



Social Trust and Civic Engagement across Time and Generations

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This article uses long-term panel data on three generations of Americans to address several issues concerning the state of social trust and civic engagement and their inter-relationships. Social trust is indicated by the standard index and civic engagement by organizational involvement and volunteerism. We demonstrate that the decline in trust and engagement has been led by Generation X, rather than the Baby Boomers, who compare quite favorably with their predecessors, the highly lauded 'Long Civic Generation.' Baby Boomers do, however, have a more sporadic and short-lived record of civic engagement than the preceding generation. Both social trust and, especially, civic engagement are also subject to consequential life cycle effects that may be disguised in cross-sectional designs. The interdependence between social trust and civic engagement is evident as individuals age, though trust is more a cause than a consequence of civic engagement, and the link disappears for voluntary associations based upon exclusive identities.

Acta Politica (2004) 39, 342–379. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500077

Keywords: social capital; civic engagement; social trust; political socialization; generations; life cycle

Introduction

Triggered in large part by the work of Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), the study of social capital has enjoyed a boom period over the past decade and has ushered in a national popular and scholarly debate about whether, why, and with what consequences social capital is declining or changing in the United States (e.g., Wuthnow 1998; Ladd, 1999; Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner 2002a; Costa and Matthew, 2003). The literature has been enriched by studies of particular historical eras (e.g., Skocpol, 1999), particular communities (e.g., Hall, 1999), particular organizations (e.g., Crawford and Levitt, 1999) and particular population groupings (e.g., Wuthnow, 1999; Smith, 1999). In the spirit of this latter vein of scholarship, the present article examines a particular slice of the American population in an analysis



designed to shed light on some larger issues surrounding the discourse about social capital.

Although definitions of social capital vary, it is typically described as an attribute of social relations, in particular, the extent to which those relations involve frequent and trusting interactions among individuals. Thus social capital is defined as:

...features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993, 167).

...an objective network structure linking individuals ... [where] ties between individuals must be of a particular type — reciprocal, trusting, and involving positive emotion (Paxton, 1999, 93)

In work focusing on social capital as a resource for individuals, the question becomes: To what extent does the individual frequently engage with trusted others and hence benefit from a high level of social capital? If a group or community is the unit of analysis, the same question is shifted to the aggregate level: To what extent do the community members frequently interact and demonstrate trust in one another? In this case, the benefits accrue both to individuals displaying such engagement and to the collectivity as a whole, in that a community filled with individuals happily interacting with others is better able to solve a whole host of collective problems. Analysts interested in social capital at the macro level typically emphasize these collective benefits, but others have stressed that social capital can be used to produce goods at the individual and group, as well as the larger community levels (Paxton, 2002). Regardless of the analytic level involved, however, the attitudes and actions of individuals are inherent to the concept of social capital (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Keele, 2003) and frequently serve as indicators for the extant levels of social capital, most famously so in *Bowling Alone* (Putnam, 2000).

Most recent research examining the nature and seeming decline of social capital in the United States utilizes two key indicators. One consists of trust in one's fellow human beings, usually termed 'social trust' or 'generalized trust.' A second major indicator is civic engagement. Although subject to various definitions, two especially prominent components of civic engagement are involvement in voluntary organizations and the performance of volunteer work, both of which facilitate the development of social networks.¹ The standard argument is that these qualities exist in a virtuous circle such that being involved in civic associations and volunteer work not only helps develop political skills but also fosters trust and confidence in others, and *vice versa*, thus enabling collective action to address social and political needs. As these commodities dwindle, so does the stock of social capital upon which individuals, and the political system, may draw.



As far as political scientists are concerned, the crucial role performed by these factors consists of their linkage to more overtly political phenomena, and at the individual-level, to political activity in particular. In this article, we take it as given that organizational involvement, volunteer work, and social trust are related to most forms of political activity, though the magnitude of those relationships will vary across generations and the life course and by specific types of political activities. Indeed, a separate analysis of the data we shall be working with coincides in broad outlines with the cross-sectional results presented by others on that score (e.g., Verba *et al.*, 1995). Our present interest, however, focuses on social trust, organizational involvement, and voluntary work *per se*.

Largely absent from the growing social capital literature about trends and relationships over the past few decades is research taking a trans-generational, developmental perspective (Youniss *et al.*, 1997). Aside from cohort analyses (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Costa and Matthew, 2003) — which have themselves been hampered by difficulties over conceptual specifications, inconsistent measures over time, and broken time series — the literature has lacked research designs capable of sharply delineating the nature of intergenerational differences in social trust and civic engagement, their origins and long-term development, and their interconnections over time.

Our task in this article is to bring that trans-generational, developmental perspective to the topic of social capital, using long-term panel data on three generations of Americans. We have four specific goals. First, we seek to provide new evidence on the character and magnitude of the generation gaps in social trust and civic engagement. Previous research has uncovered evidence that much of the decline of social capital in the US is generational, with recent cohorts less trusting and involved in their communities than previous generations. Doubt remains, however, about whether the decline has been led by lower levels of trust and involvement among the Baby Boomers, or has alone been fueled by more recent arrivals, members of the so-called Generation X.

One problem faced by others who have addressed this question with repeated cross-sections is the difficulty of disentangling life-cycle and generational effects. Our second goal is to use the panel data on multiple generations to do just that. Hence, we will situate the interest in generational differences alongside a complementary interest in the life-cycle dynamics of social trust and civic engagement. Our analysis will reveal clear life-cycle patterns in both aspects of social capital, which complicate any simple cross-sectional comparison of individuals differentiated by age.

A third issue concerns the stability of trust and engagement over the individual's life cycle. Of particular interest here are the differences in stability across generations. Are there generational differences in the extent to which trust and engagement are stable attributes of individuals? At least one analyst



has argued that Americans today still care about their communities and strive to become involved, but their involvement is much more short-lived and sporadic than was true for previous generations (Wuthnow, 1998). If so, we should see evidence by way of an intergenerational difference in the over-time stability of civic engagement at the individual level. A related life-cycle question is whether pre-adult involvement in voluntary organizations builds predispositions and skills that have long-lasting consequences, encouraging civic engagement later on in life. Evidence that this is so should give hope to those striving to reverse the downward trends in social capital through interventions aimed at youth in school.

Finally, we seek to provide new evidence on the interdependence of social trust and civic engagement. Social trust and civic engagement are bound together under the rubric of social capital because only when social interactions involve mutual trust are the benefits expected to flow. But trust and engagement are also, as an empirical matter, expected to covary because of the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between them. Trust in others is expected to encourage involvement in social organizations as well as to be inspired by it, just as distrust is expected both to breed disengagement and to be reinforced by it. We evaluate the interconnections between social trust and civic engagement at the individual level by estimating dynamic models using panel data on two generations.

A Three-Generation, Longitudinal Study Design

The long-term political socialization project provides a set of data with several measures of civic engagement and social trust repeated over time and across generations. The core of the project consists of a 1965 national sample of high school seniors who were subsequently resurveyed in 1973, 1982, and finally in 1997, by which time they were about 50 years old. Of the original 1669 respondents, some 935 survived through the fourth wave, for an unadjusted retention rate of 56%.²

During each of the first three waves data were also secured from at least one parent; the three-wave parent panel consists of 898 respondents from an original pool of 1562, for an unadjusted retention rate of 57%. Importantly, these parents had a mean age of 44 years in 1965, which is only slightly less than the erstwhile high school seniors' mean of 50 years in 1997. Considering that the younger generation has been moving through life-stages at a slower rate than did their parents, this modest disparity in ages facilitates rather than hinders the intergenerational comparisons at comparable life-cycle points. Such comparisons are all the more apt because, in accordance with most cross-sectional research, both generations stood at or near the height of their civic engagement in their respective time frames.



The 1997 survey also includes data for a third generation, children born to members of the four-wave panel from the class of 1965. Self-administered questionnaires were received from 778 of the 1435 offsprings aged 15 and older, for a response rate of 54%.³ Comparisons with the two preceding generations will be limited due to the youthful age of this third generation (mean of 23), the trimmed down version of the survey instrument, and the absence of longitudinal data. The age range encompassed by these offspring provides some flexibility in terms of the analytic units that will be employed.

For convenience, the original high school sample will be referred to as the Second Generation or Generation 2 (G2), their parents as the First Generation (G1), and their offspring as the Third Generation (G3). These three generations fit rather neatly into popular and scholarly classification schemes of political generations. All but a handful of the original parent sample (G1) was born between 1910 and 1940, with one half entering the world in the eight-year period spanning 1917–1924. The great majority spent at least part of their pre-adult years during the Depression and nearly three-fifths of the males served in World War II. This generation experienced the post-war boom and the beginning of the Cold War as adults. Thus G1 easily falls within Putnam's (2000, chapter 14) highly praised 'long civic generation,' Miller and Shanks' (1996, chapter 5) New Deal generation, and Brokaw's (1998) much lauded 'Greatest Generation.'

Generation 2, born in 1947 or 1948, takes its place as an early installment of what is often called a two-stage Baby Boomer generation. Its early years were marked by the seeming domestic tranquility and prosperity of the 1950s and the onset of the Cold War. Surveys of this birth cohort at the elementary (Easton and Dennis, 1969) and high school levels (Jennings and Niemi, 1974) depict a rather benign, contented orientation to the political world, one that did not put them greatly at odds with the preceding generation. As with their parents, however, a series of critical events — this time including the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, assassinations, and Watergate — that began in the early 1960s and ended in the early 1970s helped shape the identity of the early Baby Boomers. Rightly or wrongly they became known as the protest generation. Whether the *zeitgeist* surrounding this cohort's coming of age would encourage civic engagement and social trust seems more problematic than it was for their parents.

