

## PHIL 125: BEYOND DUALISM

Harvard University

Spring 2018: Tuesdays 2-4; Emerson 310

### INSTRUCTOR

Professor Alison Simmons

315 Emerson Hall

[asimmons@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:asimmons@fas.harvard.edu)

Office Hours: M 4-5, W 1-2 and by appointment

### COURSE DESCRIPTION

Few metaphysicians would identify as Cartesian dualists today. Nevertheless, it's hard to deny that we live in a world shaped by Cartesian dualism: we distinguish somatic health from mental health; we dissociate our minds from our bodies on the treadmill; we try to get the mind back into the body at yoga; we say that people with gender dysphoria feel their psychological gender identity is out of line with their physical sex. After looking at the two sides of Cartesian dualism, Cartesian body and Cartesian mind, we will consider some of the notorious metaphysical problems it gives rise to and five 17<sup>th</sup> century attempts to push back against it in the figures of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, Henry More, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, and Anton Wilhelm Amo.

### GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Phil 125 is a course in the history of philosophy. As a philosophy course, we will focus on the philosophical positions and arguments for them that our philosophers offer. As a history of philosophy course, we will engage in the sympathetic reconstruction of our philosophers' positions and arguments; this will require that we take into consideration, as much as we can, their 17<sup>th</sup> century philosophical motives and intellectual context.

If you work hard in this course, you can expect to:

- better understand some central topics of discussion among 17<sup>th</sup> c. philosophers, along with the various motivations for and constraints on the positions they hold;
- clearly articulate those positions and the arguments our philosophers offer for them in discussion and in writing;
- critically evaluate those positions and arguments; that means determining their *assumptions* and their *consequences*, reconstructing the *arguments* and *sub-arguments*, and *assessing* the arguments for cogency given the assumptions and consequences;
- develop your skills in a cooperative philosophical discussion that aims at the shared goal of better understanding the texts, positions, and arguments;
- better understand how conceptual change comes about;
- practice using the philosophical tools you have acquired in other philosophy courses: conceptual analysis, thought experiment, counterexamples, disambiguation of concepts and positions, argument reconstruction and/or mapping, etc.;
- develop your research skills through the writing of a research paper.

### PREPARATION FOR THE COURSE

This course is an upper level philosophy course designed for advanced concentrators and starting graduate students. The preparation I will expect from you includes:

- familiarity with basic philosophical concepts and tools;

- some familiarity with early modern philosophy (e.g., I will assume you have been through Descartes's argument for mind-body dualism and his substance-principle attribute-mode ontology);
- familiarity with the norms of philosophical writing (I do not expect you to have done a *research* paper in philosophy before, but I do expect you to have worked on the basic skills of philosophical writing);
- familiarity with basic research tools in philosophy and accessing online texts: EEBO (*Early English Texts Online*); *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; *PhilPapers*, *Philosophers Index* and *JStor*; online journals; and Widener! NB: *You should never use Wikipedia for scholarly research.*

## COURSE TEXTS

### *Required Primary Texts:*

- Amo, Anton Wilhelm. 1734. *The apatheia of the Human Mind or The Absense of Sensation or Sense in the Human Mind and its presence in our Organic and Living Body*. Available on the course website.
- Cavendish, Margaret. 1664. *Philosophical Letters: Or, modest reflections upon some opinions in natural philosophy, maintained by several famous and learned authors of this age, expressed by way of letters: By the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princess, The Lady Marchioness of Newcastle*. Available online through EEBO (Early English Books Online; access through Hollis). They will be also available in pdf form on the course website, but not as an image of the original.
- Cavendish, Margaret. 2001(originally 1666). *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Eileen O'Neill. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521776752. *Observations* is also available online through EEBO, but not with O'Neill's very helpful introduction; it is an image of the original.
- Cavendish, Margaret. 1668. *Grounds of Natural Philosophy*. London. Available online through EEBO.
- Conway, Anne. 1996 (originally 1690). *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521479042. *Principles* is also available online through EEBO, though without the helpful introduction by Coudert.
- Descartes, René. 1985. *The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes*. Translated and edited by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch. Volumes 1-2. (Cambridge) ISBN-13: 978-0521288071 and 978-0521288088.
- Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and Descartes, René. 2007. *The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes*. Edited and translated by Lisa Shapiro. (Chicago). ISBN-13: 978-0226204420 I will also put a pdf of the relevant letters on the website.
- More, Henry. 1659. *Immortality of the Soul*. London. Available online through EEBO.

