

Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?

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Abstract This study deals with the effects of authoritarian regimes on state capacity or the quality of government (QoG): do some types of dictatorship (military, monarchy, and civilian) perform better than others? More importantly, which are the mechanisms through which different authoritarian rulers produce better government? The article argues theoretically, first, that single-party regimes are more responsive to citizens' demands than other types of authoritarian rule because they have a structured mechanism to channel citizens' "voices" (the single party). As a consequence, they will provide QoG following societal demands, which are low in low-income countries and high in high-income ones. Second, the effect of the other relevant authoritarian types—monarchies and military regimes—is exclusively conditional on rulers' self-interests. We predict that with short-sighted rulers, monarchies and military regimes will tend to under-provide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs and military rulers have long-term horizons, these types of authoritarian regimes will have a positive effect on QoG. Employing a sample of over 70 authoritarian countries from 1983 to 2003, we find empirical support for these interactive effects. In single-party autocracies, the higher (lower) the average income, the higher (the lower) the QoG; while albeit weaker support than the first finding, in monarchies in particular, the longer (shorter) the government's time horizon, the higher (the lower) the QoG.

Keywords Quality of government · Monarchy · Dictatorship · Single-party autocracies

Opening Up the Darkest Box

The goal of this paper is to merge the theoretical and empirical developments of two contemporary comparative literatures: one aimed at explaining what produces state

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capacity or “quality of government” (QoG) and a second one analyzing the consequences of different types of authoritarian regimes. In short, the research questions this paper addresses are: which type of authoritarian regime produces better government? Furthermore, through which mechanism/s are different types of authoritarian regimes more effective at producing QoG? These matters of course have significant implications for the well-being of citizens in these developing areas, as QoG is strongly linked with health outcomes and economic prosperity.

These are important research questions because there is robust empirical evidence showing that “good governance,” “state capacity,” or “quality of government” foster social and economic development.¹ At the same time, dysfunctional and corrupt government institutions play a central role in many of the world’s most pressing economic and social problems (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 166).² As a result, there has been an increasing multidisciplinary scholarly interest in the causes of what, for the sake of simplicity, this paper calls “QoG.”³ In particular, there have been numerous studies analyzing the impact of different types of political regimes/institutions on QoG (e.g., Clague et al. 1996; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sung 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Keefer 2007; Bäck and Hadenius 2008). These studies compare, first, QoG-type outcomes of democratic countries vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes and, second, differences within democratic systems (e.g., presidentialism vs. parliamentarism and more vs. less veto players). Given extensive studies that show that there are substantial variations in QoG indicators when comparing established democracies, it is surprising that the considerable differences among authoritarian regimes have been overlooked by the literature. For example, of the 103 countries coded as “not free” or “partially free” by Freedom House in 2008, such states as Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, and Singapore outperform not only many other authoritarian states but many established democracies throughout the world,⁴ while other states such as Yemen, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Armenia remain at the lower end of the spectrum with respect to QoG scores, despite having similar rankings on levels of democracy. In other words, by classifying all non-democracies

¹ Although there is a large literature on the two-way causality between institutions and economic development, there is also a solid body of evidence showing causality from institutions to income (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). For a review, see Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008).

² Rothstein and Teorell (2008) offer a review of the main literature on the consequences of quality of government. For a non-academic review, see *The Economist* 13-03-2008.

³ By Quality of Government we are referring in this paper to what others in the literature have termed “State Capacity” or “Administrative Capacity” (Bäck and Hadenius 2008)—that is, the capacity a state has to perform its activities in an *efficient way and without corruption*. Thus, following this literature we are primarily concerned with accounting for variation in public sector bureaucratic performance and corruption. We borrow the term “Quality of Government” (QoG) from Rothstein and Teorell (2008), because the term “Capacity” has been more extensively used to depict the size or the level of resources—or even the capacity to raise taxes—a state has while we are more interested in how the state takes advantage of the resources it manages—that is, in its “quality.” Nevertheless, as already mentioned, QoG could be interchangeable here by the standard definitions in the literature of state capacity or administrative capacity.

⁴ According to indicators such as the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness indexes (Kaufmann et al. 2007) and the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide index, these four states all receive scores well over the average in recent years, signifying high QoG. For example, all four of these states outperform India, Peru, Uruguay, and Bulgaria, which all rank as highly competitive democracies in recent indexes of both Polity and Freedom House.

within the same category, we are ignoring a good deal of the worldwide variation in QoG. The aim of this paper is to open up the black box of authoritarianism in relation to administrative efficiency and corruption.

Alongside the QoG literature, over the past several years a research program has begun to emerge in comparative politics to examine the nature of different types of authoritarian regimes (e.g., military, monarchy, single party, and personalistic) and their consequences (Ulfelder 2005: 311). In particular, there is an increasing literature trying to assess the impact of authoritarian types—or authoritarian institutions—over economic indicators, such as economic growth and political outcomes (Przeworski et al. 2000; Geddes 1999a; Smith 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Brownlee 2007; Wright 2008a, b; Pepinsky 2008). In terms of the latter, the emphasis has been focused on explaining the survival of the regime and differences in democratization experiences—that is, how “different forms of authoritarianism *break down* in characteristically different ways” (Geddes 1999a: 1; Ulfelder 2005: 314). Nevertheless, this authoritarian comparative literature has not explored the effects that the different types of dictatorships—and the institutions they create—may have on QoG. Although we acknowledge the importance of regime stability and economic growth, we attempt to further this literature by exploring how different forms of authoritarianism also *build up* their state apparatuses in characteristically different ways.

In one of the most encompassing comparative studies of dictatorships, Egorov et al. (2009) effectively connect authoritarian types (in particular up to which extent they are resource rich) and QoG. They formalize and empirically test what they define as the “Gorbachev’s dilemma”—i.e., the fact that free media represents obviously a threat for dictator’s survival in office because it strengthens the opposition, but, at the same time, free media allow dictators to provide incentives to bureaucrats to improve QoG. Since increasing QoG to efficiently provide public goods is less important for those dictators who enjoy lots of natural resources they will allow less free media than resource-poor autocrats. Despite the pioneering nature of this article in connecting QoG and authoritarian types, Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin do not explore the impact of different forms of dictatorship over QoG and, apart from their premise that resource-rich dictators have less need to develop QoG, we know little on what accounts for within-autocracies differences in actual levels of QoG.

This article thus aims to bridge the gap between the comparative literatures on QoG, which has focused mainly on democratic states, and authoritarian regimes. The study is organized as follows. We first explain what we mean by QoG, discussing indicators and showing variation among all available states using recent data. Second, we discuss the existing (mostly supply side) explanations on the impact of authoritarian regimes on QoG, and we provide later our theoretical contribution (joining supply- and demand-side arguments). In particular, we argue that single-party regimes are more responsive to citizens’ demands than other types of authoritarian rule because they have a structured mechanism to channel citizens’ “voices” (the party). They will provide QoG following societal demands. As a result, in low-income countries (where demand for QoG is low), single-party regimes will tend to invest few resources in building QoG while in high-income countries (where social demand is higher), they will provide higher levels of QoG. Second, the effect of the other relevant authoritarian types is exclusively conditional on rulers’ self-interests. With

short-sighted rulers, we predict that monarchies and military regimes will tend to underprovide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs and military rulers have long-term horizons, these authoritarian types will have a positive effect on QoG. Next, we discuss the method and data used and proceed to test the hypotheses. We conclude with a general discussion on the main findings.

Quality of Government in Authoritarian States: Definition, Measurement and Variation

We define the term ‘quality of government’ as an uncorrupted and efficient public bureaucracy (often known as Weberian in contrast to a patronage-based or patrimonial one), a legal system that is impartial (non-discriminatory) and enforces contracts and citizens’ private property rights. Such governance has numerous benefits to society, including relatively better economic performance (North 1990), economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Kaufmann et al. 2007), and more social capital and generalized trust (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).

As with any abstract concept in the social sciences, such as democracy or minority rights, “hard measures” of concepts such as corruption or bureaucratic efficiency are problematic and nearly impossible to decide upon. For example, if one chooses to employ the number of tried or convicted corruption cases annually as a measure of control of corruption, one might simply be measuring the strength of the rule of law and/or the effectiveness of the media. Thus we are left with “soft” data that rely on perception-based measures as the primary mode of comparison across countries. This is problematic because of the notion that citizens’ attitudes can be embedded in their general attitudes towards their government; firms or experts can be biased towards countries with low taxes or high growth.

