

their insistence on a laissez-faire approach to government, the state would concern itself with the management of evermore-earthly matters surrounding the development of capitalism and its requirements of free circulation. These reforms, far from supplanting the presence of the police, saw in fact the augmentation of their disciplinary apparatuses by new set of more sophisticated and diffuse mechanisms of regulation. This new framework of security would operate at a much finer scale, penetrating far deeper into the population—the new *subject-object* of government, whose shifting composition produced endless phenomena to be monitored by the state. Between both disciplinary mechanisms and apparatuses of regulation, a new totality of state control would span from the minute interstices of life to the general conduct of the population in relation to its external forces. However, by the nineteenth century, the state would further expand its interests, shifting its concern from the economic competition between states to that between individuals. With this, the liberal ideal of “civil society” would emerge, which coincided with the multiplication of security apparatuses, intensifying their effect in proportion to the expansion of the increasingly globalized economic space. This new conception of control, because it appealed to contingencies and phenomena of reality, became recognized simply *as nature*, thus rendering it at once pervasive and invisible.

It is clear that the liberal turn arrived not in opposition to the absolutist state, but rather as a reform from within it. It is thus not surprising to note that such an “opening-up” of state practices of monitoring and control coincided with their intensification, which was precisely proportional to the distribution of rights and freedoms promised by liberal politics, and made possible only by the liberation of governments from monarchical administration. As such, the dismantling of police that took place

should be seen as more of an institutional displacement of its functions. Now, state knowledge would be provided by a decentralization of police, and their displacement across new forms of institutional administration: economic practice, population management, law, and the elimination of disorder.

With the birth of liberalism in Europe, the state and its growing purchase on civil society increasingly presented itself as a universally capable of knowing and ordering everything within its grasp. It seemed that with the rise of the Third Estate in France and its identity of the nation (bourgeois society) and the state, followed by Napoleon’s imperial disposition and the creation of a capitalist-driven European alliance, the immanence of the liberal state had achieved a kind of epistemological zenith.⁵ Its perpetual references to nature gave further credence to the state as a sort of secularized kingdom, a realization of what is naturally immanent to mankind. Yet in proportion to the retreat of transcendence within the state, there has consistently been reciprocal intensification and sophistications of state control, colonizing ever finer, microscopic levels of control. With the birth of nineteenth-century biopolitics and its radical developments over the course of the twentieth century, the state’s concern has been to render its actions invisible: through the very acts of monitoring, policing, and managing, the state at once must depoliticize its own activities while also providing material evidence of the “naturalness” and completeness of the society it purports to endorse. It is this same politics which aims to represent the entire social order as a closed, universal, “self-propelling machine” with no exterior. Seen in light of its obsessive, yet increasingly diffuse practices of control, contemporary neoliberalism is rather a negatively totalizing politics—a politics that seeks not to exist while simultaneously proffering the claim that it is all that exists.

3. Reinhardt Koselleck, *Futures Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 19.

4. *Raison d’État*, or “state reason,” is both the essence of the state itself as well as the art of knowledge of its affairs. See Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). In particular, lectures from March 8, 1978; March 15, 1978; and March 22, 1978.

5. This claim of course acknowledges that even if European states would officially remain administered by one form of monarchy or another until late in the nineteenth century, this particular period marked a certain qualitative triumph for liberal society.