Unlike Generations 1 and 2, Generation 3's political history possesses little by way of defining historical moments. Few, if any galvanizing events or movements occurred around which a special identity could be formed. One visible manifestation of this absence lies in the difficulty of knowing what to call young Americans coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s. Lacking a better term, analysts and pundits have referred to the post-Boomers, defined here as those born after 1968, as the X generation, sometimes said to have been



succeeded by the Y generation. While members of G3 have not undergone the classic formative (and transformative) historical conditioning experienced by their parents and grandparents, their political socialization has occurred within a political ethos that does bear its own identity. For most of their pre-adult and young adult lives G3 denizens have lived in a political environment where trust and confidence in major institutions have hovered at low levels, voting turnout has eroded, widespread social movements have waned, political scandals and malfeasance have been relentlessly reported, cultural diversity has increased, foreign threats have been minimal, and single-issue advocacy politics has flourished. The conventional wisdom holds that G3 came of age at a time quite unfavorable to the development of civic engagement and social trust.

Even though the three generations at our disposal do conform rather nicely to widely used characterizations of American political generations, we are obviously not claiming that they are statistically representative of those generations. The initial social class bias and cohort centric nature inherent in a 1965 sample of high school seniors work against such claims, to say nothing of the accompanying restrictiveness surrounding the ancillary samples of their parents and offspring. We do claim, however, that these three generations offer illustrations and evidence that can be used to enlighten the debate about the dynamics of civic engagement and social trust in American society. The study design permits the over-time mapping of the two older generations, at both the aggregate and individual level, thereby providing the kind of dynamic perspective reached only partially by cohort designs in the case of aggregate analysis and not at all with respect to individual-level analysis.

These three generations embody individuals connected by family ties. Lineage imposes a certain degree of controls with respect to such important social characteristics as class, race, religion, partisanship, and local political culture, as well as those aspects of social intercourse and affective relationships that are unique to the family circle. In a very real sense, then, we can observe the manifestations of civic engagement and social trust as seen through the prism of three-generation families over a substantial period of time.

Indicators of Social Trust and Civic Engagement

Social trust

Although it is not an indicator of civic engagement *per se*, social trust, or trust in others, is a core element in discussions about social capital and civic engagement. The presumed link to social capital rests in the contention that individuals cannot work collectively for a common good unless they trust each other. As some have recognized (e.g., Levi, 1996), trusting like-minded or like-situated others does not necessarily extend to trusting others falling outside



these parameters. Nevertheless, the general argument is that social trust and civic engagement exist in a reciprocal, mutually benefiting relationship. The social trust measures employed here are based on responses to the three standard forced-choice items employed by NES, GSS, and many other survey organizations for several decades. For some purposes, the items have been combined into a cumulative index.

Membership in voluntary organizations

A key argument in the national debate about whether social capital and civic virtue are declining in the United States concerns participation in voluntary organizations. We approached the measurement of organizational involvement in a traditional way. All respondents except G2 in 1965 and G3 in 1997 reacted to a long list of organizations, indicating whether they belonged and, if so, their level of activity.⁴ The lists included various organizational types, some of which are typically cited as molders of civic competence and as active players in community affairs while others are more noted for developing social bonds and interpersonal trust. Although the number of groups listed varied somewhat over time, respondents were always asked if there were other relevant groups not contained on the lists. For some purposes a cumulative index representing the total number of organizational memberships at a given point in time will be used in the analysis. In basing our indicators on the *breadth* of organizational memberships we realize that we sacrifice the *depth* dimension, which could be obtained by enlisting the reported levels of activity. Both approaches are valuable but the breadth dimension resonates more with the social capital thesis, with its emphasis on extensive social networks and the fostering of trust and generalized reciprocity.

Volunteer work

It is generally conceded that membership in traditional voluntary organizations has decreased over the past two–three decades, but some observers have argued that volunteer work, in its myriad forms, has held steady or actually increased, the implication being that levels of civic engagement need to be assessed in different ways (e.g., Dionne, 1998; Wuthnow, 1998; Ladd, 1999). As we did not begin asking a question about volunteer work until the 1982 wave, that information is available only for G1 and G2 in 1982, and for G2 and G3 in 1997. In contrast to the structured format used for voluntary organizations, the volunteer work measure drew on responses to an open-ended question. After indicating whether they performed any volunteer work ‘apart from any work you do for pay,’ those saying yes were asked ‘what kind of volunteer work do you do?’ Unlike membership in voluntary organizations, which may or may



not involve other-directed, 'helping' activities, volunteer work by definition involves assisting others. Up to three responses were coded, resulting in a four-point index running from zero to three volunteer activities. The specific types of activities coded will be described below.

In what follows we utilize these three measures to make three major types of comparisons that, subject to data limitations, will be longitudinal. First, we will compare the generations on an aggregate basis in order to ascertain whether and how levels of social trust, organizational membership, and voluntary activity have been changing over time. This will provide evidence concerning both generational and life-cycle effects in trust and engagement levels. We then turn to continuities in these orientations. We examine the stability of trust and engagement across the life cycle for each generation, and for the class of 1965, evaluate the extent to which involvement as a pre-adult shapes involvement later in adulthood. Third, we evaluate the degree to which trust and engagement are causally interconnected and, of the two, which is the prime mover. As before, we carry out this analysis over time and across generations.

Aggregate Profiles

Our first task consists of painting the aggregate portraits for each generation. In doing so, and based on the foregoing characterizations of each generation, we start with the proposition that generational differences will favor G1, followed by G2, and then G3.

Social trust

As chronicled by others, the American population as a whole has reduced its trust in others and entering cohorts have shown rather steady declines ever since the mid-1960s (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, chapter 7; Rahn and Transue, 1998). Table 1 demonstrates with stunning clarity the net effect of this erosion in terms of the three lineage generations. Notwithstanding some movement among Generations 1 and 2, a point subsequently addressed, what catches the eye are the wide gaps between G3 and its lineage predecessors on each of the three items.⁵ Given the variable age range of G3, the 1965 and 1973 entries for G2 provide apt life-stage comparisons. The wide gap remains regardless of whether the comparison is with G2 at age 18 years in 1965 or age 26 years in 1973. Breaking down G3 into more specific matching ages with G2 yields similar results. From the standpoint of contemporary generation gaps, the 1997 comparisons are very compelling.

Comparisons involving G1 and G2 also merit attention. First, G2 in 1997 looks like a virtual twin of its life-stage mate of G1 in 1965, thereby



Table 1 Social trust across time and generations

<i>Question wording</i>	<i>Generation (n)</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1997</i>
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? ^a	First (884)	69	65	60	—
	Second (916)	65	59	63	64
	Third (768)	—	—	—	37
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? ^b	First (879)	71	64	64	—
	Second (916)	63	56	62	74
	Third (768)	—	—	—	50
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair? ^c	First (875)	82	78	76	—
	Second (916)	75	70	70	79
	Third (767)	—	—	—	47
Overall Social Trust Index ^d	First (855)	0.76	0.70	0.68	—
	Second (877)	0.69	0.62	0.66	0.73
	Third (762)	—	—	—	0.45

^aEntries are in percent: can be trusted.

^bEntries are in percent: try to be helpful.

^cEntries are in percent: try to be fair.

^dEntries are averages on the 0–1 Index.

emphasizing the distinctiveness of G3 and the continuities between G1 and G2 on this score despite their having come of age in decidedly different historical eras. Second, both of the 'older' generations appeared to have shared, albeit quite modestly, in the downward secular trend after 1965. By 1997, however, G2 experienced a moderate uptick in interpersonal trust on two of the items and on the overall index. One possible explanation for this resurgence that is congruent with the matching scores of G2 in 1997 and G1 in 1965 is that civic engagement, which tends to peak in the middle years, has a salutary impact on social trust. As will be shown below, however, there is little support for that explanation at the individual level.

Another possibility is that the pattern of change found for G2 — first a decline as the youths left high school and moved through the early years of adulthood, followed by increasing levels of trust subsequently — reflects life-cycle transitions. Further evidence in support of this proposition is found in an analysis of the Third Generation. Precisely the same age-related pattern emerges for G3 as is seen for G2 in Table 1. Figure 1 depicts this relationship for G3.⁶ Trust drops for those in their early to mid-20s compared with those still in their teens. This conforms precisely to the drop seen for G2 as they aged from 18 to 26 years (columns for 1965 and 1973, Table 1). Trust then starts to rise with age, climbing just as steadily for those in the late 20s and early 30s




Figure 1 Social trust by age (third generation). *Note:* Entries are predicted trust scores derived from a regression of social trust on age and age-squared, controlling for education. Education was set to its mean in generating these predicted scores. See Note 6 for further details.

as it had dropped for those exiting their teens. This movement, too, bears a striking resemblance to what we saw for G2. The transition from adolescence to adulthood is a period of enormous change for most individuals, producing new circumstances, social environments, and uncertainties. As the parallel results for G2 and G3 suggest, one short-term consequence of these disruptions is a diminished sense of trust in others. Trust later rebounds, presumably as young adults adapt to their new circumstances and establish new social relationships.

