다음의 내용의 문단 하나? [보통 제재의 대상을 넓히면 타겟국가의 비용이 증가해서 제재 성공률이 증가한다고 예상이 가능. 그러나 타겟국가 내부에서 지도자의 정책을 지지한다면 비용 증가가 정치적 부담으로 직결되지 않을 수 있음. 북한 내부에서 지도부를 지지하는 여러 시위가 발생했고 정보가 차단된 독재라는 점은 제재 대상이 커지는 것이 제재 성공으로 직결되지 않을 수 있음을 보여줌.]

* North Korea 케이스에 대한 구체적인 설명 및 경제제재의 확대가 제재 성공률로 이어지지 않을 수 있는 이유를 서술
* 정보가 차단된 독재에 관한 내용은 본 연구에서 검증하고자 하는 가설 (사회적 자본의 조건효과)과 직접적인 내용이 아니어서 언급급하지 않음.

Furthermore, authoritarian regimes like North Korea used to control the information among the ruled, which increases the costs of mobilization and makes uprising difficult. In other words, it is challenging to state that widening the targets does not lead to an increase in the likelihood of successful sanctions.

High degrees of social capital enhance societies and their effective functioning. Three of its aspects are particularly influential and can be measured. The first is trust, which heightens a sense of inclusion. As trust increases, members are more likely to support and protect the community. The second is membership, which allows for smaller groups of like-minded people to create dense networks that engender information flow. Lastly, confidence is about high levels of social capital developed within communities. When the populace feels confidence in their communities, they tend to show greater political efficacy.

* 문장의 서술구조를 일부 수정. 내용은 거의 동일함.

Theoretically, social capital presents two contrasting possibilities. Social capital can make leaders and citizens unite and fight against economic sanctions, or social capital can empower the populace to challenge its leader and policies to comply with sanctions.

* 문장의 서술구조를 일부 수정. 내용은 거의 동일함.

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This is a good start, and I quite like the structure of your literature review (which can hopefully become part of a full paper!).

I'd have liked to see a bit more about some of the other (mostly non-domestic) factors that influence the leverage winning coalitions may have over the targeted leaders' behavior. For example, while your paper will not be about multilateral sanctioning behavior, it is still important to recognize that whether or not a sender can effectively pressure the target's winning coalition to make changes is based on the WC's external options. This means that even though it's not your primary lit, you'll still need to cite some of this.

As far as where to go next: I would think deeply about what social capital is really doing (plus, you need a more concrete definition and/or to start thinking about operationalization). This includes justifying why social capital is different from other domestic factors the literature has already examined (see notes below). You should also think about including literature on domestic institutions and other forms of foreign policy or other possible influences of social capital. Think about it as "what else needs to be held constant" such that [insert something specific about social capital] can vary and provoke the changes you'd like to assess.

Descriptionsof *Opposition effect* and *Rally effect* are revised based on page 4:

* *Opposition effect: Low social capital = weaker ties between leaders and the mass in targeted states → The mass will unite and demand leaders to comply with the sanctions.*
* *Rally effect: High social capital = stronger ties between leaders and the mass in targeted states → The mass corporates with the leaders who want to fight against sanctions.*