

① Introduction

Teaching Assistant

② De Juan and Pierskalla 2017

The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction

③ Gartzke and Rohner 2011

The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization, and Development


④ Summaries

Who is your TA?




- Sanghoon Park
- sp23@email.sc.edu
- Office Hours
 - Mon 11 am - 12 pm / Tue 1 - 2 pm
 - You can make appointment: [Here](#)
- Research Interests
 - Authoritarian regimes
 - Democratization
 - Regime breakdown

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←

Sanghoon Park

15 Minute Meeting

🕒 15 min

Select a Date & Time

January 2021

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

31

🌐 Eastern Time - US & Canada (11:14am)

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General question



Introduction to the Special Issue

The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction*

Alexander De Iuan

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and the University of Konstanz

Jan Henryk Pierskalla

The Ohio State University

Abstract

What are the causes and consequences of colonial rule? This introduction to the special issue "Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies" surveys recent literature in political science, sociology, and economics that addresses colonial state-building and colonial legacies. Past research has made important contributions to our understanding of colonialism's long-term effects on political, social, and economic development. Existing work emphasizes the role of critical junctures and institutions in understanding the transmission of those effects to present-day outcomes and embraces the idea of design-based inference for empirical analysis. The four articles in this special issue add to existing research but also represent new research directions: (1) the role of colonial-era institutions in postcolonial development; (2) noninstitutional transmission mechanisms; (3) the role of context conditions at times of colonial intervention; and (4) a finer-grained disaggregation of outcomes, explanatory factors, and units of analysis.

Keywords

colonialism, historical legacies, economic development, democratization, state building

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¹This special issue of *Politics & Society* titled "The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies" features an introduction and four papers that were presented as part of a workshop held at The Ohio State University, April 2016, organized by Marcus Kurtz and Jan Henryk Ronsbo.

Question:

What are the causes and consequences of colonial rule?

Theories

Existing explanations

- Impacts of colonial legacies on economic/political development
 - *Types* of colonies affect the outcomes after decolonization
 - Different economic/political institutions, legal systems, and social factors

However, most of the explanations focus on between-variations in effects of decolonization based on different colonizers.

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What should we do next?

Theories

De Juan and Pierskalla (2017) argue that we need something more to understand colonialism and its legacies fully.

- Survey the previous literature in Comparative Politics on colonialism.
- Show how recent scholars develop their theoretical arguments.

Theories

- Four trends in recent studies
 - 1 Internal dynamics of colonial rule: within-variations

Theories

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 - ① Internal dynamics of colonial rule: within-variations
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 - Influence of pre-colonial conditions after decolonization

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 - Influence of pre-colonial conditions after decolonization
 - ④ Increased disaggregation of outcome, explanatory variables, and unit of analysis
 - Go narrower and narrower.
 - Macro (system-, cross-country institutions-level) → micro-foundational

Question:

What motivates an end of empire?

General question

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doi:10.1017/S0000712110000252
First published online 1 February 2011

The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development

ERIK GARTZKE AND DOMINIC ROHNER*

Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear reluctant, while the weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production virtually also becomes archaic.

'Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home ...'

George W. Bush

Two recent American wars in the Middle East have reawakened discussions of American Empire.¹ In contrast to traditional patterns, however, the United States appears to have no desire to acquire more territory. Whether empire requires physical expansion and colonization, or simply 'effective control' of another society,² seems to us to be largely definitional.³ Labelling American motives and practices as imperial, hegemonic or something else is perhaps less critical than attempting to understand why such behaviour

* Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego (email: egartzke@ucsd.edu); Department of Economics, University of Zurich, respectively. The authors wish to thank Victor Asal, Alexander Cooley, Eugene Gholt, Lucy Goodhart, three referees and the Editor for comments. Viewshed (Zürich) provided research assistance. A version of this article was presented at the meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) in Columbus, Ohio, 2006. Dominic Rohner gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF grant no. 100014_122656). All data and a STATA 'do' file that replicates the analysis are available from the authors upon publication.

¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Bloodsuckers: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Owl Books, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Andrew J. Bacewicz, *American Empire: The Analysis and Consequences of US Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson, *Columbus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

² Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30.

³ Niall Ferguson prefers the term 'empire' to 'hegemony'. 'To compare ... the United States and the United Kingdom as hegemons is to miss differences that become obvious when the two are compared as empires.' Distinguishing between US hegemony and British empire would highlight the differences Ferguson seeks to emphasize: 'A century ago, the United Kingdom's formal empire was very large indeed, covering nearly a quarter of the world's surface and ruling roughly the same proportion of its population. Today, on the other hand, the United States' formal empire includes just 14 dependencies (of which the largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,000 square kilometres.' (Niall Ferguson, 'Hegemony or Empire?' Book Review, *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (2003), pp. 186–1.)

Question:

What motivates an end of empire?

