The Programmatic Emergence of the Social Security State
Author(s): Alexander Hicks, Joya Misra and Tang Nah Ng
Source: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jun., 1995), pp. 329-349
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096417
Accessed: 19-02-2020 23:32 UTC

THE PROGRAMMATIC EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY STATE[*]

Alexander Hicks
Emory University

Joya Misra
University of Georgia

Tang Nah Ng
Stanford University

Using a theoretical framework that stresses political institutions, we examine the consolidation of income-security programs during the formation of the welfare state around the turn of the century. Boolean analyses and ancillary historical materials indicate distinct routes to consolidation of social insurance programs. A "Bismarckian" path centers on strategic co-optive responses of patriarchal states and state elites to working-class mobilization. A second path, a "Lib-Lab" route, centers on strategic incorporation of labor parties and/or unions into governing Liberal coalitions. A possible third path involves reforms by Catholic parties governing patriarchal, unitary states confronting working-class challenges. The virtual absence of leftist governments before the Great Depression has challenged claims for major impacts of the working class on welfare-state formation through the 1920s. However, we find that mobilization of the working class was integral to each conjuncture that generated the adoption of social security programs during the 1880–1930 period. Worker mobilization combined with such varied and distinctly state institutions as patriarchal states and Liberal party governments in ways that advanced welfare states.

Class mobilization, power resource, and social democratic theories of the welfare state, all of which center on the progressive role of leftist party rule, have risen to preeminence in the literature on welfare-state development (Stephens 1979; Shalev 1982; Korpi 1983; Hicks and Swank 1984a, 1992; Esping-Andersen 1985). Yet the relevance of these "left power" approaches to explaining early welfare-state formation is limited by the virtual absence of sustained leftist governments before the Great Depression (Mackie and Rose 1982).

Thus, these "left power" approaches are open to strong contestation from other theoretical perspectives. These include Baldwin's (1990) neopluralist emphasis on centrist and even conservative sources of universalistic pensions; Hage, Gargan, and Hanneman's (1989) statist focus on the social activism of centralized states; and Esping-Andersen's (1990) class analytical reprise of Rimlinger's (1971) patriarchal state.[1]

[1] More recently, opposition has encompassed Skocpol's (1992) revelations that the disparate, if polity-centered, sources of social policies in pre-Depression United States lie in elite strategies and reformist movements; and Williamson and Pampel's (1993) reassertion of (neo)industrialist and (neo)pluralist accounts that view landmark pension policies as outcomes primarily of socioeconomic development and diverse organized interests. Perhaps most notable is Mann's synthetic (1993) account of the incorporation of the working class in pre-World War I capitalism.

Nevertheless, the absence of social democratic governments from the welfare state's formative years hardly purges them of working-class influence. On the contrary, each of the two most widely recounted episodes in the early history of income security policy involves a crucial role for working-class mobilization. These roles, however, are played out along side such other roles as the social control strategies of autocratic governments and the electoral strategies of Liberal parties.

During the 1880s, Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm signed into law legislation for the world's first nationally compulsory health, industrial accident, and old age insurance programs. Engineered by Chancellor Bismarck, these initiatives used a large, neo-absolutist bureaucracy to deflate liberal and, most especially, socialist challenges to traditional patriarchal rule (Rimlinger 1971; Zollner 1982; Alber 1986; Esping-Andersen 1990; Williamson and Pampel 1993; Mann 1993). These programs addressed, to quote Bismarck, "those Socialist demands which seem justified and which can be realized within the present order of society" (Zollner 1982:13), and defined a "Bismarckian" path to the first welfare state (Rimlinger 1971). In the conventional account, this "Bismarckian" episode involved *a strategic response of a patriarchal state to the growing strength of the socialist workers' movements* (Rimlinger 1971; Zollner 1982; Williamson and Pampel 1993).

Two decades later in Britain, Lloyd George's Liberal Party and Ramsey MacDonald's Labour Representation Committee (the original Labour Party) agreed to ally themselves in the common pursuit of Liberal-Labour parliamentary majorities, governments, and social reforms (Marwick 1967; Ogus 1982; Luebbert 1990). The national pension, health, and unemployment insurance laws of 1908–1911 were among the resulting social reforms. Moreover, the Lloyd George government of 1906–1914 exemplifies the type of turn-of-the-century Liberal government engineered by Liberals with labor union and labor party assistance that Mann (1993) and others have termed "Lib-Lab." Although some authors have stressed the important role played by such middle-class reform organizations as the National Pension Committee and the Fabians, thus

putting an interest-group spin on the Lloyd George reforms (Kloppenberg 1986; Williamson and Pampel 1993), others have stressed the crucial role played by Liberal and Labour party politics in inducing, channelling, and ultimately realizing the efforts of social reformers (Marwick 1967; Ogus 1982; Mann 1993). From this vantage point, Great Britain appears to have taken a "Lib-Lab" path to the welfare state that resulted from *the strategic responses of Liberal government to growing labor strength.*

Both "Bismarckian" and "Lib-Lab" roads to the early welfare state may be generalizable beyond single cases. They certainly warrant the general hypothesis that *working-class mobilization, combined with various political-institutional conditions, was a pervasive source of early welfare-state formation.*[2]

We examine welfare-state formation as exemplified in the early program consolidation of social programs in 15 industrializing nations from the 1880s through the 1920s. *Program consolidation* refers to a state's adoption of *most major types of social security programs extant during a given era.* *Early consolidation* refers to the adoption of three of the four major programs (i.e., old age, health, workman's compensation, and unemployment compensation insurance) by the 1920s—a hiatus between two eras of social reform.

Aided by a political institutional framework, we specify hypothetical determinants of early program consolidation. Then, using the Boolean method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), we specify combinations of political institutional factors that predict consolidation. This method permits systematic comparisons that test the relevance of the hypothesized explanatory factors and advance theory-building by pruning

---

[2] Although class-analytical investigators have stressed the post-Depression decades of this century (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1982), Mann's (1993: 597–793) 1815–1914 account of economic and political "entwining" in processes of working-class formation parallels our account of working-class entwinings with political institutions in the formation of pre-Depression welfare states. In a minor departure from Mann, we regard relevant working-class institutions as distinctly *political* economic.

hypothesized determinants and refining the logical relations of robust determinants to outcomes (Ragin 1987; Hicks 1994).

THEORY

Toward a Political Institutional Theory of Welfare-State Formation

We focus on adoptions of major income security programs, social insurance programs in particular. Such programs are now a core focus for studies of the welfare state, owing in part to the centrality of the problem of income security in capitalist economies, to the large shares of national budgets and incomes taken up by expenditures for such programs, and to the complicated blurring of employment policy—the other major instrument of income security—into overall economic performance and its policy instruments (Wilensky 1975; Lee and Przeworski 1992). Our focus on the major social insurance programs—old age and disability insurance; sickness, health and maternity insurance; workman's compensation insurance; unemployment compensation insurance; and (in part of the analysis) family allowance programs—is justified by their relatively recent appearance, universality, generosity and large budgets (as opposed to earlier poor relief and veterans programs) (Gordon 1988; but also see Baldwin 1990; and Skocpol 1992).

Early program consolidation is important for several reasons. First, such consolidations shape subsequent welfare policy by establishing statutory and bureaucratic precedents and resources (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975; and Hicks and Swank 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993).[3] Second, consolidation may provide a summary index of the income security achievements of relatively cohesive periods of welfare-state formation. The 1880s-to-1920s period constitutes such a relatively cohesive period: an era of extensive industrial expansion and mass enfranchisement that preceded the 1930s advent of world depression and extensive, durable Social Democratic government (Alber 1982).[4] Third, consolidations provide particularly useful handles on program innovations when, as for the 1880s-to-1920s period, data are available only for coarse chunks of time and are too spotty to support systematic analyses of program adoptions year by year and program by program.

Explanations of welfare policy consolidation traverse orthodox theoretical boundaries (Pampel and Williamson 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Misra 1993). Evidence has accumulated for aspects of each currently salient theoretical perspective (Pampel and Williamson 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Usui 1991, 1993; Hicks and Swank 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993; Ragin 1993b). Because this evidence argues against the sufficiency of any single theory, we draw on propositions from several perspectives—class, pluralist, and statist perspectives in particular.

Consistent with class-analytical traditions that date back to Engels ([1891] 1968a, [1895] 1968b) and Marx (1968), *democracy and working-class mobilization* (class consciousness, labor organization, and party organization, etc.) advance welfare-state reforms. Recent studies indicate that even though democracy did not open the floodgates to demands for mass redistribution, it did permit many income security reforms (Pampel and Williamson 1985). Affirmation of the reformist clout of labor and social democratic movements rings sharply through the empirical literature on the welfare state, although claims for working-class efficacy seldom apply to pre-Depression years.[5]

---

[3] A measure of program consolidation in 1920 in 15 nations correlates .65 with a measure of welfare effort (i.e., social insurance spending as a share of GDP) 60 years later.

