Does the song remain the same? New dimensionalities of conflict in Spanish 2019 election.

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ABSTRACT. The populist radical right (PRR) has consolidated its presence in many European countries' party systems. Spanish party system seemed to be alien to this trend, but April 2019 elections changed this scenario. VOX, a party which has yet been labelled as PRR by some academics, entered the Spanish Parliament with more than 10% of votes. This work aims to understand which the characteristic issues vindicated by the party are as well as if they do coincide with their voters' concerns. We demonstrate how these issues are more related with cultural issues than with economic ones as the *transnational cleavage theory* has shown in other countries.

Keywords: Populist Radical Right, Party System, Spain, Transnational Cleavage.

RESUM. La dreta populista radical ha consolidat la seva presencia en els sistemes de partits de diferents estats europeus. El sistema de partits de l'estat espanyol semblava aliè a aquesta tendència però les eleccions al Congrés dels Diputats deixaren un escenari diferent. VOX, un partit que ha estat classificat com a dreta populista radical hi entrà amb més del 10% dels vots. L'objectiu d'aquest treball és entendre quins són els temes característics reivindicats pel partit en qüestió i si aquests coincideixen amb les preocupacions del seu electorat. Demostrem com aquests temes tenen a veure més amb l'àmbit cultural que amb l'econòmic, tal i com la teoria de la clivella transnacional ha mostrat en altres països.

Paraules clau: Dreta populista radical, Sistema de partits, Espanya, Clivella transnacional.

Contents

0. Introduction

Since their apparition in the 1980s Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties have consolidated their presence in most European party systems and even entered some governments. Many authors have tried to explain the reasons for PRR parties to be successful. These explanations have explained this phenomenon from both the preferences of the voters (or the demand side) as well as the political offer or the parties themselves (the supply side). As some authors have argued (Kriesi et al., 2012; Van Der Brug & Fennema, 2007), a fruitful approach must combine the two sides of the coin, looking at both demand and supply sides.

One especially comprehensive thesis is that the rising of these parties might be explained as a reaction from those whose life's have been worsened with globalization and the process of European integration. Thus, as both left and right parties present a similar economic position and it doesn't seem to be any plausible alternative, the economic conflict issues lose their saliency and these issues regarding cultural or moral conceptions became more salient. Hence, PRR parties address at some of the insecurities of the *losers* providing a response that combines nativism, authoritarianism and populism while the *winners* of these global changes support parties with more liberal positions.

Since the 2008 economic crash and the later political crisis, Spanish party system has experienced the entrance of new competitors. Podemos and Ciudadanos entered the Spanish as a result of political disaffection and corruption scandals. Thus, it didn't respond to a new dimensionality of conflict (Vidal, 2018a). The fact that VOX -a party which has been considered a PRR by academics (Anduiza, s.d.; Dennison & Mendes, 2019)- entered the Spanish Low Chamber in April 2019 might challenge previous research. Hence, the aim of this work is to test if the success of VOX might be explained through the hypothesis of the *transnational cleavage*. For this reason, we will take a twofold approach, analyzing both the most salient issues on party manifesto and which are the drivers for its voters.

We will proceed as follows: First, we will introduce a general overview and some conceptualization proposals of the object of study, Populist Radical Right parties. Second, we will review some literature on the apparition of new parties in party systems, focusing later specifically on PRR parties and in the *transnational cleavage*. Third, we will introduce the political context of Spain. Fourth, the hypothesis of this work will be presented as well as the methodology. Finally, we will expose the analysis and the conclusions derived from it.

1. Populist Radical Right in Europe

1.1 Conceptualization

The end of the second world war and the defeat of the fascist regimes in Western Europe meant also the end of the ideology supported by them. As Rydgren (2005) states, "biologically based racism, antisemitism and antidemocratic critiques of the prevailing societal order" had become highly stigmatized and marginal. Economically, the *trente glorieuses* period (1945-1975) is seen as the pinning of the social democracy. Politically, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) defined this period using the metaphor of a *frozen party system* in which stability was its main trait.

This stability was broken after the oil crises in the 1970s, which made Western European economies more vulnerable, undermining the social consensus and emphasizing the decline of political trust (Rydgren, 2005). Politically, center-left and center-right parties adopted new identities, communist parties suffered a profound crisis and new parties appeared, which were classified as "greens" or "extreme right" (Moschonas, 2002). The rising of these extreme right parties represented a qualitative change in the democratic consensus as their discourse was seen as "radical", "populist", "extreme" or "antiimmigrant" (Arzheimer, 2015). Since then on, these parties have been largely studied (Ignazi, 1992; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Oesch, 2008).

There has been an ongoing academic debate on whether it is possible of not to classify these parties and if so, which are their defining traits. As Arzheimer (2018) notes, as the study of this phenomenon has become more firmly established, there has been a convergence on the definition. Specifically, the conceptualization of *Populist Radical Right* by Cass Mudde (2007) has progressively substituted the concept *Extreme Right*, which had been popularized after the works of Kitschelt (1996) and Betz (1993). It is relevant to notice that Mudde makes reference to a specific kind of parties which aren't undemocratic *per se* and formally accept democratic procedures, in opposition to traditional far-right positions (Mudde, 2007, p. 49).

This influent definition describes these parties as characterized for being nativist, authoritarians and populists. Nativism is the core ideological feature of these parties and refers to the combination of nationalism and xenophobia which assumes that some non-native "elements are a threat to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007, p. 22). Authoritarianism is here understood as "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely.". Thus, concepts such as law and order

are primordial (Mudde, 2007). The last defining trait is populism, which is understood as a "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be the expression of the general will of the people" (Mudde, 2007, p. 543). A thin-centered ideology would be, then, that which doesn't represent a holistic approach and is usually combined with another ideologies such as socialism, nationalism or ecologism (Mudde, 2004). It is important to notice that even though the parties included in this typology are not antidemocratic *per se*, their understanding if the *Demos* as a homogeneous collective and thus, a monist approach to democracy clashes with a liberal pluralistic democratic approach (Mudde, 2007, p. 157).

The weakest point of this conceptualization is the concept of "populism" and understanding it as a "thin-centered ideology." Aslanidis (2015) note that the understanding of populism as an ideology and not as a discursive recourse or a trait understood as continuous and not dichotomic might be problematic. In the same line, Rooduijn (2019) synthetizes this "ideational approach" to populism as a "substantive" message and not an ideology by itself.

