

PPR = phenomenalism-perspectivism-redundancy

PPR is “neo” logical positivism. As skeptical as possible without irrationalism.

1. “Foreground the forum.” Expand/unfold what is implicit in the very concept of rational conversation. The “forum” is the “scientific horizon.”
2. We use our shared sign system to discuss objects which must be *likewise* between-us or transcendent.
3. Phenomenalism is *anti-speculative*. It offers not a “positive” theory of empirical objects but only a *minimal* explication of the *concept* of an empirical object. The “immaterialism” of Mill is a demystification of “things in themselves.”
4. The hyper-physical thing in itself is often presented as a *cause* of an “internal” image in “consciousness.” But bringing this object-in-itself into the causal nexus is absurd, for then this object-in-itself is just the “idea” of the object-for-us.
5. Kant and others like him misread perception as the representation in “internal consciousness stuff” of an “External Physical stuff.”
6. Indirect realism trusts perceptions about sense organs and apples in order to argue against the validity of such perceptions.
7. It is absurd to say that my “experience” is a dream thrown up by my brain, for brains would then be *part* of this “dream.”

8. The redundancy theory of truth is likewise an anti-speculative, anti-metaphysical *critique* of other, *positive* theories of “truth.”
9. “Positive” theories of truth are perhaps inspired by the unwarranted postulation of “hyper-external” (quasi-mystical) “things-in-themselves,” which are typically supposed to function as Truth-makers.
10. “Superstitious” theories of truth are often implicit denials of the “from-a-point-of-view-ness” of reality, which is not so easily scrubbed off by wishful thinking.
11. To understand belief as “taking to be true” *gets things backwards*. Belief we understand, more or less. “Truth” is elusive, vacuous.
12. The redundancy theory of truth is not presented *as* a “truth.”
13. PPR, understood as an explication of what rational conversation takes for granted, suggests that warranted but always fallible belief *suffices*..
14. Popper’s concept of basic statements is helpful here. A “basic statement” is accepted *for now*, by “us.”
15. Rational conversation presupposes participants with differing beliefs. This triviality leads us to perspectivism. If we have demystified hyper-external Truthmakers and the concept of a Truth beyond all belief, then we are left with beliefs that are in some sense “first-person.” We are left with *my* beliefs and *your* beliefs.

16. If you and I are scientifically inclined, we seek consensus. But this consensus is a goal, an ideal. For Peirce, “truth” is the consensus that arrives after *infinite* inquiry. So “truth” never arrives.
17. “Truth as goal” is innocent enough in itself, but it encourages the “two substance superstition” of indirect realism. It also “bakes in” an “end of inquiry” which does not obviously make sense.
18. Even if we hope that scientific conversation will lead to improved beliefs, we still *live in* the beliefs that we have now.
19. Perspectivism is just the recognition that “reality is first-person,” and the “from-a-point-of-view-ness” of reality is largely a matter of belief.
20. Some philosophical realists questionably insist on a reality that is “pre-articulated.” *This is a tacitly theological notion.* The realist tacitly supposes reality-for-God.
21. Often this reality-for-God is described in terms of a “dead” or “apathetic” Physicality. But these “ashes of the demiurge” still have enough “life” in them to function as a trans-human Authority.