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National Security Agency

Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

CRYPTOLOGIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

USS PUEBLO

VOL. I

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SECTION IV

CRYPTOLOGIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

USS PUEBLO, AGER-2

23 January - 23 December 1968

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A. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM USS PUEBLO CREWMEMBERS

1. Classified Documents

a. Location of Cryptologic Classified Data Aboard USS PUEBLO During This Patrol:

(1) Classified cryptologic material was maintained in two areas aboard the USS PUEBLO prior to the incident which led to her capture. These spaces were: (a) the Research Operations room, occupied by the Naval Security Group Detachment, and (b) the Administrative Office used by the Officer-in-Charge as the main office for Naval Security Group matters and the prime storage area for organizational files as well as excess or duplicate documentation not required on-hand in the Research Operations room. These two spaces were considered to be "secure" areas (limited access to Naval Security Group ((NAVSECGRU)) or other appropriately cleared personnel) and, in addition, the Research room was manned continuously, therefore, documents were not always stored in safes or files. This was particularly true in the Research Operations room where classified documents were: (a) kept at the Supervisor's desk, (b) on a shelf over the Supervisor's desk, (c) at the intercept positions, (d) in drawers at the intercept positions, and (e) in a box located near the radio telephone position. The material located in the Administrative Office was normally placed in the two safes; however, on the day of the incident some classified documentation was known to have been placed on top of the Officer-in-Charge's desk, as well as in the center drawer of this particular desk.

(2) Although it has been virtually impossible to pinpoint the location of all classified material, some specific items were determined to be located in the Research Operations room immediately prior to the USS PUEBLO incident. These items are identified in the SIGINT Inventory, Section IV.B. of this report.

(3) The Administrative Office contained two safes which were used for storage of personnel data, administrative items, material not specifically required on-hand in the Research room, and duplicate copies of some of the documents located in the Research Operations room. It is known, for example, that the majority of the SICR's aboard the USS PUEBLO were being reviewed by the OIC of the Detachment and were placed in the center drawer of his desk prior to capture. On the morning of 23 January 1968, the Administrative Assistant was in the process of compiling the USS PUEBLO trip report, using the June 67 patrol report of the USS BANNER as an example, and had completed some 10-12 multilith masters. It was established that the Administrative Office maintained all permanently assigned NAVSECGRU personnel jackets, 1967/68 message files, classified Communications Technician (CT) examinations for advancement in rating, NAVSECGRU operating instructions in addition to the excess or duplicate technical documents.

b. Non-Inventoried Items On-Board USS PUEBLO:

(1) In addition to the many inventoried documents identified as having been on-board USS PUEBLO, the debrief of the crew revealed that additional cryptologic material not listed on any inventory, was also on-board. This material was compiled as a direct result of the daily activities of the Security Group Detachment (support aids, raw intercept, traffic logs, etc.) or consisted of information which various individuals gathered from previous duty stations and subsequently brought aboard the USS PUEBLO when reporting for duty. It must be pointed out that specific and detailed identification of this data is extremely difficult in that much of the information provided by the crewmembers was obtained some eleven months after last observing any of the material. Additionally, a significant amount of the information contained in their personal notebooks was compiled many months before the capture of the USS PUEBLO, thereby compounding a critical identification problem.

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(2) The debriefs revealed that the Research Operations room contained at least the following uninventoried documents:

(a) Twenty to twenty-four burn bags containing at least one to two days (22-23 January) of operational intelligence monitor traffic, carbon paper and operator scratch paper.

(b) Voice frequency listings at the Radio Telephone position.

(c) Intercept logs and raw traffic from manual Morse, Radio Telephone and ELINT intercept for period 10-23 January 1968.

(d) [redacted] and Radio Telephone intercept tapes collected during period 10-23 January 1968.

(e) Radar plotting chart reflecting positions of intercepted North Korean radars.

(f) Supervisor's daily log and "pass down log" probably classified at least "COMINT CHANNELS".

(g) [redacted] kept with daily changes received from [redacted].

(h) ELINT intercept summary messages and intercept tapes.

(i) Instructions for "O" branchers use in routing traffic internally aboard USS PUEBLO.

(j) Detachment Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) - content unknown.

(k) ELINT parameters listing developed by ELINT operators.

(l) Internal memorandums for SECGRU Detachment.

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(m) Letter files for USS PUEBLO.

(n) CO and OIC narrative report of USS PUEBLO mission off North Korea.

(o) Personal notebooks of at least eight (8) CT's containing very detailed and highly classified cryptologic material.

(3) Probably the most damaging information among the uninventoried items were the personal notebooks maintained by various crewmembers aboard the USS PUEBLO. These books were compiled for the purpose of assisting the individual in the execution of his assigned professional duties and, further, to aid in the preparation for advancement of rating examinations. No personal record of the contents was made, therefore, identification of the information contained in these books was determined on the basis of the ability of each individual to recall the contents of his own notebook. As a result of these discussions, it has been determined that at least the following information in both cryptic and detailed form is available to the North Koreans from personal notebooks:

(a) At least 15 booklets on the Soviet

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(b) Information on Soviet

(d) Soviet Air order of battle.

[redacted]

(f) A general description of [redacted]

(g) Soviet [redacted]

(h) Soviet [redacted]

(k) Portions of various SICRs extracted for information and background purposes.

(l) A net diagram of the [redacted]

(m) Data related to NSA Signal Analysis Course 100 (NSA SA-100) which included characteristics of teletype systems, modulations, diagrams of speech and sideband systems in considerable detail.

(n) Breakdown of prime radar signals which included [redacted]

(p) [redacted]

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(q) Flash cards on radar signals.

(r) Types of Soviet ships.

(s) Extracts from TECHINS 2020, TEXTA Manual.

(t) Extracts from TECHINS 1003.

(u) Information on characteristics of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
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(v) Notes on AN/BRD-6 (DF) capability.

(w) Classified material on courses for T, R, and I branches of the Communications Technician rating.

(x) Navy Communications Technician training courses.

(4) Information available indicates that these notebooks were subjected to only cursory attempts at destruction (i.e., only torn or ripped).

c. Destruction Attempts Prior to Capture:

(1) Emergency destruction of classified material accomplished aboard the USS PUEBLO was conducted over a limited period of some 20 to 40 minutes prior to the boarding of the vessel by the North Koreans. Although the order to "prepare for emergency destruction" was given fairly early in the incident, actual implementation of destruction procedures was withheld until the North Koreans opened fire. In the Research spaces, physical destruction of material commenced some five to six minutes prior to the receipt of this order from the bridge. It was obvious that the destruction that actually occurred was accomplished in almost total confusion and in a completely disorganized fashion.

(2) The following events, related to destruction, occurred in the Research Operations room and Administrative Office:

(a) Fires were started in two or three trash cans which were placed in the passageway outside of the Research room and attempts were made to burn classified papers.

(b) Almost all of the material from the Administrative Office and some additional data from the Research room was then placed in weighted bags with the intent that they would be jettisoned; however, only one unidentified bag was actually thrown over the side. Further attempts to jettison material (i.e., through a porthole) were hindered by gun fire from the North Koreans; therefore, no further efforts were made to discard material in this manner.

(c) Continued efforts to burn material in the trash cans caused considerable smoke which filled the spaces and necessitated the removal of the cans to the open deck.

(d) An insufficient number of weighted bags were available for the amount of classified material on board and resulted in the use of laundry bags or mattress covers which were then filled with material.

(e) Even though much of the classified material was placed in various bags and could have been jettisoned, continued gun fire by the North Koreans resulted in an order to cease further attempts at throwing material over the side. This order was issued not only on the basis of Korean gun fire, but also by the fact that the water depth was only 34 fathoms, far less than the 100 fathoms believed by Research personnel to be required by Navy regulations for deep water destruction.

(f) Documents, message rolls and other classified material were then torn into pieces and scattered about the deck. Some of the material in the laundry bags (or mattress covers) was dumped and scattered about in the passageway outside the Research spaces with the intent that these documents would be set on fire. Unfortunately, this never occurred, and

at the time of capture, this scattered material remained in the passageway. Additionally, an undetermined amount of material remained in bags, completely intact.

(g) During the burning, tearing and scattering of material, attempts were made to destroy highly classified personal notebooks; however, these efforts were short-lived as priority attention was given to the operational intelligence (GOPI) monitor rolls.

(h) An undetermined number of these GOPI monitor rolls, containing many highly sensitive intelligence items transmitted over the Navy's OPINTELL broadcast were torn, partially burned or scattered about the deck in both the Research space and adjacent passageway.

(3) Although it was some time before the North Koreans actually entered the spaces, no further attempts were made to destroy material after the boarding of the USS PUEBLO by the North Koreans.

d. Status of Classified Data Immediately Prior to Capture:

(1) At about the time of the boarding of the USS PUEBLO by the North Koreans, all efforts directed toward emergency destruction ceased, even though destruction was far from complete. It was ascertained that only one bag was jettisoned prior to boarding; however, it was not possible to identify the specific contents. Except for the unidentified material jettisoned, and the small amount actually burned in waste paper baskets (again unidentified), the following was the status of the remainder of the classified Special Intelligence material:

(a) The passageway immediately outside of the Research spaces was completely littered with material (some partially torn or ripped and others intact), while one or two laundry bags (or mattress covers) remained intact and filled with classified documents.

(b) The floor of the Research spaces was also completely littered with paper, some crumpled, some ripped in half and some torn into small bits. Other classified documents remained intact at the operator's position, Supervisor's desk, and at the desk of the OIC in the Administrative Office.

(2) It is estimated that 50 to 80 percent of the classified documents known to have been on-board the USS PUEBLO are now in the possession of, at least, the North Koreans. While some of the material was torn or ripped to some degree, it must be assumed that the North Koreans will attempt to recover as much documentation as possible.

e. Conclusions:

(1) It is virtually impossible to identify specific documents destroyed during the destruction process and, because of time constraints, limited facilities, enemy gun fire and information provided by the crewmembers of the USS PUEBLO, it is concluded that 50 to 80 percent of the classified documents maintained on board are now in the possession of, at least, the North Koreans. This conclusion is supported by evidence that:

(a) Only one bag was jettisoned, and that in water only 34 fathoms deep which could have allowed for recovery of this bag by the North Koreans. (North Koreans claimed recovery.)

(b) Burning of material was extremely limited and was accomplished in only two or three trash cans placed outside of the Research spaces with no attempt at "bulk" burning.

(c) Much of the documentation was torn and thrown on the deck, and could (with some effort) be reconstructed into complete documents.

(d) A number of documents originally intended to be jettisoned or set on fire were left intact in bags aboard the USS PUEBLO.

(e) Some documents were left in drawers of positions and desks.

(2) Except for the very few specific documents actually known to have been burned, all other material contained in the SIGINT Inventory (Section IV.B.) is considered as in the possession of the North Koreans.

LOCATION OF CRYPTOLOGIC/CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL
PRIOR TO INCIDENT 23 JAN 1968

STORAGE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS-
SAFES - FILES - DESKS

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STATUS OF CLASSIFIED CRYPTOLOGIC/CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MATERIAL AFTER EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION

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2. Equipment

a. General

(1) The individual intercept equipments aboard the USS PUEBLO were not classified, although in the past certain tuners of the WLR-1 ELINT receiver were considered to be CONFIDENTIAL. Any sensitivity in regard to intercept equipment results from the integration of various equipments into an intercept "position" and the assigned mission of that "position". The tasks performed by an intercept "position" using various equipment combinations as well as the signal targets assigned can divulge specific SIGINT interests. With this perspective, considering the knowledge in SIGINT collection operations displayed by the North Koreans and the information obtained from various crewmembers, the SIGINT mission of all intercept positions aboard the USS PUEBLO are considered compromised.

(2) Although crewmembers have stated that they did their best to destroy all intercept equipments aboard the USS PUEBLO, it is estimated that only about 5% of the total equipments was destroyed beyond repair or usefulness. Even this 5% estimate cannot be viewed with optimism in view of the number of related maintenance manuals and spare parts captured intact as well as the knowledge gained from interrogations of the USS PUEBLO crewmembers. A contributing factor is the assumption that the North Koreans have a copy of the "Equipment and Facilities" book.

(3) The destruction of equipments, as attempted, is best described as confused and disorganized. The disorganization may have stemmed from the lack of training in emergency destruction, the inadequacy of (or unfamiliarity with) an emergency destruction bill, and as a result of the primitive tools available for use in destroying equipments. (The only tools readily available were fire axes, sledgehammers, small ballpeen hammers, and chair legs.) There was a total of eleven crewmembers in the Research Spaces at various times during the destruction period. However, the number of fire axes and sledgehammers available, and the effectiveness of eleven crewmembers swinging a sledgehammer at rack mounted equipments in the small area only added to the disorganization and confusion.

(4) There is no evidence available to indicate that equipments (except for a small piece of unidentified test equipment) were removed from the racks. The damage to the front panels was extensive but resulted in "locking" the equipments in place. Once it was realized that very little damage to internal components was being accomplished an unsuccessful attempt was made to remove the equipments for further destruction. The debriefing of various crewmembers indicated that in a few instances, however, the internal components of some equipments were destroyed or damaged.

(5) In those cases where specific information is available on damage to the internal components, only the Winston recorders, CEI-416 Receiver, WLR-1, and one or two R-390 receivers were mentioned. Although it can be definitely established that some effort was made to destroy the circuitry of some specific equipments, there really is no way to estimate the extent of the damage. In the case of the R-390 receivers it is apparent that several were left intact while others received extensive damage. From the debrief of various crewmembers, the appearance of the equipment from a front view would indicate extensive damage. This appearance could explain the opinions of those crewmembers who stated that "the equipment looked pretty well smashed up".

(6) Of interest, but perhaps caused by a natural inquisitiveness on the part of the North Koreans because of attempted destruction, or the uniqueness of these equipments, are the questions posed concerning specific intercept equipments. These questions included information on the WLR-1, Sonagraph, AN/BRD-6, Winston Recorders, Special Printer Position and Visicorder. These questions were probably posed because of the fact that these equipments were damaged more extensively than others.

b. Conclusion

In summary, it must be assumed that the North Korean capture of the intercept equipments advanced

their knowledge of U.S. SIGINT interests and intercept equipment technology. The damage impact of any destruction to the intercept equipments was probably negligible because of:

(1) Spare parts, undamaged equipments, equipment and facilities book and related maintenance manuals captured intact.

(2) Information on the mission of individual positions as divulged to the North Koreans by the crewmembers during interrogations.

