

1. What people have *called* “phenomenal consciousness” is better thought of as the perspectival presence of the world.
2. It is not a stuff that is present but rather presence itself. To attribute “consciousness” to an entity *X* is to suggest the-presence-of-the-world-*for* this entity *X*.
3. If my wife “has” “phenomenal consciousness”, then the world is present *for* her.
4. To conceive this “consciousness” as a “stuff” is to reify the ( from-a-perspective ) “being” of the world itself.
5. The “physical” is understood in such a framework to have an unproblematic and independent sort of presence.
6. The independence of the availability of mundane physical objects from any particular “consciousness” (perspectival-perceptual presence) is tacitly extended to an independence from *all* “consciousness” (perspectival-perceptual presence ) whatsoever.
7. But these objects tend to be understood, nevertheless, in terms of the perceptual presence or “consciousness” that constitutes or discloses them.
8. The “ideality” or “concept” that isolates them as particular, enduring entities is “secretly” “left in” an incoherent conception of the object that is supposed to be radically independent from such conceptuality.
9. The trick involves a tacit equation of thought and being — and then the “removal” of thought. What

is left is a “thing in itself” that basically retains its “thing-for-us” character.

10. The “essence” of this “thing-for-us” character is the “idea” of the object. The object is something like a “logical unity” or “synthesis” of its qualities and properties, both sensory and inferential-relational.
11. We can approach the “core” of an object as something like its *role* in the space of reasons.
12. A blind person can discuss a red apple that they can taste but not see. A deaf person can discuss music in sign-language. Intelligent life from far away could potentially learn English and discuss objects with us that were perceptually present for them in a very different way than such objects are present for the average human.
13. Physicalism that fails to articulate *how* empirical objects can exist without their variable “sensory-conceptual substance”