

# *De-anonymizing Encrypted Video Streams*

*Master's Thesis*

*14 September 2019*

*Stefano Peverelli*

pstefano@student.ethz.ch

*supervised by*

*Prof. Dr. Ankit Singla & Melissa Licciardello*

Systems Group  
Department of Computer Science  
ETH Zürich



# Abstract

In the last recent years streaming services such as Netflix, Youtube, Amazon Prime Video, Hulu, and others, have become the main source for video content delivery to the public. With the effort of private companies and of the AOM consortium [1], various coding formats and streaming techniques have been refined and have been vastly adopted by the industry. *Variable Bitrate Encoding* and *Adaptive Bitrate Streaming*, between others, are two techniques that increasingly often get coupled together to improve high quality streaming of media content over HTTP.

Netflix relies on first encoding a title at a *variable* bitrate, and streaming it using DASH *Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP*, an instance of Adaptive Bitrate Streaming originally developed by MPEG. In DASH each media file gets encoded at multiple bitrates, which are then partitioned into smaller segments and delivered to the user over HTTP. As of today, Netflix makes extensive use of DASH, by encoding each title in their catalogue at different quality levels, so that the user is served tailored-size content depending on network conditions and device capabilities [2].

DASH and *variable-bitrate-encoding*, have proven to be leaking potentially harmful data. Reed et Al. [3] have shown, how despite a recent upgrade in Netflix infrastructure to provide HTTPS encryption to video traffic, it is possible to recover unique *fingerprints* for each title, and match them against future traffic traces. In their study, they make use of *adudump* [4] a command-line program that can run on passive TAP devices [5] or on a live network interface, and uses TCP and ACKs sequences to infer the size of application data units *ADUs* transferred over each TCP connection in real time.

Our approach reiterates parts of Reed et Al.'s work, but cannot rely on their every assumption and discovery, due to constant changes that Netflix is integrating into their encoding and streaming algorithms. Moreover our intent is focused on finding out if, by analyzing coarse-grained traffic data, we are able to identify a video based on its *bitrate-ladder*.

We have built a system capable of recording HTTPS encrypted Netflix video-stream traffic, at various enforced bandwidths and to build a database of 100 titles. We have re-interpreted the identification process of [3] to be able to extract unique fingerprints based on the average observed bitrate. Our system is eventually able to successfully identify 4 minutes long traffic captures, with 86% of accuracy.



# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1	Motivation . . . . .	7
1.1.1	Per-Title Encoding . . . . .	8
1.1.2	User's Privacy . . . . .	9
1.2	Related Work . . . . .	11
1.3	Structure of this Report . . . . .	12
<b>2</b>	<b>End-to-End Attack Scenario</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1	Netflix-ISP relationship . . . . .	13
2.2	Attack Scenarios . . . . .	14
2.3	Video Fingerprinting . . . . .	15
2.3.1	The <i>a-b-t</i> model . . . . .	16
2.3.2	Inference . . . . .	16
2.3.3	Identifying Netflix traffic . . . . .	17
2.3.4	Building a database of fingerprints . . . . .	18
2.4	Capturing video traffic . . . . .	19
2.4.1	Data acquired by the attacker . . . . .	19
2.4.2	Matching Captured traffic to fingerprints . . . . .	20
2.4.3	Possible countermeasures . . . . .	20
<b>3</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1	Attack Scenario . . . . .	21
3.2	Video Fingerprinting . . . . .	22
3.2.1	Implementation overview . . . . .	22
3.2.2	Crawler . . . . .	23
3.2.3	Bandwidth Manipulation . . . . .	23
3.2.4	Tcpdump . . . . .	24
3.2.5	Automated streaming with Selenium . . . . .	24
3.3	Post-processing . . . . .	25
3.4	Capturing video traffic . . . . .	26
3.5	Identification . . . . .	26
3.5.1	KD-Tree . . . . .	27
3.5.2	Building the KD-Tree . . . . .	27
3.5.3	Querying the KD-Tree . . . . .	28
<b>4</b>	<b>Evaluation and Analysis</b>	<b>29</b>
4.1	Video Identification . . . . .	29

## Contents

4.2	Bitrate Ladders . . . . .	32
4.2.1	Uniqueness of Bitrate Ladders . . . . .	35
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>39</b>
5.1	Contribution . . . . .	39
5.2	Benefits . . . . .	40
5.3	Shortcomings and Feasibility . . . . .	41
5.4	Future Work . . . . .	42
5.4.1	Possible Improvements . . . . .	42
5.4.2	Research . . . . .	42
<b>6</b>	<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>43</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>Appendix A Bitrate Ladder Statistics</b>	<b>49</b>

# Introduction

According to the latest Cisco's VNI [6], video will account for 82% of all IP traffic in Europe by 2021; in addition, the overall IP traffic per person will triplicate from 13GB to 35GB. These forecasts clearly picture the growth of the streaming industry, posing, at the same time an important question on the present and future states of the final user's privacy.

As shown by Reed et Al. [3] anonymity of user's viewing activity is at risk. Not for the use that Netflix or other streaming services do of user's session data, but because of the risk of a man-in-the-middle attack, *MITM*, carried by an *evil* party that has control over the flow of packets over a network.

In particular, they have shown how the adoption of HTTPS to protect video streams from Netflix *CDNs* to user's end devices, does not hold against passive traffic analysis.

## 1.1 Motivation

The goal of this project is to replicate part of the work conducted by Reed et Al. and to investigate the possibility of identifying a Netflix stream solely based on the observed average bandwidth.

Specifically, we have built a system capable of manipulating network bandwidth, observe video traffic, and reconstruct a *bitrate ladder* for each video being watched. We then build a library of fingerprints at various network bandwidths, and analyze how often videos can be identified successfully, and how many bitrate ladders are unique.

This, follows from the intuition that *per-title encoding* embeds the nature and the complexity of video frames in a unique way, that may reveal the identity of the content being streamed.

Furthermore we investigate and discuss possible countermeasures that streaming providers could adopt to preserve users privacy. A detailed explanation of our approach is presented in Chapter 3

### 1.1.1 Per-Title Encoding

In December 2015 Netflix announced [2] that it was introducing a new method to analyze the complexity of each title, and find the best encoding recipe based on it. Their goal with the adoption of per-title encoding was to provide users with better quality streams at a lower bandwidth.

Before then, each title was encoded with a *Fixed Bitrate Ladder*; their pipeline returned a list of  $\{\text{Bitrate}, \text{Resolution}\}$  pairs that represented the sufficient bitrate to encode the stream at a certain resolution (Table 1.1), with no visible artifacts.

Bitrate (kbps)	Resolution
235	$320 \times 240$
375	$384 \times 288$
560	$512 \times 384$
750	$512 \times 384$
1050	$640 \times 480$
1750	$720 \times 480$
2350	$1280 \times 720$
3000	$1280 \times 720$
4300	$1920 \times 1080$
5800	$1920 \times 1080$

**Table 1.1:** Netflix original's Fixed Bitrate Ladder.

This "one-size-fits-all" ladder, as reported, achieved good results in the encoded video's perceived quality (PSNR [7]) given the bitrate constraint, but, would not perform optimally under certain conditions. For instance, high detailed scenes with sudden changes of light, or rapid transitions of camera shots, would require more than  $5800\text{kbps}$ ; in contrast, more static frames, as in animated cartoons, may be encoded at higher resolutions maintaining the same bitrate level.

In summary they noticed how in certain cases, the produced encoding would either present some small artifacts (*e.g.* complex scenes), or waste bandwidth, (*e.g.* static, plain scenes). For this reason, they came up with per-title encoding.

In order to find the best fitting bitrate ladder for a particular title, there are several criterias that they took into account, the principal ones being:

- How many quality levels should be encoded to obtain a *JND* between each of them.
- Best  $\{\text{Resolution}, \text{Bitrate}\}$  pair for each quality level
- Highest bitrate required to achieve the best perceivable quality



Resolutions	Fixed Bitrate Ladder (kpbs)	Per-Title Bitrate Ladder (kpbs)
$320 \times 240$	235	150
$384 \times 288$	375	200
$512 \times 384$	560	290
$512 \times 384$	750	
$640 \times 480$	1050	
$720 \times 480$	1750	440
$720 \times 480$		590
$1280 \times 720$	2350	830
$1920 \times 1080$	3000	1150
$1920 \times 1080$	4300	1470
$1920 \times 1080$	5800	2150
$1920 \times 1080$		3840

**Table 1.2:** Comparison between the two different approaches for the same title: note how different titles may have different numbers of quality levels. For each movie, the minimum number of quality levels gets computed to produce a just-noticeable-difference (JND), when switching bitrates during playback.


