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DEMOCRACY AND WORKING-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM *

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A variety of evidence from many countries suggests that low status and low education predispose individuals to favor extremist, intolerant, and transvaluational forms of political and religious behavior. The evidence includes reports from surveys concerning differential attitudes among the various strata towards democratic values, including civil liberties for unpopular political groups, civil rights for ethnic minorities, legitimacy of opposition, and proper limits on the power of national political leaders; psychological research on the personality traits of different strata; data on the composition and appeal of chiliastic religious sects; and materials bearing on the support of authoritarian movements. The factors operating to support this predisposition are all those which make for a lack of "sophistication," a complex view of causal relations, and heightened insecurity, both objective and subjective. These findings suggest that the success of the Communist Party among those of low status in poorer nations is positively related to its authoritarian character.

GRADUAL realization that authoritarian predispositions and ethnic prejudice flow more naturally from the situation of the lower classes than from that of the middle and upper classes in modern industrial society has posed a tragic dilemma for those intellectuals of the democratic left who once believed the proletariat necessarily to be a force for liberty, racial equality, and social progress. Ignazio Silone has asserted that "the myth of the liberating power of the proletariat has dissolved along with that other myth of progress. The recent examples of the Nazi labor unions, like those of Salazar and Peron . . . have at last convinced of this even those who were reluctant to admit it on the sole grounds of the totalitarian degeneration of Communism."¹

Dramatic demonstrations of this point

* An early version of this paper was written for a conference on "The Future of Liberty" sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Milan, Italy in September, 1955. It has been extensively reworked since that time as part of a comparative study of the relationship between political behavior and social structure which has been supported by grants from the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council and the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation. I am indebted to Robert Alford and Juan Linz for research assistance.

¹ "The Choice of Comrades," *Encounter*, 3 (December, 1954), p. 25. Arnold A. Rogow, writing in the socialist magazine *Dissent*, even suggests that "the liberal and radical approach has always lacked a popular base, that in essence, the liberal tradition has been a confined minority, perhaps elitist, tradition." "The Revolt Against Social Equality," *Dissent*, 4 (Autumn, 1957), p. 370.

have been given recently by the support of White Citizen's Councils and segregation by workers in the South, and by the active participation of many workers in the "race riots" in England. A "Short Talk with a Fascist Beast" (an 18 year old casual laborer who took part in the beating of Negroes in London), appearing in the left Socialist *New Statesman*, portrays graphically the ideological syndrome which sometimes culminates in such behavior:²

'That's why I'm with the Fascists,' he says. 'They're against the blacks. That Salmon, he's a Communist. The Labour Party is Communist too. Like the unions.' His mother and father, he says, are strict Labour supporters. Is he against the Labour Party. 'Nah, I'm for them. They're for y'know—us. I'm for the unions too.' Even though they were dominated by Communists? 'Sure,' he says. 'I like the Communist Party. It's powerful, like.' How can he be for the Communists when the Fascists hate them?

Len says, 'Well, y'know, I'm for the Fascists when they're against the nigs. But the Fascists is really for the rich people y'know, like the Tories. All for the gov'nors, people like that. But the Communists are very powerful.' I told him the Communist Party of Britain was quite small.

'But,' he says, 'they got Russia behind them.' His voice was full of marvel. 'I admire Russia. Y'know, the people. They're peaceful. They're strong. When they say they'll do a thing, they do it. Not like us. Makes you think: they got a weapon over there can wipe us all out, with one wave of a general's arm. Destroy us completely and totally. Honest,

² Clancy Sigal, in the *New Statesman*, October 4, 1958, p. 440.

those Russians. When they say they'll do a thing, they do it. Like in Hungary. I pity those people, the Hungarians. But did you see the Russians went in and stopped them. Tanks. Not like us in Cyprus. Our soldiers get shot in the back and what do we do? The Communists is for the small men.'

The demonstrations of working-class ethnic prejudice and support for totalitarian political movements which have upset many leftist stereotypes parallel findings in such different areas of social science research as public opinion, religion, family patterns, and personality structure. Many studies suggest that the lower-class way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics. These findings, discussed below, imply that one may anticipate wide-spread support by lower-class individuals and groups for extremist movements.

This assertion may seem to be contradicted by the facts of political history. Since their beginnings in the nineteenth century, workers' organizations and parties have been a major force in extending political democracy and in waging progressive political and economic struggles. Before 1914, the classic division between the working-class left parties and the right was not based solely upon stratification issues, such as redistribution of income, status, and educational opportunities, but also rested upon civil liberties and international policy issues. The workers, judged by the policies of their parties, were often the backbone of the fight for greater political democracy, religious freedom and minority rights, and international peace. The parties backed by the conservative middle and upper classes in much of Europe, on the other hand, tended to favor more extremist political forms, resist the extension of the suffrage, back the established church, and support jingoistic foreign policies.

Events since 1914 have gradually eroded these patterns. In some countries working-class groups have proved to be the most nationalistic and jingoistic sector of the population. In a number of nations, they have clearly been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in countries with open immigration. The conclusion of the anti-Fascist era and the emergence of the cold war have shown that the struggle for

freedom is not a simple variant of the economic class struggle. The threat to freedom posed by the Communist movement is as great as that once posed by Fascism and Nazism, and that movement, in all countries where it is strong, is based largely on the lower levels of the working-class or the rural population.³ No other party has been as thoroughly and completely based on the working-class and the poor. Socialist parties, past and present, have secured much more support from the middle classes than have the Communists.

Some socialists and liberals have suggested that the fact of working-class backing for Communism proves nothing about authoritarian tendencies in the working-class, since the Communist Party often masquerades as a party seeking to fulfill the classic western-democratic revolutionary values of liberty, equality and fraternity; they argue that most Communist supporters, particularly the less educated, are deceived into thinking that the Communists are simply more militant and more efficient socialists. I would suggest, however, the alternative hypothesis that, rather than being a source of strain, the intransigent, intolerant, and demonological aspects of Communist ideology attract members from the lower class of low income, low-status occupation, and little education. In modern industrial societies such persons have made up a very large part of the working class.

The social situation of the lower strata, particularly in poorer countries with low levels of education, predisposes them to view politics in simplistic and chiliastic terms of black and white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, they should be more likely than other strata to prefer extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems and have a rigid outlook rather than those which view the problem of reform or change in complex and gradualist terms and which support rational values of tolerance.

³ The sources of variation in Communist strength from country to country are beyond the scope of this paper. For data and further discussion, see S. M. Lipset, "Socialism—Left and Right—East and West," *Confluence*, 7 (Summer, 1958), pp. 173-192; and Lipset, *Political Man: Essays on the Sociology of Democracy*, New York: Doubleday, forthcoming.

The "authoritarianism" of any social stratum or class, of course, is highly relative, as well as modifiable by organizational commitments to democracy and by individual cross-pressures. Thus the lower class in any given country may be more authoritarian than the upper classes, but on an "absolute" scale all the classes in that country may be less authoritarian than any class in another country. In a country such as Britain, where norms of toleration are well-developed and widespread in every social stratum, even the lowest class may be less authoritarian, more "sophisticated" in the sense of having a longer time-perspective and a gradualist political outlook, than the most highly educated stratum in an underdeveloped country, where immediate problems and crises impinge on every class and short-term solutions may be sought by all groups.⁴

Commitments to democratic procedures and ideals by the principal organizations to which low-status individuals belong may, however, influence their actual political behavior more than their underlying personal values, however authoritarian.⁵ A working class which has developed an early (prior to the Communists) loyalty to a democratic political or trade-union movement which has successfully fought for the social and economic rights of that class will not easily change its allegiance.

Commitments to other values or institutions by individuals may also override the

most established authoritarian predispositions. Thus a Catholic worker who is strongly anti-capitalist may still vote for a relatively conservative party in France, Italy, or Germany because his ties to Catholicism are stronger determinants of his electoral choice than his resentments about his class status; a worker with a high authoritarian predisposition may defend democratic institutions against Fascist attack because his links to anti-Fascist working-class parties and unions affect his political behavior more than do his authoritarian values. Conversely, those who are not predisposed toward extremist political styles may back an extremist party because of certain aspects of its program and political role. Many persons supported the Communists in 1936 and 1943 as an anti-Fascist internationalist party.

The specific propensity of given social strata to support extremist or democratic political parties, then, cannot be derived or predicted from a knowledge of their psychological predispositions or from attitudes revealed by the survey data presented below.⁶ Both evidence and theory suggest, however, that the lower strata are relatively more authoritarian, that (again, other things being equal) they will be more attracted toward an extremist movement than toward a moderate and democratic one, and that, once recruited, they will not be alienated by its lack of democracy, while more educated or sophisticated supporters will tend to drop away.

