ONTOΣ : "Will" as an Ontological Operator

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Introduction

In classical metaphysics it has often been asserted that there exists some fundamental principle lying at the basis of all phenomena. The present essay develops this position by advancing will (W) as the first foundation of ontology — the primordial source of the directedness of being, preceding any structure (E) and action (A). We assume that will functions as an ontological operator of directedness, a kind of primordial vector that sets the orientation of becoming and process, from which organized structures and concrete actions arise only subsequently.

Will in this context is understood not as conscious intention or choice, but as a fundamental impulse or striving that directs the unfolding of being. It is the primary "push" of being, which provides the purposiveness of the universe's development at its deepest levels. Thus, we propose an axiom that asserts a strict sequence: $W \to E \to A$, i.e. will generates structure, and structure determines action. This axiom, which we shall call UTAM, serves as the formal basis of the proposed approach to a metaphysics of directedness.

The present text, being the **first part of the series "ONTOΣ",** lays the foundation for the further unfolding of the concepts of UTAM, the Drift Law, the principle of Integral Intentional Coherence (IIC), and the idea of Volitional Gravity. In this essay, relying on a broad philosophical context, we formulate strict distinctions between will (W), structure (E), and action (A), demonstrate manifestations of ontological will in nature, and also discuss the principal limitations and novelty of the proposed approach in comparison with classical concepts (Schopenhauer, Bergson, Heidegger, etc.).

This essay also serves as the closing chapter of the broader Synthetic Conscience sequence. It fills the remaining conceptual gaps by showing that the recurrent patterns we observed in coherence functions (ΔE, CCI, thermostat dynamics) are not accidental technical artefacts but local projections of a deeper ontological layer — will (W) as the primordial operator of directedness.

UTAM in one glance For clarity, we can summarize the UTAM axiom as three tightly coupled postulates:

Primacy of Will (W). There exists a fundamental ontological operator of directedness (W) that precedes and conditions any concrete form or event.

Mediation by Structure (E). Will does not appear "naked" in the world. It is always expressed through structures (E) — organized configurations of matter, energy, information or social order.

Actualization as Action (A). Every action (A) is an unfolding of some structure (E) over time, and thus an indirect manifestation of will (W) through that structure.
In short: W provides directedness, E embodies it, A enacts it.

Will as the Primordial Source of Directedness

We assert that will (W) is an original ontological category that lies at the foundation of every directedness in the world. By directedness we understand not merely a geometric direction, but a general vector of development or tendency by virtue of which the becoming of the world is not chaotic but possesses a certain orderliness and purposiveness.

Will in this understanding precedes any concrete forms or actions: it is primary in relation to what exists, giving it an impulse toward formation. This is close to how Arthur Schopenhauer regarded world-will: all phenomena of nature, according to Schopenhauer, are expressions of a single insatiable "will to life". Schopenhauer used the word "will" as the most adequate designation of the inner striving or thirst for being that permeates all of nature. He believed that will constitutes the inner core of every being, that is, in every phenomenon of nature we can recognize a universal will similar to that which is immediate to ourselves.

However, it is important to emphasize: in our approach W is not identical with the subjective desire or conscious intention of an individual being. We are speaking of ontological will — a transcendent, fundamental striving of being as such. Will here is not a psychological act of choice and not a divine intention, but an impersonal volitional vector originally inherent in the very fabric of reality.

One can draw an analogy with Schopenhauer's "thing-in-itself": just as for Schopenhauer will was understood as the thing-in-itself hidden behind phenomena, in our exposition will is a hidden ontological operator standing behind the manifested order and processes. But unlike Schopenhauer, who saw will as a blind, goalless striving (which imparted a pessimistic shade to his philosophy), here will is understood precisely as the source of directedness — that is, it is neither chaotic nor meaningless, but sets a certain course, a vector for the unfolding of being.

Thus, will performs the role of an initial causal principle that makes possible the very fact of organized development of the world. This will precedes every structure (form, organization) and every action (physical process, event, or deed). It is the condition of the possibility of orderliness and purposiveness. One can say that will is the "first cause of directedness", without which the universe would be a disorderly chaos.