As aforementioned, each title’s perceived video quality, gets computed as a measure of *Peak signal-to-noise ratio*. The comparison is performed between the produced encode, upsampled to 1080p, and the original title in 1080p, and the best  $\{Bitrate, Resolution\}$  pair is assigned to that specific quality level, as depicted in Table 1.2.

In Figure 1.1, we can see the impact of per-title encoding on the original bitrate ladder: in order to achieve the same perceivable quality level (point **B** and **C**), it requires a lower bitrate to be encoded to (point **A**). Moreover, with around the same bitrate, one can see how per-title encoding can achieve a higher resolution compared the fixed case (point **A** and **D** respectively). It follows obviously that, holding to a high-quality stream while maintainig or lowering the used bandwidth is key: the end user will get same or better quality then before, at a lower bandwidth.

### 1.1.2 User’s Privacy

As of 2018, data began the most valuable commodity on the planet [8], and with its value rising, society starts to question how to legislate to protect both industry’s and user’s rights.

In 2016, Netflix announced the introduction of HTTPS to protect the content being streamed to users. With the addition of TLS on top of HTTP, Netflix aim, was to avoid the risk of eavesdropping on unsecure connections, protecting themselves and users, from third-party applications and governments potentially collecting viewer’s data and streaming habits.



**Figure 1.1:** Difference between per-title vs. fixed bitrate ladders.

Avoiding deep packet inspection from potential eavesdropper certainly adds another layer of security, but given the narrow relationship between Netflix and ISPs, one might conclude that the chance that IP packets do not get inspected by ISPs (especially in the United States, after the reclassification of ISPs as Title I *Information Services* [9]), is still a matter of mere trust given to the platform-provider relationship.

Cases of user's data breaches as the Kanopy one [10], are a testimony of how easy would be for an attacker to extract information to the point at which users could become identifiable by the solely information the platform was collecting in their internal log files. The content of which, include between others: timestamps, geo-location data, client-device informations and IP addresses.

The ability to cluster people based on just their video-streaming habits, poses a potential threat for how the data could be processed and used by parties with access to it. One could imagine how government agencies could easily get in possession of sensitive information about the nature of the content a particular user is interested about, or how ISPs could profit from selling data profiles to advertisement companies, that in turn, would exploit their information to improve per-user recommendation algorithms.

Considering this trend, it is for us crucial to investigate how parties that can have access to transport-layer information, (more details in Chapter 3), could exploit per-title encoding to identify video traffic.

## 1.2 Related Work

As previously mentioned, our work is mainly inspired by Reed et Al.'s [3] research paper, in which they presented a novel method to de-anonymize encrypted netflix stream in real-time with limited hardware requirements. Their system was able to identify a video using uniquely TCP/IP headers, by making use of *adudump*, a command-line program built on top of *libpcap* [11], a powerful C library for network traffic capture. They acquired for each video, metadata information with a tampering tool, and then matched *adudump* traces against with. The evaluation of their method revealed that they could identify majority of videos by recording only 20 minutes of traffic each.

An earlier proof on how bandwidth analysis could reveal the content of encrypted traffic, was given by Saponas et Al. [12], in their "SlingBox-Pro" case study, they investigate how a device that allowed users to remotely stream the contents of their TV over the Internet, could leak information on the video-content due to variable bitrate encoding. They acquired traces of the same content at different network bandwidth levels, and combined into a database for future use. Then they presented a novel method that showed how with a Discrete Fourier Transform based matching algorithm they could query the aforementioned database. By analyzing 10 minutes of video they could identify a video with 62% of probability, and with 40 minutes, more than 77%.

Other work that exploits VBR leakage has been done by Liu et Al. [13]. In their model they try to overcome some of the typical limitations of performing traffic analysis on video streams such as: a time consuming attack process, the fact that network conditions regarding each experiment are nearly identical (while in practice this depends on end-to-end network stability), and the fact that usually the size of video streams is limited to a pre-known set, and eventually that the performance of the underlying model on a larger database remains unknown. They have introduced a wavelet-based method to extract long and short range dependencies on the recorded video traffic traces, achieving an accuracy of 90% with only 3 minutes of video capture, and only a 1% false alarm rate.

Another machine learning based approach, [14], addresses the problem of estimating the QoE *Quality of Experience* of video stream traffic. *Adudump* is used to get a reconstruction of the video segment sizes, and then some KPI *Key Performance Indicator*, such as the initial video delay, stalls due to low download rates, and average representation quality (average throughput), are computed. Subsequently each video gets assigned a quality level, and the collected features are trained with several classification models (Naive Bayes, Random forests, SMOs). They are able to assess with 80% of accuracy the quality level of a video traffic trace recorded at an unseen network bandwidth.

Similar work has been conducted also by Moser [15], who analyzed how bitrate ladders could uniquely embed the identity of Netflix titles. In his work he further studies the impact of the aggregation of each video's segment bandwidth on the overall accuracy of his system.

## Chapter 1 Introduction

Note how in our approach, contrary to Moser's and Reed et Al's scenarios after a recent Netflix update to its video player, it is no longer possible to force the playback of a movie by simply choosing a certain quality level. This makes the process of creating video fingerprints more challenging as we describe throughout the rest of this document.

In addition, in Reed et Al's work, there is no evidence of TCM multiplexing. This is verified by looking at their network capture traces [? ]. In Chapter 4 we show how and in which scenarios, this affects our measurements.

### 1.3 Structure of this Report

In this section, we outline the contents and the structure of this report.

Chapter 1 introduced our motivation behind the project, presented featured work that influenced and inspired our approach, and listed the goals we would like to ultimately achieve.

Chapter 2 presents the attack scenario from the perspective of a malicious user that has compromised a node on the path between the client and the server, the infrastructure needed to acquire the data, the nature of the information that could be inferred, and the consequences that might arise.

Chapter 3 shows our version of the attack, in a different context, but up to some extent, with similar conditions to the one depicted in Chapter 2. It also highlights the similarities and differences from the featured approaches we followed.

Chapter 4 we evaluate our system, we present results, and discuss the relevance of such a method.

Chapter 5 tries to summarize and draw conclusions based on the claims made at the beginning of this report.

## End-to-End Attack Scenario

Of great importance to our approach, is acquiring real-time network traffic, with downstream throughput being our only focus; here we discuss the potential scenarios that allow adversaries to obtain such information, and describe how, in particular ISPs, as described in Section 1.1.2, may be collecting personal data on behalf of governments, or may independently decide to profile users to attract companies that in turn could target customers with ad-hoc advertising. This scenario can be abstracted and generalized, by considering the attacker, as a subject that has compromised, or has gained access to, a node between the client's device and the server sending the video-stream.

### 2.1 Netflix-ISP relationship




Figure 2.1: Playback process diagram. [16]


## Chapter 2 End-to-End Attack Scenario

Above is illustrated the process of retrieving content whenever a user wants to play a Netflix title. OCAs *Open Connect Appliances* are purpose-built servers responsible to store and serve video files over HTTPS to client devices. OCAs as Netflix claims, do not store client data (DRM info or member data), but only report health metrics to Netflix monitoring services in AWS.


Whenever a play request is issued by a client device, playback application services in AWS determine which streaming assets are required to handle the streaming of the intended title

Then the steering service uses cache-control services to select the best OCAs depending on client characteristics and network conditions, generating URLs that are passed back to the client device, that is now able to "communicate" with the OCAs.

Netflix partners with ISPs in the deployment of their CDN, following are presented two different policies:



**Figure 2.2:** OCAs are installed within Internet Exchange Points (IXP), and interconnected to ISPs. [16]



**Figure 2.3:** OCAs are directly deployed inside ISP networks. [16]

## 2.2 Attack Scenarios

Given the nature of modern Internet infrastructure, an adversary interested in eavesdropping a particular communication, only needs to compromise a node on the path

the communication travels through. An *on-path* attacker could easily gain passive access to network and transport layers, and start capturing network traffic. This can include malicious or compromised Wi-Fi access points, routers, tapped network cables, and ISPs.

Rather than just attacking physical devices, leaks of information could occur in network connections, in which an attacker physically close to the victim, could make use of a *Wi-Fi sniffer* to estimate traffic by capturing physical layer WLAN packets. Information may be encrypted by 802.11, and the sniffer may not take into account packet retransmissions at the session layer nor multiple TCP/IP flows on the same link, potentially causing noise on the observation. Despite so, Reed et Al. [17], have shown that it is still possible to estimate WAP-to-client throughput and use it to identify the content being streamed.