This apparent life-cycle pattern does not undermine the conclusion about inter-generational differences reached earlier. On average, the members of G3 are still much less trusting than were those of G2 at comparable moments in their life-stage. But it does mean that any analysis of the changing trust levels of Americans must take both life-cycle and generational differences into account. Simple comparisons of trust levels by age using cross-sectional data will uncover low levels of trust for young Americans, members of Generation X, or Generation Y, in part because that snapshot is being taken when younger cohorts are at a particularly distrusting moment in their lives.

Membership in voluntary organizations

To some observers the most worrisome aspect of the decline in social capital lies in the shrinking membership base of traditional voluntary organizations. A



comparison of Generations 1 and 2 offers some perspective on this worry and again shows the importance of considering both life-cycle and generational effects. Looking first at the overall membership averages (bottom row, Table 2), we see life-cycle processes clearly at work. G1 underwent a slight decline as it moved from an average age of 44 years in 1965 to 61 years in 1982. Much more impressively, and little remarked upon in the literature about civic engagement,

Table 2 Organizational involvement across time and generations (first and second generations)

	<i>Generation</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1997</i>
Church group	First	43	39	43	—
	Second	72	19	29	41
Fraternal organization	First	17	18	18	—
	Second	—	10	10	10
Civic or service organization	First	7	9	5	—
	Second	33	5	7	11
Neighborhood association	First	17	12	13	—
	Second	34	7	18	26
Sports group	First	14	9	9	—
	Second	40	20	25	19
Informal group or club	First	21	17	16	—
	Second	20	16	18	17
Ethnic or racial organization	First	3	2	2	—
	Second	—	2	4	4
Professional or business group	First	18	13	10	—
	Second	37	20	30	44
Labor union	First	15	17	11	—
	Second	—	14	16	16
Index of organizational involvement	First	1.8	1.5	1.6	—
	Second	3.6	1.2	2.0	2.6

Note: For all rows but the last, cell entries are percent reporting membership in the named organization. In the last row, cell entries are the average number of organizational memberships reported. The base *N* is 898 for the first generation and 935 for the second generation. Actual *N* values vary depending on missing data for the variable in question, but are held constant across waves. Entries for G2 in 1965 reflect both school and non-school affiliations. Occupation-related clubs in high school are equated with professional or business groups and athletic teams with sports groups. The index scores for each generation are based on the total number of organizational memberships, including some groups not listed in the table.



G2 exhibits a pronounced curvilinear pattern. The high school years are the preeminent years of organizational activity, spurred on by a receptive opportunity structure, the prospect of solidary rewards, and, for the college bound, a desire to enhance the application packet. Consequently, at least for the class of 1965, there was more than ample pre-adult preparation for later organizational involvement. During young adulthood, with its myriad life-stage alterations, the incentives for organizational involvement decreased for G2 and the opportunity costs increased. From this low point in 1973, involvement began to climb and underwent a rapid rise as G2 reached the mid-century mark in 1997.

In terms of generational matchups, the key comparison of G1 in 1965 and G2 in 1997 shows that far from being less active than their parents, members of G2 were in fact involved in more organizations at a comparable age.⁷ As the upper portion of Table 2 indicates, however, this edge derives in substantial part from the massive difference with respect to professional/business organizations. That difference, in turn, rests in part on the much greater participation of G2 women in the professions and business. On the other hand, G2 also outranks G1 with respect to neighborhood associations and sports groups and visibly trails G1 only with respect to fraternal organizations. In terms of voluntary organization memberships, then, G2 — representing the frequently maligned 60s era — is holding up its end of the civic engagement stick fully as well as did G1 — representing the much-praised ‘long civic’ generation. Our findings here accord with age-related findings (e.g., Putnam, 2000, chapter 14) and those based on explicit careful divisions between early and late baby boomers, which find the early boomers to be more civically inclined than the later ones (e.g., Bennett and Rademacher, 1997).

An intriguing question is whether the two generations combine the elements of social trust and organizational involvement in the same manner and whether these combinations change over time. Paxton (1999) argues that the conjunction of high trust and high civic involvement provides the bedrock of social capital (though she also includes institutional trust). For present purposes, let us take membership in at least two voluntary organizations and a score of 0.5 or higher on the 0–1 social trust index as constituting a rough, generous measure of the proportion of each sample that is invested with high social capital. Doing so produces the following distributions:

	1965 (%)	1973 (%)	1982 (%)	1997 (%)
Generation 1	42	33	33	—
Generation 2	—	25	40	51



In the measure that social capital is represented by population groupings, substantial gains are registered from young adulthood to middle age, followed by a tapering off. Inferentially, the age distribution of a population will have much to do with how much social capital can be tapped. In terms of generational differences, G2 comes off a bit better than does G1 at roughly similar ages. Such comparisons do not take into account differences between the generations in attributes that influence social trust and civic engagement, such as socio-economic status, marital status, and female work-force participation. Compared with G1, G2 was better educated and better off financially, which should boost their social capital in that these attributes tend to enhance both trust and engagement. At the same time, divorce and female work-force participation were more prevalent for G2 than for G1, which should work in the other direction. In any event, an analysis that compared members of G1 and G2 holding education, income, marital status, and work-force participation constant confirmed the inter-generational patterns of Tables 1–2 and that are summarized in the combined social capital comparison just presented. G2 in 1997 tends to be slightly less trusting than G1 in 1965, but substantially more organizationally involved. Overall, the social capital levels favor G2.

G3 respondents were not presented with the standard battery of voluntary organizations, mainly because of their youth. However, they did indicate their involvement in a number of extracurricular activities while in high school.⁸ Happily, their parents had supplied the same information as high school seniors, thereby providing a basis of comparison. Because, as we show later, G2's level of extracurricular activity in high school influenced their subsequent civic involvement, these comparisons have implications for G3's future.

Striking differences emerge across these two generations (Table 3). Generation 3 trails well behind its predecessor in running for office, being an officer in an organization, and being a member of non-school or 'other' school organizations. The only noticeable increases of G3 over their parents consist of the near doubling with respect to athletics, where the absolute numbers are large, and speech and debate clubs, with small absolute numbers. Some of these differences are driven by structural and institutional changes. On average, members of G3 attended larger high schools than did G2, and since running for office and being an officer are inversely related to school size, G3 faced a more limited opportunity structure than did G2. Working in the other direction, the combined impact of the women's movement and Title 9 resulted in a large upsurge in female participation on athletic teams, which helps account for the large rise in that sector. Illustratively, in 1965, 45% of G2 males and 26% of the females were on athletic teams; corresponding figures for G3 in 1997 were 71 and 62%, respectively.


Table 3 Extracurricular activities during high school (second and third generations)

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Second generation (in 1965)</i>	<i>Third generation (in 1997)</i>
Ran for an elected office in the school	50	27
Served as an officer in a school organization	63	44
Member of a school athletic team	38	66
Member of a school musical group	33	34
Member of a school debate or speech club	4	11
Member of other school organization	73	62
Member of a non-school youth organization	88	41
Overall index of extracurricular activities	3.3	2.9

Note: In all but the last row, cell entries are the percentage taking part in the named activity. The last row gives the average on the index of extracurricular activities. The third generation analysis excluded youth less than 18 years old. The base *N* values are 935 for G2 and 681 for G3.

Less explicable is the 50% + drop in non-school organization memberships. One likely suspect is the overall decline in church membership and attendance in G3 compared with G2 in that church-related organizations appear to have been a major component of G2's non-school organizational repertory. Strong evidence in that direction comes from responses to a separate battery administered in 1965. Approximately seven in 10 students claimed to be members of a church-related group. The nearest competitor had but four in 10. And whereas two-thirds of G2 said in 1965 that they attended church almost every week, the same was true of but one-fourth of their children overall and one-third of those in the 15–20-year-old age range.

In sum, members of G3 experienced substantially less 'applied' civic training in high school than did their parents. Even though gains were registered in some domains (athletic teams, and speech and debate clubs) the overall portrait is of less extracurricular involvement among today's youth than among those of the boomer era. Although our evidence has concerned pre-adult involvement in social activities and organizations, it is fully consistent with the fears, and findings, of lessened civic involvement among recent cohorts of young adults.

It is tempting to attribute this fall-off in G3 to the declining ability of parents to pass on their level of social trust and associational involvement to their progeny in the post boomer era. In an earlier version of this article (Jennings and Stoker, 2001) we took advantage of the two sets of parent–child pairs embedded in the design — G1–G2 and G2–G3 — to calculate these rates of reproducibility. Parents do play a role in shaping the extent to which their children enter adulthood with trusting or distrusting dispositions, and in the extent to which they get involved in voluntary associations, both in high school



and subsequently. Still, the magnitude of these family linkages is modest at best, thus challenging the conclusion of some analysts who assign a major role to parents (e.g., Uslaner, 2002a, chapter 4). We also found no evidence that transmission levels themselves have changed over time, that the Baby Boomers were more successfully socialized via the family into trust and engagement than were the members of Generation X. Weak family transmission leaves individuals vulnerable to other influences, and opens up the possibility of societal-level changes spurred on by either generational replacement or by period effects. But it appears that the distinctively low levels of trust and engagement found for the younger cohorts represented by G3 cannot be traced to a generational difference in the success of parent–child transmission.