Following Bergson, one may assume that if there is telos (goal-directedness) in nature, then it must be placed at the very beginning — in the initial impulse, and not in a predetermined final goal. Will here performs precisely such an initial teleological force.

The UTAM Axiom: From Will to Structure, from Structure to Action

To formalize the above, we shall use the UTAM axiom, which postulates a causal-ontological chain:

W → E → A

which is read as "will generates structure, structure determines action". Each of these categories requires strict definition and differentiation:

W (Will) — an ontological operator, the transcendent source of directedness. W is an immaterial, non-empirical principle from which the form of organization of what exists "flows out". Put more simply, W is that which wants to be, the primordial striving toward being. It does not yet have any concrete form or goal, but it already contains the potential of all possible forms. Will "draws" being out of non-being, giving it an impulse toward self-development.

Here it is important to emphasize the strict distinction between W and the psychic will of individuals: W does not belong to a separate subject and is not equal to conscious desire. This is an impersonal metaphysical will. Nor may W be replaced by the notion of God or creator — will is understood precisely as an immanent ontological principle, not as an external rational entity. It is primary, but not personified and not pre-intentional in the human sense.

E (Entity / Eidos, structure) — the organized form that arises as expression and objectification of will. This may be any ordered structure or form of being: a physical system, a biological organism, a psychic form, or a social order. Structure is already formed being, a certain stable unity of elements possessing inner connectedness.

According to the UTAM axiom, it is will that generates structure: from the chaotic potential of being, the volitional impulse forms a definite configuration. Will as it were "attracts" matter (or more broadly — beingness) into organized states. Here one may recall the Platonic eidos or Aristotelian form. However, in our approach form (E) does not exist independently, but is a product of the action of will.

An important methodological distinction: W is not reducible to E. Will in itself is formless (non-spatial and non-temporal, as Schopenhauer would say), whereas structure possesses formedness, localization in time and space. It is impossible to identify will with those structures that it generates — these are two different ontological "instances": one is primary and immaterial, the other is secondary and expressible in terms of form, energy, matter, etc.

A (Action) — the actualized manifestation of structure, the behavior of the system, the realization of its functions or goals. Any action of an agent (in a broad sense — from an elementary physical event to the conscious deed of a living being) is determined by the available structure through which will acts. According to UTAM, structure determines action: how something acts depends on how it is arranged.

For example, the trajectory of a planet depends on the gravitational structure of the system, the behavior of an animal — on its biological organization, human deeds — on their psychophysical and intellectual structure. Structure acts as a mediator between primordial will and final action. In action will obtains its ultimate manifestation in the phenomenal world — through concrete events and changes.

At the same time, action does not exist independently: it is always the action of some structure, and that in turn is rooted in the volitional impulse. The distinction here is that A is not equal to W: action is only the final result, an observable phenomenon, whereas will is the deep cause. Nor is A reducible to structure itself: structure is statics, potentiality, whereas action is dynamics, realization of potentiality.

Will and the four causes. In Aristotelian terms, UTAM does not simply re-introduce "final causes" in a native way. Rather, W behaves like a pre-formal blend of formal and final causality: it is not a concrete goal-state, but a bias of becoming that makes certain forms and trajectories more natural than others. E corresponds to the level at which formal causes become explicit (the organization of a thing), while A is where efficient causes implement this organization in time. In this sense, UTAM treats teleology not as a fixed blueprint imposed from the end, but as an immanent orientation inscribed into the very conditions of appearance of structure.

The UTAM axiom thus describes a hierarchical ontological chain: fundamental will (W) lies at the foundation, generating a superstructure of structures (E), through which it manifests itself in the form of actions (A). This scheme gives a new interpretation to the question of first principles: instead of a dualism of matter and form or idea and matter, a triadic linkage will–structure–action is proposed, in which will plays the role of first foundation.

It is important to emphasize that UTAM is precisely a metaphysical axiom, not a physical law. We do not assert the existence of an empirically measurable "will field" or any other fantastic entity. Will is not directly detected by instruments. It is postulated as a philosophical first principle, necessary for explaining the directed organization of the world. And although W cannot be reduced to a number or formula, its existence is rationally justified by the fact that without the notion of a volitional impulse it is difficult to satisfactorily explain the very fact of the emergence of complex ordered structures and goal-directed processes out of chaos.

