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# The Social Policy around the World (SPaW) Database

Codebook version 1.0 (alpha version)

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## 1 Introduction

This dataset provides summary information about social policy for a total of 154 countries in all regions of the world starting with the first major welfare state legislation enacted in 1871.

The dataset is in the country-year format. The scoring reflects the statutory policies in force that year. Whenever a new welfare law is put into effect (legislation is enacted in the parliament or decreed by head of state), the scoring is changed that year independently of when the legislative change took place during the year.

I provide data on four aspects.<sup>1</sup> First, I code the presence of a Major welfare state law for several policies following a simple and precise baseline criterion. This measure can be used to track the growth of the welfare state, as the presence of a major welfare program for a specific risk indicates a clear break with previous tendencies of either only small occupational programs or no regulation at all.

Second, I code the dominant principle of eligibility. That is, by what criteria claimants are granted benefits: by necessity and need (means-testing), by right of citizenship (universalism), or by membership in an occupational, ethnic or social group (segmentation). I create two indices, one measuring the degree of universalism or the degree to which benefits are accrued to all citizens independent of their status, the other capturing segmentation, the degree to which benefits are targeted to one or a few set of groups. Together, both indexes can be used to create a third index capturing means-testing. These new indices provide, for the first time, a unified metric to track developments in the dominant principle of eligibility within and between countries, not only in OECD-countries.

Third, I code the generosity of the enacted welfare programs. Here one will find data on how long a claimant can receive benefits, how long she must wait before receiving benefits and how long she must work before being eligible for benefits etc. These measures helps us answer questions such as how

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<sup>1</sup> For additional factors covered in the dataset see the variable summary in part 3.

much more/less generous the existing social policies are in Africa or Latin America compared to what benefits existed there 80 years ago, and it enables us to compare them directly to OECD-countries.

Fourth, I present the first dataset on union administered unemployment insurance (Ghent-systems). Trade union administered systems have been particularly highlighted as important for their ability to increase the power-base of organized labor. Several studies that focus on the post-war period have therefore investigated the effect of Ghent-systems on trade union organization after the 1970s (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006; Lind 2009; Rothstein 1992; Scruggs 2002; Van Rie, Marx, and Horemans 2011; Western 1997). Unfortunately, interest has not been reflected in conceptual clarification or data-sets on Ghent-systems before the post-war period, when most Ghent-systems originated. Here I remedy this problem by providing three conceptualization and empirical measures of Ghent-systems. These are further discussed below.

This codebook proceeds as follows. First I outline the coverage in space and time. Second I elaborate what kinds of policies are coded and which are excluded. Third, I outline the variables included, their precise measurement, and give summary statistics for all measures. Fourth I give appropriate thanks where thanks should be given. Fifth, I list the recommended [mandatory] citation. Six, I outline the coding-procedures and various problems and choices that had to be made during the classification procedure. It is important that any users of this dataset read this part as it is fundamental to understanding what the data actually show and where they are problematic. This is necessary for those who are primarily interested in the generosity measures, as the data presented within diverge from the set-up used by SCIP or CEWD researchers. Seven, here the sources for the dataset are presented, along with a short discussion of data-quality. Finally, the last section discusses some differences between this dataset (SPAW), and the major alternatives (SCIP and CEWD).

## 2 Coverage

The following countries are coded in SPAW: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, [Angola], Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, [Barbados], Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin (Dahomey), Bermuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Burundi (Ruanda-Urundi), Cambodia (Khmer Republic), Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, Zaïre), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica (Commonwealth of

Dominica), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt (United Arab Republic), El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon (Gabonese Republic), Gambia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic, Imperial and united Germany, Federal Republic of Germany (West-Germany), Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India (British India), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland (The Irish free state, Eire), Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Jamaica, Japan, [Jersey], Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic), Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar (Malagasy republic), Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, [Marshall Islands], Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, [Micronesia (federated states of)],\_Moldova, [Monaco], Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, [Naru], Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, [Oman], Pakistan, [Palau], Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia (Soviet Union) ,Rwanda, Sa'udi Arabia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal , Serbia and Montenegro (Great Serbia, Yugoslavia), Seychelles, [Sierra Leone], Singapore, [Solomon Islands], [Somalia], Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea (Korea), Spain, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), St. Vincent ,Sudan, [Swaziland], Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan (Nationalist China), Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam (North Vietnam), [(Western) Samoa] , Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), Vanuatu. Countries within square brackets are countries for which data has been coded but has not been included in the Stata-version of the dataset. In total, the Stata dataset covers 154 countries.

For colonial states with an independent bureaucracy and separate legal development from the colonizing states, I have coded laws before their formal independence. This means that I code and treat as independent units' legislation in mandate areas, (crown) colonies, and states within dual-monarchies. In reference to the latter, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is treated as separate entity as no unified social legislation existed throughout the empire. In the empire, all laws, including the Poor Laws and later social policies were enacted and administered on a state by state basis.

The dataset has no formal starting point as it attempts to track all major welfare laws enacted. For countries that were independent before 1870, the dataset goes as far back as the 18<sup>th</sup> century. One informal starting point can be 1871, as this was the first year a major welfare program was enacted anywhere in the world. All legislation previous to this points was either restricted to small occupational categories such as civil servants (or groups within), politicians, or the military. The first observation for such a special pension system is the French Civil Servant Pension of 1790.

What kind of social policies are covered? In accordance with the “Social Security Programs throughout the World” (SSPTW), I have collected data on what is commonly considered the 6 main transfer programs that cover both labor market risks and life-course risks or child-birth related risks. These are Old-Age Pensions, Accident-insurance (disability benefits for work-related accidents and not to be confused with disability pensions), Sickness benefits, Maternity benefits, Unemployment benefits, and finally Family Allowances. This excludes some forms of social insurance that has become more prevalent in recent years such as parental and paternity leave type of programs. At the same time, these programs are almost exclusively restricted to the western OECD world after the 1970s (Gauthier 1996). I therefore choose to focus on the six original welfare programs. By focusing on social entitlements I have also left out equally important legislation such as labor market regulation (working time or severance pay), as these are covered in a second dataset collected by this author.

I also make an important distinction between major and special (separate) programs. Major welfare programs are classified as statutory entitlements that cover at least one historically important social group<sup>2</sup>. These policies are contrasted to smaller, less decisive, special programs, such as old-age pensions for miners, (parts of) civil service, soldiers, sailors, electricians, or as in Greece, newspaper salesmen. Contrary to other treatments on the rise of social entitlements (Abbott and DeViney 1992; Collier and Messick 1975; A. Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Mares and Carnes 2009), this is therefore the first dataset that uses a clearly specified criterion for ascertaining what constitutes a major social policy law.

Another distinction that I have upheld is that I only code a welfare entitlement if it is a transfer program. That is, programs where a claimant receives a sum of money paid out to him or her (in addition the claimant might receive special services and so on, but this must only be in addition to the payment). This excludes programs where benefits only come in the form of services or access to work. This means that for maternity benefits where recipients only get in hours-care or coverage of hospital expenses and so on are excluded. In addition, I have excluded all unemployment relief programs because these traded relief work for food or housing. Note that I have *included* programs where benefits are not paid out over a period of time, but instead as a lump-sum at the onset of some risk. At the same time, the duration of benefits has in these cases been set to zero.

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<sup>2</sup> A) Agricultural workers, B) Industrial/production workers, C) Small firms (workers in), D) Self-Employed, E) Students, F) Employers, G) Temporary and/or casual workers, H) Family workers and/or domestic workers. See section “Social groups” below for more information.

I have excluded benefits that have been enacted for a specific event or for a restricted period of time. For example, emergency benefits in relation to war or veteran benefits related to a specific war (as the civil war in the United States) are therefore not coded (Orloff and Skocpol 1984). Given that these programs were short-term solutions, or directly tied to a major event, the causes for their enactment and their consequences on the labor market are likely to be different from the more major programs that I investigate here. As these later programs usually demanded a stronger commitment from policy-makers and greater administrative capacity to launch and maintain over-time.

