peter.neis@tse-fr.eu | peterneis.github.io | +33 (0) 7 61 20 57 14

# INTERESTS Development Economics, Law & Economics, Applied Econometrics

## **EDUCATION** Toulouse School of Economics, France

PhD in Economics, Supervisor: Daniel Chen

Expected 2023

#### University of Zurich, Switzerland

Visiting PhD Student April - December 2022

#### Toulouse School of Economics, France

M.Sc. Economic Theory and Econometrics, doctoral track

Master thesis (Supervisor: Nour Meddahi): Robustness of Machine Learning Methods for

Time Aggregation in the Case of Predicting Asset Returns

2017 - 2018

#### Toulouse School of Economics, France

M.Sc. Econometrics and Statistics

2016 - 2017

# University of Mainz, Germany

#### Paris Nanterre University, France

B.Sc. Economics (French-German double-degree)

Bachelor Thesis (Supervisor: B. David): Okun's law and labour market reforms in Germany

2013 - 2016

### **TEACHING** Advanced Econometrics, 4th year

Teaching assistant for Pascal Lavergne & Francois Poinas

Fall 2021, Fall 2020

#### Microeconomics, 1st year

Fall 2020

#### Introductory Econometrics, 3rd year

Teaching assistant for Thierry Magnac & Stéphane Gregoir

Spring 2020

#### **Applied Econometrics**, 4th year

Teaching assistant for Olivier de Groote

Spring 2020

#### Mathematics, 1st year

Teaching assistant for Reyn van Ewijk

Fall 2014

#### **EXPERIENCE** Short Term Consultant, DIME, World Bank

June 2020 - June 2022

Supporting the DeJure team on several projects linked to the interaction between development and the judiciary, especially working on a cross-country study to analyze the effect of judicial efficiency on labor informality.

# **ENTER Students Coordinator**, Toulouse, France

Jan 2020 - Dec 2022

Support incoming PhD-students of the ENTER-exchange network, organizing placements in seminars and their stay in Toulouse.

INRA, Toulouse, France

Apr - Jul 2017

Research Internship with focus on pest control for wheat farmers

Supervisor: F. Salanié

- Development of a dynamic, multi-agent decision model
- Multidisciplinary project which involved working collaboratively with biologists and economists

# Wieland S.A.S, Croissy-Beaubourg, France

Jun - Jul 2016

Internship in the finance department

#### Arche France, Pierrefonds, France

#### • Deputy Manger

2011 - 2012

Responsible for a five-person international team; managing a full time care unit with 9 adults with mental disabilities

- Organize weekly group meetings
- Manage team's workflow and care unit's planning
- Interact with wide range of external and internal partners (Doctors, Families, other units, ...)

• Social Worker 2010 - 2011

- Assisted adults with mental disability
- Share daily life with residents and organize activities during the day

**SKILLS** Software: Stata, Latex, Microsoft Office

Programming Languages: R, Python, HTML, CSS

Languages: German (native), French (fluent), English (fluent)

#### NATIONALITY German

#### **PRESENTATIONS**

#### **Presenter:**

• Jun 2023: AFSE Annual Congress, Paris, France • Apr 2023: Environmental Workshop, TSE, France • Oct 2022: Applied Micro Doctoral Seminar, UZH, Switzerland • Sep 2022: JM workshop, TSE, France • Jul 2022: Behavior, Institutions and Development Workshop, TSE, France • Jun 2022: Enter Jamboree, Barcelona, Spain • Nov 2021: Student Workshop, TSE, France • Sep 2021: 38th EALE Conference, Online • Jul 2021: Student Workshop, TSE, France • Jun 2021: Behavior, Institutions and Development Workshop, TSE, France • Mai 2021: Half Baked Seminar, World Bank • Dec 2020: Student Workshop, TSE, France • Oct 2020: The Economics of Informality Conference 2020, Colombia • Sep 2020: Behavior, Institutions and Development Workshop, TSE, France • Apr 2020: Applied Micro Workshop, TSE, France • Mar 2020: Behavior, Institutions and Development Workshop, TSE, France

#### **Discussant:**

• Oct 2020: The Economics of Informality Conference 2020, Colombia • Apr 2019: Enter Jamboree 2019, Tilburg, Netherlands

#### **REFEREEING**

#### **JOB MARKET PAPER** Courts, Firms and Informality

This paper studies the impact of judicial efficiency on informality. In many developing countries most firms and workers operate and work informally outside the legal and regulatory systems. A better judicial system can lead to a higher share of formal firms, since it changes the marginal benefit of being formal. Similarly, the impact on the workforce can go either way as formal firms can be incentivized to hire fewer formal workers. This can lead to the paradoxical effect that a more efficient judicial environment results in a larger share of formal firms albeit with fewer formal workers. The paper introduces judicial efficiency in an equilibrium model. Judicial efficiency can affect firms' decisions through two channels. First, it can have a direct impact on a firm's productivity, this captures a general, better economic environment. Second, it can have an impact on the relative cost to hire formal workers compared to informal workers. The paper uses data from India to test the impact of the judiciary on the two margins of informality. In India, most firms and workers are operating informally while the judicial system is hampered by its large and increasing backlog. Results show a negative effect of court efficiency on the share of informal firms among small firms and a negative but not statistically significant effect on the share of informal workers. Consolidating these findings with the proposed model implies that the observed effects can be explained solely by a relative cost on formal workers in formal firms and one does not need to include a general TFP shock.