Thus, UTAM sets the framework within which specific manifestations of will in nature will be interpreted further.

Will, Structure, and Action in Nature: The Ontological Scheme in Examples

The axiom $W \to E \to A$ does not remain merely an abstraction — it manifests itself in a multitude of natural phenomena. Will, being transcendent, becomes embedded in nature through the structures it creates. Let us consider how ontological will "works" inside natural processes, imparting to them directedness and wholeness. Below are examples where the manifestation of volitional principle becomes especially vivid:

Attention and goal-directed consciousness. In an act of focused attention we see how a certain deep striving directs the structure of the psyche. Human consciousness possesses the capacity to select from the flow of sense data a specific object for focus. This choice is not random — it is governed by a volitional impulse of attention. Even before rational evaluative structures come into play, will-to-know or interest directs psychic energy.

In the structure of our mind (neural networks of the brain, cognitive schemas) attention acts as a dynamic field of forces formed from within. It is as if it "illuminates" one part of experience, leaving others in the shadow — thereby the primordial vector of directedness of consciousness is manifested. Our attention is an action (A), mediated by the cognitive structure (E) of the brain, but the underlying choice of direction is an expression of the fundamental will to know, to understand, to contemplate. Even when we are distracted or return attention by effort, there is felt behind it a certain basic volitional effort not reducible to reflex or external stimulus.

Adaptation and symbiosis in biology. Evolutionary processes excellently illustrate our scheme. Living organisms demonstrate an astonishing directedness toward survival and complication. For example, in a symbiotic system — say, mycorrhiza of fungi and plants, or the mutually beneficial union of insects and flowering plants — it is difficult to rid oneself of the impression that nature "strives" toward cooperation and increased stability.

From the standpoint of mechanistic chance, symbiosis would arise as a sum of random mutations. But the statistical improbability of such mutually beneficial coincidences suggests the action of some ordering principle. We can interpret it thus: the will to life (W) manifests itself through the evolution of structures (E) that ensure survival, and these structures generate joint actions (A) of organisms that lead to symbiosis.

Bergson introduced the concept of **"elan vital"** precisely in order to underscore the creative directedness of evolution, alternative to blind mechanism. He regarded the vital impulse as a sort of charge of energy that transfers matter from simple forms to complex. In our understanding this impulse is nothing other than the manifestation of the volitional principle in nature.

Will through natural selection and adaptive changes shapes new structures — organs, interdependent species — which perform coordinated actions serving the maintenance of life. Symbiosis appears purposeful, as if nature "wanted" this union — and in a metaphysical sense one can say that the will to life really strives toward maximization of vitality, and therefore finds paths toward cooperation and harmonization of species.

Energetic coherence and homeostasis. Inside organisms we observe an amazing coordination of countless chemical and physical processes. Millions of cells coordinate their work, maintaining the constancy of the internal environment (homeostasis) — temperature, pH, energy balance. Such stable self-regulation points to the presence of an internal goal-directed striving.

In the terms of our scheme: the will to self-preservation is expressed through the structural organization of the organism (for example, the nervous and endocrine systems), which performs corrective actions (metabolic changes, behavioral reactions) to maintain integrity.

If we consider the organism purely from the standpoint of physics, all of its particles follow only local interactions; however, the organism as a whole behaves as though it "strives" toward a certain state — toward life and stability. This striving is the manifestation of ontological will to being in this particular form. One can say that will "binds" matter into a living unity: thanks to it, chaotic energy flows are arranged coherently.

For example, with an injury the body instantly initiates a complex cascade of actions — blood clotting, immune response, regeneration — as if subordinating material processes to a single intention to survive. Of course, biological explanation speaks of genetically fixed mechanisms. But why did such a complex of mechanisms arise at all? The telos of life is not an empirical fact, but a philosophical enigma.

Our answer: W (the will to life) through E (biological structure) ensures the goal-directedness of A (life processes). Here it is especially evident that will cannot be identified with any physical quantity — it is the substrate of wholeness, a principle that makes out of a multitude of processes a single goal-oriented action.