Despite of that, the clarity of the definition and its attributes as well as the extended use of the definition make it very attractive for doing comparative analysis and work from an existing groundwork. For example, Roodujin et al. (2019) have developed a database of populist parties that specifies which one should be categorized as PRR parties according to Mudde's (2007) definition.

2. When a new party? Politics as a market

2.1 Demand-side approaches

Studies looking to understand the emergence and electoral performance of different parties, and specifically PRR ones, have evolved considerably. The first tendency was to study the phenomenon from the demand-side. That is, to take voters characteristics (either socio-demographic or attitudinal) as the independent variable.

Regarding the demand side Golder (2016) identifies three main grievances that have been used in different studies: these related with modernization, the economic ones and the cultural ones. Inglehart (1990) explains the emergence of "post-materialist" values in societies where the basics for living were taken for granted. Ignazi (1992) used later this framework and developed the "silent counter-revolution" thesis, in which extreme right parties take advantage of these people linked to materialist values that feel their way of life threatened because of the emergence of new values, which are often called modernization losers. These losers are described as "a young male, with a low level of education, who is either unemployed, self-employed, or a manual worker" (Golder, 2016). This leads us to the second type of studies, those looking at economic grievances. Their main thesis is that PRR parties support is explained through the scarcity of resources of the old working class as a product of globalization, which produces an opportunity for PRR parties to produce a successful discourse linking immigration and the loss of jobs. It has been demonstrated the linkage between anti-immigrant attitudes and votes for PRR parties but the effect of economic crisis remains controversial, being suggested that it is not unemployment but the lack of protection to unemployed which drives support for these parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Finally, cultural grievances thesis explains the dependent variable from the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1979), which assumes that individuals have a natural tendency to have more intense relations with similar individuals, which drives ultimately to consider that the own group is superior than others. PRR parties would contrapose cultural norms and values of immigrants and natives in order to exploit the former assumption. As in the economic grievances, this thesis has shown controversial results in different works (i.e. Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007).

All in all, two claims have proved to be accepted (Muis & Immerzeel, 2018, p. 3): First, It has been rejected that PRR votes come from "alienated" or "irrational" voters who want to make use of *voice* (Hirschman, 1970) or protest vote against establishment. The evidence shows

that there is no significant difference between the voters of these parties and established ones. Second, given the fact that these parties had significant different results in similar countries (i.e. between the successful Walloon Front National and the much less relevant Flemish VB in Belgium), it was evident that the demand-side it is not a constant but a variable that must be taken into account (Van Der Brug & Fennema, 2007, p. 476).

As Mudde (2008) argues, most of these works approach this phenomenon from the framework of the "normal pathology" thesis. This thesis introduced by Scheuch and Klingemann in 1967 understands this phenomenon as something exceptional that could only be explained by crisis (Mudde, 2008). As we have seen, PRR parties represent values that are understood as alien to western democracies and a crisis gives them the opportunity to successfully enter the party system. David Art (2011) makes a shift and proposes studying the failure of PRR parties instead of their success. This represents abandoning the "normal pathology" thesis and advocate for a "pathologically normal" thesis (Mudde, 2008) which holds that PRR parties represent a radicalization of mainstream views instead of something completely alien to them.

2.2 Supply-side approaches

David Art's work on the organization of the Radical Right (Art, 2011) represented a turning point on these studies. Since then on, studies have focused not only on the supply-side but also on the supply-side (Mudde, 2008). In their literature review, Muis and Immerzeel (2018) discern between the internal supply-side and the external one. The former makes reference to these aspects that fully depend on the party itself (leadership, ideology, organizational strength…) while the latter refers to contextual aspects in which the party has to adapt to (institutions, political space, media…).

For example, regarding the external side, Norris (2005, p. 105-106) noticed how the most critical aspect is the mechanical effect of "converting votes into seats" (more than its influence on potential voters) through the minimum threshold and the proportionality of the system. Departing from Cox's strategical entry theory (G. W. Cox, 1997), Lago and Martínez (2011) explain the entrance of new parties into the political system as a result of unsatisfied political preferences (that is, from the demand side) and a high elasticity or willingness of the voters to change their electoral choice (operationalized as volatility). As considering the full range of the mentioned aspects would overwhelmingly exceed the purpose of this work, we will focus on the political space.

Regarding unsatisfied political preferences, the spatial approach to politics provides a fruitful framework in order to study unsatisfied political preferences. This theory has its origins on Downs's *Economic Theory of Democracy* and specifically the assumption that "both parties and voters can be located on a single ideological continuum with voters choosing the party that is closest to them" (Listhaug, Macdonald, & Rabinowitz, 1990, p. 227). This theory has its origins in studies of the United States of America's two-party system. When applying this theory to European multi-party systems, it is frequently needed to add another axis for representing well the complexity of the political space. Thus, further authors have developed a multidimensional spatial model in which an Y axis is added. Both models allow graphical representations of parties as well as voters, which is highly valuable in order to understand the dynamic of political conflict structure on a given political space.

One of the most successful and influent frameworks in order to understand how politics are structured is Lipset & Rokkan's (1967) classical work "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments". This paper argues that the political conflict is structured from *cleavages*, that is, a "specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in the social structural transformations (*crucial junctures*) that have been triggered by large-scale processes such as nation-building, industrialization, and possibly also by the consequences of post-industrialization" (Bornschier, 2009, p. 1). As Bartolini and Mair stated (1990), this "specific" type of conflict must comprise three elements: a socio-structural element, an element of collective identity and an organizational manifestation. Even though "organizational manifestation" may be an ambiguous and broad concept, we will focus on political parties.

2.2.1 "The conflict over conflicts"

But the dimensions of political conflict in a given party system do change. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explained these changes from the sociologic-historical analysis, in which *critical junctures* were determinants to establish the terms of the conflict.

One of the main critiques to the cleavage theory is its determinism, and the lack of response on why some social contradictions get politically mobilized and others do not (Chhibber & Torcal, 1997, p. 30) and the change on predominant cleavages in a society. Boix (2016, p. 504) identifies three main reasons why latent political conflict structures are not immediately reflected in a party system: there are multiple issues that concern the voters, parties may compensate voters in a short-term as a compensation for long-term policies that beforehand would be detrimental for them, and voters may not always take the decisions that would be

foreseeable for their material and social conditions. It is important to note the agency role of parties regarding their position on certain issues.

