Run-Time Detection of Self-Replication in Binary Malware

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
Gene of Self-Replication

Published previously


- Malware self-replicates to maximize the impact
- The number of practical techniques to implement self-replication is limited
- Developers of new viruses are destined to rely on a number of existing replication techniques
- Legitimate software seldom self-replicates

Gene of Self-Replication


Advantages of our approach:



GSR Structure



GSR Block Structure



Sample Replication Structure

$$G = \{V_{N}, V_{T}, P, S\}$$

$$V_{N} = \begin{cases} \langle \text{Gene_of_self_replication} \rangle, \langle \text{File_}S \, \text{earch_Block} \rangle, \\ \langle \text{File_Copy_}B \, \text{lock} \rangle, \langle \text{Directory_System_Call} \rangle, \\ \langle \text{Open_File_System_Call} \rangle, \langle \text{Create_File_System_Call} \rangle, \\ \langle \text{Write_File_System_Call} \rangle \end{cases}$$

$$V_{T} = \begin{cases} ZwQueryDirectoryFile(...), ZwOpenFile(...), \\ ZwCreateFile(...), ZwWriteFile(...) \end{cases}$$

Sample Replication Structure

```
Gene \rightarrow File\_Search\_Block \cdot File\_Copy\_Block
File\_Search\_Block \rightarrow Directory\_System\_Call \cdot Open\_File\_System\_Call
File\_Copy\_Block \rightarrow Create\_File\_System\_Call \cdot Write\_File\_System\_Call
Directory\_System\_Call \rightarrow input_1 \cdot ZwQueryDirectoryFile \cdot output_1
Open\_File\_System\_Call \rightarrow input_2 \cdot ZwOpenFile \cdot output_2
Create\_File\_System\_Call \rightarrow input_3 \cdot ZwCreateFile \cdot output_3
Write\_File\_System\_Call \rightarrow input_4 \cdot ZwWriteFile \cdot output_4
```

Sample Replication Structure

```
\delta(Gene, ZwQueryDirectoryFile) = \{File\_Search\_Block\}
                           \delta(Gene, ZwOpenFile) = \{File \ Search \ Block\}
                          \delta(Gene, ZwCreateFile) = \{File\_Copy\_Block\}
                           \delta(Gene, ZwWriteFile) = \{File\_Copy\_Block\}
\delta(File\_Search\_Block, ZwQueryDirectoryFile) = \{Directory\_System\_Call\}
          \delta(File\_Search\_Block, ZwOpenFile) = \{Open\_File\_System\_Call\}
           \delta(File\_Copy\_Block, ZwCreateFile) = \{Create\_File\_System\_Call\}
            \delta(File\_Copy\_Block, ZwWriteFile) = \{Write\_File\_System\_Call\}
         \delta(File\_Search\_Block, ZwCreateFile) = \delta(File\_Search\_Block, WriteFile) = O
 \delta(File\_Copy\_Block, ZwQueryDirectoryFile) = \delta(File\_Copy\_Block, ZwOpenFile) = O
```

Replication in Malware

Worm Xanax

```
NtOpenFile 100020h, {24, 0, 42h, 0, 0, 0, "\??\c:\Virlab\"}, 3, 33 ... 12, 0h, 1) result = 0
```

```
NtCreateFile 80100080h, {24, 12, 2 42h, 0, 1243404, "xanax.exe"}, 0h, 128, 3, 1, 96, 0, 0 ... 68, 0h, 1) result = 0
```

System Call	Input Arguments	Output Args	
NtOpenFile 0x100001	{24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "\??\C:\WINDO WS\""}, 3, 16417	12, {0x0,1}	3
NtQueryDirec toryFile 12	0, 0, 0, 1243364, 616, 3, 1, "<.exe", 0	{0x0,11 0}	4

Replication in Malware

Worm
Xanax
(cont)

System Call	Input	Output	
	Arguments	Args	
NtCreateSect	0h, 0h, <u>2,</u>	7-2	5
ion 0xf001f	134217728, 68	Virus Handl	le]
NtMapViewOfS	-1, 0h, 0,	0x980	6
ection √ 72	0, {0, 0}, 0,	000,	į
	1, 0, 2	0,0,368_	
Section Handle		-64	
System Call	Input	Output	
	Arguments	Args	
NtCreateFile	{24, 0, 40h,	52;	7
0x40110080	0, 1242788,	{0h,3}``	.
	"\??\C:\WINDO_		. '
	WS\calc.exe"		
[, 0h, 32, 0,	Victim File	
	5, 100, 0, 0		
NtSetInforma	1241948, 8,	{0h.0}	_8
tionFile 52,	20	End Of File	
NtWriteFile \	0, 0, 0,	{Oh,	9
52_	MZ\220\0\3\0	33792}	
//	\0\0\4\0\0\0\		
/_	377\37	//	
Viral Code	\0\0\0", 33 <u>792</u>	C-1-01-	\neg
	0h, 0	Code Size	

Virus Replication Data




Fig. 4. Sample Virus Replication Data (648 points, 2 attempts).

Extra Features: Weights

Each individual GSR component is assigned with a weight

$$\begin{split} W_{B} &= \sum (W_{B_{1}}, W_{B_{2}}, W_{B_{3}}, ..., W_{B_{n}}) + \\ &+ \sum (W_{B_{bind}(1\leftrightarrow 2)}, W_{B_{bind}(2\leftrightarrow 3)}, W_{B_{bind}(3\leftrightarrow 4)}, ..., W_{B_{bind}(n-1\leftrightarrow n)}) + \\ &+ \sum (W_{B_{1in}}, W_{B_{1out}}, W_{B_{2in}}, W_{B_{2out}}, ..., W_{B_{nin}}, W_{B_{nout}}) + W_{\text{Re sult}} \end{split}$$


Normalized Replication Score is computed as follows:


$$R_{norm} = \frac{(R + \sum (W_{rB_1}, W_{rB_2}, ..., W_{rB_n}))}{N} \cdot 100\%$$


Replication Rates


	Host Search	File Access	Network ing	Memory	Injection / infection	Normalied Replication (total)
W32.Alicia	100%	100%	100%	32.4%	100%	100%
W32.Bogus	100%	100%	5.3%	3.7%	100%	100%
W32.Crash	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%
W32.Neo	100%	100%	7.0%	100%	100%	100%
W32.Linda	100%	100%	4.3%	100%	100%	100%
W32.Stream	100%	100%	32.5%	100%	100%	100%
Svchost.exe	26.3%	100%	79.4%	100%	36.0%	78.4%
Explorer.exe	14.5%	92.1%	100%	84.5%	47.4%	86.2%

Overheads









Conclusion

- Monitoring and analysis of system calls at runtime is an affordable technology providing unambiguous insight into what the software actually does, including the self-replication indicative of malicious behavior.
- System calls analysis must include arguments analysis for correct behavior detection
- More work to be done to protect the detector
- Additional replication schemes may be introduced for new virus concepts
- Correct GSR definition is the key for keeping false positives down

Questions

Thank you!