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c. COMPARTMENT ARRANGEMENT AGER-2

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d. INDEX OF EQUIPMENT
AGER-2

COMPARTMENT 1-30-0-C - DRAWING NO. 1

USN 467Y ORIGINAL 31 DECEMBER 1967 COMINT RCS NSA-285

POSITION NO.	TYPE POSITION	KEY	EQUIPMENT INSTALLED
1	ELINT	1, 1A & 1B	1 AN/WLR-1B 1 C-3118/WLR 1 EECO-869-6 TIME DISPLAY UNIT 1 R-175A NB RECORDER 2 AUDIO SELECTOR 2 ELINT PNL ASSY
2	RADIO SPECIAL PRINTER	2	1 ATT CONT PNL 1 1508 VISECORDER 1 904720 TAKE UP UNIT FOR 1508 1 T6GA-500 3 SP PATCH PNL 1 GMA 3 TYPE 3001 AMP SERV UNIT 7 GVA-1 AMPLIFIERS 1 HP-6204B PWR SUPP 1 SA-4641 SYN AMP 1 PP-3114/WLR-1 (USED FOR ELINT)
		2A	1 MK-442/WLR-1 (USED FOR ELINT) 1 SG-333/WLR-1 (USED FOR ELINT) 1 S-9903D 1 AUDIO SEL PNL 1 FAIRCHILD 777 O'SCOPE 1 HP-6433 PWR SUPP
		2B	1 R-390A/URR 1 R-1151/GLQ 1 R-1307A/GR
	NON-MORSE TELEMETRY ELINT	3	1 EECO 869-6 1 TD 717B/TRQ-22A (4 CHAN DEMUX) 1 SAS 3100 MASTER STATION 1 AUDIO RECEIVER 1 CV 1916 (XR-2-85)/GR

31 DECEMBER 1967 RCS NSA 285

COMPARTMENT 1-30-0-C (Cont'd)

POSITION NO.	TYPE POSITION	KEY	EQUIPMENT INSTALLED
3 (Cont'd)		3A	1 TD-717B/TRQ-22A (4 CHAN DEMUX) 1 CMU-880A DIGITAL COUNTER 1 S-9903D 1 TD-570()/GRA DEMUX 1 SAS-3100 SUB-STATION 5 WB PATCH PANELS
		3B	1 P-5114B 1 FAIRCHILD 777 2 MOD-100 TRANSI SCOPES 1 AUDIO SEL PNL 1 HP-651B 5 WB PATCH PANELS
		3B	1 P-5114B 1 S-9903D 1 R-31 CONTROL AND MULTIPLE DISPLAY UNIT 1 MOD 10 SULZER TONE GEN 2 TWT CONTROL HEADS
		3D	1 S-9903D 1 EECO-869-6 1 SERIES 4200 DIGITAL VOLT MTR. 5 R-1385 RECEIVER 2 SM-9302A SIG MON 2 SWP-602 SWITCH 1 HSU 210 SPARE TUNER MOUNT 1 INPUT SELECTOR
		3E	1 R-31 C BAND TUNER 1 R-31 S BAND TUNER 1 R-31 L BAND TUNER 1 R-31 INTERCONNECTING UNIT 2 CEI TYPE FT-201A IF TAPE CONVERTER 1 DMEC 25-1 K BAND ANT CONT 1 FOOT SWITCH PNL UNIT

COMPARTMENT 1-30-0-C (Cont'd)

POSITION NO.	TYPE POSITION	KEY	EQUIPMENT INSTALLED
3 (Cont'd)		3F	1 ANT MULTICOUPLER INPUT PNL 2 ANT MULTICOUPLER OUTPUT PNL 1 MOD 1710 AERTECH MULTICOUPLER 1 S-9903D 1 R-175A 4 CEI TYPE 416 RECEIVERS 1 AUDIO SEL PNL 1 HMF (.012-1000) TX-38 MULTI-COUPLER
4	MANUAL MORSE	4	1 AN/BRD-6B 1 R-175A 1 R-390A/URR 2 AUDIO SEL PNL 1 AUDIO PATCH PNL
		4A	1 S-9903D 1 C-6193/SRA-17C 1 EECO 869-6 1 R-390A/URR 1 CEI TYPE VLF 351 RECEIVER 1 TYPEWRITER, TELEGRAPHIC
5	RADIO TELEPHONE	5	1 S-9903D 1 R-390A/URR 3 R-1385 2 RECORDER INPUT SEL 1 AUDIO SEL 1 J-401 ANT CONT 2 R-175A
		5A	1 TIME DEMOD PATCH PNL 1 ZA-38208 DEMOD AND TIME DISPLAY UNIT 1 HP-130C 2 SWP-602 2 SM-9302A 3 R-1385 1 TYPEWRITER, TELEGRAPHIC 1 HSU 210

COMPARTMENT 1-30-0-C (Cont'd)

POSITION NO.	TYPE POSITION	KEY	EQUIPMENT INSTALLED
5 (Cont'd)		5B	2 RT PATCH PNL 1 9903D 1 EECO-911 TIME CODE GEN 1 CEI TYPE 519 RECEIVER 2 R-1385 1 HP-4100 1 R-390A/URR 1 R-2174 RYCOM RCVR
		5C	BATTERY FOR TIME CODE GEN
6	RADIO PRINTER SINGLE CHANNEL AND RF TEST	6	1 CV-62/U 1 R-390A/URR 1 6061A SONAGRAPH
		6A	1 CV-62/U 1 R-390A/URR 1 HP-890 PWR SUPP 1 TT-192A/UG 1 G30-40F PWR SUPP
		6B	1 STEP ATTENUATOR PNL 1 HP-3200B VHF OSC 1 TTY CONTROL PNL 1 AN/UGC-20 1 TTY PATCH PNL 1 RP PATCH PNL
		6C	1 HP-8616A 1 HP-8614A 1 EECO 869-6 1 HP-342AR NOISE FIG METER 1 TT-1876/UG 1 AN/UGC-20
7	POWER PNL		
8	TYPEWRITER		
9	DESK		

COMPARTMENT 1-30-0-C (Cont'd)

POSITION NO.	TYPE POSITION	KEY	EQUIPMENT INSTALLED
10	CHAIR		
11	TEST EQUIPMENT STOWAGE		
12	BOOKCASE		
13	WORK BENCH		
14	SHELF		
15	VENTILATOR		
16	ESCAPE SCUTTLE		
17	EECO 869-6 AND S-9903D SUPERVISOR'S POSITION		
18	MONITOR SWITCH FOR SUPERVISOR		
19	STEPS		

e. PICTURES OF EQUIPMENT AND DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE

KEY TO EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

1A
CONFIDENTIAL
USN 1670 ORIGINAL
31 DECEMBER 1967
ELINT RCS NSA
DWG NO 1, KEY
AN/WLR-1E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
USS 4677 ORIGINAL
31 DECEMBER 1966
COMINT RCS NSA
DWG NO 2, KEY 2A
RADIO SPECIAL EQUIP
USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)

130
138
RCS NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RCS NSA-
USN 467Y ORIGINAL
31 DECEMBER 1967
ELINT
DWG NO 1, KEY 3B THRU
NON-MORSE TELEMETRY, ELINT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
USN 487Y ORIGINAL
31 DECEMBER 1987
COMINT RCS NSA 285
DNC NO 2, KEY 9 & 10
MANUAL MORSE
USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)

SA
SB
USN 86FY ORIGINAL
31 DECEMBER 1967
CONENT RCS NSA 2
DWG NO 1, REV 5
RADIO TELEPHONE

6B
6A
6

f. DRAWINGS OF EQUIPMENT AND DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

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 ~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

DESTROYED

DAMAGED

9. EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION CHART

Equipment Nomenclature	Position	Method of Destruction	Remarks
PS114 Winston Recorders	17, 18	Chair Leg	Opened them up and rammed them best I could.
		Hammer	Very well smashed up.
		Hammer/Axe	Reconstruction very doubtful. Smashed.
		Unknown	
		Sledge Hammer	Used sledge on heads.
		Sledge Hammer	I beat on the heads - making them inoperable.
			Smashed.
			Heads gone.
			Recorders were smashed by Strano.
Oscilloscopes		Hammer	I did go around and bust all the Oscilloscopes I could find.
	20		
	10		The scopes on the two demodulators were busted.
			"Smashed" to great extent.
			We destroyed the cathode ray tubes on the oscilloscopes.
2 Fairchild Scopes	17,13		Smashed.
SAS 3100 & I Branch Scope	15, 16		Smashed.
MDU-5 Scope	18		Broken.
1508 Honeywell Visicorder	12	Hammer/Axe	Reconstruction impractical/unrepairable. (Spaces unknown)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Equipment Nomenclature	Position	Method of Destruction	Remarks
[redacted]			
Demodulators		Hammer/Axe	Were smashed pretty good.
	12		Not a whole lot of damage internally.
Scope	13		Bashed in completely.
R390	14		Left intact.
Plugging Cables			Pretty well mutilated.
RYCOM R2174/4RR		Sledge Hammer	Smashed.
	5	Hammer/Axe	Were hit hard and damaged.
Receivers			
R390	9, 5	Sledge Hammer Hammer/Axe	No compromise - unclassified. Reconstruction impracticable Destroyed two
CEI 416	21	Sledge	Mixer amplifiers pulled out and destroyed. Crystals probably not removed. I tried to destroy circuitry inside.
R-1051		Sledge Hammer	Smashed. R-1051, R-1151, R390, not destroyed.
R-175	11, 7, 21, 9	Sledge	Smashed.
R-1385	5, 6, 7, 19		Tuners smashed. Partial.
R-31	20, 18		Beat on it, looked pretty well destroyed.
Low Band under 2nd R390	8		Had sledge hammer in it.
KD-2 Camera (Part of WLR-1)		Sledge Hammer	Destroyed "beyond use."

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Equipment Nomenclature	Position	Method of Destruction	Remarks
UGC #20 Teletype	1, 2		Smashed beyond use.
Sonagraph	4		Smashed.
AN/BRD-6 D/F	9		"Looked well destroyed" might be beyond repair.
			Scope smashed - didn't know about internals.
		Fire Axe	Scope smashed.
		Sledge Hammer	Scope destroyed.
WLR-1	10, 11	Sledge Hammer	4 top tuners & IP 480 destroyed.
			Could not use again.
			Smashed.
			Strano removed parts and smashed them individually.
		Fire Axe	Completely destroyed by Strano.
		Hammer Axe	50% - pulled drawers out of bays and smashed with hammer.
		Sledge Hammer	Receiver battered; scope smashed.
			Bay #1A were pulled out--outsides smashed don't know about inside.
			Banged up fairly well.
		Sledge/Axe	Beyond repair, tubes pulled, individual tuner pulled. Not sure of BEZEL, 5 gun scope destroyed. Destroyed beyond repair.
			Destroyed beyond repair.
			Hammered very completely.
CV 1916	15		Not destroyed.
Time Code Generator			No info.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Equipment Nomenclature	Position	Method of Destruction	Remarks
TD-570	16	Sledge	Damaged.
Convertors	3, 4	Fire Axe	Badly damaged - (Assoc. w/UHF receivers for Voice interc).
Miscellaneous	8, 9		Receivers/Recorders on Morse voice position smashed internally.

3. Verbal Disclosures

During the detention of the crew of the USS PUEBLO, classified cryptologic and Special Intelligence - associated information was disclosed, and/or may have been disclosed, through several media other than the captured classified documents. Classified information was certainly divulged to the North Koreans during the formal interrogations and in other interviews and conversations. Additionally, classified cryptologic information was disclosed in the various "confessions" and letters which were penned by the crew of the USS PUEBLO during their period of captivity. Finally, information may have been disclosed through intra-crew discussions of classified data in areas vulnerable to North Korean electronic eavesdropping.

The information disclosed during crewmember interrogations and/or "conversations" with the North Koreans includes (1) that which was responsive to North Koreans questions (and thus reflects North Korean interests) and (2) that which was divulged although not necessarily in direct response to a North Korean query. In this latter category, it should be noted that some responses were apparently designed to steer the North Koreans away from areas considered more sensitive in nature [redacted] which was disclosed in order to avoid interrogation on [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Intra-crew discussions of classified information is treated separately wherever practical in this report in order to distinguish between that information known to have been compromised (i.e., disclosed directly to the North Koreans) and that information which may have been compromised. The distinction is required because of the ambiguity surrounding the subject of electronic surveillance of the detention spaces by the North Koreans. While a majority of the crew are convinced that their rooms were not "bugged", at least one returnee reported that he was told by the North Koreans that "bugging" was being conducted. Additionally, several returnees reported

their observation of a "shotgun" microphone, aimed in their direction at a distance of 75-100 yards, while they were outside on the "playing field."

It should be noted that the analysis of non-documentary disclosures is derived in the main from the debriefings of the USS PUEBLO crewmembers. As a result, the factual completeness of this analysis is dependent upon the accuracy of memory, willingness to provide information and recall capacity (over an eleven month period) of the individual members of the PUEBLO crew.

The classified cryptologic-associated information disclosed orally through interrogations and discussions has been categorized according to subjects which, in turn, have been subdivided as to Direct Disclosures (i.e., interrogations and confessions) or Indirect Disclosures (i.e., intra-crew discussions). The subjective categories include:

a. General

b. Mission of the USS PUEBLO

c. SIGINT Processing and Analysis

d. SIGINT related locations

e. Confessions/Letters

f. Conclusion

(1) General Cryptologic Operations

(a) Direct verbal disclosures to the North Koreans included the following facets of the U.S. SIGINT operations:

1 Intercepted traffic (all of which is placed on 6-ply paper) is forwarded to NSA via courier (including tape recordings) and/or in electrical reports; the latter reports include times (of intercept), frequencies and callsigns. ESV associated telemetry also is forwarded to NSA for processing (reportedly by computer). Magnetic tapes of ELINT intercepts of radar signals are forwarded to the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 Communications Technicians (CTs) are assigned to U.S. aircraft carriers and/or aircraft. In regard to U.S. airborne operations, CT's are involved in operating (or instructing others in the operation of) the ECM (ELINT) equipment.

3 The U.S. conducts electronic surveillance of Soviet [redacted] with a prime objective of collecting telemetry during Russian missile launch/re-entry operations.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

5 The meanings of COMINT, ELINT and SIGINT and the meanings and differences between SECRET/SECRET SAVIN, TOP SECRET/TOP SECRET TRINE or DINAR, CONFIDENTIAL and HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY were discussed.

(b) Possible indirect disclosures, as a result of intra-crew discussions, touched upon several general aspects of cryptologic operations.

1 The duties of CT's including previous Temporary Assigned Duties (TADs) of PUEBLO crewmen, on board destroyers and aircraft carriers [redacted] were discussed; the discussion of duty on board carriers included references to Soviet overflights of the carriers. Additionally, discussions in unspecified detail were held on U.S. intelligence collection off the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 The Operational Intelligence Broadcast and electronic signal jamming were discussed in undetermined detail.

(2) Mission of the USS PUEBLO

The USS PUEBLO, its electronic equipments, its mission and its capabilities, naturally were of special interest both to the North Koreans (in their interrogations) and to her crewmen (in their "private" conversations.)

(a) SIGINT Collection Equipment on board the USS PUEBLO was of particular interest to the North Koreans. They apparently payed greatest attention to those equipments which had suffered the severest damage during the destruction exercise.