### *Recommended Primary and Secondary Texts:*

- Broad, Jacqueline. 2002. *Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521039178.
- Descartes, René. 1991. *The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes*. Translated and edited by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny. Volume 3: The Correspondence. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521423502.

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\_\_\_\_\_. *The World and Other Writings*. 1998. Translated and edited by Stephen Gaukroger. *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*. (Cambridge). ISBN-13: 978-0521636469.

*Useful Resources:*

EEBO (*Early English Books Online*) is a terrific resource for finding English language works that are now in the public domain. It is accessible through Hollis and through the course website.

Project VOX: a website devoted to compiling materials on women philosophers of the early modern period: <http://projectvox.library.duke.edu/pg/>

Kroetsch, Cameron. Annotated Guide to Margaret Cavendish's Texts:  
<http://www.digitalcavendish.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Kroetsch2013.pdf>

Duncan, Stewart. Guide to Margaret Cavendish's *Philosophical Letters*:  
<http://stewartduncan.org/letters-philosophical-letters/>.

### COURSE REQUIREMENTS

- **Attendance.** We meet only once a week. If you miss class, you will miss some critical discussion and the rest of us will miss your contributions. That said, I realize that even the most diligent students have to miss a class on occasion due to illness or some other emergency. Please notify me if you have such an issue.
- **Active participation** in discussion. That doesn't mean dominating the conversation. Active participation includes things like attentively listening, asking questions, offering supporting evidence for someone's claim, and even clarifying what someone else has said. NB: for discussion to be productive, we will need to establish a classroom in which we respect others' contributions but also demonstrate a willingness to challenge ideas and have our own ideas challenged.
- **Preparation and Class.** Come to class prepared: carefully read the required texts; take notes on them; formulate questions about them; and work up notes for the weekly assignment. Although I will do some micro-lecturing to give background information and occasional overviews, I will primarily come with questions for discussion concerning weekly assignment. You will work as a group to answer those questions using your assignment notes, your collective intellect, and the texts. Philosophy, I hope you will discover, is a group sport, and you each need to bring your best to the game!
- **Weekly assignments.** Each week, I will give you a specific assignment for class. I don't expect anyone to have worked out a complete and polished response to the assignment. That's the point of seminar. The aims of the assignment are (a) to help you come to class with a preliminary understanding of the material, a sense for what's relevant to answering the assignment questions, and a readiness to bounce ideas off each other so that we can, collectively, get a more solid handle on the material and (b) to help you work on some basic philosophical skills that will be put to work in your research paper. After seminar, you will have 32 hours to write up a prose response to a specified portion of the assignment, in the light of the class discussion. You must **turn in your prose response to the assignment by 11:59 p.m. on Wednesday**. While you are welcome to work collaboratively on the assignments *before* class, but what you produce *after* class must be your own. In the second

half of the semester, everyone must prepare the weekly assignments for seminar, but you will have to turn in prose responses for only **2 of 5 of the final assignments**.

- **Research paper.** You will write a research paper of 15-20 double-spaced pages due at 5:00 p.m. on May 10. Writing a research paper is a process that includes exploring the field and literature, identifying an appropriately focused topic, gathering suitable secondary literature, creating an annotated bibliography, formulating a thesis, garnering evidence *and* counter-evidence for your thesis, drafting the paper, consulting with others, and rewriting your paper. To assist you in the process, you will have a **second set of weekly tasks** to complete during the second half of the course that will be graded on a 0/1 basis.

### **GRADES**

Your grade will be determined as follows:

Weekly Assignments: 30%

Research Steps: 10%

Research Paper: 40%

Participation: 20%

### **ACADEMIC INTEGRITY**

Discussion and the exchange of ideas are essential to doing philosophy, and so I encourage you to talk about the course material with other students. On the other hand, *the work you hand in for your assignments and your research paper must be your own*. If books, articles, websites, or discussions have helped you formulate your ideas, cite them. Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty are serious offenses that undermine the trust on which the scholarly endeavor rests.

### **ACCOMMODATIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES**

Students needing academic adjustments or accommodations because of a documented disability must present their Faculty Letter from the [Accessible Education Office](#) (AEO) and speak with me by the end of the second week of the term. Failure to do so may result in my inability to respond in a timely manner.

### **COURSE CALENDAR**

Secondary literature marked with an asterisk (\*) is the literature to start with on the topic.