With no perfect indicator to capture what we intend to test in this analysis, and no two data sources measuring our concept in exactly the same way, we base our selection of the data on the following criteria: (1) the time frame of availability and country coverage, (2) the precision, internal consistency and reliability with which the researchers that provide the data can define and measure the desired concept, and (3) how accepted the measures are in the contemporary academic literature, and the frequency of publication in top journals.⁵ Based on these criteria, we employ two standard measures of QoG, from the *International Country Risk Guide* (ICRG), published by the PRS Group and the *World Bank Governance Indicators* (WGI). The former is based on annual expert assessments, and the latter based on a composite index of a wide array of sources which are pooled together to create an index of such concepts as ‘control of corruption’, ‘rule of law’, ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’ and ‘government voice and accountability’. Both indicators are used frequently in top academic journals in both political science and economics (for example - Knack and Keefer 1995; Keefer 2007; Adserà et al. 2003;

⁵ Due to space constraints, the following is admittedly a limited discussion of the pros and cons of the data sources to be employed in the analysis, for a more thorough discussion of debates on such sources of QoG, see Knack (2007) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008).

Charron and Lapuente 2010). Because they are fundamentally different in the way they are constructed, with implications for scope of the concepts that they measure, we hope that the disadvantages of one measure will be compensated by the strengths of the other.

First, the advantages to the ICRG data are that the time frame and country coverage are the most comprehensive of all available indicators. The precision with which the researchers can define and measure the desired concept is potentially higher due to the rankings being decided upon by a small number of country experts who base scoring decisions on similar criteria annually. The internally consistency of such methods imply that comparisons over time may be more reliable than surveys or composite indices, which sometimes add or subtract countries and questions from year to year, which have implications for year-to-year scoring. The disadvantages include that such a measure is of course similar to that of all expert assessment measures, such as Freedom House, in that they are less transparent in their construction, which means the researcher might be expecting to capture something significantly different than what the organization is actually measuring, potentially leading to bias in the results. Finally, the data are aimed at mainly international investors seeking to profit in potentially new countries, not academics, which could imply that QoG is more geared toward less “red tape” and business friendly environments, not necessarily providing quality government to its citizens.⁶

Second, we counter this measure with the WGI composite indices, which combine surveys of households, firms and expert surveys, employing a system of weights so that outliers for each country year are weighed less than those sources that correlate highly with one another. The advantages to this method are of course that the composite index reduces measurement error of any single source, the indicator will not be too narrow in what it captures, it offers a wide scope of countries (currently 191 countries), it is transparent in how the index is constructed and the weights of outliers curb potential biases of a single indicator. The drawbacks include that there is potentially a relatively high degree of imprecision and inconsistency in the measurements because different sources have different definitions of the concepts than make up QoG. Moreover, sources may not be independent from one another, in that experts or survey respondents may be ‘free riding’ on alternative sources of previous years. Different sources are used for countries in different years, implying less internal consistency and finally, the time frame is limited in that the data are bi-annual from 1996 to 2002, and then annual from there on.

Both measures confirm that there is a substantial degree of variation in QoG among non-democracies. For example, recent data show that states like Jordan, Uganda, and Cuba outperform even relatively high ranking democracies such as Romania, Papua New Guinea and Honduras in terms of QoG scores. Moreover, Singapore, a one-party authoritarian country, has a QoG as high as the strongest democracies in the sample with respect to corruption, bureaucratic efficiency and

⁶ However, we are doubtful that this is the case, as Kaufmann et al. (2007) show that there are insignificant differences in household perceptions compared with those of expert opinions catering to businesses.

rule of law, whereas authoritarian states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Somalia are among the worst performers in the entire world sample. Overall, these data present us with a puzzle—namely why some non-democracies exhibit moderately high levels of QoG while others perform quite poorly.

Why is there QoG in Authoritarian Governments? Existing Supply-Side Explanations

As the specific comparative literature on authoritarianism has shown, different kinds of authoritarian rule may differ from each other as much as they differ from democracies (Geddes 1999a: 121). Gandhi and Przeworski (2006: 1284) point out that “the authoritarian zoo exhibits bewildering variety,” with autocrats bearing all kinds of possible titles, from emperor or king to first secretaries, leaders of faith or administrators of the state of emergency.

At the same time, although only recently comparative scholars have started to analyze divergences in authoritarian countries systematically, there is also significant diversity among the categories that scholars have used to classify authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, with regard to cross-country comparative analysis, most of the studies use either Geddes’ (1999a) distinction of personalist, military, and single-party regimes—often regarded as the seminal contribution, at least in terms of empirical guidance, to the literature on authoritarian types (Teorell and Hadenius 2007: 145)—or slight variations of this classification.

Geddes (1999a) defines military regimes as those “where a group of officials decides who will rule and exercises some influence in policy”⁷; single-party regimes as those “where access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party”⁸; and personalist regimes as those in which the leader—who may have come to power as a military officer or leader of a single-party government—has “consolidated control over policy and recruitment in this own hands.” The literature agrees that one obvious type of non-democratic rule which is not represented in Geddes’ typology is monarchy (Ulfelder 2005: 314–315). Monarchies would be those regimes “in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution (one cannot simply proclaim oneself a monarch)” (Teorell and Hadenius 2007: 146).

To explain authoritarian countries’ differences in QoG, the literature tends to build on Olson’s (1993) classical argument of the “stationary bandit.” In a recent and comprehensive formulation of this general idea, Brautigam et al. (2008) argue that,

⁷ Not all regimes headed by military officers are classified as military regimes by Geddes. What defines a military regime is that it is controlled by a group of senior military officers. Some regimes where the leader may wear a uniform—such as Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Uganda’s Idi Amin, or Central African Republic’s Bokassa—are considered personalist because they are personal dictatorships of a single officer.

⁸ Again, it is difficult to distinguish between “real” single-party regimes, where the organization exercises some power over the leader and the career paths of officials, and “nominal” ones, where the leader himself maintains a near monopoly over policy and personnel (Geddes 1999a: 124). Geddes’ dataset—used also in this paper—includes within the single-party category such regimes as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico or the Leninist parties in Eastern Europe, but regards as personalist systems regimes such as Juan Peron’s in Argentina, since the single-party was more “nominal” than “real.”

similar to democratic leaders, authoritarian rulers in developing areas have incentives to build state capacity for one primary reason—to make it more efficient to derive taxes from citizens. A more effective bureaucracy renders this much easier to accomplish, while impartial laws and relatively low levels of corruption make citizens less skeptical about actually paying. The exceptions are states that enjoy considerable natural resources and thus do not need to worry about such tax collection measures. This is because wealth can be extracted from a single industry and hence it leaves most citizens with little to no tax responsibility. However, in the absence of significant natural resources, authoritarian leaders must derive revenue from taxation, and since a better bureaucracy makes this more efficient, there is thus an incentive for authoritarian rulers to invest in QoG. Nevertheless, this does not tell us much about the notable differences one may find among authoritarian regimes after controlling for their dependence on natural resources.

In the literature, single-party regimes are expected to be the ones providing better government. The implicit or explicit reason is that they tend to be more resilient than any other form of authoritarianism even in the face of severe economic crisis (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Geddes 1999a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). One could thus expect more long-term policies, like building a Weberian impartial administration, in a single-party regime than in the other authoritarian types. For example, Wright (2008a, b) finds single-party regimes to lead to higher economic growth, which may lead us to believe that they are more apt to build quality government institutions compared with other types of authoritarian regimes, given the strong empirical link existing between QoG and economic growth (Gupta et al. 1998; Kaufmann et al. 2007). Wright also finds a positive effect of monarchies on economic growth, which could also point towards a positive impact of monarchical regimes over QoG. The mechanism in this case could be the same as the one pointed out by the Italian village monarchist quoted by Banfield (1958: 26) and Olson (1993: 567): “monarchy is the best kind of government because the King is then owner of the country. Like the owner of a house, when the wiring is wrong, he fixes it.”