[4] Indeed, data on program innovations from Abbott and DeVinney (1992:263–64) and our data suggest a first phase of innovation characterized by extensive adoptions of old age, health, and accident insurance and incipient adoptions of unemployment insurance that ended somewhere between a 1920 spike in adoptions of unemployment insurance and a subsequent resurgence of adoptions in the 1930s. This second phase peaks in the immediate post-World War II period and dissipates as adoptions are virtually exhausted in the 1960s.

[5] Empirical support for structural and capitalist-rule theories of welfare-state reforms is far less clear (Cameron 1978; Korpi 1978, 1982; Stephens 1979; Castles 1982; Esping-Andersen

Consistent with pluralist theory, *centrist governments as well as leftist democratic governments* have advanced welfare-state reform (Castles and McKinlay 1978; Pampel and Williamson 1985, 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Ragin 1993a). In particular, government by Liberal and cross-class Catholic parties before World War II and by Christian Democratic parties since then appears to have enacted substantial income security reform (Berghman, Peters, and Vranken 1987; Roebroek and Berben 1987; Baldwin 1990; Huber et al. 1993). Various interest groups and reform movements, nonpartisan as well as partisan, also have been important (Skocpol 1992; Williamson and Pampel 1993).

Consistent with statist, elitist, and managerial traditions dating back to Pareto (1935) and before, *state paternalism and such structural capabilities of the state as unitary state organization* have also advanced welfare-state reform. Diffuse operations of state elites have been recorded (Mosca 1939; Higley and Burton 1989) as well as notable contributions by patriarchal elites and institutions to income security reform (Rimlinger 1971; Flora 1986b; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993). (For example, strategic social insurance initiatives by patriarchal Chancellor Bismarck were landmarks of early welfare-state formation.) In addition, state centralization facilitates state responsiveness to demands for income security by reducing veto points for the potential obstruction of national reforms (Pampel and Stryker 1989; Hage et al. 1989; Hicks and Swank 1984b, 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993). Indeed, unitary-state *democracy* may be the crucial state structural variable for the realization of early social insurance reforms. In democratic polities, unitary state structures facilitate reform by limiting the opportunities for the antireformist vetoes typical of subnational levels and parallel branches of government (Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber

----

1985, 1990; Flora 1986b; Hicks and Swank 1984b, 1992; Myles 1984; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993; Ragin 1993a). See Swank (1992) and Skocpol (1992) on capitalist and structural theories, respectively.

et al. 1993). In nondemocracies, autocratic power can override ostensibly federal dispersions of state authority (Taylor 1946:119; Blondel 1969). Indeed, at a glance, early social policy reforms in political democracies have been concentrated in unitary states like Great Britain and Denmark but have been rare in federal democracies such as Switzerland and the former British settler colonies (Castles and Merrill 1989; Baldwin 1990). Thus, we expect to find that *patriarchal states and unitary democracies* accelerated early welfare-state formation.

Each of these theoretical traditions has also stressed that socio-economic development is a general, underlying precondition for welfare-state formation rather than a direct cause of it. Pluralists have seen development as a process of social differentiation and empowerment that generates social needs and fiscal and other state resources, as well as political demands, for the provision of income security (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958; Wilensky 1975; Williamson and Pampel 1993). Statists have stressed the development of increasingly specialized state capabilities and the steering of societal development by the state more than they have stressed direct socioeconomic determination (Skowronek 1982; Skocpol 1992). Marxists have stressed capitalist development as a source of changing class forces and their balance of power (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1991). We adopt the view that socioeconomic development per se sets broad parameters on welfare-state formation, while *political*-institutional forces directly determine it (Flora 1986b; Hicks and Misra 1993; Mann 1993, chap. 20).

Again, the accumulation of evidence across theories of the welfare state belies the sufficiency of any one theory. Whether considering the accounts of such key cases as Bismarckian Germany and Lloyd George's Great Britain or the multivariate analyses of post-World War II studies of social expenditures and rights, explanations of welfare innovations have drawn on the insights of various theories.

Such eclecticism calls for theoretical integration. We advance two bases for integration. One is the political institution, broadly construed to include political parties and interest-group organizations as well as states,

religious as well as class groupings, and cultural as well as material and interpersonal facets of state organizations. A stress on such institutions as causes of welfare-state formation can, in fact, encompass the full range of explanatory factors found in the literature—centrist and socialist parties and labor unions, patriarchal legacies, and unitary democracy.

A second basis for integration is the theory-building capability of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987). QCA can empirically adduce precisely specified deterministic relations between a set (or subset) of hypothesized causes and an outcome. Indeed, QCA can adduce relations among explanatory variables that refine and elaborate theoretical propositions. For example, we might simply hypothesize that unitary democracy, patriarchal statism, and working-class mobilization somehow further state social reformism. Then Boolean analysis might reveal that it is a combination of patriarchy *and* worker mobilization *or* of unitary democracy *and* worker mobilization that generates welfare reform. Indeed, our review of the case-study literature on early British and German social insurance leads us to expect causally potent combinations involving worker mobilization *and* sundry political institutions. QCA can identify such combinations. In summary, QCA may help us integrate theory by combining diverse explanatory elements into new theoretical formulations that are both logically precise and empirically grounded (Ragin 1993a, 1993b).

The principal causes that we have drawn from the literature are working-class mobilization, centrist government (Liberal and Catholic), a patriarchal state legacy, and unitary democracy.

We expect these causes to operate in combinations. We expect the economic force of working-class mobilization to affect early welfare-state formation. However, pre-Depression worker mobilizations were seldom sufficient for working-class rule. Further, pre-Depression (indeed, pre-Cold War!) ruling institutions varied substantially among our advanced capitalist nation states. Therefore, we expect working-class mobilization to operate in combination with various configurations of political institutions, for example as a prod to reform for patriarchal

monarchies and Liberal-led democracies (Mann 1993:chaps. 1, 20).

DATA AND METHODS

To study the early consolidation of insurance programs around 1920, we focus on about 15 sovereign and developed nations at the onset of World War I.[6] We focus our theoretical and explanatory attention on nations at relatively high levels of development for two reasons. For one, we assume that because the stage of economic development sets only broad limits on welfare-state formation, development will provide little explanatory leverage for a set of developed nations. *While some threshold of development is crucial for any substantial degree of welfare-state development, we assume that degree of socioeconomic development is irrelevant to differential welfare-state formation, including program consolidation among developed nations.* Our core population of 15 nations is sharply set off from other nations in terms of economic development, but weakly differentiated in terms of welfare-state formation.[7]

---

[6] We focus on formally sovereign nations, eschewing nations like Ireland, India, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, in order to concentrate on relatively autonomous polities and attain relatively independent cases. We focus on nations at the onset of World War I for two reasons: (1) to avoid the many volatile post-World War I new Baltic and Slavic nations that lack the time for autonomous pre-1920s generation of welfare innovations; and (2) because extensive data on economic development are available for 1913 (Maddison 1991). This choice provides enough nations that are deep enough in history to support systematic comparative historical analysis.

[7] Analysis of Maddison's (1991) data on GDP per head *circa* 1913 confirmed that socioeconomic development (measured as a $2,000 per-capita GDP in 1985 dollars) is a strong correlate of subsequent program consolidation and a necessary condition for consolidation (i.e., no development, no consolidation) within a global sample of nations, though not among developed nations alone. This means that *formulations based on a global sample, were one available for all our measures, could not yield different reduced Boolean expressions for positive (i.e., consolidation) outcomes.* Over the $2,000 threshold, the degree of development does not differentiate between consolidating and nonconsolidating nations. (Analysis available on request from the lead au-

We also assume that relatively homogeneous social processes are constituted by relatively homogeneous sets of institutions. Thus, advanced economic development around the turn of the century, being capitalistic and Eurocentric, connotes a relatively homogeneous institutional world composed of many of those institutions—capitalist, industrial, statist, worker, and at least proto-democratic—most often evoked to explain early welfare-state formation (e.g., Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1991; Flora 1986b; Mann 1993). Thus, economic development delineates a reasonable domain for the explanation of early program consolidation in the welfare state.[8]

Our core population of developed nations (with per capita GDP of more than $2,000 in 1985 dollars circa 1913) consists of Austra-

lia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.[9] The population includes only capitalist democracies (and proto-democracies); and it includes all of the world's mass-franchise democracies with authoritative legislatures during the period, unless states with severely limited effective franchises like Chile are included (see Remmer 1984; Herring 1968). Indeed, by 1917, the only proto-democracies are Austria and Germany. Finland is excluded because of its dependence upon Russia/USSR; Ireland is excluded because of its dependence on the United Kingdom.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

QCA's Boolean techniques analyze dichotomous data on specified outcomes (O) and the hypothesized preconditions (C) for them. Initially, data are arrayed in a "truth table" that consist of combinations of Cs and (following a comma) the corresponding value of O (e.g., "10101,1" or "01111,1"). Ideally, all theoretically possible combinations of Cs are included.[10]

---

thor) [see Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Skocpol 1992 for a similarly restricted view of the role of development].)