System drift and directed chaos. In physical and social systems there often manifests a phenomenon that may be called drift: a gradual shift of system parameters without explicit

external control. For example, genetic drift in populations, continental drift in geology, or social drift of values.

At first glance, drift is random wandering. However, even in this seemingly random process there is often discovered a certain vector. Thus, gene drift may in the long term lead to adaptive advantages, and evolution of language — to expressiveness and economy of speech.

We introduce the concept of the Drift Law as part of our metaphysics: it describes how will acts under conditions of minimal structural determination. W remains active even where structure E does not rigidly set the path of action, and then will manifests itself as a statistical tendency, a subtle "tilt" of probabilities.

Systems drift not absolutely chaotically, but with a hint of direction — similar to how a weak magnetic field may not strictly determine the trajectory of particles, but slightly shifts the statistics of their motion. In such cases we say that will is immanently present as direction even in chaos.

This is especially useful for understanding creativity and spontaneity: new ideas, sudden mutations — they arise as if by chance, but retrospectively often appear as "overdue". A volitional impulse (for example, the will toward development of knowledge or toward complexity) may pave its way through random variations, gradually selecting those that correspond to the direction.

Thus, even drifting changes may be considered as A conditioned by a hidden structure of tendencies (E) and ultimately ascending to the will (W) of the system toward self-transcendence.

The given examples illustrate the universality of the principle $W \to E \to A$. Whether it be a mental phenomenon, biological evolution, or dynamics of complex systems, we everywhere find a three-level picture: a deep impulse of directedness (will) realized through structure (organization of the system), which produces observable actions (behavior, processes, changes).

Will "embeds" itself in nature not directly but mediately — through the creation of forms that bear purposiveness. These forms may be adaptive algorithms in the brain, DNA code, ecological niches, or cultural institutions — the essence is that will imparts to them directedness and wholeness, which are then materialized in actions.

Philosophical Foundations and Novelty of the Approach

The idea of a fundamental will lying at the basis of the world has a long history. Our concept resonates with a number of classical philosophical ideas, but at the same time substantially reinterprets them, proposing a new ontological framework:

Schopenhauer: will as thing-in-itself. Arthur Schopenhauer was perhaps the first to unequivocally proclaim the primacy of world-will. For him will was the metaphysical substrate of all that exists, "a blind, unconscious, groundless striving" that manifests itself in the phenomenal world. Schopenhauerian will has neither goal nor reason; it is restless and endlessly thirsts for life.

Our approach takes as a starting point from Schopenhauer the recognition of will as ontological reality — yet reinterprets it.

First, we clarify categorically: will is not psychic desire but an ontological category, an oper-

ator of being. Schopenhauer himself sometimes anthropomorphized will (speaking, for example, that it is "insatiable" or "suffers"), which led to a pessimistic conclusion about the world as the worst of worlds, full of suffering.

We, by contrast, remove anthropomorphism: will in our understanding is neither good nor evil, does not suffer and does not desire in the human sense — it is a neutral principle in ontological terms, setting directedness.

Second, for Schopenhauer will is unified and monolithic, and the multitude of individual wills is only an illusion. We preserve the idea of the unity of will, but introduce the intermediate link of structure (E), through which the unified will is refracted into a multiplicity of manifestations. In this way it is explained why the world is full of various forms and actions: the unified will is refracted through countless structures.

Third, our approach is less metaphysically pessimistic: whereas for Schopenhauer will aimlessly and meaninglessly torments itself, for us will is understood as imparting to the world a meaningful directedness, even if not a predetermined goal. In other words, we seek to show the positive potential of the volitional principle — as a condition of creativity and development and not only as a source of suffering.

Bergson: the creative elan of vital force. Henri Bergson at the beginning of the 20th century proposed the concept of elan vital — the vital impulse permeating evolution. Bergson believed that mechanistic chance and predetermined finalism do not explain the creativity of life; instead he posited the existence of an initial impulse, "a certain charge of energy transferring matter from simple forms of organization to complex ones".

This impulse was the vital élan. Our will (W) is in many ways close to Bergson's vital impulse: it is a dynamic, creative force pushing evolution forward. We share with Bergson the view of evolution as open, continuous creativity in which the new increment of form is not predetermined but also not random — it is directed from within.