The reverse holds for military regimes, which “contain the seeds of their own destruction”: they are inherently susceptible to internal splits within the ruling military elite (Geddes 1999a: 131; Ulfelder 2005: 318). Therefore, they should be less likely to undertake encompassing administrative reforms. At an even more extreme position in this continuum we would find personalist regimes where access to office to a greater extent depends on the discretion of the leader. The state thus becomes an extension of a single individual, which tends to produce state apparatuses with the most anti-Weberian or partial administrations, such as extreme forms of patrimonialism (Ulfelder 2005: 315) or so-called neo-patrimonial regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994).

Theory: Supply and Demand for QoG in Authoritarian Regimes

To understand the provision of QoG in authoritarian states, we must examine who supplies QoG and the incentives they have to do so—e.g., single party, military, and monarch or personalist rulers. The incentives of rulers may change from one

particular authoritarian type to another, as the existing literature has been pointing out. However, we argue here that the demands for QoG may also change from one authoritarian type to another.

This paper builds on the culturalist approach of Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 126) who argue for the inclusion of “ordinary people” in the explanations of good government. Welzel and Inglehart (2008) maintain that poor individuals demand goods of immediate consumption from their government. Yet, economic development increases individuals’ resources, making them more articulate and better equipped to participate in politics. Instead of being focused on day-to-day survival, citizens will give priority to freedom of choice and, generally, to self-expression values. In those circumstances, citizens will be able to combat powerful collective action problems and place pressure on elites to provide good governance. This argument is similar to some traditional arguments in economics—e.g., that poor people tend to have a higher propensity to consume vis-à-vis invest for future consumption. It is also close to some explanations of patronage-based administrations by public choice scholars. Politicians want to buy votes efficiently and votes from the poor are the cheapest. Politicians can get more support from lower than from higher income people through the delivery of clientelistic jobs and goods of immediate consumption such as “heat when they are cold, food when they are hungry, and medical care when they are sick” (Reid and Kurth 1988: 257).

The general prediction from the demand side of QoG would thus be that higher income societies will demand different policies from government institutions than lower income societies. Lower income societies are expected to undervalue medium-to-long term investments in administrative capacity – such as, for instance, investing in institutions capable of enforcing the rule of law, implementing a meritocratic recruitment system and fighting favoritism. The reason is that these are costly investments that require patience to benefit from future improvements. At the same time, lower income societies will overvalue goods for immediate consumption – such as, for instance, patronage jobs and direct cash transfers through clientelistic exchanges. Further, in a recent study employing a mixed sample of over 130 democracies and authoritarian states, Charron and Lapuente (2010) provide empirical support for the hypothesis that demand for QoG shifts as a function of economic development

Having established that societies may have different general preferences regarding QoG as a result of their level of economic development, we must now ask which type of non-democracy is most likely to be responsive to such demands. A key characteristic of an authoritarian state which could determine its degree of responsiveness to citizens’ demands is the type of “ruling organization”. Following Gandhi and Przeworski (2006: 1284), we assume there are three main types of authoritarian ruling organizations: *military rulers* have armed forces; *monarchs* have the royal family, or more broadly, the court; and *single-party* regimes have the party. The fourth type that we analyze in this paper, *personalist* regimes, is one in which one individual dominates the state apparatus. Instead of ruling organizations, in those regimes there are “personalist cliques”, formed by networks of relatives, friends and allies that surround the leader (Geddes 1999a: 130).

There is, and this is a central point of our theory, a key difference between the ruling organizations of on the one hand monarchies and military regimes

and on the other hand single-party rule. As pointed out in the literature, monarchies and military regimes “have by their very nature a ready-made institution”: the court and the army, respectively (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 1284). These pre-existing institutions, as the literature emphasizes, may pre-date both the regime as well as the modern creation of the state apparatus. The goal of these institutions, using Hirschman’s (1971) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* typology, would be to keep citizens’ “loyalty” either through appealing to external sources of legitimacy (e.g., divine rights and respect to military discipline and hierarchy) or through providing different sets of policies (being repressive measures or, quite the opposite, benevolent public goods).

In contrast, single-party regimes do not have a pre-existing organization and must create their own mobilizing popular support (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 1282–1284). Since this organization must be created *ex novo*—or, to say the least, it does not precede the regime or even the country’s state building—the single-party organization will have to rely more on what Hirschman (1971) would qualify as “voice”. Since they cannot rely on the loyalty that other organizations may have accumulated through decades or even centuries, their survival more critically depends on how they manage to accommodate (at least certain) voices within their societies, which of course can be fragile and prone to break-down (Smith 2005). In fact, unlike other non-democratic regimes, which tend to develop non-contractualist types of legitimacy, single-parties tend to justify their monopoly of power by claiming a social contract under which they serve on behalf of “the people” (Ulfelder 2005: 317).

Contrary to monarchs and military rulers, single-party leaders face a higher need for cooperation (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 1285). Single-parties answer to this necessity with an enormous capacity to collect the most diverse voices within a society. In order to do so, they tend to absorb the most heterogeneous organizations, such as trade unions, youth organizations, women’s organizations, sports clubs and even stamp collectors’ associations (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 1292). Further, single-party regimes are more open than military regimes or monarchies to “the most able, ambitious, an upwardly mobile individuals in society, especially those from peasant and urban marginal backgrounds whose social mobility might otherwise have been quite limited” (Geddes 1999a: 134). As a result, there may thus be more fine-tuning of policy in single-party regimes than in other regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 1292). Single-party regimes will provide QoG following citizens’ demands in the way predicted by the culturalist and public choice theories mentioned above—that is, low QoG in lower income societies and higher in richer ones.

H_1 : Single-party regimes are more likely than other types of authoritarian regimes to provide QoG according to the country’s level of economic development: the higher (lower) the national average income, the higher (lower) the QoG

Since other authoritarian types (monarchy, military, or personalist) are not (or, better, do not need to be) responsive to citizens’ demands, it is difficult to predict an increase or decrease in QoG when moving from lower-income authoritarian states to

higher-income ones. On the one hand, richer countries can be expected to afford better institutions (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008: 5). On the other, the richer the country, the bigger the pool of resources from which a dictator can predate without the need to undertake costly investments for the provision of public goods or the protection of property rights. Therefore, despite the fact that the technical *capabilities* to enhance QoG are expected to be higher in rich than in poor authoritarian states, the *incentives* of rulers to do so are expected to be lower. In other words, we cannot predict any significant effect of economic development on QoG for the rest of the authoritarian regimes.

We state that the other types of authoritarian regimes will simply follow the self-interested rational calculus of the ruling organization for providing QoG. In other words, it is in these authoritarian types, and not in single-party regimes, where the argument of the “stationary bandit” applies. It is in those autocracies whose ruling organizations lack voice (i.e., monarchies and military regimes) where the prediction of Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson’s (1996) influential supply-side only explanation should work. That is, that the incentives autocrats have to respect property and contract rights—i.e., to provide QoG—come from their interest in future tax collections and national income. This positive incentive will increase with rulers’ time horizons. Rulers with short time horizons will gain from opportunistic actions—such as expropriating assets of their subjects or establishing patrimonial administrations with unqualified supporters (Olson 1993). For example, Wright (2008a, b) demonstrates that authoritarian leaders with longer time horizons use foreign aid in more effective ways than those with short time horizons. Yet, a self-interested autocrat who expects to rule for a long time will gain from providing high QoG, which will increase investment and future productivity and thus also his long-run tax collections. The prediction according to this theory would thus be that for those authoritarian types which lack a systematic mechanism for channel the “voice” or demands of their citizens (as argued before, monarchies and military regimes would fall into this category), the level of QoG will depend on the time horizon of the ruling organization:

H2: Compared with single-party regimes, the longer (shorter) the time horizon of the authoritarian government in monarchies and military regimes, the higher (lower) the QoG.

