

# Money, Credit and Equilibrium Imperfectly Competitive Banking

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<https://github.com/phantomachine/BJBANKS>

# Facts: Imperfect Competition in Banking

- ▶ For example, U.S.:
  - ▶ High profit margins: Markups (90%)
  - ▶ Imperfect interest-rate pass through: Rosse-Panzar  $H$ -statistic<sup>1</sup> (50%)
- ▶ Market share of top-3 banks: Portugal (89%), Germany (78%), the United Kingdom (58%), Korea (1998-2006: 80%-100%, post 2007: 50%), Japan (44%), United States (35%)
- ▶ Data source:
  - ▶ FDIC, Call Reports, U.S. Commercial Banks, 1984-2010
  - ▶ Bankscope
  - ▶ (Corbae and D'Erasmus, 2015; Corbae and D'Erasmus, 2018)

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<sup>1</sup>Sum of the elasticities of a bank's total revenue with respect to that bank's input prices

# Monetary Policy and Regulator Concerns

- ▶ Carolyn Wilkins (Asst. Gov. BoC), *Why Do Central Banks Care About Market Power?*, G7 Conference at Banque du France (2019-04-08):  
*Still-unanswered questions for central banks about implications for people, inflation dynamics, and monetary policy transmission.*
- ▶ Rod Sims (Chair of ACCC), *Committee Hansard*, 2016-10-14:  
*There seems a lack of very robust competition in banking . . . We are not seeing as much robust competition as we would like.*
- ▶ Australian Productivity Commission Inquiry (No.89, 2018-06-29):  
*High market concentration does not necessarily indicate that competition is weak, that community outcomes will be poor or that structural change is required. Rather, it is the way market participants gain, maintain and use their market power that may lead to poor consumer outcomes. . . . Reforms that alter incentives of Australia's banks, ... aimed directly at bolstering consumer power in markets, and reforms to the governance of the financial system, should be the prime focus of policy action.*

# In Theory ...

**Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007, JET) ...**

Financial Intermediation (Banks) improve welfare by supporting “anonymous” exchange ...

so long as holding money is somewhat costly (not at Friedman Rule)

... Or is it? What if banking industry is **not perfectly competitive**?

# What We Do

## Empirical, Theoretical/Normative questions

1. Data: (Consumer) Loan-rate **markups** *positively correlated* with **dispersion**.
2. How does **equilibrium market power** of banks distort *basic* intermediation, welfare-enhancing (essential) role of banks?

When is financial intermediation (“banking”) *essential*?

3. What is an **optimal redistributive liquidity policy**?

Irrelevant when no banking market power

# What We Find I

## 1. Empirical/External Validity ...

- ▶ Model fitted to empirical money demand and average markups
- ▶ Predicts positive correlation between markups and dispersion of loan rates

# What We Find II

## 2. Financial intermediation not always “essential” (welfare enhancing):

Low inflation ...

- ▶ Banks exploit more *intensive margin* markup channel
- ▶ This destroys welfare-gain from intermediation role of banks.

Higher inflation ...

- ▶ Equilibrium loan price dispersion rises
- ▶ Banks trade-off markup incentives (Intensive Margin) for higher probability of loan customers (Extensive Margin)
- ▶ Extensive Margin dominates, loan market more competitive, approaching BCW's original insight.

# What We Find III

3. Given a long-run inflation target there is room for a *contra-Keynesian* demand stabilization via liquidity-management policy
  - ▶ When aggregate demand “heats up” (either  $n$  or  $\epsilon$ ) ...
  - ▶ Optimal stabilization prescribes injecting liquidity to active buyers in the market
  - ▶ This somewhat counter-intuitive policy makes sense when we take into account endogenous market power and markup responses by banks!



**Model**

# Causal framework I

## Introduction

Why are identical products priced differently?

Why are identically productive workers paid differently?

... What is the connection to market power?