The aim of this dataset has been to capture statutory social programs. This means that I have excluded private welfare programs that “have [not] been set up by legislation which attributes specified individual rights to, or which imposes specified obligations on, a public, semi-public or autonomous body (International Labour Organization 1978, 140). In addition, I have tended to exclude programs which are enforced through general labor law. This means that I have excluded policies such as severance benefits, which is an alternative way of insuring workers against unemployment.

One exception to this rule is accident insurance and provident funds. For accident-insurance, several of the early programs developed as employer liability programs under labor law before they became working man compensation programs and later disability insurance programs. Similarly, provident funds was sometimes set up under labor law and later developed into social insurance programs.

The dataset only covers legislation enacted at the federal or national level. This decision was taken out of pragmatic concerns, given the lack of sources on local welfare initiatives. At the same time, it has implications for authors wishing to tests specific hypotheses connected to federalism. For example, many Canadian, Australian, and American states had enacted extensive networks of pensions and workman’s compensation programs before they enacted federal legislation. One might therefore suspect that this coding-rule has the effect that federal states appear to have less generous welfare systems than they actually have. At the same time, social policy experimentation at the local level (municipalities) was prevalent in unitary states such as Norway which did not enact an old-age pension program before 1936, but allowed municipalities to enact their own pension systems (Seip 1994). The exclusion of local arrangements does therefore not unequivocally bias descriptive inferences for federal states, but users of the data should take care when interpreting the data.

### 3 Variables

Ccodecow : Country code classification

Name: Country name

Year – self-explanatory: 1795-2010

Program types: oldage, data for old-age programs. mater, data for maternity programs. sick, data for sickness programs. unemp, data for unemployment programs. working, data for work accident programs. family, data for family allowance programs.

#### Major Laws:

**Question:** Has a country enacted a statutory social program that covers one major social group? Yes = 1 no = 0. Ignore special or separate welfare programs.

oldage\_yearlaw: Major Law for the risk of old-age. Mean 0.53 Standard-Deviation 0.49, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 851, countries 154, average time-series 89.9

mater\_yearlaw: Major Law for the risk of Maternity. Mean 0.46 Standard-Deviation .49, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 606 , countries 153, average time-series 88.9

sick\_yearlaw: Major Law for the risk of Sickness. Mean 0.40 Standard-Deviation 0.49, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 704 , countries 153, average time-series 89.5

unemp\_law: Major Law for the risk of Unemployment. Mean 0.23 Standard-Deviation 0.42, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 738, countries 153 , average time-series 89.79

working\_yearlaw: Major Law for the risk of Work Accidents. Mean 0.65 Standard-Deviation 0.47 , Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 505 , countries 153 , average time-series 88.26

famiy\_yearlaw: Major Law for the risk of Child-Rearing. Mean 0.29 Standard-Deviation 0.45, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13 610, countries 152, average time-series 89.53




Figure 1 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for major welfare laws

**Universalism index variables: The degree to which all citizens are eligible for a benefit independent of their labor market status?**

**Question:** See section 7.

univers\_oldageprog: Universality of major Old-Age Programs. Mean 2.03, Standard-Deviation 2.46, Min 0 Max 9. Observations 12 525, countries 154 , average time-series 81.33

univers\_mater\_prog: Universality of major Maternity benefit Programs. Mean 1.71, Standard-Deviation 2.31, Min 0 Max 9. Observations 11 762, countries 152, average time-series 77.38


univers\_sick\_prog: Universality of major Sickness insurance Programs. Mean 1.5, Standard-Deviation 2.24, Min 0 Max 9. Observations 11 729, countries 153, average time-series 76.66

univers\_working\_prog: Universality of major Work Accident Programs. Mean 2.30, Standard-Deviation 2.11, Min 0 Max 9. Observations 10 496, countries 148, average time-series 70.91



univers\_unemp\_prog: Universality of major Unemployment insurance programs. Mean 0.76, Standard-Deviation 1.69, Min 0 Max 9. Observations 12 611, countries 149, average time-series 84.637

univers\_family\_prog: Universality of major Family Allowance programs. Mean 1.28 Standard-Deviation 2.55, Min 0, Max 9, Observations 12 369, countries 150, average time-series 82.46



**Figure 2 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the degree of universalism for each major program. Note, all observations (including no-program) included**

**Segmentation index variables: To what degree are benefits targeted to a specific set of groups or groups.**

**Question:** See section 7.

segmentation\_oldageprog: Segmentation of major Old-Age programs. Mean 2.33, Standard-Deviation 2.81, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 12 557, countries 153, average time-series 80.11


segmentation\_mater\_prog: Segmentation of major Maternity programs. Mean 2.24, Standard-Deviation 2.94, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 11 750, countries 152, average time-series 77.30

segmentation\_sick\_prog: Segmentation of major Sickness insurance programs. Mean 1.95, Standard-Deviation 2.87, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 11 882, countries 153, average time-series 77.66

segmentation\_unemp\_prog: Segmentation of major Unemployment insurance programs. Mean 1.06, Standard-Deviation 2.32, Min 0 Max 8.5. Observations 12 712, countries 152, average time-series 83.63

segmentation\_working\_prog: Segmentation of major Work Accident programs. Mean 3.63, Standard-Deviation 3.18, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 10 721, countries 148, average time-series 72.43

segmentation\_family\_prog: Segmentation of major Family Allowance programs. Mean 1.09, Standard-Deviation 2.15, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 12 502, countries 150, average time-series 83.34



**Figure 3 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the degree of segmentation for each major program. Note, all observations (including no-program) included**

## Exclusions:

**Question:** How many groups are specifically excluded in the major program? If no major program exists, code 0.

exclusion\_oldageprog: exclusions for the major Old-Age program. Mean 1.05 Standard-Deviation 1.6, Min 0 Max 7. Observations 5 869, countries 112, average time-series 52


exclusion\_mater\_prog: exclusions for the major Maternity insurance program Mean 0.80 Standard-Deviation 1.5, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 4349, countries 82, average time-series 53

exclusion\_sick\_prog: exclusions for the major Sickness insurance program Mean 0.89 Standard-Deviation 1.6, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 4251, countries 77, average time-series 55.

exclusion\_unemp\_prog: exclusions for the major Unemployment insurance program Mean 1.2 Standard-Deviation 2.3, Min 0 Max 11. Observations 3349, countries 69, average time-series 48.5

exclusion\_working\_prog: exclusions for the major Work Accident program Mean 1.3 Standard-Deviation 1.9, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 4823, countries 94, average time-series 51

exclusion\_familiy\_prog: exclusions for the major Family Allowance program. Mean 0.05 Standard-Deviation 0.30, Min 0 Max 2. Observations 3747, countries 74, average time-series 51



**Figure 4 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the number of groups explicitly excluded for each major program. Note, all observations (including no-program) included**

## Separate or Special programs:

**Question:** How many statutory occupational programs or major social programs in addition to the above mentioned major program is currently in existence? Code the specific number of programs for each social policy type:

seperateprogr\_oldage\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of Old-Age. Mean 2.2 Standard-Deviation 5.7, Min 0 Max 63. Observations 8424, countries 140, average time-series 60.

seperateprogr\_mater\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of maternity. Mean 0.72 Standard-Deviation 2.61, Min 0 Max 41. Observations 7414, countries 129, average time-series 57.

seperateprogr\_sick\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of sickness. Mean 0.76 Standard-Deviation 2.61, Min 0 Max 41. Observations 7833, countries 131, average time-series 60.

seperateprogr\_unemp\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of unemployment. Mean 0.15 Standard-Deviation 0.72, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 9804, countries 137, average time-series 71.5

seperateprogr\_working\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of work accidents. Mean 0.5 Standard-Deviation 1.1, Min 0 Max 8. Observations 7439, countries 127, average time-series 60.

seperateprogr\_familiy\_prog: The number of special programs for the risk of child rearing. Mean 0.25 Standard-Deviation 0.86, Min 0 Max 10. Observations 9104, countries 133, average time-series 68.5.




