

# Computing the Aiyagari (QJE94) Model

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# Content

## 1 Roadmap

## 2 Model

- Agents
- On  $A$
- Firm

## 3 Equilibrium

- Intuitive

## 4 Computation

## 5 Readings

# Roadmap

Roadmap for this topic:

- 1 Model
- 2 Stationary Equilibrium
- 3 Computational Approaches

## Aiyagari's Model

- Aiyagari; production economy. H-A version of Brock-Mirman (1972, JET) stochastic growth model.
- Now, the aggregate of agents' assets must equal the total capital stock in the economy.
- Stationary equilibrium: (since  $\exists$  only idiosyncratic shocks), the aggregate prices, i.e wage and capital rental rates  $w$  and  $r$ , are now constants.
- A neoclassical aggregate theory:

$$r = MPK - \delta, \quad w = MPN$$

both depends on aggregate capital stock.

## Agents: borrowing limit

- Labor endowment,  $e \in E \subset \mathbb{R}$ ; Asset  $a \in A = [-\phi, +\infty)$ .
- Recall budget constraint:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = w(r)e_t + (1+r)a_t$$

If we require  $c_t \geq 0$  a.s., then solving the above forward, we have

$$a_t \geq -\frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{w(r)e_{t+j}}{(1+r)^j} \quad \text{a.s. } \forall t \geq 0$$

- Let  $\min(e) := \underline{e}$ . Then we have also Aiyagari's **natural debt limit**:

$$a_t \geq -\frac{w \cdot \underline{e}}{r}$$

## Agents: borrowing limit

We can allow for tighter borrowing limits. Aiyagari does so by defining the borrowing constraint:

$$a_t \geq -\phi$$

where

$$\phi = \begin{cases} \min \left\{ b, \frac{w \cdot e}{r} \right\} & \text{for } r > 0 \\ b & \text{for } r \leq 0. \end{cases}$$

where  $b > 0$  is an *ad hoc* credit limit (à la Huggett's arbitrary  $a$ ).

## Agents: individual state

- Define **maximal disposable wealth** at time  $t$  as

$$z_t := we_t + (1 + r)a_t + \phi;$$

i.e. current labor income + current savings + maximal borrowings.

## Agents: individual state

- Maximal disposable wealth at time  $t$  is  $z \in Z \subset \mathbb{R}$ :

$$z_t := we_t + (1 + r)a_t + \phi;$$

- For convenience later, work with:

$$\hat{a}_t := a_t + \phi.$$

So then we can write

$$z_t = we_t + (1 + r)\hat{a}_t + r\phi$$

- Index an individual by **individual state**  $(z_t, e_t)$ .



## Agents: Feasible Sets

- Borel  $\sigma$ -algebra  $\mathcal{B}(A)$  generated by  $A$ .
- Agent's feasible action correspondence,  $\Gamma(r) : Z \times E \rightrightarrows \mathcal{B}(A)$ :

$$\Gamma(z, e; r) = \left\{ \hat{a}' \in A : z - \hat{a}' \geq 0, \hat{a}' \geq 0 \right\}.$$

## Agents: Markov decision process

- Let  $v(z, e; r)$  be the optimal value to an agent  $(z, e)$  following his optimal strategy beginning from  $(z, e)$ .
- The Bellman functional equation is:

$$v(z, e; r) = \max_{\hat{a}' \in \Gamma(z, e; r)} \left\{ u(z - \hat{a}') + \beta \int_E v(z', e'; r) d\pi(e'|e) : \right. \\ \left. z' = w(r)e' + (1 + r)\hat{a}' - r\phi \right\}.$$

- Relative price  $r$  is pinned down in a stationary equilibrium.

Solution is a savings policy function

$$\hat{a}' = A(z, e; r).$$

for a given  $b$ . This has properties proven in Theorem 1 of Huggett.

We left  $e$  in the state variable purely as an information variable for predicting

- future employment  $e'$ ,
- and therefore  $z' = we' + (1 + r)\hat{a}' - r\phi$ , conditional on realized action  $\hat{a}'$ .
- In special case  $e \sim \text{i.i.d. } \pi$ ,  $e$  is not a vital statistic for predicting future  $e'$ .