# SUBMITTED PAPERS Just Water? Environmental Jurisprudence, Water Quality and Infant Mortality in India (with S. Bhupatiraj, D. Chen, S. Joshi & S. Singh)

Toxic ambient water can be deadly, particularly in developing countries where pollution levels are high. We explore the impacts of judicial policies on surface water quality in India. We curate data on court cases, judges' prior rulings, water pollution and child mortality over a period of nearly forty years. Leveraging random judge assignment in the courts of India, we estimate the effect of pro-environmental orders on district-level measures of surface water toxicity. We observe that 'green' orders from the judiciary are preceded by decreases in maximum values of observed surface water toxicity levels. This suggests that the appointment of these judges could potentially expedite environmental improvements, even before the formal decision is made. These lower pollution levels do not however, translate into reductions in neonatal and infant mortality over the subsequent months. Moreover, we find that several years after the orders' decision date, both pollution and mortality increase relative to the pre-decision levels. These findings suggest that even though court orders can lower environmental toxicity in the short-run, they do not drive long-term substantive enhancements in water quality or health outcomes.

# Impact of free legal search on rule of law: Evidence from Indian Kanoon (with S. Bhupatiraj, D. Chen, R. Das, & S. Joshi)

Access to legal information is limited in many parts of the world. Can digital platforms offering free legal search reduce market-level constraints on economic development? We estimate the impact of Indian Kanoon, a free legal search engine, using a generalized difference-in-differences empirical strategy. We find that the staggered rollout of Kanoon was associated with a 1-2% increased likelihood of case resolutions and doubling of the number of appeals, which are also less likely to be dismissed by the courts. It affected the finances of firms with positive impacts on assets and negative impacts on audit fees and bad debts.

**Aapka Naam? Social identity and Processes of Justice in Bihar, India** (with S. Bhupatiraju, D. L. Chen, S. Joshi) WB Working Paper

How do names that signal membership to underrepresented social groups affect justice in India? We use a novel dataset of more than one million cases filed at the Patna High Court between 2009 and 2019 together with a variety of supplementary data to explore this question in the courts of Bihar, one of India's poor-est and most divided states. Our analysis finds that Muslims, women and scheduled castes are consistently under-represented at the courts. The use of "caste neutral" last names among litigants has been growing over time. Though there is little evidence of "matching" between judges and litigants on the basis of names, we find that petitioners and their advocates match on the basis of social identity and this affects the likelihoods of case dismissals. These results highlight the continued importance of networks at the state-society frontier and the role of these networks in perpetuating inequality.

Short-term association between COVID-19 related deaths, hospitalized patients and air pollution during the first lockdown in the four largest cities in Germany. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 2022, S. 1-16. (with R. Walsemann)

#### WORK IN PROGRESS Determinants of Court Productivity in Highly Congested Settings: Evidence from India.

Court output, measured as the number or quality of disposed cases, depends on judicial staffing and caseload. However, in highly congested courts, judges might not be incentivized by total caseload but rather by the flow of incoming cases. This hypothesis is tested through 2SLS and GMM estimations on a new panel dataset covering all Indian district courts. Additionally, an alternative output variable to measure judges' effort is proposed.

#### Judges, Points and Old Cases: Dynamic Incentives in Indian Lower Courts

We study an incentive scheme for judges in Indian lower courts. The scheme attributes points to each judgment. Points depend on case type, case characteristics and case age and can be important for a judge's promotion. We ask three questions. Do judges take the incentive scheme into account for their decision making. If yes, what is the impact of the scheme on different court cases and the involved parties? Finally, what is an ideal scheme look, given different policy makers' objectives? To answer these question, we exploit arbitrary discontinuities in incentives and builds a dynamic model to create counterfactuals while taking into account the dynamic aspects of the incentive scheme.

#### REFERENCES

#### **Daniel Chen**

Professor Toulouse School of Economics Institute for Advanced Study at Toulouse daniel.chen@iast.fr

#### Shareen Joshi

Associate Professor
E. A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
shareen.joshi@georgetown.edu

### **Mohamed Saleh**

Associate Professor London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) m.saleh@lse.ac.uk

Reference letters can be obtained from Christelle Fotso-Tatchum (phd.tse@ut-capitole.fr).

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