# Causal framework II

## Introduction

Markets may not always function according to the Neoclassical, Walrasian market-clearing caricature:

1. Labour: phenomenon of unemployment
2. Finance: bid-ask spreads, heterogeneous liquidity of assets in OTC trades. Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) evidence.
3. Consumer markets: Nielsen scanner data. (Kaplan and Menzio)

(And yet ... much of economics education, policy and consulting practices carry on with the “Invisible Hand” allegory of markets.)

Is the Walrasian markets abstraction innocuous?

What might we miss, as scientists and policymakers?

# Causal framework III

## Introduction

Burdett-Judd's (Econometrica, 1983) noisy consumer search:

1. An (empirically) useful **causal structure** for identifying and rationalizing price dispersion and market power.
2. Model encompasses two extremes (that micro-regulators look out for): Perfect (Bertrand) Competition  $\leftrightarrow$  Monopoly.
3. Noisy search equilibrium generates observations on market power and price dispersion.

# Causal framework IV

## Introduction

Burdett-Judd reboot:

- ▶ Banking, monetary policy and macroeconomics!


We show *in a general equilibrium* environment:

- ▶ noisy consumer loan search creates an **endogenous** or **equilibrium** policy channel

(monetary policy)  $\rightarrow$  (banking market power)  $\leftrightarrow$  (social welfare)

Channel ignored in standard Walrasian theory and policy models.

# Overview



# Banks I

- ▶  $i^d \equiv \gamma/\beta - 1$  be the marginal cost of the Bank (competitive depository insitutions, perfect enforcement assumption)
- ▶ Ex-ante profit from posting loan price  $i$ :

$$\Pi(i) = n [\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 (1 - F(i)) + \alpha_2 \zeta(i)] R(i) \quad (1)$$

where

$$\zeta(i) = \lim_{\varepsilon \searrow 0} \{F(p) - F(p - \varepsilon)\} \quad (2)$$

$$R(i) = l^*(m; i, p, M, \gamma) [(1 + i) - (1 + i^d)] \quad (3)$$

- ▶  $n\alpha_2\zeta(i)$  is the measure of consumers contacting bank, when consumers also face the same price  $i$  from another bank
  - ▶ Customers randomize between them
  - ▶ In equilibrium probability two banks set same price is zero

# Banks II

We can prove that:

1. Bank's faced with noisy-search loan customers earn maximal expected profit equal to monopolist's profit
2. Each bank (pricing at some  $i \sim F$ ) trades off
  - ▶ intensive-margin profit  $R(i)$   
— against —
  - ▶ extensive-margin profit: probability of agents showing up ("queue length")  $\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2(1 - F(i))$
3. All earn the same expected profit



SME

# SME: Households I

Household optimizes

Perfect Competition (BCW):

$$\underbrace{\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta}}_{\text{MC of extra dollar}} = \underbrace{(1 - n)i_d}_{\text{[A]: MB, idle funds}} + \underbrace{ni}_{\text{[B]: MB, less borrowing, PC } (i \leq i_d)} \quad (4)$$

$$\equiv i$$

No-bank, self-insurance (BCW, us):

$$\underbrace{\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta}}_{\text{MC of extra dollar}} = \underbrace{n[u'(q_b) - 1]}_{\text{[C]: MB, liquidity premium}} \quad (5)$$

**Essential banking (Berentsen et al, JET, 2007)**

If money yields lower return than other risk-free assets (not at Friedman rule)

...

(PC) Banks always improve on allocations/trade and thus welfare.

# SME: Households II

Household optimizes

Our setting, non-degenerate  $F$ : Consider equilibria with positive loans demand and  $\alpha_0 = 0$  (everyone meets at least one bank) ...