What makes empires (territorial expansions) unattractive now?

Theories

Existing explanations

- Imperialism: Find causes at Demand-side / Supply-side / System-level.
- Decolonization: Domestic politics in metropolis vs. International factors

Gartzke and Rohner (2011) point out that existing explanations can only explain one-way:

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Gartzke and Rohner (2011) offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization.

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Preference of territorial aggression is not given, but a variable driven by environmental conditions.

- The preference can vary: decline and RECUR AGAIN.

Models

When you read an article with scary models with
Formula, Math symbols, or Greeks.

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Read step-by-step.

From the assumptions to their theoretical connections.

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Here? Read *Hypotheses carefully.*

Models

General assumptions

- ① Two actors
 - N, S: Tribal groups, countries, or regions of the world.
 - Gartzke and Rohner (2011) implicitly refer N as colonizers, and S as colonies in the models.

Models

Let's try!

Models

Let's try! Really just try.

Models

Let's try! Really just try.

- 2 Production functions for each actor.

$$y_N = \alpha L_N^a K_N^b$$

$$y_S = \beta L_S^c K_S^d$$

- y_i = production output for actor i
- L_i = labor allocated to domestic production for actor i
- K_i = physical capital and land stock for actor i
- α, β = total factor productivities
- a, b, c, d = exogenous parameters

Models

② Production functions for each actor.

- We can change the previous-scary formula in plain words.
- $y_N = \alpha L_N^a K_N^b$
- "The production output for N is determined by domestic labor allocations for N **AND** physical capital and land stock for N, which depend on total factor productivity for N (α)."
- "Also, there exists external influences (a, b) on the labor allocations, physical capital, and land stocks in N."

Models

Let's read the hypotheses (theoretical expectations)

- Colonialism and imperialism
 - H_1 : Economic development \cap Territorial Empire (concave)
 - H_2 : Military effectiveness $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Colonies \uparrow
 - H_3 : Military tech $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Colonies \downarrow
- Political liberalization
 - H_4 : Democracies \rightarrow Colonies \downarrow
- System effects
 - H_5 : System contains many colonies \rightarrow Pr(Holding colonies) \uparrow
 - H_6 : Hegemon has many colonies \rightarrow Pr(Holding colonies) \uparrow
 - H_7 : System development \cap Pr(Holding colonies) (concave)

Empirical results

Sample

Empirical results

Sample → **IMPORTANT**

- Scope: Countries / Time: 1816-1992
- Unit of analysis: country-year (i.e. U.S. in 1816, U.S. in 1817)

Variables

- DV: Binary and counts of dependencies.
- EV: *Economic development / Fighting tech / Democracy / Fighting effectiveness / Major power status / Temporal dependence*

Methods

Empirical results

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Methods → **IMPORTANT, but not now**

- Negative binomial regression with robust standard errors.

EV	Coeff.	S.E.	Expect
Economic Develp.	1.909***	(0.399)	-
Economic Develp. ²	-0.183***	(0.046)	Concave
Fighting Effectiveness	41.17	(24.40)	Positive
Fighting Technology	-69.01***	(18.68)	Negative
Develp.×Fight Tech	6.639***	(1.536)	
Democracy	-0.0103	(0.0649)	Negative
Sys. Develp.	12.35***	(3.424)	-
Sys. Develp. ²	-4.099***	(1.166)	Concave
Hegemon (US)	-2.317***	(0.585)	Positive
Hegemon (US) ²	0.168***	(0.042)	Concave
Major Power	1.036	(1.061)	-
# States in System	-0.0365***	(0.011)	-
# Major Powers	0.345	(0.186)	-

Table: The Political Economy of Decolonization

Conclusions

See Gartzke and Rohner (2011, 555-556)

- "The desire to control land . . . remains strong in the developing world."
- "Successful development could increase middle tier, which is against territorial aggression."
- Tech. innovation \uparrow \rightarrow Labor costs \uparrow = Costly empire
- However, decline of empire is not deterministic \rightarrow It can recur or revive.

Summaries

De Juan and Pierskalla (2017)

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- Review previous literature on imperialism, colonialism.
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- Suggest that we should look into micro-foundational dynamics.
- Good to skim: How are existing theories developed?.

Gartzke and Rohner (2011)

- I know...
- However, it addresses micro-foundations of imperialism, decolonization, and development.
- "Decolonialism" by strategic actors with varying preferences.
- Maybe a good practice if you read step-by-step.

Questions

Thank you!

Any questions or meetings?

✉ Email: sp23@email.sc.edu

✉ Calendly: [Here](#)

De Juan, Alexander and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2017. "The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction." *Politics and Society* 45(2):159–172.

Gartzke, Erik and Dominic Rohner. 2011. "The political economy of imperialism, decolonization and development." *British Journal of Political Science* 41(3):525–556.