1 WLR-1: In addition to their possession of the Facilities Book picture of the WLR-1, the North Koreans were provided a drawing (albeit possibly inaccurate) of the position. The North Koreans were told the frequency range of the WLR-1 receiver, its use in the intercept of radar signals, the characteristics of signals collected (e.g., 1 microsecond pulse) and their appearance on the IP-480 scope, how to analyze "traces", and other general information on how to operate the WLR-1. The North Koreans were advised of the range of the WLR-1 (reported to be "50 miles") and that the DF capability was considered to be poor and, in fact, non-existent below 1000 kilocycles (KCS). The time code generated signal and its recording on track eight of the associated WINSTON Recorder, as well as other aspects of the operations of these recorders, was disclosed.

2 The operations and technical characteristics of virtually all collection receivers were disclosed. For example, the North Koreans were told the frequency ranges of the AS-899, R-390, RC-32, SRT-31, WRT, R-1026 and R-1385. The North Koreans reportedly were told (erroneously) that the R-31s were used in the tracking of U.S. satellites.

3 The radiotelephone position, including the techniques for sideband, tuning of the voice/ciphony carrier frequency and how signals were recorded on the WINSTON Recorder was explained to the North Koreans. The North Koreans expressed interest in its capability to collect [redacted] signals.

(b)(6)(1)
(b)(3)-50USC403
(b)(3)-18USC798
(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

4 The North Koreans were informed about the radioprinter position, including its configuration (e.g., R-390, demodulator recorder and printer) and how the antenna was patched to the receiver, demodulator and keyer.

5 The details of the KAY-101 Sonograph and its operations were explained as was the 1309 Visicorder (for which a drawing also was provided) and the RYCOM. At least the front panel of the AN/BRD-6 (DF) equipment was sketched for the North Koreans. The North Koreans specifically questioned the function of the NMGS position and a demultiplexer.

6 In summary, the North Koreans asked about, and/or had explained to them, the purpose and function of virtually every piece of SIGINT collection equipment on board the USS PUEBLO. In fact, the North Koreans informed one crewmember that they, the North Koreans, were capable of using the R-390, R-1385 and oscilloscope.

(b) The SIGINT mission of the USS PUEBLO, including specific targets as well as general SIGINT operating capabilities, was disclosed directly to the North Koreans.

1 The North Koreans were informed that the USS PUEBLO's general targets were Korea, [redacted] and the USSR, with particular attention to be paid to the location and intercept of the communications and radar emissions of the North Korean Army and Navy, airfields and radio stations. It was disclosed that the USS PUEBLO had: (1) located (by Radio Direction Finding) [redacted]; (2) had made about 130 intercepts of signals from 6-8 types of radars; (3) intercepted [redacted] information; and (4) that the North Koreans were told the USS PUEBLO did not have the antenna capability to accomplish the tracking of satellites. Additionally, a full frequency spectrum search was to be made for North Korean Naval communications.

2 In order to accomplish their mission, it was made clear that the intercept frequency spectrum ranged from 0-4000 gigocycles (COMINT and ELINT) although improper antennas decreased the capability in the UHF and SHF ranges. The modes of communications being

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

intercepted were identified as manual Morse, radioteletype, [redacted] and radiotelephone, and new/unusual signals. On the ELINT side, it was disclosed that radar signals were intercepted, located by RDF and analyzed.

3 It was disclosed that radiotelephone intercepts were to be transcribed on-board and that some intercepted radiotelephone intercepts were retained for analysis of codes and other data included therein.

(3) SIGINT Processing and Analysis

Numerous, although frequently minor, aspects of cryptologic analysis and processing were disclosed to the North Koreans.

(a) The case notation system was explained (as to what the notations were and how they were assigned) with about ten case notations disclosed along with 10-15 associated callsigns.

(b) Intercept and traffic identification techniques, e.g., the checking of callsigns against callsign rotas and lists, the use of frequency rotas, etc., were described. It was disclosed that on-board the USS PUEBLO were manuals to assist in signal and traffic identification and radar type descrimination (by differences in RF and PRF) and that differences between the communications of the several North Korean services could be distinguished. The use of the ITU (Berne) callsign listing in radio direction finding (RDF) operations also were divulged.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(c) Information on the [redacted] was elicited by the North Koreans, albeit apparently in no great detail, and they were told that one crewman learned the [redacted]

(d) The more common [redacted] (but purportedly not the more sophisticated or specific systems), were explained to the North Koreans, as were single channel radioprinter (1T1D), sidebands (AM, SSB, double SSB with suppressed

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

carrier) and how the carriers are set up, [redacted] and (in rough terms) the [redacted] system. The North Koreans demonstrated particular interest in [redacted] broadcasts, DRAMBUIE, telemetry, [redacted], "Diarizers" and TEBO positions. (In the case of the TEBO-related questions, North Korean interest appeared to have been generated by personnel records of a crewman attendance at the TEBO school [redacted]).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(e) The North Koreans were told that the [redacted]

(f) The North Koreans were given certain specific ABC radar covernames, i.e., TOKEN, CROSSLOT, KNIFEREST, MOONFACE and WHIFF.

(g) Additionally, the North Koreans demonstrated specific interest during their interrogations and discussions in the meanings of ICHTHYIC, "P&R", (Processing and Reporting), DFS, PPM, CLICKBEETLE, [redacted] MARABOU, HAMPDEN, and DRAMBUIE. The Koreans were provided with the meaning of AGTR and demonstrated awareness of the meaning of SMRIS, MARS/VENUS/PLUTO operating areas and PINKROOT operations as these terms relate to the USS PUEBLO, USS BANNER and USS PALM BEACH.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(4) SIGINT Related Locations

(a) The amount of compromised information regarding SIGINT collection sites revealed by the USS PUEBLO crewmembers during captivity varied relative to the crew-members background. Other than the information provided about [redacted], the amount of SIGINT information divulged by any one individual would appear relatively minor. However, a compilation of everything each different individual divulged about the various stations, including missions and capabilities, would provide the information necessary to reconstruct the worldwide network of collection sites and their production flow of ELINT, COMINT and Direction Finding information.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) The physical layout and basic organization was provided for almost all of the locations included in the attached list. As regards [redacted] there were many diagrams drawn of the entire base and the operations complex. The North Koreans produced a chart on their own, showing the base and the operations complex, probably produced from the collection of charts and organizational structures provided by various crewmembers. They questioned many of the crewmembers on specific locations of divisions and buildings from this chart. Therefore, it can be assumed that the [redacted] operations spaces, divisions, capabilities and some specific target information were provided the North Koreans.

(c) The following list of individual locations in alphabetical order were either discussed with or revealed to the North Koreans. The information regarding these locations was extracted from confessions, letters, and the crewmembers recollection of interrogations by the North Koreans.

1 ADAK, ALASKA: It was disclosed that part of the mission of Adak includes [redacted] targets and that Adak acts as a D/F station in the Pacific DF network. A general organizational diagram of Adak was also provided as well as the fact that one crewmember "learned" manual Morse and teletype operations while stationed at Adak.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP (ADNSG): The location of ADNSG was given as collocated with NSA at Fort Meade. One crewmember described his job at ADNSG as "maintaining continuous awareness of Soviet Naval elements [redacted]"

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

3 [redacted] The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a Soviet Navy targets between [redacted] were copied at [redacted]

b An organizational diagram of the station was drawn including number of personnel.

c The fact that [redacted] was connected with the [redacted] station.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

4 CAPE CHINIAK, ALASKA: The station designator for Cape Chiniak was disclosed as USN-426. An organization chart with the number of personnel (30-40) was also provided.

5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA): It was disclosed that CIA cooperates with NSG and NSA in intelligence matters and that NSA was in control of SIGINT and that CIA provides collateral information.

6 CHELTENHAM, MARYLAND: The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a Cheltenham has a Research and Development section.

b Cheltenham is the D/F logging center for the Atlantic.

c There is specific D/F interest in:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

d The station designator for Cheltenham is USN-22.

e A diagram of the base at Cheltenham was drawn.

f An organization chart of the station was also provided.

7 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (CNO): It was revealed that CNO directs the Naval D/F operations.

8 COMNAVFOR, JAPAN: COMNAVFOR Japan was identified as the ultimate command for the PUEBLO and that traffic for COMNAVFOR Japan was passed through Kami Seya.

9 [redacted] The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

a The station designator for [redacted]

b An organization chart was provided including CO, XO, Dept Head, and Watch Sections.

c That manual Morse and Radioprinter signals were collected there.

d That [redacted] was a Radio Relay station.

e That a crewmember worked in the American Embassy and passed coded traffic.

f That the complement for the station was 400 men.

10 [redacted] was listed as a Security Group Station and part of the Atlantic D/F network.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 [redacted] The North Koreans were told that Pacific Command, [redacted] Center was located at [redacted] Additionally that training on ELINT for recognition of radar signals including parameters of each signal was conducted at [redacted] It was also disclosed that radar intercept from the PUEBLO was forwarded on magnetic tape to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

12 [redacted] The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

a That the station designator for [redacted]

b An organization chart for [redacted] was provided.

c That the GOPI Broadcast originated from Guam/Japan/Philippines.

d That [redacted] acted as a Pacific net D/F station.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

e That [redacted] was part of the Pacific SIGINT network.

f A layout map of the station was drawn.

g That coded weather was transmitted from [redacted] to the ship.

h Soviet Radioprinter targets were given as one of the SIGINT missions for [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

i That transmitters were located at [redacted]

13 [redacted] The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a [redacted] was described as a focal point for Pacific SIGINT network which included Philippines, [redacted] and Skaggs Island.

b That a Pacific Net D/F station is located there.

c An organizational chart was drawn including D/F, MM, R/D and ADMIN.

d That there is a complement of 200 men, and four watch sections with 15 men on each D/F section.

e That coded weather was transmitted to ship from [redacted]

14 [redacted] The school for manual Morse operators was located at NAVCOMSTA at [redacted] as well as the school for "T" branch.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

15 KAMI SEYA, JAPAN: The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

b Several diagrams were drawn. They included divisional structure, command structure, base building diagram, Operations Spaces, labeled by division and function, on base diagram included all departments such as supply, medical, admin, etc.

[redacted]

d That Kami Seya was the station with which the PUEBLO communicated while on operational patrol.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

g That Kami Seya was the closest point of relay to COMNAVFOR Japan.

h That the GOPI Broadcast and coded weather was transmitted from there.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

16 [redacted]: One crewmember drew an organizational diagram of the station and the fact that it was part of a D/F network.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

18 KODIAK, ALASKA: It was disclosed that a [redacted] is located at Kodiak. One crewmember noted that he had worked in conjunction with the Coast Guard in SAR (Search and Rescue) operations while at Kodiak.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

19 LONDON, ENGLAND: London was listed as the Command Security Group Station for the European area. European Headquarters for NAVSECGRU was in London.

20 MARIETTA, WASHINGTON: Marietta was disclosed [redacted] as used in Search and Rescue operations.

[redacted]

22 MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA: The North Koreans were told that the Defense Language Institute (DLI) was located at Monterey. A complete description of the DLI at Monterey was provided including number of students, languages taught, teachers names, physical layout and organizational structure. One crewman told that he was sent to Monterey to be trained as an interpreter for Embassy duty and that the Soviet language course was 37 weeks duration.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

24 NORFOLK, VIRGINIA: Norfolk was identified as a [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

25 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA): The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a A diagram of NSA was drawn on at least two occasions.

b A diagram of MPRO-3 was provided with specifics. MPRO-3 was defined as a Machine Production Element.

c That there were 5,000 to 6,000 persons employed at NSA.

d That 2,000 persons were involved in analysis and used computers as aids.

e That NSA functions in analysis, decoding and development of crypto devices.

f Description of internal NSA Korean section was given and told the North Koreans it was headed by a South Korean named "KIM".

g That NSA expanded as National Security Agency and that the location was at Fort Meade, Maryland.

h That the Office of Soviet Collection was divided into (a) Army, (b) Navy, and (c) Air Force sections.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

i That there was an assignment for [redacted] North Vietnam, and China at NSA.

j That the SIGINT effort was primarily against the Soviet, second against China and third against all others.

k That a [redacted] at NSA diagrammed nets and briefed Naval personnel on Pacific area.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

l NSG works in conjunction with NSA and that NSG is subordinate to NSA.

m That the following instructions were performed at NSA:

"1. Operation of R390 Receivers.

"2. Operation of Magnacorders (Tape recorders).

"3. Voice Operators Supervisor School conducted at NSA.

"4. That SA-100 School on Signal Analysis conducted.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

"5. That personnel instructed in use of [redacted] callsign system.

n That NSA designed and constructed Crypto equipment and designed Crypto keylists.

o That Crypto efforts are made to break traffic and that machine (computer) assistance is provided.

p That transcriptions from voice tapes were made at NSA.

26 NAVAL SECURITY GROUP (NSG): The North Koreans were told that NSG collects for NSA and that material collected by NSG is analyzed by NSA. A diagram of NSG Headquarters was drawn. One crewmember related the fact that he attended an NSG school for Technical Guidance Units (TGU) for electronics in Washington, D. C.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

27 NORTHWEST VIRGINIA: Northwest Virginia was identified as a [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

29 [redacted] The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a A block diagram was drawn of [redacted]

b Identified [redacted] as a [redacted]

c Related that [redacted] was a "Training Station". Specific training disclosed to the North Koreans consisted of:

"1. "I" Branch. Crewmember gave a detailed description of his "I" Branch training.

"2. Manual Morse. Crewmembers stated that [redacted] Manual Morse was taught.

"3. Radioprinter. That personnel were instructed in use of Teletype equipment.

"4. ELINT. That crewmember received ELINT training at Naval Communications Training Center, [redacted].

d Disclosed that there were approximately 300 students at [redacted].

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

e Stated that there are 15 classes at [redacted] (at one time) and that there are 20 people to a class.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

30 [redacted] The North Koreans were told that [redacted] was a [redacted] [redacted] and part of the [redacted] They were further told that the GOPI Broadcast could originate in the Philippines/Guam/Kami Seya, and pass coded weather information.

[redacted]

32 [redacted] The North Koreans were told at [redacted] training was conducted for Radioprinter, R390 Receivers, Tape Recorders, as well as Russian [redacted] information.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

34 [redacted] The North Koreans were told that SASEBO and Kobe were [redacted]

35 SKAGGS ISLAND, CALIFORNIA: The following information was provided to the North Koreans:

a That the station designator for Skaggs was USN-26.

b An organization chart of the station.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] c That Skaggs is part of the

d Complement of Skaggs is 100 men.

e That Skaggs is a Direction Finding (D/F) net station.

f That the mission was D/F for Sea Rescue.

g Located Skaggs on map of San Francisco area.

[redacted]

[redacted]

40 YOKOSUKA, JAPAN: The North Koreans were told that the mission of TGU Yokosuka was teaching Fleet ECM operators. It was further related that there are 18 men stationed at TGU in Yokosuka and that Yokosuka transmitted coded weather. C-30 was described as the "COMMAND CAVE" on the Yokosuka Base.