Schattschneider (Mair, 1997) focused in the agency of parties for explaining political conflict structure and developed the concept of "conflict over conflicts", in which parties struggle for putting new issues in the political agenda. These new issues are those which benefit the party itself, that is, where it holds a majoritarian position within the society but that it is not shared by other parties (de Vries & Hobolt, 2012). Han (2018) provides further evidence that parties may blur their positions on issues which may harm their popular support. The strategy of entering a new issue may both develop into a whole dimension of political conflict being mobilized or just a new aspect of the existing ones. As Mair considered, Schattschneider's theory claimed that "the structure of political competition does not simply reflect pre-existing social alignments or social divisions, but also helps to provide these with a coherence and a relevance" (Mair, 1997, p. 949).

Furthermore, Chhibber and Torcal (1997) studied new democracies and claim that social conditions and the institutional basis provide the opportunity for political elites to mobilize politically these latent conflicts. The process in which new issues are introduced and cannot be integrated in the pre-exiting cleavage structure is called *realignment* (Bornschier, 2010, p. 61). Hence, before a new dimension of conflict structures political conflict, parties try to take position in this dimension constrained by their ideological background, voters' preferences and own organizational structure. Marks and Hooghe (2018) argue that parties are programmatically inflexible and unable to adapt to new dimensions of conflict. Thus, a new dimension is usually mobilized by new parties. A realignment then cannot be successful unless there is a previous weakening in the bounds between voters and parties or -what is the same- in the institutionalization of party system (Lago & Martínez, 2011). Thus, this process of adaptation is accompanied with a high level of volatility between parties, in what Bornschier called "critical elections" (Bornschier, 2010).

2.2.2 The transnational cleavage

As we have argued, the social context is critical in order to understand which cleavages or issues might be mobilized or not. A common feature of most West European states has been being members of the European Union. This phenomenon goes hand by hand with globalization. Even though this concept has a different meaning for different academics, Cox (1994) characterized it as:

> *"The characteristics of the globalization trend include the internationalizing of production, the new international division of labor, new migratory movements from South to North, the new competitive environment that accelerates these processes, and the internationalizing of the state…making states into agencies of the globalizing world."*

The relevance of these phenomenon has been huge not only on the macro-economic indicators but also on people's life. As Kriesi and colleagues argue (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 922), the process of globalization and European integration has created winners and losers within countries. Winners would be characterized as entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors with a competitive advantage (open to international competition) and losers as those manual workers of traditionally protected sectors. This thesis has been successfully tested in diverse societies by Hessami (2009) and Kalleberg (2009, 2013). On the other hand, globalization has had also an important impact on the cultural diversity of societies, either as a result of immigration or what Inglehart called the rising of postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1990). Most *Winners* have been demonstrated to be favorable on cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity while *losers*, which have lost most of their economic securities, see on their national identity a source of security. The perceived threats to the national community might be immigration, alien cultural influences, or international elites and agencies (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002, p. 976)

This new social context (characterized by denationalization as a result of immigration, integration, and trade) constitutes the social basis of a potential cleavage between *winners* and *losers*. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the 2015 refugee crisis are the *critical junctures* that lead to the definition of the two poles (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, p. 116). This new dimension of conflict, supported by many literature (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2012; Marks & Wilson, 2000) is, then, articulated between those supportive of more integration (the *winners*) and those who demand more sovereignty (the *losers*). Authors proposing this approach pointed out that this new cleavage cross-cuts the older structural cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2012, p. 12). Thus, mainstream parties -no matter if leftists or rightists- are expected to support integration and Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) values while new parties support demarcation and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) values (Hooghe et al., 2002). Support for Populist Radical Parties should then be understood as a result of this social changes and the political mobilization of redefined subjectivities (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018).

3. "The Spanish Exception"

3.1 Spanish party system since Restoration

After the Francoist dictatorship, Spain approved its democratic Constitution on 1978. Since then, the center right Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) governed between 1977 and 1982, when the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), led by Felipe González won the national election and governed during four legislatures, until 1996. Since the downfall of UCD, national-wide politics have been mostly characterized by the predominance of a "balanced two-party national system" (Pallarés & Keating, 2003) represented by the Popular Party (formerly called Popular Alliance -AP-), which progressively turned from extreme-right positions to more centrist ones and a centrist left (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE). Yet, these parties have had to bargain governability with non-state-wide parties (NSWP) based mostly in Catalonia and in the Basque Country (Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Pallarés & Keating, 2003) and represented by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU) on the right and the Basque Nationalist Left movement (represented by different parties at different times) and Catalan Republican Left (ERC).

2008 financial crisis represented a critical point for this party system. As Orriols and Cordero argue, the period from 2008 to 2015 is marked by a three-sided crisis: an economic one, one related with corruption scandals and a political crisis represented by high levels of political disaffection (Orriols & Cordero, 2016, p. 4). This crisis also made new parties at a national level to appear: Podemos and Ciudadanos. Some studies have demonstrated that their apparition doesn't respond to the mobilization of new dimensionalities of conflict but to the combination of political disaffection, sociodemographic characteristics and the pre-existing left-right division (Hutter, Kriesi, & Vidal, 2018; 2018a). Thus, the old dimensions of conflict remained stable: the territorial one and the socio-economic division.

On the one hand, the territorial cleavage (or center-periphery) might be explained as the contradiction between singular peripheral territories, which aspire to be autonomous from the central government "in order to be able to preserve their distinctiveness" and the central government desire to preserve its hegemony in the whole territory (Alonso, Gómez, & Cabeza, 2013). On the other hand, the social cleavage works as a "super dimension" (Rovny & Polk, 2019) formed by the economic dimension (or up to which extent should the state regulate the market) and the cultural one.

3.2 Far right in the post-francoist Spain

Since the end of Francoism, far right parties haven't had any relevance in the Spanish party system. The historian Xavier Casals have referred to this phenomenon as "an absent presence", characterized by having a great relevance on public discourse but also weak organizations (Casals, 1999). Two main elements that explain the scarce electoral results of far-right parties in Spain in the first period after the dictatorship: an antiqued political message and political fragmentation among the heirs of the regime. In fact, the discourse remained almost the same that that of the regime: the need to defend Spain from the "anti-Spain" (represented mainly by leftists, non-Spanish nationalisms and freemasons), as it was done during the civil war, a strong bound with Catholicism and a strong sense of pride for the old Spanish empire (Casals, 2005, p. 135-136). After a "journey through the desert", the emergence of Platform for Catalonia in 2003 local elections in Vic represented a qualitative change. Its discourse was much more resembling European PRR parties such as the French National Front than the Spanish far-right. Thus, they had a populist discourse, pointing at mainstream political parties and immigrants as responsible of the loss of cultural identity and the degradation of public services (Casals, 2017). The party reached its pinning at 2011 local elections, winning 67 councilors in Catalonia and a sum of 65.905 votes (Casals, 2017) after almost entering the Catalan parliament in 2015, the party practically disappeared from the public arena as a result of internal divisions as well as the rising saliency of independentism in Catalonia.