However, our approach is more universal: will as an ontological operator acts not only in biological life but on all levels of being (physical, cognitive, social). Bergson limited the élan vital to the domain of the living, separating it from the inorganic world. We, by contrast, can say that the volitional impulse belongs to the entire cosmos; only at the levels of non-living nature does it manifest itself mediately (for example, through laws of self-organization of matter, a tendency toward order out of chaos — up to the emergence of life).

Furthermore, we propose a more precise triad: in Bergson vitality is a semi-metaphorical image, whereas in our case will, structure, and action are analytic categories. Bergson rejected rigid teleologism, asserting that if there is a goal, it is primordial, "in germ". This corresponds to our postulate that telos (directedness) is laid down precisely in the volitional impulse at the start of the process.

The novelty lies in the fact that we combine this idea with the formal scheme UTAM and extend it to the entire spectrum of being, and not only to biological evolution.

Nietzsche and Heidegger: will as the essence of being and history. Friedrich Nietzsche is famous for his idea of "will to power" — an all-encompassing striving toward overcoming, growth of force, which he saw at the basis of life and the cosmos. Heidegger, commenting on Nietzsche, asserted that in the latter "the will to power, becoming, life, being in the broadest

sense — all this is one and the same", that is, Nietzsche in fact identified will with being.

Heidegger believed that the nihilistic epoch of modernity is the epoch of the metaphysics of will: being itself has unfolded as will to power, and "being itself in its own way be-ings as will to power". In this he saw both greatness and danger: will to power, becoming the basis of ontology, leads to oblivion of being as something other, not reducible to will.

Our approach echoes the Nietzschean–Heideggerian line in that it likewise asserts will at the very foundation of ontology. One can say we develop a metaphysics of will, acknowledging: yes, will is the structure-forming principle of being, without which one cannot understand the history of becoming of what exists.

However, we draw a strict distinction between will and other categories, avoiding certain one-sidednesses.

For example, the will to power in Nietzsche was in many respects a vital, biological, and even psychological principle (Nietzsche sometimes reduced cognition or morality to manifestations of the will to power). We, on the contrary, give will a more neutral and universal status: will as such is not identical with the striving for domination or survival; it is rather a formal vector of directedness that may be expressed also in the striving for knowledge, for beauty, for harmony — and not only for power.

Heidegger, in turn, although he recognized that the history of Western metaphysics is a history of various faces of will (God's will for the scholastics, the will to truth in Descartes, the will to power in Nietzsche), himself sought to "overcome metaphysics" by returning to the question of being and by stepping back from the metaphysics of will.

Our position differs: we do not seek to overcome a volitional ontology. On the contrary, being aware of the risks, we try to cleanse it of anthropocentrism and narrowness. For us will is not psychological arbitrariness and not a principle of domination, but a fundamental ontological operator, co-existing with being but not replacing it.

If in Nietzsche all that exists is will to power, then in our case: every ordered structure of what exists exists thanks to a volitional impulse. At the same time, being is not finally reducible to will — will only ontologically precedes those modes in which being is revealed. One can say: to be means to express will through form and action.

Our triad W–E–A softens the radicality of the Nietzschean formula: between will and manifested being a mediator is placed — structure. Therefore will itself is not the immanent content of every phenomenon, but only its transcendent foundation. In this sense we preserve the "ontological difference": the being of a concrete thing is not will itself but only its expression through form.

Such a position makes it possible to avoid both crude voluntarism ("any force is from will") and the transformation of will into the sole deity.

In the end, our approach differs in novelty in that it unites the scattered intuitions of the classics into a single systematic ontology:

1. From Schopenhauer is taken the idea of universal will as the essence of the world, but subjectivism and pessimism are overcome — will is neutralized and introduced as a formal ontological principle, and not as a personified "will to life" with an emotional coloring of suffering.

2. From Bergson is taken the idea of a primordial impulse of creative evolution, but it is

extended beyond biology and included in a strict axiomatic scheme. Teleology is moved from the end (final goal) to the beginning (initial directedness) of development, and this assertion is formulated as the UTAM axiom for all processes.