[8] The assumption that developed nations are institutionally homogeneous enough to plausibly conform to a relatively cohesive set of explanatory elements is supported by several factors. One is the preponderantly capitalist mode of economic organization in developed nations prior to 1918, which is a source of many institutional similarities from capitalist firms and markets to Liberal and working-class parties. A second is that these developed nations can be regarded as proto-democracies. That is, they manifest definitive features of political democracy as characterized by Dahl (1971), Therborn (1977) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1991): free and competitive elections of top government/legislative officials, extensive suffrage, ample authority in the legislature, and rights of expression and association. True, some, like pre-1917 Netherlands, are exclusive democracies with competitively elected and authoritative but severely restricted franchises (Therborn 1977). Others, like pre-1917 Germany, could be called suppressed democracies, characterized by competitively and extensively elected legislatures whose final authority is circumscribed by a higher autocratic authority (Rueschemeyer et al. 1991). However, all were characterized by extensive associational life and some electoral/legislative activity during much of the 1880 to 1920 period studied here. This combination of developed capitalist and democratic (and proto-democratic) traits suggests an institutionally cohesive theoretical domain and a reasonable "most similar nations" strategy for the study of program consolidation (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

---

[9] We exclude Czechoslovakia, a dependency of Austria until 1919. We also exclude Argentina and Spain, because available information on their social insurance programs is spotty. Japan is included in ancillary analyses to enhance comparability with post-World War II studies that include Japan (Cameron 1978; Stephens 1979; Castles 1982; Pampel and Williamson 1989; Hicks and Swank 1992).

[10] Only for data that contain all possible logical combinations of conditions should a table be reduced. Otherwise the logical structure of our theory will be flawed by its grounding in a limited range of observed cases. For example, omission of combinations of conditions might yield a Boolean expression that is inaccurate or unnecessarily complicated (or both) relative to the expression computed from a full table. There are three main ways of completing a truth table for a set of conditions whose combinations are not empirically exhausted: (1) setting outcomes for all unobserved combinations equal to 0; (2) specifying that all outcomes are "don't knows" free for assignment during the process of Boolean minimization of those values that yield the simplest solution; and (3) theoretical specification of outcomes for certain empirically unobserved combinations.

Next, the data are simplified into rows of "primitive terms." Then, if these primitive terms are solvable (i.e., without contradiction so that no combination of Cs conjoins with both O and not-O), the terms are reduced into the most parsimonious logical expression (purged of all redundancies) that equals O via the application of Boolean algorithms. (The O for a data table without contradiction can always be expressed as equivalent to some expression of the Cs that consist of each C joined by the logical "and" ("×" is often implicit) and "or" ("+") operators.) In logical terms, statements of the "equivalence of O to an expression of Cs" are equal to statements that "the expression of Cs is a necessary and sufficient condition for O." For illustration, recall our simple earlier example involving the relation of unitary democracy (U), patriarchal statism (P), and worker mobilization (W) to the early consolidation of welfare programs (C). This was presumed for purposes of illustration to boil down into $C = UW + PW$. (See Ragin 1987, 1993a for the basic technical procedures of QCA.)

Application of Boolean logic to the analysis of categorical data is ideally suited to an analysis of program consolidation because consolidations are categorical thresholds that either have or have not been passed. Not only can the Boolean method evaluate the explanatory usefulness of the political institutions proposed as explanations of welfare-program innovation and adoption, it can provide inductive as well as deductive help to specify the precise and often varied combinations of causal elements generating program outcomes. That is, QCA applies a set of "leading" theoretical hypotheses to a body of data by a process of theoretically informed hypothesis formulation, testing, and revision reminiscent (despite an advance in technical sophistication) of what Rueschemeyer et al. (1991), following Znaniecki (1934), have termed analytical induction (see Hicks 1994). In particular, QCA opens theory construction to the sort of conjunctural, or combinative, formulation illustrated by the "Bismarckian" fusion of state paternalism and working-class mobilization that is largely neglected in the social scientific literatures on politics and change (Ragin 1987, chap. 3; Ragin 1993a). In addition, QCA can be used with a small number of cases unlike event-history techniques for the analysis of qualitative outcomes (Ragin 1993b; Usui 1993b). QCA systematizes comparisons of nations while mandating attention to historical and institutional detail and narrative life. It fuels quantitative-formal and qualitative, comparative, and case study approaches (Ragin 1987, chaps. 3–5; Ragin 1993a).

VARIABLES

Outcome Variables

Program consolidation is measured in two ways to provide a check on the robustness of analytical results in the face of some rather fine distinctions about the seriousness of program initiatives and the precise timing of consolidations. It also allows us to refine our results. Auxiliary analyses involving alternative measures of explanatory variables provide further checks on the robustness of Boolean results.

Each measure is a binary coding of nations according to whether at least three of the four major social insurance programs were adopted under national law within a decade of Versailles (Department of Health and Human Services 1990).[11] Programs may be (1) "binding" and/or (2) "extensive and funded." They are "binding" in the sense of being legally compulsory for some set of national actors (citizens, firms, etc.) or virtually binding as in the case of Ghent unemployment programs, which include rights to program participation among the requirements of "voluntary," but plentifully rewarded, union membership.[12] Furthermore, "extensive and

[11] Initial adoption of a state/province counts as national adoption for cases of industrial accident insurance in federal systems through which workman's compensation quickly swept the state/provincial level of government, in Australia (1902–1918), Canada (1908–1918), and the United States (1911–1918).

[12] Without the caveat for "Ghent" systems of unemployment compensation, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden's Ghent-style, union-administered unemployment compensation programs would not be distinguished from other noncompulsory programs, despite these programs' extensive coverage, generous benefits, and ample state subsidization (Rothstein 1990).

funded" means they cover a notable share of the target group and are adequately funded within some short time period (two or three years) to provide notable benefits.[13] These stipulations systematize the criteria for significant program adoptions and avoid the shortcomings in program datings from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1991), which was used by Usui (1993a, 1993b) and Abbott and DeViney (1992).[14]

Consolidation 1920. For the 1920 consolidation measure, a nation must have adopted three of the four major social insurance programs—old age, sickness and maternity, industrial accident and unemployment—by 1920. The adoptions must be either binding *or* extensive and funded. This standard was met by eight nations. Consolidated nations are coded 1, others 0.[15]

---

[13] "Notable benefits" are judged in light of historical studies and standards. However, "notable" typically means at least 15 percent of potential target group (say retirees) and adequate funding. The ample pension coverage afforded by U.S. Civil War pensions and "maternalist" pensions during the first three decades of this century may qualify the United States as a pension adopter before the 1935 Social Security Act—probably by about 1917 when 35 states had maternalist pensions. However, these long overlooked pensions would only add up to a second adoption for the United States, while this inclusion would still be questionable due to funding deficiencies (Skocpol 1992).

[14] For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Social Services (1991) datings includes the voluntary Belgian health insurance law of 1894, while this was by our own criteria neither sufficiently binding nor seriously implemented. This reference's lack of explicit program criteria makes it an unspecific source relative to such other sources as Flora (1983, 1986a) or Palme (1990). At worst, it allows for legislative initiatives like France's 1905 unemployment compensation law, which was not only voluntary but never seriously funded, inflated status.

[15] Baseline dates, which refer to the first national program of each type, regardless of its coverage/funding or "binding" character are from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1991) and Flora (1983, vol. 1:454). Modifications of these dates to include "binding" characterizations are from Flora (1983, Vol. 1:454; Flora 1986a, vol. 4). Modifications to ensure adequate funding (i.e., income replacement) and coverage are based on information from Flora

Consolidation 1929. For the 1929 consolidation measure, the adopted programs must be *both* (1) "binding" *and* (2) "extensive and funded." As this more stringent measure was only met by three nations by 1920, qualification for it was extended to 1929, and the three major social insurance program adoptions may include family allowance programs. Six nations meet this more stringent measure of consolidation.[16] Dates of program adoptions, plus the benchmark dates used by Usui (1991) and Abbot and DeViney (1992), are displayed in Table 1. Consolidated nations are coded 1, others 0.

Explanatory Variables

Patriarchal Statism taps the institutional and cultural legacies of traditional authoritarianism with its traditions of paternalism, noblèsse oblige, civil service privilege, and mass patronage (Rimlinger 1971; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993; and Huber et al. 1993). It is the sum of four six-point (0 to 5) measures: (1) the extent of eighteenth- and

---

(1986a, vol. 4), Palme (1990), Kangas (1991), Wennemo (1992) and unpublished materials from the Stockholm Institute for Social Research. Further information on dates regarding the "binding" programs and the implementation of funding/coverage was obtained from responses to inquiries to national experts, namely: P. Baldwin (for France and the U.K.), F. Castles (Australia, New Zealand), H. Deleek (Belgium), G. Esping-Andersen (Denmark, Sweden), M. Ferrera (Italy), O. Kangas (Denmark and Finland) J. Kohl (Austria, Germany), S. Kuhnle (Norway, Sweden), R. Mishra (Canada), Luis Moreno (Spain), J. Myles (Canada), G. Paz (Argentina), E. Huber Stephens (Switzerland), W. Ultee (the Netherlands) and J. Vecernik (Czechoslovakia).