Alonso and Rovira-Kultwasser (2015) also explored the causes that explain the absence of a populist radical right party in Spain. Their findings reveal that the demand-side factors of Spain are not significatively different from those countries in which PRR parties have succeeded. Thus, they explore the supply-side, in which they find three main explanations (in order of importance). The critical one is that the cleavage structure in Spain doesn't leave place for a PRR party to establish. This cleavage structure is organized around the socioeconomic left-right (the state vs. the market) and the centre-periphery conflict between the central and peripheral nationalisms. The authors argument that PRR parties have no space left in this context for putting into the public agenda the *nativist* card or the debate of the nation, as it is already occupied by other parties in the centre-periphery conflict. Thus, for a PRR to appear successfully, a change in either the cleavage structure or the actor's position on it is needed. The second drawback for PRR parties is the fact that, for historical and strategical reasons, the PP has traditionally received most of the far-right's votes. Hence, if PP

left an empty space in their right, this might be occupied by a PRR party. This makes sense with Lago and Martínez (2011) findings, which explain the appearance of new parties as a result of electoral market failures (unsatisfied voter demands) and electoral volatility. Finally, the highly disproportional electoral system and its high barriers to national-wide parties is an impediment for a new party to successfully establish in the Spanish national party system (Lago & Montero, 2005).

On 2013, a new party was created with former members of PP. The reasons given by one of their leaders, Santiago Abascal, pointed at the freeing of "terrible criminals" -referring to Basque prisoners members of or related to ETA- as a result of the application of the Parot's doctrine and the as a tipping point of a discrepancy that has its origins in 2008 PP's congress in Valencia (Remírez, 2013). Hence, the sector critical with PP's leader Mariano Rajoy and his more centrist postulates later created VOX. Even though its results were discrete, the party entered on Andalusian Parliament on December 2018 with almost 400,000 votes (10.97%) and 12 out of 109 seats, the Spanish Congress (April 2019) with 2,688,092 votes (10.26%) and 24 deputies and the European Parliament (1,388,681 votes, which represent a 6.2%). Although there hasn't been done extensive research yet, some authors have suggested that VOX has the characteristics of a Populist Radical Right Party (Anduiza, s.d.; Dennison & Mendes, 2019), so we will treat them provisionally as so.

4. Hypothesis

As we have seen, Populist Radical Right Parties have become a relevant actor in European national party systems. They are characterized for being nationalists, authoritarian and populists (Mudde, 2007). One of the most comprehensive approaches for explaining this phenomenon has been the *transnational cleavage* theory. This theory argues that the lack of differentiated positions to new challenges -produced in an economically, culturally and economically globalized context- of mainstream parties due to their programmatic inflexibility or credibility problems (Hooghe & Marks, 2018) have paved the road for new challengers that address these issues. The success of these parties would be explained then due their appeal to the "cultural anxieties" of the losers of globalization, which is the common feature between them, due to their heterogeneous economic preferences (Kriesi et al., 2012).

Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) addressed explicitly the absence of a PRR party in Spain and shown how the absence of a PRR party in Spain was explained by the cleavage structure, which left no place for a PRR party to emerge as two of their tenets were already part of the territorial cleavage (nativism) or the social one (authoritarianism). Spanish national party system has evolved abruptly from a two-party system to a multi-party one after the apparition of Podemos and Ciudadanos but no evidence was found that this was a result of the mobilization of this new cleavage (Vidal, 2018b). The apparition of VOX -which has yet been labelled as a PRR party (Anduiza, s.d.; Dennison & Mendes, 2019)- might be a turning point on this. The question, then, is: has VOX mobilized the GAL-TAN dimension of confict?

For this reason, we will follow an integrated bottom-up and top-down approach, analyzing then both the supply (parties) and the demand (voters) sides. On the one hand we will analyze the offer side through VOX's electoral manifesto, in order to reveal whether the party has effectively highlighted these issues. On the other side, we will observe if the vote for VOX might be explained through these issues.Thus, we will try to respond the question through two hypotheses:

- H1: TAN issues[1] are significatively more salient in VOX manifesto than in other parties.

- H2: Voter's concern on TAN issues are good predictors of voting VOX.

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[1] For an operationalization look at Table 3.

5. Methodology

5.1 Supply-side

Different methods have been used for measuring party position in a given political space. The three main ones are expert survey, voters survey and party manifestos. Expert surveys ask the same questions regarding different aspects and positions of political parties to political scientists or relevant academics in every country. Example of this are the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Polk et al., 2017). In Spain, voters' surveys have been introduced in the Sociological Studies Centre (CIS) surveys or in Center for Opinion Studies (CEO). Even though both methods have shown to be reliable (Evans & De Graaf, 2013), they have two main pitfalls for our objective: they are highly subjective and based on perceptions and the dimensionality is pre-defined by the survey itself.

Thus, we will rely on party manifestos. Studying political manifestos has three main advantages: they cover a wide range of issues, they are supposed to have been reached through consensus or -at least- great majority in the organization and they are usually released periodically, which allows comparison through different parties or different moments (Volkens, 2002). Specifically, we will work with the Manifesto Project dataset (Volkens et al., 2018). This database analyses party manifestos through quantitative methods. In short, the electoral manifesto is analyzed by trained coders, which manually divide the full text in quasi-sentences, being each one "an argument or phrase which is the verbal expression of one idea or meaning." (Klingemann, Volkens, McDonald, & Budge, I.& Bara, 2006, p. xxiii) and then classify them in 56 pre-defined categories[2]. It is important to notice that the values provided by this dataset doesn't measure a party position on an issue but the saliency of this issue. Bakker and Hobolt (2013, p. 38; Table 2) provide a classification of which issues of the database could be classified as "right", "left", "GAL" and "TAN". Thus, after doing the nMDS we will be able to compare the salient issues for VOX with this classification in order to test our hypothesis.

Even though the Manifesto Project method has been also criticized for the alleged uncertainty of manual coding and the categorization of the different issues (Budge, 2013), we will rely on it because it allows us to measure dimensionality of conflict and is the most actualized database at the time of writing this, being available yet VOX's manifesto for 28th April

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[2] For more details see Table A1 of the Annex

Spanish elections. For the rest of parties[3] we will use the latest data available, which dates from 2016 election. The results from this analysis are provisional and further data would be needed to discern if the differential issues that VOX make reference to are due to the party itself or is due to the different context between both elections. However, the analysis can still provide significative outcomes.

