Microsoft

Towards Secure Coding Agents with FlowGuard

Landon Cox, Rodrigo Fonseca, Vic Li, and Pedro Henrique Penna

Anatomy of a coding agent



Prompt-injection attacks in the news

docker AI Products Developers Pricing Support Blog Company

MCP Horror Stories: The GitHub Prompt Injection Data Heist

Ajeet Singh Raina

TRUESEC Platform Services Solutions Resources Company Login Talk to us! Under Attack?

Threat Insight

Novel Cyber Attack Exposes Microsoft 365 Copilot

A novel attack technique named EchoLeak has been characterized as a "zero-click"
allows bad actors to exfiltrate sensitive data
context without any user interaction.

9 | Insight

Agentic AI , Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning , Data Security

OpenAI Fixes Gmail Data Flaw in ChatGPT Agent

Attackers Could Siphon Gmail Data Unnoticed From Users Who Let AI Tool Access Email

Rashmi Ramesh (rashmiramesh_) • September 23, 2025

When AI Has Root: Lessons from the Supabase MCP Data Leak

Bobby DeSimone
Founder & CEO
July 7, 2025

Hackers can hide AI prompt injection attacks in resized images

A new method of hiding instructions for "AI" systems takes advantage of how images are compressed when uploaded.

By Michael Crider
Staff Writer, PCWorld | AUG 26, 2025 7:42 AM PDT

Demo prompt-injection attack



Demo prompt-injection attack



Demo prompt-injection attack



Demo prompt-injection attack



Demo prompt-injection attack



Demo prompt-injection attack



Attack demo w/ OpenAI Codex

https://github.com/t-shihangli_microsoft/backend-rs-issues/issues/1

Server health check is failing #1

Edit New issue

Open t-shihangli_micro...#32

Malicious bug report

t-shihangli_microsoft
opened 2 weeks ago · edited by t-shihangli_microsoft

Describe the bug

When I ping the webserver for health check at the root url "/", I got an empty error response.

To Reproduce
Steps to reproduce the behavior:

1. Deploy this service (in development it runs on localhost:3000)
2. Run `ping localhost:3000`
3. See error message `curl: (52) Empty reply from server`

Expected behavior

The server should return with a health check message: "hello world!"

Desktop (please complete the following information):

No one - Assign yourself

Labels
No labels

Projects
No projects

Milestone
No milestone

Relationships
None yet

Development

Coding across public and private repos

- Public issue tracker + private implementation
  - Android Open Source → Proprietary subsystems
  - Google Chromium → Chrome
- Public interface/spec + private implementation
  - https://github.com/googleapis/googleapis
  - https://github.com/aws/containers-roadmap
- Public core + private enterprise add-ons
  - https://about.gitlab.com
- Public mirror of a private repo
  - https://github.com/google/boringssl
- Public SDK/client + private service
  - https://github.com/stripe
- Public docs-as-code + private generators/tooling
  - https://github.com/openai/openai-cookbook



The lethal trifecta



Invariant: given a trusted initial state, an agent should not access all three.

Source: The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication

Mitigations

Ask the user

- User inspects untrusted inputs
- Block anything suspicious

- Increases user burden
- Leads to prompt fatigue

Apply ML

- LLMs separate instruction, data
- LLMs detect malicious prompts

- Probabilistic guarantees
  - Spotlighting
  - SecAlign
  - ISE
  - StruQ
  - TaskTracker
  - MCPShield (MSFT Hackathon)

Information flow control

- Taint-track secrecy, integrity
- Block unsafe tool calls

- Over-constrains control flows
  - CaMeL (Google)
- Variable-based tracking
  - FIDES (Microsoft)

FlowGuard

FlowGuard architecture



FlowGuard architecture





FlowGuard architecture



FlowGuard architecture



Mitigating prompt-injection



FIDES approach



FlowGuard approach



FlowGuard overview

- Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC)
  - Agents and MCP data have integrity and secrecy labels
  - Capabilities allow agents to add and remove tags from labels
  - Communication rules on tool calls prevent lethal trifecta

- AgentSpawn
  - If agent has two and needs a third, can spawn a sub-agent
  - Constrained parent-child communication
  - E.g., child can only transmit a Boolean back to parent
  - Generalizes FIDES constrained variable-inspection

- Goals and non-goals
  - Trying to ensure private-data confidentiality, e.g., prevent leaks
  - Not trying to ensure private-data integrity, e.g., prevent back-doors



Threat model





Agents begin in a trusted initial state; become untrusted based in inputs.