41 USS BANNER: [redacted] for the BANNER as well as the fact that the BANNER was the same type ship as the PUEBLO. The North Koreans discussed the operations of the BANNER which revealed the following:

(b)(6)(1)
(b)(6)1&9&0SUS&03&03
(b)(6)1&1&18SUS&09&98
(b)(6)3&?-E.L&6&&636

a They possessed the operational order for the BANNER.

b That the mission of the BANNER was known and was related to crewmembers.

c BANNER was a subject in "lectures" to the crew at least several times.

d North Koreans stated that the BANNER had previously operated in the Yellow Sea.

e They were aware of the schedule for the BANNER.

f They had knowledge of the BANNER operating in coastal area of North Korea.

[redacted]

43 USS BELMONT: The North Koreans were told that the USS BELMONT had worked the same area

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)50USC403
(b)(3)18USC798
(b)(3)P.L.86-36

44 USS GEORGETOWN: The North Koreans mentioned the GEORGETOWN in a "lecture".

45 USS JAMESTOWN: The North Koreans were told that the USS JAMESTOWN was a TRS involved in Scientific Projects. It was further disclosed that the CT personnel on board were involved in projects expanding the Naval Communications Systems. It was also mentioned that the JAMESTOWN is the same type of ship as the USS OXFORD and USS LIBERTY.

46 USS OXFORD: The North Koreans were told that the OXFORD was the same type as the JAMESTOWN and the LIBERTY and that the OXFORD is a TRS involved in scientific projects concerning expansion of Naval Communications Systems.

47 USS LIBERTY: The North Koreans were told that the LIBERTY was the same type ship as the JAMESTOWN and the OXFORD. Additionally, they were told that the mission of the LIBERTY included targets of:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)50USC403
(b)(3)18USC798
(b)(3)P.L.86-36

48 USS MULLER: The North Koreans mentioned the MULLER in a "lecture".

49 USS PALM BEACH: One crewmember told the Koreans that the PALM BEACH was in Bremerton, Washington. The North Koreans mentioned the PALM BEACH in a "lecture".

50 USS VALDEZ: The North Koreans mentioned the VALDEZ during a "lecture".

[redacted] Additionally, crewmembers were questioned on the USS PROVIDENCE (7th Fleet Flagship) on how many men, mission, deployment.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)50USC403
(b)(3)18USC798
(b)(3)P.L.86-36

(d) Other US Military Stations Mentioned:

1 ANACOSTIA NAVAL BASE: The North Koreans were told that Russian Language Training was conducted at Anacostia Naval Base.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)50USC403
(b)(3)P.L.86-36

3 DANANG, VIET NAM: That Viet Cong radio signals were copied at DaNang was revealed.

4 FRANKFURT, GERMANY: Crewmember told the North Koreans that Headquarters of Security Group in Europe was located in Frankfurt.

5 PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA: Crewmember told that the Navy Crypto Repair Facility was located in Portsmouth.

6 VIET NAM: Crewmember was questioned on 1st Radio Bn in Viet Nam by the North Koreans. In room, crewmember told how identification of VC communications was determined by power output of their transmitters and that attacks were predictable by their communications.

7 VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA: Crewmember told that the Navy Crypto Repair Facility was located in Vallejo.

8 MASSACHUSETTS: North Koreans displayed interest in Massachusetts bases, Hascom AFB, Westover, and South Flanders NAS.

9 COMSUBFLOT 7: In room, the Captain stated that SUBFLOT SEVEN Staff had a hull check of Soviet ships on station off Guam.

10 SOUTH KOREA: Crewmember told that there are Army and Air Force stations in South Korea probably involved in an effort to gather information on North Korea.

(5) Confessions/Letters

(a) All PUEBLO crewmembers were involved in writing confessions and letters (both individually and jointly) while in captivity and although a large number of these letters have been released (either by the Koreans or the recipients) very few confessions are available for evaluation. A great deal of information regarding the contents of this material was provided by the crewmembers during debriefing; however, this section deals primarily with the actual letters/confessions which are available vice what each crewmember provided during debrief based on his recollection of the material.

(b) The crewmembers debriefings did indicate that a great deal more classified information was contained in the written confessions than the letters and this is borne out by a review of the available material.

(c) Certain observations can be made regarding all of this material. The majority of letters were written in March and August 1968. The March letters contained a number of references to the mission of the ship, the destruction of classified material, the capture of documents, and some letters even provided a description of the job of the author. The August letters were more "personal" and contained fewer references to any sensitive matters. Confessions were written at various intervals during confinement and the number and detail of this material varied with each crewmember. There were joint confessions (as well as joint letters of apology and a joint letter to the President) signed by all of the crewmembers, but the majority of the confessions released were written by the officers and were written shortly after capture. These confessions detailed the mission of the ship and a considerable amount of classified information. Although classified, none of the available information is unique to the confessions (i.e., the same material was

provided to Koreans in the captured documents and interrogations) and consequently the details are not included in this section of the report. Further, there were a number of other confessions written during confinement (e.g., each crewmember wrote a detailed confession just prior to release); and the only information available regarding the contents of this material was obtained from the crewmembers during debriefing.

(d) In addition to the letters and the confessions, another means of providing the Koreans with information regarding the mission of the USS PUEBLO would be the press conferences. The text of these conferences were reviewed for possible disclosures of classified material and although there was a considerable amount of sensitive information discussed, again the details were readily available to the Koreans in captured documents, written confessions or as the result of interrogation of the crew.

(e) One other item worthy of note is the fact that the letters and the confessions were also tape recorded by the Koreans. Some of this material was (and possibly will be) released via radio broadcast vice publication in a written form.

(6) Conclusion

Based on a review of information obtained through crewmember debriefings, published confessions, available letters, etc., the following conclusions have been reached in regard to verbal disclosures of information to the Koreans:

(a) The interrogations and written material provided the Koreans detailed information not otherwise available. This is particularly true in the area of previous experience, jobs, training schools and prior assignments.

(b) A significant portion of the oral and written material was already available to the North Koreans by virtue of the capture of documents and equipments aboard

the USS PUEBLO. These type disclosures were probably most beneficial to the Koreans in that they apparently aided the interpretation and understanding of the captured material and provided the North Koreans a ready gauge as to the degree of cooperation of the individual crewmembers.

(c) A great deal of the information was disclosed in a piecemeal fashion (i.e., a number of items on a certain subject were derived from a number of crewmembers or from the same crewmembers in separate interrogations). Although divulged piecemeal, the compilation of this material could easily provide a comprehensive picture on a number of subjects which were of interest to the North Koreans. This was also obvious from the debriefing as it was necessary to look at all the crewmember's statements to get an estimate on the totality of possible compromises.

(d) Possibly of greatest importance is the fact that the completeness and accuracy, etc., in this report, of the information orally provided to the Koreans, is dependent upon the individual crewmember's recollection of what were at times extended discussions (with the Koreans) which took place at various intervals over the period of eleven months.

(e) There were a number of confessions written by the crewmembers during confinement (each crewmember wrote at least one and some of these were quite lengthy) which have never been released by the Koreans. It has been established that a number of these confessions were quite detailed and contained SI information; however, the only information regarding the contents of this material included in this report has been obtained, once again, from the debriefing. For this reason, it is probable that the report of damage assessment regarding confessions is relatively incomplete.

(f) The North Koreans displayed particular interest in other SIGINT units around the world, collection equipment and the previous duties of the men. It appears that a portion of the information elicited was directly related to the degree of knowledge the North Koreans held

on a particular subject or the need to have a particular individual expound on his previous assignment/training, etc., guided by the captured service records.

(g) Finally, to arrive at a conclusive assessment of damage in this section of the report is extremely difficult. Although this information (i.e., confessions/interrogations) is essential for any comprehensive evaluation, the completeness and accuracy of this data is viewed with less confidence than with the remainder of the report. Although it can be established that a great deal of information was provided the North Koreans in oral and written form, a combination of certain factors, i.e., crewmember ability to recall information, uncertainty of room "bugging", validity of hearsay, lack of corroborating evidence and the time interval between the event and the debrief, all tend to reduce the probability of a comprehensive evaluation. Rather, it appears that the information listed in this section (particularly that data passed to the North Koreans during interrogation) can best serve as:

1 An aid to determine North Korean interest, and

2 An indicator of the type and variety (not completeness) of the information provided.

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MUSSO DOCUMENTS

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
Introduction To Musso	(Same)	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHDOC #102	Ground Based ELINT Collection Operations (25 July 66)	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHDOC #106	Morse Search and Development Concept of Operations	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHDOC #107	NMSD Operations	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHDOC #400	SIGINT Product Reporting	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1001	Standard Intercept Symbols and Abbreviations	Supervisor's Desk	Torn
TECHINS #1002	Morse Collection Procedures	Supervisor's Desk	Unknown
TECHINS #1003	Radiotelephone Recording and Transcription Procedures	Supervisor's Desk	Unknown
TECHINS #1005	Radioprinter, [redacted] Collection Procedures	Supervisor's Desk	Torn
TECHINS #1007	Morse General Search and Cover Reporting	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1012	Non-Morse Search and Development Procedures and Techniques	Supervisor's Desk	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
TECHINS #1016	Component Mission Intercept	Supervisor's Desk	Unknown
TECHINS #1019	Machine Intercept Analysis Report (MIAR)	Supervisor's Desk	Torn
TECHINS #1021	Classification of Radio Signals and Communications Systems	Supervisor's Desk	Torn
TECHINS #1030	Procedures for NMSD Search and Development Operations Aboard Technical Research Ships	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1036	SIGINT Equipment/Systems Directory	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1037	Equipment and Facilities Standards for Intercept Stations	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1038	Manning Standards for SIGINT Positions	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1042	Instructions for Preparing and Packaging for Forwarding of Intercept Traffic and Related Material	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1043	NSA Forwarding Instructions	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1044	Instructions for Selections and Applications of Delivery Distribution Indicators	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
TECHINS #1046	Instructions For Conduct of ILC Operations in the Field	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1055	SIGINT Activities Directory	Super-visor's Desk	Unknown
TECHINS #1056	Collection Management Procedures	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1059	Collection and Process-ing of Soviet [redacted] Transmissions	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1302	ELINT Collection and Data Reporting; Procedures For	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1310 (Provisional)	Interaction Reports	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #1350	Missile Space Vehicle Intercept Reporting	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #2003	Instructions For Preparation of Daily Technical Summaries	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #2020	TEXTA Manual	Super-visor's Desk	Torn
TECHINS #2022	Raw Traffic; Marking of Additional Callsign Data On	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #2048	Soviet [redacted] Instructions; Standard-ized Procedures to be Followed For Reporting Changes In	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
TECHINS #4001	SIGINT Product; Serialization Of	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4002	SIGINT Readiness	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4003	Direct Distribution of SIGINT Product; Authorized Recipients For	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4010	SIGINT Publication Manual	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4011	SIGINT Support to Unified and Specified Commands and Other Overseas Consumers	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4014	SIGINT Electrigrams and Spot Reports	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4015	SIGINT Product Distribution	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4016	Reporting Designators	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4019	SIGINT Critical Intelligence (CRITIC); Handling of	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4034	COMINT End Product; Technical Information in Reporting of	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4058	SIGINT Product; Use of Collateral in	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #4301	ELINT Product Reporting	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
TECHINS #6002	SIGINT Minimize Procedures	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #7010	Informal Technical Notes	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #7011	Cryptologic Information Publications	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #7013	Standard Transliteration Tables	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #7014	U.S. SIGINT Field Units; Procedures For Providing Information Support to	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9001	Rubber Stamps; Procurement of Classified and/or Sensitive	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9003	Categorization of COMINT	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9015	Soviet [redacted] Message; Procedures For Technical and SIGINT Product Reporting of	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9016	COMINT Communications Cover Plans	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9018	Intercept Messages; Standard Nomenclature For	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9050	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
TECHINS #9101	Morse Intercept Operator Training	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9102	Training For Enlisted Men Service Radio Traffic Analysis	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9117	SIGINT Training; Technical Support For	Admin Office	Unknown
TECHINS #9201	Signal Research Operating Procedures	Admin Office	Unknown

✓TITLE: Introduction to MUSSO with Changes 1, 5, 6

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This outlines the structure of the MUSSO system, explains the nature of the documents and numbering system, coordination and distribution procedures, aspects of sanitization (for ELINT, [redacted] INFOCONS), preparation and maintenance, standard distributions. Examples of standard unit OPINS/Annexes are included.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

IMPACT: This document reveals tasking procedures (narrative unit OPINS) and makes reference to other documents applicable to specific tasking. It reveals US/2nd Party COMINT collaboration. It reveals, in the Standard Distribution Lists, the designators for internal NSA elements as well as SCA units, certain Second Parties, and most major SIGINT customers. Its loss would not seriously hamper the U.S. SIGINT effort but might give an incite into the MUSSO system not otherwise available.

TECHDOC 102

TITLE: Ground-based ELINT Collection Operations

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-3

CONTENT: Outlines the philosophy and methods of conducting ground-based ELINT collection operations. Identifies types of ELINT search and applications against generic types of ELINT signals.

IMPACT: Because the information is general in nature, its loss or capture is considered negligible.

TECHDOC 106

TITLE: Morse Search and Development Concept of Operation

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document sets forth principles and techniques applicable to Morse Search and Development. It describes the principal and secondary objectives of MSD, type of assignments, tuning techniques, MSD analysis, processing and support.

IMPACT: The loss of this document would reveal a general description of Morse Search and Development operation. Specific MSD locations and specific intercept results would not be disclosed.

TECHDOC 107

TITLE: Non-Morse Search and Development Operations

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document sets forth the principles and techniques applicable to the Non-Morse Search and Development (NMSD) program.

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

(1) the philosophy of NSA in conducting a world-wide Non-Morse Search and Development (NMSD) program.

(2) the objectives, in general terms, of NMSD.

(3) the methods, i.e., Machine Intercept Analysis Reports, used by NMSD field elements to report items of COMINT interest, although these items are not specified, nor is the format of the MIAR given.

TECHDOC 400

TITLE: SIGINT Product Reporting

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document defines the primary mission of the National SIGINT Effort (NSE) as the reporting of information obtained from foreign signals and alludes to a relationship between USIB and NSA, collaborating and Third Party SIGINT efforts. Defined in the document are (1) the fusion of COMINT and ELINT, (2) interpretation of SIGINT, (3) the types and uses of collateral, and (4) the various types of reporting, both product and technical, including a listing of technical and operational characteristics of interest to the NSE.

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals open source statements regarding the NSE and (2) reveals the extent of the NSE interest in foreign signals.

TECHINS 1001 with Changes 1 through 4

TITLE: Standard Intercept Symbols and Abbreviations

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document contains standard abbreviations and their expansions to be used by SIGINT collectors and processors. It is cross-referenced and covers such general subjects as international communications terms, standard abbreviations for describing frequency measurements, signal quality and symbols used to indicate the technical basis for identification of collected signals, (i.e. identified by callsign and schedule or identified by frequency, procedure and placename.