Research Design and Data

To test empirically the aforementioned hypotheses we employ a cross-section, time series model using generalized least squares, correcting for first order autocorrelation (AR 1) by using a Prais Winston and panel controlled standard errors as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995).⁹ Though cross-sectional analysis is

⁹ As regards to heteroskedasticity, we used both a Breusch-Pagan (1979) and a Cook-Weisberg (1983) post-estimation test using the baseline model in Table 1. As regards to serial correlation, we employed a Woodridge test, as recommended by Drukker (2003) for panel data. In both cases, we found that the post-estimation tests rejected the null hypotheses that there was no heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation (AR 1).


common in the corruption and QoG literatures, we select a time series model because of the possibility of a change in regime in the key independent variable as well as variations in the dependent variable and other explanatory variables in the model. We are well aware of the endogeneity problem between economic development and QoG,¹⁰ and although we cannot completely solve this potential problem of two-way causality between QoG and a number of the variables on the right hand side of the model, we follow previous literature (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010) and lag all independent variables by one year, which also helps to answer any questions about endogeneity and directional causality, modeling the impact of the independent variables occurring before the event of the dependent variable diachronically.

The dependent variables used are the ICRG ‘QoG’ indicator and the World Bank’s ‘Government Effectiveness’ measure, as previously discussed. Figures 1 and 2 display the variation of the two variables among the different classifications of authoritarian regimes from 1996–2003 in the Wright/Geddes and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) authoritarian classifications respectively. While showing initial distinctions in the aggregate scores, civilian, followed by monarchy are the strongest performers with respect to QoG on average followed by personalist and military regimes according to the Wright classifications. According to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) in Fig. 2, monarchy stands out among authoritarian regimes as the best performers of QoG on average, followed by civilian dictatorships with military regimes displaying the lowest in the aggregate. Figure 1 also demonstrates the high correlation of the two indicators, with the ICRG slightly higher in all cases. This suggests that, despite the many aforementioned problems with such data, they are externally consistent.

Scholars of comparative politics have long debated over different types of classification of authoritarian rule, rendering any attempt at quantitatively distinguishing any given regime into a certain category somewhat controversial. In our opinion, the choice of classification should be based primarily on which source best suits one’s theory. We are interested in distinguishing between regimes based on their “inner sanctums” (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010) and in particular, in the case of H1, whether the rulers are reliant upon a relatively strong party apparatus or not. In distinguishing authoritarian regimes, we follow therefore first and foremost the coding of Wright (2008a, b), using dummy variables for “personalist,” “single party,” “monarchy,” and “military.”¹¹ For robustness checks, we employ the coding of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), who have coded regime type for over 200 countries from 1948 to 2008, whereby *civilian*, *military*, and *monarchy* are distinguished. In the latter data, we

¹⁰ For a thorough overview of this issue, see the debate between Kurtz and Schrank (2007) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007).

¹¹ Depending on model specification, roughly 15–20% of the available sample in the regressions includes four classifications of “hybrid regimes” (single party/military, single party/personalist, personalist/military, and single party/personalist/military). In assigning the hybrids to one of the four main regime types, we follow Wright’s grouping method (Wright 2008a, b), and thus, when we discuss military and single-party regimes, we also include the hybrid forms of these regimes, as well as triple-hybrid regimes. For example, single party/military, single party/personalist, and single party/personalist/military are coded as “Single party” while personalist/military is coded as “Military.” We checked the sensitivity of these coding with several alternatives and did not find the results to be altered in any significant way. In addition, we run models that test H1 and H2 with all hybrid state years dropped from the analysis to check for robustness, which we include in Tables 1 and 2.




Notes: The World Bank ‘Government Effectiveness’ measure is used here, while ICRG is the combined data on corruption, bureaucratic efficiency and rule of law from the PRS Group. Each has been re-scaled so that they range from 0 to 5, with higher scores implying better QoG. Mean scores are taken from 1996 on, due to a lack of data for the WBI prior to this data. Authoritarian regime type from Geddes (1999) and Wright (2008) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009)

Fig. 1 The World Bank “Government Effectiveness” measure is used here, while ICRG is the combined data on corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, and rule of law from the PRS group. Each has been re-scaled so that they range from 0 to 5, with higher scores implying better QoG. Mean scores are taken from 1996 on, due to a lack of data for the WBI prior to this data. Authoritarian regime types from Geddes (1999a), Wright (2008a, b), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)

treat the ‘civilian’ category as the one of primary interest for H1. In both cases, we create dummy variables for each so that each is mutually exclusive from one another¹²

¹² We elect to use the Geddes/Wright classification due to the essential feature of what differentiates a “personalist” regime from other types of authoritarianism is that “although personalist regimes have parties and militaries, these organizations have not become sufficiently developed or autonomous to prevent the leader from taking personal control of policy decision and selection of regime personnel” (Geddes 2003). Thus, because of weaker institutions in these societies, clientalism tends to dominate more as a ruling method than in other authoritarian regimes (Wright 2008a, b). Quantitatively speaking, the dataset most known for this type of classification is by Geddes (1999a), which has been updated and expanded (also to include “monarchies”) by Wright 2008a, b), whereby four groups—the “personality,” the “single party,” the “military regimes,” and “monarchy” are distinguished. In the single party, “access to political office and control over policy is controlled by a single political party” while in military regimes “a group of officers decides who will rule and exercise some influence on policy” (Geddes 1999a: 121). Power in a monarchy however relies on hereditary passing of rule from one generation to the next. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) base their coding on the “way in which governments are removed from power” (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010: 84). Their classification consists of two similar categories as the Wright and Geddes data (military and monarchy) and a “civilian” category that “create(s) a smaller body within a regime party—a political bureau—to co-opt potential rivals.” For practical purposes, the “civilian dictatorships” in the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland are more or less equivalent to Geddes/Wright’s single-party regimes, and then we apply our hypotheses regarding single-party countries to civilian dictatorships when using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data.



Note: graph produces with codes from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). Dots represent the marginal effect of a one unit increase of GDP per capita (logged) in each of the four regime types (single party (S.P.) is the reference group in each model). Dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval around the estimate; if both lines are above or below the “0” horizontal reference line, the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. QoG data is the ICRG from model 2 in Table 1.

Fig. 2 Graph produces with codes from Brambor et al. (2006). Dots represent the marginal effect of a one unit increase of GDP per capita (logged) in each of the four regime types (single party (S.P.) is the reference group in each model). Dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval around the estimate; if both lines are above or below the “0” horizontal reference line, the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. QoG data are the ICRG from model 2 in Table 1

There is a fair degree of variation along the lines of regime type not only across countries, but diachronically within countries as well. First, an authoritarian regime might fall and become some type of democratic system, such as Hungary, Poland did going from civilian dictatorship to multiparty democracy in 1990, or Bangladesh from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1986. In other cases, both datasets have switched the coding of several regimes from one type of authoritarian regime to another. In the Geddes and Wright classification for example, Algeria, once a single-party state, has been coded as a military regime since 1993 after their civil war. Belarus, once a single-party regime from 1991 to 1994, has been coded as a personalist regime since 1995, when Alexander Lukashenko came into power. In the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data, Algeria was coded as a military regime up until 1999, and since has been coded as civilian rule. Chad was classified as a civilian dictatorship until 1989, and from 1990 has been coded as a military dictatorship. Vietnam, was coded as a civilian dictatorship until 1996, then as a military dictatorship from 1997–2000, and has been coded as civilian rule since 2001. Therefore these two aspects make the time component of the analysis all the more salient.

Regarding the additional independent variables, we aim to demonstrate not only differences among the four types of authoritarian governments with respect to QoG,

but mostly potentially important contextual effects—in particular, with the level of *economic development* and with the ruling organization's *time horizon*.¹³ The first measure interacted with the authoritarian regimes is gross domestic product per capita ($\text{Log}(\text{GDPpc})$). This measure is intended to demonstrate if any of the four types of authoritarian regimes exhibit higher or lower QoG depending on whether they are relatively poor or wealthy, thus testing H1. The data are taken from the *World Development Indicators* database from the World Bank. Since we employ OLS regression, the logged values are taken because they provide a better linear fit to the model.