[16] Information on compulsory and binding programs is from Flora (1986a); information on coverage and funding is from Flora (1986a), Palme (1990), Kangas (1991), and Wennemo (1992). Requiring adoption of four programs would confine us to Germany and the United Kingdom (plus Denmark for the 1929 measure), which would be too restrictive. A two-program criterion which would encompass all cases except Canada, France, and the United States—all but Canada and the United States for the 1929 measure—would be too permissive. Therefore, we chose a three-program criterion.

Table 1. Date of Adoption of Five Major Welfare Programs by Type of Adoption: Fifteen Developed Nations

Country	Type of Adoption	Welfare Program				
		Old Age, Disability, and Survivors	Sickness and Maternity	Workers' Compensation	Unemployment Compensation	Family Allowances
Australia	Initial adoption	1908	1944	1902	1944	1941
	Binding or extensive/funded	1908	1944	1902	1944	1941
	Binding and extensive/funded	1908	1944	1902	1944	1941
Austria	Initial adoption	1906	1888	1887	1920	1948
	Binding or extensive/funded	1927	1888	1887	1920	1948
	Binding and extensive/funded	1927	1888	1887	1920	1948
Belgium	Initial adoption	1924	1894	1903	1920	1930
	Binding or extensive/funded	1924	1894	1903	1920	1930
	Binding and extensive/funded	1924	1945	1971	1945	1930
Canada	Initial adoption	1927	1957	1908	1940	1944
	Binding or extensive/funded	1927	1971	1908	1940	1944
	Binding and extensive/funded	1927	1971	1908	1940	1944
Denmark	Initial adoption	1891	1892	1898	1907	1952
	Binding or extensive/funded	1922	1892	1890	1907	1952
	Binding and extensive/funded	1922	1933	1916	1907	1952
France	Initial adoption	1910	1928	1898	1905	1932
	Binding or extensive/funded	1946	1930	1946	1967	1932
	Binding and extensive/funded	1946	1930	1946	1967	1952
Germany	Initial adoption	1889	1883	1884	1919	1943
	Binding or extensive/funded	1889	1883	1884	1919	1943
	Binding and extensive/funded	1889	1883	1884	1927	1963
Italy	Initial adoption	1919	1912	1898	1919	1937
	Binding or extensive/funded	1919	1928	1898	1919	1945
	Binding and extensive/funded	1945	1946	1898	1919	1945
Netherlands	Initial adoption	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
	Binding or extensive/funded	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
	Binding and extensive/funded	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
Norway	Initial adoption	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
	Binding or extensive/funded	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
	Binding and extensive/funded	1936	1909	1895	1938	1946
New Zealand	Initial adoption	1898	1938	1908	1930	1926
	Binding or extensive/funded	1898	1938	1908	1930	1926
	Binding and extensive/funded	1898	1938	1908	1930	1926
Sweden	Initial adoption	1913	1891	1901	1934	1948
	Binding or extensive/funded	1913	1891	1916	1934	1948
	Binding and extensive/funded	1913	1891	1916	1934	1948
Switzerland	Initial adoption	1946	1891	1901	1924	1952
	Binding or extensive/funded	1946	1911	1911	1924	1960
	Binding and extensive/funded	1946	1911	1911	1976	1960
United Kingdom	Initial adoption	1908	1911	1897	1911	1945
	Binding or extensive/funded	1908	1911	1897	1920	1945
	Binding and extensive/funded	1925	1911	1946	1920	1945
United States	Initial adoption	1935	1964	1912	1935	NONE
	Binding or extensive/funded	1935	NONE	1912	1935	NONE
	Binding and extensive/funded	1935	NONE	1912	1935	NONE

nineteenth-century state absolutism (Rokkan 1970, chap.3); (2) resistance to universal enfranchisement (Rokkan 1970, chap. 3); (3) class rigidity, or the precipitousness and non-permeability of class and status gradations, as elaborated from Lipset (1983); and (4) Huber et al.'s (1993) measure of absolutism circa 1900. (This last item prevents excessive domination of institutional legacies over institutional actualities but allows legacies to settle the issue for some borderline cases like Belgium.) The measure is dichotomized to code Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden as 1, and all other nations as 0. The measure is the same for both outcome measures.

Unitary democracy is measured as the *joint* presence of state centralization and polyarchy. Its centralization component is measured in terms of unitary, as opposed to federal, government. This stresses the subordination of intermediate and local governments to the central state by means of prefectural systems of centralized appointment, financing and authority (Blondel 1969:283–301; Lijphart 1984:14). Its polyarchy component is defined as nations with full or exclusivist democracy since 1914, where full democracy requires legislative representation (with competing parties) and extensive, if incomplete or unequally weighted, adult franchise (Therborn 1977). It is coded identically for the two outcome measures, except for the deletion of Italy (authoritarian after 1922 as before 1900) from the democratic ranks of the latter period. In brief, only nations that are both centralized and polyarchal are coded 1; others are coded 0.

Working-Class Mobilization measures union and socialist party strength. It is coded 1 for nations with (1) at least 20 percent of the labor force unionized (as averaged across union density figures for 1913 and 1919 (plus 1930 for the 1929 consolidation measure) or (2) at least 20 percent vote for leftist (Socialist, Social Democratic, Communist, and Labour) parties across all national elections to the lower (or lone) house of the legislature, 1906–1919 (1906–1929 for the 1929 consolidation measure) (Mackie and Rose 1982). The measure is otherwise coded 0. Union density figures are from Stephens (1979, table 4.8) and are normed on the total

rather than the nonagricultural labor force because the former provides a better measure of political clout.[17]

Liberal government (i.e., Democratic and non-Catholic center party) indicates nations characterized by a strong degree of Liberal party rule (i.e., Liberal, Free Trade, Radical, Center or Farmer's party). For both outcome measures, this variable is coded 1 for nations with at least 40 percent of government by a Liberal party (or a Liberal-led coalition government) in years since "democracy" (Flora 1983:155–90; Mackie and Rose 1982; and Jacobs 1989). Otherwise it is coded 0.

Catholic government (Christian Democratic, Catholic Conservative, Catholic "Republican," and confessional parties) is coded 1 (for both outcome measures) for nations with Catholic government (or Catholic-led coalitional government) for at least 40 percent of its years as a democracy; otherwise coded 0.[18]

---

[17] Data for 1913, 1919, and 1930 are used for lack of more extensive data. A 20-percent cutting point is used for union and party measures because it taps the threshold of organizational strength emphasized in the literature (e.g., differentiates strong Australian unions from weak New Zealand unions and strong Austro-German leftist parties from weak Dutch and Belgian leftist parties). Both criteria are used because of a tendency for some nations to be strong on one criterion but not the other. For example, in Britain (32 percent on union density and 7.8 percent on leftist vote), labor unions were bulwarks of Liberal government during 1908–1914; in Italy electoral support for the left (scored 22.5 percent) was strong enough to sustain Lib-Lab governments despite low union membership (7 percent). In the 1920s, increases in Swiss union density and decreases in Italian union density were quite pronounced; and New Zealand's shift to leftist rule in the 1920s was also pronounced.

[18] The strength of Liberal and Catholic government is coded for years in which nations are at least exclusive ("partial franchise") democracies as allowed by our Therbornian definition of democracy. Forty percent was chosen as a threshold that permitted a substantial share of democratic rule. Liberal and Catholic government characterizations are not mutually exclusive, but each type of rule tends to crowd out the other and the two are negatively correlated. The 1920s brought Catholic rule to prominence in Austria, Germany, and France.

ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

The proposed explanatory elements fit the data on post-World War I program consolidation elegantly, intelligibly, and without contradiction for both outcome measures (Table 2). Auxiliary analyses that modify dichotomizations check the robustness of results.

Table 2 presents the distributions of our 15 nations across the hypothesized preconditions and outcomes for the two outcome measures. Consolidations are more numerous for the 1920 measure, which defines consolidation as adoption of social insurance programs that attain adequate funding/coverage *or* binding status.

Although some combinations of preconditions may be apparent in Table 2, judicious extraction of combinations requires that we apply the Occam's razor of Boolean reduction.