In addition to the above, *side-channel eavesdropping* can exploit information about the network structure, to saturate a link between the user and the server, and estimate fluctuations of congestion by sending probes remotely and observing queueing delays in routers [18].

We will now present the relevant phases and tools needed for an evil party  $i$  to carry on such an attack. For the rest of this chapter, we will consider  $i$  as an *on-path* attacker in control of a network device, throughout which, video traffic travels.

## 2.3 Video Fingerprinting

In order to identify a user's video stream traffic capture, attacker  $i$  needs to first build a database of video fingerprints to be compared with. To build such a database,  $i$  needs to have access to a network interface, be able to control its inbound bandwidth to get different levels of quality for each title, and to capture incoming traffic passing through it.

$i$  needs to be in control of some network interface to be able to throttle its bandwidth. Depending on the infrastructure  $i$  is in possess of, he could either decide to limit its bandwidth on the ethernet interface on its machine, or to be able to program a general L4 network switch. In general limiting the network bandwidth on a router or a switch, may result in less deviation when measuring the overall inbound throughput, or bitrate.

The value of the enforced bandwidth determines the quality (bitrate) of the content that will be captured. Assuming that each title has a unique bitrate ladder, attacker  $i$  should come up with an ad-hoc policy, for every video to faithfully reconstruct the quality levels of it. While correct, a more viable approach to this problem, would be to just consider a range of bitrates capable of spanning the space of possible quality levels.

In our own version of the attack, presented in Chapter 3, we use the values in Table 2.1.

Bandwidth levels (Mbps)												
0.6	0.8	1.2	2	3.5	4.2	4.8	5.5	6.5	7.05	10	15	20

Table 2.1: Enforced bandwidth levels.

$i$  can now connect a UNIX-like machine to the switch’s network interface with bandwidth limit  $b$ , and invoke `adudump` to infer the size of each *application data unit* ADU, by processing TCP/IP packet header traces, that generate *a-b-t* connection vectors [19].

### 2.3.1 The a-b-t model

The lifetime of a TCP endpoint that sends and receive data units is not only dictated by the time spent on these operations, but also by quiet times in which the TCP connection remains idle, waiting for upper layers to formulate new demands. Clearly, longer lifetimes may have a huge impact overall, due to the fact that resources needed to handle TCP state, remain reserved for a longer time. In contrast, ADUs that are sent within a short period of time, get aggregated by the TCP window mechanism, reducing the exchange of requests/responses between source and destination.

These ideas have been formalized into the *a-b-t model*, that describes TCP connections as sets of ADU exchanges and quiet times. The term a-b-t is descriptive of the building blocks of the model: *a-type* ADUs, sent from the connection initiator to the connection acceptor, *b-type* ADUs, sent from the responder back to the initiator, and quiet times  $t$ ’s, during which, no data segments are exchanged.

The model has two different flavors depending on whether ADU interleaving is sequential or concurrent: the former is used for modeling connections for which only one ADU is sent from one endpoint to the other at a given point in time, (one endpoint will wait until the other has completed the transmission of the current ADU before sending a new one), while the latter is used for modeling connections in which both endpoints send and receive ADUs simultaneously.

As one can notice from a sample traffic trace from Netflix, the two endpoints behave in a sequential fashion, as shown by the SEQ flag in Listing 2.1.

### 2.3.2 Inference

Figure 2.4 shows an example of how `Adudump`’s inference process works. The connection starts when the three-way handshake completes, (marked as a SEQ record). The monitor then records the time the first data segment is sent from the client. The server then acknowledges the previous request, and `adudump` infers the size of the completed ADU to be 372 bytes, generating a record with the ADU’s size direction and think-time. Note how `adudump` generates no record until it infers that the ADU is complete, moreover the think times reported, are relative to the position of the monitor in the network,






Figure 2.4: Detailed segment size inference in adudump.

the farther the monitor is from the server, the noisier the measure of quiet times becomes. More on the effect of quiet times is described in Chapter 3.

### 2.3.3 Identifying Netflix traffic

In order to identify specific video traffic from a Netflix CDN, attacker  $i$  could either inspect the DNS response packets or the TLS handshake messages, and perform a DNS lookup for each video every time, or to maintain an updated list of IP addresses with mappings to the recorded traffic. Then all he is left with, is a mixed trace of audio and video segments.

Each Netflix audio segment represents about 16 seconds of playback, while every video segment corresponds to a 4 second playback [3]. Reed et Al's approach is to threshold ADU sizes to be at least 200 kilobytes. The reason behind their choice is that they observed the size of audio segments to be  $\approx 198$  kilobytes. Throughout the testing of our system, we observed how this heuristic can no longer be applicable without a loss of information occurring in low-bandwidth settings. We noticed how with an enforced bandwidth level  $b < 1 \text{ Mbps}$ , the sizes of transmitted video segments are less than 200

kilobytes, although in general, the number of segments with less than 200 kilobytes is low. Thus, We have decided to filter ADU segments with size less than 100 kilobytes, as described in Chapter 3.

### 2.3.4 Building a database of fingerprints

The attacker can now automate the streaming of Netflix videos, and build a database of fingerprints. Here,  $i$  is free to use a method of storage of choice, depending on the granularity of the features required to represent each title, and on the cardinality of the set of titles it wants to capture. In addition, as Netflix is constantly adding/removing titles from its library, the attacker is required to constantly keeping updated the database, to guarantee that the attack can target newly added titles.

---

```

ADU: 1565880580.152388 192.168.0.157.54924 <1 45.57.19.134.443 198837 SEQ 0.804088
ADU: 1565880581.321246 192.168.0.157.54924 <1 45.57.19.134.443 198760 SEQ 0.907568
ADU: 1565880582.688335 192.168.0.157.54924 <1 45.57.19.134.443 199407 SEQ 1.052862
ADU: 1565880591.912352 192.168.0.157.54974 <1 45.57.19.134.443 525046 SEQ 0.058709
ADU: 1565880592.168340 192.168.0.157.54968 <1 45.57.19.134.443 275568 SEQ 0.558654
ADU: 1565880592.168344 192.168.0.157.54974 <1 45.57.19.134.443 305115 SEQ 0.062028
ADU: 1565880592.172495 192.168.0.157.54982 <1 45.57.19.134.443 198735 SEQ 0.670224
ADU: 1565880592.697314 192.168.0.157.54974 <1 45.57.19.134.443 236474 SEQ 0.179115
ADU: 1565880592.820292 192.168.0.157.54982 <1 45.57.19.134.443 286547 SEQ 0.106913
ADU: 1565880592.820395 192.168.0.157.54968 <1 45.57.19.134.443 198530 SEQ 0.310506


```

---

**Listing 2.1:** Incoming traffic trace of Mulan, captured at 10Mbps (first 10 segments).

## 2.4 Capturing video traffic

Irregardless of the compromised device the attacker  $i$  has gained access to, it needs to be capable of mirroring traffic from a port to another one. Then any UNIX-like system that implements *libpcap* is suitable for capturing inbound traffic on the mirrored port, as presented below in Figure 2.5.



**Figure 2.5:** Traffic capture scenario of an on-path attacker.

In this scenario, the client is unaware of the fact that its traffic is being mirrored and recorded by  $i$ , and there is no practical way for him to claim that. On the other hand, a user concerned with its privacy, may avoid such attack, as described in Section 2.4.3.

### 2.4.1 Data acquired by the attacker

Captured traffic, as shown in Listing 2.1, apart from the size of each segment and quiet times, include timestamps of each ADU, and source and destination IP addresses. With this information, the attacker is able to reconstruct streaming habits of every targeted user (identifiable by the source IP address), by looking at what time the user does usually connect to the platform, identifying the content of the stream (matching to fingerprints), and by analyzing how much time the user spends watching content. Thus  $i$  can aggregate user's collected data and build a database of user profiles to use it for its own will. Data about a particular user is no longer in the solely hands of Netflix, as one could argue it should be, but it now resides in some private database, potentially exploitable and profitable, with any given prior consent.

### 2.4.2 *Matching Captured traffic to fingerprints*

*i* can now identify the captured trace by comparing it to the saved fingerprints. Based on the type of data structure used to store them, there are several methods to search and retrieve the best candidate for a given trace. We will not articulate this process here, but we rather present our own solution later in Chapter 3.