Optimal money demand satisfies Euler functional equation:

$$\underbrace{\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta}}_{\text{MC of extra dollar}} = \underbrace{(1 - n)i_d}_{\text{[A*]: MB of idle funds (BCW, PC)}} + \underbrace{n \int_{i_{\min}}^{i_{\max}} \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq \rho < \tilde{\rho}_i\}} [\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 (1 - F(i))] i dF(i)}_{\text{[B*]: Borrow, MB less borrowing } \leq ni \text{ (BCW, PC)}} \quad (6)$$

# SME: Households III

Household optimizes

Simplifies to:

$$1 = \underbrace{\int_{i_{\min}}^{i_{\max}} \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq \rho < \tilde{\rho}_i\}} \underbrace{[\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 (1 - F(i))]}_{\text{Extensive margin}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{i}{i_d}\right)}_{\text{Intensive margin markup}} dF(i)}_{\text{Ex-ante markup from h/hold perspective}} \quad (7)$$

## Proposition (Banks can be inessential)

At certain  $\tau_b$  and thus  $F(z, \tau_b)$ , nett MB  $[A^*] + [B^*]$  can be less than (equal to) MB of self-insurance world, i.e.,  $n[u'(q_b) - 1]$ .

- ▶ In calculus of intertemporal money demand, household anticipates bank's ex-post markup vs. matching probability trade-off ...
- ▶ (Earlier) banks' ex-ante profit encodes this too ...

# SME: Banks

## Banks optimize

Distribution of loan rates  $F$ :

$$F(i; z, \rho, Z, \gamma) = 1 - \frac{\alpha_1}{2\alpha_2} \left[ \frac{R(i^m)}{R(i)} - 1 \right], \quad (8)$$

- ▶  $\text{supp}(F) = [i_{\min}, i_{\max}]$
- ▶ given monopoly price  $i^m$  and max. willing to pay  $\hat{i}$ ,  $i_{\min}$  solves:

$$R(i_{\min}) = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2} R(i_{\max}) \quad (9)$$

where

$$R(i) \equiv R(i; z, \rho, Z, \gamma) = \left[ \rho^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (1+i)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - (z + \tau_b Z) \right] (i - i^d) \quad (10)$$

is (real) bank profit per customer served

# SME: Firms and Markets

Firms optimize, goods markets clear, loans feasible

DM sellers optimize and the Walrasian price-taking DM market clears:

$$\begin{aligned} q_s(z, Z, \gamma) &\equiv c'^{-1}(\rho) \\ &= n\alpha_0 q_b^{0,*}(z; \rho, Z, \gamma) \\ &\quad + n \left[ \int_{i_{\min}}^{i_{\max}} [\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 - 2\alpha_2 F(i)] q_b^*(z; \rho, Z, \gamma) dF(i) \right] \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

(CM also clear ...)

Total deposits weakly exceed total loans:

$$\begin{aligned} (1-n)\delta^*(z, Z, \gamma) &\equiv (1-n) \left( \frac{z + \tau_b Z}{\rho} \right) \\ &\geq n \left\{ \int_{i_{\min}}^{i_{\max}} [\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 - 2\alpha_2 F(i)] \xi^*(z; i, \rho, Z, \gamma) dF(i) \right\} \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

# SME: Market Power and Inflation Targeting

## Lemma

In an SME,  $F(z')$  stochastically dominates  $F(z)$ , for  $z' < z$ .

## Proposition

For high-enough long-run inflation target  $\tau$  (or  $\gamma$ ) ...

- ▶ Real money demand  $z$  falls.
- ▶ Stochastic dominance result  $\Rightarrow$  agent- $z$  more likely to draw lower ex-post markups.
- ▶ Banks tend to care more about customers showing up, mark up less (i.e., tends toward Bertrand competition).



# Empirical Validation



# Statistical calibration

Some parameter can be externally calibrated from long run data statistics.

Method of Simulated Moments (min. weighted  $L^2$ -norm):




to pin down preference  $(B, \sigma_{DM})$  and BJ contact rates  $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1)$ .

