

# Targeted Sanctions Consortium **T S C**

## Database Codebook

TARGETED  
SANCTIONS  
CONSORTIUM

### Coding Key

Variable number	Variable name	Standard coding			
	Variable description	Yes: 1	No: 0	N/A: -99	Missing: .

### General Background

v1	<b><i>United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responsiveness</i></b>	Time in months
	The time between the UNSC first taking note of a conflict or situation (presidential note, official conversation/discussion, item on the agenda, etc.) and the imposition of sanctions. Only relevant for the first episode. NOTE: Adjustments in the middle of existing sanction regimes (i.e. Taliban and Iraq) are coded as N/A (-99).	
v2	<b><i>Is a permanent member of the Security Council (P5) directly affected or involved?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Direct involvement refers to the degree of engagement between a P5 member and the targeted country or region. A high degree of engagement will generally exist between bordering territories, former colonial powers and subjects, Cold War and contemporary allies, patron states and their clients, as well as between states with a history of close interaction (due to large diaspora constituencies residing in a P5 country, for example).	
v3	<b><i>Identity of P5 member affected or involved?</i></b>	US: 1    China: 2    UK: 3    Russia: 4    France: 5
	More than one P5 member may be affected or involved (as indicated in extra columns v3a and v3b). NOTE: N/A refers to cases where no P5 member was affected or involved.	
v4	<b><i>Is an elected Security Council (SC) member directly affected or involved?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	See v2.	
v5	<b><i>Is a regional organization involved?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Involvement of regional organizations includes, among others, mediation, peacekeeping, sanctions, or humanitarian assistance. NOTE: For regional organizations involved, see v168-v176.	
v6	<b><i>Is the conflict part of another conflict within the region?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Conflict has well-acknowledged/established links to a preceding conflict in another country/countries in the region. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v7	<b><i>What is the target's degree of global interdependence?</i></b>	Open field
	Measured as trade as a percentage of GDP. NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	
v8	<b><i>Distinctively unique aspects of this case</i></b>	Open field
	This variable covers a broad variety of distinctive	

	elements that can be contained within the design of the sanctions themselves or within the environment they aim to address. Anything novel associated with the relevant sanctions regime.	
v9	<b>Cases involve regime change?</b> Refers to regime change as an outcome at some point throughout the duration of UN targeted sanctions. Causality is not implied. Information for the whole sanctions regime is provided in the first episode. NOTE: In cases where sanctions regimes are split (e.g. AQT), regime change is coded only for the first episode of the original regime.	Yes: 1      No: 0

## Objectives

Refers to objectives articulated in the UNSC resolutions that trigger new episodes. More than one objective may apply.

v10	<b>Objective: Nuclear non-proliferation</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v11	<b>Objective: Counter-terrorism</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v12	<b>Objective: Armed conflict - Cease hostilities</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v13	<b>Objective: Armed conflict - Negotiate peace agreement</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v14	<b>Objective: Armed conflict - Peace enforcement</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v15	<b>Objective: Armed conflict - Peace building</b> Support initiatives such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) or United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO) support.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v16	<b>Objective: Democracy support</b> Such as restoring constitutionally elected governments or supporting transitional governments and dissuading spoilers.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v17	<b>Objective: Good governance</b> Such as rule of law, transparency and accountability mechanisms (i.e. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or Kimberley Process).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v18	<b>Objective: Human rights</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v19	<b>Objective: Protect population under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v20	<b>Objective: Support humanitarian efforts</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v21	<b>Objective: Support judicial process</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v22	<b>Primary Objective</b>  Acknowledging the complexity of the situation, the primary objective in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.	Nuclear non-proliferation: 1 Counter-terrorism: 2 Armed conflict (cease hostilities, negotiate peace agreement, peace enforcement, and/or peace building): 3 Democracy support: 4 Good governance: 5 Human rights: 6 Protect population under R2P: 7 Support humanitarian efforts: 8 Support judicial process: 9

## Sanctions Regime Details

v23	<b>Number of episodes</b>	Number of episodes
	Episodes are defined principally by change in the nature of the targeted sanction (type of sanctions, target of sanctions, purpose of sanctions, or significant change in enforcement). Dramatic changes on the ground may also trigger a new episode, but variable generally remains dependent on a new UNSCR to start each episode. Information for the whole sanctions regime is provided in the first episode. NOTE: In some cases, targeted sanctions regimes transformed into comprehensive ones. Episodes of comprehensive sanctions are excluded from the database and not considered in this variable.	
v24	<b>Sanctions terminated?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to sanctions terminated explicitly in UNSC resolution. Only relevant for the last episode. NOTE: Sanctions regimes that changed from targeted to comprehensive sanctions (i.e. Former Yugoslavia I and Haiti) are considered terminated.	
v25	<b>UN sanctions preceded by other sanctions?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Autonomous unilateral or regional sanctions put in place with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v26	<b>Unilateral sanctions preceded UN sanctions?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Autonomous sanctions imposed by single countries with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v27	<b>Regional sanctions preceded UN sanctions?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Autonomous sanctions imposed by regional organizations (such as European Union or African Union) with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v28	<b>Did a threat of sanctions precede its imposition?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	A threat must be contained within a formal UN pronouncement or articulated by a public official in a position to bring the proposal of sanctions forward to the UN. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v29	<b>Episode start date</b>	dd/mm/yyyy
	For definition of an episode, see v23.	
v30	<b>Episode end date</b>	dd/mm/yyyy
	For definition of an episode, see v23.	
v31	<b>Duration of episode</b>	Time in months
	Rounded to the nearest half month. For definition of an episode, see v23. NOTE: N/A refers to sanctions regimes that are ongoing.	