### 2.4.3 *Possible countermeasures*

In order to safely stream Netflix videos without the attacker *i* being able to identify the content of them, a user particularly concerned about its privacy, (e.g. public figures, politicians, government agency employees), may decide to use a VPN. When using a VPN, the user, still needs the ISP to connect to the internet, but instead of having the ISP communicating directly with the desired resource, the ISP now "talks" with the VPN server. It is responsibility of the VPN server in fact, to establish a communication with the webpage the user wants to access. The key point is that the client and the VPN server establish a secure connection (VPN tunnel). Thus, as long as the user's VPN of choice, encrypts data transfer, either with IPsec's **Encapsulated Security Payload** or, in case of a remote-access VPN, with point-to-point based protocols such as L2F, PPTP or LT2P, the user is guaranteed that its traffic cannot be intercepted by the ISP. This is feasible as long as both the VPN software provides an automatic kill switch to avoid dropouts, and the online resource does not restrict access to users connected via VPN.

Netflix does not allow the use of VPN software to prevent users to get access to other countries catalogue, although certain VPN clients are able to bypass this check [20].

# Approach

We will now present our contribution and practical approach to build a database of fingerprints and to capture and identify video traffic of an unaware user over a compromised network.

We have built a system capable of manipulating the incoming bandwidth of a network interface, able to obtain fingerprints for a limited number of Netflix titles at various enforced bandwidth levels, and reconstructed each video's bitrate ladder. We compare our reconstructed bitrate ladders with the bitrate ladders constructed from HTTP header (HARs), and report, for each one its the RMSE. Eventually, we evaluate the robustness of the saved fingerprints, by feeding to our identification mechanism, several test-captures of video IDs (present in our fingerprint's database), at *unseen* bandwidth levels. In this phase we study the impact of tuning the parameters of the system in relation to the number of successfully/unsuccessfully identified videos, and report relevant statistics of each test.

## 3.1 Attack Scenario

Our own version of the attack, conversely to the one depicted in Figure 2.5, does not include the ISP as a potential adversary, nor does involve an attacker that has compromised an ISP where the OCA resides. We consider a specific case in which the attacker is a malicious user  $i$ , with access to the same network an honest client is using to stream a Netflix title. Attacker  $i$  has:

- either installed a passive TAP device on a LAN
- or gained control of the main switch of a LAN
- or compromised an AP over a public WiFi network.

For each of the aforementioned scenarios, the steps required for the attacker  $i$  to identify video traffic of another user, are the same: the first phase consists of recording fingerprints of each Netflix title, process them, store them in a persistent, (and convenient for

search and retrieval), data structure, and a second phase that exploits the compromise device in the network to capture user's traffic, and identify the content of the stream, by querying the database of fingerprint.

## 3.2 Video Fingerprinting

Let  $T$  be the set of Netflix titles for Switzerland, we refer to  $n$  as the cardinality  $|T|$ , which is roughly 3500; consider now the set  $R$  as the set of bandwidth levels shown in Table 2.1, we refer to  $i$  as the cardinality  $|R|$ .

Consider now the cartesian product  $T \times R$ :

$$T \times R = \{(t_1, r_1), (t_1, r_2) \dots (t_n, r_i)\}$$

and its cardinality:

$$|T \times R| = |T| \cdot |R| = n \cdot i \approx 45500$$

Due to time restrictions, we have decided to fix the size of the set  $T$  of titles to 100, in order to give a proof of concept on the feasibility of such an attack. According [3], we have also decided to bound the time of each video capture to 4 minutes of playback, as it has been shown to be sufficient in order to uniquely identify a video over more than 40000 titles.

### 3.2.1 Implementation overview

We have implemented a set of Python scripts to be able to:

1. Crawl the swiss Netflix catalogue to obtain a list of video IDs.
2. Manipulate the incoming bandwidth of an ethernet network interface.
3. Invoke `tcpdump` listening on the same network interface.
4. Instrument the browser to:
  - a) Navigate to a specific title URL (identified by the title ID).
  - b) Control the Netflix video player by injecting JavaScript code.
  - c) Capture HAR metadata via a proxy.

Note that contrary to [3], in this phase we do not make use of `adudump`, instead, to record traffic, we use `tcpdump` [11]. The main reason behind this choice, is the fact that `adudump` has been conceived to reconstruct data segments sizes in an online fashion. By doing so, the time spent by `adudump` processing each segment, creates an overhead that in turn, results in noisy measurements. `Adudump` can work in an offline-fashion, simply by passing as input a `pcap` [11] file, that gets generated when invoking `tcpdump`.

### 3.2.2 Crawler

The script responsible of crawling the Netflix catalogue is `crawler.py`. We use the `scrapy` Python library [21] to get a list of Netflix titles divided by genre. Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we have decided to work only with movies, as for TV series, we would have needed to add checks due to the autoplay function of subsequent episodes in the viewing phase.

The resulting output of the script is a CSV file with the following structure:

ID	GENRE	TITLE
70115629,	Family Animation,	Despicable Me
70264803,	Family Animation,	Despicable Me 2
80096067,	Family Animation,	Ice Age: Collision Course
70220028,	Family Animation,	Hotel Transylvania
80121840,	Family Animation,	The Emoji Movie
70021636,	Family Animation,	Madagascar
70216224,	Family Animation,	Madagascar 3: Europe's Most Wanted
70213513,	Family Animation,	Brave
14607635,	Family Animation,	Mulan

**Listing 3.1:** Sample of crawled movies

Due to the fact that a movie can be labeled in more than one category, the resulting CSV have been filtered to include just one occurrence of each title.

```
cat netflix_titles/titles.csv | cut -d , -f1 | sort | uniq
```

**Listing 3.2:** Command to filter out unique IDs

### 3.2.3 Bandwidth Manipulation

In order to be able to manually control the bandwidth of the ethernet interface, we use `tcconfig` [22], a Python wrapper for the `tc` [23] Unix utility to configure traffic control in the kernel.

The script that throttles the bandwidth is `bandwidth_manipulator.py`, that invokes the command:

## Chapter 3 Approach

```
tcset --device <network_interface> --direction incoming --rate  
      <bandwidth_rate>
```

**Listing 3.3:** Enforce a bandwidth rate on the specified interface

### 3.2.4 *Tcpdump*

The script that records the capture traffic is `capture.py`, it calls `tcpdump` as below:

```
tcpdump -i <network_interface> net 45 -w <output_file>
```

**Listing 3.4:** Listens for TCP/IP traffic on the specified interface

Note the usage of argument `net 45`. As Netflix OCAs IP addresses are of the form `45.XXX.XXX.XXX`, to simplify the process of identifying traffic from Netflix, we just use this regular expression for convenience. Steps required to carry out a more general way to achieve this have been described in Section 2.3.3.

### 3.2.5 *Automated streaming with Selenium*

In order to instrument the browser to automatically stream each title, we have developed a script that uses the Selenium library [24]. Selenium provides a `WebDriver` interface capable of controlling various browsers such as Chrome, Opera, Safari, Firefox and others. One must use the appropriate version of the `WebDriver`, according to the browser of choice and its version. For convenience of use, and support, we have chosen to work with GoogleChrome and its `ChromeDriver` interface.

In order to assess the quality of `adudump`'s inference of video segment sizes, we compare the recorded traffic with HAR [25] metadata. The format of each HAR file is a json object containing content and session data acquired by the browser during the playback of the video. For this task, we use `Browsermob` [26], a webproxy built to work with Selenium.

Furthermore, to speedup the capture of each video, we have installed an extension that is able to control HTML5 video speed playback.



We have implemented a class `netflix_browser.py` capable of:

1. Log in the user to its Netflix account
2. Navigate to a video url given a video ID
3. Start the proxy to record HAR metadata
4. Seek the video to 240 seconds (4 minutes) (avoiding entry credits)
5. Wait until the buffer of the video reaches 8 minutes (start at 240 seconds, ends at 480).
6. Stop the proxy and save the resulting HAR file

### 3.3 Post-processing

The script that handles post-processing of `.pcap` output files is `post_process.sh`. It is composed by three main functions.


The first one invokes `adudump` on the traces recorded with `tcpdump`, after that, it extracts the DNSs contained in the HAR metadata and performs a DNS lookup using Unix's `host` command. This step is required to get the complete list of IP addresses of the OCAs that served the video, so that we can filter all non-video traffic that `tcpdump` has captured. In addition we threshold ADUs which sizes are less than 100 kilobytes, as mentioned in Section 2.3.3.