Figure 5 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the number of separate (special) programs for each major risk. Note, all observations (including no-program) included

## Private programs:

**Question:** Is the major welfare program a private mandatory account program or a private provident fund? If the major program consists of several additional tiers, are any of these programs private? Yes = 1 No = 0.

private\_oldageprog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of Old-Age. Mean 0.1 Standard-Deviation 0.30, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 6805, countries 140, average time-series 48.6


private\_mater\_prog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of child-birth. Mean 0.02 Standard-Deviation 0.16, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 5987, countries 114, average time-series 52

private\_sick\_prog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of sickness. Mean 0.03 Standard-Deviation 0.17, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 5558, countries 103, average time-series 54

private\_unemp\_prog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of unemployment. Mean 0.03 Standard-Deviation 0.17, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4310, countries 83, average time-series 52

private\_working\_prog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of work accident. Mean 0.31 Standard-Deviation 0.46, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 7390, countries 138, average time-series 53.5

private\_family\_prog: The presence of a private mandatory or provident fund program for the risk of child rearing. Mean 0.002 Standard-Deviation 0.04, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4651, countries 93, average time-series 50.




**Figure 6 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the presence of a private program for each major risk. Note, all observations (including no-program) included**

## Waiting days:

**Question:** How many days must the claimant wait before he or she can receive benefits. Code the requirements for the minimum benefit for the major program, for a first time claimant. If no program exists code zero. Ignore considerations of special programs.

waiting\_sick: how many days a claimant must wait before receiving sickness benefits. Mean 2.32 Standard-Deviation 3.7, Min 0 Max 84. Observations 4602, countries 94, average time-series 49

waiting\_unemp: how many days a claimant must wait before receiving unemployment benefits. Mean 3.2 Standard-Deviation 6.7, Min 0 Max 60. Observations 3333, countries 74, average time-series 45



**Figure 7 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the number of waiting days for sickness and unemployment programs. Note, all observations (including no-program) included**

## Contributions

**Question:** How many weeks must the claimant be employed or pay contributions before he or she becomes eligible for benefits. Code the requirements for the minimum benefit for the major program, for a first time claimant. If no program exists code 0. If program is non-contributory, code residential requirement. Ignore considerations of special programs.

contribution\_employment\_oldage: how many weeks a claimant must work or pay contributions before becoming eligible for old-age benefits. Mean 614 Standard-Deviation 439, Min 0 Max 2600.


Observations 5608, countries 132, average time-series 42

contribution\_employment\_mater: how many weeks a claimant must work or pay contributions before becoming eligible for Maternity benefits. Mean 17.6 Standard-Deviation 20, Min 0 Max 156.

Observations 5084, countries 113, average time-series 45

contribution\_employment\_sick: how many weeks a claimant must work or pay contributions before becoming eligible for sickness benefits. Mean 11 Standard-Deviation 16, Min 0 Max 104. Observations 4568, countries 98, average time-series 46.6

contribution\_employment\_unemp: how many weeks a claimant must work or pay contributions before becoming eligible for unemployment benefits. Mean 25 Standard-Deviation 33, Min 0 Max 192. Observations 3210, countries 74, average time-series 43




**Figure 8** Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the number of weeks paid contributions or paid employment for old-age, maternity, sickness, and unemployment programs. Note, all observations (including no-program) included

## Retirement age:

**Question:** At what age can a worker claim his pension? Early-retirement age pensions are not to be coded. If different for males and females I code the male retirement age. No program is coded 999. A provident program without a specific retirement age is coded 0.

retage\_oldage: the retirement age for a male worker under the major old-age program. Mean 60.5 Standard-Deviation 7, Min 0 Max 70. Observations 5764, countries 143, average time-series 40 – excluded 999 values observations.





**Figure 9 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for old-age retirement age (male). Note, no program observations excluded (999).**


### **Duration of Benefits:**

**Question:** For how many weeks is the claimant entitled to benefits. If benefits are not time-restricted, code 999. Ignore conditions for special programs. If no major system is in place code 0.

**duration\_mater:** how many weekly payments (minimum) an eligible claimant is eligible to receive before and after child birth. Mean 17 Standard-Deviation 83, Min 0 Max 999. Observations 5093, countries 110, average time-series 46

**duration\_sick :** how many weekly payments (minimum) an eligible claimant is eligible to receive during a single sickness spell – waiting days not taken into account. Mean 120 Standard-Deviation 291, Min 0 Max 999. Observations 4432, countries 94, average time-series 47

**duration\_unemp:** how many weekly payments (minimum) an eligible claimant is eligible to receive upon becoming unemployed – waiting days not taken into account. Mean 62 Standard-Deviation 212, Min 0 Max 999. Observations 3019, countries 73, average time-series 41



**Figure 10** Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the number of weeks benefits are paid. Note, all observations (including no-program) included. Indefinitely payments are coded 999.

## Income Restrictions:

**Question:** is eligibility to benefits determined by the claimant's income? Yes 1, No 0. If no program exists code 0.

**income\_oldage:** Is eligibility to the major old-age program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.31 Standard-Deviation X, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 6644, countries 135, average time-series 50


**income\_mater:** : Is eligibility to the major maternity program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.17 Standard-Deviation X, Min Max 1. Observations 5409, countries 103, average time-series 52.5

**income\_sick:** : Is eligibility to the major sickness program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.2 Standard-Deviation X, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4991, countries 98, average time-series 50.9

**income\_unemp:** : Is eligibility to the major unemployment program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.25 Standard-Deviation X, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 3713, countries 75, average time-series 49.5

**income\_working:** : Is eligibility to the major work accident program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.18 Standard-Deviation X, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 5269, countries 111, average time-series 47.4

income\_family: : Is eligibility to the major family allowance program restricted by income? Both in the form of means-testing and income ceilings (claimant above a certain income cannot insure). Mean 0.16 Standard-Deviation 0.36, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4340, countries 89, average time-series 48.7



**Figure 11 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for income restrictions for all the major programs. Note, all observations (including no-program) included.**

## State subsidies:

**Question:** does the state subsidize parts of the costs or guarantee for the financial security of the existence of the major welfare program? No = 0 Yes 1. If no program code 0. Ignore state subsidies of special programs.

statesubsidy\_oldage: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major old-age program? Mean 0.52 Standard-Deviation 0.50, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 6655, countries 136, average time-series 49


statesubsidy\_mater: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major maternity program? Mean 0.43 Standard-Deviation 0.50, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 5147, countries 102, average time-series 50

statesubsidy\_sick: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major sickness insurance program? Mean 0.45 Standard-Deviation 0.50, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4855, countries 94, average time-series 51

statesubsidy\_unemp: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major unemployment insurance program? Mean 0.47 Standard-Deviation 0.50, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 3663, countries 76, average time-series 48

statesubsidy\_working: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major work accident program? Mean 0.15 Standard-Deviation 0.36, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 5719, countries 121, average time-series 47

statesubsidy\_family: does the state partake in the subsidy - by direct matching contributions or covering deficits – of the major family allowance program? Mean 0.37 Standard-Deviation 0.48, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 4305, countries 90, average time-series 47



**Figure 12** Histogram showing the distribution of observations for state subsidy for all the major programs. Note, all observations (including no-program) included.

### Ghent-systems:

**Question:** is the major unemployment program administered by the unions independently of whether it is voluntary or compulsory? Or are unions allowed to opt out of the public scheme and administer their own schemes with state subsidies? Yes = 1, No = 0. If no program exist code 0.

Ghent \_all: is there a Ghent-system in place. Mean 0.04 Standard-Deviation 0.21, Min 0 Max 1.

Observations 13782, countries 153, average time-series 90

### Voluntary Ghent-systems:


**Question:** Is the major social policy program a voluntary unemployment program administered by the unions? Yes = 1 No = 0. If no program exist code 0.

Ghent \_volunt: is there a voluntary Ghent-system in place? Mean 0.03 Standard-Deviation 0.18, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13765, countries 153, average time-series 90

### Dual Ghent-systems:

**Question:** Is the major social policy program a compulsory unemployment administered by the unions? Or are unions allowed to opt out of the public scheme and administer their own schemes with state subsidies? Yes =1 No =0. If no program exist code 0.