As a proxy for *time horizon* we use the risk or probability of government failure in each authoritarian government annually, taken from Wright's (2008a, b) innovative index of predicted probability of regime failure (Wright 2008a, b: 17, 47). Wright generates this measure based on a number of factors: $\text{Log}(\text{GDPpc})$, economic growth($t-1$), percentage of population that is Islamic, Civil War ($t-1$), foreign occupation, regime type, area controls and Time Splines to control for regime duration. The measure at higher values indicates higher likelihood of regime failure.¹⁴ This measure is less problematic than other measures of *time horizons*, such as the age of the regime (Clague et al. 1996) or the number of changes in the chief executive and number of coups (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006) because it does not assume that all leaders share the same risk of failure as a function of time while simultaneously capturing variation within a single authoritarian regime over time (see Wright 2008a, b). The primary problem with this measure is of course multicollinearity with other variables in the model, such as *GDP per capita*, or growth, which would make the estimates less efficient, but of course does not bias the results. Due to the theoretical expectations that each of these variables is a potentially significant determinant of variation of QoG, we include each of them in the models as control variables as well as interacting each of them with the various authoritarian regimes to test for context.

Additional control variables include *freedom index*, *population*, *oil reserves*, *ethnic fractionalization* and regional area control dummy variables. Since our “civilian” group does not make the distinction between what are sometimes referred to as “hegemonic one-party dictatorships”—do not allow any other party to participate in the legislature—as opposed to “electoral authoritarianism”—e.g., one party states that allow for some degree of opposition to sit in the parliament (see Linz 2000; Diamond 2002)—we seek to capture these nuances with Freedom House's *political rights* measure (inverted), which ranges from 1 to 7. We expect that on average, higher values of *freedom index* will have higher QoG. $\text{Log}(\text{Population})$ is taken into account to control for the additional resources, on average, that a larger population would be able to produce, thus allowing the government more options for investing in state capacity, *ceteris paribus*, relative to a smaller state. The data are taken from the *World Development Indicators* and are logged to reduce the misleading results driven by several states with extreme high or low values. We

¹³ Which Wright defines as the “predicted probability of authoritarian regime failure” (Wright 2008a, b: 972)

¹⁴ For a full description of this measure and logit estimations for all variables in constructing the measure, see Wright (2008a: 47)

suspect that states that are more resource endowed will, on average, produce lower QoG, thus we take *Log (Oil reserves)*. It is a measure taken from Humphreys (2005) which measures resource dependence that takes into account fluctuations in world oil prices. It improves upon previous dichotomous measures of oil dependence (Escriba Folch 2003), which grouped states according to whether they had more than 50% of their total exports as oil, or less. This measure allows for much more variation; however due to the extreme values of small, Middle Eastern states, we take the logged value. We employ the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of *ethnic fractionalization*, a measure which has been shown to have a negative impact on both economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997) and quality of government indicators (Alesina et al. 2003; Charron 2009). Because it is plausible that authoritarian regimes are not randomly distributed throughout the world, we include also test for area dummies which indicate that a country is located in *sub-Saharan Africa*, *Latin America* or the *Middle East*. Previous empirical research has shown that there are significant systematic effects on QoG indicators for the Middle East (Norris 2008), Latin America (Treisman 2000) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Treisman 2000).¹⁵ Further information and summary statistics for all aforementioned data are found in the [Appendix](#).

Additionally, due to the time series nature of the data, we include a *time count* trend using calendar year dummies in groups of five-year time periods, beginning with the first year that ICRG began to code their international risk assessments. We thus have four groups—“time 1 to time 4.” We do this for two reasons. First, as it is common in TSCS data, the count variable helps to avoid problems associated with spurious correlation when both the dependent variable and the primary independent variables vary independently, but in a constant trend over time (Tavits 2005). This is the case with the dependent variable (ICRG), democracy and GDP data, thus the count variable would be necessary to control for this tendency. Secondly, since the dependent variable is based on subjective perceptions, the time count variable is expected to help us correct for potential year-to-year differences in the administration of the PRS group’s surveys (e.g., one can expect cross-time changes in the composition of the respondents or in the way questions are framed) and trends in the systematic diachronic changes.

Results

We test H1 and H2 separately. In addition, we test the robustness of the results with the ICRG data and Wright classification by employing data from the World Bank (WGI) and by using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) regime classification in Table 3. Moreover, we test each hypothesis checking for the effect of oil, the *freedom index* and by removing hybrid regimes. Table 1 shows the results for the test of H1. To test the supply side of the theory, we run a baseline model with no interaction to simply test for initial variation among the four types of authoritarian regimes. As mentioned above, following the design of Wright (2008a, b), all the models use *personalist*

¹⁵ For the sake of space in the model, we present only the results of the oil reserves and population consistently. For the results of the other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, the year count and area dummies, please contact the authors.

Table 1 Test of H1—Wright/Geddes authoritarian regime classification (reference group = single party)

	1 (baseline)	2 (interaction)	3 (oil and freedom index)	4 (no hybrids)	5 (WGI) ^a
Personalist	−0.48*** (4.25)	1.92*** (2.32)	2.24** (1.97)	1.99** (2.43)	3.89*** (14.79)
Military	−0.39** (−2.33)	3.99*** (4.71)	4.13*** (4.24)	2.53* (1.88)	4.55*** (9.48)
Monarchy	−0.21 (−1.59)	5.02*** (4.25)	4.33*** (2.74)	5.13*** (4.50)	2.77*** (5.43)
GDP (log p.c.)	0.43*** (8.28)	0.67*** (9.06)	0.70*** (9.24)	0.68*** (10.87)	0.76*** (42.52)
Time horizon	−0.31 (−0.64)	−0.31 (−0.65)	−0.93* (−1.70)	−0.57 (−1.14)	−0.11 (−0.22)
Population	0.04 (1.59)	0.02 (0.89)	0.04 (1.23)	0.03 (0.91)	−0.04** (−2.51)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.35** (2.54)	0.43** (3.03)	0.53*** (3.49)	0.60*** (4.01)	0.21*** (3.47)
Oil reserves	—	—	−0.002*** (−2.77)	—	—
Freedom index	—	—	0.04*** (2.74)	—	—
Personalist*GDP	—	−0.33*** (2.80)	−0.35** (2.25)	−0.35*** (2.96)	−0.60*** (−17.80)
Military*GDP	—	−0.60*** (5.27)	−0.62*** (−4.68)	−0.45** (−2.39)	−0.68*** (−9.79)
Monarchy*GDP	—	−0.63*** (4.73)	−0.55*** (2.96)	−0.65*** (−5.00)	−0.38*** (−6.07)
Time 2	0.03 (0.45)	0.03 (0.36)	0.05 (0.57)	0.03 (0.32)	—
Time 3	0.17 (1.46)	0.16 (1.38)	0.16 (1.43)	0.15 (1.46)	—
Time 4	0.10 (0.69)	0.09 (0.62)	0.12 (0.83)	0.08 (0.67)	−0.04* (−1.81)
Constant	−1.45*** (−2.62)	−3.08*** (4.92)	−3.30*** (−6.21)	−3.27*** (−6.07)	1.57* (−1.82)
Rsq.	0.40	0.43	0.43	0.48	0.72
Observations	1,087	1,086	791	868	306
Countries	77	77	71	63	71
Years	20	20	16	20	5

Prais Winston (OLS) model with panel correct standard errors corrected for ar (1) autocorrelation (z-statistics in parentheses). Dependent variable for models 1–4 is ICRG (0–5), and for model 5, the dependent variable is the World Bank’s “government effectiveness” variable (0–5), with higher scores indicating higher QoG. “Time 2,” “Time 3,” and “Time 4” account for time trends in the data and are 1989–1993, 1994–1998, and 1999–2003, with the comparison group being “Time 1” which are years earlier than 1989. Omitted group for all models is “single party”

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

^a WGI is the World Bank’s “government effectiveness” variable and the model run using GLS correcting for heteroskedasticity and AR1 autocorrelation.

regimes—the ones in which the nature of the ruling organization is less susceptible to be affected by the theoretical predictions in H1—as the comparison group. We begin being by reporting the simple baseline model (model 1).