Volunteer work

Due to the absence of pre-1982 observations, we cannot make the same kinds of comparisons between G1 and G2 as we did for organizational memberships. And although we do have data for G3, we cannot compare G3 with G2 at comparable life-stages. Nevertheless, we can provide findings that bear on the volume and nature of volunteer work. Shown here are the percentages of those engaged in at least one voluntary activity:

	1982 (%)	1997 (%)
First generation	29	—
Second generation	41	46
Third generation	—	35

At least three in ten members of each generation reported engaging in volunteer work, surely an impressive performance. The difference between G1 and G2 in 1982 is almost certainly a function of G1's older age at that time. In the aggregate G2 members increased their volunteering a bit as they aged from their mid-30s to around 50 years of age, as also expressed by an increase in the mean number of activities from 0.57 to 0.70. Although G3 trails G2 as of 1997, a breakdown by age shows that late adolescents essentially match their parents: 43% of the 16–20-year olds do volunteer work. The higher rate in this group probably reflects the highly publicized efforts by educational institutions to encourage community service among their charges.

Coding of the specific behaviors was complicated due to the fact that some respondents mentioned organizations, others described activities, and some did both. However, the great majority of responses referred to specific organizations or types of organizations. Consequently, the findings to be presented here

are organized in that fashion. Table 4 gives the distribution of volunteer types for all respondents, less missing data, and for those who had engaged in volunteer work. Infrequently cited organizations are not included in the

Table 4 Types of volunteer activities (in %)

<i>Generation</i>	<i>1982</i>		<i>1997</i>	
	<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>
<i>Religious</i>				
First	11	39	—	—
Second	14	34	16	35
Third	—	—	8	24
<i>Charitable</i>				
First	11	39	—	—
Second	9	21	11	25
Third	—	—	8	25
<i>Neighborhood</i>				
First	4	15	—	—
Second	3	7	4	8
Third	—	—	5	16
<i>Youth</i>				
First	2	6	—	—
Second	11	26	9	20
Third	—	—	8	22
<i>Education</i>				
First	1	4	—	—
Second	10	23	7	16
Third	—	—	7	20
<i>Political</i>				
First	2	5	—	—
Second	3	8	3	6
Third	—	—	2	4
<i>Cultural</i>				
First	1	4	—	—
Second	1	2	4	9
Third	—	—	1	4

Note: The percentage base for column (a) is all respondents while that for column (b) is respondents who had done volunteer work. *N* values for columns (a) and (b), respectively, are 879 and 257 for G1; 931 and 380 for G2 in 1982, and 933 and 424 in 1997; and 751 and 255 for G3. Percentages may exceed 100 in column (b) due to multiple mentions.



table. Rather surprisingly, these rarely mentioned groups included traditional service clubs such as Lions, Rotary, and Kiwanis. Somewhat less surprisingly, volunteer work was also rarely identified with business or professional groups.

Regardless of generation or life stage, religious and charitable organizations provide major sites or vehicles for volunteer work. (References to charitable organizations dealt mainly with health related and social welfare groups.) Cultural and explicitly political work receives only minor time commitment in any generation. At the same time, the findings appear to reflect very strong life-cycle effects. Note the paucity of education and youth related mentions among G1 respondents, most of whom were well beyond the child-rearing years by 1982. By inference, charitable work in particular appears to take up the volunteer slack thereby created. In contrast, members of G2 had very substantial percentages in the youth and education areas in 1982 and then dipped a bit by 1997 as their child-rearing tasks began to diminish. Note also the relatively more balanced volunteer portfolio of G3, occasioned in part by its considerable age range. Thus both the volume and focus of volunteer work are mightily conditioned by life stage as well as by the opportunity structures presented by well-established institutions.

Continuities across Time

We have just treated continuities in these three-generation families at the aggregate level. In principle, ingenious researchers working with exceptionally large, replicated cross-sectional databases might have approximated the same results. That is not true of continuities over the life cycle, for which long-term panel data are required.

It makes a difference if civic engagement and social trust are reasonably stable properties of individuals as they mature. Higher levels of continuity with respect to social trust would suggest a fairly consistent quality of interpersonal relationships, whether experienced in primary or secondary networks, while lower levels would suggest that the vicissitudes of life lead people into and out of trusting states. As for engagement, high levels of continuity would suggest a fairly tight social system whereas low levels would suggest considerable slack, and more sporadic civic involvement. Although the social capital literature has been preoccupied with *levels* of trust and civic engagement, the question of whether those characteristics are durable is clearly important (Wuthnow, 1998). The extent of the payoff, to individuals and communities, from mutually supportive social interactions should depend on whether they are sporadic or long-lived.



The results for social trust indicate the sort of medium range continuity to be expected on a common socio-psychological trait, as these continuity coefficients (r) reveal:

	<i>1965–1973</i>	<i>1973–1982</i>	<i>1982–1997</i>
Generation 1	0.49	0.54	—
Generation 2	0.33	0.43	0.46

The results also demonstrate the typical hardening of attitudes that accompany aging, with G2 showing the most movement in that they start from a much younger age base than was true for their parents. The similarity between the third panel period for G2 and the first panel period for G1 points toward quite similar levels of continuity as G2 approaches G1 in age.

Continuities in organizational involvement present similarities and contrasts with those in social trust (Table 5). For the most part G1 retains moderately high and similar continuity levels across the two panel periods, on both the individual groups and the overall index. Small gains are evident for most types of associations except those related to occupation (professional and business associations, labor unions), which in itself represents G1's edging into retirement. And G2 shows the expected development of growing continuity over time.

What is more difficult to explain is the considerably lower stability achieved by G2 even during the last panel. The continuity correlations for G2 typically lag quite far behind those of their parents. Admittedly, the generational comparison here is imperfect — G1 was aging from 44 to 52 years between 1965 and 1973 and G2 was aging from 35 to 50 years between 1982 and 1997 — and the panel periods are of different lengths. Nevertheless, members of G2 clearly experienced less sustained involvement as they progressed through their middle years than did their parents. This lends some support for Wuthnow's (1998) contention that the civic engagement of recent generations is more episodic than in generations past. In the absence of detailed analysis at this point, we would speculate on the place of intergenerational differences as these two generations made their way toward middle age. Compared with their parents, the offspring have married later (or not at all), have more broken marriages, have fewer children and at a later age, and have more dual career marriages. On balance the domestic life of the younger generation is more heterogeneous and less predictable than was true of its predecessor. This more complex life-stage pattern may have consequences in a more irregular associational life when compared with the older generation. While such differences might have little impact on the crystallization of an attitude such as



Table 5 Over-time stability in organizational involvement, by generation (first and second generations)

	1965–1973	1973–1982	1982–1997
<i>Church group</i>			
G1	0.43	0.46	—
G2	0.15	0.32	0.36
<i>Fraternal organization</i>			
G1	0.60	0.56	—
G2	—	0.24	0.40
<i>Civic or service organization</i>			
G1	0.26	0.26	—
G2	0.08	0.09	0.21
<i>Neighborhood association</i>			
G1	0.27	0.34	—
G2	0.07	0.09	0.25
<i>Sports group</i>			
G1	0.34	0.42	—
G2	0.19	0.28	0.31
<i>Informal group or club</i>			
G1	0.46	0.52	—
G2	0.06	0.21	0.21
<i>Ethnic or racial organization</i>			
G1	0.07	0.43	—
G2	—	0.23	0.44
<i>Professional or business group</i>			
G1	0.51	0.43	—
G2	0.02	0.35	0.41
<i>Labor union</i>			
G1	0.58	0.55	—
G2	—	0.42	0.45
<i>Overall index</i>			
G1	0.53	0.53	—
G2	0.08	0.33	0.41

Note: Entries are Pearson continuity correlations. Unstandardized regression coefficients obtained by regressing the T_2 score on the T_1 score are almost identical. Cases were held constant for each variable across time, within each generation. The continuity correlation for voluntary activity, which is available only for G2 in 1982–1997, is 0.32. The indicator for ethnic or racial organizations in 1965 differs from that used in all other waves, which is one reason for the lower 1965–1973 continuity correlation for G1. For G2 in 1965, the professional or business group category refers to groups that are linked to occupations.



social trust, they could make for a considerable difference when it comes to concrete behaviors such as organizational memberships.

Another way to examine life-cycle continuities focuses on the extent to which early experiences shape later ones. The continuity results just presented are at best suggestive on this point in that they are based on adjacent time periods and fail to take into account the possible reemergence of early orientations at more distant life stages. Such later manifestations could occur when individuals find themselves in environments that are analogous to those of an earlier stage. Members of G2 provide the ideal testing ground for this possibility because we have data on their organizational involvement from their high school years to middle age. Consequently, we can trace the effect of G2's total and specific organizational involvement while in high school on their subsequent total involvement — asking: Does organizational involvement in the pre-adult years foster civic engagement later in life?

If the answer is yes, this has two important, and related, implications regarding the decline in civic engagement in the United States. First, it would suggest that some of the decline has its origins in the breadth and vitality of organizations available to and taken advantage of by youth in school. As the analysis reported in Table 3 has suggested, members of Generation X lag behind those of their parents' generation in this regard. Second, and more optimistically, it suggests an avenue for revitalizing civic engagement in America through interventions aimed at promoting organizational involvement among high school students.

We begin by examining the bivariate relationships between high school activity levels and overall level of organizational involvement as of 1973, 1982, and 1997. The involvement index scores for each of these 3 years were regressed against the 1965 high school index as well as the specific organizational affiliations.⁹ The resulting bivariate coefficients appear in the first three columns of Table 6. The last three columns show the results with controls for the individual's education, income, work status, marital status (all measured at the same time point as the dependent variable) race, and sex. As an added test, the multivariate analysis also controls for the parent's level of organizational involvement as of 1965.