Ghent \_dual: Is there a voluntary Ghent-system in place? Mean 0.01 Standard-Deviation 0.10, Min 0 Max 1. Observations 13280, countries 153, average time-series 86.7



**Figure 13 Histogram showing the distribution of observations for the various types of Ghent-systems. Note, only data for those countries with an unemployment system included.**

## 4 Acknowledgments

I am grateful for discussions and moral support from Øyvind Skorge, Tore Wig, Sirianne Dahlum, Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Carsten Jensen, and Aksel Braanen Sterri. I am also grateful for insightful comments on the dataset and coding-procedures from Axel West-Pedersen, Henning Finseraas, Jo Lind, Jonas Pontusson, Kalle Moene, and several anonymous reviewers on the papers that use this dataset. I am also grateful to Emilie Wesche Guttormsen for excellent research assistance and to Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Kalle Moene and ESOP at the University of Oslo for Financial support. Equally supportive were my dissertation supervisors Carsten Jensen and Kees Van Kersbergen. As always, this could not have been done without loving assistance from Vilde Stuvøy Heggen.

## 5 Future Revisions

This datasets includes data on several complicated aspects of social policy for a very long time and over 100 countries. Inevitably, therefore, the data contains several errors. Some of these errors result from lack of available sources on the laws themselves, meaning that errors may sneak in as I have had to use secondary accounts that only refer to the existing legislation in passing. In addition, many of the reports used are sometimes inconsistent in terms of which year their data refers to (sometimes of by 1-2 years). The reports are also highly inconsistent in the definition of general concepts such as wage-worker, employees, and so on. This is especially the case for the SSPTW-reports, since these are based on surveys to the relevant national department in the country in question. This means that changes in the wording of the respondent can end up being classified as a legislative change in coverage (with the wording changing from “wage and salary workers” to “employees” without any real change in the legislation. This is likely to introduce error in the segmentation and universalism indexes. The SSPTW also proved highly erratic in their reports on special benefits for smaller occupational groups. Here special benefits can be mentioned one year, with no mention the next year before returning in the third year. It has therefore proved difficult to track legislative changes over time for these benefits, and authors using these data should take care and perhaps not use them at all except as a proxy. Another problem concerns the very definition of major social programs, with some datasets, reports and published papers making no distinction between what is considered major and what is simply an occupational benefit. Similar errors also arose for differences between transfer and in-kind benefits.

Consequently, even if I have sought to cross-reference the specific codings with several sources, referred to national accounts and so on, it is reasonable to assume that many of the specific classifications are simply wrong. I am therefore highly grateful for any recommendation to alternative

classifications. Anyone who suspects I have made an error is therefore recommended to contact me directly.

I am also working hard on SPAW version 2.0 together with Carl Henrik Knutsen (UIO) with financial assistance from the DEEPI-project. The main difference between these two datasets will be the inclusion of several social policies regulated through labor law. This will include, but not be restricted to, severance payments, notification of dismissal, and working-time laws. We also aim to collect disaggregated data on Australian, Canadian and American states and Swiss cantons leading up to the first federal benefits.

## **6 Recommended citation**

Rasmussen, Magnus (2016). The Social Policy Around The World (SPAW) database 1870-2010. Aarhus.

## **7 The Coding Process**

This section provides an account of my coding procedures for the major laws, the universalism and segmentation index and provides a discussion of general issues.

### **Major social policy laws**

The first measure coded is the presence of a major social policy. This is a dichotomous measure of whether a social policy program – passing a minimum threshold – exists or not. This minimum threshold is operationalized as the program covering one or more of the following 8 major social/occupational groups: agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-firm workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; family/domestic workers.

My starting point for the coding of major welfare laws was to first use several ILO reports (especially the M-series), published between 1922 and 1939 and two SSPTW reports (1937 and 1939) to code the first year of legislation for all countries or colonies covered in these reports.

Having first established which countries had enacted what kinds of policies, if any, before 1939 I proceeded in the following manner:

1) For the countries that had laws before 1939 I used the Legislative Series for the time period between 1919 up to 1939. For the countries that had legislation even further back in time I used different sources. One source was the labor monthly published by the American labor department and their

individual reports on accident insurance programs (workingman compensation programs). For legislation even further back I used individual studies by historians, political scientists or – when available online – English and Scandinavian law databases and statistical yearbooks with summaries of major legislative acts for the year in question.

2) Having first coded the introduction of a major law for a country, I used regional ILO reports and the bi-annual SSPTW reports to track whether a law was still in place or had been removed. This was rarely the case for any policies except unemployment laws. These tended to be removed or suspended indefinitely in African countries (French-colonies), or in Eastern-European countries under soviet-influence.

3) I then turned to the countries that did not have laws prior to 1939 (or did not have laws either as an independent country or as a colony or mandate-area). Here I started out with the country list from SSPTW 1999 and as a first rough cut used the bi-annual SSPTW reports to track the introduction of major laws. In addition I used regional reports from the ILO in order to track developments in Africa and Latin America especially. After 1970 and 1980 I also used ILOs SECSOC, NATLEX, and TRAVAIL together with EUs MISSOC and CISSTAT databases to track more recent events. Having narrowed it down I then used the legislative series to check that the laws did fit the criteria of major laws as prescribed.

4) The resulting classifications were then compared to already major welfare laws databases or major studies in order to both verify but also investigate the precision of previous attempts at making major law databases. Here I used several different databases (e.g. Aleksynska and Schindler 2011; Carnes and Mares 2014; Flora, Alber, and others 1983; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Gauthier 1996; descriptions in Haggard and Kaufman 2008; A. M. Hicks 1999; A. Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Huberman and Lewchuk 2003; The country specific notes from Korpi and Palme 2007; Mares 1997; Mesa-Lago 1978; Rama and Artecona 2002). When I found conflicting classifications I used the legislative series to see if the law in question was indeed a major law under the classification here used or whether it was instead the result of previous authors using different criteria for what constituted a major welfare law. In most instances I found that differences in coding resulted from two factors: the first was previous databases having relied on recent SSPTW reports to code backward in time. Reports in which classification of what constituted a major law changed within countries between reports. This is a result of the SSPTW-reports being based on surveys of labor departments in the countries in question. With changing personnel and regimes (colonies becoming independent for example) the replies from the labor



departments could change quite drastically even if the legislation was the same as before. The second factor was unclear principles by previous researchers as to what constituted a major welfare state program.

## **Social groups**

In order for a welfare law to be coded as a major welfare law and not a special program it must cover one of the following social groups: A) Agricultural workers, B) Industrial/production workers, C) Small firms (workers in), D) Self-Employed, E) Students, F) Employers, G) Temporary and/or casual workers, H) Family workers and/or domestic workers. If none of these groups are covered the law is instead to be coded as a separate program.

These groups were chosen based on their historical importance, in the advent of the industrial economy or as major groups of the labor force, but also the extent to which they are explicitly mentioned as covered or excluded from eligibility in the social policy laws themselves.

There is also precedence for using these groups to capture the degree of universalism or coverage in the literature. These groups were also the social groups chosen by the Rama and Artecona (2002) for their alternative dataset on welfare state coverage, and three of them were also pertinent in Mares (2005, 648) index on universalism in social insurance programs.<sup>3</sup>

## **Universalism and Segmentation Scoring**

In constructing measures for universalism and segmentation I build on the approach outlined by Mares (2005). The aim was to construct a measure that captures variation between programs in the degree to which they are targeted to the poor, targeted to a (few) groups, or available to all. I first outline the segmentation index, then the universalism index, before illustrating the coding procedure that was used in creating these measures.

*The segmentation index:* The extent to which eligibility is segmented, concentrated to specific groups or a group, is coded depending on the number of social or occupational groups entitled to benefits. The baseline versions range from 0–8. Where entitlement is universal, or dependent on a property-based mean-test (pure income-based tests are not counted as means-tested programs – see discussion below), I code a program as having the lowest segmentation score (1).<sup>4</sup> In these systems, benefits are not targeted to a specific group (taken into consideration that which groups are poor is to some degree

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<sup>3</sup> The three groups are (a) agricultural workers, (b) the self-employed, and (c) small firms.