As is shown in model 1 in Table 1, single parties (i.e., the reference group), followed by monarchies have higher QoG on average than personalist or military regimes. While there is no statistically significant difference between military and monarchies, or between single party and monarchies on average, we find that personalist regimes perform significantly worse than monarchies and single-party regimes with respect to QoG, *ceteris paribus*. Further, we find that wealthier countries and ethnic heterogeneity are also factors that are positively related with the dependent variable, while time horizons and population have no independent impact on QoG. In model 2, we test H1 directly using an interaction term between the regime dummy variable and GDP per capita (logged). We find support for H1 in that

economic development is likely to most impact QoG in single-party countries. As expected, the coefficient for single party becomes negative (as shown by positive and significant coefficients for the other three types of regimes), which indicates that at low levels of economic development that single parties have either lower or indistinguishable levels of QoG compared with monarchies. Because the single-party countries are the reference group, we can interpret the coefficient of GDP per capita (logged) as the impact of economic development in single-party states. Thus the effect of GDP in single parties is strongly significant and positive, while comparatively, in military regimes and monarchies, the effect of GDP per capita (logged) is insignificant; indicating the performance of single parties is mostly conditional on economic development. Interestingly, we find that in personalist regimes, the impact is positive and significant at the 90% level of confidence, yet these results are not robust to alternative specifications in models 3–5.¹⁶ Model 2 shows that with a one percent increase in GDP per capita (logged) is associated with an increase in QoG by 0.0067.¹⁷ We see that overall, when single-party regimes are poorer, QoG is low compared with monarchies and that QoG is likely to increase in such regime as a function of economic development, which corroborates our theory of ‘demand’. In model 3, we add the effects of oil reserves and the *freedom index*, which due to limited data coverage for oil, reduces our sample by 4 years. We find these two variables to be significant determinants of QoG in the expected directions. However, while economic development is no longer significant in personalist regimes, the results remain substantively the same with regard to H1. In model 4, we replicate model 2, yet remove all hybrid regimes from the regression, dropping 218 observations from the analysis. We find no substantive differences in model 4 as compared with model 2. Finally, model 5 replaces the ICRG data using a shorter time period from the WGI. We find somewhat of a different story using this data—economic development positively affects QoG in all authoritarian regimes significantly during this more limited time period. In this model, monarchies now have a coefficient for GDP per capita (logged) of 0.38, which is significantly higher than the impact of GDP per capita (logged) in personalist and military regimes according to the interaction coefficients, yet we still find robust support for H1 in the sense that economic development has the greatest substantive impact in single-party regimes—its coefficient of 0.76 is significantly higher than all other types of non-democratic regime.

Using the advice of Brambor et al. (2006), we demonstrate the expected marginal effect of GDP per capita (logged) for each of the authoritarian regime types based on the results from model 2 in Table 1. In each of the three boxes, we observe that the effect of economic development in monarchies is insignificant, as indicated by the confidence interval around the estimate overlapping zero.¹⁸

¹⁶ In addition, we performed a post-regression *t* test between the GDP coefficient for single parties and personalist regimes and found the former to be significantly higher (*p* value=0.03)

¹⁷ We follow the advice of Gujarati (2003: 181–182) on the interpretation of logged variables in the form of a one percentage increase.

¹⁸ The black dots represent the coefficients for GDP per capita for each of the regime types, while the line connecting the dots should not be interpreted. Monarchies are included in each box because they served as the comparison group in Table 1. The graph was produced with the codes from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and combine with the “graph combine” command in STATA.

Moreover, the estimate for GDP per capita (logged) in military regimes is indistinguishable from zero. However, as H1 predicts, economic development has the greatest marginal effect in single-party regimes (between 0.67 and 0.76 depending on the model), and this effect is highly robust and significant in each of the five models. The effect of economic development in personalist regimes, while positive and significant in model 2, Table 1, should be treated with a degree of caution as it drops from statistical significance in models 3–5 in Table 1 using alternative specifications.

H2 is tested in Table 2 using the Geddes/Wright data. Here the hypothesis anticipates that, compared with single-party regimes, all other types of authoritarian countries will be negatively affected by time horizons with respect to QoG, thus single party is used as the comparison group here.¹⁹ In contrast to H1, we find little support for H2 in model 1. Here, we find that time horizons has no statistically significant impact in single-party states (as indicated with an insignificant coefficient for the time horizons variable of -1.01) and furthermore, in none of the other authoritarian regime types is the time horizons variable a significant determinant of QoG. In fact, the variable has a slight positive (yet insignificant) coefficient for personalist regimes. The results from model 1 are essentially the same as when oil and the freedom index are included, or when dropping hybrid regimes from the analysis in model 3; although in the latter scenario the interaction coefficient for military and monarchies with time horizons begin to approach statistical significance. In model 4 using the WGI data, we find the effect of time horizons in monarchies is more severe than in single parties, yet this difference is only slightly significant at the 90% level of confidence. Interestingly, the time horizons variable has little to no impact on any of the regimes, save monarchies in the fourth scenario. Thus, we find some weak support with respect to monarchies in model 4, yet we do not want to overstate the findings for H2.

In Table 3, the robustness of the regime classification according to the Geddes/Wright data is checked by using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data. Similar to Table 1, we test H1 in Table 3 using civilian dictatorships as the comparison group, which proxies for single-party regimes in the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data. In model 1 we test H1 directly, again, using the interaction term between the different regimes and economic development. The coefficient for the GDP per capita (logged) variable, indicating the effect of economic development in civilian dictatorships, is 0.54 and significant at the 99% level of confidence and this impact of economic development in civilian regimes is higher than in the other two types of authoritarian states,²⁰ as indicated by the negative and significant interaction coefficients for military regimes and monarchies with economic development. Including the oil reserves and freedom index variables in model 2 does not alter the results in any meaningful way. Model 3 with the WGI data again lends clear empirical support for our hypothesis, whereby we see that compared with monarchies, GDP per capita (logged) in civilian regimes has a strongly positive and significant effect on QoG, while the

¹⁹ A baseline not run model here because the results would be the same as in Table 1

²⁰ Again, we perform a post-regression *t* test between GDP in military and civilian regimes, with the two being significantly different (*p* value=0.045)

Table 2 Test of H2—Wright/Geddes regime classification (reference group = single party)

	1 (interaction)	2 (w/oil and freedom index)	3 (no hybrids)	4 (WGI) ^a
Personalist	−0.56*** (−4.16)	−0.56*** (−3.62)	−0.53*** (−4.34)	−0.83*** (−10.34)
Military	−0.37*** (−2.69)	−0.33** (−2.22)	−0.44*** (−3.32)	−0.68*** (−4.23)
Monarchy	−0.22* (−1.71)	−0.10 (−0.77)	−0.32** (−2.01)	−0.12 (−1.12)
GDP (log p.c.)	0.43*** (8.58)	0.46*** (8.83)	0.51*** (12.31)	0.44*** (22.04)
Population	.04 (1.58)	0.04 (1.36)	0.04 (1.58)	−0.05*** (3.53)
Time horizon	−1.01 (−0.82)	−1.84 (−1.40)	−0.01 (−0.02)	−0.08 (−0.06)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.34** (2.50)	0.49*** (3.36)	0.54*** (4.13)	0.13* (1.76)
Freedom index	–	0.04*** (3.05)	–	–
Oil reserves	–	−0.003*** (−3.06)	–	–
Personal*TH	−1.26 (0.89)	1.61 (1.01)	−0.14 (−0.11)	2.99 (1.60)
Military*TH	0.08 (0.09)	−0.22 (−0.16)	−2.12 (−1.49)	1.48 (0.84)
Monarchy*TH	−2.20 (−1.09)	−1.93 (−0.81)	−3.10 (−1.46)	−8.52* (−1.66)
Time 2	0.04 (0.46)	0.06 (0.63)	0.03 (0.34)	–
Time 3	0.16 (1.46)	0.18 (1.53)	0.15 (1.42)	–
Time4	0.09 (0.70)	0.13 (0.89)	0.07 (0.57)	−0.05 (−1.39)
Constant	−1.44** (−2.79)	−1.53** (−2.34)	−2.19*** (−4.76)	−0.61*** (−3.15)
Rsq.	0.41	0.42	0.47	0.67
Observations	1,086	791	868	306
Countries	77	71	63	71
Years	20	16	20	5

Prais Winston (OLS) model with panel correct standard errors corrected for ar (1) autocorrelation (z-statistics in parentheses). Dependent variable for models 1, 2, and 3 is ICRG (0–5), and for model 4, the dependent variable is the World Bank’s “government effectiveness” variable (0–5), with higher scores indicating higher QoG. “Time 2,” “Time 3,” and “Time 4” account for time trends in the data and are 1989–1993, 1994–1998, and 1999–2003, with the comparison group being “Time 1” which are years earlier than 1989. Omitted group for all models is “single party”

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

^a WGI is the World Bank “government effectiveness” variable and the model run using GLS correcting for heteroskedasticity and AR1 autocorrelation

effect of economic development on QoG in military regimes is now the weakest when using the WGI data. In all scenarios in models 1–3, the coefficient for single-party (or civilian) dictatorships indicates how responsive such regimes appear to be to economic development with respect to investing in quality public institutions—the poorest countries are predicted to have very low QoG relative to the sample, while wealthier states seem to have made investments in state capacity in response to growth, similar to the results for single parties in Table 1, and thus lending further support to H1.