Due to the characteristics of the Manifesto Project Database, many scholars (Kriesi et al., 2012; Van Der Brug, 2003) have approached the data through Non-Metric Multidimensional Scaling (nMDS). As the data is not lineal, Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis don't appear as valid tools (Van Der Brug, 2003). nMDS technique allows to represent graphically a multidimensional dataset into two dimensions by calculating the distance between the different objects and representing them in most exact possible way[4]. The goodness-of-fit of this technique is measured through the *Stress* (which measures the discordance between the output and the input). For example, Reinermann and Barbet (2019), in order to study how the dimensionality of conflict affected the perceived quality of representation, made a MDS and looked at the Stress value to evaluate how data fitted in a two-dimensional space[5].

As we have many missing values (issues not present in the manifestos studied), we should use the Bray-Curtis distance which is not affected by missing values. Otherwise, we could reach biased levels of similarity between parties. Moreover, the categories "Foreign Special Relationships" (both "positive" and "negative"), "Marxist Analysis", "Education Limitation" as well as "Labour Groups: Negative" haven't been included in the analysis, as no party mentioned them.

5.2 Demand

The second part of our analysis will analyze which are the drivers for VOX voters and compare them to the other Spanish national-wide parties: PSOE, PP, Podemos and Ciudadanos. The reason for not considering regional parties is that it won't give us any much more information in order to respond our hypotheses.

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[3] That is: People's Party (PP), Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), Citizens (Cs), United Left (IU), We Can (Podemos), United We Can (ECP), Basque Country Unite (EH Bildu), In Common We Can (ECP), In Tide (EM), Compromise-We Can (COMPPOD), Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Democracy and Freedom (CDC), Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Canarian Coalition (CC).

[4] For further details consult O'Connell, Borg, & Groenen (2006)

[5] Kruskal (1964) established that it is acceptable when the value is less than 0.2, good when less than 0,1 excellent when is less than 0,05 (O'Connell et al., 2006, p. 48).

There are available two relevant surveys made by the Spanish Sociological Investigations Center (CIS) are available. The first one is the post-electoral survey made in Andalusia in December 2018, and the second one is a pre-electoral *macro-barometer* done in March. The Andalusian survey may be biased as it is only representative of a regional segment of the total VOX voters, but it provides more information than the barometer. The barometer has a large sample (n=16,194) but makes less relevant questions for our study. The Center for Opinion Studies (CEO), depending of the Catalan Government, also made a post-electoral survey after April 2019 elections with a wide range of questions, but it has a sample of near 1000 people, of which only 13 responded that voted for VOX. Thus, having considered all these options, we will use the CIS pre-electoral March Barometer (2019), which allows us to have representative data as well as, unfortunately, fewer variables.

We have built four multinomial logistic regression models with different dependent variables. Thus, every regression has a different dependent variable, which is a dummy one that takes the value "1" if the subject has the intention of voting the specific party or is the closest one to its preferences, and "0" if not. Thus, we have one regression for every one of the four main parties in Spain (PSOE, PP, Cs and Podemos) and VOX.

We might divide the independent variables in two sets: the first one is formed of "socio-demographic" variables, and the second one of "political" ones. The size of the habitat has been included, coded as a discrete variable from 1 to 7. "Education" has also been coded as a discrete variable with three possible options (low, middle and higher). "Gender" has been coded as a dummy variable, being 0 the value for males and 1 for females. Finally, "age" hasn't been recoded and it has been included "unemployment" as a dummy variable.

On the second set of variables, we included "interest in politics", which ranges from 1 (no interest) to 4 (much interest) as well as ideology in a Likert scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right). One of the most relevant variables is the perceived problems in Spain. This open-response question asks for the three main problems (ordered by importance) that Spain faces at the time when the survey is made. We might suspect, then, that the vote choice and the main perceived problems have a high correlation and that it is a good predictor of the vote. Thus, it allows us to test our second hypothesis and see if VOX voters are concerned about the issues highlighted by the party. The operationalization of this question has been done transforming the 53 original variables to 23, which coincide with some categories of the Manifesto Project

Database[6]. By assigning the value of 1 to the "first problem", 0.6 to the "second problem" and 0.3 to the "third problem" and finally summing all these values for subject and variable, 23 new variables have been created, which range from 0 to 1.99, as it can be seen in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of the recoded categories of perceived problems.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Economy	16194	0	1,99	0,7543	0,53152
Welfare	16194	0	1,99	0,2078	0,35047
Agriculture	16194	0	1	0,0011	0,02877
Political Disaffection	16194	0	1,99	0,5275	0,53948
Immigration	16194	0	1	0,0558	0,18866
Feminism	16194	0	1,66	0,0517	0,18021
Traditional values	16194	0	1	0,0066	0,0712
Education	16194	0	1	0,0645	0,1969
Environment	16194	0	1	0,0038	0,04949
Nationalism	16194	0	1,66	0,0725	0,22582
Housing	16194	0	1	0,0008	0,02268
Constitutionalism	16194	0	1	0,0012	0,03118
Professional Groups	16194	0	1	0,0016	0,03376
Taxes	16194	0	1	0,0027	0,04361
Emigration	16194	0	1	0,0007	0,02303
Justice	16194	0	1	0,0076	0,07256
Racism	16194	0	1	0,001	0,0259
Basic Services	16194	0	1,66	0,0182	0,10976
Infrastructures	16194	0	1	0,0024	0,03931
Youth	16194	0	1	0,0053	0,0605

Note: Data retrieved from March Pre-electoral Barometer (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2019)

After analyzing the descriptive statistics of these new variables, those whose means were almost 0 and excluding them improved the Alkaike Index, have been excluded. These excluded variables are racism, infrastructures, justice, taxes, housing, monarchy, and emigration.

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[6] For more details see the Table A1 of the Annex

6. Results

6.1 nMDS

We have performed two nMDS analyses. The first one with two dimensions and the second one with three (Graphic 1). Looking at their Stress, the three-dimensional model seems much more appropriated, having a value of 0.103 instead of 0.161. The graphs should be interpreted by looking at the distance between different objects (party or category). The closer they are, more similarities do they have in their manifestos.