## Political Will

v32	<b>What prompted UNSC action</b>	Open field
	Typically based on opening paragraphs of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.	
v33	<b>Is NGO pressure significant to UN deliberation?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	Evidence of strong lobbying on behalf of an affected party or NGO activists.	
v34	<b>Which country leads drafting UNSC resolution?</b> Information generally found through the Security Council Report and UN press releases. More than one country can lead resolution drafting (as indicated in extra columns v34a and v34b).	US: 1 China: 2 UK: 3 Russia: 4 France: 5 Other: 6
v35	<b>Number of votes in favor</b>	Number of votes
v36	<b>Number of votes opposed</b>	Number of votes
v37	<b>Number of abstentions</b>	Number of votes
v38	<b>Was the vote unanimous?</b>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v39	<b>Number of abstentions from P5 members</b>	Number of abstentions
v40	<b>Stated reasons for opposition or abstention</b> Information available in UN press releases, case studies, and credible media reporting.	Open field
v41	<b>Were there P5 reservations to the sanctions?</b> Information available in UN press releases, case studies, and credible media reporting.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v42	<b>Identity of P5 member with reservations to the sanctions</b> Refers to a P5 member statement of reservation at the time of resolution passage. May be more than one country (as indicated in the extra column v42a). NOTE: N/A refers to cases with no P5 member reservations.	US: 1 China: 2 UK: 3 Russia: 4 France: 5
v43	<b>Was Sanctions Committee formed at the beginning of the episode?</b> Sanctions Committee formed at the passage of the first UNSCR in the episode. Coded as 1 for subsequent episodes if the Committee was already in place at the beginning of the episode. NOTE: Episodes where Sanctions Committee is formed later in the episode (FRY 1 EP1, Somalia EP1, Liberia EP1, and DRC EP1) are coded as 0.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v44	<b>Is there a Panel of Experts/Monitoring team?</b> Established or in place at any point during the episode.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v45	<b>If individual sanctions are authorized, are individual targets designated?</b> Refers to whether any designations of individuals and/or corporate entities were made during the episode. NOTE: N/A refers to cases where no individual sanctions were authorized.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v46	<b>Time between UNSCR authorization of individual sanctions and designation of targets</b> Applies only to episodes where targets of individual sanctions (v106) have been designated (v45). Continuing designations from previous episodes are coded as 0 months (i.e. immediate designation) and "ongoing" if no one was designated and the episode has not yet ended. If the first designations took place in later episodes, the time reported includes also the length of the previous episodes where individual sanctions were authorized but no designations were made.	Time in months
v47	<b>Member state reporting</b> Based on UNSC resolution text. Refers to whether	No reporting: 0 Called for / Urged: 1 Conditional: 2 Requested: 3 Required: 4

	<p>member states reporting is requested, required, or conditional – that is, if it is requested or required (a) upon completion of a certain action (such as cargo inspection) or (b) only by a specific category of member states (such as those in the region or those participating in a peacekeeping operation).</p> <p>NOTE: When more than one reporting requirement is present in the same episode, priority goes to the one considered more strongly worded (i.e. reverse order of the coding rule: required, requested, conditional, called upon/urged). Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.</p>	
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## Purpose and Target

Articulated by UNSC resolutions and inferred from the specific design of the sanctions and the targets to whom sanctions apply. More than one purpose is possible.

v48	<b>Purpose: Coerce a change of behavior</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Specific demands to a target in the form of “desist from...” or “join the talks”, etc. found in the text of the UNSC resolutions. For evaluation of effectiveness in coercing, see v282-286.	
v49	<b>Purpose: Constrain a target’s behavior</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Drawn from the text of the relevant resolution and the design of respective measures. The pattern of individual and sectoral targeting in each case can provide a clear indication of the purpose. For evaluation of effectiveness in constraining, see v287-291.	
v50	<b>Purpose: Signal and/or stigmatize a target</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanction targets, and regime design. This variable looks at how sanctions interact with norms (contestations and reinforcement). It also looks at how targets feel stigmatized. There are, consequently, two dimensions or components to the variable: the clarity of the signal communicated and the degree of stigmatization experienced (social psychological aspect). For evaluation of effectiveness in signaling, see v292-296.	
v51	<b>Principal purpose of sanctions in the episode</b>	Coerce: 1      Constrain: 2      Signal: 3
	Acknowledging the complexity of the situation and the multiple purposes often associated with sanctions, the principal purpose in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode and the design of the sanctions regime.	
v52	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Entire government</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v53	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Government leadership</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v54	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Rebel faction</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	