Data: Lucas-Nicolini New M1 series;  
Bank Prime Loan Rate/3 month TB rate

# External validity I

Data: USA, RateWatch



- ▶ Personal unsecured loan (Tier 1) rates
- ▶  $\approx 7 \times 10^5$  monthly (panel) observations over 20 years (2001-2020)
- ▶ Above: national level statistics for dispersion vs average (percentage) markups

## External validity II

$\text{corr}(\text{Dispersion}, \text{Markups}) > 0$

- ▶ Data: 0.64
- ▶ Model: 0.69

To do:

- ▶ More careful micro-data evidence (loan contract-level data)
- ▶ Estimate "residual" loan rate markups and dispersion statistics

# Comparative Steady States


# Comparative Steady States

- ▶ Consider a set of economies, each distinguished by their long-run inflation rates,  $\tau$
- ▶ Questions to ask:
  - ▶ Inflation tax and demand for loans
  - ▶ Inflation tax and bank profits: intensive vs. extensive margins
  - ▶ When are banks essential?

c.f., Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007)

# Comparative Steady States

DM loan demand (credit line)





# Comparative Steady States

## Discussion—Loan/Goods Demand Side

- ▶ With higher inflation  $\tau$ , the equilibrium support of  $F \sim i$  shifts right
- ▶ Also  $z$  falls with higher  $\tau$
- ▶ *Ceteris paribus*, DM-goods demand  $q^*(z, i; \tau)$  (conditional on meeting banks) falls since borrowing cost rises with  $\tau$
- ▶ *Ceteris paribus*, loan demand  $\xi^*(z, i; \tau)$  rises with  $\tau$  as self-insurance by holding money becomes more costly

# Comparative Steady States

DM banks' intensive vs. extensive profit





# Comparative Steady States

## Discussion—Loan Supply Side

- ▶ With higher inflation  $\tau$ , banks' cost of funds  $(1 + \tau)/\beta$  is higher
- ▶ With BJ Banks, there is a price-posting vs. queue-length tension:
  - ▶ **Intensive margin**: Raise lending rate  $i$  to keep profit margin, conditioning on loan demand in  $i$  and “being on the LHS of profit-max point”

(But this drives customers away towards other (imperfectly) competing banks)

— vs. —

- ▶ **Extensive margin**: Lower lending rate  $i$  to increase the frequency of contact with borrower.

# Comparative Steady States

DM banks' expected profit

Tension tends to resolve as follows:

- ▶ the equilibrium support of  $F \sim i$  shifts right, and is wider
- ▶ the probability mass shift to the tails of  $F$


in order that firms are still meeting their equal-expected-profit condition.

As a result:

- ▶ At low enough  $\tau$  banks tend to exploit the intensive (markup) channel
- ▶ At high enough  $\tau$  extensive margin dominates

# Comparative Steady States

Is banking essential?



# Welfare and Policy Implications

# Policy Implications I

Perfectly competitive banking ( $\alpha_0 = \alpha_1 = 0$ ,  $\alpha_2 = 1$ ):

1. Away from the Friedman rule, financial intermediation improves welfare.
2. Due payment of interest to depositors. Insuring idle funds.

Imperfectly competitive banks  $\alpha_1 \in (0, 1]$ :

1. Away from the Friedman rule, financial intermediation does not necessarily improve welfare.
2. Expected gain from insurance role lost through price dispersion ( $\equiv$  banks extract borrowers' surplus)

Additional redistributive/liquidity policies can improve welfare towards Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) ideal

# Optimal Stabilization Policy I

Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock

**Long run policy.** Interpret  $\tau$  as desired inflation target  $\equiv$  central bank has targeted price path

- ▶ fixed (legislated, mandated)
- ▶ Cannot run Friedman rule,  $\tau > 0$  (an institutional given)

# Optimal Stabilization Policy II

Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock

**Short run policy.** Commitment to policy functions  $\omega \mapsto (\tau_1, \tau_2)(\omega)$

- ▶  $\omega = \{\epsilon, n\}$  is a aggregate random variable
- ▶ demand-side stabilization
- ▶ any state-contingent injection of liquidity to DM agents will be undone in CM, i.e.,  $\tau_2(\omega) = -\tau_1(\omega)$ ;  
i.e., a repo agreement where central bank sells money in DM and commits to buy back in CM
- ▶ w.l.o.g., we have  $\tau_1 = \tau_b$