IMPACT: A. The loss of this document should have very little if any impact on the SIGINT community. In reality it is nothing more than a list of common communication and communications related terms which are used by communications personnel world wide.

B. Section 3 paragraph 7 and paragraph 13 appear to be the only areas of this document that could provide some help to unauthorized users. However even these paragraphs are of no use unless the unauthorized user has access to classified SIGINT correspondence on a continuing basis.

TECHINS 1002

TITLE: Morse Collection Procedures

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document prescribes the procedures used by the Morse Intercept Operators when recording and transcribing Morse signals. Also included (Annex I) are procedural instructions for the implementation and use of Data Preparation Devices (An/GGC-15).

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals procedures used by the Intercept Operators and the advances made by NSA

in achieving an automatic data preparation device for preparing intercepted traffic for computer processing.

TECHINS 1003 with Change 1

TITLE: Radiotelephone Recording and Transcription Procedures

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: Basically this document provides the standard terminology and procedures to be used by intercept units engaged in the intercept of radiotelephone transmissions.

IMPACT: The impact on the SIGINT community due to the loss of this document to unauthorized persons should be minimal.

Except for the degree of thoroughness this document should offer little more than the knowledge of how the U.S. COMINT community performs the recording and transcription of radiotelephone transmissions.

The loss of the document should have no effect on future radiotelephone collection.

TECHINS 1005 with Changes 1 and 2

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: Radioprinter, [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: A. Establishes standard procedures for the collection of Radioprinter, [redacted] except Non-Morse Search and Development assigned to COMINT cover.

B. Included in this document are detailed instructions for the handling of Russian [redacted]. A complete description of the depth of knowledge and [redacted] cooperation on this problem.

C. It further describes the degree of concern placed on the [redacted] problem by the U.S.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

D. The depth of U.S. commitment of intercept for all data systems is contained.

IMPACT: The loss of this document must be considered to be serious. While not divulging any particular success or failure it does combine into and document the depth of the U.S. commitment to the collection of these signals.

Based on information contained in this document unauthorized persons could alter or influence the transmission programs of these signals. If this was to happen it could mean a serious loss of information.

TECHINS 1007

TITLE: Morse Search and Development Cover and Reporting

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document defines the classification of Morse targets detected by Morse Search and Development (MSD) positions and prescribes the treatment to be given each class. The document also prescribes MSD reporting requirements.

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

(1) MSD definitions of unidentified and identified transmissions.

(2) MSD STRUM format instructions

(3) Follow-up procedures

(4) Assignment of TEMPO notations on MSD intercept

(5) Use of collective digraphs

(6) Procedures for reporting Mission Support Statistics

(7) [redacted]

(8) List of countries requiring minimum cover

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 1012

TITLE: Non-Morse Search and Development

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document establishes operating procedures and techniques for the conduct of Non-Morse Search and Development (NMSDA) in the [redacted] radio spectrum.

IMPACT: The loss of this document is considered serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) that environmental studies are conducted in the radio frequency spectrum 0-90 Megahertz from many geographical areas.

(2) the specific techniques and procedures applicable to the NMSD program.

(3) a list of world-wide NMSD facilities (by station designators) with their associated search plans.

(4) an implied association with [redacted]

(5) listings of various communications entities, e.g., [redacted], in order of NMSD priority.

(6) a list of reference material by title used by NMSD field facilities, e.g., NSA MUSSO documents, Russian Language Guide, [redacted] Berne publications.

(7) by association with other MUSSO documents, types of communications systems of high (or low) NMSD interest.

/TECHINS 1016

TITLE: Component Mission Intercept

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document establishes procedures for the collection, documentation and reporting of radio communication signals which are determined to be Component Mission Intercept (CMI), i.e., signal systems which cannot be identified by collection personnel.

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

(1) an extent of the effort against the detection of unidentified signal systems,

(2) specific tuning, recording and forwarding procedures, although the document contains no codeword material, and

(3) by nomenclature, equipments used by U.S. field positions, e.g., AN/TNH-11, MINCOM CM-100, AN/GSQ-53.

/TECHINS 1019, With Changes 1 through 5

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TITLE: Machine Intercept Analysis Report - MIAR

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document provides instructions for the reporting of all Non-Morse (all Radioprinter [redacted] voice, [redacted]), ILC Radiotelephone, plus manaual Morse on certain entities in a machine retrievable format. It gives detailed instructions for the preparation of the report and identifies what types of intercept are to be reported under the system, and indicates our ability [redacted]

IMPACT: Loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise from the standpoint of the machine reporting procedures being employed by our SIGINT Activities. Although this document does not reveal intelligence successes, it does reveal

the types of foreign intercept adaptable to machine attack, and provides the holder with a working knowledge of procedural methods employed for machine intercept reporting not previously known.

✓ TECHINS 1021, With Changes 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and Annex

TITLE: Classification of Radio Signals and Communications Systems

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This publication provides designators for known communications signals and methods the Non-Morse Operators Signal Analysis Handbook provides descriptions of know communication signals. The Telegraphic Code Manual provides combination equivalents for known telegraphic codes.

IMPACT: Access to any of these documents would reveal the extent of our knowledge of the external parameters and coding of communications signals. Further, the fact that we describe signals and codes [redacted], the documents reveal that the U.S. has knowledge of these countries' communications.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/ TECHINS 1030, Annex Bravo

TITLE: Procedures For Non-Morse Search and Development (NMSDB) Operations Aboard Technical Research Ships

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document establishes operating procedures and techniques for the conduct of NMSDB operations aboard designated Technical Research Ships (TRS).

IMPACT: The loss of this document is considered serious since it reveals:

(1) That NMSDB environmental studies are conducted from [redacted] from aboard TRS and that TRS

are deployed to [redacted] the Far East.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 U[redacted]03
(b)(3)-18 U[redacted]8
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) target areas of SIGINT interest, e.g., [redacted] Communist and Bloc Nations, [redacted].

(3) specific techniques and procedures applicable to the NMSDB program. This includes search plans and guidance, intercept and recording techniques and forwarding instructions.

(4) sample operator's logs whose hypothetical line items of intercept show types of communication systems, countries of origin (e.g., [redacted] Soviet Union), traffic excerpts, TEXTA data and ship coordinates.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/TECHINS 1036

TITLE: SIGINT Equipment/Systems Directory (U)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document serves as a quick ready reference in obtaining technical and physical characteristics, manufacturer, and cost concerning equipments and systems that are contained in TECHINS 1037, Equipment and Facilities Standards for Intercept Stations (C). The document contains, "AN", AFSAV and commercial nomenclatures. TECHINS 1036 is composed of five separate volumes:

VOLUME I	Introduction-Table of Contents Master Index - Cross Reference - Distribution
VOLUME II	Antennas Multicouplers Preamplifiers Amplifiers DF Equipment
VOLUME III	Receivers Radio Sets Transceivers Recorder/Reproducers and Associated Equipment

Panadapters
Spectrum Display Units

VOLUME IV Terminal and Auxiliary Equipment

VOLUME V Systems

Volumes I - IV are classified SECRET. Volume V is classified SECRET-HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY.

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

(1) A very large portion of all equipments, both classified and unclassified, utilized in the SIGINT effort.

(2) Rack layouts, functional block diagrams, lists of equipments and the capability of certain POEIs (Position Equipment Indicators) as contained in TECHINS 1037.

(3) SCA/NSA address indicators.

TECHINS 1037, With Change 1

TITLE: Equipment and Facilities Standards for Intercept Stations

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document, classified SECRET-HVCCO, is a resource standards document prescribing selected general and specific community wide standards for SIGINT operations buildings, antenna fields, and equipment configurations for each position, to be used wherever applicable in support of the development and review of resource requirements.

The standards listed in Annex A, "SIGINT Operations Building and Antenna Field," are very general.

The standards listed in Annex B, "Equipment Composition of Positions," are very specific. The equipments

listed in this section are all equipments of an electronic, electrical and electro-mechanical nature that are an integral part of a SIGINT position and have been standardized by NSA to increase community-wide operational and technical efficiency. In Annex B there is a complete description of our Identification Code System from which the six element, alpha numeric code designator is established, and this is commonly called POEI (Position/Equipment Indicator) in the Agency's and SCA's Programming and Tasking documents.

In Annex B, each position sheet includes the following:

Position Code
Capability
Equipment
Floor Space Required
Weight
Power Required

Under the Capability Section of the position sheet is given the capability of of the position in relationship to the requirement which established the position. Specifics included in the capability are:

(a) The frequency range of the receivers.

(b) Capability of Demodulating and Demultiplexing general type transmissions.

(c) In some of our [redacted] position sheets, the capability section includes specific signals the position is capable of on-line processing.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(d) In some Radioprinter position sheets, we go into detail on our capability for collecting and demultiplexing [redacted]

Included in the Equipment section of this document is practically every known equipment used in the SIGINT community. This equipment is listed by AN or commercial designator plus the title of the equipment.

In conclusion, it must be said that some position sheets are very brief and some do go into great detail of the capability for collecting and processing signals.

Loss of this document could permit the appraisal of:

(1) Our Identification Code System used throughout the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) Our capability for collecting and to a certain degree our capability for processing every signal being transmitted.

(3) Information on practically every equipment being used in the SIGINT community.

If OPINS 10/20/30 Annex A are used with TECHINS 1037, the impact would be:

(1) Inform the user of our complete capability for SIGINT at each site listed in OPINS.

(2) It could be ascertained what our intercept mission is at each site.

/ TECHINS 1038

TITLE: Manning Standards for SIGINT Positions (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document prescribes the number of personnel required for the manning of collection processing, and operational management positions programmed in OPINS 10/20/30. The Manning Standard is the number of personnel required to operate a given type of position with a specific Position Equipment Indicator (POEI) for (1) each eight-hour watch and (2) continuous 24-hour operation (four watches).

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

(1) The types of collection, processing and operational management positions used by NSA.

(2) The actual number of people required on duty to operate given positions.

(3) The method used by NSA to prescribe the number of personnel required to operate positions.

/ TECHINS 1042

TITLE: Instructions for Preparing and Packaging for Forwarding of Intercept Traffic and Related Material

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes uniform procedures for preparing and packaging for forwarding of intercept traffic and related material to the National Security Agency and other Cryptologic Centers.

(1) Reveals the various means used to record intercept traffic [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(4) Discloses bundle label and tape label format and official addresses to be used by members of the COMINT Production Community in forwarding material to NSA and the [redacted] and pinpoints the OPI's for various types of material. Also listed in this document are the different Field Stations allowed to exchange material with the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) Formatting and forwarding procedures for various types of material.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) Pinpoints areas within NSA as to type of material they process.

(3) Reveals the existence of a [redacted] (C-HVCCO) and refers to TECHINS 1003, if compromised, deals with Radioprinter [redacted] Collection Procedures (C).

(4) The cover story used by SUSLO Melbourne, which states that he is the Senior Liaison Officer in Melbourne for the U.S. Department of Defense, is compromised.

(5) Reveals our coding system for marking packages destined for [redacted] and also reveals stations that exchange material with [redacted]

✓ TECHINS 1043, Annex A and Supplement A

TITLE: NSA Forwarding Directive

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENT: This document contains forwarding instructions for collected raw materials, (Magnetic tapes, pageprint, perforator tapes, etc.). Instructions are broken down to Morse, Radiotelephone and Radioprinter [redacted]. Also includes selection guides for certain types of intercept - how to identify high interest traffic and what raw traffic is to be forwarded electrically.

IMPACT: The loss of these documents would present a serious impact on the Cryptologic community. It permits the isolation of interest areas within Foreign communications, designates specific types of material which must be forwarded via electrical means (certain types of cipher messages, etc.). It indirectly indicates success in various crypto areas and as such may result in drastic changes in target communication procedures, crypto systems, transmission types, frequency usage, etc.

TECHINS 1044

TITLE: Manual for the Selection and Application of Delivery Distribution Indicators (DDI's)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: This document provides the procedures governing the selection and application of Delivery Distribution Indicators (DDI's) by message originators for those messages intended for automatic internal distribution at DIRNSA, [redacted] and selected other addressees served by the DDI program. Target country entities are grouped in separate sections of this document by virtue of category, country and service, and approximately 600 DDI's are shown through specific listings and diversification of DDI assignments.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Listed in TECHINS 1044 are:

(1) The country(ies) or target(s) area of foreign communications in which this Agency and associated activities have a specific interest, e.g., [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) Types of messages and the definition of each category, e.g., crypto-analytic, traffic analytic, raw, SIGINT product, special item, administrative and operational,

(3) The service representing the facility or source within the target area, and

(4) References to various other TECHINS for specific details regarding a particular subject.

IMPACT: This document reveals association between DIRNSA and second and third party sources by short title activity designators, although there is no geographical location included. The distribution portion also reveals association between DIRNSA and various field organizations by activity titles, organizational titles and authorized "F" designators. Additionally, the importance of material forwarded under DDI ZZZ is revealed by virtue of the material to which it is assigned (CRITIC) and by the distribution of this material which includes the Office of the President and other unspecified high level governmental activities.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓TECHINS 1046

TITLE: Instructions for Conduct of ILC Operations in the Field

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CODEWORD

CONTENTS: This document establishes the instructions for the conduct of International Commercial (ILC) Communication Operations [redacted]

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) the entire scope (without revealing sources) of NSA's effort against International Commercial (ILC) Communications activities conducted for the United States Intelligence Community;

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

/ TECHINS 1055, With Changes 1 through 4, 6 through 8, and 10

TITLE: SIGINT Activities Directory

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document contains information regarding each intercept site [redacted]; i.e.,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(a) Organizational Title

(b) Location (includes geographical coordinates)

(c) Category ceilings

(d) If located in exposed area whether considered "Risky" or "Dangerous"

(e) Mission (Intercept, Direction Finding, ELINT, Telemetry Collection, etc.)

(f) Mail, Courier and Freight Addresses

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(g) Designator codes (End Product, Machine Source, etc.)

[redacted]

IMPACT: Loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals the magnitude of our SIGINT activities and their geographical coordinates. Also listed [redacted] SIGINT elements and locations. The scope of our SIGINT operations are highlighted in as much as the document contains general mission statements.

√ TECHINS 1056

TITLE: Collection Management Procedures

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: Establishes standard procedures for the management of SIGINT Collection facilities at United States Stations.

IMPACT: The loss of this document should present only a minimal impact to the community. It is noted that the format of messages is given in this document and under certain conditions, this type of information could be used for cribbing. The probability of this is thought to be very low. Foresee no effect on future operations.