v55	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: All parties to the conflict</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v56	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Terrorist group</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v57	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Leadership family members</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v58	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Facilitators of proscribed activity</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v59	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Individual targets</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v60	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Key regime supporters</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v62. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v61	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Domestic constituencies in target country</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v62	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Regional constituencies</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Such as regional organizations or neighboring states. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v63	<b>Who is meant to be coerced: Global constituencies</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Such as global human rights organizations. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v64	<b>Primary target of coercion</b>	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5 Leadership family members: 6 Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7 Individual targets: 8 Key regime supporters: 9 Domestic constituencies in target: 10 Regional constituencies: 11 Global constituencies: 12
	Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanctions regime design, and implementation/enforcement during the episode. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v65	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Entire government</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v66	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Government leadership</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v67	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Rebel faction</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v68	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: All parties to the conflict</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v69	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Terrorist group</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v70	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Leadership family members</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v71	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Facilitators of proscribed activity</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v72	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Individual targets</b> Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v73	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Key regime supporters</b> Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v75. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v74	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Domestic constituencies in target countries</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v75	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Regional constituencies</b> Such as regional organizations or neighboring states. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v76	<b>Who is meant to be constrained: Global constituencies</b> Such as global human rights organizations. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v77	<b>Primary target of constraint</b>  Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanctions regime design, and implementation/enforcement during the episode. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5 Leadership family members: 6 Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7 Individual targets: 8 Key regime supporters: 9 Domestic constituencies in target: 10 Regional constituencies: 11 Global constituencies: 12
v78	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Entire government</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v79	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Government leadership</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	
v80	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Rebel faction</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v81	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: All parties to the conflict</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v82	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Terrorist group</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v83	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Leadership family members</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v84	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Facilitators of proscribed activity</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v85	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Individual targets</b> Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v86	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Key regime supporters</b> Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v68. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v87	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Domestic constituencies in sending countries</b> NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v88	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Regional constituencies</b> Refers to signals being sent to regional organizations or neighboring states; often the AU or ECOWAS are already on the ground and looking for a signal that their pursuits are internationally acknowledged and supported. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v89	<b>Who is meant to be signaled: Global constituencies</b> Refers to signals being sent to all global constituencies, often about a universal international norm. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v90	<b>Primary target of the signal</b>	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5



	<p>Drawn from UNSC resolution text and sanctions regime design during the episode.</p> <p>NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.</p>	<p>Leadership family members: 6</p> <p>Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7</p> <p>Individual targets: 8</p> <p>Key regime supporters: 9</p> <p>Domestic constituencies: 10</p> <p>Regional constituencies: 11</p> <p>Global constituencies: 12</p>
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## Norm Signaling

Norms are generally explicitly articulated in the text of UNSC resolutions or implied by the specific design of each sanctions regime. More than one norm can be signaled.

v91	<b>Norm signaled: Nuclear non-proliferation</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v92	<b>Norm signaled: Counter-terrorism</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v93	<b>Norm signaled: Prohibition of war/armed conflict</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v94	<b>Norm signaled: Support democracy/Oppose non-constitutional change in government</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v95	<b>Norm signaled: Improve governance</b> In particular with regards to the governance of natural resources and/or the security sector.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v96	<b>Norm signaled: Human rights</b> Human rights violations (such as the use of child soldiers, treatment of minorities, gender-based violence, and ethnic cleansing) articulated in text of UNSC resolution.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v97	<b>Norm signaled: Protect population under R2P</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v98	<b>Norm signaled: Authority of the UN Security Council</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v99	<b>Norm signaled: Authority of regional arrangements</b> Includes for example regional organizations, peace negotiation initiatives, or peacekeeping forces.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v100	<b>Norm signaled: Support judicial process</b> Including legal referrals to the ICC, creation of specialized courts, and/or support for national legal prosecutions.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v101	<b>Principal norm signaled</b>  Acknowledging the complexity of the situation, the principal norm signaled in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.	Non-proliferation: 1 Counter-terrorism: 2 Prohibition of war/armed conflict: 3 Non-constitutional change in government: 4 Improved governance: 5 Human rights: 6 Protect population under R2P: 7 Authority of UN Security Council: 8 Authority of regional arrangements: 9 Support judicial process: 10	

## Type of Sanctions

NOTE: The specific type of sanction is coded as 'yes' (1) if it was in place at one point during the episode. In the case of sanctions suspensions (Libya 1 EP3 and Haiti EP2), suspended sanctions are coded as 'yes' (1).

V102	<b><i>Was sanctions implementation deliberately delayed?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to UNSC resolutions passed with delayed implementation date for at least one of the sanctions imposed, at least one time during the episode, with explicit delay (of 30 days, for example) before sanctions come into force.	
V103	<b><i>Were sanctions imposed for a specific time period?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to sanctions imposed for a limited time period (e.g. 1 year).	
v104	<b><i>Were sanctions regionally limited within a country?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Includes delimitations by demarcated provinces and areas controlled by targeted group.	
v105	<b><i>Did this episode involve secondary sanctions?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Imposed on another country for sanctions violations or other actions taken in support of the target(s).	
v106	<b><i>Were individual sanctions imposed?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	For designations, see v45.	
v107	<b><i>Individual sanction: Travel ban</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to individual travel bans. For travel bans on classes of government officials or diplomats, see v118.	
v108	<b><i>Number of travel ban designees</i></b>	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees during each episode.	
v109	<b><i>Individual sanction: Individual/corporate entity asset freeze</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to individual and/or corporate entities (companies, non-governmental organizations or political entities) asset freeze. NOTE: For the subcategory of this variable referring to political entities (government, former regime, or rebel faction) specified directly in the sanctions resolution text, see v110-3.	
v110	<b><i>Were assets of political entities frozen?</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to the subcategory of individual asset freeze, explicitly targeting political entities (government, former regime, or rebel faction) in the resolution text. NOTE: For the broader category of individual/corporate entity asset freeze, see v109.	
v111	<b><i>Target of political entities asset freeze: Government</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v112	<b><i>Target of political entities asset freeze: Former regime</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v113	<b><i>Target of political entities asset freeze: Rebel faction</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v114	<b><i>Number of asset freeze designees</i></b>	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees during each episode. NOTE: Applies only to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories.	
v115	<b><i>Individual sanction: Asset freeze and transfer</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to the specific cases in which in addition to an asset freeze (v109) the resolution demands the transfer of assets to a particular source.	