#### **Seminar 0, January 23: Introduction**

In the initial meeting, I will (a) introduce the topic of the course, (b) survey the metaphysical transition from Aristotelian hylomorphism to Cartesian dualism, and (c) survey the dramatic changes brought about by Descartes' realigning the conceptions soul, mind, body and life. I recommend that you review Cartesian dualism by reading the following things:

*Meditations*, "Synopsis" (CSM II 9-11)

*Principles* I.51-75 (CSM I 210-222)

Rozemond, Marleen. 2008. "Descartes's Dualism." In *A Companion to Descartes*. Edited by Janet Broughton and John Carriero. Blackwell. 372-389.

#### **Seminar 1, January 30: Descartes' Conception of Body 1 (Metaphysics and Physics)**

This week we'll look closely at Descartes' conception of the nature of body (or matter or material substance) and some of its consequences: the relation between body and space; the rejection of void or empty space; the nature of rarefaction and condensation; impenetrability; motion; force and cause of motion; individuation of bodies.

*Required Reading:*

*The World* (CSM I 79-98); *Principles*, "Preface to the French Edition" and "Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth" (CSM I 179-192), I.51-76 (CSM I 210-222), Book II (CSM I 223-247); *Letters to More* (CSMK 360-367, 371-375, 380-382) and *Letters to Arnauld* (CSMK 354-359).

*Assignment 1: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Jan. 31.*

*Recommended Secondary Literature* (places to start to poke around in the issues):

Della Rocca, Michael. 1999. "When a Body Meet a Body. In *New Essays on The Rationalists*.

Edited by R. J. Gennaro and C. Huenemann. Oxford.: 48-81.

Des Chene, Dennis. 1996. *Physiologia*. Cornell. Chapter 8 "Motion and Its Causes" and Chapter 9 "Parts of Matter."

Hatfield, Gary. 1997. "Force (God) in Descartes' Physics." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 10: 113-140.

Reid, Jasper. 2014. "Descartes and the Individuation of Bodies." *Archiv* 96(1): 38-70.

\*Woolhouse, Roger. 1994. "Descartes and the Nature of Body." *BJHP* 2(1): 19-33.

**Seminar 2, February 6: Descartes' Conception of Body 2 (Biology and Psychology)**

This week we will look at Descartes' mechanism, and in particular his mechanization of life and much of psychology. The first thing to come to grips with is *how very much* Descartes attempts to mechanize. The second thing to puzzle over are the difficulties he runs into: what is the principle of life? (what distinguishes living from non-living bodies?); how do we individuate one organism from another (the "boundary problem") and a single organism over time (the "growth problem"?); do biological functions smuggle in illegitimate teleology?; what's the relationship between the functional and micromechanical levels of analysis?; what is the metaphysical status of an organism?

*Required Reading:*

*Treatise on Man* (CSM I 99-108) [nb: the full version of the text is available in the Gaukroger edition noted above]; *Discourse on Method* 5-6 (CSM I 131-151); *Description of the Human Body* (CSM I 314-324); *Passions* I.2-6 (CSM I 327-334). NB: Don't get bogged down in the details of the mechanisms. What you are looking for is the vision.

*Assignment 2: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Feb. 7.*

*Recommended Secondary Literature:*

Brown, Deborah. 2011. "Cartesian Functional Analysis." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. DOI:10.1080/00048402.2011.566274.

Des Chene, Dennis. 2001. *Spirits & Clocks: Machine & Organism in Descartes*. Cornell. Introduction, Chapter 4 "Tools of Knowledge" and Chapter 6 "Unity of the Body."

\*Detlefsen, Karen. 2015. "Descartes on the Theory of Life and Methodology in the Life Sciences." In *Early Modern Medicine and Natural Philosophy*. History, Philosophy and

Theory in the Life Science 14. Edited by P. Distelzweig et al. Springer. Uncorrected Proofs.

Hatfield, Gary. 2008. "Animals." In *A Companion to Descartes*. Edited by J. Broughton and J. Carriero. Blackwell. 404-425.

\*Hatfield, Gary. 2012. "Mechanizing the Sensitive Soul." In *Matter and Form in Early Modern Science*. Edited by G. Manning. Brill. 151-186.

### **Seminar 3, February 13: Descartes' Conception of Mind**

This week we will look at Descartes' two-step transformation of the *other* half of the world: (a) the transformation from soul to the mind and (b) the transformation from mind to Cartesian mind. (Both occur sneakily in Meditation 2.) We'll puzzle over the nature of the Cartesian mind. It is a thinking thing. But what is thought? We'll also attend to the differences between the embodied mind and the disembodied mind.