Consolidation 1920

The "primitive terms" in Table 2 for the consolidation 1920 outcome indicate that no combination of preconditions for this outcome has contradictory outcome values (i.e., no combination of preconditions has both outcomes, "consolidation" and "no consolidation.") After Boolean reduction, the expression for the consolidation 1920 outcome is

Consolidation 1920 =
    PATRIARCHY WORK catholic
    unitary-democratic + LIBERAL
    UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC
    WORK catholic + CATHOLIC
    PATRIARCHY DEMOCRACY
    liberal.   (1)

(Outcomes for unobserved combinations of preconditions were set to 0). For clarification, some description of this expression may be useful. Thus, terms that are not joined by an explicit operator are joined implicitly by the "and" operator. Variable names in upper-case letters denote the presence of the variable (e.g., Catholic government for "CATHOLIC"), while variable names in lower-case letters the absence of the variable (e.g., "catholic" expresses the absence of Catholic government). Thus, in plain English,

Consolidation 1920 =
    PATRIARCHY and WORK
    and catholic and unitary-democratic
    or LIBERAL and UNITARY
    DEMOCRATIC and WORK and
    catholic or CATHOLIC and
    PATRIARCHY and UNITARY
    DEMOCRATIC and liberal.   (2)

In yet plainer English, consolidation by 1920 obtains in a nation if and only if (1) patriarchal statism and working-class mobilization are present and Catholic government and unitary democracy are absent (Austria, Germany, Italy), *or* (2) Liberal government, working-class mobilization, and unitary democracy are present while Catholic government is not (Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom), *or* (3) Catholic government and unitary democracy and patriarchal statism are present but Liberal government is absent (Belgium, Netherlands).[19] In other words, three configurations of preconditions, suggesting three distinct routes to welfare-state formation by 1920, emerge from our analyses.[20]

Consolidation 1929

If empirically unobserved values are set to 0, the equation for the 1929 measure of program consolidation is

Consolidation 1929 =
    PATRIARCHY WORK CATHOLIC
    unity-democratic liberal +
    LIBERAL UNITARY-
    DEMOCRATIC WORK catholic.   (3)

In other words, if patriarchal statism, working-class mobilization, and Catholic government are present in the absence of uni-

---

[19] In more precise Boolean detail, the right-hand side of the expression is a necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of consolidation by 1920. Each of the three combinations of preconditions is a sufficient condition for consolidation by 1920. Moreover, each term in a particular configuration is a necessary condition for the sufficiency of the configuration for consolidation by 1920.

[20] Parallel analysis that added three similarly developed nations (Argentina, Spain, and Japan) for which data were spottier yielded the same results.

Table 2. Primitive Terms for QCA Analysis of Program Consolidation: Fifteen Developed Countries

				Consolidation 1920		
Liberal Govern- ment	Catholic Govern- ment	Patri- archal State	Unitary Democracy	Working- Class Mobil- ization	Consol- idation 1920	Nation
1	0	1	1	1	1	Denmark, Sweden
1	0	0	1	1	1	United Kingdom
0	0	1	0	1	1	Austria, Germany
0	0	1	0	1	1	Italy
0	1	1	1	1	1	Belgium
0	1	1	1	0	1	Netherlands
0	0	0	0	1	0	Australia
1	0	0	0	0	0	Canada, Switzerland, United States
1	0	1	1	0	0	France
1	0	0	1	0	0	Norway, New Zealand

				Consolidation 1929		
Liberal Govern- ment	Catholic Govern- ment	Patri- archal State	Unitary Democracy	Working- Class Mobil- ization	Consol- idation 1929	Nation
1	0	1	1	1	1	Denmark, Sweden
1	0	0	1	1	1	United Kingdom, New Zealand
0	1	1	0	1	1	Austria, Germany
1	0	1	0	0	0	Italy
0	0	0	0	1	0	Australia
0	1	1	1	1	0	Belgium, Netherlands
1	0	0	0	0	0	Canada, United States
1	1	1	1	0	0	France
1	0	0	1	0	0	Norway
1	0	0	0	1	0	Switzerland

tary democracy and Liberal government (Austria and Germany) *or* Liberal government, working-class mobilization, and unitary democracy are present in the absence of Catholic government (Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, New Zealand), then consolidation by 1929 obtains.[21]

If empirically unobserved combinations are theoretically specified, the equation for positive outcomes on the 1929 measure of

program consolidation is somewhat more parsimonious:

Consolidation 1929 =
    PATRIARCHY WORK CATHOLIC
    unitary-democratic + LIBERAL
    UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC
    WORK.   (4)

This specification builds on equation 3 by assigning consolidation for some empirically unobserved combinations of explanatory elements and 0 outcomes for others.[22] In par-

---

[21] For the parallel analyses that add (a) Argentina and Spain, (b) Japan, or (c) Argentina, Japan, and Spain to the core 15-nation models, Boolean formulations for positive outcomes (consolidations) are identical to those for the original 15 nations.

[22] Theoretical specifications of 1929 consolidation outcome do not change any Boolean solutions for positive outcomes.

ticular, we *assume* that Catholic party government may be added to the observed Lib-Lab unitary government combinations (10011,1 and 10111,1) on the grounds that such governments would not sabotage Liberal reform in the presence of liberal government, unitary democracy, and working-class mobilization. This yields the new combinations 11011,1 and 11111,1.

An element of arbitrariness is present in dichotomizations of traits that are not intrinsically dichotomous. One check on the robustness of findings is to redo analyses after small but plausible shifts in the dichotomizations of the explanatory variables.[23] For each explanatory variable for each outcome we considered shifting codes twice, once including one *more* positive term (e.g., one more nation with Liberal government = 1) than had previously been measured, and once including one less positive term (e.g., one less nation with Liberal government = 1). We shifted a nation—recoding a variable—if the recode was substantively plausible. For example, it was implausible to *reduce* the initial 1920 repertoire of nations with positive values for Catholic government because cases initially coded for Catholic were incontrovertibly Catholic, but it *was* plausible to *add* Switzerland to the Catholic ranks *for the 1929 analysis*. When-

ever a recode was implemented, a new Boolean analysis was executed.[24]

Reanalyses yielded no changes for the 1929 outcome measure. However, reanalyses yielded three changes for the 1920 period. One change involved the recoding of early working-class mobilization in the Netherlands from "weak" to "strong." (Quantitatively, the Netherlands was, on the basis of its 18 percent unionization rate just below our threshold of 20 percent; qualitatively such a coding was consistent with relevant literature [Luebbert 1990]). This recoding added working-class mobilization to the "CATHOLIC PATRIARCHY UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC liberal" combination in equation 1. This change suggests that our original coding of working-class mobilization for the Netherlands may have been prejudiced against our hypothesis of pervasive (but variously conditioned, or "entwined") working-class effects.[25]

The other two changes involve shifts in codings for Italy, which hovered between unitary and nonunitary democracy and was equivocal on working-class mobilization. If Italy is recoded from strong worker mobilization to weak worker mobilization, Italy splits off from the "Bismarckian" combina-

---

[23] Recodings were confined to explanatory variables. (The use of two outcome variables is already a check on the robustness of findings.) Recodings were done only for analyses (one per outcome) that contained 0 codings of empirically unobserved combinations of pre-conditions. Recodings of these models sometimes add terms to or delete terms from the crucial observed cases. For example, a recoding for 1920 consolidation of the United States from "10000" to "00000" might change the primitive terms by switching "00000" from an unobserved term ("00000,–") to an observed term ("00000,0"). The same recoding of this combination for the 1929 model with *theoretically* specified unobserved combinations changes nothing. The recoding simply reallocates the United States between two elements (from "10000" to "00000") within an unaltered set of terms. (More radical recodings might have introduced contradictions, say the addition of a "11111,0" where a "11111,1" already existed, but no such radical recoding was empirically plausible.)

[24] Variable by variable, the addition and deletion of cases due to recodings of explanatory variables involved the following additions/deletions for the 1920 outcome: for Liberal government, Australia/U.S.; for Catholic government, France/none; for paternalistic statism, Norway/Belgium and the Netherlands; for unitary democracy, Italy/none; for working-class mobilization, the Netherlands/Italy. For the 1929 outcome, these additions/deletions were involved: for Liberal government, Australia/U.S.; for Catholic government, Switzerland/none; for patriarchal statism, Norway/Belgium and the Netherlands; for unitary democracy, Italy/none; for working-class mobilization, France/Switzerland.

[25] "Entwining" means that causes operate "not like billiard balls, which follow their own trajectories, changing directions as they hit one another. [Instead] they entwine, that is, their interactions change one another's inner shape as well as their trajectories" (Mann 1993:2). We embrace Mann's injunction to go beyond theories stressing "monocausality," independent causes, or even the mere interaction of factors ("changing direction as they hit one another").

tion into a case all her own, while the Bismarckian configuration is slightly complicated.[26] Second, when Italy is recoded as a unitary democracy, it jumps from the "PATRIARCHY WORK liberal catholic unitary-democratic" Bismarckian combination to the "LIBERAL UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC WORK catholic" or Lib-Lab combination. Both shifts situate Italy somewhere between the patriarchal and Liberal worlds (Mann 1993:688).