A distinctive pattern emerges (Table 6). There is a clear life-cycle dynamic at work in the link between one's organizational experiences as a pre-adult and those that surface later on. How the members of G2 sorted themselves out in terms of overall civic engagement when they were in their mid-20s (1973) bore no imprint of their overall levels of engagement in high school (bottom row), and was only seriously affected by one specific form of involvement — athletics. However, the connection grew stronger as the generation aged through their 30s and forties. By the time they had reached mid-life, their involvement levels were strongly linked to their high school profiles. Not only

**Table 6** Effect of involvement in organizational involvement during high school on organizational involvement later in life (second generation)

<i>Involvement in high school</i>	<i>Dependent variable: organizational involvement Bivariate results</i>			<i>Dependent variable: organizational involvement Multivariate result</i>		
	<i>in 1973</i>	<i>in 1982</i>	<i>in 1997</i>	<i>in 1973</i>	<i>in 1982</i>	<i>in 1997</i>
Church group	−0.06 (−1.31)	0.12** (2.86)	0.15*** (3.69)	−0.04 (−1.01)	0.12** (2.95)	0.13*** (3.43)
Civic or service organization	0.07 (1.58)	0.05 (1.08)	0.14*** (3.53)	0.05 (1.21)	−0.01 (−0.32)	0.07* (1.85)
Neighborhood association	0.01 (0.17)	0.07 (1.58)	0.14*** (3.39)	0.00 (.05)	0.05 (1.11)	0.11** (2.73)
Athletic team	0.16*** (3.58)	0.15*** (3.55)	0.13*** (3.23)	0.11** (2.58)	0.10* (2.33)	0.08* (2.14)
Informal group or club	0.02 (0.47)	0.03 (0.79)	0.08* (2.00)	−0.01 (−0.25)	0.02 (0.37)	0.09** (2.39)
Occupation-related group	−0.01 (−0.12)	−0.07 (−1.50)	0.02 (0.41)	0.06 (1.45)	0.01 (0.29)	0.08* (1.88)
Debate club	−0.05 (−1.06)	0.01 (0.12)	0.08* (2.08)	−0.04 (−0.99)	−0.00 (−0.07)	0.06 (1.44)
School subject-matter club	−0.01 (−0.16)	0.02 (0.38)	0.15*** (3.83)	−0.01 (−0.24)	−0.04 (−0.96)	0.10** (2.57)
Band or orchestra	0.02 (0.45)	0.09 (2.01)	0.05 (1.22)	0.04 (0.84)	0.08* (1.92)	0.03 (0.70)
School newspaper	−0.01 (−0.24)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	0.01 (0.27)	0.01 (0.33)	−0.01 (−0.24)
Organizational involvement	0.04 (1.02)	0.13** (2.97)	0.25*** (6.26)	0.06 (1.24)	0.09* (2.05)	0.19*** (4.82)
Voluntary activity	—	0.05 (1.08)	0.17*** (4.28)	—	0.02 (0.44)	0.13** (3.01)

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients with *t*-ratios in parenthesis below. To produce the results reported in the first three columns, overall organizational involvement (as of 1973, 1982, or 1997) was regressed on the variable indicated in each row. The models generating the results found in the second set of columns added controls for education, family income, marital status, and working status, all measured in the same wave as the dependent variable, as well as race, sex, and the parent's organizational involvement as of 1965. Education, income, and sex were highly significant at each point in time, in the expected direction. Race was insignificant in 1973 but significant in the 1982 and 1997 analyses, when involvement levels were higher among non-whites, *ceteris paribus*. Parental organizational involvement as of 1965 was significant in 1973 and 1982, but not in 1997. The analysis was based on all available G1–G2 pairs, and the *N* values were held constant within time periods but varied slightly across time. *N* values were 516, 534, and 609 for the 1973, 1982, and 1997 analyses, respectively. *** $P < 0.001$, ** $P < 0.01$, * $P < 0.05$.



was this so for the 1965 full index, but also for virtually all of the specific organizational affiliations; the only exceptions are involvement in band or orchestra and the student newspaper. Significantly, this holds true after controlling for personal characteristics that influence civic engagement and after taking into account the initial socialization boost (or lack thereof) in engagement provided by the parent's level of organizational involvement, as the last three columns demonstrate.¹⁰ Those involved in high school organizations show higher rates of voluntary activity by 1997 as well.

Manifestations of sleeper, or delayed effects, have been hard to come by in the socialization literature. The results just presented provide near spectacular support for such effects. The seeds planted during the high school years germinate and only gradually bear fruit. As people move into the life situations of middle age that evoke or require civic engagement, they draw on the predispositions and skills set in place at an earlier time. Pre-adult experiences do eventually matter.

Tracing the Connections between Social Trust and Civic Engagement across Time

One reason that civic engagement and social trust are bound together in the concept of social capital is that they are expected to reinforce each other. Some treatments of this interdependence focus on aggregations at the community, state, or nation-state level as the unit of analysis (e.g., Putnam, 2000, chapters 16–22; Paxton, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Hero, 2003; van der Meer, 2003). Localities in which civic organizations thrive are more likely to produce citizens who trust one another, and in localities where citizens trust one another civic organizations are more likely to thrive. But the interdependence has also been cast at the individual level, in part because individual-level dynamics might be behind the aggregate level relationships. As the argument goes, those who join organizations, who work or play with others in voluntary associations, are more likely to be trusting of others in the first place but also likely to emerge out of those interactions even more trusting than before. Hence, trust breeds involvement while also being inspired by it, just as distrust and disengagement go hand in hand. The 'vicious-virtuous' cycle (Brehm and Rahn, 1997, 1018) is in place.

Whether there is, in fact, a causal interdependency between trust and engagement is at present a very unsettled matter. Some scholars even question the expectation of a causal link. Although there are reasons to expect distrust to breed disengagement, there are plausible reasons to expect distrust to spur engagement as well. Moreover, while the experience of interacting with others in voluntary organizations may instill confidence in others, it might do so just



for the particular others one is interacting with, and not the generalized other that is the subject of most social trust indicators — or not at all if the experience ends up turning out badly.¹¹ Still, survey data on both US and non-US samples repeatedly turn up positive correlations between indicators of social trust and civic engagement. This, then, leaves the question of whether these correlations are spurious or instead indicative of the influence of social trust upon civic engagement, or *vice versa*, or both.

Several studies have tried to tease out information concerning these causal paths through statistical modeling. Brehm and Rahn (1997) evaluated the reciprocal relationships between social trust and organizational involvement. They found evidence of two-way causality but with a stronger path from organizational involvement to social trust than the other way around.¹² Claibourn and Martin (2000) found almost no evidence of a causal interdependence, but their conclusion about the directional arrows agrees with Brehm and Rahn — organizational involvement does have an effect (albeit a weak one) on social trust (see also, Shah, 1998). On the other hand, Uslaner found that greater trust did flow from voluntary, charitable activity, but uncovered much stronger evidence for the notion that social trust inspires civic engagement, especially ‘those forms of civic engagement that connect us to people who are different from ourselves’ (Uslaner, 2002b, 26). The contention that social trust is more a cause than a consequence of civic engagement is also supported by Stolle (1998, 2001), who compared group members based on their length of organizational involvement. In her study, the trust levels of joiners were high when they first became involved, and were not especially elevated among those with long-lived memberships.

Panel data provide one of the best means to address the interdependence of social trust and organizational involvement. With repeated measures on the same subjects over multiple waves, one can trace the extent to which civic engagement encourages trust in others and the extent to which trust in others in a prerequisite for civic engagement. Rather than trying to tease out information about a dynamic process from cross-sectional data, the inferential leverage comes from the longitudinal design. In this section, we examine the relationship between social trust and organizational involvement by estimating fairly simple panel models.

Before doing so, it is worth noting that the contemporaneous associations that we find between social trust and civic engagement are not of the magnitude implied by the ‘vicious-virtuous cycle’ appellation. The simple correlation between the social trust index and the organizational involvement index for G1 was 0.22 in 1965, 0.13 in 1973, and 0.17 in 1982. The correlation between trust and voluntary activity in 1982 was 0.13. Relationships are even weaker in the younger generation, beginning with 0.01 in 1965, based on the high school organizational involvement index. Succeeding years brought only



slightly stronger connections: 0.13 in 1973, 0.11 in 1982, and 0.09 in 1997, which are comparable to those found for trust and voluntary activity: 0.11 in 1982 and 0.07 in 1997. These findings, however, understate the relationships in two ways. First, membership in some types of organizations tends to be either unrelated or negatively related to social trust, which drags these correlations down. Specifically, labor union involvement is negatively related to trust in each year for both generations, and the correlations approach zero for involvement in church groups, fraternal organizations, and ethnic or racial groups. Second, and more fundamentally, these contemporaneous relationships do not speak to the vexing issue of how trust and engagement affect each other over time.