#### *Required Primary Reading:*

*Optics* 4-6 (CSM I 164-175); *Meditations*, Meditation 2 (CSM II 16-23), Meditation 3, paras 5-15 (CSM II 25-29), Meditation 6 (CSM II 50-62); *O&R* 3.2-8 (CSM II 122-130); *O&R* 4.1 (CSM II 138-144 and 154-162); *O&R* 6.9 (CSM II 281-282 and 294-296); *Principles* I.8-12 (CSM I 195-197), IV.187-197 (CSM I 278-284); *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* (CSM I 294-311); *Passions* I.17-29 (CSM I 335-339).

Also worth looking at: *O&R* 2.1 (CSM II 77-78, 93-96); *O&R* 2 Appendix - definitions and proposition 4 (CSM II 113-114 and 199); *O&R* 3.2 (CSM II 122-124); *O&R* 4.1 (CSM II 139-144, 154-162), *O&R* 5, On the Second Meditation, topic 4 (CSM II 183-185, 246-247); *O&R* 6, Appendix and Reply 10 (CSM II 282-284, 296-301).

*Assignment 3: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Feb. 14.*

#### *Recommended Secondary Reading:*

Alanen, Lilli. 2003. *Descartes's Concept of Mind*. Harvard. Chapter 3 "Thought, Consciousness, and Language."

Pasnau, Robert. 2007. "The Mind-Soul Problem." In *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima*. Edited by P. J.J.M. Bakker and J. M.M.H. Thijssen. Ashgate. 3-20.

\*Rozemond, Marleen. 2006. "The Nature of the Mind." In *The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations*. Edited by Stephen Gaukroger. Blackwell. 48-66.

Simmons, Alison. 2012. "Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered." *Philosophers' Imprint* 12(2): 1-21.

### **Seminar 4, February 20: Elisabeth Poses a Problem: Interaction (and Union)**

Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia poses a problem to Descartes: how, exactly, are mind and body supposed to interact? They clearly do: body acts on mind in sensory perception and mind acts on body in voluntary action (the case Elisabeth focuses on). Descartes fails to give her a direct answer. (Some say he simply mansplains.) He starts talking about mind-body union, and says our "primitive notion" of the mind-body union is supposed to help us understand how mind and body interact. What is this "primitive notion of the mind-body union"? There are at least two issues at stake here. First, how do mind and body together (two substances) form a *single* human being (a union)? Second, how does the union help us



understand the mind-to-body causal interaction with which Elizabeth was concerned? Descartes persistently relies on a puzzling analogy with gravity or heaviness to explain himself. (He offers it to Elizabeth, but repeats it to Arnauld.) What's up with that?

Scholarship on the mind-body union has focused on several issues:

1. What's the relationship between *mind-body interaction* and *mind-body union*? Is one prior to the other? Does union simply *consist* in there being causal interaction between mind and body? Or is there something more to it? Does, in fact, the possibility of mind-body interaction depend on an antecedent metaphysical union between mind and body? (Radner 1971; Broughton and Mattern 1978; Chappell 1994; Schmaltz 1992; Voss 1994)
2. *Nature of the union.* Responses run from (a) an Aristotelian substance (Hoffman 1986) and (b) a third Cartesian substance (Schmaltz 1992) to (c) nothing more than two Cartesian substances causally linked (Chappell 1994; Bennett 1994), with a whole lot of positions in between (Alanen 2008; Brown 2007; Curley and Koivuniemi 2015; Hoffman 1986; Rozemond 1998 chapter 5; Schmaltz 1992; Shapiro 2003; Simmons 2017)
3. Is the mind united to the *whole body* or just to *one part* of the body, viz., the pineal gland? This topic raises the spectre of "holenmerism" (the view that the soul is whole in the whole of the body *and* whole in any single part of it); if the soul is present *in the whole body* does that make it extended? (Rozemond 2003) NB: some think that Descartes is torn between his mechanism and Christian doctrine on this topic.

*Required Primary Reading:*

*Correspondence with Elizabeth*, 6 May 1643 to 1 July 1643 (Shapiro 61-73) and 8 July 1644 to 24 July 1645 (Shapiro 81-96); Fifth Replies (CSM II 266 and 275); Sixth Replies (CSM II 296-300) *Letters to Regius* (CSMK 181-183, 199-201, 205-209, 210, 213-214, 254-255); *Letter to Mesland* (CSMK 241-244); *Letters to Arnauld* (CSMK 354-356 and 356-359); and *Passions* I.30-50 (CSM I 338-348).