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Empirical Patterns

Bismarckian paths. Bismarckian paths to welfare-state consolidation emerge for both measures of consolidation. Only Austria and Germany travel this path for 1929 consolidation. For these nations, a federal, paternalistic state confronted with working-class mobilization in the form of socialist unionization and party formation and experiencing a notable degree of Catholic government led to welfare-state consolidations. These nations fit the model well: Narratives about Germany gave rise to our conception of a "Bismarckian" model in the first place. Moreover, Catholic parties were influential in the original Austro-German insurance innovations of the 1880s; and they were also crucial for 1920s enactment of unemployment insurance in Austria and Germany.[27] For con-

_____

[26] In particular, Italy shifts from a "PATRIARCHY WORK catholic unitary-democratic" combination to a "LIBERAL PATRIARCHY work catholic unitary-democratic" combination. This configuration suggests a possible "Liberal-patriarchal" path to consolidation in which Catholic parties do not dilute Liberal clout and democratically augmented patriarchal fears of the workers movement are muted by weakness. The complication of the Bismarckian combination involves a simple shift from a "PATRIARCHY WORK catholic unitary-democratic" combination to a "PATRIARCHY WORK liberal catholic unitary-democratic" combination, which suggests incompatibility of Liberal as well as Catholic governments with a patriarchal defusing of a strongly mobilized working class.

[27] For 1929 consolidation, the "Bismarckian" result masks two sub-paths: one distinctly autocratic stretch in which the Imperial administrations managed by Bismarck and Von Taaffe appear to be the final agents of change, and another

solidation by 1920, Italy falls among the Bismarckian cases, but it fits the "PATRIARCHY WORK catholic unitary-democratic" Bismarckian profile somewhat precariously. Italy's characterization as a decentralized and, hence, nonunitary democracy is a result of the extremely decentralized operation of a formally unitary state (Hage et al. 1989). If Italy is regarded as a unitary democracy, it appears to have taken a Lib-Lab rather than a Bismarckian route to early welfare-state formation. Also, Italy lies between our strong and weak characterizations of working-class mobilization. Shifted into the weak category, Italy appears to have embarked on a distinctive Liberal-patriarchal path (Mann 1993: 683). The volatile Italian case is well suited to such unstable results. Italy's industrial accident reform in 1898 was an autocratic reaction to liberal and working-class pressures that fit the "Bismarckian" label. The passages of old age and unemployment insurance in 1919 issued from Giolitti's Liberals in clear alliance with Socialist and labor groups under extensive populist pressures (Luebbert 1990:46–51). Italy's uncertainly Bismarckian trajectory, which veers close to Lib-Lab reformism and (in the twilight hours of her labor quiescence) a unique "Liberal-patriarchal" path, reflects her tumultuous historical record.

Lib-Lab/unitary-democratic paths. Lib-Lab/unitary-democratic paths to welfare-state consolidation emerge for both measures of consolidation. A Lib-Lab path characterized by unitary democracy as well as Liberal government and strong labor movement emerges for Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom for the 1920 outcome. A similar path emerges for these nations and New Zealand for the 1929 outcome. These nations clearly match their Boolean paths for the 1929 outcome, although labor alliances in Scandinavia at the turn of the century were constituted more by unions and local associations than by parties and Sweden's accident insurance law of 1916 issued from the formally nonpartisan but Conservative leaning government of Hjalmar Hammarskjold (Luebbert 1990:125– 33; Lewin 1988:110–12).

_____

democratic one during which the Catholic-led parliamentary governments of Prime Ministers Marx and Fenner led the way.

However, program consolidation in the United Kingdom by 1929 does not perfectly match the Boolean combinations. The unemployment insurance law of 1920 was passed under a coalition government involving the short-lived "Lloyd George Liberals"—*cum* renegade Labourites—and the Conservatives. Further, the enactment of *compulsory* pension insurance in 1925 came under the Conservative government of Sidney Baldwin. In short, Lib-Lab coalitions only tend to characterize adopting governments in these arenas of frequent Liberal rule, working-class mobilization, and unitary democracy captured by the "LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WORK" term.

Catholic paternalistic paths. Catholic paternalism emerges as a third path to early welfare-state consolidation by 1920. However, consolidation in Belgium and the Netherlands and their paths to consolidation dissolve by 1929 if we require "binding" programs (as the 1929 consolidation measure does). Nations characterized by Catholic party government, patriarchal statism, and unitary democracy, but free from the complication of liberal government (e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands, the two "liberal CATHOLIC PATRIARCHY UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC" nations), achieve consolidation by 1920.

In Belgium, the Catholic party had exercised virtual hegemony from the earliest days of exclusivist democracy while Liberal and other parties, though often popular, were generally barred from government until after World War II. In the Netherlands, Catholic-led coalitions of Confessional parties typically held sway over parliament from the turn of the century until well after 1920, although Liberals governed periodically during the last decades of the nineteenth century (Mackie and Rose 1982; Luebbert 1990:139–44). Despite Liberal governments in the Netherlands in the last decades of the nineteenth century, their adoptions of accident insurance (1901), old age and health insurance (1913), and unemployment insurance (1916) were all implemented by Confessional governments. Although Belgian Lib-Lab alliances were used by *opposition* parties in the early decades of the twentieth century to shore up precarious electoral positions, the Belgian adoptions of

health insurance (1894), accident insurance (1903), and unemployment insurance (1920) all delivered Catholic programs. Thus, Confessional hegemony in Belgium and the Netherlands effectively differentiates these nations from the Liberal nations, indeed from all other nations for the 1920 consolidation period.

Belgian and Dutch Catholic parties were interclass parties representing worker constituencies in a context of weak *socialist* labor movements. Consistent with the similarity of the Dutch case to the Belgian case as regards strong working-class mobilization, Luebbert (1990) wrote:

> It is clear that the Catholic party was a genuinely inter-class party. Its Christian Democratic workers association, the Ligue Democratique Cretienne Belgigue, had 200,000 members by 1911. Catholic mutual help societies had 500,000 members by 1909. Although its Christian Democratic wing, the agent of Catholic workers' interests, never established supremacy within the party, it did play a decisive role in leading the party to accommodate workers. . . . The experience of the Netherlands . . . was little more than a variant of this. (P. 143) [28]

Workers. The 1929 measure of consolidation can be suggestively expressed as

Consolidation 1929 =
        WORK (PATRIARCHY
        CATHOLIC unitary-democratic
        + LIBERAL UNITARY
        DEMOCRATIC).   (5)

Working-class mobilization emerges as a necessary condition for program consolidation; indeed it spurs each of the alternate paths. Here, as for Rueschemeyer et al.'s (1991:96–98) account of the emergence of (full-male-franchise) democracy, the industrial working class emerges as a crucial driving force. Indeed, the role of the working class appears more decisive for welfare-state consolidation than for democratic consolida-

[28] In both nations, working-class mobilization, although notable during and immediately after World War I, was largely separated from the *socialist* workers' movement—almost *entirely* so in Belgium—by strong Catholic worker movements and popular Catholic political associations under the auspices of Catholic "Peoples' Parties" (Fitzmaurice 1989; Jacobs 1989; Boswell 1990:160–76; Luebbert 1990:139–44).

tion. For welfare reform, as opposed to mass electoral enfranchisement, worker politics appear essential. Whether by provoking state autocrats to preempt working-class social appeals or by enticing Liberal party governments (aided by unitary-democratic states) to buy working-class allegiance with social policy concessions, the working class figures prominently in every case of 1929 consolidation.

Furthermore, our recoding of the Dutch workers movement for 1920 consolidation suggests that the Dutch case may be a variant of the Belgian case for both outcomes. Reanalysis of the 1920 consolidation with the Netherlands classified like Belgium added WORK to the third combination in equation 1. Rearranging equation 1 after recoding yields:

Consolidation 1920 =
    WORK (PATRIARCHY catholic
    unitary-democratic + LIBERAL
    UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC catholic
    + CATHOLIC PATRIARCHY
    UNITARY-DEMOCRATIC
    liberal).   (6)

Here, early working-class mobilization emerges as a necessary component of all paths to 1920 program consolidation, as it did for all paths to 1929 consolidation. We substantiate our introductory conjecture that working-class mobilization, variously combined with other institutional conditions, was a pervasive and crucial source of early welfare-state formation. Indeed, if Luebbert's (1990) discussion of the important role of the industrial working class in Dutch and Belgian Catholic parties augments more quantitative analyses of Dutch working-class strength, the importance of early working-class mobilization for welfare-state development seems solidly documented.

The principal difference between the results for the two outcomes is that patriarchal, unitary democracies that are governed by Catholic parties—and facing strong working-class mobilization—achieve program consolidation by 1920. However, for the 1920 outcome, if compulsory programs are required Belgium and the Netherlands fail to attain consolidation. Working-class pressure among Catholics probably was a key ingredient of social insurance reform in the Catho-

lic, patriarchal unitary democracies. Evidently, the conjuncture of Catholic (and non-Liberal) government with patriarchal legacies and unitary democracy was insufficient to consolidate compulsory social insurance programs, at least during the first several decades of the century.