The second function is responsible for generating the bitrate ladders of each title, and to save all fingerprints in a text file. Given a trace at a particular bandwidth level  $b$ , we compute the average bitrate as:

$$AVG_{bitrate} = \frac{8}{4} \cdot \frac{\sum_{i=0}^n adu_i}{n}$$

We average over all ADUs (sizes are in bytes), divide by 4 seconds (approximate lenght of a video segment according to [3]), and multiply by 8 to get a measure in *bits/s*.

We repeat the process decribed above, also by generating fingerprints from the HAR records we capture with our proxy. By doing so, we can reconstruct the *true* bitrate ladders for each capture, and use them as a term of comparison to asses the quality of the ADU-based reconstructed ladders. For each ADU reconstructed bitrate ladder, we compute the *mean-normalized* RMSE with respect to the HAR reconstructed ones as shown in Chapter 4.



**Figure 3.1:** Overview of the process of acquiring video fingerprints.

### 3.4 Capturing video traffic

In order to evaluate the attack, we capture a set of video traffic traces, (the ones the attacker  $i$  can retrieve by mirroring traffic on the compromised device), at unseen enforced bandwidths. In practice, our database of fingerprints hosts 100 movie titles at the 13 bandwidth levels presented in Table 2.1, while the new *unseen* bandwidths are listed below in Table 3.1.

Unseen Bandwidth levels (Mbps)							
0.5	1.0	3.0	5.0	6.0	8.0	12.0	18.0

**Table 3.1:** Enforced unseen bandwidth levels.

As for the acquisition of fingerprints, we repeat the same exact steps to build our testing set, that is composed by the same 100 titles recorded at the new 8 unseen bandwidth levels depicted above.

### 3.5 Identification

For this purpose, we have implemented a modified version of the search tree used in [3]. All the scripts in this Section can be found under the `identify` directory located at the root of the project.

The identification process involves two parties: a Java program that runs as a proxy to our database, and a Python script that takes as input the fingerprints of captured traffic to query the database for matches.

The Python script queries the Java process running the KD-tree, that returns a list of possible matches for the given captured trace.

### 3.5.1 KD-Tree

The code that implements the KD-Tree is found under the `identify/server` directory. `runServer.sh` runs an instance of the system and requires 6 parameters as input:

```
cd server && ./runServer.sh <db_file> <capture_file>
<window_size> <key_size> <key_mode> <key_delta>
<pearson_threshold>
```

**Listing 3.5:** Start the Java Server

To simplify writing, we assign to the following parameters a corresponding greek letter:

- $\omega$  represents the window size.
- $\kappa$  is the key size.
- $\mu$  represents the key mode.
- $\delta$  represents how broad the search it will be.
- $\rho$  represent the minimum pearson correlation coefficient to accept a match.

The above script executes `Netflid.jar`, composed by the following Java classes:

- `Netflid`: main Class, sets up the `KDTree`, and start a `ServerThread` instance.
- `KDTree`: implements the KD-tree data structure.
- `ServerThread`: listens for the client to send data, queries the `KDTree`, and respond to the client with matches.
- `Window`: constructs and store the key to search the `KDTree`.
- `Movie`: represents a movie instance.

### 3.5.2 Building the KD-Tree

`Netflid` is the main class that creates a `KDTree` instance (with  $K$  being the dimension of the search key), to which every record in the database is added to. Each record, has the following structure:

ID	AVG_BITRATE	SEGMENTS
896970_15000	3038	321427,198559,113973 ...

## Chapter 3 Approach

The ID of the record is formed by the video ID, and the enforced bandwidth at which the title has been captured. 896970\_15000, represents movie ID 896970 *Red Heat*, recorded at 15.0 *Mbps*. Note how the number of segments for each record is not fixed, because of distortion that adds to the segment size inference, as reported in Chapter 4. For each record, we create an instance of *Movie*, in which we store its ID, the average bitrate and its segments. Based on the number of segments  $s$ , we build  $s - 1$  Windows of  $\omega$  segments. For each window, we build a search key of dimension  $K$ , in one of the following modes, expressed by  $M$ :

In case  $M == 0$ , the key gets constructed by assigning the total sum of the segment sizes in the window as first dimension; the rest  $K - 1$  dimensions, represent the proportion of data received within  $\frac{\omega}{K - 1}$  segments with respect to the aforementioned total in the first dimension.

In case  $M == 1$ , instead we store the average bitrate (computed as in Section 3.3) of all segments in the window as first dimension, then each of the  $K - 1$  dimensions is the average bitrate of  $\frac{\omega}{K - 1}$  segments, normalized again by the first dimension.

### 3.5.3 Querying the KD-Tree

The script acting in the role of the client, is located under `identify/client's directory`

```
cd client && cat <capture_file> | grep ADU | awk '$6 > 100000' | cut -d "
    -f2,3,4,5,6 | python preprocessor.py | python detector.py 127.0.0.1
    1007 <capture_file> <window_size> <key_mode> <key_delta>
```

After having added the key to the KDTree, we start a `ServerSocket` thread that listens for incoming connections from the client. `ServerThread` is the runnable class responsible for consuming the input of the socket the Python client communicates through. The Python Client consists of a script that takes as input a post-processed traffic capture, and sends sliding window of  $\omega$  segments until it has consumed all lines.

The `ServerThread` in Java reads up to  $\omega$  lines, and creates a `Window` and its corresponding key with the same method used when adding records from the database to the KDTree. Then it queries the KDTree by generating an upper, and a lower range key, with the specified  $\delta$  (the greater  $\delta$  is, the broader the search will be). The KDTree then retrieves a list of matching windows with a *pearson correlation* coefficient greater than  $\rho$ .

# Evaluation and Analysis

The scripts that perform the evaluation of our testing set, are `evaluation.sh` and `exec_query.sh`.

The values of parameters of the KDTree described in Section 3.5.1 used are:

- $\omega = \{2, 3, 5, 10, 20\}$
- $\kappa$  gets computed based on  $\omega$  factors (s.t.  $\kappa - 1$  has to be a factor of  $\omega$ ).
- $\mu = 1$  (Average Bitrate Mode)
- $\delta = \pm 25bps$
- $\rho = 0.99$

## 4.1 Video Identification

After receiving a list of matching windows from the KD-Tree, we classify each one of them as a proper **match** iff the window's ID matches the ID of the capture we passed to the Java identification process, whereas, if the ID of the capture and the window ID are different, we classify the returned window as a **mismatch**.

We then report, for various  $\omega$  window sizes, the accuracy of our method, to be the proportion of matches with respect to the number of mismatches over the total number of returned windows as:


Let  $n$  be the number of returned windows for a given capture trace, and let  $TP$  represent the number of matches, and  $FP$  to represent the number of returned mismatches:

It follows that  $n = TP + FP$

$$\text{acc} = \frac{TP}{n} = 1 - \frac{FP}{n}$$

## Chapter 4 Evaluation and Analysis


As mentioned in Section 3.4, our testing dataset consists of the same 100 movies present in the database at 8 unseen enforced bandwidths. We pass each capture to the identification process, that runs the evaluation by varying the window size  $\omega$ , and the corresponding key size  $\kappa$ . For every run, we then compute the number of matches/mismatches, and report the statistics shown in Table 4.1. In addition, we plot for each configuration the number of matches, the number of collisions and the number of mismatches. The number of collisions, represents the number of matches from different bandwidth levels, (e.g. suppose to have a capture at 6.0 *Mbps*, now assume the KDTree returns as matching windows, a list of matches all of the same movie, but at different bandwidths, 5.0 *Mbps*, and 7 *Mbps*, then the number of collisions is 2).



**Figure 4.1:** Frequency of matches, collisions, and mismatches at various window sizes for "Dirty John" ID: 81056132, recorded at 500 Kbps

The plot in Figure 4.1 represent a low-bandwidth capture where the number of mismatches dominates the number of matches. The fact that with a small window the KD-Tree returns a greater number of mismatches than when considering larger windows is trivial, since the search key is based on the average bitrate. Despite this, the KD-Tree, does not return matches nor mismatches for  $\omega = \{3, 5, 10, 20\}$ . We observe this behavior only in low-bandwidths scenarios, and it is due to an incorrect segment size inference by adudump. The main reason for why adudump cannot correctly in-

## 4.1 Video Identification



**Figure 4.2:** Frequency of matches, collisions, and mismatches at various window sizes for "Dirty John" ID: 81056132, recorded at 18 Mbps

ference the video segment sizes is spottable by looking at the trace in Listing 2.1, particularly at the destination IP address (which is the local address of the interface we are recording traffic on). One can notice how ADUs have different PORT numbers, one for every virtual connection established by the custom TCP-connection algorithm running on OCAs. On contrary, in [3], the reported adudump traces did not manifest this behavior.