I shall first discuss basic lower-class attitudes toward civil liberties and non-economic liberalism in general and then examine certain parallels between religion and politics. After documenting some of the general patterns, I shall specify the elements in the general life-situation of lower class persons—the family patterns, typical educational experiences, characteristic tensions and insecurities, their isolated group existence and general lack of sophistication—which differentiate their life from that of the middle

⁴ See Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1957, pp. 78–79, 146–148, for a discussion of the acceptance of norms of toleration by the British working class. E. T. Prothro and Levon Melikian, in "The California Public Opinion Scale in an Authoritarian Culture," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Fall, 1953), pp. 353–363, have shown, in a study of 130 students at the American University in Lebanon, that they exhibited the same association between authoritarianism and economic radicalism as is found among workers in the United States. A survey in 1951–52 of 1,800 Puerto Rican adults, representative of the entire rural population, found that 84 per cent were "somewhat authoritarian," as compared with 46 per cent for a comparable U. S. population; see Henry Wells, "Ideology and Leadership in Puerto Rican Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (March, 1955), pp. 22–40.

⁵ The Southern Democrats were the staunchest opponents of McCarthy and his tactics, not because of any deep opposition to undemocratic methods, but rather because of an organizational commitment to the Democratic Party.

⁶ For a detailed discussion of the fallacy of attempting to suggest that political behavior is a necessary function of political attitudes or psychological traits, see Nathan Glazer and S. M. Lipset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity" in Daniel Bell, editor, *The New American Right*, New York: Criterion Books, 1955, pp. 141–166.

TABLE 1. RESPONSES OF DIFFERENT GERMAN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS TO PREFERRED PARTY SYSTEM IN PERCENTAGES (MALES ONLY), 1953 *

Occupational Group	Several Parties	One Party	No Party	No Opinion	N
Civil Servants	88	6	3	3	111
Upper White-Collar	77	13	2	8	58
Free Professionals	69	13	8	10	38
Skilled Workers	65	22	5	8	277
Artisans	64	16	9	11	124
Lower White-Collar	62	19	7	12	221
Businessmen (Small)	60	15	12	13	156
Farmers	56	22	6	16	241
Semi-Skilled Workers	49	28	7	16	301
Unskilled Workers	40	27	11	22	172

* Computed from IBM cards supplied to author by the UNESCO Institute at Cologne from its 1953 survey of German opinion.

classes and make the poor receptive to authoritarian values and likely to support extremist movements.⁷

DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND STRATIFICATION

The distinction between economic and non-economic liberalism helps to clarify the relationship between class position and political behavior. Economic liberalism refers to the conventional issues concerning redistribution of income, status, and power among the classes. The poorer everywhere are more liberal or leftist on such issues; they favor more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade-unions, and other measures opposed by those of higher class position. On the other hand, when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms—so as to support, for example, civil liberties for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration legislation—the correlation is reversed.⁸

⁷ The term "extremist" is used to refer to movements, parties, and ideologies. "Authoritarian" refers to the attitudinal predispositions of individuals (or of "groups," where a statistical aggregate of individual attitudes, and not group characteristics as such, are of concern). The term "authoritarian" has too many associations with attitudinal studies to be used safely to refer also to types of social organizations.

⁸ See G. H. Smith, "Liberalism and Level of Information," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 39 (February, 1948), pp. 65-82; and "The Relation of 'Enlightenment' to Liberal-Conservative Opinions," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 28 (August, 1948), pp. 3-17.

Abundant data from almost every country in the world with competing political parties show that economic liberalism or leftism is inversely associated with socio-economic status. In Germany, for example, a study conducted by the UNESCO Institute at Cologne asked a systematic sample of 3,000 Germans: "Do you think that it would be better if there were one party, several parties, or no party?" The results analyzed according to occupational status indicate that the lower strata of the working class and the rural population were less likely to support a multi-party system (a reasonable index of democratic attitudes in westernized countries) than the middle and upper strata. (See Table 1.) Comparable results were obtained in 1958 when a similar question was asked of national or regional samples in Austria, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and France. Although the proportion favoring a multi-party system varied from country to country, within each nation low socio-economic status was associated with failure to support a multi-party system.⁹

⁹ Based on as yet unpublished data in the files of the World Poll, an organization established by International Research Associates which sponsors comparable surveys in a number of countries. The question asked in this survey was: "Suppose there was a political party here which corresponds to your own opinions—one you would more or less consider 'your' party. Would you wish this to be the only party in our country with no other parties besides, or would you be against such a one party system?" Similar correlations were found between low status and belief in the value of a strong leader.

Somewhat similar findings were obtained in studies in Japan, Great Britain, and the United States in surveys designed to secure general reactions to problems of civil liberties or the rights of various minorities. In Japan, for example, the workers and the rural population tended to be more authoritarian and less concerned with civil liberties than the middle and upper classes.¹⁰

In England, Eysenck found comparable differences between "tough-minded" and "tender-minded" people in their general social outlook. The first group tended to be intolerant of deviations from the standard moral or religious codes, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic, while the "tender-minded" in general were tolerant of deviation, unprejudiced, and internationalist.¹¹ In summing up his findings, based on attitude scales given to supporters of different British parties, Eysenck reports that "Middle-class Conservatives are more tender-minded than working-class Conservatives; middle-class Liberals are more tender-minded than working-class Liberals; middle-class Socialists are more tender-minded than working-class Socialists; and even middle-class Communists are more tender-minded than working-class Communists."¹²

The evidence from various American studies dealing with attitudes toward civil liberties, as well as such other components of non-economic liberalism as ethnic prejudice, is also clear and consistent—the lower strata are the least tolerant.¹³ In the most

systematic of these, based on a national sample of nearly 5,000 Americans, Stouffer divided his respondents into three categories, "less tolerant, in-between, and more tolerant," by using a scale based on responses to questions about the right of free speech for Communists, critics of religion, advocates of nationalization of industry, and the like. As the data presented in Table 2 demonstrate, tolerance increases with moves up the stratification ladder. Only 30 per cent of those in manual occupations are in the "most tolerant" category, as contrasted with 66 per cent of the professionals and 51 per

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ARE "MORE TOLERANT" WITH RESPECT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES *

Professional and Semi-Professional	66%	(159)
Proprietors, Managers and Officials	51	(223)
Clerical and Sales	49	(200)
Manual Workers	30	(685)
Farmers or Farm Workers	20	(202)

* Source: Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, New York: Doubleday, 1955, p. 139. The figures for manual and farm workers were calculated from cards supplied by Professor Stouffer.

cent of the proprietors, managers, and officials. As in Germany and Japan, farmers are low in tolerance.

The findings of public opinion surveys in thirteen different countries that the lower strata are less committed to democratic norms than the middle classes are reaffirmed by the research of more psychologically oriented investigators, who have studied the social correlates of "authoritarian personality" structures as measured by the now famous "F scale."¹⁴ The most recent sum-

¹⁰ See Kotaro Kido and Masataka Sugi, "A Report of Research on Social Stratification and Mobility in Tokyo (III), The Structure of Social Consciousness," *Japanese Sociological Review*, 4 (January, 1954), pp. 74-100; and National Public Opinion Institute of Japan, *Report No. 26, A Survey Concerning the Protection of Civil Liberties* (Tokyo, 1951).

¹¹ H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 127.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 137. For a severe critique of the methods used in this study see Richard Christie, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Communists," *Psychological Bulletin*, 53 (November, 1956), pp. 411-430.

¹³ See Arnold W. Rose, *Studies in Reduction of Prejudice*, Chicago: American Council on Race Relations, 1948, for a review of the literature bearing on this point prior to 1948. Several studies have shown the key importance of education and the independent effect of economic status, both basic components of low status. See Daniel J. Levinson

and R. Nevitt Sanford, "A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism," *Journal of Psychology*, 17 (April, 1944), pp. 339-370; and H. H. Harlan, "Some Factors Affecting Attitudes Toward Jews," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (December, 1942), pp. 816-827, for data on attitudes toward one ethnic group. For a digest of recent research in the field of race relations in the United States, see Melvin M. Tumin, *Segregation and Desegregation*, New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1957.

