De-anonymizing Encrypted Video Streams

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Abstract

In the last recent years streaming services such as Netflix, Youtube, Amazon Prime Video, Hulu and others, have become the main source for video content delivery to the public. With the effort of private companies and of the AOM consortium [1], various coding formats and streaming techinques have been refined and have gained popularity. *Adaptive Bitrate Streaming*, between others, enables high quality streaming of media content over HTTP, and represents nowadays the industry's standard.

DASH *Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP* is an instance of Adaptive Bitrate Streaming originally developed by MPEG. In DASH each media file gets encoded at multiple bitrates, which are then partitioned into smaller segments and delivered to the user over HTTP. Netflix's use of DASH services is no mistery, indeed it is already five years that each title on Netflix sits with its own different bitrate copies on a CDN, waiting to be served to clients in a particular area of the planet. [2]

Despite a recent upgrade in Netflix infrastructure to provide HTTPS encryption of each video stream, research shows that the privacy of the end user is at risk, more precisely there exist techniques to identify the content the client is playing as Reed et Al. [3] have shown. They make use of adudump [4] a command live program that uses TCP sequence and ACKS to infer the sizes of application data unit *ADUs* transferred over each TCP connection. Our approach is mainly based on their work, with few differences highlighted in Section X.

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Introduction

According to the latest Cisco's VNI [5], video will account for 82% of all IP traffic in Europe by 2021; moreover the overall IP traffic per person will triplicate from 13*GB* to 35*GB*. These forecasts clearly picture the growth of the streaming industry, posing, at the same time an important question on the present and future states of the final user's privacy.

As shown by Reed et Al. [3] anonimity of user's viewing activity is at risk. Not for the use that Netflix or other streaming services do of user's session data, but because of the risk of a man-in-the-middle attack *MITM* carried by an *evil* party.

In particular, they have shown how the adoption of HTTPS to protect video streams from Netflix *CDN*s to user's end devices, does not hold against passive traffic analysis.

1.1 Motivation

The goal of this project is to replicate part of the work conducted by Reed et Al. and to investigate the possibility of identifying a Netflix stream solely based on the observed average bandwidth. This, follows from the intuition that *per-title-encoding* embeds the nature and the complexity of video frames in a unique way, that may reveal the identity of the content being streamed.

1.1.1 Per Title Encoding

In December 2015 Netflix announced [2] that it was introducing a new method to analyze the complexity of each title and find the best encoding recipe based on it. They integrated per-title-encoding in their content delivery pipeline to provide users better quality streams at a lower bandwidth.

Chapter 1 Introduction

- 1.1.2 User's Privacy
- 1.2 Related Work
- 1.3 Main Objective
- 1.4 Structure of this Report

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