




Towards Secure Coding Agents with FlowGuard


Landon Cox, Rodrigo Fonseca, Vic Li, and Pedro Henrique Penna



1 Prompt-injection attack




2 Lethal trifecta




5 FlowGuard approach

4 Fork-in-the-road moment



5 FlowGuard approach



3 Potential mitigations

Ask the user



- User inspects untrusted inputs
- Block anything suspicious
- Increases user burden
- Leads to prompt fatigue

Apply ML



- LLMs separate instruction, data
- LLMs detect malicious prompts
- Probabilistic guarantees
 - Spotlighting
 - SecAlign
 - ISE
 - StruQ
 - TaskTracker
 - MCPShield (MSFT Hackathon)

Information flow control



- Taint-track secrecy, integrity
- Block unsafe tool calls
- Over-constrains control flows
 - CaMeL (Google)
 - Variable-based tracking
 - FIDES (Microsoft)

FlowGuard provides Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) at the granularity of agents and integrates DIFC controls with standard tool interfaces like Model Context Protocol (MCP), via a user-level reference monitor.

6 Project overview and status

FlowGuard design principles

- DIFC can prevent information leaks caused by prompt-injection attacks
- AgentSpawn balances security and utility through constrained communication
- Agents can reason about and manage their own labels

Prototype

- MCP proxy + GitHub Guard (15k lines of code)
- Support OpenAI Codex and SWE-Bench coding agents
- Sandboxing with Docker + network whitelist

Future work

- Testing with AgentDojo prompt-injection benchmark
- More use-cases and guards (only GitHub so far)
- More coding agents (only codex, swe-bench so far)
- More sub-agents (only Boolean so far)
- Sandboxing with Hyperlight + Nanvix

Message Landon (@lacoxy) or Pedro (@ppenna) to follow up