In summary, three routes to the early consolidation of the welfare state emerge. These are (1) a "Bismarckian" route, (2) a unitary-democratic "Lib-Lab" route, and (3) a Catholic paternalistic unitary-democratic route found only for the 1920 outcome. Early working-class mobilization, differently conditioned and emerging in different national contexts, seems pervasive. Thus, all routes to program consolidation are manifestations of working-class pressures for social amelioration even prior to extensive entry of social democratic parties into government during the 1930s.

Substantive and Theoretical Contributions

Identification of the three routes to consolidation contributes to the literature on early welfare-state formation. The general outline of a Bismarckian model—a patriarchal state is defusing a burgeoning working-class movement's mass appeal by adopting paternalistic social policies—is implicit in extant accounts of Germany and immediately recognizable in accounts of Austria (Rimlinger 1971; Hofmeister 1982; Esping-Andersen 1990). Moreover, no similar, comparably precise description of causal combinations has been generalized previously as a sufficient condition for welfare-state formation or exemplified by Austria and (pre-Fascist) Italy as well as Wilhelmine Germany.[29]

Although the general outlines of the Lib-Lab model resemble accounts of Lloyd George's landmark reforms of 1908–1911, no Lib-Lab model of social insurance reform (as opposed to government formation or

---

[29] Alber's (1982) general authoritarian model stresses the generalized responses of authoritarian states to the disruptions of industrialization but does not emphasize the industrial working class, much less Catholic and Liberal partisan politics. Esping-Andersen's (1990) general conservative model stresses state paternalism (patriarchy and traditionalism) but does not emphasize class, center parties, or state centralization.

democratic stabilization) has previously been extended beyond the case of the United Kingdom. Indeed, accounts of the Lloyd George reforms have sometimes pitted Liberal explanations against Labourite explanations rather than seeing Liberals and Labour as co-active agents of reform (Williamson and Pampel 1993; Marwick 1967).[30] In addition, our specification of unitary democracy as a necessary component of the Lib-Lab configuration is new.

Catholicism has been stressed in some treatments of early autocratic reforms and post-World War II welfare legislation. However, researchers have not previously stressed the social policy innovativeness of nations that combine Catholic government with a centralized parliamentary system and a legacy of patriarchal statism. Researchers have tended either to lump early Belgian and Dutch innovations with "conservative" or "authoritarian" innovations (Alber 1982; Esping-Andersen 1990), or simply to neglect them (Williamson and Pampel 1993). Moreover, explicit treatments of particular cases have refrained from generalization, while general Christian Democratic models have not reached back to the possibility of proto-Christian Democratic reformism in pre-World War II years (Kersbergen 1991; Huber et al. 1993).

Furthermore, the three paths have much in common. In each, early working-class mobilization, whether union-centered or party-centered (or both) combines with political conditions—for example, Liberal, Catholic, or patriarchal government—to constitute the particular causal combination. To use Mann's (1993:597–691) term for relations among the several interdependent sources of working-class identities within the major world powers circa 1900, class mobilization "entwined" with political institutions to bring forth early social insurance reforms.

These conclusions are theoretical as well as substantive. Not only do they branch out from a simple theoretical stress on political institutions, they incorporate other cases of early proto-democratic industrializing states that existed (Argentina) or might have existed (an earlier Czech Republic).

Methodological Contributions

Methodologically, the combination(s) of the three routes by means of "or" operators yields a comprehensive, deterministic formulation of the causes of early welfare-state formation. These routes combine explanatory elements stressed by different theoretical perspectives into elegant alternative constellations of causal factors. Heterogeneity and universality are bridged because these expressions allow "or" terms to join the particular causal combinations within overarching generalizations.[31] Indeed, within the limits of the stipulated domain (relatively industrialized democratic nations before World War II), the Boolean expressions for program consolidation are universal. QCA supports the more generalizing theoretical side of our conclusions, subsuming the proper names of history ("Germany," "the United Kingdom") under general, if somewhat complex, propositions.

As regards the *heterogeneity* of the Boolean expressions, there are multiple routes to program consolidation. However, these routes show a common necessary impetus from the demands and expectations placed upon state actors and institutions by organized workers. Thus, as regards the *integrity* of the Boolean expressions, organized workers appear to have catalyzed patriarchal, Lib-

[30] For example, Williamson and Pampel (1993) provide a pluralistic non-Labourite account compared to Marwick (1967) and Perry (1986); and Baldwin's (1990) stress on Liberal sponsorship of Sweden's 1913 pension reforms and agrarian agitation for universalistic reforms downplays the decisiveness of Social Democratic support of the reforms and sidesteps the Liberal allegiance of Sweden's 1913 farm vote (Lewin 1988). Alber's (1982) Liberal model focuses on an early twentieth-century era of Liberal prominence in social reform without pinpointing the complementary role of labor's political strategy, indeed the centrality of Liberal-labor alliances.

[31] Boolean expressions with "or" operators bridge contextualized explanation and universal nomothetic explanation, for "or" is an elementary operator within a general expression that subsumes the specific cases (e.g., "Germany") under more general terms (e.g., "paternalism," "Liberalism") and provides a deterministic explanation for general outcomes (e.g., consolidation 1920) across a population of nations.

eral, and Catholic prime ministers into enacting extensive social insurance reforms by the 1920s.

Boolean induction combines the elements of our political institutional/class theory—state structures, Liberal and Catholic partisan government, and the political-economic institution of socialistic labor movements—to provide an elegant explanation for the social policy outcome and era in question.[32] Although the "Bismarckian," state-augmented "Lib Lab," and Catholic paternalistic accounts of early welfare-state formation that are formulated by our Boolean expressions can benefit from additional historically detailed and nuanced telling, each story of the road to an early "welfare state" conforms to a well-structured genre.

Discussion

Our paths shed light on other categorizations of advanced capitalist states. They bear directly on Esping-Andersen's (1990) categorization of conservative, social-democratic, and liberal "welfare state regimes." Despite caveats about the "impurity" of his regimes, Esping-Andersen (1990:28–32) suggested that his regimes demarcate distinct long-term causal paths to the modern welfare state. However, our paths go beyond Esping-Andersen's demarcations: Substantively, they suggest common Lib-Lab roots for some "social democratic" and Liberal welfare states (e.g., the United Kingdom and Sweden); theoretically, they suggest that long, common, homogeneous political histories can not be inferred from common recent policy configurations—the basis for Esping-Andersen's typology of regimes.

---

[32] Although our accounts of early consolidation are confined to early industrializers, evidence offered here suggests that more elementary, incipient introductions of social insurance can be predicted by, and are largely impelled by the process of socioeconomic development. Although the consolidation of three or four social insurance programs by the 1920s establishes a foundation for a process of subsequent welfare-state development, evidence not presented here shows that this foundation predicts such major indicators of welfare-state development as welfare effort and de-commodification more than a half century later.

Our configurations bear somewhat less directly on Mann's (1993) categorization of national modes of worker incorporation in terms of "political crystallizations." Among Mann's "crystallizations" are a "semi-authoritarian" crystallization encompassing "Imperial Germany," "Austria-Hungary," and Italy (as well as Japan and Spain), and a "Liberal-representative" crystallization encompassing our own British, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish consolidators (plus Norway and France).[33] Early social reform was a factor in Mann's (1993:499–504, 651) analysis of worker incorporation. Our combinations suggest that Mann's framework might profit from attention to degrees as well as modes (class, sectional, etc.) of worker organization, for the *extent* of unionization is crucial to the timing of incorporation (e.g., in Germany versus Japan). Our paths also indicate that Mann's (1993:683) "Liberal-representative incorporation" with its Dutch and Belgian exemplars conflates distinctive Liberal and Catholic modes of representative rule.

More broadly, our political institutional theoretical framework and Boolean method illuminate a broad range of questions in comparative historical political sociology and economy. One extension of our analysis could look at social insurance reforms during the Great Depression. Such extensions may revise our understanding of contemporary welfare states. Indeed, our study indicates that extensions of our framework and method might illuminate general questions of class and state formation.

Alexander Hicks is Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Emory University. He is co-editor (with Thomas Janoski) of The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State *(Cambridge University Press, 1994) and co-author of recent papers in the* APSR *and* AJS *on income-security spending. He is now writing on the adoption and development of principal income-security programs in advanced capitalism, 1880 to 1990, as well as commencing studies of literary and film narrative.*

---

[33] Mann (1993), who focused on world powers, does not deal with Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. Thus, he cannot be faulted for excluding New Zealand as a Lib-Lab case or as a "Liberal-representative" crystallization.

Joya Misra is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Georgia. Her work focuses primarily on social and economic policy. Presently she is researching the key patterns of family policy innovation and has begun a study of the politics of welfare dependency. She is also writing (with Terry Boswell) an analysis of hegemony in the modern world-system.

Tang Nah Ng is a Ph.D. student in Sociology at Stanford University. Her award-winning master's thesis focused on the effects of democracy on welfare effort in neoliberal contexts. She is currently researching the global transformation of welfare rights and expenditures from the 1880s to 1990s.