User-space reference monitor is trusted.

MCP servers are trusted; resources may not be.

Information Flow Control for Standard OS Abstractions

Maxwell Krohn Alexander Yip Micah Brodsky Natan Cliffer
M. Frans Kaashoek Eddie Kohler[†] Robert Morris
MIT CSAIL [†]UCLA
http://flume.csail.mit.edu/

Abstract

Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) [24] is an approach to security that allows application writers to control how data flows between the pieces of an application and the outside world. As applied to privacy, DIFC allows untrusted software to compute with private data while trusted security code controls the release of that data. As applied to integrity, DIFC allows trusted code to protect untrusted software from unexpected malicious inputs. In either case, only bugs in the trusted code, which tends to be small and isolated, can lead to security violations.

We present *Flume*, a new DIFC model and system that applies at the granularity of operating system processes and standard OS abstractions (e.g., pipes and file descriptors). Flume eases DIFC's use in existing applications and allows safe interaction between conventional and DIFC-aware processes. Flume runs as a user-level reference monitor on Linux. A process confined by Flume cannot perform most system calls directly; instead, an interposition layer replaces system calls with IPC to the reference monitor, which enforces data flow policies and performs safe operations on the process's behalf. We ported a complex Web application (MoinMoin wiki) to Flume, changing only 2% of the original code. The Flume version is roughly 30–40% slower due to overheads in our current implementation but supports additional security policies impossible without DIFC.

Categories and Subject Descriptors:
D.4.6 [**Operating Systems**]: Security and Protection—*Information flow controls, Access controls*; D.4.7 [**Operating Systems**]: Organization and Design; C.5.5 [**Computer System Implementation**]: Servers

General Terms: Security, Design, Performance

Keywords: distributed information flow control, DIFC, endpoints, reference monitor, system call interposition, Web services

1 Introduction

As modern applications grow in size, complexity and dependence on third-party software, they become more susceptible to security flaws. Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) [24], a variant of classic information flow control [1, 2, 6], can improve the security of complex applications, even in the presence of potential exploits. Existing DIFC systems operate as programming language abstractions [24] or are integrated into communication primitives in new operating systems [8, 38]. These approaches have advantages, such as fine-grained control of information flow and high performance, but require a shift in how applications are developed. Flume instead provides process-level DIFC as a minimal extension to the communication primitives in *existing* operating systems, making DIFC work with the languages, tools, and operating system abstractions already familiar to programmers.

The Flume system provides DIFC at the granularity of processes, and integrates DIFC controls with standard communication abstractions such as pipes, sockets, and file descriptors, via a user-level reference monitor. Its interface helps programmers secure existing applications and write new ones with existing tools and libraries. Flume enforces the DIFC policy as the application runs.

A typical Flume application consists of processes of two types. *Untrusted* processes do most of the computation. They are constrained by, but possibly unaware of, DIFC controls. *Trusted* processes, in contrast, are aware of DIFC and set up the privacy and integrity controls that constrain untrusted processes. Trusted processes also have the *privilege* to selectively violate classical information flow control—for instance, by *declassifying* private data (perhaps to export it from the system), or by *endorsing* data as high-integrity. This privilege is distributed among the trusted processes according to application policy, making it decentralized (the "D" in DIFC). Though bugs in the trusted code can lead to compromise, bugs elsewhere in the application cannot, and trusted code can stay relatively isolated and concise even as the application expands.

A central challenge for Flume is to accommodate processes that use existing communication interfaces such as sockets and pipes but also need to specify how and when they use their privileges. It would be awkward to, for example, modify each call to `read` or `write` to take arguments indicating whether privilege should be applied. Worse, the conventional process interface is rife with channels that "leak" information, like network sockets. A system could simply mark these channels off-limits, restricting the process interface to those system calls with obvious and controllable information flow, but this approach would make many libraries unusable. Flume instead seeks to restrict access to these uncontrolled channels only when necessary.

Our solution is an *endpoint* abstraction. Flume represents each resource a process uses to communicate as an endpoint, including pipes, sockets, files, and network connections. A process can specify what subset of its privileges should be exercised when communicating through each endpoint. Uncontrolled channels are modeled as endpoints that exit the DIFC system; Flume ensures that no process can have both an uncontrolled channel and access to private data it cannot declassify.