We tackle that issue by estimating panel models that compare the extent to which the T_1 value of one social capital component predicts the T_2 value of the other. Thus, we use T_1 social trust to predict T_2 organizational involvement, T_1 organizational involvement to predict T_2 social trust. At the same time, we control for other variables known to affect social trust and/or membership in voluntary organizations, and voluntary activity, including age and age-squared (for G1), education, income, work status, marital status, race, and sex. In light of Uslaner's (2000a) findings about the importance of optimism, we also include a control for the personality trait of self-confidence. To make the test for the effects of trust and engagement more demanding, we include controls measured in the same wave as the dependent variable (i.e., T_2). This pair of analyses will reveal the extent to which someone who is highly trusting as of the first time point ends up more civically engaged at the second than would otherwise be expected on the basis of his or her socio-demographic characteristics and self-confidence level; and, similarly, the extent to which someone who is highly involved as of the first time point ends up more trusting than would otherwise be expected. Despite their simplicity, these models will provide some insight into the individual-level causal dynamics of the social capital nexus.¹³

We applied these models to panel data for the First and Second Generations. For G1 this provides two sets of analyses, one for 1965–1973 and one for 1973–1982. For G3, there are three panel periods, 1965–1973, 1973–1982, and 1982–1997. Because we have caught these generations at quite different stages of life-long development, we must be attentive to general patterns in the results while also sensitive to life-cycle differences. Each analysis was carried out for the overall index of organizational involvement as well as for nine dummy variables representing involvement in the different types of organizations (church groups, sports groups, labor unions, and so on). Although the different organizational types we are able to identify do not map well onto the distinctions often made in the social capital literature — between horizontally *vs* vertically structured organizations, for example — it is still reasonable to



expect variation by organization in the process we are examining. Given that the coefficients linking trust with membership in labor unions or business associations are frequently negative (though never significant), we include an organizational involvement index that drops these two components. For G2, we add voluntary activity since we have the necessary two waves of data in this case (1982–1997).

Table 7 presents the results for the parent generation. The columns of the table identify which variable served as dependent and which served as independent, as well as the waves analyzed. In the body of the table we report standardized coefficients as well as *t*-statistics. In the interests of space, we omit the results for the control variables.¹⁴

First consider the results when organizational involvement is used to predict social trust (first two columns). In the first panel period the overall index of involvement shows a slight, marginally significant relationship with trust once business and labor groups are excluded ($b = 0.06$, $t = 1.75$), but the results for specific groups yield small and insignificant coefficients in nearly every case. By contrast, results from the second panel period (1973–1982) show a stronger trust-building role for civic engagement. The overall index of involvement as of 1973 bears a strong relationship to trust in 1982, controlling for the socio-demographic variables mentioned above, especially once membership in business and labor groups is excluded ($b = 0.09$, $t = 2.61$). This relationship is largely fueled by membership in service organizations (e.g., Lions or Rotary) and informal clubs (e.g., bridge clubs), though the coefficients for neighborhood associations and sports groups approach significance.

Social trust, on the other hand, is a stronger predictor of organizational involvement than *vice versa* in the first panel period, especially when one excludes labor unions and business or professional associations from consideration (column 3). The trusting are less likely to join those work-related organizations, though not to a statistically significant degree, whereas they are more likely to join other voluntary associations — particularly fraternal organizations, neighborhood associations, sports groups, informal clubs, and ethnic or racial organizations. In the second panel period trust is again influential, though to a statistically significant degree only for neighborhood associations and sports clubs, as well as for the slimmed-down index. Indeed, while a head-to-head comparison of the relative predictive power of social trust and civic engagement would have social trust ahead in the first panel period, that is no longer true by the second.

Table 8 shows the results from estimating the models for G2. A first, striking finding is that those who were members of organizations in high school — especially church groups, neighborhood groups, or informal clubs — were more *distrusting* by their mid-20s than were those who had been uninvolved in high school. It is possible, though unlikely, that the experience of membership

Table 7 Interdependence of social trust and organizational involvement (first generation)

	<i>Using 1965 involvement to predict 1973 social trust</i>	<i>Using 1973 involvement to predict 1982 social trust</i>	<i>Using 1965 social trust to predict 1973 involvement</i>	<i>Using 1973 social trust to predict 1982 involvement</i>
Church group	0.04 (1.26)	0.02 (0.57)	0.03 (0.90)	0.01 (0.27)
Fraternal organization	0.05 (1.53)	−0.02 (−0.45)	0.07* (1.93)	0.03 (0.70)
Civic or service organization	−0.01 (−0.36)	0.06* (1.71)	0.04 (1.09)	0.01 (0.13)
Neighborhood association	0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (1.33)	0.09** (2.40)	0.08* (2.08)
Sports group	0.01 (0.42)	0.04 (1.23)	0.11** (2.38)	0.10** (2.46)
Informal group or club	0.01 (0.30)	0.09** (2.70)	0.09** (2.39)	0.01 (0.15)
Ethnic or racial organization	−0.01 (−0.16)	0.03 (0.84)	0.08* (1.97)	0.01 (0.18)
Professional or business group	0.02 (0.78)	−0.04 (−0.95)	−0.05 (−1.31)	−0.02 (−0.62)
Labor union	−0.04 (−1.15)	−0.01 (−0.39)	−0.03 (−0.91)	−0.05 (−1.35)
Overall involvement level	0.06 (1.61)	0.07* (1.92)	0.10*** (2.83)	0.06 (1.63)
Overall, excluding business and labor organizations	0.06* (1.75)	0.09*** (2.61)	0.13*** (3.62)	0.09* (2.27)

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients with *t*-ratios in parenthesis. In the analyses reported in the first and second columns social trust (at T₂) served as the dependent variable and involvement in the organization named in the row (at T₁) served as the independent variable. In the analyses reported in the third and fourth columns, involvement in the organization named in the row (at T₂) served as the dependent variable and social trust (at T₁) served as the independent variable. In the bottom rows, summary measures of organizational involvement were used. Each analysis controlled for education, income, marital status, working status, and self-confidence, all measured at T₂, as well as age, age-squared, race, and sex. *N*s, which vary from 754 to 878, were held constant across rows. ****P* < 0.001, ***P* < 0.01, **P* < 0.05.

Table 8 Interdependence of social trust and organizational involvement (second generation)

	<i>Using 1965 involvement to predict 1973 social trust</i>	<i>Using 1973 involvement to predict 1982 social trust</i>	<i>Using 1982 involvement to predict 1997 social trust</i>	<i>Using 1965 social trust to predict 1973 involvement</i>	<i>Using 1973 social trust to predict 1982 involvement</i>	<i>Using 1982 social trust to predict 1997 involvement</i>
Church group	-0.06* (-1.72)	-0.03 (-0.68)	0.06 (1.45)	-0.07* (-1.67)	-0.01 (-0.34)	0.02 (0.58)
Fraternal organization	—	0.00 (0.11)	-0.01 (-0.27)	—	0.02 (0.44)	0.06 (1.53)
Civic or service organization	-0.01 (-0.18)	-0.04 (-1.07)	0.02 (0.56)	-0.07* (-1.68)	0.07* (1.69)	0.11** (2.71)
Neighborhood association	-0.11** (-2.79)	0.03 (0.73)	0.02 (0.46)	0.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.41)	0.05 (1.37)
Sports group	0.01 (0.23)	-0.01 (-0.31)	0.02 (0.63)	-0.01 (-0.18)	0.04 (0.88)	0.05 (1.31)
Informal group or club	-0.08* (-2.05)	0.02 (0.60)	0.04 (1.12)	-0.01 (-0.17)	0.12** (3.00)	0.09** (2.33)
Ethnic or racial organization	—	0.02 (0.55)	0.05 (1.32)	—	0.02 (0.50)	0.05 (1.27)
Professional or business group	0.02 (0.63)	-0.01 (-0.24)	0.02 (0.41)	-0.04 (-1.05)	-0.03 (-0.75)	-0.02 (-0.45)
Labor union	—	-0.04 (-1.27)	-0.01 (-0.32)	—	0.04 (1.38)	-0.01 (-0.21)
Overall involvement	-0.09* (-2.34)	-0.03 (-0.67)	0.04 (1.00)	-0.05 (-1.40)	0.06 (1.57)	0.10** (2.73)
Overall, excluding business & labor	-0.11** (-2.71)	0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (1.39)	-0.06 (-1.64)	0.06 (1.47)	0.12** (3.19)
Voluntary activity	—	—	0.07** (2.28)	—	0.08** (2.41)	0.07* (2.24)

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients with *t*-ratios in parenthesis. In the analyses reported in the first three columns social trust (at T₂) served as the dependent variable and involvement in the organization named in the row (at T₁) served as the independent variable. In the analyses reported in the last three columns, involvement in the organization named in the row (at T₂) served as the dependent variable and social trust (at T₁) served as the independent variable. The bottom three rows report the findings when summary measures of organizational involvement and voluntary activity are used. Each analysis controlled for education, income, marital status, working status, and self-confidence, all measured at T₂, as well as race, and sex. *N* values, which vary from 677 to 910, were held constant across rows. ****P* < 0.001, ***P* < 0.01, **P* < 0.05.



in these groups itself fueled distrust of others. Another possibility is that the youth who were organizationally involved in high school were more aware of and troubled by the social and political disturbances that transpired in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and became less trusting as a result. A third interpretation begins with the assumption that individuals experiencing the transition from adolescence to adulthood would lose the social infrastructure available to them as high school students, which they availed themselves of to varying degrees. If so, these negative relationships would imply that distrust was exacerbated among those for whom the loss in social involvement was greatest, namely, those who had been involved in organized youth groups in high school. This interpretation, somewhat paradoxically, views the negative relationships seen in the first column of Table 8 as evidence that a loss of social capital matters, in this case by encouraging generalized distrust.¹⁵

That said, there is little other evidence of a trust-building role for civic engagement. Across the second and third panel periods, none of the eighteen coefficients referring to specific types of groups are statistically significant, nor are those for the summary index. Only for voluntary activity is there a positive, statistically significant result. Those with a history of volunteering are more trusting, subsequently, than would be otherwise expected on the basis of their personality and socio-demographic characteristics.