¹⁴ See Theodore Adorno, *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harpers, 1950. This, the original study, shows less consistent results on this point than the many follow-up investigations. The

many of the research findings of the many studies in this area shows a consistent association of authoritarianism with lower class and status.¹⁵ One survey of 460 Los Angeles adults reports that "the working class contains a higher proportion of authoritarians than either the middle or the upper class," and that among workers, those who explicitly identified themselves with "the working class" rather than "the middle class" were more authoritarian.¹⁶

Recent research within lower status groups suggests the possibility of a *negative* correlation between authoritarianism and neuroticism. This would be congruent with the hypothesis that those who deviate from the standards of their group are more likely to be neurotic than those who conform. Hence, if we assume that authoritarian traits are conventional reactions of low status people, then the lower class anti-authoritarian should be more neurotic.¹⁷ As Davids and Eriksen point out, where the "standard of reference on authoritarianism is quite high," people may be well adjusted *and* authoritarian.¹⁸ The absence of a relationship between authoritarian attitudes and neurotic traits among lower class groups reported by these authors is consistent with the hypothesis that authoritarian attitudes are "normal" and expected in such groups.¹⁹

authors themselves (p. 178) point to the inadequacy of their sample.

¹⁵ Richard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature Relating to the Authoritarian Personality," *Journal of Psychology*, 45 (April, 1958), pp. 171-199.

¹⁶ W. J. McKinnon and R. Centers, "Authoritarianism and Urban Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (May, 1956), p. 618.

¹⁷ Much of contemporary psychological knowledge in this area has been gained from populations most convenient for the academic investigator to reach, university students. It is often forgotten that personality and attitude syndromes may be far different for this highly select group than for other segments of the total population.

¹⁸ See Anthony Davids and Charles W. Eriksen, "Some Social and Cultural Factors Determining Relations Between Authoritarianism and Measures of Neuroticism," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 21 (April, 1957), pp. 155-159. This article contains many references to the relevant literature.

¹⁹ The greater compatibility of the demands of Communist Party membership and working-class background as indicated by Almond's finding that twice as many of the middle-class party members as of the working-class group in his sample of Com-

AUTHORITARIAN RELIGION AND STRATIFICATION

Many observers have called attention to a connection between low social status and fundamentalist or chiliastic religion. The liberal Protestant churches, on the other hand, almost invariably have been predominantly middle-class in membership. In the United States, this class division among the churches has created a dilemma for the clergy of the so-called liberal churches, who have tended to be liberal in their politics as well as in their religion and, hence, have often desired to spread their social and religious gospel among the lower strata. They have found, however, that the latter prefer ministers who preach of hell-fire and salvation, of a conflict between God and Satan, to those who advocate modern liberal Protestant theology.²⁰

Writing in the early period of the socialist movement, Frederick Engels noted that early Christianity and the revolutionary workers' movement had "notable points of resemblance," particularly in their millennial appeals and lower-class base.²¹ Recently, Elmer Clark has shown that small sects in contemporary America, sects resembling early Christianity, "originate mainly among the religiously neglected poor." He writes:

[when] the revolts of the poor have been tinged with religion, which was nearly always the case until recent times, millennial ideas have appeared, and . . . these notions are prominent in most of the small sects which follow the evangelical tradition. Premillenarianism is essentially a defense mechanism of the disinherited; despairing of obtaining substantial blessings through social processes, they turn on the world which has withheld its benefits and look to its destruction in a cosmic cataclysm which will exalt them and cast down the rich and powerful.²²

munists had neurotic problems hints again at the normality and congruence of authoritarian politics with a working-class background. See Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 245-246.

²⁰ See Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, pp. 105-116.

²¹ Frederick Engels, "On the Early History of Christianity," in K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957, pp. 312-320.

²² Elmer T. Clark, *The Small Sects in America*,

Troeltsch has characterized the psychological appeal of sectarian religion in a way that might as appropriately be applied to extremist politics:

It is the lower classes which do the really creative work, forming communities on a genuine religious basis. They alone unite imagination and simplicity of feeling with a non-reflective habit of mind, a primitive energy, and an urgent sense of need. On such a foundation alone is it possible to build up an unconditional authoritative faith in a Divine Revelation with simplicity of surrender and unshaken certainty. Only within a fellowship of this kind is there room for those who have a sense of spiritual need, and who have not acquired the habit of intellectual reasoning, which always regards everything from a relative point of view.²³

Jehovah's Witnesses is an excellent example of a rapidly growing sect which "continues to attract, as in the past, the underprivileged strata."²⁴ Their principal teaching is that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand. "The end of the age is near. Armageddon is just around the corner, when the wicked will be destroyed, and the theocracy, or rule of God, will be set up upon the earth."²⁵ And as in the case of Communist political millennialists, the organization of the Witnesses, whose membership in the United States is many hundreds of thousands, is "hierarchical and highly authoritarian. There is little democratic participation in the management or in the formation of policies of the movement as a whole."²⁶

New York: The Abingdon Press, 1949, pp. 16, 218-219. According to Bryan Wilson, "insecurity, differential status anxiety, cultural neglect, prompt a need for readjustment which sects may, for some, provide. The maladjusted may be communities, or occupational groups, or dispersed individuals in similar marginal positions." "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (February, 1959), p. 8. See also Wilson's *Minority Religious Movements in Modern Britain*, London: Heineman and Sons, forthcoming.

²³ Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1930, Vol. 1, p. 44.

²⁴ Charles S. Braden, *These Also Believe. A Study of Modern American Cults and Minority Religious Movements*, New York: Macmillan, 1949, p. 384.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 363. It may be suggested that, as in authoritarian political movements, the intolerant character of most of the sects is an attractive feature and not a source of strain for their lower-class members. Although no systematic evidence is

Direct linkages between the social roots of political and of religious extremism have been observed in a number of countries. In Czarist Russia, the young Trotsky consciously recognized this relationship and successfully recruited the first working-class members of the South Russian Workers' Union (a revolutionary Marxist organization of the late 1890s) from adherents to religious sects.²⁷ In Holland and Sweden, recent studies have shown that the Communists are strongest in regions which once were centers of fundamentalist religious revivalism.²⁸

These findings do not imply that religious sects supported by lower-class elements become centers of political protest; in fact, the discontent and frustration otherwise flowing into channels of political extremism are often drained off by a transvaluational religion. The point here is that rigid fundamentalism and chiliastic dogmatism are linked to the same underlying characteristics, attitudes, and predispositions, which find another outlet in allegiance to authoritarian political movements.

In his excellent study of the sources of Swedish communism, Sven Rydenfelt demonstrates the competitive relationship between religious and political extremism. He analyzed the differences between two northern counties of Sweden, Vasterbotten and Norrbotten, in an attempt to explain the relatively low Communist vote in the former (two per cent) and the much larger vote in the latter county (21 per cent), although both have comparable social and economic conditions. The Liberal Party, which in Sweden gives much more support than any other to religious extremism, was very strong in Vasterbotten (30 per cent) and correspondingly weak in Norrbotten (nine

available, this assumption would help to account for the lack of tolerance of factionalism within these sects, and for the endless schisms, with the new groups as intolerant as the old, since the splits usually occur over the issue of *whose* intolerant views and methods shall prevail.

²⁷ See Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky, 1879-1921*, London: Oxford University Press, 1954, pp. 30-31.

²⁸ Sven Rydenfelt, *Kommunismen i Sverige. En Samhällsvetenskaplig Studie*, Lund: Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1954, pp. 296, 336-337; and Wiardi Beckman Institute, *Verkiezingen in Nederland*, Amsterdam: 1951, mimeographed, pp. 15, 93-94.

TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955 *

Education	Percentage in the Two "Most Tolerant" Categories			
	Occupation			
	Low Manual	High Manual	Low White Collar	High White Collar
Grade School	13 (228)	21 (178)	23 (47)	26 (100)
Some High School	32 (99)	33 (124)	29 (56)	46 (68)
High School Grad.	40 (64)	48 (127)	47 (102)	56 (108)
Some College	— (14)	64 (36)	64 (80)	65 (37)
College Grad.	— (3)	— (11)	74 (147)	83 (21)

* Computed from IBM cards supplied by Samuel Stouffer from his study, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, New York: Doubleday, 1955.

per cent). Rydenfelt concludes that a general predisposition toward radicalism existed in both counties, containing some of the poorest, most socially isolated, and rootless groups in Sweden, but that the expression of radicalism differed, taking a religious form in one county, and a Communist in the other. "The Communists and the religious radicals, as for instance the Pentecostal sects, seem to be competing for the allegiance of the same groups."²⁹

THE TYPICAL SOCIAL SITUATION OF LOWER-CLASS PERSONS

A number of elements in the typical social situation of lower-class individuals may be singled out as contributing to authoritarian predispositions: low education, low participation in political organizations or in voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns. Although these elements are interrelated, they are by no means identical.