As in Huggett,

- the equilibrium decision rule  $A(z, e; r)$ , and
- transition probability function for  $e$ ,  $\pi(e'|e)$ ,

can be used to construct an equilibrium transition probability function  $P$ . that maps a current probability measure over agent types  $\psi(\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E})$  into next period's probability measure  $\psi'(B)$ , where

- $\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$ ,
- $B \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$


Optimal consumption can be calculated as

$$c = z - A(z, e),$$

and must satisfy

$$u_c(c) \geq \beta(1+r)\mathbb{E}\{u_c(c')|e\}, \quad \text{"=" if } \hat{a}' > 0.$$

How does the mean of assets behave w.r.t.  $r$  in this model?



**Figure:** Typical shape of  $\mathbb{E}_{w(r)}a(\phi)$ .

## Firm

Aggregate factors  $(K, N)$ . Technology:  $(K, N) \mapsto F(K, N)$ .

Takes  $w$  and  $r$  as given. Profit:

$$F(K, N) - wN - (r + \delta)K$$

Neoclassical firm with profit maximizing conditions:

- ①  $r = F_K(K, N) - \delta$
- ②  $w = F_N(K, N)$

Technology s.t.:

- $F_K, F_N > 0$
- $\lim_{r \searrow -\delta} F_K(K, N) = +\infty, \lim_{r \nearrow \infty} F_K(K, N) = 0.$
- $\lim_{r \nearrow \infty} w(r) = 0, \lim_{r \searrow -\delta} w(r) = +\infty.$

# Stationary Distributions

Candidate Markov kernel. At each  $r$ , define  $Q_r : Z \times E \times \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E) \rightarrow [0, 1]$  by,

$$Q_r((z, e), \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}) = \sum_{e' \in \mathcal{E}} \mathbb{1}_{\{A(z, e) \in \mathcal{Z}\}} \pi(e' | e),$$

for all  $\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$ , where

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{A(z, e) \in \mathcal{Z}\}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a' = A(z, e) \in \mathcal{Z} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$



- Let  $M(Z \times E)$  be the set of probability measures on  $(Z \times E, \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E))$ .
- Then  $Q_r$  is our candidate transition function with the associated operator  $W_r : M(Z \times E) \rightarrow M(Z \times E)$ , giving

$$\begin{aligned}\psi'(\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}) &= W_r(\psi)(\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}) \\ &= \int_{Z \times E} Q_r[(z, e), \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}] d\psi\end{aligned}$$

for all  $\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$ .

- For a fixed  $r$ , a stationary distribution  $\psi^*$  satisfies both sides of this mapping.

# General Equilibrium

Market clearing requires

$$K = \int_{Z \times E} a(z, e; r) d\psi(r) =: \mathbb{E}a(r)$$

and

$$N = \int_{Z \times E} e d\psi(r)$$


$\psi$  is the fixed point of the operator  $W$  at the equilibrium interest rate  $r$ :

$$\psi(B) = W_r(\psi)(B), \quad \forall B \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E).$$

## Capital market clearing:

- Intersection of aggregate supply  $\mathbb{E}_{w(r)}(a(r)) =: \mathbb{E}a(r)$  schedule with the capital demand schedule implicit in  $r = F_K(K, N) - \delta$ .
- Previously, we took  $w$  as a parameter. Now,  $w = F_N(K, N)$  will be pinned down in equilibrium.
- It can be shown that  $\mathbb{E}_w a$  shifts right with  $w = w(r)$ . Why?


# Stationary Equilibrium: Intuitive



**Figure:** Stationary equilibrium:  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  and  $F_K(K, N) - \delta$  determines equilibrium capital stock  $K(r^*)$  and  $r^*$ . Note; since  $w$  is decreasing in  $r$ ,  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  may well be non-monotonic. Equilibrium may not be unique. No analytical results – in general need to check numerically. [▶ Example SE](#)

## Exercise

*Argue that if there were full insurance on labor risk (i.e. certainty), then the risk-free rate is not as low and equilibrium capital stock is lower.*



**Figure:** Comparing allocations between model equilibrium with idiosyncratic risk (A), and model equilibrium with full insurance (B).

## Remark:

- At A: Equilibrium of economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and no insurance (NI). Equilibrium  $(K^*, r^*)$ .
- With full insurance (FI), representative agent result. Receive a constant earnings  $w \cdot 1$  each period. If  $r < \rho$ , representative agent would always be borrowing constrained,  $a = -\phi$ . If  $r = \rho$ , agent's asset equals whatever initial asset he has. If  $r > \rho$ ,  $a \rightarrow \infty$ .
- So FI asset supply schedule (desired asset holding) is given by green right-angled line.