By contrast, there is fairly strong evidence in the G2 results of the influence of trust on involvement, though it is also the case that this relationship increases over time. Illustratively, social trust as of 1965 bears a slight negative relationship to organizational involvement in 1973 ($b = -0.05$, $t = -1.40$), but lagged trust becomes a positive predictor in the next panel period ($b = 0.06$, $t = 1.57$), and even stronger in the last ($b = 0.10$, $t = 2.73$). A similar pattern is evident if one looks at the results for the specific organizations. The coefficients and t -statistics typically climb from 1973 to 1982 to 1997.¹⁶ In terms of the variation across groups or activities, whether one is trusting or distrusting appears especially important to one's likelihood of joining service organizations and informal clubs, and bears a strong relationship to voluntary activity as well.

In light of the full set of results for both generations several points are worth addressing further. First, the greater effect of civic engagement on social trust found for G1, compared with G2, requires explanation. Because G1 was aging from 44 to 61 years over the period, while G2 was aging from 26 to 50 years, the differences might be explained by life-stage effects, generation effects, or both. Indirect evidence in favor of a generational explanation comes from findings about the individual-level stability of trust and civic engagement for G1 and G2. Recall that while G2's continuity correlations for social trust in the last panel period approximated those of G1, the same was not true for civic engagement, where G2 continuity fell well behind that for G1. Sustained levels



of engagement would presumably have more impact on social trust than would less sustained ones. Alternatively, G2 might yet rise to the continuity level of G1 (though that seems unlikely to us), in which event a life-cycle interpretation would be preferred.

In this context, it may also be significant that the effects of organizational involvement found for G1 occurred when social trust was on the decline for that generation. Membership in voluntary associations (especially service organizations, neighborhood associations, and informal clubs) apparently worked to ward off increasing distrust. A plausible interpretation is that this effect of civic engagement is tied to the aging of G1, with the assortment of vulnerabilities and tendency toward isolation that older age brings. Accordingly, sustained engagement with others in collective enterprises would help to create a whole host of positive outcomes for the individual, including less distrust in others.

Second, these results lend some credence to the general expectation that civic engagement and social trust are interdependent, with each playing a part in sustaining the other. At the same time, and unlike the conclusion reached by some (e.g., Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Shah, 1998; Claibourn and Martin, 2000), though in accordance with the conclusion reached by Stolle (2001) and Uslaner (2002b), our evidence suggests that trust is a stronger prerequisite for, than an outcome of, civic engagement. Results concerning the Boomer generation are particularly unsupportive of the idea that trust and engagement reinforce each other, and hence are bound together in a virtuous-vicious cycle.

Third, these findings help sustain the conclusion that civic engagement and social trust have powerful life-cycle dynamics. Not only do levels rise and fall over the course of the life cycle, as we saw in Table 2, and not only do pre-adult experiences with organizational involvement spur greater involvement later on — especially in mid-life — as we saw in Table 6. In addition, as Tables 7 and 8 have shown, whether trust spurs involvement and distrust restrains it *also* depends on life stage. As the members of G2 moved through young adulthood and into middle age, their general inclination to trust or distrust others became increasingly important to whether they become civically engaged. Middle age was also the time frame in which the largest effects of trust on engagement were found for G1, eclipsing those found as this generation moved into old age. Why this is so is open to multiple interpretations. One possibility, which could explain the G2 pattern, is that the trusting or distrusting disposition itself becomes more meaningful to the individual as she ages, just as it becomes more stable over the life course, as we have shown. Hence, its power to mold behavior subsequently grows. Another possibility, pertinent to the findings for both generations, is rooted in the changing circumstances and opportunities faced by individuals at various points in their lives. What is changing, in this view, are the conditions that evoke or require civic engagement. As the



opportunities for involvement rise, so too does our ability to predict involvement on the basis of predispositions such as social trust.

Finally, the variability in the results depending upon the particular organization analyzed should be underscored. We found either no relationship or a negative one between trust and involvement in work-related organizations. Only rarely did we see relationships involving fraternal organizations, ethnic/racial associations, and church groups. At the other end of the spectrum lies civic or service organizations, neighborhood associations, and informal clubs. For these groups the connection between trust and involvement was greatest, though for G1 the relationship tended to go both ways (with trust first spurring involvement, and then involvement inspiring trust), while for G2 it went one way (with trust promoting involvement).

One way to make sense of this pattern of findings calls upon the distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. The former emerges from interactions with similar others in groups that reinforce exclusive identities. The latter emerges from interactions with diverse others in inclusive groups. Involvement in labor unions, business or professional organizations, church groups, fraternal organizations, and ethnic or racial associations — those where involvement shows no relationship to social trust — would each be considered sources of bonding social capital. In these cases, it is reasonable to believe that trust or distrust of people in general would be far less relevant to or affected by organizational involvement than trust or distrust of people identified in terms of the exclusive group identity. Although we could speculate further about the sources of these group differences, one conclusion requires no speculation. When it comes to the interconnection of trust and engagement, summary indices of involvement across diverse types of organizations conceal more than they reveal.

Conclusion

Our results support several broad conclusions that bear on political scientists' interest in social capital and its decline in the United States. First, to the extent that the decline has been fueled by generational replacement, it is the newest generation, Generation X, that is fueling the decline. The gap in social trust between the (early) Boomers and Generation X was large and dramatic, made even more so by the aggregate similarity in trust between the Boomers and their parents, members of the New Deal or Long Civic Generation. In terms of organizational involvement levels, again the Boomers came out looking as engaged or even more engaged than the generation that preceded them. And again the members of Generation X lagged behind (though here we were only able to compare the generations in terms of their involvement in youth groups



during high school). Although we have not addressed what makes Generation X less trusting and involved in voluntary associations than previous generations — be it TV, changing residential contexts, changes in family life, or the absence of a galvanizing social and political context, among other things (e.g., Putnam, 2000) — our analysis does reinforce the conclusion that understanding this generation is key.

Second, while generational differences in social trust and civic engagement are stark, so too are those involving the life cycle. As is well known based on other work, though again demonstrated in our analysis here, levels of civic engagement — both involvement in voluntary organizations and the performance of voluntary work — tend to first rise and then fall across the *adult* years. As is less well known, there is one other twist in the road, a decline in each form of civic engagement from late adolescence to early adulthood. Youth in high school not only have many opportunities to volunteer and join groups, but they have strong incentives to do so, and hence many do. Involvement levels then drop sharply as individuals leave that youthful environment and begin to go it alone as young adults, only slowly climbing upwards again as middle age sets in.

Somewhat surprisingly, and to our knowledge previously unnoticed, there appears to a parallel life cycle trend in social trust — with trust levels first falling with the transition from adolescence to adulthood, then climbing again in the late 20s and subsequently. There may even be a decline in the later years, as is typical with civic engagement, though on this point we are unable to use our evidence to distinguish period from life-cycle effects. The parallel nature of these life-cycle trends encourages the expectation that trust and engagement are dynamically inter-related, but as we have seen, the evidence on this point is decidedly mixed. Moreover, since social trust and civic engagement share many of the same determinants, especially those related to socioeconomic status, it is equally or even more plausible that SES is lurking behind both patterns.

One implication of both of these life-cycle patterns, that for social trust and that for civic engagement, is that any static comparison of social capital levels by age will inevitably reveal differences shaped by both generational and life-cycle effects. Young Americans of today, those aged 18–25 years for example, will manifest lower levels of social trust and civic engagement than their elders both because they are at a particularly unsettled point in their lives and because they are representatives of the low social capital Generation X (or Y). The two phenomena should not be conflated when interpreting age differences as they have very different implications for how both individuals and society will change as time moves on.

Scholars are accustomed to thinking of life-cycle effects in terms of how levels of political behavior ebb and flow as the individual ages. The age-related changes found for levels of civic engagement and social trust fit this model. But



our analysis also uncovered evidence of two different, yet related, kind of life-cycle effects involving civic engagement. The first is the extent to which adult involvement in voluntary associations has its roots in pre-adult experiences. As to whether those roots are there: they are. But more to the point, germination is a long-term process. The effects of organizational involvement in high school on involvement later in life are delayed, emerging gradually and increasingly strongly as the individual approaches middle age. The second finding of this sort, itself a variant of the first, is that the apparent effect of social trust on civic engagement also increases as individuals move from young adulthood to mid-life. In other words, the disposition to trust (or distrust) others provides no boost (or barrier) to civic engagement among the young, but does emerge as consequential in the later years. As we remarked earlier, we suspect that each phenomenon is linked to real changes across the life cycle in the opportunities and incentives for civic engagement.

While each of these life-cycle findings are of interest in themselves, when taken together they convey important lessons for those concerned about the decline of civic engagement in the US. One lesson is that interventions aimed at high school students may, in fact, be able to stem or even reverse the tide. Involving adolescents in social organizations early on will, if our analysis is to be believed, have consequences for their civic engagement level later in life. But at the same time, those consequences will not be immediate. They will take time, perhaps even decades, to be felt, as the erstwhile high school students wend their way through life. At a more mundane level, researchers trying to trace the effects of high school interventions may come up disappointed if their designs have a short time horizon, even if those interventions do come to matter later on.