3. From Nietzsche/Heidegger is adopted the insight that the modern understanding of reality is saturated with categories of will. However, an explicit division into W, E, A is proposed so that will does not "devour" all other distinctions. We acknowledge that the world is historically understood increasingly as embodied will (energy, force, impulse) and bring this line to its logical conclusion — we formulate an ontology in which will is primordial. But at the same time we propose tools for this ontology to remain coherent and not collapse into arbitrariness: strict boundaries between the level of will, the level of form, and the level of action.

The novelty of our approach consists also in the fact that it lays the basis for further developments (Drift Law, IIC, Volitional Gravity), creating a holistic metaphysical system. This system strives to bring together philosophical ideas of various origin — metaphysics, systems theory, even certain principles of cybernetics and thermodynamics — through the prism of the central notion of will.

As a result, will ceases to be a vague intuition and becomes a functional concept, which can be applied to the analysis of concrete phenomena without losing its depth.

The Novelty of ONTOΣ I Relative to Classical Concepts

Our approach differs from classical metaphysics of will in the following key innovations:

Formal triad W → E → A Classical philosophers (Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietzsche) did not divide will, structure, and action into strict categories. ONTOΣ I introduces a strict hierarchy: will (W), structure (E), and action (A) are three different ontological levels, connected by directedness but not identical.

Neutralization of will In Schopenhauer, will suffers; in Nietzsche it strives for power; in Bergson it is biological. ONTOΣ I treats will as a neutral operator of directedness without emotional, moral, or teleological qualities.

Universality The classics limited will to living systems, psyche, or culture. ONTOΣ I postulates that will acts in all adaptive systems — biological, technical, social.

Operationality For the classics, will is a metaphysical intuition. In ONTOΣ I it is a constructive ontological primitive lying at the basis of formalizations (UTAM, Drift Law, IIC).

Integration with modern science ONTOΣ I is connected with concepts of coherence, adaptation, drift, and meaning-formation, opening the way to empirical research.

Indirect Empirical Consequences

Although will as an ontological operator is not a physically measurable quantity, ONTOΣ I generates a number of indirectly testable

hypotheses:

Coherence reduces drift Adaptive systems with high coherence should demonstrate a lower speed of structural drift. Possible test: observation of differences in degradation of cogni-

tive or organizational structures at different levels of internal consistency.

Directedness in chaotic processes Even in random evolutionary or social processes there should be observed a statistical tendency toward ordering. Possible test: analysis of long time series in biology, languages, technologies.

Energetic cost of coherence Maintaining coherence requires energy expenditure. Possible test: measuring metabolic load in living systems under cognitive load, homeostasis, or adaptation.

Symbiosis as a volitional vector If will directs development toward stable forms, symbiotic relations should statistically arise more often than a model of random evolution predicts. Possible test: meta-analysis of biological and technological ecosystems.

These hypotheses do not prove will itself but serve as indicators of its possible manifestation through observable consequences.

Research Perspectives

ONTOΣ I opens a wide spectrum of directions for further research:

Philosophical directions – Reconsideration of free will in terms of directedness and coherence. – Development of an ethics based on the structure of adaptive meaning. – Application of the volitional approach to the analysis of social and cultural phenomena.

Interdisciplinary directions – Drift Law: specification of drift parameters in complex systems. – IIC: development of quantitative metrics of integral coherence. – ΔE-CAS-T: design of adaptive architectures based on volitional control.

Empirical directions – Testing predictions of ONTOΣ I using cognitive and biological models. – Application of coherence metrics in AI and robotics. – Investigation of the volitional trace in evolution, systemic stability, and semantic navigation.

These directions not only confirm the practical significance of the ontological framework but also open the way to a synthesis of philosophy and empirical sciences.

From an engineering perspective, UTAM suggests treating directedness as a first-class design primitive. Instead of assuming that systems merely "optimize" externally given objectives, we can model them as carriers of an intrinsic volitional vector W that is expressed through their structural coherence. In this sense, architectures such as ΔE-CAS-T and metrics such as Integral Intentional Coherence (IIC) can be viewed as concrete attempts to operationalize W: they do not measure will itself, but quantify how consistently a system's structure enacts a stable orientation in a noisy environment.