In Figure 4.2, at a much higher bandwidth shows how the number of matches varies as increasing  $\omega$ . We note how for  $\omega = 20$  the KD-Tree does not return any match nor mismatch. In Table 4.1 we report the overall number of matches/mismatches for different  $\omega$ s.

**Table 4.1:** Frequency of matches for different values of  $\omega$

$\omega(\kappa)$	Matches	Mismatches
2(3)	17648	6794
3(4)	12957	410
5(6)	6414	2
10(11)	1541	0

**Table 4.1:** Frequency of matches for different values of  $\omega$ 

$\omega(\kappa)$	Matches	Mismatches
10(2)	1481	0
10(3)	1516	0
10(6)	1528	0
15(16)	461	0
15(2)	461	0
15(4)	459	0
15(6)	456	0
20(11)	138	0
20(21)	138	0
20(2)	145	0
20(3)	137	0
20(5)	139	0
20(6)	142	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	45761	7206
<b>ACCURACY</b>		0.86

## 4.2 Bitrate Ladders

At first, we evaluate the accuracy of the reconstructed bitrate ladders by computing the RMSE between each one of them and their corresponding HAR-based bitrate ladder. We have decided to use the RMSE, as it is a well-known indicator that aggregates the residuals to give a measure of the magnitude of error in our predictions, and it is computed as follows.

Let  $Y = \{y_1, y_2 \dots y_n\}$  be the set of HAR-based bitrates for movie  $m$ , at enforced bandwidth  $b$ , and let  $\hat{Y} = \{\hat{y}_1, \hat{y}_2 \dots \hat{y}_n\}$  be the set of ADU-based computed bitrates for the same movie at the same enforced bandwidth, then:

$$\text{RMSE}_{m,b} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \hat{y}_i)^2}{n}}$$

where  $n = |Y| = |\hat{Y}|$


Then, the *mean-normalized* RMSE is given by:

$$\text{NRMSE}_{m,b} = \frac{\text{RMSE}_{m,b}}{\bar{\hat{y}}}$$



## 4.2 Bitrate Ladders


In addition, in order to assess the uniqueness of both the real and the reconstructed bitrate ladders, we compute, for each bitrate ladder, its average bitrate, the bitrate standard deviation, and the median.



**Figure 4.3:** Comparison between the HAR-based bitrate ladder (REAL) and the ADU-based reconstructed bitrate ladder for "Casino" ID: 70019012. Accuracy of reconstruction is shown as the RMSE.


The plot above represents the "real" and reconstructed bitrate ladders. The accuracy of our prediction is represented by the RMSE, which is 0.07. This title's bitrate ladder gets reconstructed faithfully, and almost every title in our database follow this trend. This is confirmed by further looking at the average RMSE shown at the end of Table A.1. Eventually, 63 titles have an RMSE less than 0.12, and 87 less than 0.16. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 are two examples of reconstruction which RMSE is 0.12 and 0.16 respectively.

## Chapter 4 Evaluation and Analysis



**Figure 4.4:** Comparison between the HAR-based bitrate ladder (REAL) and the ADU-based reconstructed bitrate ladder for "Armed Response" ID: 80198592. Accuracy of reconstruction is shown as the RMSE.

By looking at the above plot we spot two major areas where the differences between the real and the reconstructed bitrates have greater impact on the overall accuracy. Bottom left, when the enforced bandwidth and the bitrates are low, and top right, at 15Mbps. We focus our attention on the bottom-left area, and notice how it correlates with the RMSE of the following plots.



**Figure 4.5:** Comparison between the HAR-based bitrate ladder (REAL) and the ADU-based reconstructed bitrate ladder for "Mission Blue" ID: 80198592.


In this case we observe that with a greater RMSE, the two curves start to be parallel to each other. By looking at the plot in Figure 4.6 we see a magnified version of this behavior, and explain its existence.

This plot represents a particular case of a reconstruction which RMSE we consider too high. This behavior, as already mentioned in the description of Figure 4.1, happens only at low-enforced bandwidth, in this particular case one can observe how the "real" bitrate ladder, has also a low average bitrate in comparison with the one seen so far. That in turns confirm that our identification method is prone to error when a Netflix title has been encoded at low bitrates, or in poor network conditions.

#### 4.2.1 Uniqueness of Bitrate Ladders

We have collected the statistics in Table A.1, to show that for our set of titles, each ladder is indeed unique. In fact, each ladder, can be modeled as a Gaussian Probability Distribution with mean  $\mu$  and standard deviation  $\sigma$ . Across our entire database these two values are unique, therefore we can conclude that each bitrate ladder is unique.

In addition to that, we have implemented a simple K-means clustering script, which we feed the *reconstructed*  $\mu$ ,  $\sigma$  of all video titles captured at 20Mbps and median  $\tilde{y}$ .




**Figure 4.6:** Comparison between the HAR-based bitrate ladder (REAL) and the ADU-based reconstructed bitrate ladder for "Dirty John" ID: 81056132.

Following we present the plot obtained by setting the number of centroids  $K = 10$ , (as the number of different movie genres in our database), that shows a possible labeling based on the average bitrate  $\mu$ .


Below we show a magnified and labeled version of the result given by the clustering. Interestingly, we notice how despite movies with approximately close average bitrates can be assigned to different clusters, as standard deviation, median, and RMSE may be crucial in the discrimination of the cluster appropriate cluster.

The red stroke polygon encloses an area of particular interest, for which the average bitrate of 6 out of 10 cartoons in our database varies by less than 200 Kbps.

We notice also how 4 out of 10 cartoons in our database get clustered together with this setting (*Madagascar 3*, *Despicable Me 2*, *Minions*, and *The Emoji Movie*), as the complexity of the scenes across them may potentially be alike.



**Figure 4.7:** K-means labeling of average bitrates for every reconstructed bitrate ladder.



**Figure 4.8:** Zoomed version of Figure 4.7, displaying the title of each movie

# Conclusions

We now analyze and discuss our system’s strengths and weaknesses, arguing on the conditions required to successfully perform the attack, and eventually, present our perspective on possible future research.

## 5.1 Contribution

In Chapter 4 we have given both quantitative and visual evidence of the results achieved with our methodology. We now extend the analysis by abstracting the context to a more realistic scenario.

Throughout the description of our approach, we have ignored potential factors that may be source of various types of errors when carrying out the attack in a real scenario (*e.g.* a public WLAN network).

We have presented a revisited version of [3] that, by watching 4 minutes of video playback for a limited number of Netflix titles (100), in stable network conditions, can faithfully reconstruct bitrate ladders of movies encoded with an average bitrate greater than 1Mbps across 13 different enforced bandwidth levels. The 100 reconstructed bitrate ladders are uniquely identifiable by their bitrate’s average, standard deviation, or median.

Our system identifies with approximately 86% of accuracy the same set of video titles across 8 *unseen* bandwidth levels not previously captured in the database. We have tested this behavior for several window sizes and conclude that for majority of the titles, the average bitrate of, up to 20 subsequent ADUs, represents a robust feature to represent the a 4 minutes video title.

## 5.2 Benefits

The obtained results, even if on a limited number of titles, have shown potential for possible further research. In particular, the accuracy at which bitrate ladders have been reconstructed, and the fact that the average observed bitrate has proven to be a good descriptor of the complexity and structure of video streamed content, are promising facts.

In order to confirm this claims, we would need to collect fingerprints for the entire Netflix catalogue, and re-evaluate the system.

The key aspects of this approach are:

- As DASH is likely to be a technology that won't be suddenly abonded, chances that our system will work in the near future are considerably high.
- In order to identify a given capture trace, the time spent executing a search query for matches, considering the full Netflix catalogue, is considerably low as shown in [3].
- Keeping updated the system can be done trivially. One could keep always a fresh version of a database of fingerprints by crawling Netflix for new added titles. Contrary to machine-learning approaches, we would not need to re-train a model whenever a new title is available.
- Fidelity of bitrate ladder reconstructions, and accuracy of video identification have shown to depend on factors such as network bandwidth and bitrate levels of each encoded title. Having stated that, with the rising growth of the streaming industry, and the growth rate at which technology evolves, it is for us reasonable to assume good quality network conditions, and high-bitrate encodings of new movies.
- An attacker, has the ability to target multiple users and is able to map every ADU to each one of them by looking at the dst IP addresses. Indeed, if the network bandwidth is good enough to support high quality streaming for all the users, then the probability of identifying traffic of a set of  $n$  users should remain the same as when targeting a single user.