- At B: FI equilibrium  $K_{FI} < K^*$ .
- Economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraint produces precautionary saving motive. Too much saving and capital.
- Note: Equilibrium at C consistent with a partial equilibrium model such as Huggett.
- Equilibrium  $r^* \in (-\delta, \rho)$ . This will be useful to discipline computational guesses.

# Stationary Equilibrium

As we illustrated in the diagram previously ...

**Existence** comes down to showing that excess demand as a function of price  $r$  is

- continuous, and
- crosses zero.

**Uniqueness** depends on showing that excess demand is strictly monotone.

## Stationary Equilibrium: Existence

If we can show that aggregate supply of capital

$$\mathbb{E}a(r) := \int_{Z \times E} A(z, e; r) d\psi(z, e; r)$$

is continuous in  $r$  and crosses the aggregate capital demand function, then we have existence.

Let's check this ...

First we consider the limits.

① (Previous lecture) Aiyagari showed:

- $\mathbb{E}a(\rho) = +\infty$ . In this case, there is no stationary distribution here, since  $\mathbb{E}a(\rho)$  not defined.
- $\lim_{r \nearrow \rho} \mathbb{E}a(r) = +\infty$ .

Also,  $\mathbb{E}a(-1) = -\phi$ .

② Technology s.t.:

- $F_K, F_N > 0$
- $\lim_{r \searrow -\delta} F_K(K, N) = +\infty$ ,  $\lim_{r \nearrow \infty} F_K(K, N) = 0$ .
- $\lim_{r \nearrow \infty} w(r) = 0$ ,  $\lim_{r \searrow -\delta} w(r) = +\infty$ .
- Need:  $K(-1) < \phi$ , and,  $\lim_{r \nearrow \rho} K(r) > -\infty$

Guarantees:

$$\mathbb{E}a(-1) < K(-1), \quad \lim_{r \nearrow \rho} \mathbb{E}a(r) + K(r) > 0,$$

so there is at least one  $r$  such that  $\mathbb{E}a(r) + K(r) = 0$ , if we can show continuity of  $\mathbb{E}a(r) + K(r)$ .

## Example (Huggett 1993)

$K(r) = 0$ . So continuity of  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  suffices to establish existence of a stationary equilibrium.

## Example (Aiyagari 1994)

Cobb-Douglas technology. Firm solves

$$\max_{K,N} K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha} + (1-\delta)K - wN - (1+r)K.$$

Optimal capital demand function in this case is

$$K(r) = \left( \frac{\alpha N^{1-\alpha}}{r + \delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Check:  $\lim_{r \searrow -\delta} K(r) = +\infty$ , and,  $\lim_{r \nearrow +\infty} K(r) = 0$ . So then verifying continuity of  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  establishes existence of stationary equilibrium. [▶ Figure SE](#)

# Stationary Equilibrium: Existence

If  $K(r)$  continuous, now we just have to check:

- Existence of  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  – i.e. existence of a stationary probability measure  $\psi$ ; and then,
- Continuity of  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  w.r.t.  $r$ .

There is a unique  $\psi$  s.t.:

$$\psi(\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}) = W_r(\psi)(\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}) = \int_{\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}} Q_r[(z, e), \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E}] d\psi$$

for all  $\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$ , if

- $Q_r$  is a transition probability function:
  - $Q_r((z, e), \cdot)$  is a probability measure on  $(Z \times E, \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E))$
  - $Q_r(\cdot, B)$  is measurable for all  $B \in \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E)$ .

Easy to show since  $(z, e) \mapsto A(z, e)$  is continuous function on a compact state space.

- $Q_r$  is an increasing map: need to show that  $(z, e) \mapsto A(z, e)$  is jointly increasing, so that “higher”  $(z, e)$  makes  $Q_r((z, e), \cdot)$  place bigger probability mass on “higher”  $(z', e')$ .
- Monotone mixing holds.