REFERENCES

Abbott, Andrew and Stanley DeViney. 1992. "The Welfare State as Transnational Event: Evidence from Sequences of Policy Evaluation." *Social Science History* 16:245–74.

Alber, Jens. 1982. *Vom Armenhans zum Wohlfahrtstaat* (From Poor House to Welfare State). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus.

———. 1986. "Germany" Pp. 1–154 *Growth to Limits, vol. 2, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy,* edited by P. Flora. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.

Baldwin, Peter. 1990. *The Politics of Social Solidarity.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Berghman, Jon, Jan Peters, and Jan Vranken. 1987. "Belgium." Pp. 751–810 in *Growth to Limits: the Western European Welfare State Since World War II,* vol. 4, edited by P. Flora. New York: de Gruyter.

Blondel, Jean. 1969. *An Introduction to Comparative Government.* London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Boswell, Jonathan. 1990. *Community and Economy: The Theory of Public Cooperation.* London, England: Routledge.

Cameron, David R. 1978. "Expansion of the Public Economy." *American Political Science Review* 72:1243–61.

Castles, Francis. 1982. *The Impact of Parties.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

———. 1985. *The Working Class and Welfare.* London, England: Allen and Unwin.

Castles, Francis and Robert McKinlay. 1978. "Public Welfare Provision and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics." *British Journal of Political Science* 9:157–72.

Castles, Francis and Vance Merrill. 1989. "Toward a General Theory of Policy Outcomes." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1:177–212.

Cutright, Phillips. 1965. "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs." *American Journal of Sociology* 70:539–55.

Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Department of Health and Human Services, 1990. *The Cost of Social Security.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office...

Engels, Friedrich. [1891] 1968a. "Introduction to Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engles." Pp. 252–62 in *The Civil War in France, 1848–1850,* by K. Marx. Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers.

———. [1895] 1968b. "Introduction." Pp. 651–68 in *The Class Struggle in France,* by K. Marx. Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1985. *Politics Against Markets.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fitzmaurice, John. 1989. "Belgium." Pp. 2–19 in *Western European Political Parties,* edited by F. Jacobs. London, England: Longman's.

Flora, Peter. 1983. *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe.* Vols. 1 and 2. Chicago, IL: St. James Press.

———. 1986a. *Growth to Limits: the Western European Welfare State Since World War II.* Vols. 1–4. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

———. 1986b. "Introduction." Pp. xi–xxxvi in *Growth to Limits: the Western European Welfare State Since World War II,* vol. 1, edited by P. Flora. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Gordon, Mary. 1988. *Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: A Comparative Analysis.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Hage, Jerald, Edward T. Gargan, and Robert Hanneman. 1989. *State Responsiveness and State Activism.* London, England: Unwin Hyman.

Herring, Hubert. 1968. *A History of Latin America.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Hicks, Alexander. 1994. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Analytical Induction." *Sociological Methods and Research* 23:86–113.

Hicks, Alexander and Joya Misra. 1993. "Political Resources and the Expansion of Welfare Effort." *American Journal of Sociology* 99: 668–710.

Hicks, Alexander and Duane H. Swank. 1984a. "Governmental Redistribution in Rich Capitalist Democracies." *Policy Studies Journal* 13: 265–86.

———. 1984b. "On the Political Economy of Welfare Expression." *Comparative Political Studies* 17:81–119.

———. 1992. "Politics, Institutions and Welfare Effort." *American Political Science Review* 86:658–74.

Higley, John and Michael G. Burton. 1989. "The

Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review* 51:17–34.

Hofmeister, Herbert. 1982. "Austria." Pp. 265–83 in *The Evolution of Social Insurance, 1881–1981: Studies of Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria and Switzerland,* edited by P. A. Kohler, H. F. Zacher, and M. Partington. London, England: Frances Pintes.

Huber, Evelyne, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens. 1993. "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State." *American Journal of Sociology* 99:711–49.

Jacobs, Francis. 1989. *Western European Political Parties.* London, England: Longman's.

Kangas, Olie. 1991. *The Politics of Social Rights* (Monograph 19). Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm, Sweden.

Kersbergen, Kees. 1991. *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Post-War Settlement of the Welfare State.* Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Kloppenberg, James T. 1986. *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Korpi, Walter. 1978. *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism.* London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

———. 1982. *The Democratic Class Struggle.* London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

———. 1988. "The Politics of Employment Policy: A Comparative Study of Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment and Active Labor Market Policy in 18 OECD Countries." Paper Presented at the Workshop on Inequality and Distributional Conflict, August 30, Stockholm, Sweden.

Lee, Jeong-Hwa and Adam Przeworski. 1992. "Cui Bono: Corporatism and Welfare." Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. Unpublished Manuscript.

Lewin, Leif. 1988. *Ideology and Strategy.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. *Politics and Markets.* New York: Basic Books.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1983. *Political Man.* Expanded ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Luebbert, Gregory. 1990. *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Mackie, Thomas and Richard Rose. 1982. *The International Almanac of Electoral History.* 2d

ed. London, England: MacMillan.

Maddison, Angus. 1991. *Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Mann, Michael. 1993. *The Sources of Social Power,* vol. 2, *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Marwick, Arthur. 1967. "Labour Party and Welfare State in Britain, 1900–1948." *American Historical Review* 73:380–403.

Marx, Karl. 1968. *Selected Works in Three Volumes.* Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers.

Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class.* New York: McGraw Hill.

Myles, John. 1984. *Old Age in the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Public Pensions.* Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Ogus, Arthur I. 1982. "Great Britain." Pp. 150–264 in *The Evolution of Social Insurance, 1881–1981: Studies of Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria and Switzerland,* edited by P. A. Kohler, H. F. Zacher, and M. Partington. London, England: Frances Pintes.

Palme, Joakim. 1990. *Pensions in Welfare Capitalism* (Monograph 14). Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm, Sweden.

Pampel, Fred C. and John B. Williamson. 1985. "Age Structure, Politics and Cross-National Patterns of Public Pension Expenditures." *American Sociological Review* 50:782–98.

———. 1989. *Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pampel, Fred C. and Robin Stryker. 1989. "State Context and Welfare Development in Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1980." Paper Presented at the Workshop on Inequality and Distributional Conflict, September 8, Stockholm, Sweden.

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology.* New York: Dover.

Perry, Richard. 1986. "United Kingdom." Pp. 155–239 in *Growth to Limits: the Western European Welfare State Since World War II,* vol. 1, edited by P. Flora. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry.* New York: Wiley.

Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1993a. "Introduction to Qualitative Comparative Analysis." Pp. 299–319 in *Methodological Advances in Comparative Political Economy,* edited by T. Janoski and A. Hicks. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1993b. "A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Pension Systems." Pp. 320–45

Methodological Advances in Comparative Political Economy, edited by T. Janoski and A. Hicks. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Remmer, Karen L. 1984. *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Rimlinger, Gaston. 1971. *Welfare Policy and Industrialization in America, Germany and Russia.* New York: Wiley.

Roebroek, Joop and Theo Berben. 1987. "Netherlands." Pp. 751–810 in *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare State Since World War II,* vol. 4, edited by P. Flora. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Rokkan, Stein. 1970. *Citizens, Elections and Parties.* Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Rothstein, Bo. 1990. "Marxism, Institutional Analysis and Working Class Power: The Swedish Case." *Politics and Society* 18:317–45.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens. 1991. *Capitalism, Development and Democracy.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Shalev, Michael. 1982. "The Social Democratic Model and Beyond." *Comparative Social Research* 6:315–52.

Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Skocpol, Theda and Edwin Amenta. 1986. "States and Social Policies." *Annual Review of Sociology.* 12:131–57.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Stephens, John D. 1979. *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism.* London, England: MacMillan.

Swank, Duane H. 1992. "Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic Capitalist Nations." *American Political Science Review* 86:38–54.

Taylor, Alan J. P. 1946. *The Course of German History.* New York: Capricorn.

Therborn. 1977. "Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy." *New Left Review* 103:3–41.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 1991. *Social Security Throughout the World.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office

Usui, Chikako. 1993a. "The Origins and Development of Modern Welfare Policies in 60 Countries." *Research in Political Sociology* 6:39–70.

———. 1993b. "The Origins and Development of Modern States." Pp. 254–77 in *The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State,* edited by T. Janoski and A. Hicks. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wennemo, Irene. 1992. "The Development of Family Policy." *Acta Sociological* 35:201–17.

Wilensky, Harold. 1975. *The Welfare State and Equality.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wilensky, Harold and Charles N. Lebeaux. 1958. *Industrial Society and the Welfare State.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Williamson, John H. and Fred C. Pampel. 1993. *Old Age Security in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Znaniecki, Florian. 1934. *The Method of Sociology.* New York: Farrar and Reinhart.

Zollner, Delteu. 1982. "Germany." Pp. 1–92 in *The Evolution of Social Insurance, 1881–1981: Studies of Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria and Switzerland,* edited by P.A. Kohler, H. F. Zacher, and M. Partington. London, England: Frances Pintes.