### 5.3 Shortcomings and Feasibility

When considering a real case scenario, we need to re-introduce factors abstracted away in our proof-of-concept.

The presence of various users in the network, for instance, may potentially impact the quality of our reconstruction, especially if the content being streamed is encoded at a low bitrate, or if the network bandwidth is unstable (could cause the Netflix buffering algorithm to jump over different bitrate levels during a 4 minute capture).

The fingerprints that we have collected, apart from constituting a limited sized version of the entire Netflix catalogue, consist of traffic traces of 4 minutes between the playback time 4:00-8:00. This in itself, is a major limitation, if the user's video playback is already past that time frame.

Both our modified version, and the original [3] KD-Tree use a considerably high amount of memory to run. Reason for which the whole identification system has been running on a t2.xlarge EC2 Amazon instance. Thus an attacker in a public WLAN would either need a high-end workstation, or access to a fast cloud resource that could run Java.

In addition, as already discussed in Section 2.4.3 this attack is no longer feasible if the targeted user runs a VPN not blocked by Netflix.

## 5.4 Future Work

In this section we first present possible improvements to our system, as well as our perspective on how different techniques could prove to be worth of investigation.

### 5.4.1 Possible Improvements

To overcome the fact that our system is susceptible to poor network conditions, we should investigate more deeply the behavior of per-segment statistics as the packet-interarrival times distribution along our capture, or by analyzing traffic bursts rather than only video segment sizes as in [27].

An aspect that requires further work, is certainly the size of both training and evaluation dataset, as more sound and general analysis are needed to argue that the constructed system can be a treath in a real scenario. This is true both for assessing the quality of reconstructed bitrate ladders and to subsequently identify traffic.

### 5.4.2 Research

Recent work (2017) on identifying video stream traffic with convolutional neural networks has been shown to achieve interesting results in terms of accuracy, as in [27], where they evaluated their model on 100, 60-seconds traffic captures, nearly 98% of the movies were matched.

Machine learning's purpose is to learn a model that can generalize and be flexible when applied to test data. We have various proof of how ML techniques have being successful when applied in the context of traffic analysis, even if in majority of the cases the test sets are limited to hundreds of samples.

Thus, what should concern future researchers the most, is to produce sample tests which evaluation metrics can constitute better proof of what most current research have already shown, that DASH and VBR are two major source of information leakage, and after cases like [28] that have left the public in shock, it is responsibility of the streaming industry to come up with more sound techniques to ensure user's privacy.

Among those techniques, platforms could decide to opt for solutions that combine different HTTPs requests in a unique one, by adding distortion to the average bitrate; although this seems a trivial task, a proper solution that will not impact the quality of experience of users, has not yet been introduced nor adopted.

# Acknowledgements

*As I approach the conclusion of my studies at ETH Zurich, I would like to thank all the people that have helped me, in this awesome journey, my family, my close friends, and would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ankit Singla and Phd student Melissa Licciardello, for their precious feedbacks and contribution to this work.*



# Bibliography

- [1] Wikipedia. Alliance for open media, 2019. URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance\\_for\\_Open\\_Media](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_for_Open_Media).
- [2] Netflix TechBlog. Per-title encode optimization, 2015. URL <https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/per-title-encode-optimization-7e99442b62a2>.
- [3] Andrew Reed and Michael Kranch. Identifying https-protected netflix videos in real-time. In *Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY '17*, pages 361–368, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-4523-1. doi: 10.1145/3029806.3029821. URL <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3029806.3029821>.
- [4] Jeff Terrell, Kevin Jeffay, F. Donelson Smith, Jim Gogan, and Joni Keller. Passive, streaming inference of tcp connection structure for network server management. IEEE International Traffic Monitoring and Analysis Workshop, 2009.
- [5] Wikipedia. Network tap, 2019. URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network\\_tap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_tap).
- [6] Business Insider Intelligence. Video will account for an overwhelming majority of internet traffic by 2021, 2019. URL <https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-ip-traffic-will-be-video-by-2021-2017-6?r=US&IR=T>.
- [7] Wikipedia. Peak signal-to-noise ratio, 2019. URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak\\_signal-to-noise\\_ratio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_signal-to-noise_ratio).
- [8] The Economist. The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, 2018. URL <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data>.
- [9] Wikipedia. Net neutrality in the united states, 2019. URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Net\\_neutrality\\_in\\_the\\_United\\_States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Net_neutrality_in_the_United_States).
- [10] @xxdesmus. Kanopy.com leaking api and website access logs, 2019. URL <https://rainbowtabl.es/2019/03/21/kanopy-data-leak/>.
- [11] tcpdump. URL <https://www.tcpdump.org/>.

## Bibliography

- [12] Scott Saponas, Jonathan Lester, Carl Hartung, Sameer Agarwal, and Tadayoshi Kohno. Devices that tell on you: Privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing. In *Proceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium*. USENIX, August 2007. URL <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/devices-tell-privacy-trends-consumer-ubiquitous-computing/>.
- [13] Yali Liu, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Dipak Ghosal, and Biswanath Mukherjee. Video streaming forensic – content identification with traffic snooping. In Mike Burmester, Gene Tsudik, Spyros Magliveras, and Ivana Ilić, editors, *Information Security*, pages 129–135, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN 978-3-642-18178-8.
- [14] Bogdan Iacob. Streaming video detection and qoe estimation in encrypted traffic. 2018.
- [15] Florian Moser. Identifying encrypted online video streams using bitrate profiles, 2018. URL <https://github.com/famoser/network-experiments>.
- [16] Netflix Open Connect. URL <https://openconnect.netflix.com/Open-Connect-Overview.pdf>.
- [17] A. Reed and B. Klimkowski. Leaky streams: Identifying variable bitrate dash videos streamed over encrypted 802.11n connections. In *2016 13th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications Networking Conference (CCNC)*, pages 1107–1112, Jan 2016. doi: 10.1109/CCNC.2016.7444944.
- [18] Xun Gong, Nikita Borisov, Negar Kiyavash, and Nabil Schear. Website detection using remote traffic analysis. In Simone Fischer-Hübner and Matthew Wright, editors, *Privacy Enhancing Technologies*, pages 58–78, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN 978-3-642-31680-7.
- [19] F Donelson Smith, Felix Hernández-Campos, Kevin Jeffay, and David Ott. What tcp/ip protocol headers can tell us about the web. volume 29, pages 245–256, 06 2001. doi: 10.1145/378420.378789.
- [20] Nord VPN. URL <https://nordvpn.com>.
- [21] Scrapy. URL <https://docs.scrapy.org/en/latest/>.
- [22] tcconfig. URL <https://pypi.org/project/tcconfig/>.
- [23] tc. URL <http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/tc.8.html>.
- [24] Selenium. URL <https://docs.seleniumhq.org/>.
- [25] Wikipedia, . URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAR\\_\(file\\_format\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAR_(file_format)).
- [26] LightBody. URL <https://bmp.lightbody.net/>.

- [27] Roei Schuster, Vitaly Shmatikov, and Eran Tromer. Beauty and the burst: Remote identification of encrypted video streams. In *26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17)*, pages 1357–1374, Vancouver, BC, August 2017. USENIX Association. ISBN 978-1-931971-40-9. URL <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/schuster>.
- [28] Wikipedia. . URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge\\_Analytica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Analytica).