v116	<b>Number of asset freeze and transfer designees</b>	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees (both individuals and corporate entities or political entities) for asset freeze and transfer during each episode.	
v117	<b>Were diplomatic sanctions imposed?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v118	<b>Diplomatic sanction: Limiting travel of diplomatic or government personnel</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to travel limitations on classes of government officials or diplomats (such as government, armed forces, or military junta). For individual travel bans, see v107.	
v119	<b>Diplomatic sanction: Limiting diplomatic representation</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Including offices of official representation.	
v120	<b>Diplomatic sanction: Revision of visa policy</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to limiting, suspending, or canceling entry visas and/or expulsion of categories of nationals.	
v121	<b>Diplomatic sanction: Limiting number of diplomatic personnel</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v122	<b>Were sectoral sanctions imposed?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v123	<b>Sectoral sanction: Aviation ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v124	<b>Sectoral sanction: Arms imports embargo</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	For arms exports embargo, see v128.	
v125	<b>Arms imports embargo: Non-governmental entities</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v126	<b>Arms imports embargo: Government forces</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v127	<b>Arms imports embargo: All parties to the conflict</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v128	<b>Sectoral sanction: Arms exports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	For arms imports embargo, see v124.	
v129	<b>Sectoral sanction: Proliferation-sensitive material</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Including both imports and exports ban on proliferation-sensitive material.	
v130	<b>Sectoral sanction: Oil services equipment imports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v131	<b>Sectoral sanction: Shipping and transportation</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
	Includes bunkering bans and ground or waterborne transportation services and equipment bans.	
v132	<b>Were commodity sanctions imposed?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v133	<b>Commodity sanction: Petroleum imports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v134	<b>Commodity sanction: Diamond exports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v135	<b>Relevance of diamonds to total exports</b>	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v136	<b>Commodity sanction: Timber exports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v137	<b>Relevance of timber to total exports</b>	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v138	<b>Commodity sanction: Charcoal exports ban</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v139	<b>Relevance of charcoal to total exports</b>	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	

v140	<b>Commodity sanction: Luxury goods imports ban</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0
v141	<b>Relevance of luxury goods to total imports</b> Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	Percentage
v142	<b>Commodity sanction: Other</b> Including both commodity imports and exports bans. Other commodities include heroin processing chemicals, cultural property, or illegal crude oil exports.	Yes: 1    No: 0
v143	<b>Relevance of other commodity to total exports</b> Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	Percentage
v144	<b>Were financial sector sanctions imposed?</b> Refers to broader financial sector sanctions. For individual/corporate asset freeze, see v109.	Yes: 1    No: 0
v145	<b>Financial sector sanction: Central Bank asset freeze</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0
v146	<b>Financial sector sanction: Investment ban</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0
v147	<b>Financial sector sanction: Financial services</b> Such as transfers or public support, including provisions of bulk cash, export credits, loans, guarantees, or insurance.	Yes: 1    No: 0
v148	<b>Financial sector sanction: Sovereign wealth funds</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0
v149	<b>Estimated size of frozen sovereign wealth funds</b>	Size in US dollars
v150	<b>Financial sector sanction: Diaspora tax</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0

## Other Actors Involved

Significant players or contributors to policy outcomes on the ground by virtue of a coordination/directing role (regardless of whether they directly interact with the sanctions regime) mentioned in UN reports (panels of experts or monitoring groups, for example) or documented well by media or academic observers. Information of involvement may also be drawn from specific actors' websites. The objective of these variables is to gain insight into the nature of the environment on the ground. This information is used to assess UN sanctions contribution to policy outcomes (v283, v288, v293). Actor is coded as 'yes' (1) if it was involved at one point during the episode.

v151	<b>Conflict-related actor: Peacekeeping forces</b> Includes both UN and regional peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Does not consider exclusively civilian or political missions. NOTE: Excludes PKOs that do not address the same issue as the UN sanctions (i.e. Lebanon and Sudan I are coded as 0).	Yes: 1    No: 0
v152	<b>Conflict-related actor: Peacekeeping mission in neighboring country</b> Includes both UN and regional peacekeeping operations.	Yes: 1    No: 0
v153	<b>Conflict-related actor: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)</b> Pre-OCHA institutions (i.e. Department of Humanitarian Affairs) included.	Yes: 1    No: 0
v154	<b>Conflict-related actor: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</b>	Yes: 1    No: 0