There is consistent evidence that degree of formal education, itself closely correlated with social and economic status, is also highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes. Data from Stouffer's study of attitudes toward civil liberties in America and from the UNESCO Research Institute's survey of German opinion bearing on a multi-party

TABLE 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND SUPPORT OF A DEMOCRATIC PARTY SYSTEM IN GERMANY—1953 *

Occupation	Per Cent Favoring the Existence of Several Parties	
	Educational Level	
	Elementary School	High School or Higher
Farm Laborers	29 (59)	—
Manual Workers	43 (1439)	52 (29)
Farmers	43 (381)	67 (9)
Lower White Collar	50 (273)	68 (107)
Self-Employed Business	53 (365)	65 (75)
Upper White Collar	58 (86)	69 (58)
Officials (Govt.)	59 (158)	78 (99)
Professions	56 (18)	68 (38)

* Source: see Table 1.

system presented in Tables 3 and 4 reveal this clearly.

These tables indicate that an increase in educational attainment has the effect of raising the proportion of democratic attitudes at each occupational level. Within each educational level, higher occupational status also seems to make for greater tolerance, but the increases associated with higher educational level are greater than those related to higher occupational level, when the other factor is held constant.³⁰ It may be inferred that

²⁹ See W. Phillips Davison's extensive review of Rydenfelt, *op. cit.*, in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (Winter, 1954-55), pp. 375-388; quoted at p. 382. Note that the total "extremist" vote in the two counties was almost identical, 30 and 32 per cent.

³⁰ A study based on a national sample of Americans reported that education made no difference in the extent of authoritarian responses on an "authoritarian personality" scale among workers, but that higher educational attainment reduced such responses among the middle-class. The well-educated upper-middle class were least "authoritarian." Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authori-

the quality of the educational experience is more highly associated with political tolerance than occupational experience *per se*. But both inferior education and low occupational position are highly intercorrelated, both are part of the complex making up low-status, and are associated with a lack of tolerance.³¹

Low-status groups also participate less in formal organizations, read fewer magazines and books regularly, possess less information on public affairs, vote less, and, in general, are less interested in politics.³² The available evidence suggests that each of these attributes is related to democratic attitudes. Thus, an analysis of German data collected by the UNESCO Institute in 1953 found that at every occupational level those who belonged to voluntary associations were more likely to favor a multi-party than a one-party system.³³ American findings also indicate that authoritarians join fewer "community groups" than non-authoritarians.³⁴ A study of the determinants of economic and non-economic liberalism reports that on every occupational level the persons poorly informed on public questions are more likely to be both more radical on economic issues and less liberal on non-economic issues.³⁵ Non-voters and those less interested in political matters are much more intolerant

and xenophobic than those who vote and have political interests.³⁶

The authors of a study concerned with the "hard core" of "chronic know-nothings" suggest that such persons come disproportionately from the less-literate, lower socioeconomic groups. These people are not only uninformed, but "harder to reach, no matter what the level or nature of the information." Here again is a hint at the complex character of the relations between education, liberalism, and status. Non-economic liberalism is not a simple matter of acquiring education and information; it must be considered at least in part a basic attitude which is actively discouraged by the social situation of lower-status persons.³⁷ As Knupper has pointed out in her review of the literature bearing on the "underdog," "economic underprivilege is psychological underprivilege: habits of submission, little access to sources of information, lack of verbal facility. These things appear to produce a lack of self-confidence which increases the unwillingness of the low-status person to participate in many phases of our predominantly middle-class culture. . . ." ³⁸

These characteristics also reflect the extent to which lower-class persons are *isolated* from the activities, controversies, and organizations of democratic society, an isolation which prevents them from securing that sophisticated and complex view of the political structure which makes understandable and necessary the norms of tolerance. It is instructive to examine in this connection those occupations which are most isolated, in every sense, from contact with the world outside their own occupational group. We should

tarianism and Political Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Summer, 1953), pp. 195-196.

³¹ The independent effect of education even when other social factors are least favorable has especial long-range significance in view of the rising educational level of the population. Kornhauser and his associates found that auto workers with an eighth grade education were more authoritarian than those with more education. See Arthur Kornhauser, A. L. Sheppard, and A. J. Mayer, *When Labor Votes*, New York: University Books, 1956, for further data on variations on authoritarianism within a working-class sample.

³² The research showing that such factors as education, status, and income (themselves components of an overall class or status index) are associated with political participation is summarized in Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959.

³³ Data computed for this study.

³⁴ F. H. Sanford, *Authoritarianism and Leadership*, Philadelphia: Stevenson Brothers, 1950, p. 168. See also Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, 11 (December, 1946), p. 688.

³⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³⁶ G. M. Connelly and H. H. Field, "The Non-Voter, Who He Is, and What He Thinks," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 8 (Summer, 1944), p. 179; Samuel Stouffer, *op. cit.*; Sanford, *op. cit.*, p. 168; M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

³⁷ See Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11 (Fall, 1947), p. 413. A recent survey of material on voluntary association memberships is contained in Charles L. Wright and Herbert Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (June, 1958), pp. 284-294.

³⁸ Genevieve Knupper, "Portrait of the Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11 (Spring, 1947), p. 114.

expect that persons in these occupations will support extremist movements and exhibit low political tolerance. Such in fact is the case. Manual workers in "isolated occupations" which require them to live among their workmates in one-industry towns or areas—for example, miners, maritime workers, loggers, fishermen, and sheep shearers—all exhibit high rates of Communist support in most countries.³⁹

Similarly, rural persons, both farmers and laborers, show high authoritarian predispositions. All public opinion surveys indicate that they oppose civil liberties and multi-party systems more than any other occupational group. Election surveys indicate farm owners to have been among the strongest supporters of Fascist parties, while farm workers and poor farmers and share-croppers have given even stronger backing to the Communists in Italy, France, and India, for example, than have manual workers.⁴⁰

³⁹ The greatest amount of comparative material is available on the miners. For Britain, see Herbert G. Nicholas, *British General Election of 1950*, London: Macmillan, 1951, pp. 318, 342, 361. For the United States, see Paul F. Brissenden, *The IWW, A Study of American Syndicalism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1920, p. 74; and Harold Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics*, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, pp. 31–32. For France, see François Goguel, "Geographie des elections sociales de 1950–1," *Revue Française de science politique*, 3 (April–June, 1953), pp. 246–271. For Germany, see Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik*, Offenbach am Main: Bollwerk-Verlag, Karl Drott, 1948, p. 211. Data are also available for Australia, Scandinavia, Spain, and Chile.

Isolation has also been linked with the differential propensity to strike of different industries. Violent strikes having the character of a mass grievance against society as a whole occur most often in isolated industries, and probably have their origins in the same social situations producing authoritarianism. See Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike: An International Comparison," in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin, and A. M. Ross, editors, *Industrial Conflict*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1954, pp. 189–212.

⁴⁰ According to Friedrich, agricultural groups are more emotionally nationalistic and potentially authoritarian politically because the "rural population is more homogeneous, . . . it contains a smaller number of outsiders and foreigners, . . . it has much less contact with foreign countries and peoples, and finally, . . . its mobility is much more limited." See Carl Friedrich, "The Agricultural Basis of Emotional Nationalism," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1 (April, 1937), pp. 50–51. See also Rudolf Heberle,

The same social conditions which are related to unsophistication and authoritarianism among workers are also associated with middle-class authoritarianism. The groups which have been most prone to support Fascist and other middle-class based extremist ideologies have been, in addition to farmers and peasants, the small businessmen of provincial communities. These groups are isolated from "cosmopolitan" culture and also rank far lower than any other non-manual occupational group in educational attainment.⁴¹

If elements which contribute to a lack of sophistication and detachment from the general cultural values constitute an important factor associated with lower-class authoritarian proclivities, a second and no less important factor is a relative lack of economic and psychological security. Economic uncertainty, unemployment, and fluctuation in total income all increase with moves down the socio-economic ladder. White collar workers, even those who receive no more pay than skilled manual workers, are less likely to suffer the tensions created by fear of loss of income. Studies of marital instability indicate clearly that family tension is closely correlated with low income and financial insecurity. Economic insecurity clearly affects the political and attitudinal responses of groups.⁴² High states of tension encourage

From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study of Political Parties in Germany, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, pp. 32 ff., for a discussion of the appeal of Nazism to the German rural population; and K. Kido and M. Sugi, *op. cit.*, for similar findings in Japan. For references to materials on rural Communism, see Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Statistical data indicate that German and Austrian Nazism, contemporary Italian Neo-Fascism, French Poujadism, and American McCarthyism have all drawn their heaviest non-rural support from the less educated small businessmen of provincial small communities. See "Fascism: Left, Right and Center," in Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

⁴² In addition to the "normal" insecurity of lower-class existence, special conditions which uproot people from a stable community life and upset the social supports of their traditional values make them receptive to extremist chiliastic ideologies which help to redefine their world. I have discussed the evidence linking the *discontinuities* and rootlessness flowing from rapid industrialization and urbanization on the politics of workers in different countries in "Socialism: Left and Right," *op. cit.* Rydenfelt,

immediate alleviation through the venting of hostility against a scape-goat, the search for a short-term solution by support of extremist groups, or both. Considerable research indicates that the unemployed are less tolerant towards minorities than the employed, are more likely to be Communists if they are workers, and to be Nazis if they are middle class. Those industries with many Communists among their employees are also characterized by a large amount of economic instability.