√ TECHINS 1059

TITLE: Collection and Recording of Soviet [redacted] Transmissions

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENT: Defines types of [redacted] (Soviet) signals in general [redacted], but not specific signals [redacted] etc.) and tuning/recording procedures for each type. It refers to other applicable documents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

IMPACT: Document is classified SECRET - CCO. Its loss would give the enemy information that a capability exists to intercept [redacted] Soviet [redacted] signals and that specific techniques are employed in the collection and recording of these signals. Damage to collection efforts is considered minimal in that specific signals of high interest (i.e., R-400, etc.) are not mentioned.

/TECHINS 1302

TITLE: ELINT Collection and Data Reporting Procedures for SCA Facilities, dated 1 September 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-3

CONTENTS: Establishes definitions and general procedures relating to ELINT [redacted] collection, processing and reporting. The TECHINS defines generic types of signals, the various types of reports required, reporting requirements for general types of signals, tuning and recording procedures and photography procedures. In addition, a distribution list for the TECHINS is included.

IMPACT: Since T-1302 does not identify specific or sophisticated collection, recording procedures or the degree of success we have in the exploitation of ELINT through application of these procedures, the specific loss and impact on future operations is considered minimal. Analysis of the distribution list contained in T-1302 and correlation of this list with other documents reported to be aboard the PUEBLO (i.e., T-1055 and T-1043) does, however, indicate the world-wide scope of ELINT operations.

/TECHINS 1310 (Provisional)

TITLE: Interaction Reports

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document sets forth the target criteria and exact formats for the reporting of fused/interaction

intercepts of COMINT, ELINT and/or RADINT reflections of a common target. The examples of reports include data elements which are extracted from intercepted Soviet communications.

IMPACT: The compromise of this TECHINS would reveal U.S. requirements for SIGINT interaction and the techniques used in reporting the results of this effort. Specifically compromised would be the U.S. capability to intercept and exploit the Soviet [redacted] system and, through correlation of this signal with Soviet radar tracking communications, the association of this signal with Soviet missile firings.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ TECHINS 1350

TITLE: Missile/Space Vehicle Intercept Reporting

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-1

CONTENT: This TECHINS establishes definitions for abbreviations and designators used throughout the missile/space collection/processing and reporting cycle. Listed are:

[redacted]

(4) the identity of elements within NSA that are engaged in receipt, processing and distribution of collected data, and

(5) a comprehensive listing of participating stations and commands/agencies that are associated with the missile/space community.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 2003

TITLE: Preparation of Daily Technical Summaries (TECSUMS)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This TECHINS prescribes the procedures for the preparation of semi-processed technical data of manual Morse and radiotelephone intercept required electrically by NSA. The instructions are detailed and includes specifics on how to submit callsigns; schedules; frequencies, chatter extracts; message preambles and text; and direction finding (DF) and radiofingerprinting (RFP) results. Examples are provided for each type of information required; in most cases the examples were taken from live intercept. Included as an annex is a listing of the entities, trigraph/digraph, which are, or were, reported on in accordance with this TECHINS. Geographical areas represented include the Soviet Union, East European Communist countries; [redacted] S.E. Asia; and [redacted]

IMPACT:

1. The loss of this document compromises the geographical boundaries of our collection interest in the two communications modes, voice and Morse by the inclusion of:

a. The list of target country digraphs/trigraphs and;

b. The technical details required on each service entity.

2. Viewed with other documents held by the PUEBLO, this TECHINS would compromise to a great extent the depth of analysis on [redacted] since examples from line intercept include [redacted]

TECHINS 2020 with Changes 1 through 4

TITLE: TEXTA Manual

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CONTENTS: This document establishes definitions for abbreviations used in the TEXTA system and further provides instruction as to which SIGINT activities may issue either TEXTA, TEXIN or TEMPO and gives detailed instruction as to how this will be accomplished. Listed in the TEXTA Manual are (1) Country [redacted] and (6) the reporting format. Also listed in this document are all the different Collaborating Centers and Field Activities which participate in the publication of TEXTA data.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) the method used by NSA to provide systematic differentiation among target communication nets,

(2) the method used to systematically present the identifying characteristics of communications targets,

(3) a complete listing of participating stations [redacted] and their individual responsibilities for either reporting TEXTA, TEXIN or TEMPO, and

(4) a fixed machine format for reporting.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 2022 (Basic)

TITLE: Marking of Additional Callsign Data on Raw Traffic

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CODEWORD

CONTENTS: This document contains instructions for raising the classification of raw traffic which contains callsigns derived from [redacted]

IMPACT: This document reveals our ability to [redacted] systems and the fact that when

such is done it requires a raise in classification of traffic. The listing of Annexes indicates such is done on Soviet, North Korean, Vietnamese Communist, [redacted] traffic. Annexes provide details.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 2022, Annex A

TITLE: Marking of Additional Callsign Data on Soviet Raw Traffic

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

√TECHINS 2048

TITLE: Standardized Procedures to be Followed for Reporting Changes in Soviet Signal Operational Instructions

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

CONTENTS: This document establishes special procedures to be followed by the U.S. SIGINT Community in the event of significant changes in Soviet signal operational instructions and further provides instruction as to what SIGINT activities are to report and gives detailed instruction as to how this will be accomplished.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) The method used by NSA to provide systematic attack against changes in Soviet signal operational instructions;

(2) A fixed machine format for reporting.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 4001

TITLE: Serialization of SIGINT Product

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: Establishes requirements for the serialization of product reports and translations according to content. Acts as a working aid in allowing the reader to make a rapid assessment as to the general content of a serialized report/translation.

IMPACT: The loss of this document is a serious compromise as it reveals: (1) a complete listing of National SIGINT Effort (NSE) target countries, (2) the method used by the NSE to provide systematic differentiation among targets being reported upon, (3) the definition for and use of special subject suffixes for [redacted] including examples, and (4) the method used by the NSE reporting elements to serialize SIGINT product.

TECHINS 4002

TITLE: SIGINT READINESS

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document defines SIGINT READINESS as a state of special preparedness and watchfulness occasioned by unusually significant and possibly ominous developments, either directly in the international situation or in SIGINT target activity within the context of a tense or potentially tense international situation. This document further: (1) defines and provides instructions pertinent to the three conditions of SIGINT READINESS applicable to the U.S. SIGINT producing community, (2) defines the authority and roles of NSA, NSA Field Activities, and the SIGINT reporting units, and (3) describes relationships to other readiness/alert programs, i.e., collaborating center programs, the CRITIC program, and the DEFCON system.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise as it: (1) confirms a working relationship with collaborators - [redacted] (2) reveals criteria established for the declaration of a SIGINT READINESS condition, and thus an indication of the ability of the members of the SIGINT community to exploit foreign communications; and (3) identifies and provides criteria for the [redacted] SIGINT ALERT system, the [redacted] SIGINT READINESS system, and the JCS DEFCON system.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

√ TECHINS 4003

TITLE: Authorized Recipients

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document identifies U.S. and collaborating center recipients (other than numbered SIGINT stations) who are authorized to receive SIGINT product on direct distribution, the command(s) serviced by the recipient, and the location of the recipient.

IMPACT: The loss of this document is a very serious compromise as it reveals: (1) the extent of the Intelligence Community and its interest in receiving SIGINT information, (2) the recipients of SIGINT product and their location, and (3) the command structure of the Intelligence Community.

√ TECHINS 4010

TITLE: SIGINT Publication Manual

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: Provides the general principles, rules and procedures governing the nature and form of SIGINT reports and translations.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a negligible compromise. While information contained in other TECHINS is referenced or restated, this document is primarily a style manual and would shed no unique light on the National SIGINT effort against foreign communications targets or any success derived therefrom.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ TECHINS 4011

TITLE: SIGINT Support to Unified and Specified Commands and Other Overseas Consumers (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document describes procedures which will be followed by cryptologic elements in the fulfillment of the SIGINT requirements of unified and specified commands and other overseas customers. It defines the general category of intelligence requirements and provides details of procedures to be followed by NSA and cryptologic field activities in the handling of customer requirements. It reveals the relationship of NSA [redacted] targets. It also refers to [redacted] as theater command ELINT centers and the appropriate channel for ELINT requirements. Annex A of the document consists of a list of all the major commands throughout the world, the SSO servicing the command, the NSA or cryptologic unit which provides SIGINT service to the command and the cable address of the NSA or cryptologic unit. Annexes B and C provide sample formats and examples of monthly requirements status reports which Service Cryptologic Field Headquarters are required to submit to NSA and relate specific targets to specific cryptologic units.

IMPACT: The loss of TECHINS 4011 is considered serious because of the general information contained concerning the cryptologic effort.

✓ TECHINS 4014

TITLE: SIGINT Electrigrams and Spot Reports

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document defines and prescribes procedures for issuing ELECTRIGRAMS and SPOT Reports. Definitions and procedures for the use of the various supplementary and technical vehicles are also included.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a negligible compromise as it contained primarily administrative and editorial procedures that since have been revised and issued in a new TECHINS.

TECHINS 4015

TITLE: SIGINT Product Distribution

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document prescribes procedures for the establishment, use, and maintenance of SIGINT product distribution symbols, lists, and catalogues. Also included as annexes are: (1) special procedures for afloat units, (2) guidelines on product distribution to cryptologic organizations, (3) sample texts for establishment of distribution lists, and (4) a sample WBCAP (Weekly Recapitulation) report.

IMPACT: The loss of this document, by itself, compromises little more than the administrative procedures for handling distribution of product.

TECHINS 4016

TITLE: Reporting Designators

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes procedures for assigning, changing, and deleting reporting designators of U.S. units producing SIGINT product and lists reporting designators assigned to each U.S. and collaborating center reporting unit. It states that DIRNSA will assign such designators and indicates the system of application for: (1) parent and independent units, (2) subordinate units, and (3) non-product reporting units authorized to issue special unserialized Tactical Reports (TACREPs).

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals the scope of and the participants in the National SIGINT reporting effort.

/TECHINS 4019

TITLE: Handling of SIGINT Critical Intelligence (CRITIC)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document provides instructions for selecting and reporting critical intelligence by U.S. SIGINT organizations. It defines critical intelligence as information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation that affects the security or interests of the U.S. to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President. It identifies and defines: (1) the CRITICOMM system, (2) the scope of the CRITIC program, and (3) the responsibilities of the participants. It establishes exacting criteria and reveals specific procedures for the issuance of a CRITIC, a LATERAL CRITIC, and CRITIC Follow-ups.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise of the USIB CRITIC criteria (as contained in DCID 7/1) and the U.S. SIGINT community's procedures for the reporting of intelligence that meets those criteria.

/TECHINS 4034

TITLE: Reporting of Technical Information in COMINT End Product

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document defines and lists the aspects of SIGINT considered to be technical in nature and prescribes procedures and conditions under which such information can be used in SIGINT product.

IMPACT: The loss of this document is a damaging compromise of the technical areas of concentration of the National SIGINT Effort as it reveals that resources are expended on: (1) the recovery of cipher systems, (2) the technical and operational characteristics of foreign signals, e.g., signal characteristics, callsigns, and network construction, frequencies and schedules, and (3) foreign cryptographic systems to the point where details of systems employed by a target can be reported.

√TECHINS 4058

TITLE: Use of Collateral in SIGINT Product

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document defines collateral as information derived from any source other than a SIGINT source (i.e., COMINT, ELINT, TELEMETRY, or other electronically transmitted or emitted signal or impulse). It defines the applicability of collateral to and its use in SIGINT reporting and prescribes: (1) the conditions to be met prior to use in SIGINT product, (2) the records to be maintained by the product originator, and (3) documentation procedures.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

IMPACT: The loss of this document comprises a serious compromise in that it: (1) references service directives (DIAR 50-10, AR 381-1, OPNAV INST 5509.39, and AFR 205-19), (2) reveals caveats used by the members of the SIGINT community (NOFORN, [redacted] and thus reveals a working relationship with collaborators, and (3) gives an indication of the way collateral information is used in product.

√TECHINS 4301

TITLE: ELINT Product Reporting

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-1

CONTENTS: This document defines ELINT (information derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radions emanating from other than an atomic detonation or radioactive sources), and establishes procedures and defines the basis for product reporting.

IMPACT: The loss of this document constitutues a negligible compromise as it reveals little that already has not been published in open source documents. The TECHINS is primarily an administrative and editorial guide and does not indicate the extent of our interest or reveal any successes.

TECHINS 6002

TITLE: SIGINT Minimize Procedures

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document provides information in general relative to the type(s) of material/information generated within the NSE and forwarded electrically under normal circumstances but decreased in precedence or to be forwarded by courier under MINIMIZE conditions.

IMPACT: Compromise of this document would not seriously affect the cryptologic effort except to give an enemy an insight into how to disrupt and slow down the electrical exchange of information between and among the members of the community by disrupting communications so that a MINIMIZE might be declared.

TECHINS 7010

TITLE: Informal Technical Notes

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document contains general information on the types of technical data exchanged between and among members of the cryptologic community.

IMPACT: Compromise of this document would not seriously affect the U. S. cryptologic effort.

TECHINS 7011 with Changes 1 through 4

TITLE: Cryptologic Information Publications

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (Annex is Codeword)

CONTENTS: This document describes the reporting of cryptologic information not released to SIGINT customers.

IMPACT: This document reveals that certain information is handled separately from normal SIGINT product and is of special interest to NSA. Its compromise would not seriously affect the cryptologic effort.

TECHINS 7013 with Changes 1 through 7

TITLE: Standard Translation Tables

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes standard methods for converting foreign languages (particularly Cyrillic) to romanized form with Morse equivalents.

IMPACT: This document reveals that NSA establishes standard methods of reporting translations. No serious damage would result in its compromise.

TECHINS 7014

TITLE: Procedures for Providing Information Support to U.S. SIGINT Field Units (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes procedures for providing collateral materials and information to U.S. SIGINT field units in support of their missions; and to provide guidance for the systematic processing of such materials for most effective information support. It defines collateral materials as those documentary materials, obtained from both classified and unclassified sources, containing information about people, places and things, organizations, activities and events which are of value in support of the U. S. SIGINT effort and specifically states SIGINT serialized product and SIGINT technical information such as cryptanalytic recoveries, traffic analytic data, callsign and frequency allocations, etc., are not included. It states the Director, National Security Agency has the responsibility to compile for each U.S. SIGINT field unit, a listing of the specific collateral materials considered essential to the effective performance of the unit's mission; such listings will be coordinated through appropriate Service Cryptologic Agency Field Headquarters; states listings concerning [redacted] for review and comment and also refers to USARPAC or TAREX/ASAE as a possible source for providing certain information.

IMPACT: The loss of this document does not constitute a serious compromise since a compilation of specific collateral materials considered essential to the mission of the PUEBLO had not been prepared. However, it reveals that TAREX collects material for the SIGINT Community.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TECHINS 9001

TITLE: Procurement of Classified and/or Sensitive Rubber Stamps

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS: This TECHINS outlines the procedures for procurement of classified and/or sensitive rubber stamps. It defines classified stamps as "stamps that contain classified information, such as COMINT Codeword stamps" and sensitive stamps as "stamps that reveal or imply relationship between the U. S. Government and foreign governments and stamps that direct special handling and/or channeling." It also outlines the channels through which these stamps will be ordered.

