
Searching for Subspace Trails and Truncated Differentials

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Structural Attacks


Invariant Subspaces

Invariant Subspaces [Lea+11] (Crypto 2011)

Let U be a subspace of \mathbb{F}_2^n , and $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$. We write $U+a \xrightarrow{F} U+b$, if

$$\exists a: \exists b: F(U+a) = U+b$$

Main Idea



Structural Attacks

Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis


Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis [GRR16] (Last Year's FSE)

Let U, V be subspaces of \mathbb{F}_2^n , and $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$. We write $U \stackrel{F}{\to} V$, if

$$\forall a: \exists b: F(U+a) \subseteq V+b$$

We restrict ourselves to essential subspace trails.

Main Idea



The Problem

How to search efficiently for Subspace Trails?

Security against Subspace Trails?

Given the round function $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$ of an SPN cipher, prove the resistance against subspace trail attacks!

1

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Main problem: Too many possible starting points.

Already for initially one-dimensional subspaces there are 2^n possibilities.

Can't we just activate a single S-box and check to what this leads us?

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Can't we just activate a single S-box and check to what this leads us?

The short answer is: No!¹

¹The long answer is this talk.

Outline



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- 1 Motivation
- 2 Intuition
- 3 Algorithm

Subspace Complement

If *U* is a subspace of \mathbb{F}_2^n , we denote by U^{\perp} it's *complement*:

$$U^{\perp} := \left\{ u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \forall x \in U : \langle x, u \rangle = 0 \right\}$$

Derivative

Let $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$. We denote the *derivative of F in direction u* by

$$\Delta_u(F)(x) := F(x) + F(x+u)$$

Linear Structure


Let $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Then (α, u) is called a *linear structure*, if

$$\exists c \in \mathbb{F}_2 : \forall x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : \langle \alpha, \Delta_u(F)(x) \rangle = c$$

Lemma

Let $U \stackrel{F}{\rightarrow} V$ be a subspace trail. Then

$$\forall u \in U : \operatorname{Im}(\Delta_u(F)) \subseteq V.$$



Proof

Let $U \stackrel{F}{\rightarrow} V$, then for every $u \in U$

$$x \in U+x \xrightarrow{F} F(x) \in V+b$$
,

$$x + u \in U + x \xrightarrow{F} F(x + u) \in V + b$$
,

implying
$$F(x) + F(x + u) \in V$$
.

Definition

Let $F: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n$. A truncated differential of probability one is a pair of affine subspaces U+s and V+t, s. t.

$$\forall u \in U : \forall x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : \Delta_{u+s}(F)(x) \in V + t$$


■ Direct consequence from Lemma 1:

Link: Subspaces Trails are Truncated Differentials with probability one

Let $U \xrightarrow{F} V$ be a subspace trail. Then U+0 and V+0 are a truncated differential with probability one.

Approach to the Algorithm

SPN Structure



Easy parts

- Given a starting subspace, computing the trail is easy.
- The effect of the linear layer *P* to a subspace *U* is clear:

$$U \stackrel{P}{\rightarrow} P(U)$$

How to reduce the number of starting points?

Two possibilities, depending on the S-box S.

Observation

For an S-box S and $U \xrightarrow{S} V$, because of the above lemma,

$$\begin{split} \forall x, \forall u \in U : \Delta_u(S)(x) \in V \\ \Rightarrow \forall \alpha \in V^{\perp} : \forall x, \forall u \in U : \langle \alpha, \Delta_u(S)(x) \rangle = 0. \end{split}$$

Thus, V^{\perp} consists of the linear structures of S.

Theorem

Let $F: \mathbb{F}_2^{kn} \to \mathbb{F}_2^{kn}$ be an S-box layer that applies k S-boxes with no non-trivial linear structures in parallel. Then every essential subspace trail $U \overset{F}{\to} V$ is of the form

$$U=V=U_1\times\cdots\times U_k,$$

where $U_i \in \{\{0\}, \mathbb{F}_2^n\}$.

Algorithm

- Simply activate single S-boxes
- Compute resulting subspace trail

Complexity

Linear in the number of S-boxes.

In particular, in this case, bounds from activating single S-boxes are optimal.

This approach is independent of the S-box, i. e. any S-box without linear structures behaves the same with respect to subspace trails.

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The problem with S-boxes that have linear structures

Subspace trails through S-box layers with *one*-linear structures are not necessarily a direct product of subspaces (see e.g. Present).

Observation

If $U_1 \stackrel{F}{\to} U_2$ is a subspace, then for any $V_1 \subseteq U_1$ there exists a $V_2 \subseteq U_2$, s. t. $V_1 \stackrel{F}{\to} V_2$:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U_1 & \stackrel{F}{\longrightarrow} & U_2 \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ V_1 & \stackrel{F}{\longrightarrow} & V_2 & & & & \\ \end{array}$$

Complexity (Size of W)

For an S-box layer $F: \mathbb{F}_2^{kn} \to \mathbb{F}_2^{kn}$ with k S-boxes, each n-bit: $|\mathbb{W}| = k \cdot 2^n$

Algorithm Idea

- Find a good set \mathbb{W} , s. t. for any possible subspace trail over the S-box layer $U \xrightarrow{F} V$, there is an element $W \in \mathbb{W}$ s. t. $\{W\} \subseteq V$.
- Compute the subspace trails for any starting point $W \in \mathbb{W}$.

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Questions?

Thank you for your attention!



Mainboard & Questionmark Images: flickr

- [GRR16] L. Grassi, C. Rechberger, and S. Rønjom. "Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis and its Applications to AES". In: IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2016.2 (2016), pp. 192–225. doi: 10.13154/tosc.v2016.i2.192-225.
- [Lea+11] G. Leander, M. A. Abdelraheem, H. AlKhzaimi, and E. Zenner. "A Cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: The Invariant Subspace Attack". In: CRYPTO. Vol. 6841. LNCS. Springer, 2011, pp. 206–221. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_12.