The insecurities and tensions which flow directly from economic instability are reinforced by the particular patterns of family life associated with the lower strata. There is more direct frustration and aggression in the day-to-day lives of members of the lower classes, both children and the adults. A comprehensive review of the many studies made in the past 25 years of child-rearing patterns in the United States reports that their "most consistent finding" is the "more frequent use of physical punishment by working-class parents. The middle-class, in contrast, resorts to reasoning, isolation, and . . . 'love-oriented' techniques of discipline. . . . Such parents are more likely to overlook offenses, and when they do punish they are less likely to ridicule or inflict physical pain."⁴³ The link between such practices in lower-class families and adult hostility and authoritarianism is suggested by the findings of investigations in Boston and Detroit that physical punishments for aggression, characteristic of the

working class, tend to increase rather than decrease aggressive behavior.⁴⁴

THE PERSPECTIVES OF LOWER-CLASS GROUPS

Acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security. The less sophisticated and stable an individual, the more likely he is to favor a simplified and demonological view of politics, to fail to understand the rationale underlying the tolerance of those with whom he disagrees, and to find difficulty in grasping or tolerating a gradualist image of political change. Lack of sophistication and psychic insecurity, then, are basic "intervening variables" which clarify the empirical association between authoritarian attitudes and low status.

Several studies focusing on various aspects of working-class life and culture have emphasized different components of an unsophisticated perspective. Greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of past and future, inability to take a complex view, difficulty in abstracting from concrete experience, and lack of imagination each have been singled out as characteristic products of low status. All may be considered as interrelated indices of a more or less general lack of sophistication and ego stability, and also as part of the complex psychological basis of authoritarianism.

Suggestibility has been presented by one student of social movements as a major explanatory concept with which to account for participation in diverse extremist movements.⁴⁵ The two conditions for suggestibility are both characteristic of low-status persons: *lack* of an adequate mental context, and a *fixed* mental context (a term of Hadley Cantril's, meaning "frame of reference" or "general perspective"). A poorly developed mental context reflects a limited education: a paucity of the rich associations which provide a basis for critical evaluation of experience. A fixed mental context—in a sense,

in his study of Swedish Communism, suggests that "rootlessness" is a characteristic of individuals and occupations with high Communist voting records; see Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 378. It is interesting to note that Engels also called attention in the 1890s to the fact that chiliastic religions and social movements, including the revolutionary socialist one, attracted all the deviants, those without a place in society: e.g., "all the elements which had been set free, i.e., at a loose end, by the dissolution of the old world came one after the other into the orbit of [early] Christianity. . . . [as today] all throng to the working-class parties in all countries." Engels, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-320. See also Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 236; and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, New York: Wiley, 1941, Chapters 8 and 9.

⁴³ Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, editors, *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York: Henry Holt, 1958, p. 419.

⁴⁴ Some hint of the complex of psychological factors underlying lower-class authoritarianism is given in one study which reports a relationship between overt hostility and authoritarianism. See Saul M. Siegel, "The Relationship of Hostility to Authoritarianism," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 52 (May, 1956), pp. 386-372.

⁴⁵ Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

the opposite side of the coin—reflects the tendency to elevate whatever general principles are learned to absolutes which are difficult to correct by experience.

Richard Hoggart, with reference to Britain, notes the same point. Low-status persons, he explains, without rich and flexible mental context are likely to lack a developed sense of the past *and* future:

Their education is unlikely to have left them with any historical panorama or with any idea of a continuing tradition. . . . A great many people, though they may possess a considerable amount of disconnected information, have little idea of an historical or ideological pattern or process. . . . With little intellectual or cultural furniture, with little training in the testing of opposing views against reason and existing judgments, judgments are usually made according to the promptings of those group-apophthegms which come first to mind. . . . Similarly, there can be little real sense of the future. . . . Such a mind is, I think, particularly accessible to the temptation to live in a constant present.⁴⁶

This concern with the present leads to a concentration on daily activities, without much inner reflection, imaginative planning of one's future, or abstract thinking. One of the few studies of lower-class children utilizing projective techniques reports:

. . . these young people are making an adjustment which is orientated toward the outside world rather than one which rests on a developing acquaintance with their own impulses and the handling of these impulses by fantasy and introspection. . . . They do not have a rich inner life, indeed their imaginative activity is meagre and limited. . . . When faced with a new situation, the subjects tend to react rapidly, and they do not alter their original impressions of the situation which is seen as a crude whole with little intellectual discrimination of components.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Hoggart, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159.

⁴⁷ B. M. Spinley, *The Deprived and the Privileged*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, pp. 115–116. These conclusions are based on Rorschach tests given to 60 slum area children. The last point is related to that made by another British scholar that working-class persons are not as likely as those with middle-class backgrounds to perceive the *structure* of an object, involving thought on a more abstract level of relationships, but have an action-oriented reaction to the *content* of an object. For further discussion of this point, see B. Bernstein, "Some Sociological Determinants of Perception," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 9 (June, 1958), pp. 160 ff.

Working-class life as a whole, and not merely the character of perception and imagination, has been seen as concrete and immediate. As Hoggart puts it, "if we want to capture something of the essence of working-class life . . . we must say that it is the 'dense and concrete' life, a life whose main stress is on the intimate, the sensory, the detailed and the personal. This would no doubt be true of working-class groups anywhere in the world."⁴⁸ Hoggart sees the concreteness of the perceptions of working-class people as a main difference from those of middle-class people, who more easily meet abstract and general questions. He identifies the sharp British working-class distinction between "Us" and "Them" as:

. . . part of a more general characteristic of the outlook of most working-class people. To come to terms with the world of 'Them' involves, in the end, all kinds of political and social questions, and leads eventually beyond politics and social philosophy to metaphysics. The question of how we face 'Them' (whoever 'They' are) is, at last, the question of how we stand in relation to anything not visibly and intimately part of our local universe. The working-class splitting of the world into 'Us' and 'Them' is on this side a symptom of their difficulty in meeting abstract or general questions.⁴⁹

Hoggart is careful to emphasize that probably most persons in *any* social class are uninterested in general ideas, but still "training in the handling of ideas or in analysis" is far more characteristic of the demands of middle-class parents and occupations.⁵⁰

A recent discussion of variations in the conceptual apparatus of the different classes, which analyzes sources of variations in so-

⁴⁸ Hoggart, *op. cit.*, p. 88. This kind of life, as with other social characteristics, has different consequences for different areas of society and social existence. It may be argued (contrary to my own views) that this capacity to establish personal relationships, to live in the present, may be more "healthy" (in a strictly mental-health sense) than a middle-class concern with status distinctions, one's own personal impact on one's life situation, and a preoccupation with the uncertain future. But in terms of political consequences, the problem of concern here, this same action-oriented, non-intellectualistic aspect of working-class life seems to prevent awareness of the realities of long-term social and economic trends simply because such awareness requires abstraction and generalization.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵⁰ *Idem.*

cial mobility, also emphasizes the ways in which the different family patterns of the middle and working classes affect their authoritarianism. The author, B. Bernstein, points out that the middle-class parent stresses "an awareness of the importance between means and long-term ends, cognitively and affectually regarded . . . [and has] the ability to adopt appropriate measures to implement the attainment of distant ends by a purposeful means-end chain. . . . The child in the middle-classes and associated levels grows up in an environment which is finely and extensively controlled; the space, time and social relationships are explicitly regulated within and outside the family group."⁵¹ But while the middle-class child is led to understand the need to defer immediate gratifications for long-term advantages, the situation in the working-class family is quite different:

The working-class family structure is less formally organized than the middle-class in relation to the development of the child. Although the authority within the family is explicit the values which it expresses do not give rise to the carefully ordered universe spatially and temporally of the middle-class child. The exercise of authority will not be related to a stable system of rewards and punishments but may often appear arbitrary. The specific character of long-term goals tends to be replaced by more general notions of the future, in which chance, a friend or a relative plays a greater part than the rigorous working out of connections. Thus present, or near-present activities, have greater value than the relation of the present activity to the attainment of a distant goal. The system of expectancies, or the time-span of anticipation, is shortened and this creates different sets of preferences, goals, and dissatisfactions. The environment limits the perception of the developing child of and in time. Present gratifications or present deprivations become absolute gratifications or absolute deprivations for there exists no developed time continuum upon which present activity can be ranged. Relative to the middle-classes, the postponement of present pleasure for future gratifications will be found difficult. By implication *a more volatile patterning of affectual and expressive behavior will be found in the working-classes.*⁵²