v155	<b>Conflict-related actor: World Food Programme (WFP)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v156	<b>Conflict-related actor: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v157	<b>Conflict-related actor: Kimberley Process</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v158	<b>Conflict-related actor: Human Rights Council/Commission</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v159	<b>Conflict-related actor: Other</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Includes the full spectrum of established actors active in conflict zones (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, UN Peacebuilding Commission). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v160	<b>Proliferation-related actor: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v161	<b>Proliferation-related actor: Other</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
	For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or US-led proliferation security initiative. NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v162	<b>Terrorism-related actor: Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v163	<b>Terrorism-related actor: Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v164	<b>Terrorism-related actor: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/International Monetary Fund (IMF)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v165	<b>Terrorism-related actor: Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v166	<b>Terrorism-related actor: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v167	<b>Terrorism-related actor: Other</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
	For example, United Nations Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC) or Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v168	<b>Regional actor: Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v169	<b>Regional actor: African Union (AU)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v170	<b>Regional actor: Organization of American States (OAS)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v171	<b>Regional actor: European Union (EU)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v172	<b>Regional actor: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v173	<b>Regional actor: Arab League</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v174	<b>Regional actor: Organization of Islamic Conference</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v175	<b>Regional actor: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v176	<b>Regional actor: Other</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v177	<b>Is there a Special Representative for the Secretary</b>	Yes: 1	No: 0

	<b>General?</b>	
v178	<b><i>Is there any functionally specific Special Representative?</i></b> For example, a Special Representative for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v179	<b><i>Are the Panels of Experts interacting with other actors?</i></b> For presence of Panel of Experts/Monitoring teams, see v44.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v180	<b><i>On balance, did UN sanctions complement or conflict with the activities of other UN actors?</i></b> NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	Complement: 1      Conflict: 2 Unable to determine: 3
v181	<b><i>On balance, did UN sanctions complement or conflict with the activities of other multilateral actors?</i></b> NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	Complement: 1      Conflict: 2 Unable to determine: 3
v182	<b><i>With which other multilateral actors did UN sanctions conflict or cooperate?</i></b>	Open field

## Other Sanctions

Refers to autonomous sanctions in place that go beyond UN sanctions during the episode.

v183	<b><i>Are sanctions by regional organizations in place?</i></b> Refers to autonomous sanctions by regional organizations that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations). NOTE: For autonomous sanctions imposed by regional organizations prior to UN sanction imposition, see v27.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v184	<b><i>Regional sanctions: Are European Union (EU) sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to autonomous EU sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v185	<b><i>Regional sanctions: Are African Union (AU) sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to autonomous AU sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v186	<b><i>Regional sanctions: Are Organization of American States sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to autonomous OAS sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v187	<b><i>Regional sanctions: Are Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to autonomous ASEAN sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v188	<b><i>Regional sanctions: Are Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions in place?</i></b>	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2

	Refers to autonomous ECOWAS sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v189	<b><i>Are unilateral sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to unilateral sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations). NOTE: For autonomous sanctions imposed by single countries prior to UN sanction imposition, see v26.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v190	<b><i>Unilateral sanctions: Are United States (US) unilateral sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to unilateral US sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v191	<b><i>Unilateral sanctions: Are United Kingdom (UK) unilateral sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to unilateral UK sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v192	<b><i>Unilateral sanctions: Are other unilateral sanctions in place?</i></b> Refers to unilateral sanctions by other countries that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0      Targeted: 1      Comprehensive: 2
v193	<b><i>Are there sanctions regimes in neighboring countries?</i></b> Refers to UN sanctions imposed on immediate neighbors (i.e. sharing contiguous borders) in place at one point during the episode.	Yes: 1      No: 0

## Other Policy Instruments

Other policy instruments include significant measures taken by the United Nations, individual Member States, or regional organizations.

v194	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Threat of use of force</i></b> Refers to a credible threat by or on behalf of a public official in a position to affect the circumstances.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v195	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Force, limited strikes and operations</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v196	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Force, robust military force</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v197	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Force, no-fly zone</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v198	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Force, naval blockade</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v199	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Peacekeeping operations</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
V200	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
V201	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Covert, cyber-sabotage</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v202	<b><i>Other policy instruments: Covert, targeted assassinations</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

v203	<b>Other policy instruments: International Criminal Court (ICC)/International Court of Justice (ICJ)</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v204	<b>Other policy instruments: Other international courts and tribunals</b> For example International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or Special Court on Sierra Leone.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v205	<b>Other policy instruments: Significant diplomatic pressure and/or multilateral negotiation</b> Refers to efforts to influence on the part of regional groups or other multilateral coalitions such as P5+1 (five UNSC permanent members plus Germany) on DPRK or the E3+3 (China, Russia, US, France, UK and Germany) on Iran.	Yes: 1      No: 0

## Implementation and Enforcement

v206	<b>Were substantive member state reports received?</b> Refers to reports that address more than a simple acknowledgement of compliance or translation into domestic law. Demonstrates that member is actively engaging with the sanctions. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended. For member state reporting requirements, see v47.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v207	<b>Are Sanctions Committee guidelines in place?</b> Refers to the procedural guidelines for the operation of the Sanctions Committee. NOTE: For presence of Sanctions Committee at the beginning of each episode, see v43.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v208	<b>Are designation criteria specified?</b> NOTE: Applies only to individual sanctions (v106).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v209	<b>Are enforcement authorities specified?</b> Refers to enforcement authorities specified in UNSC resolution text. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v210	<b>Are there clear instances of enforcement?</b> Refers to examples of enforcement that go beyond implementation articulated by policy or law. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v211	<b>Specific instances of enforcement</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v212	<b>Does a Peacekeeping Operation have an enforcement role?</b> Information derived from UNSCRs and UNDPKO site lists the mandates. NOTE: Applies only for episodes where peacekeeping operations are present (v151). Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v213	<b>Are there indications of national level implementation?</b> Primarily refers to implementation by sending countries but could be applied to targets (in the case of certification schemes, for example). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v214	<b>Specific indications of national level implementation</b>	Open field



	Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	
v215	<b><i>Is there evidence of travel ban implementation?</i></b> Refers to both individual (v107) and governmental (v118) travel bans. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v216	<b><i>Specific evidence of travel ban implementation</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v217	<b><i>Were assets frozen?</i></b> Refers to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v218	<b><i>Total volume of assets frozen</i></b> NOTE: Only applies to episodes in which assets were frozen (v217). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Volume in USD
v219	<b><i>Were accounts frozen?</i></b> Refers to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v220	<b><i>Total number of accounts frozen</i></b> NOTE: Only applies to episodes in which accounts were frozen (v219). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Number of accounts frozen
v221	<b><i>Were diplomatic sanctions enforced?</i></b> NOTE: Applies only to diplomatic sanctions (v117). For the different types of diplomatic sanctions, see v118-21. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v222	<b><i>Instances of diplomatic sanctions enforcement</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v223	<b><i>Were landing rights denied?</i></b> Related to aviation ban (v123). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v224	<b><i>Specific instances of landing rights being denied</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v225	<b><i>Was servicing denied?</i></b> Servicing restrictions are primarily related to the implementation of aviation bans (v123), but may extend to other sanctions (such as shipping v131 and specific prohibitions on arms, proliferation, or Internet hosting related servicing) if relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended or relevant sanctions never entered in force. Coded as 1 for cases where servicing was denied based on recommended actions by the UNSC.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v226	<b><i>Specific instances of denial of service</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as	Open field

	articulated by policy or law.	
v227	<b><i>Is there any evidence of interdiction?</i></b> Refers to boarding a vessel, inspection of a vessel or other means of transport, or otherwise arresting the movement of embargoed goods. Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v228	<b><i>Specific evidence of interdiction</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v229	<b><i>Is there any evidence of detention of vessels?</i></b> Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v230	<b><i>Evidence of vessels detention</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v231	<b><i>Is there any evidence of the cancellation of credits?</i></b> Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v232	<b><i>Evidence of credits cancelled</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field

## Impact Assessment

The following variables indicate direct and indirect impacts of targeted sanctions. Impacts of targeted sanctions are direct when they affect principal parties to the conflict or situation that prompted sanctions. Direct impacts include assessments of the economic disadvantages to the target of sanctions and on the target's ability to continue proscribed activities. Variables representing direct political, social, and psychological (stigmatizing or isolating) effects on the targeted parties are also important, including assessments of reputational costs to legitimate actors engaged with targeted parties. Indirect impacts refer to the extent to which the measures had impacts on non-targeted, but inter-related economic, political, and social dynamics, processes, or groups (such as creating incentives for import substitution, as an economic example, or the sociological implications of targeted measures that have indirect implications for gender or ethnicity).

v233	<b><i>Indications of direct economic impact</i></b> Assets frozen, change in arms supplies, measure of resource exports, and other measures of diminished trade and/or access to financing.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v234	<b><i>Specific indications of direct economic impact</i></b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v235	<b><i>Indications of direct political impact</i></b> Refers to a change in the political dynamics associated with the targeted regime or faction. For example, if a commodities embargo directly contributes to the fracturing of a rebel group or to a regime's decision to call	Yes: 1      No: 0

	a ceasefire.	
v236	<b>Specific indications of direct political impact</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v237	<b>Indications of direct social or psychological impact</b> Stigmatizing or isolating effects on the targeted party or legitimate actors engaged with the targeted party.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v238	<b>Specific indications of direct social or psychological impact</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v239	<b>Indications of indirect economic impact</b> For example, creating incentives for import substitution, the development of new technologies, or the diversion of foreign investment and credit.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v240	<b>Specific indications of indirect economic impact</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field
v241	<b>Indications of indirect political impact</b> For example, divisions within political leadership, introduction of rationing schemes, undermining state infrastructure or weakening state institutional capacity.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v242	<b>Specific indications of indirect political impact</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field
v243	<b>Indications of indirect social or psychological impact</b> Refers to implications of measures that go beyond the targeted parties and affect social or psychological dynamics (associated with gender or ethnicity, for example).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v244	<b>Specific indications of indirect social or psychological impact</b> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field