IMPACT: The loss of this document would not constitute a serious compromise since it only reveals:

(1) That NSA has material that requires protection by a "COMINT Codeword". (It does not reveal the categories or actual codewords).

(2) That NSA supplies the Service Cryptologic Agencies, DIA and the FBI with "COMINT Codeword and sensitive stamps".

TECHINS 9003 with Changes 5, 10 and 11

TITLE: Categorization of COMINT

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

CONTENTS: This document defines various categories of COMINT and degree of sensitivity the U.S. applies to each.

IMPACT: This document reveals 2nd Party collaboration, existence of special sources, existence of 3rd Party sources by station designators, certain classification criteria, and (in Annexes) specific categorization/classification rules after COMINT material assigned to the various categories. The latter is a definite revelation of success both from a T/A and C/A and collection standpoint in addition to referencing other documents which are even more specific in their revelation.

TOP SECRET

/TECHINS 9015

TITLE: Procedures for Technical and SIGINT Product Reporting of Soviet [redacted] Messages

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document provides introduction for US/ [redacted] on the technical reporting of intercepted Soviet [redacted] messages and associated activity in a machine retrievable format. It also provides guidance for the end-product reporting of intelligence derived from [redacted] messages and signals, and assigns the covername [redacted] to such activities - [redacted]

IMPACT: The availability of this document to the North Koreans:

(1) an effort by NSA to determine [redacted]

(2) a current [redacted]"

(3) the effort against the Soviet Rocket Forces [redacted],

(4) various examples of Soviet communications procedures.

TECHINS 9016

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

IMPACT: Virtually all of the explicit information contained in TECHINS 9016 and the inferences that could be drawn from it have been assumed for many years to be in the hands of most hostile intelligence agencies. In fact, much of the information has appeared, in one form or another and either as statements of fact or surmise, in public news media. The document will be prized primarily for its confirmatory value.

TECHINS 9018

TITLE: Standard Nomenclature for Intercepted Messages

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This TECHINS defines readable, unreadable, encrypted, practice, dummy, exercise, valid messages. It indicates our ability to discriminate between or among such types of messages.

IMPACT: Document is classified SECRET HVCCO. Its loss is considered negligible since it is general in nature and more or less "common sense" definitions. It would reveal Second Party collaboration by virtue of inclusion of Second Party designators in the distribution list.

TECHINS 9050

TITLE: [redacted] Collection, Analysis and Reporting on Soviet [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

CONTENTS: This TECHINS, which is only three pages long, serves as an introduction to the effort applied against Soviet [redacted]

Annex A - dated 21 August 1967

Title: [redacted] Instructions - Phase I (C)

Content: This Annex contains

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

certain operator functions to permit the timely detection and reporting of items of traffic analytic interest.

(2) Pageprint marking requirements

(a) MK-2 stamp

(b) Bench marks

(c) Manual Morse transcription

(d) Traffic analytic interest items

(e) Analytical information marking requirements

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(f) On-line diarization marking requirements

(g) Equipment and signal condition comments

(3) Reporting (specifies appropriate TECHINS)

(4) Forwarding instructions

Annex B - dated 2 August 1966

Title: [redacted] Instructions - Phase II (C)

Content: This Annex contains:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

of items of cryptanalytic interest and associated by-product items of intelligence occurring on Soviet [redacted] transmissions.

(2) Requirements and procedures for performing [redacted]

Annex C - dated 6 December 1967

Title: Field COMINT Reporting on [redacted]

Classification: TOP SECRET TRINE

Content: This Annex establishes procedures to be followed in field station reporting of COMINT information derived from Soviet [redacted]

A55/4S - dated September 1965

(Note: A55/4S was a [redacted] working aid which has since been reissued as Annex D to TECHINS 9050).

Title: A55 Field Working Aid

Classification: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

Annex E - dated 11 September 1967

Title: [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Classification: SECRET SAVIN

Content: This Annex establishes the requirements and procedures [redacted]

A54/12A - dated February 1965

(Note: This was an A54 working aid which has since been reissued as Annex F to TECHINS 9050).

Title: Field Cryptanalytic Aid - [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Classification: TOP SECRET DINAR

Content: This working aid contains detailed information on procedures for the recognition and reporting of interest areas found in [redacted] intercept.

Annex I - dated 1 August 1966

Title: [redacted]

Classification: TOP SECRET TRINE

Content: Annex I to TECHINS 9050 provides guidance to [redacted] elements engaged in the interception, analysis, and handling of [redacted] Annex B, TECHINS 9050).

Annex I to TECHINS 9050 is a brief guide to the interception, analysis, and handling of [redacted] Although detailed instruction is provided in areas that pertain directly to [redacted] it is assumed that users of the Annex already have an adequate understanding of general communications terms, equipment, and theory.

This Annex is divided into six parts, each dealing with a specific topic. Part I explains the general characteristics of [redacted] Part II provides several working aids for operators and analysts. Part III enumerates, explains, and describes those phenomena considered of special interest to NSA. Part IV provides information on reporting. Part V assists in the partial identification of [redacted] Part VI describes some of the techniques that can be used in the exploitation of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A53/16A - dated 14 January 1965

(Note: This was an A53 working aid which was subsequently reissued as Annex J to TECHINS 9050).

[redacted]

Classification: TOP SECRET DINAR

Content: This is a special supplement which was to be used as an aid in conjunction with guidelines given in [redacted] and applicable TECHINS to perform [redacted]

A51/9A - dated 15 November 1965

(Note: This working aid was reissued as Annex N to TECHINS 9050)

[redacted]

effort. In the event that all of the aforementioned documents were on board the PUEBLO and were in fact captured by the North Koreans,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

then the overall [redacted] effort may well have been compromised. In short, if TECHINS 9050 and Annexes fell into [redacted]

TECHINS 9101

TITLE: Morse Intercept Operator Training

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes the standard for Morse Intercept Operator Training. It specifies standards of 18.6 groups and 22 words a minute. The document also outlines in non-specific language how U.S. COMINT organizations receiving graduates of a Morse Intercept Operator Course will conduct a planned and supervised apprenticeship training program to include operation of Morse intercept equipment, target identification techniques, initiation of tip-off to SIT, Non-Morse or R/T section, and preparation of operator's comments.

IMPACT: The compromise of this document constitutes only slight damage as the intercept of Morse communications is of general knowledge to most countries.

TECHINS 9102

TITLE: Service Radio Traffic Analysis Training for Enlisted Men

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

CONTENTS: This document establishes the standard for Radio Traffic Analyst Training by prescribing the level of proficiency that an individual must attain in technical training and in apprenticeship training. The document requires the analyst to:

a. recognize the difference between normal radio-printer and [redacted] traffic;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

b. recognize encrypted message externals and decipher them by employing cryptanalytic techniques including the use of charts, keys and other devices;

c. analyze frequencies, callsigns, skeds, chatter and practice traffic -- by using timely analytic aids and raw traffic.

The distribution of the document includes [redacted]

IMPACT: The loss reflects the NSA/SCA ability to intercept, identify, and process raw intercepted material.

TECHINS 9117

TITLE: Technical Support for SIGINT Training

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL (GP-1)

CONTENTS: This TECHINS provides general instructions relative to provision of technical material in support of SIGINT training. It reiterates the need-to-know principle governing the dissemination and use of SIGINT. The document further provides the format for the preparation and processing of SCA requests for SIGINT technical material from NSA, establishes the NSA criteria for evaluation of such requests and furnishes the mailing address of Commandant, National Cryptologic School to facilitate processing of the requests for technical support.

IMPACT: It reflects formal procedures for providing unspecified reports, technical support letters, working aids, magnetic tape recordings, transcripts, translations, dictionaries, glossaries and other material developed primarily for support of SIGINT operations. The document should have no adverse affect on any U.S. intelligence source.

TECHINS 9201

TITLE: Signals Research Operating Procedures

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document outlines operating procedures for the conduct of Signals Research at R/D field sites. Signal designators assigned and used by NSA are defined. Detailed procedures are given for search and collection of signals to permit precision measurements to be made for the stated purpose of providing the technical data base required for designing and developing SIGINT systems and techniques. The technical sophistication of the instrumentation at R/D field sites is implicit in the document. All numbering and tagging procedures and terminology relative to signal storage media and documentation are described. All recording media used by R/D from perforated tape to video tape are specifically mentioned with the identifying alpha-numeric designators which are used for each. The Annex attached to this document is a sample R/D log which was provided for the purpose of illustrating typical logging format and content. [redacted] Five R/D tasks are specifically mentioned by alpha-numeric designator, but only one of these (R34-63-11) identifies the target signal, which in this case is [redacted] intercepts in connection with [redacted] are also specifically mentioned.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

IMPACT: The loss of this document reveals:

1. The degree of technical sophistication in both hardware and procedures used by NSA to collect and analyze foreign communications systems for technical intelligence.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. Some measure of the degree of success of our SIGINT effort through remarks in the Annex cited above.

3. The location of two of our intercept sites engaged in signals research.

SIGINT

PRODUCT

REPORTS (Hardcopy)

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown
		Ops Research Spaces	Unknown
		Admin Office (?)	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

COMINT

TECHNICAL

REPORTS (CTRs)

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
A2 CTR 59-64		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 21-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 36-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 50-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 71-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 77-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A2 CTR 19-67		Admin Office	Unknown
GENS-4 CTR 16-60 (Reissued 4 May		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 25-62		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 14-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 17-66		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 1-67		Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
A61 CTR 2-67		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 3-67		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 5-67		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 6-67		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 7-67		Admin Office	Unknown
A61 CTR 8-67		Admin Office	Unknown
B27 CTR 3-65		Op Spaces	*Torn
B71 CTR 5-65		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 03-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 4-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 08-66		Op Spaces	Torn

(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
B71 CTR 9-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 10-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 13-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 15-66		Op Spaces	Torn
B71 CTR 2-67		Op Spaces	Torn
B11 CTR 1-67		Op Spaces	Torn

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

*Many of the above North Korean documents were subjected to varying degrees of tearing and ripping, and some were probably left intact. It is not possible to identify any of these specific reports which were completely or partially destroyed in this manner.

A2 CTR #59-64, Dated 1964

IMPACT: While the technical data in this CTR had been superceded by the time the PUEBLO was captured, the CTR

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A2 CTR #21-66, Dated 15 Apr 66

A2 CTR #36-66, Dated 1 Jul 66

A2 CTR #50-66, Dated 9 Aug 66

A2 CTR #71-66, Dated 31 Oct 66

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A2 CTR #77-66, Dated 6 January 1967, and Supplement #1, Dated 22 November 1967

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A2 CTR #19-67, Dated 1 May 67

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

GENS-4 COMINT Technical Report #16-60 (Reissued 4 May 66)

A61 CTR 25-62

TITLE:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

See comments above on GENS-4 CTR 16-60 reissued for May 1966.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A61 CTR #14-66

A61 CTR #17-66

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A61 CTR #1-67 and #2-67

A61 CTR #3-67

A61 CTR #5-67, #6-67, #7-67

A61 CTR #8-67

TITLE:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/ B27 CTR #03-65

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B71 CTR #5-65

TITLE: [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: See assessment statement for B71 CTR #2-65.

(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B71 CTR #03-66

B71 CTR #4-66

B71 CTR #8-66, 13 July 1966; Supplement One, 7 December 1966; Supplement Two, 22 June 1967

B71 #09-66, 22 Jul 66

B71 CTR #10-66, 17 Aug 66

TITLE:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN NOFORN

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

/ B71 CTR #13-66, 15 Dec 66

[redacted]

/ B71 CTR #15-66, 8 Dec 66

[redacted]

IMPACT: This document reveals U.S. knowledge of communication procedures employed by the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B71 CTR #2-67

NOTE: Above assessment also applies to B71 CTR #5-65, 18 Oct 65.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/B11 CTR #1-67

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

WORKING AIDS

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
A3 WA 2-66	Communist Bloc Non-Communications Emitters	Unknown	Unknown
A5 WA 03-64	Special [redacted] For NSG Special Collection Operations (2 copies)	(1) Op Spaces (1) Admin Off.	Burned Unknown
A5 WA 01-67	[redacted] Working Aid (2 copies)	(1) Op Spaces (1) Admin Off.	Burned Unknown
A582 WA 1-67	Cross Reference Listing of TEXSIGS as of 1 Dec 67	Admin Office	Unknown
A64 WA 21-65	Russian Dictionary Reverse Alphabetical Sort	Admin Office	Unknown
A64 WA 24-65	Soviet Space Craft Working Aid	Admin Office	Unknown
A64 WA 10-66	Soviet Radio Telephone Manual	Op Spaces	Torn
A64 WA 20-66	Soviet Radio Telephone Manual (Naval Forces)	Unknown	Unknown
A65 WA 1-67	Soviet [redacted] Handbook	Admin Office	Unknown
A67 WA 1-67	Head Net Radar Equated to Specific Ships	Admin Office	Unknown
B11 WA 01-67	North Korean [redacted] Activity	Op Spaces	Unknown
B11 WA 3-67	NSA Standard Abbreviations	Unknown	Unknown
B11 WA 05-67	[redacted]	Unknown	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
[redacted]-2 WA 1-64	[redacted]	Unknown	Unknown
NMSDB WA	Working Aid For AGER Operations	Unknown	Unknown
[redacted]5122	Section Supplemental Information For [redacted] Operations	Admin Office	Unknown
[redacted]5413	AS-0001 Operator Training Outlined For [redacted] [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403g
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/A3 WORKING AID 2-66, 31 Jul 66

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ A5 [redacted] - A5/03/64, Feb 64

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: This document is compartmented. See Special Supplement.

CONTENTS: This document is compartmented. See Special Supplement.

A5 [redacted] #01-67, Dated 1967

[redacted]

CONTENTS: This document is compartmented. See Special Supplement.

A582 WORKING AID #1-67

TITLE: Cross-Reference Listing of TEXSIGS as of 1 September 1967

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: Provides a current listing of Technical Extracts of Signals (TEXSIGS), both active and cancelled. [redacted]

IMPACT: If compromised only [redacted] and the [redacted] notation and coverwords assigned would be revealed. However, in conjunction with TEXSIG cards (also provided to the Pueblo), it would be possible to equate notations/coverwords with specific signals which are identifiable by the parameters listed on the TEXSIG cards.

A64 WORKING AID #21-65

TITLE: Russian Dictionary Reverse Alphabetical Sort.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS: Russian Dictionary

IMPACT: None

A64 WORKING AID #24-65

TITLE: Soviet Spacecraft Working Aid

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A64 WORKING AID #10-66

TITLE: Soviet Radiotelephone Manual

A64 WORKING AID NO. 20-66

TITLE: Soviet Radiotelephone Manual, Naval Forces

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A65 WORKING AID, NR 1-67

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] Handbook

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

Additionally, the Handbook includes:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A67 WORKING AID 1-67, 20 MAR 67

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B11 WORKING AID #01-67

TITLE: North Korean [redacted]
1 Aug 67

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

[redacted]

B11 WORKING AID #3-67

TITLE: NSA Standardized Abbreviations, 9 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document contains extracts from TECHINS 1001 and is used to standardize certain abbreviations for English terms.