This concern with the immediately perceivable, with the personal and concrete, is part and parcel of the short time-perspective

and the inability to perceive the complex possibilities and consequences of actions which is referred to above as a lack of social sophistication. It is associated with some fundamental characteristics of low status, and often eventuates in a readiness to support extremist political and religious movements, and in a generally lower level of liberalism on non-economic questions.⁵³

Within extremist movements, these differences in the perceptions and perspectives of working-class persons affect their experiences, ease of recruitment, and reasons for defecting. Almond's study of 221 ex-Communists in four countries provides some data on this point. He distinguishes between the "exoteric" (simple, for mass consumption) and "esoteric" (complex, for the inner circle) doctrines of the party. "Relatively few working-class respondents had been exposed to the esoteric doctrine of the party before joining, and . . . they tended to remain undisciplined while in the party," in contrast with the middle-class members.⁵⁴ Middle-class recruits who were potentially capable of absorbing a complex doctrine nevertheless "tended to come to the party with more complex value patterns and expectations which were more likely to obstruct assimilation into the party. . . . The working-class member, on the other hand, is relatively untroubled by doctrinal apparatus, less exposed to the media of communication, and his imagination and logical powers are relatively undeveloped."⁵⁵

One aspect of the lack of sophistication and education of lower-class persons is their

⁵³ This hypothesis has suggestive implications for a theory of trade union democracy, and possible strains within trade union organizational life. Working-class union members may not be nearly as concerned with dictatorial union leadership as are middle-class critics who assume that the rank-and-file would actively form factions and critically evaluate union policies if they were not constrained by a monolithic structure imposed by the top leadership. On the other hand, the more educated, articulate staff members (on a union newspaper, for example) may desire to include more literate and complex discussions of issues facing the union but may be constrained by the need to present simple, easily understood propagandistic slogans for rank-and-file consumption. The "house-organ" type of union newspaper may not be due entirely to internal political necessities.

⁵⁴ Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁵¹ Bernstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 165.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 168 (italics added).

anti-intellectualism (a phenomenon noted by Engels long ago as a problem faced by working-class movements). While the complex esoteric ideology of Communism may have been a principal feature drawing middle-class persons to it, the fundamental anti-intellectualism of extremist movements has been a source of strain for their "genuine" intellectuals, who find it difficult to view the world in black or white terms. In the Communist Party, these class differences are reflected in the fact that the working-class rank-and-file are least likely to become disturbed by ideological shifts, and least likely to defect.⁵⁶ Their commitment, once established, cannot as easily be shaken by a sudden realization that the Party, after all, does not conform to liberal and humanistic values, as can the commitment of middle-class members, who usually joined for different reasons and values and maintain a more complex view both of their own lives and of politics.

Some evidence of the differential receptivity of leftist parties to middle- and working-class persons may be seen in the leadership composition of Socialist and Communist Parties. The former have been led by a higher proportion of intellectuals, in spite of an original ideological emphasis on maintaining a working-class orientation. The Communists, on the other hand, tend to alienate their intellectual leaders and to be led by those with preponderantly working-class occupations.⁵⁷ Almond's study of the *Appeals of Communism* concludes:

... while the party is open to all comers, working-class party members have better prospects of success in the party than middle-class recruits. This is probably due both to party policy, which has always manifested greater confidence in the reliability of working-class

recruits, and to the difficulties of assimilation into the party generally experienced by middle-class party members.⁵⁸

THE MAIN FINDINGS RESTATED

To sum up, the lower-class individual is more likely to have been exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early childhood, experiences which often produce deep-rooted hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudice, political authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational religion. His educational attainment is less than that of men with higher socio-economic status, and his association as a child with others of similar background not only fails to stimulate his intellectual interests but also creates an atmosphere which prevents his educational experience from increasing his general social sophistication and his understanding of different groups and ideas. Leaving school relatively early, he is surrounded on the job by others with a similar restricted cultural, educational, and family background. Little external influence impinges on his limited environment to increase his connections with the larger world and to heighten his sophistication. From early childhood, he has sought immediate gratifications in favor of activities which might have long-term rewards. The logic of both his adult employment and his family situation reinforces this limited time-perspective. As North has well put it, isolation from heterogeneous environments, characteristic of low-status, operates to "limit the source of information, to retard the development of efficiency in judgment and reasoning abilities, and to confine the attention to more trivial interests in life."⁵⁹ All of these characteristics combine to produce a tendency to view politics, as well as personal relationships, in black-and-white terms, a desire for immediate action without critical reflection, impatience with talk and discussion, lack

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 313 ff., 392.

⁵⁷ For French data from 1936 to 1956 see Mattei Dogan, "Les Candidats et les élus," in *L'Association Française de science politique, Les Elections du 2 janvier*, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1956, p. 462, and "L'origine sociale du personnel parlementaire Français," in Maurice Duverger, editor, *Parties politiques et classes sociales en France*, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1955, pp. 291-329. For a comparison of German Social Democratic and Communist parliamentary leadership before Hitler see Viktor Engelhardt, "Die Zusammensetzung des Reichstage nach Alter, Beruf, und Religionskenntnis," *Die Arbeit*, 8 (January, 1931), p. 34.

⁵⁸ Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 190. This statement is supported by analysis of the biographies of 123 Central Committee leaders of the Party in three countries, as well as by interviews with 221 ex-Communists (both leaders and rank-and-file members) in four countries, France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States.

⁵⁹ C. C. North, *Social Differentiation*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926, p. 247.

of interest in organizations which have a long-range gradualistic political perspective, and a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the presumably conspiratorial forces, either religious or political.⁶⁰

It is interesting to note that Lenin saw the character of the lower classes and the tasks of those who would lead them in terms similar to those presented in this paper. He specified as the chief task of the Communist parties the leadership of the broad masses, who are "slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert, and dormant"—a picture borne out by the data presented here. These masses, said Lenin, must be aligned for the "final and decisive battle" (a term reminiscent of Armageddon) by the Party which alone can present an unequivocal, uncompromising, unified view of the world, and an immediate program for drastic change. In contrast to "effective" Communist leadership, Lenin pointed to the democratic parties and their leadership as "vacillating, wavering, unstable" elements, a characterization that is probably valid for any political group lacking ultimate certainty in its program and willing to grant legitimacy to opposition groups.⁶¹

The political outcome of these predispositions, however, as suggested above, is not determined by the multiplicity of factors bearing upon the development of authoritarian predispositions. Isolation, a punishing childhood, economic and occupational insecurities, and a lack of sophistication are con-

ducive *both* to withdrawal, or even apathy, and to strong mobilization of hostile predispositions. The same underlying factors which predispose individuals toward support of extremist movements under certain conditions may result in withdrawal from political activity and concern under other conditions. Lack of information, social isolation, little participation in groups outside of one's immediate circle, a short-term time perspective, which generally characterize the lower strata, are associated both with low levels of political interest and involvement (while maintaining authoritarian attitudes) in "normal" non-crisis periods and with action in an extremist direction when those underlying predispositions are activated by a crisis and millennial appeals.⁶²

EXTREMISM AS A COMPLEX ALTERNATIVE: A TEST OF AN HYPOTHESIS

Thus far this paper has been concerned with the authoritarian proclivities of lower-status groups. One proposition which has been drawn from the analysis is that the lack of a complex and rich frame of reference, a tendency to view events from a concrete and short-term perspective, is the vital intervening variable between low status and a predisposition toward transvaluational extremist religion or politics. The proposition, however, does not simply suggest that the lower strata will be authoritarian; it implies that other things being equal, they will choose the least complex alternative. If we

⁶⁰ Most of these characteristics have been cited by psychologists as typical of adolescent attitudes and perspectives. Werner Cohn, in "Jehovah's Witnesses as a Proletarian Movement," *The American Scholar*, 24 (Summer, 1955), pp. 281-299, considers youth movements as a prototype of all such "proletarian" movements. Both "adolescence fixation and anomie are causal conditions" of their development (p. 297), and all such organizations have an "aura of social estrangement." (p. 282).

⁶¹ V. I. Lenin, *Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*, New York: International Publishers, 1940, pp. 74-75. Lenin's point, originally made in his pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, that workers left to themselves would never develop socialist or class consciousness in place of economic "day to day" consciousness unless an organized group of revolutionary intellectuals brought them a broader vision, is similar to the generalizations presented here concerning the limited time perspective of the lower strata.