*Assignment 4: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Feb. 21.*

*Recommended Secondary Reading* (taking its lead from the correspondence with Elisabeth):

- \* Koivuniemi, Minna and Curley, Ed. 2015. "A Kind of Dualism." *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford.
- Normore, C.G. 2011. "Cartesian Unions." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 35: 223-239.
- Perler, Dominik. 2016. "Human Being." *The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon*. Edited by Larry Nolan. Cambridge.
- \*Rozemond, Marleen. 2003. "Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism." *Philosophical Topics* 31(1-2): 343-367.
- \*Simmons, Alison. 2017. "Mind-Body Union and the Limits of Cartesian Metaphysics." *Philosophers' Imprint* 17(14): 1-36.
- Yandell, David. 1997. "What Descartes Really Told Elisabeth: Mind-Body Union as a Primitive Notion." *BJHP* 5(2): 249-273.

*Further Reading:*

Fowler, C.F., O.P. 1999. *Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian Doctrine*. Kluwer.

### **Seminar 5, February 27: Henry More's Dualism**

Henry More was as much a dualist as Descartes, but he drew the line between body and soul in a different place and he had reasons to hang onto the word "soul" or "spirit" rather than switch over to the more Cartesian "mind." His work was a huge influence on the others, and especially on Conway. Because his work is especially difficult, I strongly recommend reading the Sarah Hutton piece to orient yourself to More and our next philosopher, Cavendish, and then the Jasper Reid piece to guide you through the details of and problems for More's conception of extended soul or spirit. You will need to rely on all the philosophical skills we've been working on in the coming weeks!

#### *Required Primary Text:*

*Immortality of the Soul*, Book I, chapters 1-5, 7-8, 11. [For some interesting arguments against materialism, venture into Book II!]

*Assignment 5: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Feb. 28.*

#### *Recommended Secondary Literature*

\*Hutton, Sarah. 2003. "Henry More and Margaret Cavendish." In *A Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle*. Edited by Stephen Clucas. Ashgate. 185-198.

\*Reid, Jasper. 2003. "Henry More on Material and Spiritual Extension" *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 42(2): 532-553.

### **Seminar 6, March 6: Margaret Cavendish's Vital Materialism**

This week we'll focus on Cavendish's materialism (apart from God, all that exists is matter; there are no finite souls, minds, witches, or fairies in nature). We'll look first at some of her complaints about the new science's mechanical conception of matter and the methodology that gives rise to it. We will then look at her argument for putting self-motion back into matter (which will serve as the ground for putting sentience and rationality into matter). Finally, we'll look at her "three degrees" conception of matter.

#### *Required Primary Texts*

*Observations* Introduction (review xxiii-xxxv), Preface (7-10), An Argumental Discourse (23-42), Observations 1-3 (46-53), 15 (68-72), 25 (95-100), 31 (135-131), 34 (135-136), and 37.15 (184-185).

*Philosophical Letters* Prefaces, I.1,13, 23, 30, & 42; II.5-7, 11-12, 25, & 29; III.1, 18, & 30; IV.1, 6, & 29 (EEBO and website).

*Grounds of Natural Philosophy* Part I (website).

*Assignment 6: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. March 7.*

*Research Step 1: Philosophical Topics, due by 4:00 p.m. March 9.*

#### *Recommended Secondary Literature*

Detlefsen, Karen. 2007. "Reason and Freedom: Margaret Cavendish on the Order and Disorder of Nature." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 89: 157-191.



Hacking, Ian. 1983. "Microscopes." In *Representing and Intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 186-209.  
\*Shaheen, Jonathan. 2017. "Part of nature and division in Margaret Cavendish' materialism." *Synthese*.

### **March 13: SPRING BREAK**

#### **Seminar 7, March 20: Margaret Cavendish on Mind and Mentality**

This week flip things over and look at the effects of Cavendish's materialism on our conception of mind and mentality: it is everywhere (in some form or other) and it is composite and divided. What does this look like? What are the arguments? Are there ethical consequences of thinking there is mind and feeling everywhere in nature? We may also look at her conception of perception and knowledge as a form of "patterning."