<sup>4</sup> All substantial results presented within are robust to excluding this category in the segmentation index.

random). This system entails that all citizens (or citizens experiencing a drastic loss of resources, independently of their social or ethnic group membership) are entitled to benefits. Next are programs that require some form of labor market employment, such as private-mandatory or social insurance programs. Here eligibility is either dependent on the length of employment or the payment of contributions, and eligibility is usually formally restricted to specific sectors or professions. I therefore distinguish between these programs depending on the degree to which entitlement is restricted to many or few groups. In the case that only one group has access; the program is scored as fully segmented with a score of 8.

- 0. No policy
- 1. Universal or Means-tested [asset-test in combination with income-test or residency/citizenship based ]
- 2. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 7 social groups covered
- 3. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 6 social groups covered
- 4. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 5 social groups covered
- 5. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 4 social groups covered
- 6. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 3 social groups covered
- 7. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 2 social groups covered
- 8. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 1 social group covered

The segmentation index is an ordinal variable, measuring whether benefits are targeted to a specific set of groups or in its outmost instance, to one group. It also gives an indication of the degree of randomness in the targeting of social policy benefits. At the lower levels, coverage is less specified, with various sectors or occupations having access depending either on residency or their means. At higher levels, uncertainty is reduced as benefits are clearly targeted to one or a few set of groups.

- 0. No policy
- 1. Means-tested [asset-test in combination with income-test]
- 2. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 1 social groups covered
- 3. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 2 social groups covered
- 4. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 3 social groups covered
- 5. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 4 social groups covered
- 6. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 5 social groups covered
- 7. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 6 social groups covered

8. Employment [contribution/employment based] – 7 social group covered
9. Universal [residency/citizenship based] – all citizens are covered.

*The universalism index:* The universalism indexes capture which parts of the population are included on equal terms in the same program. The baseline versions range from 0–9, and are scored 0 if programs are absent and 1 if programs are means-tested based on some property criteria. Further, contribution- or employment-based programs covering one major group are scored 2. 3-scores indicate that programs are contribution- or employment-based and cover two major groups, and so on, up to 8-scores where seven groups are covered. Maximum 9-scores indicate all residents are automatically entitled to benefits – a fully universal system. A major difference between the universalism and segmentation index is that the former only goes to 8, while the universal system can be further distinguished between those employment based programs with high coverage, and those that grant benefits independently of market status. In other words, this covers those programs where the criteria for eligibility are citizenship or residency.

An alternative index is the overall difference in universalism and segmentation. The final difference index score for country  $x$  at time  $y$  equals the universalism program score – segmentation program score. If a program is scored higher on the universalism variable than the segmentation variable, the resulting score will be higher, meaning that higher numbers equals more universal benefits. If a program is scored as means-tested, the difference will be zero, meaning that the program is no more segmented than universal. If the program is scored as fully universal, a right based on citizenship, the universalism score will be 9 and the segmentation score will be 1. The program will therefore receive the maximum score of 8. This indicates that the program is much more universal than segmented. Similarly, if a program scored 8 on the segmentation index and therefore 2 on the universalism index the difference will be -6. The program is therefore more segmented than universal.

Users can also use the universalism index to create alternative types of programs. For example, researchers can create a dummy variable capturing whether countries have a means-tested (non-contributory) program, so that one can simply create a dummy that takes on the value zero when the index is 1.

One central problem is that law-texts or alternative sources (especially SSPTW) are not always explicit as to how many groups are covered. Sometimes the law specifies “all employees” as eligible, with temporary and domestic workers included in the definition of employees, whereas other times, “all employees” only refer to employees in long-term contract and not in domestic employment. Sometimes

additional country sources could be used to determine which definition of employees was used – and we have gone to great lengths to identify and assess such sources, but in many instances the law itself is ambiguous. In these instances I therefore developed the following rule of thumb: when only employees are stated as covered I coded the system as covering a wage and salaried workers in both industry and agriculture independent of firm size, resulting in a segmentation score of 6. This designates a system where the major groups of employees are covered. When instead the law refers to all employees I code the system as covering all forms of wage work, including temporary, students, domestic workers, resulting in a score of 4. The only excluded categories in these systems are self-employed, students, and employers.

Two sources of mistakes posed a particular challenge to creating the above index. Inflated statements of coverage in general program descriptions, and coverage of major groups in separate programs.

Another problem was the fact that coverage could be exaggerated in general descriptions. Some laws would for example only actually cover certain smaller groups within one of the large social groups even if the introductory law text refers to the whole group. For example, SSPTW or the law itself could state that self-employed people were covered, even if self-employed in this case were narrowly defined as specific groups of self-employed workers (artisans etc.). Alternatively, self-employed could mean only urban self-employed workers, excluding farmers or other forms of rural self-employment. Another prevalent tendency for disability insurance was to state that also rural workers were covered, but then later restrict this to only rural employees working with electricity or power (saw-mill workers etc.). In all of these instances, I have coded these programs as covering neither of these groups (self-employed or rural employees).

Major groups could also be covered through programs separate from the first major program. For example, a country could first have introduced a sickness scheme covering industrial and commercial workers, meaning it would be a major program, but later introduce a second major program covering rural employees.

Alternatively (and this is where it becomes really complicated), smaller parts of a major group could become covered in additional special programs. In some instances, enough of these smaller groups could become covered in special schemes as to warrant classifying a major group as covered. For example, special program can first be extended to urban self-employed, then to farmers, making both rural and urban self-employed covered.

In these instances, I have coded the indices as if these groups are covered in the main program. This is because I aim to capture the overall level of coverage for a specific risk, not just the specific programmatic coverage – even if this is a decisive dimension of it. At the same time, it complicates the coding process as the number of programs that one needs to track, and the depths to which one must read the laws, drastically increases.

All in all, there are several potential pitfalls for making wrong descriptive inferences. In coding the index I therefore proceeded as follows:

1) I used the presence of a major law as the starting point for my classifications. For laws before 1900, and for laws between 1900 and 1918 I use Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistic reports and legislative histories from ILO reports published between 1920 and 1930s. After 1918 the legislative series takes precedence over any alternative source, unless official descriptions are available or alternative sources indicates that the legislation in question was interpreted differently from the legislative text. I start out by classifying each first major law for the various risks; I then use this classification as a comparison when comparing later laws in order to track changes in the universalism or segmentation indexes. This means that for countries that introduced a law in, say, 1973, as Samoa did, and later experienced no changes, the coding-sheet only classify this first law and then only notes that this program had not changed when more recent (post 1973) legislation or reports were consulted. This is indicated in the country codebook sheet by “no changes”.

2) After the first law has been coded, I use ILO reports and the biannual SSPTW reports to indicate whether a change has taken place that influences the scoring. Here again I face the problem that changes in SSPTW does not necessarily reflect changes in the legislation. I therefore tried to substantiate that changes had indeed taken place by using the legislative series. Since the SSPTW also could be tracking changes in implemented legislation (that is, legislation decreed at an earlier date but not implemented before the survey year) I check for legislative changes up to three years before the SSPTW survey year.

For factors not tracked by the legislative series, and only in the SSPTW-reports, such as the number of special programs (of which only some tend to be covered) it becomes much harder to verify the changes in SSPTW data. Here I adopted several strategies that I usually used in tandem with each other. First, after having detected say a change in the number of special programs in SSPTW, I would read forward in the SSPTW reports to ascertain whether the changes were not a sign of omission – that had been left out in one report only to be put in later. Second, I would use additional detailed social policy

studies (such as Flora et. al. 1987, Mesa-Lago 1978) containing extensive legislative histories, or country-reports from governmental offices (usually the labor departments or sometimes social-security offices) in order to verify the information. One problem that I encountered here was that several of these additional sources would refer back to SSPTW reports, making them unfit to verify the SSPTW-reports. In several instances, I ended up simply letting some years between reports go to missing. Fortunately, the legislative tends to follow separate programs for the groups defined as major in this dataset.