In models 4–6, we use the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data to test H2. We find that the relationship between time horizons and QoG in these three different types of authoritarian regimes much less clear than in models 1, 2, or even 3. First of all, time horizons impact all three types of regimes negatively, including civilian

Table 3 Robustness Check with Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland Regime Classification (reference group = civilian dictatorships)

	Hypothesis 1		Hypothesis 2			
	1	2 (w/oil and freedom index)	3 (H1 w/WGI) ^a	4	5 (w/oil and freedom index)	6. (H2 w/WGI) ^a
Military	1.18* (1.83)	1.21* (1.69)	3.18*** (6.68)	-0.14 (-1.46)	-0.31** (-2.55)	0.04 (0.71)
Monarchies	3.98*** (3.44)	3.43** (2.21)	1.46** (2.38)	-0.02 (-0.13)	0.01 (0.04)	0.37*** (3.51)
GDP (log p.c.)	0.54*** (8.24)	0.56*** (9.22)	0.58*** (23.45)	0.43*** (7.84)	0.45*** (8.52)	0.47*** (19.28)
Time horizon	-1.23** (-2.13)	-2.06*** (-3.39)	-1.54** (-1.98)	-1.74** (-2.23)	-3.17*** (-3.45)	-0.41 (-0.53)
Population	0.05 (1.53)	0.05 (1.05)	0.02 (1.46)	0.06 (1.59)	0.05 (1.12)	0.003 (0.24)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.31* (1.81)	0.45** (-2.51)	0.13 (1.46)	0.28* (1.71)	0.41** (2.57)	0.14** (1.98)
Freedom index	-	0.03* (1.70)	-	-	0.03* (1.71)	-
Oil reserves	-	-0.003** (-2.69)	-	-	-0.003*** (-3.14)	-
Military*GDP	-0.17** (-1.95)	-0.11** (-1.96)	-0.42*** (-6.49)	-	-	-
Monarchy*GDP	-0.49*** (-3.65)	-0.40** (-2.23)	-0.15** (2.15)	-	-	-
Military*TH	-	-	-	1.11 (1.27)	1.98 (1.57)	1.02 (1.17)
Monarchy*TH	-	-	-	-1.54 (-0.79)	-0.59 (-0.38)	-8.42* (-1.76)
Time 2	0.04 (0.49)	0.06 (-0.82)	-	0.36 (0.47)	0.05 (0.83)	-
Time 3	0.17 (1.52)	0.19* (1.73)	-	1.70 (1.52)	0.21* (1.75)	-
Time 4	0.11 (0.81)	0.16 (-1.16)	-	0.11 (0.83)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.05** (-1.98)
Constant	1.45 (1.39)	-0.97 (-0.65)	-0.04 (1.65)	-1.83*** (-2.97)	-1.59** (-2.21)	-1.71*** (-5.26)
Rsq.	0.41	0.44	0.57	0.41	0.43	0.54
Observations	1,001	726	279	1,001	726	279
Countries	71	66	64	71	66	64
Years	20	16	5	20	16	5

Prais Winston (OLS) model with panel correct standard errors corrected for ar (1) autocorrelation (z-statistics in parentheses). Dependent variable for models 1, 2, 4, and 5 is ICRG (0–5), and for models 3 and 6, the dependent variable is the World Bank's "government effectiveness" variable (0–5), with higher scores indicating higher QoG. "Time 2," "Time 3," and "Time 4" account for time trends in the data and are 1989–1993, 1994–1998, and 1999–2003, with the comparison group being "Time 1" which are years earlier than 1989. Omitted group for all models is "monarchies"

^a WGI is the World Bank 'government effectiveness' variable and the model run using GLS correcting for heteroskedasticity and AR1 autocorrelation.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

regimes in both models 1 and 2, and in fact, the impact of time horizons is indistinguishable among all three regime types. In model 6, using the World Bank data, we find this time that time horizons has no significant impact on QoG in civilian regimes, while the effect is in the predicted direction and significant in monarchies, with the effect in the later being quite large (−8.83). However, the large coefficient in this case is due to the fact that the monarchies have much lower probability of regime failure than the other two groups, resulting in the range of the time horizons variable within the monarchies group throughout the entire sample to be three times smaller (from 0.0004 to 0.13) compared with the military or civilian dictatorships.²¹ *Time horizons* in military regimes moreover cannot be distinguished from those in civilian regimes, which again, shows weak support at best for H2.

A brief examination of the control variables in the models shows that the most robust determinant of QoG is economic development, which is significant at the 99% level of confidence in all models in Table 2 and models 4–6 in Table 3. *Freedom index* is positive and significant in the four models in which it is included, with its coefficient being between a .003 and .005. *Time horizons* alone, without their interaction effects on certain types of authoritarian regimes, account for no significant change in the dependent variable, while using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data, its impact is significant and negative. *Population* is only significant (and negative) with the World Bank data using the Geddes/Wright classification. When we control for resource dependence, in particular *oil reserves*, we found that the variable was significant at the 95% level of confidence and negative in each of the five models we applied it. This result can thus be interpreted as a strong empirical confirmation of Egorov, Guriev and Sonin's assumption on the relationship between resource dependence and QoG. Finally, *ethnic fractionalization* is a positive and significant determinant of QoG in most models, which runs counter to several analyses which have included democratic states (e.g., Alesina et al. 2003), suggesting that more heterogeneous dictatorships on average have lower QoG; a finding that certainly merits further investigation.

In Table 4, we demonstrate the substantive effects of the two main interaction terms for each authoritarian regime type. For the sake of simplicity, we show the predicted effect of the dependent variable based on a min-max change from the estimates in model 2 Table 1 (for GDP) and model 1, Table 2 (for Time horizons).²² In sum, we find fairly straightforward empirical support for H1 in that single-party (or civilian) regimes are most likely to respond to growing demands for QoG (as proxied by economic development). Overall, we see that the effect of changes in demand for QoG varies substantially in the four different regimes types. For example, we see that a min-max shift in GDP per capita results in a change in QoG values of 168.9% in single-party regimes, while the min-max change results in only 3.4% increase in QoG monarchies.

Despite the weak support for H2, the effect of time horizons seems larger in military regimes and monarchies. We suggest two potential explanations for this

²¹ In the time period during which the World Bank data are available, the range of the time horizon variable is even smaller among monarchies, with a max value of 0.061.

²² To make these effects more meaningful, we show a change of QoG based on min–max values within each regime type, using the “predict” command in STATA. Control variables are held at their mean values.

Table 4 Predicted Levels of QoG at min-max values of GDP and Time Horizons

	GDP per capita			Time horizons		
	Min	Max	% change	Min	Max	% change
Single party	1.51	4.06	168.87	2.51	2.31	−7.9
Military	1.76	2.03	15.34	2.12	1.85	−12.73
Personalist	1.10	2.36	112.61	1.96	2.03	3.57
Monarchy	2.66	2.75	3.38	2.28	1.86	−18.42

GDP estimates from model 2 (Table 1). Time horizon estimates from model 1 (Table 2). Both estimates use ICRG data. Min–max shift is the minimum and maximum value for GDP and time horizons within each regime category. Estimates done using the “mfx predict (xb)” command in STATA with control variables held at their mean values

finding. First, following the theoretical hypothesis of this paper, rulers’ *time horizons* should affect single-party regimes less than other authoritarian forms because single-party regimes must respond relatively more to citizens’ demands. Second, it can also be argued that regime change is not the end of the world for single-party cadres, who, thanks to their numerous societal ties, frequently remain important in political life after the demise of the authoritarian regime (Geddes 1999a: 141). Unlike what may happen in the other authoritarian regimes, single-party elites can imagine a political future for themselves after a regime breakdown or transition to competitive democracy (Ulfelder 2005: 317).