We might make three groups of parties from this analysis. The first one is comprised of left parties and includes United Left (IU), Podemos, Compromise-Podemos[7], In Tide (EM), In Common We Can (ECP) as well as the regionalists Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), EH Bildu and Canarian Coalition (CC). The second group comprises the regionalist right (Democracy and Freedom -CDC- and the Basque Nationalist Party -PNV-) as well as the national right (the Popular Party-PP- and Citizens -CS-). Finally, we can see how VOX has a differentiated position, meaning that it shows little similarities with the other parties. As we have stated previously, the results might be biased as we are comparing manifestos from two different elections, and further analysis should be done with actualized data.

The categories[8] in which VOX has a more differentiated position are negative references to international co-operation (7), positive references to the traditional morality (41), negative references to multiculturalism (46) as well as favorable mentions to the "national way of life" (39). There are some issues highlighted by both VOX and other right-wing parties (PP, Citizens and the NSWP PNV and CDC), which are favorable mentions to constitutionalism (11) and "law and order" (43), as well as the limitation of Welfare State (37) and the defense of a free market economy (18). Closer to VOX than the other right-wing parties is the issue of centralization (14), but this seems to be caused for the differences in the temporal context rather than the parties themselves. There are a couple of issues in which VOX shows some similarity (even though fragile) with left-wing parties such as IU, EH Bildu, Podemos and its alliances or PSOE. Still, these are ambiguous issues which don't give us much information: references to "non-economic demographic groups" (51) and appeals to national solidarity (44). From the basis of Bakker and Hobolt classification (Table 2), we can see how VOX's differential issues almost coincide with the TAN pole except for the category "political

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[7] Which have almost no differences with Podemos national manifesto.

[8] The meaning of every number and category is available in the Table A1 of the Annex.

authority". Evidence seems to confirm then our first hypothesis: TAN issues are significatively more salient in VOX's manifesto than in other parties.

TABLE 2. Operationalization of right-left and GAL-TAN dimensions (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 38)

Right-Left emphases		GAL-TAN emphases	
Right	Left	Authoritarian	Libertarian
Free enterprise (18) Economic incentives (19) Anti-protectionism (24) Social services limitation (37) Education limitation (*) Productivity: Positive (27) Economic orthodoxy: Positive (31) Labour groups: negative (48)	Regulate capitalism (20) Economic planning (21) Pro-protectionism (23) Social services expansion (36) Education expansion (38) Nationalization (30) Controlled economy (29) Labour groups: positive (47) Corporatism: positive (22) Keynesian demand management: positive (26) Marxist analysis: positive (*) Social justice (35)	Political authority (17) National way of life: positive (39) Traditional morality: positive (41) Law and order (43) Multiculturalism: negative (46) Social harmony (44)	Environmental protection (33) National way of life: negative (40) Traditional morality: negative (42) Culture (34) Multiculturalism: positive (45) Anti-growth (32) Underprivileged minority groups (51) Non-economic demographic groups: positive (52) Freedom and human rights (9) Democracy (10)

Note: Asterisk signify that none of the analyzed manifestos referred to the issue and it has been excluded from the analysis. Numbers indicate the reference in the nMDS.

GRAPHIC 1. Non-metric MultiDimensional Analysis for political parties' manifestos in Spain (2016-2019)

Note: Dimensions (k) =3. Stress = 0.103. Data: Manifesto Party Database.

6.2 Logistic regression

The aim of this analysis is to evaluate whether if VOX voters are concerned with the differential issues highlighted in the manifesto of the party or not. Prior to this, it is relevant to see the Variance Inflation Factor in order to discard multicollinearity. As the values are quite low and no one higher than 4, we might discard it. Also, having a look at the socio-demographic and political variables as well as comparing the vote for VOX and the vote for other national parties will be useful in order to discard possible spurious effects.

Regarding socio-demographic variables, VOX voters appear to be mostly men and slightly younger than the voters of other parties. Variables such as town size, level of studies or being unemployed appear to be non-significant. It might be surprising how being unemployed is only significant and positively correlated for Podemos and PSOE (at $p<0.05$), the two left-wing parties of the analysis. Also, the level of studies is not statistically significant for VOX and neither Podemos, which contradicts the thesis that VOX voters are the *losers* of globalization. Regarding political attitudes, VOX voters have less interest in politics than other parties' voters (except Podemos). The ideological position appears to have slightly more influence in PP than in VOX, being significant at $p<0.01$ in both cases.

Finally, the perceived problems give us some information about which the drivers for voting one party or another might be. Concern for immigration appears to be significant at a $p<0.01$ and with a value of 1.82. No other variable in the model has shown to be as a good predictor as this one. Political disaffection also has a positive correlation and the same statistical significance. Another relevant predictor is the preoccupation for the loss of traditional values in society. It appears to be positively significant at $p<0.1$ for VOX but maybe more surprisingly, also for Podemos, reaching similar values (0.95 for the former and 0.748 for the latter). Contrarily, in PP' model has exactly the opposite value than VOX. This indicates that it might be a good indicator for discerning between the vote for PP and for VOX.

Might we accept our second hypothesis? Definitively yes. The drivers for voting VOX coincide with the issues differentially more salient in its manifesto. That is, negative references to immigration, favorable mentions to the "national way of life" and a superior level of political disaffection. It is relevant to remark that, whereas political disaffection is positively correlated with almost every dependent variable (except with PP), it achieves the highest value in VOX' model. It is remarkable, though, that education is not statistically significant and it challenges the assumption that VOX social basis is that of globalization' *losers*.

TABLE 2. Marginal effects of multinomial logistic regression on vote.