## Evasion/Coping Strategies

v245	<b>Are there indications of sanctions evasion/coping strategies?</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v246	<b>Evasion: Disguise of identity or use of forged documents</b> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v247	<b>Evasion: Use of front companies</b> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v248	<b>Evasion: Reliance on family members</b> Utilizing a relative's bank account to move money when assets are frozen, for example. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v249	<b>Evasion: Use of informal value transfer systems</b> Refers to an informal yet defined mechanism for transferring funds or financing evasion, such as the Hawala system. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v250	<b>Evasion: Use of safe havens</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	Refers broadly to any place of refuge safeguarded by sympathizers, whether a specific location, region, or foreign country. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	
v251	<b><i>Evasion: Disguise vessels</i></b> Refer to seaborne vessels and other means of transport (for example, switching the tail numbers of aircraft). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v252	<b><i>Evasion: Use of black market contractors</i></b> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v253	<b><i>Evasion: Denial of inspection</i></b> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v254	<b><i>Coping: Use of alternative value source</i></b> Refers to a substitute commodity or industry.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v255	<b><i>Coping: Shifting terms of debate or change subject (diplomatically)</i></b> For example, mobilization of AU and Arab League against UN sanctions implementation during Libya 1.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v256	<b><i>Coping: Stockpiling supplies</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v257	<b><i>Coping: Diversion of trade through third countries</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v258	<b><i>Coping: Coerce or put pressure on major trade partners not to enforce sanctions</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v259	<b><i>Coping: Import substitution, development of new technology.</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v260	<b><i>Coping: Diversify sources of funds and investment</i></b>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v261	<b><i>Evasion/Coping: Others</i></b> Efforts to complicate litigation, for example. NOTE: The specific type of other evasion/coping strategies is indicated in the extra column (open field).	Yes: 1      No: 0

## Unintended Consequences

The following variables identify the principal unintended consequences (both positive and negative) of the sanctions imposed in each episode. Among the possible negative externalities of targeted sanctions are the legacies of corruption and criminality often left by sanctions, the strengthening of instruments of authoritarian rule, a “rally around the flag” effect, an increase in human rights violations, and harmful effects on neighboring states. Positive externalities might include increased capacity to regulate internationally in different issue domains (such as financial controls) or opportunities for capacity building training for financial controls, immigration, or customs.

v262	<b><i>Are there indications of unintended consequences?</i></b> As indicated in PoE reports or other authoritative sources.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v263	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Increase in corruption and/or criminality</i></b> Refers to the tendency for sanctions to contribute to a proliferation of illicit means and networks that function in place of previously legitimate channels.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v264	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Strengthening of authoritarian rule</i></b> Refers to increased repressive capacity by the state and/or the deterioration of civil liberties under targeted	Yes: 1      No: 0

	regimes.	
v265	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Strengthening instruments of the security apparatus of senders</b></p> <p>Typically considered a negative externality because it provides justification for a state to build its surveillance and intelligence capacities and puts civil liberties at risk. However, it may also have positive externalities such as strengthening a sending state's capacity for border security.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v266	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Rally round the flag effect</b></p> <p>Sanctions are used to justify diversionary policy, resulting in an Increase of short-run popular support for a regime.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v267	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Increase in human rights violations</b></p> <p>Under targeted regime or by targeted parties.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v268	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Harmful effects on neighboring states</b></p> <p>Article 50 concerns and spillover effects of the sanctions regime on other states.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v269	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Strengthening of political factions</b></p> <p>Sanctions contribute to a disproportional strengthening of a political faction, either within the government structure or outside of it.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v270	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Enhancing stature of targeted individuals</b></p> <p>The imposition of sanctions generates sympathy or support for a designated target, possibly encouraging others to emulate the targeted individual. NOTE: Applies only to episodes in which individuals designated (v45).</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v271	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Increase in international regulatory capacity in different issue domains</b></p> <p>Creation of new international institutions, laws, or norms in response to proscribed activity, though not designed to establish autonomous regulatory regimes. For example, the Kimberley Process (in diamond cases) or improved anti-money laundering provisions established under the 1267 (AQ/T) regime.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v272	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains</b></p> <p>Refers to an empirically observed increase in enforcement and the capacity to enforce as a result of the imposition of a sanctions regime.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v273	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Resource diversion</b></p> <p>Refers to the diversion of resources from one sector to another as a result of sanctions constraints (for example, healthcare allocations being cut to supplement the military budget).</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v274	<p><b>Unintended consequences: Increase in the growth of the state role in the economy</b></p> <p>Refers broadly to a variety of ways a state may intervene in the economy as a response to UN sanctions (e.g. allocation, direct ownership, regulation, or subsuming activity previously conducted by private enterprise).</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v275	<b>Unintended consequences: Significant burden on</b>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	<b><i>implementing states</i></b>	
	The implementation burden is not confined to the public sector; private sector costs are included as well.	
v276	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Humanitarian consequences</i></b> Situations in which sanctions are directly linked to the disruption of basic services and the realization of basic needs (for example, undelivered pharmaceutical materials or medical equipment or food access blocked due to the sanctions regime).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v277	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Human rights implications for sending states</i></b> Negative impact on human rights in sending states as a result of imposing and implementing sanctions (for example, increased surveillance due to expansion of the global counter-terrorism regime).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v278	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council</i></b> Situations in which a popular loss of faith in the UNSC occurs, whether in sending states or under targeted regimes, due, for example, to a failure to implement sanctions that have been imposed in a UNSC resolution. May also refer to a situation in which UN sanctions are mismanaged (by targeting or designating the wrong individuals) or flawed more generally.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v279	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Reduction of local institutional capacity</i></b> Situation in which sanctions unintentionally disrupt or prevent local institutions from functioning properly.	Yes: 1      No: 0
v280	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Widespread harmful economic consequences</i></b> Circumstances in which sanctions injure the productive capacity of the country or prevent segments of the population from engaging in the economy (national, regional, or sectoral).	Yes: 1      No: 0
v281	<b><i>Unintended consequences: Other</i></b> NOTE: The specific type of other unintended consequences is indicated in the extra column (open field).	Yes: 1      No: 0