3) After having used these three major sources to code the datasets, I shifted to trying to verify these classifications using already existing studies that tracked legislative changes (some of which have been referenced already). For OECD-countries the country coding-sheets given in the SPAW-data proved invaluable as confirmation that all major legislative changes had been tracked in these countries. After 1970, the Scruggs coding-sheets played a similar role. The richness of these descriptions was invaluable as a testing ground for my classifications. This is especially true since the extent of legislative changes in the OECD-region dwarfed that of the African and Asian countries. It was therefore easier to get an oversight over the changes that had taken place in these countries than the countries in the OECD-area. Given the scant information in the SSPTW on coverage for smaller groups – or exceptions to specific groups within these larger groups - what was especially important was the process to verify when smaller groups such domestic workers, students, types of self-employed groups and so on became eligible for benefits.

4) As this project took place over several years, I was able to revisit my classification using additional sources discovered during the project. This was especially the case with ILO reports on Africa, and additional case-study work done by other authors.

The following sections will discuss specific issues with the major welfare state laws and the universalism segmentation indexes.

### **Coverage in separate programs**

How do I handle coverage extended through separate programs when creating the indexes? For example, if first industrial and commercial employees are covered in one program and rural workers in a second program, is the final score coded as only covering only two or all three? Or, if farmers (self-employed workers in the rural sector) or artisans or other categories of urban self-employed are covered in smaller, separate programs, are self-employed workers still covered? In all of these instances, the program is coded as if these groups are covered in the main program. This is done to reflect the

fact that groups have indeed access to benefits, even if these are on different conditions and with differences in benefits and eligibility conditions.

One way a welfare state can be segmented is by not restricting coverage to specific groups, but by instead pillarizing the welfare state system (Lijphart 1989). In these pillarized systems, coverage would not be restricted, but group membership would still result in different benefits and conditions, even if all groups are at some level covered against a specific risk. Group membership would therefore mean access to a unique pillar of the welfare system.

The above consideration shows that the scoring system chosen is problematic. Specifically by trying to capture the overall access granted to welfare benefits to various groups into one program score, it also ends up losing out on a central aspect of segmentation. Researchers that aim to use the data to describe this kind of segmentation should therefore take into consideration that it will in fact not be a perfect measure of doing so.

### **State sector programs**

There is one exception to the above rule. If a program is introduced that covers employees in the *state sector*, and this refers not only to civil servants but also workers in state owned manufacturing and commercial firms, I do not code this as separate program but instead as a major program.

In these countries, the state sector takes a much larger role in the economy than others, with most industrial workers finding coverage under these systems. When the coverage is only for state owned commercial and industrial workers the program is scored as fully segmented – or close to depending on restrictions dependent on firm size. As new groups are included in the state system, the segmentation score (universalism score), decreases (increases) as per the index outlined above.

### **Wage-and salary workers**

Some programs make a distinction between “workers” on “salary-” and “wage-based” workers. With countries either having separate programs for each group or excluding the one in favor of the other. In the latter instances, I have increased the segmentation index by 0.5 and decreased it similarly for the universalism index by 0.5.

### **Means-testing**

Existing data-sets are in a disagreement on how one should deal with means-testing when it comes to universalism. This disagreement is reflected in quite different country-classifications from two of the leading approaches to scoring welfare state universalism. On the one hand is Korpi and Palme (2007),

who consider means-tested programs as the opposite to universal benefits, classifying all programs with a means-test, independently of the stringency of this test, as having zero coverage. This means that old-age pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits in New Zealand and Australia are scored zero. Similarly, Esping-Andersen (1990, 71) also gives sickness and unemployment programs in New Zealand and Australia the lowest possible universalism score in his index, arguing that means-tested programs do not constitute full social citizenship. Comparing these classifications to those of Scruggs we see a radical difference in 1980 – Scruggs gives the unemployment and sickness system a coverage score of 100 % and pensions 95 %. The leading datasets therefore actually diverge on a spectrum from min to max level of scoring(sic!).

The essence of this debate is the question of how to penalize universalism scores for the presence of means-testing. I argue that we can do this by recognizing that not all means-tests are equal. By distinguishing the penalizing and non-penalizing (or non-exclusionary and exclusionary) means-tests we can create an index that deal with the valid concerns of both sides in the debate. I do this by differentiating between means-tests where all assets of the claimant goes into consideration (stocks, house, and income of family members), and lenient means-test based on the claimant's income alone. Only the former is considered a means-tested system in the scorings here used. One could of course differentiate the latter based on how restrictive the income criteria is, but lacking proper wage-data such an approach is dropped in favor of the more simple criteria used here.

At the same time, authors that disagree with my classification can use the income restriction variable together with the segmentation index in order to create an alternative means-test measure. By creating a dummy that takes on the value 1 when the segmentation index is 1 and the income restriction variable is 1 would create a dummy that captures means-tested non-contributory programs following the standard adopted by Korpi and Palme (2007).

## **Dual-systems**

One issue of concern is the fact that some countries, such as the present day unemployment insurance in the UK, for example, have enacted two or up to three major programs to cover the same risk. In order to deal with the presence of dual programs, I follow the same strategy as Mares (2005). First I code each independent program using the metric above, and then I the average of resulting scores as the final segmentation score.

Note that in order to be considered as a dual or triple system, entitlement for the second program must be independent of the first program. A program will not be coded as an independent program if



payment is dependent on having received payments from the first program. This follows from the fact that eligibility for the continuation benefit is dependent on first having qualified for the first program.

### **Transfer Benefits and In-kind Programs**

One common source of disagreement on the introduction of major laws relates to previous studies not separating benefits in kind systems from transfer programs. In order to provide a clear coding and avoid any resulting conflation and misinterpretation, SPAW only codes the latter. It should be noted that even previous datasets that have claimed to measure only transfer programs are sometimes doing otherwise. For example, New Zealand is sometimes coded as having an unemployment program in 1930. Unfortunately, closer inspection with primary sources shows that New Zealand at that time had only introduced an unemployment relief program, where unemployed workers were given public work in exchange for basic assistance. Even if one accepts this as an unemployment insurance program, benefits were not in payments, but instead in kind. New Zealand did not introduce a transfer program before in 1938, an eight year difference between our score and the score from the previous measures.

### **Voluntary or Compulsory Coverage**

Some programs start out by outlining which groups are obligated to insure in a social program, while also specifying some groups that can voluntarily decide to opt in. Since the coverage tends to be lower in the latter group, several researchers have tended to focus only on compulsory coverage, ignoring voluntary insurance. The universalism and the segmentation indexes make no distinction between coverage that is voluntary or compulsory. This is because I code what rights are granted workers, not how effective these policies were in increasing social insurance into all spheres of social life. The distinction between voluntary or compulsory coverage is not decisive for whether we classify a certain social group as covered or not. This explains why, for instance, our coded coverage level for Japanese programs is more generous than what is sometime assumed; we take into account that even as compulsory insurance was restricted to urban workers in large firms, other categories of workers could voluntarily opt into coverage. I have, however, left out voluntary coverage programs without some form of state subsidies – as these systems are more analogous to private than state insurance.

By considering voluntary and compulsory coverage as equal also raises certain problems. Most voluntary programs, as for example the Swedish unemployment law of 1934, leaves it up to administrator to accept or reject applications from unemployment funds (which would be supplied by unions, in most instances) from various sectors of the economy. Voluntary systems such as these are to some extent agnostic on which groups are actually able to insure with a voluntary fund. I therefore

developed the following rule in scoring voluntary programs in the absence of clearly specific rules for coverage: I assume that all non-temporary or domestic employees have the right to insure in the system. This results in segmentation score of 6 and universalism score of 4.