⁶² Various studies indicate that lower-class individuals in the United States who are non-voters and who have little political interest tend to reject the democratic norms of tolerance. See Stouffer, *op. cit.*, and Connelly and Field, *op. cit.*, p. 182. Studies of the behavior of the unemployed in countries in which extremist movements have been weak, such as the United States and Britain, indicate that apathy was their characteristic political response. See, e.g., E. W. Bakke, *Citizens Without Work*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, pp. 46-70. On the other hand, German data indicate correlations between working-class unemployment and support of Communists and between middle-class unemployment and support of Nazis. In France, Italy, and Finland today, those who have been unemployed tend to back the large Communist parties. See S. M. Lipset, "Socialism: Left and Right," *op. cit.*, p. 181; and Erik Allardt, *Social Struktur Och Politisk Aktivitet*, Helsingfors: Soderstrom and C: o Forlagsaktiebolag, 1956, pp. 84-85.

can find situations in which extremist politics represents the more complex rather than the less complex form of transvaluational politics, we should expect low status to be associated with *opposition* to such movements and parties.

A situation in which an extremist movement is the more complex alternative exists wherever the Communist Party is a small party competing against a large reformist party, as in England, the United States, Sweden, and Norway. Where the Party is small and weak, it can not hold out the promise of immediate changes in the situation of the most deprived. Rather, such small extremist parties usually present the fairly complex intellectual argument that tendencies inherent in the social and economic system will strengthen them in the long run.⁶³ For the poorer worker, support of the Swedish Social-Democrats, the British Labor Party, or the American New Deal is a simpler and more easily understood way of securing redress of grievances or improvement of social conditions than supporting an electorally insignificant Communist Party.

The available evidence from countries such as Norway, Sweden, Canada, Brazil, and Great Britain suggests the validity of this interpretation. In these countries, where the Communist Party is small and a Labor or Socialist Party is much larger, the support of the Communists is stronger among the better-paid and more skilled workers than it is among the less skilled and poorer strata.⁶⁴

⁶³ Recent research on the early sources of support for the Nazi Party challenges the hypothesis that it was the apathetic who came to its support prior to 1930, when it still represented a complex, long-range alternative. A negative rank-order correlation was found between the per-cent increase in the Nazi vote and the increase in the proportion voting, in the German election districts between 1928 and 1930. Only after it had become a relatively large party did National Socialism recruit the previously apathetic, who then could see its immediate potential. For a report of this research, see Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ For Norway, see Allen Barton, *Sociological and Psychological Implications of Economics Planning in Norway*, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1957; and several surveys of voting behavior in Norway conducted by a Norwegian poll organization including the 1949 FAKTA Survey, and the February, 1954, and April, 1956, NGI Survey, the results of which are as yet unpublished. Data from the files of the Canadian Gallup Poll for 1945, 1949, and

In Italy, France, and Finland, where the Communists are the largest party on the left, the lower the income level of workers, the higher their Communist vote.⁶⁵ A comparison of the differences in the relative income position of workers who vote Social-Democratic and those who back the Communists in two neighboring Scandinavian countries, Finland and Sweden, shows these alternative patterns clearly (see Table 5).⁶⁶

These assumptions concerning the relationship between Communist strength, differential time perspective involved in support of the party, and variations in the social base of its electoral appeal hold up for all countries for which data exist.⁶⁷ Data from one

1953 indicate that the Labor-Progressive (Communist) Party drew more support from the skilled than the unskilled sections of the working class. For Brazil, see A. Simao, "O voto operario em Sao Paulo," *Revista Brasileira estudos politicos*, 1 (August, 1956), pp. 130-141.

⁶⁵ For a table giving precise statistics for Italy and France, see S. M. Lipset, "Socialism: Left and Right, East and West," *op. cit.*, p. 182. In pre-Hitler Germany, where the Communists were a large party, they also secured their electoral strength much more from the less skilled sections of the workers than from the more skilled. See Samuel Pratt, *The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany*, M.A. thesis, Michigan State College, 1948, pp. 156 ff.

⁶⁶ In Finland, where the Communists are very strong, their support is drawn disproportionately from the poorer workers, while in Sweden, where the Communists are a minor party, they have considerably more success with the better paid and more skilled workers than they do with the unskilled and lowly paid. Or, to present the same data in another way, in Finland 41 per cent of all workers earning less than 100 markkas a month vote Communist, as compared with only 12 per cent among those earning over 600 markkas. In Sweden, 7 per cent of the workers earning less than 2,000 kronen a year vote Communist, as compared with 25 per cent among those earning over 8,000.

⁶⁷ It may be noted, parenthetically, that where the Socialist Party is small and/or new, it also represents a complex alternative, and attracts more middle-class support proportionately than when it is a well-established mass party which can offer immediate reforms. On the other hand, when a small transvaluational group does *not* offer an intellectually complex alternative, it should draw disproportionate support from the lower strata. Such groups are the sectarian religions whose millennial appeals have no developed rationale. Some slight evidence on this point in a political context is available from a recent Norwegian poll which shows the composition of support for various parties. Only 11 persons supporting the Christian party, which appeals to the more fundamentalist

TABLE 5. THE INCOME COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING-CLASS SUPPORT OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN *

Finland—1956			Sweden—1946		
Income Class in Markkas	Social Democrats	Communists	Income Class in Kronen	Social Democrats	Communists
Under 100	8%	13%	Under 2,000	14%	8%
100-400	49	50	2,001-4,000	40	38
400-600	22	29	4,001-6,000	32	30
600 +	21	8	6,001 +	14	24
N	(173)	(119)		(5176)	(907)

* The Finnish data were secured from a special run made for this study by the Finnish Gallup Poll. The Swedish statistics were recomputed from data presented in Elis Hastad, *et al.*, editors, “*Gallup*” och *den Svenska Valjarkaren*, Uppsala: Hugo Gebers Forlag, 1950, pp. 175-176. Both studies include rural and urban workers.

other country, India, offer even better evidence for the hypothesis, however, because they permit a comparison of variations in electoral strength within a single country, and also because these data were located after the hypothesis was formulated and

Lutherans who are comparable to those in Sweden discussed earlier, were included in the total sample, but 82 per cent (nine) of these came from lower-income groups (less than 10,000 kronen per year). In comparison, 57 per cent of the 264 Labor Party supporters and 39 per cent of the 21 Communist supporters earned 10,000 kronen or more. Thus the small Communist Party as the most complex trans-valuational alternative drew its backing from relatively high strata, while the fundamentalist Christians appeared to have the economically poorest social base of any party in the country. See the NGI Survey of February, 1954, issued in December, 1956, in preliminary mimeographed form.

thus can be considered an independent replication.

In India, the Communists are a major party, constituting the government or the major opposition (with 25 per cent or more of the votes) in two states, Kerala and Andhra. While it has substantial strength in some other states, it is much weaker in the rest of India. If the proposition is valid that Communist appeal should be relatively greater among the lower and uneducated strata where the Party is powerful, and proportionately stronger among the higher and better educated ones where it is weak, the characteristics of Party voters should vary greatly in different parts of India. This is precisely what Table 6 shows. Where the Indian Communist Party is small, its support, like that of the two

TABLE 6. COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PREFERENCES IN INDIA, BY CLASS AND EDUCATION *

	Communist Party Preferences in		Preferences for Socialist
	Kerala and Andhra	Rest of India	Parties in All-India
Class			
Middle	7%	27%	23%
Lower Middle	19	30	36
Working	74	43	41
Education			
Illiterate	52%	43%	31%
Under-matric.	39	37	43
Matric. plus	9	20	26
N	(113)	(68)	(88)

* These figures have been computed from tables presented in the *Indian Institute of Public Opinion, Monthly Public Opinion Surveys*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 5, 6, 7 (Combined Issue), New Delhi, January-April, 1957, pp. 9-14. This was a pre-election poll, not a report of the actual voting results. The total sample consisted of 2,868 persons. The Socialist Party and the Praja-Socialist Party figures are combined here, since they share essentially the same moderate program. The support given to them in Andhra and Kerala was too small to be presented separately.

small moderate Socialist Parties, comes disproportionately from relatively well-to-do and better educated strata. The picture shifts sharply in Kerala and Andhra, where the Communists are strong. The middle class provides only seven per cent of Communist support there, with the working class supplying 74 per cent, showing the difference in the constituency of an extremist party when it becomes an effective political force.⁶⁸ Educational differences among party supporters show a similar pattern.

HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND DEMOCRATIC ACTION

Complex historical factors explain why, in the face of profoundly anti-democratic tendencies in lower class groups, their political organizations and movements in the more industrialized democratic countries have supported *both* economic and political liberalism. Economic liberalism or leftism flows from their situation, producing demands for redistribution of the wealth, but their situation neither produces nor calls for non-economic liberalism, support of ethnic tolerance, and democratic norms.⁶⁹ Of course, workers' or-

ganizations, trade unions, and political parties played a major role in extending political democracy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These struggles for political freedom by the workers, like those of the middle class before them, took place in the context of a fight for economic rights.⁷⁰ Freedom of organization and of speech, as well as universal suffrage, were necessary means in the battle for a better standard of living, social security, shorter hours, and the like. The upper classes resisted the extension of political freedom as part of their defense of economic and social privilege.