## Effectiveness

v282	<b>Policy outcome: Coercion</b>	<p><b>1:</b> Lack of significant change in behavior, ignoring the UNSCR, or complete intransigence.</p> <p><b>2:</b> Agreeing to a process and/or engaging in negotiations that could result in settling or resolving the dispute or in obfuscation, delaying, or changing terms of debate.</p> <p><b>3:</b> Accommodation or significant concessions to resolve the dispute.</p> <p><b>4:</b> Meeting most of the objectives of the UNSCR and/or approximating the core purposes as originally articulated in the UNSCR (but not necessarily according to the explicit terms spelled out in the original UNSCR).</p> <p><b>5:</b> Meeting all the principal objectives of the UNSCR.</p>
	<p>Evaluates the extent to which the target changed its behavior and the demands of the Security Council have been met.</p> <p>NOTE: For indicators of coercion as a purpose of sanctions, see v48. For overall sanction effectiveness in coercing, see v284-286.</p>	
v283	<b>UN Sanctions contribution: Coercion</b>	<p><b>0: Negative</b> (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity)</p> <p><b>1: None</b> (no discernible sanctions contribution)</p> <p><b>2: Minor</b> (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome)</p> <p><b>3: Modest</b> (sanctions reinforced other measures)</p> <p><b>4: Major</b> (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target)</p> <p><b>5: Significant</b> (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>
	<p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions.</p> <p>NOTE: For indicators of coercion as a purpose of sanctions, see v48. For overall sanction effectiveness in coercing, see v284-286.</p>	
v284	<b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Effective</b>	
	<p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and</li> <li>UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to coercion, see v283.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v285	<b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Mixed</b>	
	<p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy outcome is 3, and</li> <li>UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0

	coercion, see v283.	
v286	<p><b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Ineffective</b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or</li> <li>• Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to coercion, see v283.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v287	<p><b>Policy outcome: Constraint</b></p> <p>Evaluates the extent to which the target has been constrained in proscribed activities (raising costs/changes in strategy). NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v49. For overall sanction effectiveness in constraining, see v289-291.</p>	<p><b>1:</b> No discernible constraints experienced by the target.  <b>2:</b> Increases in costs can be managed by the target (sanctions are largely a nuisance factor) perhaps due to ease of evasion.  <b>3:</b> Slight increases in costs to target (as evidenced by diversion of trade through third countries, and/or delay in engaging in proscribed activity and/or diminution in the frequency of engagement in proscribed activity).  <b>4:</b> Increases in costs, minor changes of strategy of the target, statement that target may be experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity.  <b>5:</b> Significant increases in costs, changes of strategy of the target, statement that target is experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity.</p>
v288	<p><b>UN Sanctions contribution: Constraint</b></p> <p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions. NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v49. For overall sanction effectiveness in constraining, see v289-291.</p>	<p><b>0: Negative</b> (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity)  <b>1: None</b> (no discernible sanctions contribution)  <b>2: Minor</b> (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome)  <b>3: Modest</b> (sanctions reinforced other measures)  <b>4: Major</b> (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target)  <b>5: Significant</b> (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>
v289	<p><b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Effective</b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and</li> <li>• UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest</li> </ul>	Yes: 1      No: 0



	<p>(3), major (4) or significant (5). NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.</p>	
v290	<p><b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Mixed</b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 3, and</li> <li>• UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v291	<p><b>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Ineffective</b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or</li> <li>• Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v292	<p><b>Policy outcome: Signaling</b></p> <p>Evaluates the extent to which the norm has been articulated and the target stigmatized. NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v50. For overall sanction effectiveness in signaling, see v294-296.</p>	<p><b>1:</b> Norm (or norms) not articulated, no stigmatization and/or clear evidence of legitimation.  <b>2:</b> Norm (or norms) poorly articulated (e.g. too many, diffusely articulated), limited evidence of stigmatization and/or possible legitimation.  <b>3:</b> Norm (or norms) articulated, and some stigmatization of target.  <b>4:</b> Norm (or norms) articulated and targets strongly stigmatized.  <b>5:</b> Norm (or norms) clearly articulated and target fully stigmatized and/or isolated (e.g. effective signaling to the international community and stigmatizing and/or isolation of the target).</p>
v293	<p><b>UN Sanctions contribution: Signaling</b></p> <p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions. NOTE: For indicators of signaling as a purpose of</p>	<p><b>0: Negative</b> (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity)  <b>1: None</b> (no discernible sanctions contribution)  <b>2: Minor</b> (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome)  <b>3: Modest</b> (sanctions reinforced other measures)  <b>4: Major</b> (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target)  <b>5: Significant</b> (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>

	sanctions, see v50. For overall sanction effectiveness in signaling, see v294-296.	
v294	<p><b><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Effective</i></b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and</li> <li>• UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v295	<p><b><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Mixed</i></b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 3, and</li> <li>• UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0
v296	<p><b><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Ineffective</i></b></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or</li> <li>• Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2).</li> </ul> <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1      No: 0