How would ontological cubism account for processes that seemingly don't have their being in any human-like streamings of the world (like processes happening inside organisms or in different parts of the universe)? If vacuous actuality is denied, then there either are perspectival streamings of them of a kind that wouldn't be associated with any "biological organism" known or alien or they do not exist in any meaningful sense- which seems like a conclusion that counts against the system that entails it. The same applies to a pre-biological world. This seems to be the main reason why people are drawn towards an idea of an aperspectival realm. If some kind of ideality is taken to be the transcendent essence of an object then doesn't it just replace the thing in itself and create similar problems? perhaps getting rid of essence would help this but then if ideality/signitive or logical presence only makes sense in reference to animal type streamings, again what about processes that we clearly want to say are real yet are never present in any biological organism type streaming? This makes me think of Whitehead and prehension which if I understand it correctly is partly a way to account for both perspectival presence and seemingly perspective independent happenings. I'm very curious about your thought on this.

I am truly grateful for such a deep, appropriate question. I have thought about this, but no one usually

brings it up. I read *After Finitude,* and I've thought about the status of "pre-sentience" objects. Were there not mountains before there was "consciousness" ? In "ontocubism", we don't have "consciousness." The "subject" is a "stream of perspectival-presence." Lately I'm thinking about how these streams are not fundamental but synthetic or derived from objects, in some sense.

On the other hand, the "forum" is presupposed by rational conversation as the condition for its possibility. So "linguistic subjects" (discussed by Robert Brandom) are "deep" and not so easily reduced to objects. This is arguably a kind of constraint on ontology. If we want it to be scientific/rational, then we can't reduce the normativity that would be needed for that very reduction.

To finally get to the issue : what does it "mean" to say that the mountains "were" *before presence itself* ? I think we are "futural" beings. I believe that the only since we can give to claims about "presentient objects" is (implicitly) conditional. If we *could* go back in time, then we *would* see what we call a mountain. Our mathematical models that include carbon dating would ultimately be about *the future.* Everything is "care-structured" and "futural." Postulations about the "pre-presence" past seemingly only make sense in terms of possible futural presence. And of course to here and now. But the here and now is itself horizonal and future orientied. Reichenbach is good on this stuff. Our tacit understanding of empirical objects is basically what we *expect* from them. A "real"

(empirical) glass of water doesn't vanish into thin air.

In *After Finitude,* the status of these pre-sentience objects actually (in my view) cuts both ways. What *kind* of existence are they supposed to have ? *How* are these things in themselves supposed to exist ? What does it mean for such a thing to be ? If one projects mathematizable qualities as "real," this is just a tacit equation of thought and being all over again. Simply disavowed, wrapped in an anti-anthropocentric piety.

I will agree that casting the "presentient past" as a kind of signitive projection is still questionable and weird. I don't pretend to have a knock-down argument. I like to think of myself as "following the logic" against a scientistic common sense. But in the scientific spirit. Mach is one of my heros. How does the past exist ? How does the future exist ? Deep questions.

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