## **Generosity**

In this section I outline the coding considerations that were used when I coded program generosity. It is important to keep these considerations in mind when comparing these data to alternative datasets (such as those of CEWD and SCIP) as I make quite different assumptions on what kind of person is receiving benefits and what kind of benefits are coded. The first refers to the specifics of the claimant, the second whether the benefit claimed is the maximum or minimum allowed and so on.

First, where there are several programs we always code the redistributive potential of the compulsory or earnings-related program that as a minimum covers industrial wage-workers. Certain countries determine waiting and contribution period dependent on age and or region of residence. In such cases I code the minimum requirement and the accompanied duration. This means that I in most instances will bias the results downwards (less redistributive). When the requirements are different for the first and following usages, I have not coded any additional usage. This will in principle mean that I underestimate the generosity of the system for the clinically ill persons employed in stressful environments. When it comes to extensions of the primary benefit period these extensions have not been coded. This is because it is in many instances unclear exactly how these extensions are implemented. In coding maternity benefits I have assumed a single working mother with one child. Pains have been taken to follow this standard, but in some instances deviation from this pattern have occurred. This is noted in the country notes.

Lump-sum schemes are considered major programs on equal terms with benefits that are paid over-time, but they have been coded as having zero duration. For old-age pensions, there is sometimes individual retirement ages for the different genders. In these instances the reported retirement age is the one given to male workers. The male retirement age also tends to be higher than that of female workers. In future editions, I hope also to include the female retirement age.

For non-contributory benefits, there is not normally any required employment period to which the claimant must adhere to in order to receive benefits. Instead, the claimant is often required to have been a resident of the country for a specific period of time. I therefore use the residency period as the contribution/employment period necessary to receive benefits. If one is inclined to argue that this is

not an apt comparison, users can amend this decision by removing countries with non-contributory benefits from their analysis. That is, programs scoring 1 on the segmentation index.

Another important issue to note is that the data does not capture the degree of job-protection in the case of sickness or childbirth. For example, even if the claimant has a right (or is mandated) to take a specific number of weeks off from work, her or his job might not be protected against dismissal for this time. That is why it would have been optimal to separate between duration of benefits and the degree to which the claimant's job was protected during this leave. Unfortunately, the data does not differentiate between weeks of paid leave that is granted the claimant and the number of weeks in which the claimant is protected against dismissal. In addition, the impression that I got during the coding was that job-protection must not be assumed to be present even in industrialized countries until after the 1970 (sic). I hope to remedy this missing piece in future versions of the dataset.

Observant readers would undoubtedly have noticed the absence of de-facto replacement rates – the percent of net-wages replaced by net-benefits. Given that the measure has risen to become the predominant way of capturing the generosity of an entitlement (Scruggs 2006), a note on its absence is needed. First and foremost, I decided not to collect net-replacement rates given the lack of average income data that is needed to compute the replacement rate over the long period of time that is under investigation in this project. The ILO-statistical yearbooks and later October survey are able to mitigate this problem somewhat, but even in these publications, the data reported in the early editions are not apt to make cross-national comparisons.

One alternative is to use what we can label the de-jure replacement rate, the replacement rate stated in the law. The de-facto and the de-jure replacement rates usually end up quite different as several factors shape the de-facto replacement rate. For example, the size of the benefit is usually capped for high income earners – and taxes on benefits and wages also interact. One downside to using this measure is therefore that not all welfare laws specify a de-jure replacement rate, or sometimes the law-specified replacement rate deviates radically from the actual replacement rate even when leaving taxes outside of the equation. However, assuming that politicians are information constrained actors, this is likely to matter more for research into the impact of generous welfare benefits, not so much for the study of the politics. Since the de-jure replacement rate is a simple, easy to understand and produce, it is likely to be a focal point for politicians and actors in the political struggle surrounding the enactment of welfare programs. De-facto replacement rates, on the other hand, requires extensive calculations and will most likely differ between income categories. For time and information constrained actors, the de-jure

replacement rate might therefore be a simpler measure to focus on. This is, of course, mere armchair speculation. At the same time, it sounds to me plausible as a starting point for collecting de-jure replacement rates. In future editions I therefore aim to collect de-jure replacement rates.

## **Ghent-systems**

Trade union administered systems have been particularly highlighted as important for their ability to increase the power-base of organized labor. Several studies that focus on the post-war period have therefore investigated the effect of Ghent-systems on trade union organization after the 1970s (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006; Lind 2009; Rothstein 1992; Scruggs 2002; Van Rie, Marx, and Horemans 2011; Western 1997). Unfortunately, interest has not been reflected in conceptual clarification or data-sets on Ghent-systems before the post-war period, when most Ghent-systems originated.

Here I remedy this problem by providing three-clear conceptualization and empirical measures of Ghent-systems. First, I use an extensive definition of a Ghent-system that encompasses union administration in both voluntary and compulsory systems: Ghent-systems are present when the unemployment benefit is either administered by unions alone, or unions have the option to either set-up their own schemes with subsidies or administer the state scheme on a sectorial basis. This definition can be split into two smaller parts: one in which unions administer a voluntary unemployment insurance scheme, and no other major program exists. This seems to be the layman understanding of the term. The classical case of this is the early Danish and Norwegian Ghent-systems. Another category we can think of as dual-systems: here unions administer one system, but there exists alternative programs with state founding. One example of this is Norway 1938 between 1946 where unions operated their voluntary schemes while the state had enacted a compulsory scheme for those not member in a union found.

Second, I provide historical classification of all of these three definitions of Ghent-systems, but only for major unemployment programs using the classification above. This means that I for instance have not coded whether unions have been given the right to organize miner's pensions or administer benefits for railway-workers.

When it comes to eligibility, Ghent-systems are coded, as all other voluntary systems with state subsidies, as covering all wage- and salary-earners in both industry and agriculture. It must be remembered that close to all systems that is labeled Ghent-systems was voluntary insurance systems such as these, open for unorganized and organized alike. It was only informally that union membership

was to some degree required, as unions could use social pressure as administrators to push workers into dual-membership (Rothstein 1992; Scruggs 2002; Western 1997). If the Ghent-system is a de-jure Ghent system (meaning that only trade union members are legally allowed to become insured) it receives a segmentation score of 8. To reiterate, Union administration of benefits is not enough to be considered a Ghent-system, and these systems are instead scored as other voluntary or compulsory systems.

## 8 Sources

The primary source has been Legislative Series published by the International Labour Organization (Various) between 1919 up to 1980. As already noted, the Legislative Series is an impressive collection of all the major labor laws in this time period, translated into French, Spanish and English. In order to do a rough test of how accurate these translations are I compared the English text of the 1936 Norwegian pension law to its original. The translation quality was surprisingly high, probably even a better job than the collector of this dataset could have done himself. Of course, this might be an outlier, but the general quality of the translation appears to be consistent between countries and over time.

The M-series (social insurance) reports by the (International Labour Organization 1925) starting in 1925 with the excellent “General Problems of Social Insurance” provided invaluable documentation of previous legislative development in all member states (prior to the legislative series), and was also decisive in tracking later developments up to the 1940 and later. For example, the 1955 report on unemployment is both an amazing collection of summaries and statistics on current legislative arrangements (in 1955), but also a historical treatise tracking legislative developments in all countries with an unemployment law up to the 50s (International Labour Organization 1955b). For family allowance I also made use of the D-series (Wages and Hours) to track early legislative developments (International Labour Organization Various) and the I series (Employment of Women and Children) for maternity legislation (International Labour Organization 1932).

In addition, the ILO published report series such as the *International Survey of Social Services* (summarizing social policies in 1930, 1933, and 1950), which proved excellent and invaluable information on the state of social legislation and the operation of these schemes at the specific dates along with the recent legislative development (International Labour Organization Various). For developments during the late 1980s and 1990s the World Labor Report and Conditions of Work Digest also provided additional

excellent information on aspects such as maternity and family benefits (International Labour Organization Various). Furthermore, major regional reports such as the Labor Survey of North Africa by the International Labour Office (1960), the report on social policy in all dependent states of 1944 (International Labour Office 1944), and the cost of social security reports between 1947 and 1996 (International Labour Organization Various) allowed me to check previous classifications.