A second lesson begins with the observation that there is heterogeneity in the determinants of civic engagement, a heterogeneity structured by age. What inspires civic engagement in early adulthood is not the same as what instigates it in mid-life, nor, perhaps, in the later years. As just noted, there appears to be age-related variation in the extent to which individuals' early organizational experiences come to play a role, and in the extent to which their dispositions to trust or distrust others are consequential. And while this was something we noted only in passing, our analysis also suggested that socioeconomic characteristics might become increasingly important predictors of trust and engagement as individuals move into middle age. In any event, these kinds of dynamics matter to how life-cycle effects play out in the aggregate over time. If, for example, the disposition to trust others shapes organizational involvement in mid-life more than in the early adult years, then the low levels of trust displayed by members of Generation X will have grim consequences for their civic engagement that will only be felt as that generation approaches middle-age.



Claims such as this last one depend on the expectation that the intergenerational differences in trust already evident will remain intact as the members of Generation X age. Another possibility, however, is that the Generation Xers will come to shed their unusually distrusting attitudes as they move through the life course. Although nothing in our analysis suggests that this *will* happen, and since our focus has not been on the determinants of social trust we cannot say how it *could* happen, we do have one reason to be somewhat optimistic in this regard. Our results suggest that social trust is a disposition that is quite malleable among young adults. It is at best weakly transmitted from parent to child, leaving the young adult quite open to other influences, good or bad. It is also quite unstable across the early years of adulthood, or at least it was in our analysis of the high school class of 1965. At the same time, the tendency to trust or distrust others appears to crystallize with age. Hence, efforts to nurture trusting dispositions will be fruitful if they are targeted at those, particularly young adults, whose dispositions are more in play.

Although we observed age-related variation in the stability of social trust, we saw both age-related and generational differences in the stability of organizational involvement. Compared to those from the Long Civic Generation (our G1), the Baby Boomers (our G2) move more frequently into and out of voluntary associations over time. Intriguingly, this generational difference in the stability of organizational involvement seems to lend support to Wuthnow's contention that the character of Americans' civic life is changing:

Americans still care deeply about their communities and make efforts to connect with other people. But these efforts generally do not take the same forms as they had in the past because of the increased diversity, fluidity, interdependence, and specialization of contemporary life....In place of enduring membership organizations, we now see a wide variety of activities that involve short-term or sporadic commitments and task-specific relationships that bring together individuals and organizations from different sectors of the community. (Wuthnow 1998, 203)

If Wuthnow is correct, recent generations are more 'loosely connected' to their communities, often involved but not in as regular or enduring a fashion as were earlier generations. This possibility is fascinating in its implications and has received far less attention than the possibility that generational differences in the level of civic engagement have emerged. It is one thing to say that people born in different historical eras and yet at comparable life-stages vary in the extent to which they are likely to be involved in any organization or in lots of organizations. It is another thing to carry out this comparison with the continuity of involvement in mind. Although our stability findings are



consistent with Wuthnow's conclusion, much more could be done to explore this possibility.

Acknowledgement

This article is a revised version of one prepared for presentation at the 2001 American Political Science Association Convention, San Francisco, CA. Financial support for the most recent data collection utilized here came from the National Science Foundation, Grant SBR-9601295. This research was also supported by the Institute of Governmental Studies and the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley. We thank Jake Bowers, Kathy Cramer Walsh, and Lia Roberts for assistance in the collection and processing of the recent data, and Bruce Bimber and Robert Putnam for comments on an earlier draft.

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Notes

- 1 Because social capital involves social relations, the nature of individuals' *informal* social networks are sometimes analyzed in addition to their organizational membership and their voluntary activity (e.g., Putnam, 2000, chapter 6). Less frequently, trust in institutions is sometimes treated as a critical aspect of social capital (e.g., Paxton, 1999). We omit these components from present consideration.
- 2 For more details on the methodology of the initial and subsequent surveys see Jennings (2004), Jennings and Niemi (1981) and Stoker and Jennings (1999).
- 3 Around two-thirds of these respondents had one or more siblings in the dataset, which raises the issue of whether the data should be weighted in the analysis. Comparisons based on weighted *vs* unweighted data produced very similar results. Consequently, we present unweighted results in this article.
- 4 Waves 2 and 3 included a number of mailback questionnaire respondents; they were not asked the organizational question.
- 5 All of the G3 data were obtained via self-administered questionnaires. Because self-administration tends to produce somewhat fewer socially approved responses, it might be concluded that the gaps are methodological artifacts. Beyond the convergence of these age-related findings with other data sources and the unlikely ability of administration mode to generate such large differences, we have evidence from a 1965 comparison of interviewed and self-administered high school seniors showing a meaningful difference only on the 'people are fair' item (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, 218–219). In addition a comparison of interviewed and mail-back respondents in the 1973 wave of the G2 panel revealed very small differences according to mode of administration (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, 403).
- 6 The age comparisons for G3 are between subjects at one time point (1997) rather than within subjects over time. To generate this figure, we regressed social trust on age and age-squared while also controlling for education. The entries are the average trust scores by age, setting education to its mean level. Age is negatively associated with education level for G3. At the same time, higher education is associated with higher levels of trust. Controlling for education removed this confound. The education scale we used largely differentiated the education levels of those older than 18 years, who had had the opportunity to go to college. Specifically, it distinguished those still in high school, those with a high school degree but no college, those with some college experience, those with a college degree, and those with post-graduate education.



- With all variables scaled to range from 0-1, the actual coefficients obtained were as follows: education, $b = 0.30$ ($t = 4.73$), age, $b = -0.70$ ($t = -2.20$), age-squared, $b = 0.79$ ($t = 2.16$). The N was 762.
- 7 Methodological artifacts could be at work here because G2 was presented with a longer list in 1997 than was G1 in 1965. Two factors argue against such effects. One, as noted above, respondents could and did volunteer other memberships not contained on the list. Second, a comparison based only on groups common to both lists again shows a higher average for G2 than G1.
 - 8 The question read: 'Here is a list of some things which people might do when they are in high school. Please check all that apply to you, or that applied to you when you were in high school.'
 - 9 Because the two generations are no longer being compared, we take advantage of the more extensive data on G2 to analyze a larger set of high school activities than found in previous tables.
 - 10 These analyses involved separate regressions for each of the types of organizations listed in the table and for the overall index of involvement in high school. The results are virtually unchanged if we instead run one analysis simultaneously including the variables for each organizational type. As would be expected, the t -ratios dip somewhat and some of the coefficients decline slightly, but on the whole, each form of involvement contributes independently to civic engagement later in life. Interesting, the role of education in predicting involvement also grows over time. The standardized coefficient goes from 0.04, to 0.10 to 0.21 across the 1973-1997 waves.
 - 11 For an overview of these and other arguments concerning the link between civic engagement and social trust, see Claibourn and Martin (2000), Hooghe (2003), Kramer (1999), Portes (1998), Ridout and Espino (2000), and Uslaner (2002b).
 - 12 This is true when looking at the unstandardized coefficients in the models they present. Interestingly, the standardized coefficients go the other way — the path from trust to involvement has a larger coefficient than *vice versa*.
 - 13 Structural equation models like those developed by Brehm and Rahn (1997), Claibourn and Martin (2000), Shah (1998) and Uslaner (2002b) strive to simultaneously estimate the reciprocal relationships between trust and engagement. Such models require strong assumptions in order to be identified, in particular, assumptions about what affects social trust but *not* civic engagement and *vice versa*. Results are typically very sensitive to exactly how these exclusion restrictions are specified. Since our simple models do not build in any exclusion restrictions, the differences we uncover in the relative predictive power of trust and engagement cannot be traced to that source. In addition, the results we present here agree with those obtained when predicting T1-T2 change in the dependent variable instead of T2 level (Jennings and Stoker, 20001). At the same time, they do not provide what is ultimately needed: a dynamic model of the causal interdependence between trust and engagement.
 - 14 Details are available from the authors upon request. Standardized coefficients make more sense than do unstandardized coefficients in the present case since the organizational involvement variables tend to have limited variances and skewed distributions while the trust variable does not. With all variables scaled 0-1, the unstandardized coefficients tend to be lower than the standardized coefficients when the dependent variable is organizational involvement, while the opposite is true when the dependent variable is social trust. Ultimately, we decided that the standardized coefficients provided a fairer basis for making the key comparisons of interest to us here. Also in the interests of comparison, we used OLS instead of shifting to Logit or Probit when analyzing the dichotomous organizational involvement variables.
 - 15 Since the correlation between trust and involvement in 1965 is only 0.01, there is no regression to the mean phenomenon lurking behind this result. In addition, the same finding is obtained when



change in trust between 1965 and 1973 is modeled; the more involved in high school, the more distrusting one became from 1965 to 1973. To evaluate this matter more completely, one would need to develop a model of trust that takes into account civic engagement levels in high school (1965) as well as the changing civic engagement levels between 1965 and 1973, while also building in the possibility of reciprocal effects. See Note 13.

- 16 Recall that organizational involvement in high school also has increasing effects on later involvement over time (Table 6), yet is not included among the predictor variables for the models we report upon in Table 8. If organizational involvement in high school is added as a predictor for involvement in 1973, 1982, and 1997, the results for trust are in each case as strong, or stronger, as those found in Table 8. The ‘sleeper effect’ of high school engagement is vividly apparent, again, as well.