**Stationary equilibrium optimal policy.** Focus on equilibria where real balance  $z$  is time invariant.

# Optimal Stabilization Policy III

Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock

Active central bank

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{q_b^0(\omega), q_b^1(\omega), \tau_b(\omega)\}_{\omega \in \Omega}} U(x) - x - c(q_s) \\ & + \int_{\omega \in \Omega} n \alpha_0 \epsilon u[q_b^0(z; \rho, Z, \gamma, \tau_b, \omega)] \psi(\omega) d\omega \\ & + \int_{\omega \in \Omega} n \int_{i_{\min}}^{i_{\max}} [\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2 (1 - F(i; z, \gamma, \tau_b, \omega))] \\ & \times \epsilon u[q_b^1(z; i, \rho, Z, \gamma, \tau_b, \omega)] dF(i) \psi(\omega) d\omega \end{aligned}$$

subject to:

- ▶ optimal money demand (Euler condition)  $\hookrightarrow z^*(\tau)$
- ▶ credit search and bank profit max  $\hookrightarrow F(\cdot, \tau, \omega)$
- ▶ goods markets clearing  $\hookrightarrow x^*, (q^0, q^1)(z^*(\tau), \omega)$
- ▶ Aggregate loan feasibility
- ▶ GBC:  $\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = \tau + \tau_1(\omega) + \tau_2(\omega)$  and  $\tau_1(\omega) = -\tau_2(\omega)$



# Optimal Stabilization Policy IV


Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock

## Passive central bank

- ▶ Policy constrained by  $\tau_1(\omega) = \tau_2(\omega) = 0$  for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ .
- ▶ The outcomes will be very similar to our deterministic, baseline SME.

# Optimal Stabilization Policy V



Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock



Relatively more transfers to ex-post high equilibrium-valuation (of money) consumers ...

# Optimal Stabilization Policy VI


Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock



Active policy induces relatively higher pass-through / lower market power for higher valuation buyers

# Optimal Stabilization Policy VII


Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock



Active policy delivers relatively more consumption and loans to high valuation buyers.

# Optimal Stabilization Policy VIII

Active vs. Passive:  $\epsilon$  taste shock



Thus active “demand-side stabilization policy” through liquidity provision results in higher ex-ante welfare for agents.

# Punchline I

## Pass-through and welfare

With information frictions, banks can be shown to be essential under perfect competition (Berentsen, Camera, and Waller, 2007).

When market power of banks is endogenous to policy:

1. equilibrium imperfect competition renders an otherwise *essential* banking system detrimental in *low-inflation economies*
2. Pass-through of monetary policy (cost of funds variation) to lending interest rates
  - ▶ positive relationship between the average markup and the dispersion of lending interest rates

# Punchline II

## Optimal stabilization policy

Given a long-run inflation target ...

... there is room for a *contra-Keynesian* demand stabilization via liquidity-management policy:

- ▶ When aggregate demand “heats up” ( $\epsilon$ ) ...
- ▶ Optimal stabilization prescribes injecting relatively more liquidity to ex-post high-taste (high marginal valuation of money) agents
- ▶ This somewhat counter-intuitive (to textbook Keynesianism) policy makes sense when we take into account endogenous market power and markup responses by banks!

# Punchline III

*As long as a branch of science offers an abundance of problems, so long it is alive*

*David Hilbert*

Lessons for policy thinking?

- ▶ Think beyond Invisible Hand economics
- ▶ Walrasian abstraction may not be a harmless one
- ▶ In a new model that rationalizes some macro and consumer-loan market facts, there exists an important **endogenous** and **policy-sensitive** channel:

(monetary policy) → (banking market power) ↔ (private decisions, welfare)

- ▶ New thinking beyond textbook Keynesian fixes required
- ▶ More work connecting to markets micro-regulation and existing partial-equilibrium banking regulation thinking?



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