Monarchs and military officers may find accommodation in a democracy, but only single-party officials can reasonably expect to be rulers again in a democratic setting.

Thus, since they may expect life as they know it to continue after regime change, regime’s *time horizon* should exert a less powerful incentive for providing QoG in single-party regimes.

Conclusions

Geddes (1999a: 142) considered that while scholarship on dictatorships had been successful in amassing large amounts of data—mostly in the form of case studies—it had been less successful in finding general comparative patterns. One decade later we argue that the same holds true when it comes to analyzing the consequences of different types of authoritarian regimes over the type of administration or more broadly the quality of government in a country: we are unable to predict how different authoritarian regimes build up their state apparatuses in characteristically different ways.

In order to fill that gap, this paper follows Wright’s (2008a, b) pioneering analysis of the interactions among different authoritarian characteristics—instead of the previous approaches to authoritarian regimes which focused on one specific feature (mostly, the nature of the rule). Similar to him, we claim that differences among authoritarian regimes may explain variations in important political and economic

outcomes just as it has been shown for differences amongst democratic political institutions. Unlike Wright (2008a, b), who studies economic growth and investment, we look at an intermediate variable which comparative literature has pointed out as an essential bridge between a political system and economic performance: state capacity or the quality of government. After several careful robustness checks of the original findings—using alternative indicators of the dependent variable and authoritarian regime classification—we find strong empirical support for H1 and weak-to-modest support of H2.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. Previous studies on the impact of authoritarian regimes over QoG focused almost exclusively on supply-side factors, such as the nature of the rule. We argue that single characteristics of authoritarian regimes can only tell us a part of the story, yet we need more comprehensive hypotheses that combine both features of the supply side of QoG together with characteristics of the demand side.

The paper has argued theoretically and shown empirically that there is an interaction effect between the *supply* of QoG, determined by the incentives for rulers to provide QoG (e.g., the type of authoritarian rule) and the *demand* for QoG from ordinary citizens on their government to make mid-to-long term investments in bureaucratic capacity. As a country's standard of living increases, so do the demands from citizens for future investments in the state. This relationship is by far the most relevant for single-party regimes, since they are more responsive to citizens' demands. We find weak support that this relationship also is present in personalist regimes, yet the findings are not robust to alternative specifications. Thus, following Hirschman, these single-party regimes, although preventing citizens from exerting an "exit" option (i.e., voting an alternative party), do allow a certain degree of "voice"—to a larger extent than in monarchies or military regimes. At low levels of economic development, single-party regimes have a negligible or even negative effect on QoG, given than citizens' demands for QoG in low-income countries, as predicted by Welzel and Inglehart (2008) among others, is low. On the contrary, at higher levels of economic development single-party regimes have a positive effect on QoG. Additionally these findings are robust to multiple data on QoG. Moreover, we find a similar effect in personalist regimes, yet the finding is not robust to the exclusion of hybrid regimes or the inclusion of oil reserves.

Although empirical support is not as strong as it was for H1, the second relevant finding of this paper is that the effect of the other authoritarian types—in particular monarchies—is somewhat conditional to rulers' time horizons. With short-sighted rulers, monarchies will tend to under-provide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs have long-term horizons, they will significantly provide higher levels of QoG. In sum, contrary to the prevailing view in the authoritarian literature, this paper shows that time horizons do not affect all authoritarian rulers equally, but only those who do not seem to respond so clearly to countries' socio-economic conditions when designing their administrative apparatus. Similarly, unlike the prevailing view among culturalist or public choice scholars, the paper shows that the level of economic development does not affect all rulers equally, but only those (single-party leaders) who most critically depend on the integration of citizens' voices while building their bureaucracies.

Appendix

Table 5 Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Source
ICRG	1562	2.24	0.87	0.21	4.72	Political risk services
W.B. Gov. effectiveness	508	2.03	0.73	0.15	5.05	Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2009)
Log (oil reserves)	1,380	6.99	28.69	0	261.5	Humphreys (2003)
Freedom index (inverted)	1,944	2.03	1.77	1	7	Freedom house (political rights)
Log(GDPpc)	1,879	7.57	0.91	5.32	10.02	WDI (2007)
Log(population)	2,014	9.12	1.34	5.75	14.07	WDI (2007)
Time horizon	1,446	0.052	0.051	0.0004	0.363	Wright (2008a, b)
Ethnic fractionalization	2,011	0.53	0.25	0.04	0.93	Alesina et al. (2003)
Single*GDP	1,468	2.93	3.71	0	10.02	Author
Military*GDP	1,468	1.93	3.22	0	8.96	Author
Monarchy*GDP	1,468	0.78	2.48	0	9.79	Author
Single*TH	1,328	0.021	0.037	0	0.36	Author
Military*TH	1,328	0.026	0.048	0	0.35	Author
Monarchy*TH	1,328	0.002	0.008	0	0.13	Author
Time1	2,080	0.25	0.43	0	1	Author
Time2	2,080	0.25	0.43	0	1	Author
Time3	2,080	0.25	0.43	0	1	Author
Time4	2,080	0.25	0.43	0	1	Author
Authoritarian regime data	Total observation	Proportion of sample	Source			
1 (Geddes/Wright authoritarian data)	1,844		Geddes (1999b) and Wright update (Wright 2008a, b)			
Ia. Hybrids aggregated						
Single party (0/1)		0.49				
Military (0/1)		0.13				
Personalist (0/1)		0.28				
Monarchy (0/1)		0.12				
Ib. Hybrids separated						
Single party (0/1)		0.32				
Military (0/1)		0.05				
Personalist (0/1)		0.28				
Monarchy (0/1)		0.12				
Single-party military (0/1)		0.04				
Single-party personal (0/1)		0.09				
Military-personal (0/1)		0.07				
Single-party–military personal (0/1)	0.04					

Table 5 (continued)

Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Source
2. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland authoritarian data	1,468		Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009)			
Civilian (single party) (0/1)		0.52				
Military (0/1)		0.37				
Monarch (0/1)		0.11				

For further information on the construct of certain variables including the ICRG and World Bank data, please refer to the Quality of Government data codebook at <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/>

Table 6 List of states

Afghanistan	El Salvador	Libya	Singapore
Albania	Eritrea	Madagascar	Somalia
Algeria	Ethiopia	Malawi	South Africa
Angola	Gabon	Malaysia	South Yemen
Argentina	Gambia	Mali	Soviet Union
Armenia	Georgia	Mauritania	Spain
Azerbaijan		Mexico	Sudan
Bangladesh	Ghana	Moldova	Suriname
Belarus	Guatemala	Mongolia	Swaziland
Benin	Guinea	Morocco	Syria
Bolivia	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Taiwan
Botswana	Guyana	Nepal	Tajikistan
Brazil	Haiti	Nicaragua	Tanzania
Bulgaria	Honduras	Niger	Thailand
Burkina Faso	Hungary	Nigeria	Togo
Burma	Indonesia	Oman	Tunisia
Burundi	Iran	Pakistan	Turkey
Cambodia	Iraq	Panama	Turkmenistan
Cameroon	Ivory Coast	Paraguay	UAE
Central African Rep	Jordan	Peru	Uganda
Chad	Kazakhstan	Philippines	Uruguay
Chile	Kenya	Poland	Uzbekistan
China	Korea North	Portugal	Vietnam
Congo Brazzaville	Korea South	Qatar	Yemen
Congo Kinshasa	Kuwait	Romania	Yugoslavia
Croatia	Kyrgyzstan	Rwanda	Zambia
Cuba	Laos	Saudi Arabia	Zimbabwe
Czechoslovakia	Lebanon	Senegal	
Dominican Rep	Lesotho	Serbia and Montenegro	
Egypt	Liberia	Sierra Leone	

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