Weak convergence of probability measures. Then we have

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \int A(z, e; r) d\psi_t = \int A(z, e; r) d\psi,$$

for every continuous and bounded real-valued function  
 $A : Z \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

$\mathbb{E}a(r)$  is continuous w.r.t.  $r$ :

- Continuity of  $A(\cdot; r)$ : Can show that  $A(\cdot; r)$  converges to  $A(\cdot; r^*)$  uniformly since  $Z \times E$  is compact (e.g. Thm 3.8 SLP).
- Continuity of  $\psi(r)$  in the sense of weak convergence (Thm 12.13 SLP). Assume
  - ①  $Z \times E$  compact,
  - ② If  $(z_n, e_n; r_n)_n$  a sequence in  $Z \times E \times [-1, \rho]$  converging to  $(z, e; r^*)$ , then  $Q_{r_n}(z_n, e_n, \cdot)$  converges weakly to  $Q_{r^*}(z, e, \cdot)$  on  $M(Z \times E, \mathcal{B}(Z) \times \mathcal{B}(E))$ ;
  - ③ For each  $r$ ,  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \int A(z, e; r) d\psi_t = \int A(z, e; r) d\psi$
- If  $(r_n)$  is a sequence converging to  $r^*$ , then  $(\psi_{r_n})$  converges weakly to  $\psi_{r^*}$ .

# Stationary Equilibrium: Existence

Recap:

- The above show that  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  is well defined for  $r \in [-1, \rho)$ .

► Figure SE

- $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  is continuous w.r.t.  $r$ .
- Given “nice”  $K(r)$ , exists stationary equilibrium.

## Stationary Equilibrium: Uniqueness?

- Need to show monotonicity of  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  w.r.t.  $r$ . No analytical results.
- Solution: Plot  $\mathbb{E}a(r)$  for many  $r$ .
- Example with multiple equilibria: model with seigniorage (see Ljungqvist and Sargent 17.11).

Assume  $E$  is a finite set,  $|E| = m$ , and  $(e_t)$  is Markov- $(P, \mu_0)$ . Since leisure does not enter  $u$ , labor supply is inelastic. Calculate aggregate labor supply as

$$N = \sum_{i=1}^m e_i \mu_i,$$

where  $\mu = (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_m)$  is ergodic distribution of the  $e$ .

$N$  is fixed number – can calculate outside of loops.

# Pseudocode

**Step 1** Pick initial guess  $r_0 \in (-\delta, \rho)$ . Set  $r = r_0$ .

**Step 2** Given  $r$ , find  $K(r)$  satisfying

$$r = F_K(K, N) - \delta.$$

Then find  $w(r) = F_N(K(r), N)$ .

**Step 3** Given relative prices  $(r, w(r))$ , solve agent's DP problem. Get solutions  $A(a, e; r)$  and  $C(a, e; r)$  (latter via budget constraint).

**Step 4** Given policy  $A(a, e; r)$  and  $C(a, e; r)$ , and  $P$ , initial  $\psi_0$ , find

$$\psi_r = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} W_r^t(\psi_0).$$

**Step 5** Given aggregate demand for capital  $K(r)$ , compute

$$\mathbb{E}a(r) = \int_{A \times E} A(a, e; r) d\psi_r.$$

**Step 6** Check market clearing condition. Excess demand:

$D(r) = K(r) - \mathbb{E}a(r)$ . If  $D(r) > 0$ , then next guess  $r' > r$ .

Else if  $D(r) < 0$ , then next guess  $r' < r$ . Can exploit concavity of  $F$  here:

$$r' = F_K(\mathbb{E}a(r), N) - \delta.$$

**Step 7** Set new  $r$  using smoothing,  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ :

$$r = \lambda r' + (1 - \lambda)r.$$

Repeat Step 2-7,  $n \geq 1$ , until  $|r_{n+1} - r_n| < \epsilon$ , for  $\epsilon$  small.



## Numerical Example

Some results:

$\rho$	$\sigma$	$K$	$r$	$Welfare$	$Gini$
0.0000	0.2000	5.6014	0.0395	-3.1781	0.2701
0.0000	0.4000	5.9243	0.0353	-2.9093	0.2568
0.3000	0.2000	5.6429	0.0389	-3.2309	0.3001
0.3000	0.4000	6.1567	0.0325	-3.0001	0.2896
0.6000	0.2000	5.7818	0.0371	-3.4444	0.3671
0.6000	0.4000	6.8281	0.0253	-3.4142	0.3661
0.8000	0.2000	5.8211	0.0366	-4.7170	0.5000
0.8000	0.4000	6.9735	0.0239	-6.2047	0.5160

## Reading List

- ① Aiyagari (1994, QJE)
- ② Aiyagari (1992, FRB Minneapolis Working Paper)
- ③ Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) 17.3 - 17.7