IMPACT: No damage would result from the disclosure of this document.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

√ B11 WORKING AID #05-67

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Non-Morse Search and Development (NMSDB) Working Aid for AGER Operations (Operating Procedures)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SAVIN

CONTENTS: This document provides technical guidance to the AGER concerning operating procedures and techniques for the conduct of NMSDB when tasked by DIRNSA. The document includes search procedures, recording techniques, method of preparing an operator's log and forwarding instructions. Included in the document was a sample operator's log.

IMPACT: The loss of this document is considered a serious compromise since it reveals:

(1) that NMSDB environmental studies are conducted in the radio frequency spectrum from [redacted] Megahertz and are made from the peripheral areas of specified countries of SIGINT interest.

(2) that a comprehensive search is conducted for the detection of new or unusual signal systems.

(3) the detailed procedures (e.g., standardized search plans, intercept and recording techniques, forwarding instructions) of the NMSDB operations aboard an AGER.

(4) a sample operator's log. This log, when compared with associated TECHINS/TEXTA, i.e., TECHINS 1021 and [redacted] cards, could reveal the country and type of transmission that was hypothetically intercepted; however, ship coordinates were omitted from the sample.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] 5122, Feb 67

TITLE: Section Supplemental Information on [redacted] Operation

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE, US/UK EYES ONLY, LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

CONTENT: This document is compartmented. See Special Supplement.

[redacted] 5413, AS-0001

TITLE: AS-0001 Operator Training, Outlined for [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE, NOFORN, [redacted] LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

CONTENT: This document is compartmented. See Special Supplement.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

(*SICR's)

*Although the status of the SICR's is listed as unknown, it is probable that most, if not all, were left intact aboard the PUEBLO when captured. A complete set was last located in a top drawer of a desk in the NAVSECGRU Detachment Admin Office prior to boarding by the North Koreans.

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
U-NPA-N0034	North Korean [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-N0045	CHICOM Communications System	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-N0076	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-N0077	North Korean [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-N0085	CHICOM Communications Systems	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-05570	Soviet Communications Systems - [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-05656	Soviet Navy Communications Capability ([redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-06041	Soviet Navy, Naval Air Force [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E32-06534	Radar in [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E32-06662	BIG NET and TOP TROUGH Air Search Radars	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-07257	Chinese Communist [redacted] Activity	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-07714	Communist Bloc Systems for [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E32-08198	Madge [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E32-08223	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
D-ACQ-09077	Multiband Soviet, Satellite and CHICOM [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-1E4-11534	Correlation of ELINT Signals	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-11899	Soviet Missile Operations, Space Launches and Related Activities	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-12247	New Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-12468	Soviet Naval Air Force [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1D-13448	SAM Radars in Soviet Ships	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-13707	Soviet Communications System - [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1D-14055	Soviet PLINTH Net Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
D-ST3-14250	Missile, Earth Satellite and Space Vehicle Associated Signals	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-14251	Communist Bloc Naval [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-14277	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-14437	Unidentified [redacted] Signals	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-14680	New Generation Fighter A/C ELINT	Admin Office	Unknown

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
A-FSC-14742	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-14873	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-15077	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-15096	Air-to-Surface Missile ELINT	Admin Office	Unknown
G-FST-15130	Soviet [redacted] ELINT Requirements	Admin Office	Unknown
D-1C3-15209	North Korean [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-15292	Square Tie Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-15301	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-15348	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-15628	Soviet Naval [redacted] Information	Admin Office	Unknown
D-ST2-15647	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
D-ST2-15648	Function and Nature of CROSS UP [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-UPB-15761	[redacted] North Korea	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-15837	Front Piece Radar [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
U-NPA-16020	North Korean [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-16021	CHICOM Communications Systems	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-16061	CROSS SLOT Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16077	[redacted] Systems for Technical Intelligence	Admin Office	Unknown
U-UEV-16232	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y1E-16247	Soviet Navy, Naval Air Force, [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16372	CHICOM [redacted] and Related Activities	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16623	[redacted] CROSS UP Relationships	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16635	SCAN Series ELINT	Admin Office	Unknown
U-APF-16690	[redacted] Activity in China	Admin Office	Unknown
U-APF-16691	[redacted] CHICOM Radars	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16885	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-16890	Airborne Range-Only Radar	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
N-Y10-16894	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-16922	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-EEB-16994	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-17028	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-17029	New/Unusual/Unidentified Radar Signals	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17044	Bow Group [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17045	THIN SKIN Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17046	EGG CUP Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17047	SUN VISOR Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17048	HAWK SCREECH Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-17105	[redacted] ELINT	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17138	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-17139	Consol [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
N-E4C-17179	FLAT SPIN Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E4C-17180	DRUM TILT Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E4C-17245	Characteristics of SCOOP PAIR [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E4C-17246	TOP NET Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E4C-17247	HEAD NET Radar	Admin Office	Unknown
U-GPS-17350	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-SAC-17468	[redacted] CHICOM [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
D-3A7-17634	Electronic Order of Battle	Admin Office	Unknown
C-FST-17782	END BOX	Admin Office	Unknown
U-GPB-17967	North Korean [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-17982	Soviet Navy Communications Capability ([redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-18094	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SHORT TITLE	LONG TITLE	LOCATION	STATUS
G-FST-18156	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-18263	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-18344	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
U-NPA-18350	Soviet [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-18438	Communist Bloc (Except Soviet) [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-18476	Soviet Interest/Capabilities [redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown
A-FSC-18751	Soviet [redacted] Systems	Admin Office	Unknown
N-E1E-18898	EGG BALL	Admin Office	Unknown
N-Y10-19042	[redacted]	Admin Office	Unknown

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

U-NPA-N0034

TITLE: North Korean [redacted]

See comments under SICR #U-NPA-16020

U-NPA-N0045

TITLE: CHICOM Communications System

See Comments under SICR #U-NPA-16021

U-NPA-N0076

TITLE: Soviet [redacted]

See comments under SICR #U-NPA-15348

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

U-NPA-N0077

TITLE: North Korean [redacted]

[redacted]

U-NPA-N0085

TITLE: CHICOM Communications System

See comments under SICRS U-NPA-16021
U-NPA-19423

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

N-Y1E-05570

TITLE: Soviet Communications System - [redacted]

See comments under SICR #N-Y10-13707

N-Y1E-05656

TITLE: Soviet Navy Communications Capability [redacted]

See comments under SICR #N-Y10-17982

N-Y1E-06041

TITLE: Soviet Navy, Naval Air Force [redacted]

See comments under SICR #N-Y1E-16247

N-E32-06534 (PR 248-64)

TITLE: Radar [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTENT: The objective of this requirement is to obtain any information that might help in compromising the identity of Soviet [redacted] and to aid in an appraisal of the

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

√ N-E32-06662 (PR 290-64)

TITLE: Search Radars BIG NET and TOP THROUGH Air

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

√ N-Y1E-07257 (PR 342-64)

TITLE: Chinese Communist [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET DINAR

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-Y1E-07714 (PR 467-64)

TITLE: Communist Bloc Systems for [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

N-E32-08198 (PR 554-64 SUPP #1)

TITLE: MADGE [redacted]

[redacted]

N-E32-08223 (PR 601-64)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

D-ACQ-09077 (PR 10-65)

TITLE: [redacted] Soviet, Satellite and CHICOM [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

N-1E4-11534

TITLE: Correlation of ELINT Signals (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A-FSC-11899 (PR 518-65)

TITLE: Soviet Missile Operations, Space Launches and Related Activities (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-X10-12247

TITLE: New Soviet [redacted] (C-HVCCO)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

√ N-Y10-12468 (PR 595-65)

TITLE: Soviet Naval Air Force [redacted] Requirements (S-HVCCO)

[redacted]

√ N-E1D-13448 (PR 234-66)

TITLE: [redacted] Soviet Ships

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

(E)(1)(1)
(B)(3)(H)(5)(U)(S)(C)(O)(3)
(B)(3)(H)(1)(U)(S)(C)(9)(8)
(B)(3)(H)(L)(L)(8)(6)(8)

[redacted]

✓ N-Y10-13707 (PR 96-66)

TITLE: Soviet Communications System - [redacted] (C-HVCCO)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ N-E1D-14055 (PR 154-66)

TITLE: PLINTH NET Radar (C)

✓ D-ST3-14250 (PR 33-67)

TITLE: Missile, Earth Satellite and Space Vehicle Associated Signals (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

j N-Y10-14251 (PR 173-66)

TITLE: Communist Bloc Naval [redacted]

[redacted]

j N-Y10-14277

TITLE: [redacted] (C)

See comments under SICR #N-Y10-18344

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

√ N-E1E-14437 (PR 291-66)

TITLE: Unidentified [redacted] Signal

[redacted]

√ A-FSC-14680 (PR 249-66)

TITLE: New Generation Fighter Aircraft ELINT

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

✓ A-FSC-14742 (PR 263-66)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted]
[redacted] (C)

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓ N-Y10-14873 (PR 98-64 SUPP#4)

TITLE: [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

✓ A-FSC-15077 (PR 518-65, SUPP 5)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A-FSC-15096 (PR 335-66)

TITLE: [redacted] ELINT

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ G-FST-15130 (PR 504-67)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] ELINT Requirement (S/NOFORN)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (NOFORN [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

D-1C3-15209 (PR 340-66)

TITLE: North Korean [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

N-E1E-15292 (PR 385-66)

TITLE: SQUARE TIE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)—50 USC 403
(b)(3)—18 USC 798
(b)(3)—P.L. 86-36

N-YLE-15301 (PR 351-66)

TITLE:

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

✓ U-NPA-15348 (PR 363-67)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50USC3024(i)
(b)(3)-P.L.86-36
(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

✓ N-Y1E-15628 (PR 313-66)

TITLE: Soviet Naval [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

✓ D-ST2-15647 (PR 398-66)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

D-ST2-15648 (PR 401-66)

TITLE: Function and Nature of CROSS UP [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-3

[redacted]

U-UPB-15761 (PR 453-66)

TITLE: [redacted] North Korea

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-E1E-15837 (PR 524-66)

TITLE: Front Piece Radar [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

√ U-NPA-16020

TITLE: North Korean [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

√ U-NPA-16021 (PR 448-66)

TITLE: CHICOM Communications Systems (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

N-E1E-16061 (PR 459-66)

TITLE: CROSS SLOT Radar ~~(C)~~

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

A-FSC-16077 (PR 474-66) and Supplement (SICR A-FSC-18751)

TITLE: [redacted] Systems for Technical Intelligence (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

U-UEV-16232 (PR 526-66)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

/ N Y1E-16247 (PR 222-66)

TITLE: Soviet Navy, Naval Air Force [redacted] (U)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

A-FSC-16372

TITLE: CHICOM [redacted] and Related Activities

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 40
(b)(1 - USC 79
(b)(-P. . 86-5

A-FSC-16623 (PR 517-66)

TITLE: CROSS UP Relationships (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A-FSC-16635 (PR 559-66)

TITLE: SCAN Series ELINT

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

U-APF-16690 (PR 340-67)

TITLE: [redacted] Activity in China

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

U-APF-16691 (PR 597-66)

TITLE: [redacted] CHICOM Radars

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

A-FSC-16885 (PR 648-66)

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓ A-FSC-16890 (PR 637-66)

TITLE: Airborne Range-Only Radar (U)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓N-Y10-16894 (PR 606-66)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-[illegible]

[redacted]

✓ N-EIE-16922 (PR 314-67)

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

✓ A-EBB-16994 (PR 660-66)

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

A-FSC-17028 (PR 134-67)

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

A-FSC-17029 (PR 12-67)

TITLE: New, Unusual, or Unidentified Radar Signals

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓ N-ELE-17044 (PR 26-67)

TITLE: BOW Group [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 4
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-

✓ N-E1E-17045 (PR 23-67)

TITLE: THIN SKIN Radar (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

✓ N-E1E-17046 (PR 17-67)

TITLE: EGG CUP Radar (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓ N-E1E-17047 (PR 24-67)

TITLE: SUN VISOR Radar

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/ N-E1E-17048 (PR 25-67)

TITLE: HAWK SCREECH Radar [redacted] (C)

[redacted]

/ A-FSC-17105 (PR 29 67)

TITLE: [redacted] ELINT

[redacted]

b(1)
b(3)-50 USC 403
b(3)-18 USC 798
b(3,-P.L. 86-36

✓ N-E1E-17138 (PR 28-67)

TITLE: [redacted] (U)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET GP-3

[redacted]

✓ N-E1E-17139 (PR 71-67)

TITLE: CONSOL [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

✓ N-E4C-17179 (PR 80-67)

TITLE: FLAT SPIN Radar

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

✓ N-E4C-17180 (PR 75-67)

TITLE: DRUM TILT Radar

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-E4C-17245 (PR 79-67)

TITLE: Characteristics of SCOOP PAIR [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

N-E4C-17246 (PR 72-67)

TITLE: TOP NET Radar

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

N-E4C-17247 (PR 81-67)

TITLE: HEAD NET

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

U-GPA-17350 (PR 115-67)

TITLE:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

U-SAC-17468 (P. R. 76-67)

TITLE: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

D-3A7-17634 (PR 288-67)

TITLE: Electronic Order of Battle

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET NOFORN

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

√ G-FST-17782 (P. R. 153-67)

TITLE: END BOX (U)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET NOFORN

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

U-GPB-17967 (PR 162-67)

TITLE: North Korean [redacted]

[redacted]

N-Y10-17982

TITLE: Soviet Navy Communications Capability ([redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

[redacted]

N-Y10-17983

TITLE: [redacted] (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

DOCID: 4002585

36.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

BEAR-D

N-Y10 18094

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] [redacted] (S-S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

(4)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

N-Y10 18094

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (S-S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

NORTHCOM

[redacted]

H-FST-18156

TITLE: CHICOM [redacted] Communications

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET TRINE

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-Y10-18263 (PR 222-66 Supp 2)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

N-Y10-18344 (FR 245-67)

TITLE: [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

U-NPA-18350

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (SC)

See comments under SICR U-NPA-15348

N-Y10-18438 (PR 255-67)

TITLE: Communist Bloc (Except Soviet) [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET HVCCO

[redacted]

N-Y10-18476 (PR 262-67)

TITLE: Soviet [redacted] (C)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

A-FSC-18751 (PR 474-66, Supp #1)

TITLE: Soviet Communications [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

N-E1E-18898 (PR 352-67)

TITLE: EGG BALL

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[redacted]

N-Y10-19042 (PR 347-67)

TITLE: [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET CODEWORD

[redacted]

[redacted]

✓ U-NPA-19423

TITLE: CHICOM [redacted]

See comments under SICR #U-NPA-16021

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36