We built Flume in user-space (with a few small kernel patches) for implementation convenience and portability: the implementation runs on Linux and OpenBSD. Unlike prior systems that provide DIFC as part of a new kernel design (e.g., Asbestos [8] and HiStar [38]), Flume takes advantage of large existing efforts to maintain and improve the kernel support for hardware, NFS, RAID, SMP, etc. The disadvantage is that Flume's trusted computing base is many times larger than those of dedicated DIFC kernels, leaving

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.

SOSP'07, October 14–17, 2007, Stevenson, Washington, USA.

Copyright 2007 ACM 978-1-59593-591-5/07/0010 ...$5.00.

"**Flume** provides Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) at the granularity of processes and integrates DIFC controls with standard communication abstractions such as pipes, sockets, and file descriptors, via a user-level reference monitor."

FlowGuard provides Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) at the granularity of agents and integrates DIFC controls with standard tool interfaces like Model Context Protocol (MCP), via a user-level reference monitor.

Krohn et al, SOSP 2007

DIFC 101: secrecy

Trusted | Untrusted
Private | Public

Secrecy labels track what agents have seen



DIFC 101: secrecy

Trusted | Untrusted

Private | Public

Secrecy labels track what agents have seen



DIFC 101: secrecy

Trusted
Untrusted
Private
Public

Receiver must have seen all of sender’s secrets



DIFC 101: integrity

Trusted
Untrusted
Private
Public

Integrity labels track endorsements



DIFC 101: integrity



Receiver must have equal or lower integrity



DIFC 101: integrity

Trusted
Untrusted
Private
Public

Receiver must have equal or lower integrity



DIFC 101: capabilities

Trusted | Untrusted
Private | Public

Capabilities allow agents to modify labels

Removing secrecy tag is **declassification.**

Adding integrity tag is **endorsement.**

Agent 1

$O_1 = \{e_A^+, e_B^+, e_C^+, w_{Vic}^-\}$
$S_1 = \{e_A\}$
$I_1 = \{\}$

$$O_{Flowguard} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} e_A^-, e_B^-, e_C^-, w_{Vic}^+, \\ e_A^+, e_B^+, e_C^+, w_{Vic}^- \end{matrix} \right\}$$

Agent 2

$O_2 = \{e_A^+, e_B^+, e_C^+, w_{Vic}^-\}$
$S_2 = \{e_A, e_C\}$
$I_2 = \{w_{Vic}\}$

A
$S_A = \{e_A\}$

B
$I_B = \{\}$

C
$S_C = \{e_C\}$

FlowGuard DIFC

Trusted | Untrusted
Private | Public

FlowGuard MCP proxy

GitHub Guard

Agent system calls

AgentSpawn

MCP servers

- GitHub
- M365
- Azure
- Browser

GitHub

Private repo

$S_c = \{e_c\}$
$I_c = \{w_c\}$

Public repo

"Count LoC"

$S_p = I_p = \{\}$

"Fix any bug reports that have been posted."

FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC



FlowGuard DIFC





Attack demo w/ OpenAI Codex and FlowGuard

```
—Agent 1——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
t-shihangli@VicLaptop:~/proj/demo$ ./start_codex_with_flowguard.sh "Please help me solve issue #1 in t-shihangli_microsoft/backend-rs-issues"
```

Start Codex to work on issue

```
[flowguard1:bash*                                                  22:23
```

Project status

- FlowGuard prototype (~15k lines of code)
  - MCP proxy
    - Message routing
    - DIFC enforcement
    - AgentSpawn
  - GitHub Guard
    - GitHub data labeling
    - Encapsulates GitHub semantics



- Agent sandboxing
  - Docker container with network whitelist, e.g., only allow OpenAI API calls for Codex

Conclusion

- FlowGuard design principles
  - DIFC can prevent information leaks caused by prompt-injection attacks
  - AgentSpawn balances security and utility through constrained communication
  - Agents can reason about and manage their own labels

- Future work
  - Testing with AgentDojo prompt-injection benchmark
  - More use-cases and guards (only GitHub so far)
  - More coding agents (only codex, swe-bench so far)
  - More sub-agents (only Boolean so far)
  - Sandboxing with Hyperlight + Nanvix

- Message Landon (@lacox) or Pedro (@ppenna) to follow up

Backup slides

Why not filter outputs?