# Bitrate Ladder Statistics

**Table A.1:** Collected statistics for the bitrate ladders (values in Mbps)

Title ID	Real			Reconstructed			RMSE
	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	
1151721	0.77	0.25	0.92	0.73	0.27	0.88	0.09
14607635	0.81	0.25	0.95	0.74	0.27	0.89	0.12
328438	0.88	0.34	1.06	0.89	0.37	1.06	0.06
60000870	1.22	0.80	1.03	1.13	0.90	0.89	0.12
60004481	0.75	0.19	0.85	0.65	0.19	0.76	0.16
60020801	0.88	0.33	1.06	0.84	0.35	1.00	0.08
60027695	0.93	0.38	1.13	0.92	0.41	1.08	0.06
60033314	0.45	0.03	0.46	0.30	0.06	0.34	0.50
70019012	1.59	1.09	1.40	1.52	1.15	1.25	0.07
70021636	0.98	0.43	1.21	0.91	0.42	1.01	0.13
70039177	0.66	0.16	0.74	0.58	0.21	0.66	0.18
70041162	0.94	0.36	1.12	0.91	0.38	1.08	0.07
70052701	1.40	1.10	1.07	1.30	1.18	0.95	0.10
70084788	0.77	0.26	0.89	0.74	0.30	0.87	0.09
70102778	0.73	0.23	0.87	0.71	0.26	0.85	0.08
70103763	1.18	0.54	1.31	1.19	0.61	1.33	0.08
70104894	0.82	0.28	0.96	0.78	0.31	0.92	0.09
70112732	0.78	0.27	0.94	0.76	0.29	0.92	0.07
70123542	0.86	0.31	1.03	0.81	0.33	0.94	0.10
70123920	1.06	0.46	1.33	1.03	0.47	1.25	0.08
70130445	0.68	0.10	0.70	0.60	0.12	0.68	0.15
70167075	0.87	0.32	1.04	0.82	0.33	1.00	0.08
70181730	1.80	1.65	1.51	1.75	1.59	1.44	0.09
70208599	0.70	0.23	0.83	0.67	0.23	0.79	0.07
70213513	0.66	0.12	0.70	0.51	0.14	0.59	0.29
70216224	1.06	0.45	1.34	0.93	0.45	1.14	0.18
70220028	0.83	0.17	0.90	0.69	0.18	0.80	0.21
70243464	1.69	1.24	1.45	1.57	1.26	1.24	0.11

## Appendix A Bitrate Ladder Statistics

**Table A.1:** Collected statistics for the bitrate ladders (values in Mbps)

Title ID	Real			Reconstructed			RMSE
	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	
70251894	0.79	0.25	0.93	0.76	0.30	0.92	0.10
70264803	1.07	0.44	1.30	1.02	0.46	1.22	0.08
70295915	0.48	0.08	0.51	0.44	0.10	0.49	0.13
70296965	1.43	0.83	1.48	1.40	0.87	1.33	0.10
70297757	0.63	0.18	0.72	0.61	0.19	0.72	0.07
70298735	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.35	0.05	0.38	0.25
70301367	0.44	0.05	0.46	0.33	0.07	0.36	0.35
70305893	1.08	0.39	1.30	0.98	0.40	1.21	0.13
70308278	1.44	1.03	1.09	1.25	1.04	0.90	0.16
80000643	2.44	1.41	1.99	2.37	1.41	1.94	0.05
80009431	1.64	1.10	1.43	1.56	1.17	1.27	0.10
80013870	1.03	0.19	1.09	0.95	0.18	1.03	0.11
80018689	1.05	0.44	1.24	1.00	0.46	1.16	0.08
80023001	1.49	0.89	1.40	1.34	0.93	1.18	0.14
80029196	1.12	0.32	1.30	0.98	0.31	1.16	0.15
80031611	1.39	0.73	1.37	1.26	0.77	1.26	0.13
80031715	1.01	0.44	1.17	0.99	0.44	1.19	0.06
80033394	0.96	0.38	1.16	0.93	0.42	1.17	0.08
80038359	0.84	0.31	0.99	0.82	0.32	0.96	0.06
80052541	1.32	0.70	1.23	1.12	0.77	1.00	0.20
80075563	1.40	0.65	1.26	1.24	0.72	1.04	0.16
80081155	1.70	1.22	1.39	1.71	1.37	1.27	0.11
80081770	1.13	0.44	1.35	1.00	0.49	1.22	0.15
80091741	1.84	1.56	1.39	1.84	1.70	1.32	0.10
80091879	1.08	0.48	1.34	1.02	0.49	1.28	0.08
80093106	1.18	0.55	1.49	1.11	0.58	1.37	0.08
80093138	1.68	1.21	1.49	1.60	1.26	1.31	0.11
80096067	0.91	0.34	1.06	0.87	0.37	1.01	0.09
80097391	0.50	0.04	0.51	0.40	0.04	0.41	0.25
80102952	1.72	1.51	1.29	1.81	1.66	1.31	0.10
80106307	1.52	0.76	1.59	1.47	0.78	1.54	0.05
80109295	1.40	0.86	1.28	1.35	0.96	1.32	0.13
80121387	1.60	0.84	1.52	1.54	0.89	1.38	0.07
80121840	0.98	0.40	1.20	0.93	0.42	1.15	0.09
80122759	1.46	0.79	1.57	1.32	0.82	1.34	0.14
80128722	1.58	0.72	1.94	1.49	0.75	1.75	0.09
80134721	1.96	1.05	2.16	1.88	1.08	2.00	0.06
80135164	1.40	0.87	1.20	1.34	0.89	1.17	0.07
80144140	0.52	0.10	0.56	0.42	0.11	0.48	0.23
80163052	0.41	0.03	0.42	0.30	0.05	0.32	0.40

**Table A.1:** Collected statistics for the bitrate ladders (values in Mbps)

Title ID	Real			Reconstructed			RMSE
	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	$\mu$	$\sigma$	$\tilde{y}$	
80168188	2.07	1.37	1.74	2.02	1.49	1.65	0.07
80169469	1.35	0.82	1.37	1.21	0.85	1.25	0.14
80171659	2.06	1.68	1.59	1.96	1.72	1.35	0.09
80174429	1.63	1.06	1.41	1.53	1.11	1.28	0.10
80183328	1.22	0.59	1.16	1.07	0.60	0.96	0.15
80184100	1.14	0.66	1.10	1.17	0.78	1.13	0.14
80191608	1.28	0.59	1.51	1.22	0.63	1.42	0.08
80192445	1.67	0.86	1.86	1.56	0.89	1.58	0.09
80192815	1.32	0.68	1.19	1.27	0.72	1.20	0.07
80195049	1.70	1.09	1.65	1.64	1.19	1.44	0.10
80198592	1.21	0.62	1.17	1.14	0.70	1.06	0.12
80199806	1.19	0.56	1.40	1.11	0.60	1.28	0.11
80200961	0.99	0.50	0.88	0.91	0.56	0.77	0.13
80202920	1.54	1.00	1.42	1.55	1.14	1.29	0.11
80206300	0.82	0.28	0.94	0.79	0.31	0.95	0.09
80210932	1.46	0.69	1.90	1.34	0.67	1.71	0.11
80216541	1.61	0.79	1.77	1.51	0.83	1.57	0.09
80217312	1.58	1.07	1.53	1.55	1.16	1.39	0.08
80232502	1.21	0.64	1.10	1.11	0.70	1.00	0.10
80239639	1.12	0.48	1.33	1.01	0.50	1.20	0.12
80986885	1.38	0.79	1.45	1.38	0.84	1.47	0.05
80991158	1.09	0.50	1.34	0.98	0.50	1.17	0.13
80993095	0.96	0.43	1.01	0.89	0.48	0.96	0.11
81000864	1.86	1.25	1.67	1.70	1.26	1.46	0.10
81006261	1.34	0.85	1.21	1.37	0.94	1.21	0.08
81056132	0.48	0.06	0.50	0.37	0.08	0.41	0.29
81074663	1.67	1.01	1.70	1.63	1.10	1.57	0.08
81075239	1.22	0.54	1.43	1.17	0.58	1.37	0.07
81076251	1.21	0.61	1.12	1.08	0.66	0.98	0.14
81080637	1.45	0.78	1.26	1.35	0.82	1.13	0.11
81110498	2.35	1.33	2.08	2.22	1.50	2.04	0.20
896970	1.55	0.96	1.37	1.39	0.99	1.15	0.13
AVERAGE							0.12



Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich  
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

## Declaration of originality

The signed declaration of originality is a component of every semester paper, Bachelor's thesis, Master's thesis and any other degree paper undertaken during the course of studies, including the respective electronic versions.

Lecturers may also require a declaration of originality for other written papers compiled for their courses.

I hereby confirm that I am the sole author of the written work here enclosed and that I have compiled it in my own words. Parts excepted are corrections of form and content by the supervisor.

**Title of work** (in block letters):

De-anonymizing encrypted video streams

**Authored by** (in block letters):

*For papers written by groups the names of all authors are required.*

**Name(s):**

Stefano

**First name(s):**

Peeverelli

With my signature I confirm that

- I have committed none of the forms of plagiarism described in the '[Citation etiquette](#)' information sheet.
- I have documented all methods, data and processes truthfully.
- I have not manipulated any data.
- I have mentioned all persons who were significant facilitators of the work.

I am aware that the work may be screened electronically for plagiarism.

**Place, date**

Zurich, 07.09.2019

**Signature(s)**

*For papers written by groups the names of all authors are required. Their signatures collectively guarantee the entire content of the written paper.*