Few groups in history have ever voluntarily espoused civil liberties and freedom for those who advocate measures they consider despicable or dangerous. Religious freedom emerged in the western world because the contending powers found themselves unable to destroy the other group without

tana, 3 (1956), pp. 378-396. In an article on the recent British "race riots," Michael Rumney notes the working-class base of anti-Negro sentiment and goes so far as to predict that "the Labor party will become the enemy of the Negro as time goes on." He reports that "while the Conservative party has been able to stand behind the police and take any means it feels necessary to preserve the peace, the Labor party has been strangely silent. If it speaks it will either antagonize the men who riot against West Indians, or forfeit its claim to being the party of equal rights." "Left Mythology and British Race Riots," *The New Leader* (September 22, 1958), pp. 10-11.

⁷⁰ Similarities exist between the behavior of middle-class groups at the time when they were lowly ranked in a predominantly aristocratic and feudal society and working-class groups in newly industrialized societies. The affinities of both for religious and economic "radicalism," in the same sense, are striking. Calvin's doctrine of predestination, as Tawney points out, performed the same function for the eighteenth century bourgeoisie as did Marx's theory of the inevitability of socialism for the proletariat in the nineteenth. Both "set their virtue at their best in sharp antithesis with the vices of the established order at its worst, taught them to feel that they were a chosen people, made them conscious of their great destiny . . . and resolute to realize it." The Communist Party, as did the Puritans, insists on "personal responsibility, discipline and asceticism," and although the historical contents differ, they may have the same sociological roots: in isolated, status-deprived occupational groups. See R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, New York: Penguin Books, 1947, pp. 9, 99. For a similar point, see Donald G. MacRae, "The Bolshevik Ideology," *The Cambridge Journal*, 3 (December, 1950), pp. 164-177.

⁶⁸ The hypothesis presented here does not attempt to explain the growth of small parties. Adaptations to major crises, particularly depressions and wars, are probably the key factors initially increasing the support for a small "complex" party. For an analysis of the change in electoral support of a Socialist party as it moved up to a major party status, see S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, esp. pp. 159-178.

⁶⁹ There have been many exceptions to the generalization that democratic leftist parties based on the lower strata support non-economic liberalism. The Australian Labor party has been the foremost supporter of a "white Australia." Similarly, in the United States until the advent of the ideological New Deal, the lower-class based Democratic party has usually been the more anti-Negro of the two parties. For documentation of this point see "Classes and Parties in American Politics," in Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9. The American labor movement has opposed non-white immigration, and much of it maintains barriers against Negro members. Even the Marxist Socialist movement of western Europe was not immune to anti-Semitism. Thus, before World War I there were several anti-Semitic incidents in which Socialists were involved, some avowedly anti-Semitic leaders connected with different socialist parties, and strong resistance shown to committing the socialist organization to oppose anti-Semitism. See E. Silberman, "The Anti-Semitic Tradition in Modern Socialism," *Scripta Hierosolymica*

destroying the entire society, and because the very struggle led many men to lose faith and interest in religion, and consequently lose the desire to suppress dissent. Similarly, universal suffrage and freedom of organization and opposition developed in many countries either as concessions to the established strength of the lower classes or as means of controlling the lower classes, a tactic advocated and used by such sophisticated conservatives as Disraeli and Bismarck.

Once in existence and although originating in a conflict of interests, however, democratic norms, like others, become part of an institutional system. Thus, the western labor and socialist movement has incorporated these values into its general ideology. But the fact that the ideology of the movement is democratic does not mean that its supporters actually understand its implications. The evidence seems to indicate that understanding of and adherence to these norms are highest among leaders and lowest among followers. The general opinions or attitudinal predispositions of the rank and file are relatively unimportant in predicting behavior as long as the organizations to which they are loyal continue to act democratically. In spite of the workers' greater authoritarian propensity, their organizations which are anti-Communist still function as better defenders and carriers of democratic values than parties based on the middle class. In Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, individuals who support the democratic left party are more likely to support civil liberties and democratic values than people *within* each occupational stratum who back the conservative parties. That is, workers who back the democratic left are more likely to have tolerant or non-authoritarian attitudes than workers who support the conservative parties. Similarly, middle-class Social-Democrats are more prone to support civil liberties than middle-class conservatives. It is probable that organized social-democracy not only supports civil liberties but influences its supporters in the same direction.⁷¹

⁷¹ A striking case in point occurred in Australia in 1950. During a period of much agitation about the dangers of the Communist party, a Gallup Poll survey reported that 80 per cent of the electorate favored outlawing the Communists. Shortly after

Conservatism is especially vulnerable in a political democracy since there are more poor people than well-to-do and promises to redistribute wealth and to create a better life for the lower classes are difficult to rebut. Consequently, conservatives have traditionally feared a thorough-going political democracy and have endeavored in most countries—by restricting the franchise, or by manipulating the legislature through second chambers or overrepresentation of rural districts and small towns (traditional conservative strongholds)—to prevent a popular majority from controlling the government. The ideology of conservatism has often been based on élitist values which reject the idea that there is wisdom in the voice of the electorate. In addition, militarism and nationalism, often defended by conservatives, probably have an attraction for individuals with authoritarian predispositions.⁷²

It would be a mistake to conclude from the data presented in this paper that the authoritarian predispositions of the lower-classes necessarily constitute a threat to a democratic social system; nor should similar conclusions be drawn about the anti-democratic aspects of conservatism. Whether or not a given class supports restrictions on freedom depends on a wide constellation of

this survey, the conservative government submitted a proposal to outlaw the party to referendum. During the referendum electoral campaign, the Labor party and the trade-unions came out vigorously against the proposal. Considerable shifting took place thereafter, to the point that the measure to outlaw the Communists was actually defeated by a small majority, and Catholic workers who had overwhelmingly favored the measure when first questioned by the Gallup Poll eventually followed the advice of their party and unions and voted against it. See Leicester Webb, *Communism and Democracy in Australia, A Survey of the 1951 Referendum*, New York: Praeger, 1955.

⁷² A study of the 1952 elections in the United States reveals that at the grammar school, high school, and college levels individuals who scored high on an "authoritarian personality" scale were much more likely to vote for Eisenhower than for Stevenson. Robert Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (March, 1955), pp. 173-190. In Britain, a study of working-class anti-Semitism reports that the small number of Conservatives in the sample were much more anti-Semitic than the Liberals and the Laborites. James H. Robb, *Working-class Anti-Semite*, London: Tavistock Publications, 1954, pp. 93-94.

factors of which those discussed here are only a part.

The instability of the democratic process in general and the strength of the Communists in particular are closely related to national levels of economic development, including degrees of educational attainment.⁷³ The Communists represent a mass movement in the poorer countries of Europe and elsewhere, but are weak where economic development and educational attainment are high.⁷⁴ The lower classes of the less developed countries are poorer, more insecure, less educated, and possess fewer status symbols than those of the more well-to-do nations. In the more developed stable democracies of western Europe, North America, and Australasia the lower classes are "in the society" as well as "of it": their cultural isolation is much less than the isolation of the poorer groups in other countries, who are cut off from partici-

pation by abysmally low incomes and very limited, if any, schooling. Thus the incorporation of the workers into the body politic in the industrialized western world has greatly reduced their authoritarian predispositions, although in the United States, for example, McCarthy demonstrated that an irresponsible demagogue who combines a nationalist and anti-elitist appeal can still secure considerable support from the less educated.

While the evidence as to the effects of rising standards of living and education permits us to maintain hopeful expectations concerning working-class political values and behavior in those countries in which extremism is weak, the available data suggest pessimistic conclusions with regard to the less economically developed, unstable democracies. Where an extremist party has secured the support of the lower classes, often by stressing equality and economic security at the expense of liberty, it is problematic whether this support can be taken away from it through use of democratic methods. The Communists, in particular, combine the two types of politics which have a basic appeal to these classes, economic radicalism and a chiliastic view of the world. Whether democratic working-class parties able to demonstrate convincingly their ability to defend economic and class interests can be built up in the less stable democracies is a moot question.

⁷³ See S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (March, 1959), pp. 69-105; and *Political Man*, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ "It is in the advanced industrial countries, principally the United States, Britain, and North-western Europe, where national income *has* been rising, where mass expectations of an equitable share in that increase are relatively fulfilled, and where social mobility affects ever greater numbers, that extremist politics have least hold." Daniel Bell, "The Theory of Mass Society," *Commentary*, 22 (July, 1956), p. 80.