(a, z, \tau)$  depends on the specific income  $i(a, z, \tau)$ , but the continuation value uses the shared  $\bar{V}(a')$  since  $\tau$  is redrawn whenever  $z$  resets.

### 5 Distributional and Transition Dynamics

#### 5.1 Monte Carlo Binned Distribution

The distribution  $\mu_t(a, z)$  is tracked by simulating  $N_{sim}$  agents. At any time  $t$ , agent  $j$  has assets  $a_j$ . The mass is mapped to the asset grid via linear interpolation weights:

$$\omega_{k+1} = \frac{a_j - a_k}{a_{k+1} - a_k}, \quad \omega_k = 1 - \omega_{k+1} \quad (13)$$

This allows for calculating aggregate labor demand  $L_{d,t}$  and capital demand  $K_{d,t}$  as smooth functions of prices:

$$K_{d,t}(w, r) = \sum_{i,j} \mu_t(a_i, z_j) k^*(a_i, z_j, w, r) \mathbf{1}_{\{\pi > w\}} \quad (14)$$

### 6 Algorithm B.2: Nested Price Path Iteration

The general equilibrium transition path is computed via Algorithm B.2 (Appendix B.2), which decomposes the market clearing of capital and labor into nested price-path sequences.

#### 6.1 Price Path Sequences

Let  $\mathbf{w} = \{w_t\}_{t=0}^T$  and  $\mathbf{r} = \{r_t\}_{t=0}^T$  be the sequences of wages and interest rates. The algorithm solves for fixed points of these sequences such that markets clear at every  $t$ .

#### 6.2 Nested Iteration Structure

The implementation uses a nested loop structure:

1. **Outer Loop (Interest Rates):** Updates the guess for the interest rate path  $\mathbf{r}^{(n)}$ .
  - (a) **Inner Loop (Wages):** Given  $\mathbf{r}^{(n)}$ , iteratively updates the wage path  $\mathbf{w}^{(k)}$ .
    - i. **Backward Induction:** Solve for policies  $a'_t(a, z)$  given  $(w_t^{(k)}, r_t^{(n)})$  for  $t = T - 1, \dots, 0$ .
    - ii. **Forward Simulation:** Simulate  $N_{sim}$  agents forward from  $\mu_0$  using  $a'_t$  to obtain the sequence of binned distributions  $\{\mu_t\}_{t=0}^T$ .

- iii. **Labor Clearing:** For each  $t$ , find the wage  $w_t^*$  that clears the labor market *given the fixed distribution*  $\mu_t$ :

$$L_{excess}(w_t^*|\mu_t, r_t^{(n)}) = 0 \quad (15)$$

- iv. **Wage Relaxation:** Update the wage path using damping  $\eta_w$ :

$$w_t^{(k+1)} = \eta_w w_t^* + (1 - \eta_w) w_t^{(k)} \quad (16)$$

- (b) **Capital Clearing:** For each  $t$ , find the interest rate  $r_t^*$  that clears the capital market given the converged wage and distribution:

$$K_{excess}(r_t^*|\mu_t, w_t^{(converged)}) = 0 \quad (17)$$

- (c) **Interest Rate Relaxation:** Update the path using damping  $\eta_r$ :

$$r_t^{(n+1)} = \eta_r r_t^* + (1 - \eta_r) r_t^{(n)} \quad (18)$$

### 6.3 Numerical Market Clearing (Bisections)

The clearing prices  $w_t^*$  and  $r_t^*$  are found using a robust root-finding method:

- **Bracketing Scan:** Before bisectioning, the price space  $[P_{min}, P_{max}]$  is scanned at  $N_{scan}$  points to find a bracket  $[a, b]$  where the excess demand function changes sign.
- **Bisection:** Once a bracket is found, a bisection method converges to the specific clearing price with a tolerance of  $10^{-10}$ .

### 6.4 Convergence Criteria

The algorithm requires two conditions to stop:

1. **Sequence Convergence:** The maximum change in price paths between iterations must be small:  $\max_t |r_t^{(n+1)} - r_t^{(n)}| < \epsilon_{seq}$ .
2. **Market Clearing Gaps:** The actual excess demand residuals (calculated by re-evaluating the economy with the final prices) must satisfy  $|ED_L| < \epsilon_{ED}$  and  $|ED_K| < \epsilon_{ED}$ .