

OBJECTIVES	Present		Primary objective	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Armed conflict	42	67	37	59
Cease hostilities	31	49	--	--
Peace enforcement	31	49	--	--
Support peace building	10	16	--	--
Negotiation of peace agreement	8	13	--	--
Human rights	22	35	0	0
Democracy support	17	27	6	10
Counter-terrorism	15	24	9	14
Good governance	8	13	1	2
Support judicial process	6	10	1	2
Non-proliferation	7	11	7	11
Support humanitarian efforts	4	6	0	0
Protect population under R2P	2	3	2	3

*Note: Percentage calculated from valid cases only, non-applicable and missing data excluded*

PURPOSES	Present		Principal purpose	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Coerce a change of behavior	50	79	35	56
Constrain target behavior	59	94	26	41
Signal and/or stigmatize target	63	100	2	3

NORMS SIGNALLED	Present		Principal Norm	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Prohibition of war/armed conflict	36	57	32	52
Human rights	28	44	1	2
Authority of regional arrangements	23	37	0	0
Counter-terrorism	15	24	9	15
Non-constitutional change in government	15	24	7	11
Improved governance (natural resources/security sector)	9	14	4	6
Non-proliferation	8	13	7	11
Authority of the UN Security Council	7	11	0	0
Protect population under R2P	4	6	2	3

POLITICAL WILL	Present	
	Frequency	%
Significant NGO pressure to UN deliberation	16	25
Unanimous UNSC vote	48	76
Abstentions in UNSCR vote	52	32
UNSCR Permanent 5 reservations to sanctions	20	89
Sanctions Committee formed at the beginning of episode	56	89
Panel of Experts/Monitoring team formed during episode	29	46
Individual sanctions are authorized/designated	35	88

*Note: Percentage calculated from valid cases only, non-applicable and missing data excluded*

TARGETS BY PURPOSE	Coercion		Constraint		Signaling	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Government	33	66	30	51	38	60
Government leadership	32	64	24	41	34	54
Rebel faction	21	42	26	44	27	43
All parties to the conflict	10	20	19	32	22	35
Terrorist group	2	4	8	14	8	13
Leadership family members	7	14	18	31	13	21
Facilitators or proscribed activity	11	22	21	36	22	35
Individual targets	18	36	31	53	30	48
Key regime supporters	5	10	9	15	11	17
Domestic constituencies	0	0	0	0	14	22
Regional constituencies	6	12	8	14	31	49
Global constituencies	1	2	1	2	27	43

*Note: Percentage calculated from valid cases only, non-applicable data was excluded.*

TYPES OF SANCTIONS	Present	
	Frequency	%
Individual sanctions	47	75
Travel ban	34	54
Asset freeze	40	63
Asset freeze and transfer	3	5
Diplomatic sanctions	13	21
Revision of visa policy	6	10
Limiting of travel of diplomatic personnel	11	17
Closing of embassies / offices of official representation	5	8
Limiting number of diplomatic personnel	5	8
Sectoral sanctions	60	95
Arms imports embargo	55	87
Aviation ban	11	17
Arms export ban	11	17
Proliferation-sensitive material	7	11
Shipping	3	5
Oil service equipment	2	3
Commodity sanctions	26	41
Diamonds	11	17
Oil import ban	8	13
Timber	3	5
Luxury goods	3	5
Charcoal	1	2
Other	5	8
Financial sector sanctions	6	10
Investment ban	1	2
Diaspora tax	2	3
Central Bank asset freeze	2	3
Financial services (insurance)	1	2
Sovereign wealth funds	2	3

OTHER SANCTIONS	Present	
	Frequency	%
Regional sanctions in place during the episode	43	68
EU	33	52
AU	2	3
OAS	1	2
ASEAN	0	0
ECOWAS	11	17
Unilateral sanctions in place during the episode	41	65
US	40	63
UK	19	30
Other	9	14
Sanctions regimes in neighboring countries	34	54

OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS	Present	
	Frequency	%
Diplomacy (pressure and/or negotiations)	61	97
Legal tribunals	29	46
ICC/ICJ	14	22
Special courts and tribunals	19	30
Peacekeeping operations	39	62
Threat of use of force	16	25
Use of force	33	52
Limited strikes and operations	18	29
Robust military force	22	35
No-fly zone	1	2
Naval blockade	2	3
Covert	7	11
Cyber-sabotage	4	6
Targeted assassinations	7	11
DDR/SSR	27	43

IMPLEMENTATION	Present	
	Frequency	%
Designation criteria specified (individual sanctions)	41	98
Sanctions committee formed at the passage of UNSCR	56	89
Individual sanctions authorized/designated	35	88
Committee guidelines developed	49	78
Reporting requested or required, conditional or not	44	72
Instances of enforcement	34	63
Enforcement authorities specified	35	57
Panel of Experts or Monitoring Teams appointed	29	46
Peacekeeping operations' enforcement role	17	45

EVASION/COPING STRATEGIES	Present	
	Frequency	%
Indications of evasion/coping strategies	52	91
Evasion	45	80
Black market contractors	37	69
Safe havens	23	43
Disguise of identity, forged documents	16	31
Informal value transfer systems	13	25
Front companies	15	28
Denial of inspection	14	24
Disguise vessels	14	26
Reliance on family members	6	12
Coping strategies	49	82
Diversion of trade through third countries	46	79
Stockpiling supplies	32	60
Diversify sources of funds or investment	19	32
Alternative value sources	8	14
Import substitution, new technology	9	15
Coerce/pressure major trade partner not to enforce sanctions	6	11
Shifting terms/subject of debate (diplomatic)	6	11
Other evasion/coping strategies	4	8

*Note: Percentage calculated from valid cases only, non-applicable and missing data excluded*

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES	Present	
	Frequency	%
Indications of unintended consequences	48	94
Increases in corruption and/or criminality	31	58
Humanitarian consequences	24	44
Decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of the UN Security Council	19	37
Strengthening of authoritarian rule	19	35
Resource diversion	18	34
Increases in human rights violations	14	26
Strengthening of political factions	13	25
Increases in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains	11	20
Harmful effects on neighboring states	10	19
Increase in international regulatory capacity in different issue domains	10	19
Widespread harmful economic consequences	8	19
Rally round the flag effect	7	13
Significant burden on implementing states	5	9
Reduction of local institutional capacity	4	8
Strengthening instruments of security apparatus of senders	4	8
Increase in the growth of the state role in the economy	4	8
Human rights implications for sending states	1	2
Enhanced stature of targeted individuals	0	0
Other	5	10

*Note: Percentage calculated from valid cases only, non-applicable and missing data excluded*

EFFECTIVENESS BY PURPOSE	Effective		Mixed		Ineffective	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Coercion	5	10	5	10	40	80
Constraint	16	27	10	17	33	56
Signaling	17	27	18	29	28	44

#### LIST OF EFFECTIVE EPISODES OF UN TARGETED SANCTIONS (1991-2013) BY PURPOSE

Coercion	Constraint	Signaling
Côte d'Ivoire EP3 (2005–2010)	Angola EP3 (1998–1999)	Angola EP3 (1998–1999)
DRC EP2 (2005–2008)	Angola EP4 (1999–2002)	Angola EP4 (1999–2002)
Libya I EP3 (1999–2003)	AQ/T EP3 (2001–2011)	AQ/T EP3 (2001–2011)
Sierra Leone EP4 (2000–2002)	AQ/T EP4 (2011–)	Côte d'Ivoire EP4 (2010–2011)
Somalia EP4 (2009–2012)	DRC EP3 (2008–2010)	DRC EP2 (2005–2008)
	Haiti EP1 (1993)	Haiti EP1 (1993)
	Haiti EP3 (1993–1994)	Haiti EP3 (1993–2004)
	Liberia EP2 (2001–2003)	Liberia EP2 (2001–2003)
	Liberia EP3 (2003)	Liberia EP3 (2003)
	Liberia EP4 (2003–2006)	Liberia EP4 (2003–2006)
	Liberia EP5 (2006–)	Liberia EP5 (2006–)
	Libya I EP1 (1992–1993)	Libya II EP1 (2011)
	Libya I EP2 (1993–1999)	Libya II EP3 (2011–2014)
	Libya II EP2 (2011)	Sierra Leone EP1 (1997–1998)
	Sierra Leone EP4 (2000–2002)	Sierra Leone EP4 (2000–2002)
	Sierra Leone EP5 (2002–2010)	Sierra Leone EP5 (2002–2010)
		Somalia EP4 (2009–2012)