##### *Required Primary Texts*

*Observations* 35-37 (137-194)

*Philosophical Letters* I.4-10, 14, 18, 22, 24-25, 35-37; II.10, 13-22; III.21 (EEBO and website)

*Selected Poems* (EEBO and website)

*Assignment 7: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. Wed, March 21*

*Research Step 2: Research Plan due by 4:00 p.m. Fri, March 23.*

##### *Recommended Secondary Literature*

Boyle, Deborah. 2015. "Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self-Knowledge, and Probable Opinion." *Philosophy Compass* 10(7): 438-450.

Cunning, David. 2006. "Cavendish on the Intelligibility of the Prospect of Thinking Matter." *HPQ* 23(2): 117-136.

Michaelian, Kourken. 2009. "Margaret Cavendish's Epistemology." *BJHP* 17(1): 31-53.

#### **Seminar 8, March 27: Conway at 20,000 feet**

This week we'll get oriented to Anne Conway's metaphysics. In class, I'll start by talking a bit about her biography and some of the unusual influences on her thought (like the Lurianic Kabbala and Quakerism). We'll look briefly at her overarching substance triadism of God, creation, and Christ, each of which has its own principal attribute (immutability, mutability, and something in between). Then we'll look at the more accessible summary of her metaphysics of creation (that is, of the world or nature) and the way she distinguishes her view from that of Descartes and Hobbes in the closing chapter of her text. We will start to dig into her arguments *against* both dualism and materialism (and more particularly, against dead matter (a "vain fiction") and pure spirit (which can only be God)).

##### *Required Primary Text*

*The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* Introduction, Prefaces, Chs. 1-5 and 9

*Assignment 8: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. March 28*

*Research Step 3: Annotated Bibliography A due by 4:00 p.m. March 30*

##### *Recommended Secondary Literature*

Broad, Jacqueline. 2002. *Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge. Chapter 2.

Hutton, Sarah. 2004. *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher*. Cambridge.  
Lascano, Marcy. 2013. "Anne Conway: Bodies in the Spiritual World." *Philosophy Compass* 8(4): 327-336.

### **Seminar 9, April 3: Conway's Queer Monism**

Conway insists that the substance of creation is always and everywhere both male/female, light/dark, spiritual/bodily and that any individual in creation falls somewhere along a continuum of male/female, light/dark, spiritual/material. She draws the striking conclusion, "Consequently, the distinction between spirit and body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial" (p. 40). What is more, no individual is stuck in any one position on the continuum; it is mutable and so can change its position on the continuum, becoming, say, *more* male/spiritual/light, or less. In fact, the typical progression involves a kind of Stairway to Heaven in which an individual "transmutes" to ever better, more spiritual conditions. Pain is a critical part of this process. The view has the curious consequence that I could become a banana (presumably if I don't do well) or something like an angel (if I do well).

#### *Required Primary Text*

*The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, Chapters 6-8

*Assignment 9: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. April 4*  
*Research Step 4: Project Description, due by 4:00 p.m. April 6*

### **Seminar 10, April 10: Amo Against the Cartesian Soul**

The work of Amo's that we have is his dissertation, which provides an argument against Descartes' conception of the soul as capable of sensations and passions. Amo defends a more traditional Aristotelian view of the human soul (or, really, of the human mind) as reason and reason alone. It is the *body*, on Amo's view, and not the soul or mind, that has sensations and passions.

#### *Required Reading*

*The apatheia of the Human Mind* or *The Absence of Sensation in the Human Mind*, whole thing (it's not long)

*Assignment 10: Notes and ideas due in class; prose response due by 11:59 p.m. April 11*  
*Research Step 5: Annotated Bibliography B, due by 4:00 p.m. April 13*

### **Seminar 11, April 17: Methodological Questions**

This week we take a step back to ask some methodological questions. We started out with Descartes' dualism. The traditional next step would have been to turn to Spinoza and Leibniz. We didn't do that. Instead we read the work of less familiar philosophers: Henry More, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, and Anton Wilhelm Amo. We'll talk about reasons that these figures have been left out of the "canon" and reasons for reshaping the canon by introducing them into it.

#### *Required Reading*

O'Neill, Eileen. 1997. "Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History." In *Philosophy in a Feminist Voice*. Edited by Janet A. Kourany. Princeton, 1997. 17-62.

*Assignment 11: Just come ready to talk about the reading and the issue; no prose response due*  
*Research Step 6: Research Diary, due by 4:00 p.m. on April 20*

*Recommended Reading*

\*Shapiro, Lisa. "What is a Philosophical Canon?" (manuscript posted on <https://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com>)

Smith, Justin. "The Two Libraries Problem" (manuscript posted on <https://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com>).

ERRR...there's one more week...