	VOX	PP	CS	PSOE	PODEMOS
Town Size	0.031	-0.085***	0.021	-0.023*	0.105***
	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Gender	-0.721***	0.187***	0.125**	0.133***	-0.312***
	(0.096)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.066)
Age	-0.026***	0.023***	-0.017***	0.014***	-0.022***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Studies	0.014	-0.101***	0.126***	-0.189***	0.002
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Unemployed	0.090	-0.113	-0.002	0.139**	0.204**
	(0.136)	(0.102)	(0.081)	(0.061)	(0.088)
Interest in Politics	-0.124**	-0.056	0.023	-0.001	-0.345***
	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.037)
Ideology	0.716***	0.803***	0.305***	-0.443***	-0.641***
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Problem: Economy	-0.017	0.190**	0.421***	0.532***	0.278***
	(0.133)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.061)	(0.093)
Problem: Welfare	-0.162	-0.161	0.265**	0.306***	0.265**
	(0.188)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.076)	(0.119)
Problem: Agriculture	-0.999	1.907**	-0.109	0.389	-0.490
	(1.767)	(0.812)	(1.175)	(0.742)	(1.344)
Political Disaffection	0.412***	-0.151*	0.364***	0.203***	0.216**
	(0.133)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.061)	(0.094)
Problem: Immigration	1.815***	-0.471***	-0.015	0.011	-0.244
	(0.181)	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.134)	(0.246)
Problem: Feminism	-0.608	0.376**	-0.231	0.064	0.447***
	(0.375)	(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.124)	(0.171)
Problem: Traditional Values	0.953*	-0.953*	0.120	-0.586	0.748*
	(0.493)	(0.493)	(0.417)	(0.367)	(0.389)
Problem: Education	0.006	-0.021	0.465***	0.223*	0.199
	(0.275)	(0.183)	(0.153)	(0.120)	(0.166)
Problem: Environment	1.064	-3.474**	-0.241	0.063	1.360***
	(0.852)	(1.573)	(0.683)	(0.408)	(0.417)
Problem: Nationalism	0.357*	0.317**	0.815***	0.125	-1.337***
	(0.196)	(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.108)	(0.220)
Problem: Professional groups	0.325	-3.140**	1.675***	-0.030	0.616
	(1.164)	(1.531)	(0.561)	(0.667)	(0.808)
Constant	-5.971***	-6.942***	-4.186***	0.345**	1.407***
	(0.393)	(0.277)	(0.247)	(0.176)	(0.259)
Observations	13,668	13,668	13,668	13,668	13,668
Log Likelihood	-1,903.433	-3,672.020	-4,444.121	-6,942.268	-3,328.895
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,844.866	7,382.039	8,926.241	13,922.540	6,695.790

*Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significante: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Data retrieved from March Pre-electoral Barometer* (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2019).

7. Conclusion

The aim of this project was to explain the entrance of VOX in the Spanish Low Chamber. It is an especially relevant case as it represents the end of the "Spanish exception" to the global phenomenon of PRR parties. Thus, we hypothesized that the end of this exception might be due to the mobilization of what has been called the Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) issues (Hooghe et al., 2002) and the *transnational cleavage* (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). The causal relation between this analysis would be that the lack of programmatic alternatives to the mainstream or neoliberal economic policies has led the *losers* of these policies to drive the conflict in the cultural field. Thus, the *losers* of globalization are expected to adopt a TAN position on cultural issues, while the *winners* are expected to support the GAL position (Hutter et al., 2012). Relying on the *saliency theory*, we hypothesized that VOX introduced new issues in the political agenda, which were those of the TAN pole in the *transnational cleavage*. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the concerns of VOX voters coincide with the more salient issues in the party' manifesto.

Having done a nMDS analysis for analyzing the differential issues which were salient for VOX and five multinomial logistic regressions for analyzing the characteristics of its electorate, we failed to reject our hypotheses. Thus, it seems to be proven that VOX has entered new issues on the public agenda such as the call for less international cooperation, negative references to multiculturalism as well as nationalism and positive references to the traditional morality. Not only this, but from the multinomial logistic regression we can infer that VOX voters are less preoccupated for the economy and more for immigration, the loss of traditional values as well as nationalism, supporting our hypotheses.

As we have pointed previously, the main drawback for doing this research project has been to find relevant and actualized data. Thus, further research should be done for comparing party manifestos with this new data as well as to repeat the logistic regression model with variables that had been excluded of the CIS Pre-electoral Barometer 2019. Furthermore, more detailed research on the economic voting determinants and the operationalization of *winners* and *losers* should be done. By the way, our results indicate than education is not a good predictor, and that this assumption should be operationalized more carefully. To sum up, we think that this project has shed some light on the end of the "Spanish exceptionalism", showing how - even though there are evident historical specificities- the apparition of a PRR party in Spain has many similarities with similar process in the rest of Europe.

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A. Annex

TABLE A1. nMDS categories and its characteristics.

nMDS Reference	Code	Name	Description	Category (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013)
9	per201	Freedom and Human Rights	Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights in the manifesto and other countries.	GAL
10	per202	Democracy	Favourable mentions of democracy as the "only game in town". General support for the manifesto country's democracy.	GAL
32	per416	Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics. Rejection of the idea that all growth is good growth. Opposition to growth that causes environmental or societal harm. Call for sustainable economic development.	GAL
33	per501	Environmental Protection	General policies in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate, and other "green" policies.	GAL
34	per502	Culture: Positive	Need for state funding of cultural and leisure facilities including arts and sport.	GAL
40	per602	National Way of Life: Negative	Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history.	GAL
42	per604	Traditional Morality: Negative	Opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values.	GAL
45	per607	Multiculturalism: Positive	Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.	GAL
51	per705	Underprivileged Minority Groups	Very general favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms (e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants, indigenous). Only includes favourable statements that cannot be classified in other categories (e.g. 503, 504, 604, 607 etc.)	GAL
52	per706	Non-economic Demographic Groups	General favourable mentions of demographically defined special interest groups of all kinds.	GAL
20	per403	Market Regulation	Support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market.	Left
21	per404	Economic Planning	Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government.	Left
22	per405	Corporatism/Mixed Economy	Favourable mentions of cooperation of government, employers, and trade unions simultaneously. The collaboration of employers and employee organisations in overall economic planning supervised by the state.	Left
23	per406	Protectionism: Positive	Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets (by the manifesto or other countries).	Left
26	per409	Keynesian Demand Management	Favourable mentions of demand side oriented economic policies (assistance to consumers rather than businesses).	Left
29	per412	Controlled Economy	Support for direct government control of economy.	Left
30	per413	Nationalisation	Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in state hand or nationalising currently private industries. May also include favourable mentions of government ownership of land.	Left
35	per503	Equality: Positive	Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people.	Left

38	per506	Education Expansion	Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels.	Left
47	per701	Labour Groups: Positive	Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general.	Left
36	per504	Welfare State Expansion	Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme.	Left
18	per401	Free Market Economy	Favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model.	Right
19	per402	Incentives: Positive	Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (assistance to businesses rather than consumers).	Right
24	per407	Protectionism: Negative	Support for the concept of free trade and open markets. Call for abolishing all means of market protection (in the manifesto or any other country).	Right
27	per410	Economic Growth: Positive	The paradigm of economic growth.	Right
31	per414	Economic Orthodoxy	Need for economically healthy government policy making.	Right
37	per505	Welfare State Limitation	Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care).	Right
48	per702	Labour Groups: Negative	Negative references to labour groups and trade unions. May focus specifically on the danger of unions 'abusing power'.	Right
17	per305	Political Authority	References to the manifesto party's competence to govern and/or other party's lack of such competence. Also includes favourable mentions of the desirability of a strong and/or stable government in general.	TAN
39	per601	National Way of Life: Positive	Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals.	TAN
41	per603	Traditional Morality: Positive	Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values.	TAN
44	per606	Civic Mindedness: Positive	Appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as united. Calls for solidarity with and help for fellow people, familiar and unfamiliar.	TAN
46	per608	Multiculturalism: Negative	The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.	TAN
43	per605	Law and Order: Positive	Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country's law code.	TAN
1	per103	Anti-Imperialism	Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states.	-
2	per104	Military: Positive	The importance of external security and defence.	-
3	per105	Military: Negative	Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the 'evils of war'.	-
4	per106	Peace	Any declaration orbelief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises– absent reference to the military.	-
5	per107	Internationalism: Positive	Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101.	-
6	per108	European Community/Union: Positive	Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general.	-
7	per109	Internationalism: Negative	Negative references to international co-operation. Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.	-