Sanctions effectiveness by purpose

Coerce

	Lib.I	Som.	DRC	S.L.	CDI
Effective	EP3	EP4	EP2	EP4	EP3
	4	4	4	4	4
	4	3	3	4	3

Total
5
10%

Mixed

	Libya.I	Haiti	Liberi.	DPRK
Effective	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP1
	3	3	3	1
	4	3	4	3

Total
5
10%

Ineffective

	Somalia	Haiti	Angola	Rwanda	Sudan I	Sierra Leone	FRY II	AQI	E-E	DRC	Sudan II	Cote d'Ivoire	Leb.	Iran	Talib.	Libya II	G-B	CAR
Effective	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP1	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP1
	1	1	2	3	5	2	2	1	1	5	2	1	4	1	3	2	2	3
	1	1	4	1	2	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2

Total
40
80%

Constrain

	Libra I	Haiti	Liberia	Angola	Sierra Leone	AQI	DRC	Lib. II
Effective	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP3	EP4
	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4
	4	4	5	3	4	3	4	3

Total
16
27%

Mixed

	Angola	S.L.	AQI	DRC	CDI	Iran	DPRK	Lib.II
Effective	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP3	EP2	EP3
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	5

Total
10
17%

Ineffective

	FRY I	Somalia	Haiti	Liberi.	Rwanda	Sierra Leone	FRY II	AQI	E-E	DRC	Iraq	Sudan II	Cote d'Ivoire	Fam	DPRK	Talib.	Lib.II	G-B	CAR
Effective	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP1	EP1	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP3	EP1	EP1
	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	5	2	3	2	5	2	1
	0	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	4	1	3	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	1

Total
33
56%

Signal

	Som.	Haiti	Liberia	Angola	Sierra Leone	AQI	DRC	CDI	Libya II
Effective	EP4	EP1	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP3	EP2	EP4	EP1
	4	4	4	5	4	5	4	5	4
	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Total
17
27%

Mixed

	FRY I	Libya I	Angola	Sud. I	AQI	DRC	CDI	Iran	DPRK	Talib.
Effective	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP1	EP1	EP2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	3	4	3	3	5	4	4	3	3	4

Total
18
29%

Ineffective

	Lib.I	Somalia	Haiti	Liberi.	Rwanda	Sud. I	Sierra Leone	FRY II	AQI	E-E	DRC	Iraq	Sudan II	Cote d'Ivoire	Leb.	Lib. II	G-B	CAR
Effective	EP2	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP5	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP1	EP1	EP3	EP4	EP1	EP2	EP1	EP5	EP1	EP1
	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	5	4	3	2	3	2	4	5	3	3
	4	0	1	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2

Total
20
44%

Legend
AQI: Al Qaeda/Taliban
CAR: Central African Republic
CDI: Côte d'Ivoire
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
E-E: Ethiopia-Eritrea
FRY: Former Republic of Yagobawa
G-B: Guinea-Bissau
Leb.: Lebanon
Lib.: Libya
Liberi.: Liberia
S.L.: Sierra Leone
Som.: Somalia
Sud.: Sudan
Talib.: Taliban
Rwanda: Rwanda