

Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block Ciphers

PhD Defense

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Arbeitsgruppe Symmetrische Kryptographie, Horst-Görtz-Institut für IT Sicherheit, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Friedrich Wiemer

RUB

2019-11-27

Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block
Ciphers



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Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block
Ciphers
└ Introduction
└ The setting

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└ Introduction

└ Block Ciphers

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Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block Ciphers

└ Introduction

└ Security

Substitution Permutation Networks

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Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block
Ciphers

└ Introduction

└ Substitution Permutation Networks

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Substitution Permutation Networks

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1 Introduction

2 Subspace Trail Attack

3 Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

4 Conclusion

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Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block Ciphers

└ Introduction

└ Overview

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
Overview

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Subspace Trail Attack
- 3 Security against Subspace Trail Attacks
- 4 Conclusion

Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis


Main Idea of Subspace Trails



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
Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block
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- └ Subspace Trail Attack
- └ Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis



Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis


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
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Security Arguments and Tool-based Design of Block
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- └ Subspace Trail Attack
- └ Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis



Main Idea of Subspace Trails




Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis [GRR16] (FSE'16)

Let $U_0, \dots, U_r \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Then these form a *subspace trail* (ST), $U_0 \xrightarrow{F} \dots \xrightarrow{F} U_r$, iff

$$\forall a \in U_i^\perp : \exists b \in U_{i+1}^\perp : F(U_i + a) \subseteq U_{i+1} + b$$

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 └ Subspace Trail Attack

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└ Subspace Trail Attack

└ Our Goal



Given a starting subspace U , we can efficiently compute the corresponding longest subspace trail.

Lemma

Let $U \xrightarrow{F} V$ be a ST. Then for all $u \in U$ and all $x: F(x) + F(x + u) \in V$.

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- Subspace Trail Attack

- Subspace Propagation

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Subspace Propagation

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
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
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
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
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Computing the subspace trail

- To compute the next subspace, we have to compute the image of the derivatives.

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Computing the subspace trail.

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Proof

Computation of Subspace Trails

Input: A nonlinear function $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, a subspace U .

Output: A subspace trail $U \xrightarrow{F} \dots \xrightarrow{F} V$.

```

1 function ComputeTrail(F, U)
2   if dim U = n then return U
3   V ← ∅
4   for  $u_i$  basis vectors of U do
5     for enough  $x \in_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{F}_2^n$  do
6       V ← V ∪  $\Delta_{u_i}(F)(x)$ 
7   V ← Span{V}
8   return  $U \xrightarrow{F} \text{ComputeTrail}(F, V)$ 
    
```

Correctness: previous two lemmata

Runtime:

- Line 4: max. n iterations
- Line 5: $n + c$ random vectors are enough
- Overall: $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ evaluations of F

Remaining Problem: cyclic STs

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Subspace Trail Attack

ComputeTrail Algorithm

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How many random vectors are enough:

<https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/564603/probability-that-a-random-binary-matrix-will-have-full-column-rank>

How to Bound the Length of Subspace Trails



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└ Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

└ How to Bound the Length of Subspace Trails



Activating a single S-box only

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└ Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

└ Activating a single S-box only

The Connection to Linear Structures

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└ Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

└ The Connection to Linear Structures

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S-boxes without Linear Structures

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└ Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

└ S-boxes without Linear Structures

S-boxes with Linear Structures

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└ Security against Subspace Trail Attacks

└ S-boxes with Linear Structures

Conclusion

Thanks for your attention!

Applications of ComputeTrail

- Bound longest probability-one subspace trail
- Link to Truncated Differentials
- Finding key-recovery strategies



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Conclusion

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