8	per110	European Community/Union: Negative	Negative references to the European Community/Union.	-
11	per203	Constitutionalism: Positive	Support for maintaining the status quo of the constitution. Support for specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. The use of constitutionalism as an argument for any policy.	-
12	per204	Constitutionalism: Negative	Opposition to the entirety or specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. Calls for constitutional amendments or changes. May include calls to abolish or rewrite the current constitution.	-
13	per301	Decentralization	Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power.	-
14	per302	Centralisation	General opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels. Support for unitary government and for more centralisation in political and administrative procedures.	-
15	per303	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient.	-
16	per304	Political Corruption	Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power. Need to abolish clientelist structures and practices.	-
25	per408	Economic Goals	Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category.	-
28	per411	Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	Importance of modernisation of industry and updated methods of transport and communication.	-
49	per703	Agriculture and Farmers: Positive	Specific policies in favour of agriculture and farmers. Includes all types of agriculture and farming practises. Only statements that have agriculture as the key goal should be included in this category.	-
50	per704	Middle Class and Professional Groups	General favourable references to the middle class.	-

TABLE A2. Operationalization of perceived problems

Original category	Recoded category
El paro	Economy
Los problemas de índole económica	Economy
Los problemas relacionados con la calidad del empleo	Economy
Reforma Laboral	Economy
Los bancos	Economy
Las drogas	Drugs
La inseguridad ciudadana	Security
El terrorismo internacional	Security
Las infraestructuras	Infrastructures
Falta de inversión en industrias e I+D	Infrastructures
La sanidad	Welfare
Las pensiones	Welfare
Los problemas de índole social	Welfare
El funcionamiento de los servicios públicos	Welfare
"Los recortes"	Welfare

La vivienda	Basic services
Subida de tarifas energéticas	Basic services
Los problemas de la agricultura, ganadería y pesca	Agriculture and Farmers
La corrupción y el fraude	Political disaffection
Los/as políticos/as en general, los partidos y la política	Political disaffection
El Gobierno y partidos o políticos/as concretos/as	Political disaffection
La falta de acuerdos, la situación política, la inestabilida	Political disaffection
La Administración de Justicia	Justice
El racismo	Racism
La inmigración	Immigration
La violencia contra la mujer	Feminism
Los problemas relacionados con la mujer	Feminism
Los problemas relacionados con la juventud	Youth related problems
La crisis de valores	Traditional Values
La educación	Education
Los problemas medioambientales	Medi ambient
Los nacionalismos	Nationalism
Estatutos de autonomía	Nationalism
La independencia de Cataluña	Nationalism
Las preocupaciones y situaciones personales	Personal
La subida del IVA	Taxes
El fraude fiscal	Taxes
Los desahucios	Housing
La Monarquía	Monarchy
Emigración	Emigration
Problemas relacionados con autónomos/as	Middle Class and Professional Groups
Otro/s	-
Ninguno	-

TABLE A3. Variance Inflation Factors of the multinomial logistic model.

	VOX	PP	PSOE	CS	PODEMOS
Town Size	1,074	1,068	1,049	1,051	1,038
Gender	1,064	1,076	1,055	1,064	1,052
Age	1,211	1,341	1,351	1,203	1,179
Studies	1,29	1,41	1,426	1,265	1,244
Unemployed	1,057	1,076	1,07	1,055	1,044
Interest in Politics	1,126	1,138	1,188	1,128	1,148
Ideology	1,074	1,05	1,111	1,07	1,065
Problem: Economy	2,398	2,169	2,347	2,796	2,34
Problem: Welfare	1,442	1,54	1,663	1,743	1,606
Problem: Agriculture	1,006	1,014	1,009	1,007	1,008

Political Disaffection	2,697	2,249	2,458	2,976	2,477
Problem: Immigration	1,535	1,234	1,147	1,268	1,099
Problem: Feminism	1,093	1,152	1,186	1,152	1,233
Problem: Traditional Values	1,097	1,041	1,031	1,056	1,068
Problem: Education	1,211	1,188	1,245	1,351	1,276
Problem: Environment	1,028	1,015	1,019	1,015	1,038
Problem: Nationalism	1,481	1,386	1,295	1,567	1,143
Problem: Professional groups	1,015	1,016	1,008	1,025	1,013

TABLE A4. Variables used in the multinomial logistic models

Category		Variable Name	Type	Value
Variable dependent		VotSimPP	Dummy	0-1
		VotSimPSOE	Dummy	0-1
		VotSimPOD	Dummy	0-1
		VotSimCS	Dummy	0-1
		VotSimVOX	Dummy	0-1
Socioeconomic		Town size	Categorical	1 <= 2000; 2 = 2–10 K; 3 = 10–50 K; 4 = 50–100 k; 5 = 100–400 K; 6 = 400–1000 K; 7 => 1000 K
		Female	Dummy	0 = Male; 1= Female
		Age	Continuous	
		Education	Categorical	1 = Low (1-3); 2 = Middle (4-6); 3 = Higher (7-9); NA (0, 10, 99)
		Atur	Dummy	0-1
Politics		Interest in Politics	Categorical	1 to 4
		Ideology	Continuous	1 = Left; 10 = Right
	Concerns	**Econ**	Continuous	0-3
		Welfare	Continuous	0-3
		Agriculture	Continuous	0-3
		Political_disaffection	Continuous	0-3
		MulticultN	Continuous	0-3
		Feminism	Continuous	0-3
		Trad_Values	Continuous	0-3
		Education	Continuous	0-3
		Environment	Continuous	0-3
		Nationalism	Continuous	0-3
		Constitutionalism	Continuous	0-3
		Prof_groups	Continuous	0-3