In addition to these overarching sources from the ILO, I have also made use of several *individual publications* from the ILO. For example, to track coal-miners' social entitlements I have used various reports from ILO agencies and actors (International Labour Organization 1922a, 1931, 1935, 1939, 1947, 1959, 1975, 1976, 1982), social insurance in Greece (International Labour Organization 1949c), early Soviet Russia (International Labour Organization 1922b, 1924), the Caribbean states (International Labour Organisation 1977), the West Indies (Matthews Coj and International Labour Organisation 1952), African states generally (Ejuba and International Labour Organization 1980; Grieve 1973; International Labour Office 1977; Mouton and International Labour Organization 1975; Musiga and International Labour Organisation 1980), Botswana (Woodall et al. 1997), Cambodia (International Labour Office 2012), coverage of agricultural workers (International Labour Office 1952; International Labour Organization 1921b; Savy and International Labour Organization 1972), unemployment insurance (International Labour Office 1968; International Labour Organization 1920, 1921a, 1933b, 1955b), health coverage in developing countries (International Social Security Association 1982; Roemer and International Labour Organization 1969), Cyprus (Matthews and International Labour Organization 1967), the inter-war period (Woytinsky and International Labour Organization 1936), maternity benefits generally (International Labour Organization 1984), maternity benefits in Finland (International Labour Organisation 1975), and finally old-age pensions (International Labour Organization 1989)

In addition, I also made use of an extensive number of country and subject reports published in the *International Labour Review*, starting from 1920 running up to 2010 (International Labour Organization Various). These reports were invaluable on hard cases such as British India (International Labour Organization 1949a), Latin America (Altmeyer 1945; International Labour Organization 1958; Moisés 1928, 1934; Roemer 1973; Stack 1941; Tixier 1935), Brazil (Cardoso and Moacyr 1961), Uruguay (Sanguinetti Freire A 1949), early Chilean legislation (International Labour Organization 1934), Colombia (Herrnstadt 1943) Ceylon/Sri-Lanka (International Labour Organization 1949b), Burma (Sein 1957), Singapore (Brocklehurst and International Labour Organization 1957), Indonesia (Craig and International Labour Organisation 1958), The Philippines (International Labour Organisation

1974), Asia generally (International Labour Organization 1960, 1966; Thompson and International Labour Organization 1974), early up to the 1970s Japan (Ayusawa and International Labour Organization 1926; International Labour Organization 1921d, 1922a, 1933a, 1949e, 1950a, 1961b; Kikuchi 1959; Kitaoka 1934), early Chinese legislation (Chan 1929; Djang 1945), early Thai legislation (Dulyachinda 1949), Algeria (International Labour Organization 1955a), Austria (Lederer 1921), Hungary (Kovrig 1929), Czechoslovakia (International Labour Organization 1921c, 1938b, 1948, 1954), the Eastern-European Socialist States (Tomes 1967), on Africa (Gruat 1990; International Labour Organization 1944, 1961a; Maccabe and International Labour Organization 1973; Mouton and Voirin 1979), early family allowances (Biagi 1937; Hoffner 1935), early maternity laws (International Labour Organization 1929) especially in Spain (Severino 1929), the Franco-Spain reforms (International Labour Organization 1965), for early Yugoslavian (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) legislation (International Labour Organization 1923), the 1925 British pension act (International Labour Organization 1926), Soviet Union (International Labour Organization 1938a; Lantsev 1962), coverage of agricultural labor (International Labour Organization 1950b), early finish legislation (Mannio 1948), early post-war developments (International Labour Organization 1949d), early pension developments in American states (Stack 1931), just to mention a few subjects.

For Africa, the African Social Security Series by the ISSA (International Social Security Association Various) gave in depth information on legislative changes in Africa from 1967-1977. In addition, the ISSA report “Pensions insurance of self-employed persons other than farmers” was decisive to correct several coding mistakes (David and International Social Security Association 1973) together with a report on development in family allowances (Hochard and International Social Security Association 1977) and administrative structures (Idri and International Social Security Association 1986), and a number of special occupational pension programs in Europe in the 1980s (International Social Security Association 1987). I also used several reports collected and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (e.g. Larson, Ethel Y. and United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1930; Meeker, Royal and United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1916; United States. Bureau of Labor 1912; United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1914; United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics et al. 1913; United States: Department of Labor 1929), and finally several reports usually compiled for general assemblies by the International Social Security Association (Various)

In addition I have relied on descriptions, tables and general insights from a host of previous undertaken studies by eminent scholars (Alber 1981; Andreas Sagner 2000; Ashford 1987; Bjørnson 2001; Blaisdell Jr 1938; Briggs 1961; Carnes and Mares 2014; Edling 2006; Erna Magnus 1944; Esping-Andersen and

Korpi 1986; Estevez-Abe 2008; Fishback 2010; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Hagen 2013; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Harris 1984; A. Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Inglot 2008; Jonsson 2001; Kim 2008; Kofi Kumado and Augustine Fritz Gockel 2003; Kuhnle 1983; Lundberg and Aamark 2001; Mares 1997; de Mesa and Mesa-Lago 2006; Mesa-Lago 1978, 2007, 2008; Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002; Nørgaard 1997; Packer and others 2011; Pérez 1998; Petmesidou 1991; Rimlinger 1961, 1968, 1971; Rothstein 1992; Rubinow 1911; Seip 1984, 1994; Stephen Devereux 2007; Stewart and Yermo 2009; Toft 1995; Tzannatos and Roddis 1998; Wadhawan 1972; Western 1997; Whiteside 1980).

I also relied on the following law or statistical databases:

ILO SECSOC : [http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home?p\\_lang=en](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home?p_lang=en)

ILO database: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/crisis-inventory/f?p=17030:2:321742103553269>

MISSOC [http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialsecurity/missceo/tables\\_EN.asp?#2000](http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialsecurity/missceo/tables_EN.asp?#2000)

ILO EPLEX Employment protection rights: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home>

OECD family database: <http://www.oecd.org/els/familiesandchildren/oecdfamilydatabase.htm>

OECD benefits and wages: <http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagespolicies.htm>

ILO LINKS TO LABOUR SURVEYS: [http://www.ilo.org/dyn/lfsurvey/lfsurvey.home?p\\_lang=en](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/lfsurvey/lfsurvey.home?p_lang=en)

ILO TRAVAIL database (maternity + parental leave) <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/travmain.home>

CISSTAT (Coverage data old-soviet union republics) <http://www.cisstat.com/0base/index-en.htm>

World Bank Pension database:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTPENSIONS/0,,contentMDK:23231994~menuPK:8874064~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:396253,00.html>

## 9 Some Differences between SPAW, SCIP and CEWD

The main difference with Scruggs CEWD data is in the coding of duration and contributory periods. In CEWD Scruggs coded the requirements that correspond with a fully insured 40 years old manufacturing employee. This usually leads them to use the maximum benefits and the requirements that correspond to getting their chosen benefit. As I am not coding replacement rates I only code the minimum requirements. Anyways, this point is of minor importance as it is the relationship between requirements to benefits and what the person actually gets in return that is decisive. Therefore, as long as one is comparing minimum requirements to minimum benefits, each procedure is equally valid.



SPAW breaks with SCIP in classifying countries according to all their major programs under a specific risk, and not just their primary program, as is common under SCIP. For example, in coding pensions in UK, Korpi and Palme have opted to only classifying the compulsory flat-rate insurance program, excluding the non- contributory pension of 1908. There are several reasons for why it should be reflected in the scoring of pension eligibility that the UK has a dual-system. First, deciding which program is the “primary” program is for many countries and over time, an exercise in arbitrariness, resulting in scores that reflects coders’ bias. Second, when only scoring one program one ends up with an incomplete picture as to what kind of welfare programs workers face at any one point in time. The scoring would therefore only reflect parts of the social reality that they are meant to capture. I therefore follow Mares (2005, 649) recommendation to first score the two major programs separately, and then take the average of the two resulting scores as the final index score for the universalism and segmentation indices.

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