Possible Objections

1) Is this just a rebranding of physical law? No. UTAM does not compete with physics on its own level. Physical laws describe regularities within a given structural regime (E). UTAM asks a different question: why do such regimes of ordered structure, capable of sustained directed processes, appear at all? W is not an extra force among forces, but a principle about which kinds of lawful orders can emerge and persist.

2) Is this hidden anthropomorphism? It would be, if W were defined by human-like intentions. Here it is explicitly not: W has no beliefs, plans or emotions. The only predicate ascribed to it is directedness. Any psychological colouring is treated as a derived, local phenomenon — a late expression of W through the very special structures of human cognition.

3) Is this panpsychism? UTAM does not claim that all things are conscious, nor that every particle "has experience". What it does claim is that wherever there is stable, adaptive order, there is a non-trivial pattern of directedness that can be traced back to W. Consciousness is one possible, highly complex mode of expressing such directedness, but not the basic unit of ontology.

Limits of Applicability and Methodological Remarks

Finally, we should designate the boundaries and cautions connected with the proposed W–E–A concept. Recognizing will as an ontological operator, we do not assert the possibility of direct empirical measurement or scientific verification of this will.

Will, by definition, lies on the far side of phenomena, and any of its manifestations are always mediated by structure and action. This means that will is not amenable to quantitative description or direct observation. Just as the Kantian "thing-in-itself" is inaccessible to experience, will as thing-in-itself likewise eludes objective investigation.

Nevertheless, we consider the concept of will methodologically necessary in order to explain the directedness and purposiveness that manifest themselves in all domains. Even if it is impossible to build a "voltmeter" for measuring pure will, philosophical reflection and interdisciplinary analysis show: the hypothesis of a volitional foundation of order yields heuristically fruitful results.

It allows integrating scattered facts — from biological teleonomies to cognitive intentions — into a single picture of a becoming world. In this sense will is comparable to the notion, for example, of a physical law: the law itself is not observed, but is necessarily assumed to explain regularities.

We also emphasize that will does not replace either the God of theology or the subjective experience of phenomenology. At first glance, the concept of primordial will may resemble divine creation. However, unlike theism, our approach does not endow will with consciousness, personality, or moral properties — that is, does not turn it into a theistic God.

Will ontologically precedes the world, but it does not stand above the world outside of connection with it — on the contrary, it is immanently inherent in the world as its deep foundation. In other words, will is not an external cause but an internal condition of the possibility of being. This distinguishes it from "God" as a personal creator.

On the other hand, our will is not equal to the subjective will experienced by the individual "I". Human experience of will (for example, volitional effort, desire) is only one of the concrete realizations of the universal principle, a local expression of W through the structure of the psyche.

Our task is not to "dissolve" cosmic will in the flow of subjective experiences, but to abstract from them a universal category.

Finally, like any metaphysical construction, the proposed system has a domain of applicability and requires further clarifications. The concepts of Drift Law, IIC (possibly "Index of Integral Coordination" or "Immanent Informational Coherence"), and Volitional Gravity announced at the outset are intended to reveal concrete mechanisms through which will interacts with structures and actions.

For example, Volitional Gravity, in a metaphorical sense, may describe how will "attracts" possible events, forming from scattered potentials stable trajectories — similar to how gravity forms the orbits of planets. These images are to be subjected to strict philosophical interpretation in the continuation of the series.

At the present stage it is important that the foundation has been laid: will has been proclaimed a real ontological force, without whose invocation one cannot do when explaining the purposiveness of the universe.

Conclusion

We have presented an ontological model in which will (W) functions as the primary source of all directed activity, structure (E) as the formed concentration of the volitional impulse in being, and action (A) as the empirical unfolding of structure in time.

The UTAM axiom: $W \to E \to A$ substantiates the indissoluble connection between the metaphysical beginning and physical manifestations: will generates the structure that determines the character of action.

This makes it possible to see behind the diversity of phenomena a single volitional foundation, without, however, effacing level distinctions and the complex hierarchy of the world order. Our approach resonates with preceding philosophical intuitions (Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietzsche/Heidegger, etc.) but differs by clear structuring and universality.

