

Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Provide Welfare?

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Summary

- 1 Research Question
- 2 Theory
- 3 Data and Empirical Specification
- 4 Empirical Analysis
- 5 Conclusion



Motivation

- *Major Topic*: Distribution and Redistribution
 - Initial modern welfare state



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 - Compensations (Boix 2001; Adserà and Boix 2002)
 - Power resources (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Bradley et al. 2003; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Lim and Kwon 2016)
 - Median Voters (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2006)

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 - Median Voters (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2006)
- How can we explain why authoritarian regimes provide welfare?

Not every authoritarian regime is the same.

- In reality, we can observe authoritarian regimes have distinctive leadership groups (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014).
- Generally, studies have a consensus that the party based regime has a larger coalition compared to the personalist regime, which has a small coalition to remain in office (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Gandhi and Lust-okar 2009).

The welfare state literature + Empirical observations of authoritarian welfare provisions.

- Given the fact that (i) authoritarian regimes can be seen as the diminished form of democracies and (ii) authoritarian regimes have variations,
- Some forms of authoritarian regimes are more likely to provide welfare.

Class coalition, and cooptation

Even though some autocrats use forces and coercions to rule the regime, not all do.

- Two fundamental problems of autocrats, which cannot be solved by a single strategy (Svolik 2012).
 - 1 Problem of power-sharing, which is about challenges from the elites.
 - 2 Problem of control in which autocrats face threats from the masses they rule.
- Autocrats may have two strategies of coercion and cooptation (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright 2008)
- Then, who is the target of cooptation?

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- Then, who is the target of cooptation? → The critical supporting groups, which establishes the ruling coalition.

Class coalition, and cooptation

- How to identify the groups for ruling coalition?
 - Party institutionalization (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2019)
 - The more autocrats with institutionalized parties want to maintain power, the more likely they are to run universal social policies
- However, we cannot assume that parties in authoritarian regimes are identical to those in democracies.
 - Not only party institutionalization, but the types of welfare can show the different class-coalition tendency across authoritarian regimes.
 - The types of welfare delivery (cash benefits versus service benefits) would vary depending on the regime types (Bambra 2005).


Class coalition, and cooptation

- H_1 : When party institutionalization increases, welfare programs become universal *de jure* (in terms of enacted and formal laws) and *de facto* (in terms of the coverage of social groups).
- H_2 : Given party institutionalization, different authoritarian regimes increases different welfare programs closely related to their relevant class coalition *de jure* (in terms of enacted and formal laws) and *de facto* (in terms of the coverage of social groups).

Welfare Programs

- DV: Welfare Encompassingness and Universalism
 - Social Policy around the World (SPaW) Database (Rasmussen 2016)
 - *Encompassingness*: whether there is a major, national welfare law for each of the following risks.
 - *Universalism*: Range from 0–9, maximum 9-scores indicate all residents are automatically entitled to benefits, a fully universal system.
 - The dataset covers 154 countries from 1790 to 2013.

Welfare Programs



Regime is classified by Geddes et al. (2014)

Figure: Global Trends of Welfare Programs by Regime Types

Class coalition cooptation

- Distinct platforms (*v2psplats*): how many parties among those with representation in the legislature have publicly available, and distinct, party platforms.
- Constituency linkages (*v2psprlnks*): the most common form of linkage between parties and their constituents across all major parties.
- Particularistic versus public goods (*v2dlencmps*, hereafter Type of Goods): the tendency of rent-seeking of autocrats regardless of the party linkage.

Authoritarian regime types from Autocratic Regimes dataset of Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).

- The interests represented in the leadership group help to explain and predict the behavior of authoritarian regime while they remain in power.
- Dominant-party, monarchy, military, and personal regimes covering 4,591 observations from 1946 to 2010.

Also, several covariates to control the confounding influence on primary explanatory, and dependent variables are included:

- *Trade openness, the logged GDP per capita, the percentage of Elderly Population, the percentage of the Youth Population, urbanization, the size of military, resource dependence*

Model Specification

- Data: unbalanced, pooled time-series cross-sectional data of class coalition cooptation variables, authoritarian regime types, and welfare programs
 - Coverage: 74 autocracies, respectively, during the period 1816–2013.
- Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with panel-corrected standard errors.
 - Time- and unit- fixed effect included.
 - All explanatory variables are lagged by 3 years.

Party Institutionalization and Welfare




Figure: Party Institutionalization and Welfare Encompassingness

Party Institutionalization and Welfare




Figure: Party Institutionalization and Welfare Universalism

Disaggregated Universalisms




Figure: Party Institutionalization and Disaggregated Universalism

Class coalition, Welfare Benefits




Figure: Marginsplot by regime type on Cash benefits

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


Figure: Marginsplot by regime type on non-Cash benefits

Conclusion

- The first hypothesis is partially confirmed since the party institutionalization only increases the *Encompassingness*, which means the coverage of risk-areas.
 - Why? → Disaggregate *Universalism* by programs
 - I find that party institutionalization does not have equal influence on the different welfare programs.
 - There is no reason to assume that parties have inherent features to expand welfare programs.
- How about Class-coalition cooptation?
 - Autocrats would want to deliver the resources they promised through the channel without autocrats' private goods. rule.
 - Welfare programs are expected to be different depending on the groups on which the autocrat depends for support.
 - The influence of party institutionalization conditional on different welfare programs depends on the class coalition—authoritarian regime types.