Peter G. Troyan

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CONTACT INFORMATION

Department of Economics
University of Virginia
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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2014

B.S., Mathematics (with High Honors) and Physics
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 2008

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 2020-present

Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 2014-2020

Visiting Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 2019

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Market Design, Matching

PUBLICATIONS

Matching with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman, *Theoretical Economics* (2020), 15(3):1095-1133

Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman, *Games and Economic Behavior* (2020), 120:370-390

Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill, *Journal of Economic Theory* (2020), 185

– Abstract appears in the *Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)*

Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles, *International Economic Review* (2019), 60(3)

Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis, *Games and Economic Behavior* (2019), 114:232-252

Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, *Journal of Economic Theory* (2017), 170:319-345

Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints (with Daniel Fragiadakis), *Theoretical Economics* (2017), 12(2):863-908

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo), *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation* (2015), 4(1), Article 6

Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, *Games and Economic Behavior* (2012), 75(2):936-947

Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas (with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo), *Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012)* (2012), 3:1327-1328 [extended abstract]

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (with Fuhito Kojima), *Japanese Economic Review* (2011), 62:82-98 [refereed survey article]

WORKING PAPERS	A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design, with Marek Pycia (2nd revise and resubmit, *Econometrica*)

- Best Paper Award at *20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)*
- Exemplary Theory Paper at *20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)*
- Abstract appears in the *Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)*

PRESENTATIONS (INCLUDING SCHEDULED)	**2021:** Brown University

2020: Columbia MTI, UCSD, Notre Dame, ASSA Annual Meeting (San Diego) *Canceled due to COVID-19:* Johns Hopkins, Villanova, ESSET 2020 (Gerzensee), Osaka-Rochester Workshop on Alternatives to Market Design

2019: Washington University in St. Louis, Maryland, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School (brown bag), NSF/NBER/CEME Mathematical Economics Conference (Berkeley), ASSA Annual Meeting (Atlanta), MATCH UP 2019 (Ascona), Conference on Economic Design (Budapest), Econometric Society Summer Meetings (Seattle), INFORMS 2019 (Seattle), EC19 (Phoenix), Ottawa Micro Theory Conference

2018: UBC, Zurich, Matching in Practice (Cologne), Workshop on Game Theory (National University of Singapore), SAET Conference (Taipei)

2017: ITAM, NC State, INFORMS Annual Meeting (Houston), Matching in Practice (Brussels), EEA-ESEM (Lisbon), NSF/CEME Decentralization (University of Michigan), MATCH UP 2017 (Microsoft Research Cambridge), Conference on Economic Design (York), SAET Conference (Faro)

2016: NBER Market Design Workshop (Stanford), GAMES 2016 (Maastricht University)

2015: Texas A&M , Midwest Economic Theory Conference (Ohio State University), MATCH UP 2015 (University of Glasgow), Society for Economic Design (Istanbul Bilgi University), Econometric Society World Congress (Montreal)

2014: Cal State East Bay, University of Iowa, University of Western Ontario, University of Virginia, University of Illinois

2013: International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook)

2012: International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook), SAET Conference (University of Queensland), North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society (Northwestern), Southwest Economic Theory Conference (UC San Diego)

SERVICE	Referee for: *Econometrica, American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, American Economic Journal: Policy, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association, Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, Southern Economic Journal, Social Choice and Welfare, International Journal of Game Theory, Mathematics of Operations Research, European Economic Review, International Economic Review, Management Science, European Science Foundation, US-Israel Binational Science Foundation, American Economic Review: Insights, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*

Program Committee, EC17, EC20, EC21

College of Expert Reviewers, European Science Foundation

Co-organizer, University of Virginia Bankard Workshop in Economic Theory and Experimental Economics

Grants, Fellowships and Awards	A&S Summer Stipend, 2021
	Best Paper Award, EC19
	Exemplary Theory Paper Award, EC19
	Roger Sherman Fellowship, 2019-2020
	Bankard Fund for Political Economy, 2017, 2019, 2020
	Haley-Shaw Fellowship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2013
	Graduate Fellowship, Stanford University Department of Economics, 2008
	Keeler Scholarship, University of Michigan Department of Mathematics, 2007
	Buckfire Scholarship, Unversity of Michigan Honors Program, 2007
	Bodine Scholarship, University of Michigan Department of Physics, 2006
	Dean's Merit Scholarship, University of Michigan, 2003-2007