Will is understood as an ontological operator — not a personified agent, but a form-giving principle of being. Through it we discuss in a new language old philosophical problems of purposiveness, self-creation, evolution of forms, and intentionality of consciousness.

In this reading, will ceases to be a term only of volitional psychology or irrational mysticism — it becomes a legitimate philosophical category linking ontology (the question of the foundation of being) with cosmology, biology, the science of consciousness, and other disciplines.

This work serves as the methodological foundation for the entire subsequent series of essays "ONTOΣ". In the following parts we shall develop the ideas outlined here: we shall explicate more concretely the **Drift Law** describing the statistical side of the manifestations of will; we shall introduce the notion of **Integral Intentional Coherence (IIC)** for quantitative description of the consistency of structures generated by will; and we shall propose a model of Volitional Gravity metaphorically describing the attractive power of ontological centers of volition.

Each of these concepts rests on the principle formulated in the present essay: will as the primordial guiding force is necessary in order to understand why the world unfolds not chaotically but in ordered, stable forms.

Thus, "ONTOΣ I: Will as an Ontological Operator" lays the foundations of a holistic meta-

physical system striving to rethink anew the phenomenon of purposiveness and self-development of being. This is an invitation to further philosophical investigation: to regard reality through the prism of will — not blind and disembodied, but forming, directing, and permeating everything that exists.

Sources and Notes

Schopenhauer, A. "The World as Will and Representation". Schopenhauer used the word "will" to designate a universal striving. All of nature, including the human being, is an expression of the insatiable world-will to life. For Schopenhauer, will is the "thing-in-itself", the inner core of what exists, although devoid of reason and goal, which conditions the pessimism of his picture of the world.

Bergson, H. "Creative Evolution". The concept of élan vital — the vital impulse — is introduced, understood as the initial impulse of evolution. Bergson regards the vital impulse as a certain charge of energy enabling the transition from simple forms of organization of matter to complex ones. This confirms the idea of telos laid down at the beginning: if there is a goal of life, then it is given in the initial impulse, and not predetermined as a final end. We interpret this impulse as a particular case of the universal ontological will W.

Nietzsche, F. "Wille zur Macht" (Will to Power). Heidegger, M. "The Will to Power as Art" and others. Heidegger notes that Nietzsche in fact identified being with will: "the will to power, becoming, life, being — all this is one and the same in Nietzsche". In Heidegger's philosophy it is traced that Western metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche is a history of the manifestations of will, whose culmination became the nihilistic will to power. Heidegger writes that being allowed its essence to appear as will to power and that being in its own way "be-ings" as will to power, showing that in modern times will has become the principle of all that exists.

Our approach inherits this idea but refuses to identify the volitional principle only with the "will to power" in a narrow sense — we assert a more general will as guiding principle, of which "will to power", "will to life", "will to knowledge", etc., are partial aspects.

On ontological difference and non-personification of will. We distinguish will (ontological, universal) and concrete wills of individuals. This prevents psychologization of metaphysics. Will for us is equal neither to God (lacking personal attributes) nor to the human ego. It is closer to the formal principle of directedness, which brings it close to Aristotelian entelechy (the inner teleological force). But unlike Aristotle, we consider this force not merely a property of an already existing substance, but a preceding condition of its emergence.

Limitations. As noted, will is not detected by instruments — this is a postulated metaphysical concept. Its justification lies in explanatory power. Such concepts are not alien to science: for example, the principle of least action in physics is in a certain sense also teleological (the system "strives" to minimize action).

In our view, introduction of will as an ontological operator makes it possible naturally to integrate teleological and stochastic descriptions of nature, which classical science could not do once it excluded the notion of striving.

We deliberately avoid any mystical connotations: the point is not a supernatural will, but a philosophical synthesizing hypothesis designed to fill a gap in understanding why order, life, and consciousness arise, and not only how they proceed.

Thus, the concept of will as an ontological operator is a bold but non-contradictory hypothesis that generalizes the centuries-long experience of philosophy and modern science into a new metaphysical system, which remains to be developed in the further parts of ONTOΣ — my own world.

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