

# M&A Discussion – KeyBank’s \$4.1 Billion Acquisition of First Niagara

Presentation to the Board of Directors

# M&A Recommendation and Executive Summary

- We recommend **against** pursuing this \$4.1 billion acquisition of First Niagara, as the company is ~45% overvalued at that price, and the deal is dependent on Cost Synergies that represent 40% of First Niagara's Non-Interest Expense
- Similar, recent deals in the sector have had *projected* Cost Synergies estimated at ~30% of the Seller's Non-Interest Expense; the average over the past ~20 years is closer to 25%
- Not only is First Niagara overvalued at the Offer Price of \$11.40 / share, but its ROE, ROA, ROTCE, and regulatory capital ratios are all worse than KeyBank's
- First Niagara is more of a pure-play commercial bank, but KeyBank has been diversifying and moving away from that model; ~55% of its Revenue comes from Net Interest Income vs. ~80% for First Niagara
- First Niagara would not deliver lower funding costs, higher Asset Growth, or valuable IP for KeyBank; the only benefits would be modest geographic expansion and a slightly more diversified loan portfolio
- This transaction would make sense only if the Purchase Price were significantly lower or far lower Cost Synergies were required for significant EPS accretion and improvement in the Returns-based financial metrics

# Valuation: Summary of Dividend Discount Model Assumptions

## Total Asset Growth Rate

- Between 1% and 2%; declines to 1.5% by FY 26

## Risk-Weighted Assets % Total Assets

- 73-74% over the 12 years in the explicit forecast period (FY 15 – FY 26)

## Targeted CET 1 Ratio

- 9.0% (Slightly above company's current target of 8.5%)

## Return on Average Assets

- 0.60% increasing to 0.83% by FY 26

## Dividend Payout Ratio

- 65-70% increasing to 80% by FY 26

## Cost of Equity

- 8.97% in all periods (2.1% RFR, 5.8% ERP, and 1.19 Levered Beta)

## Terminal P / TBV Multiple

- 1.33x based on 1.6% NI to Common Growth, 11.42% ROTCE, and 8.97% Cost of Equity; implied Terminal P / E multiple of 11.8x

# Dividend Discount Model Output

(\$ USD in Millions except for \$ per Share Figures)

- As a standalone entity, First Niagara is almost certainly overvalued at its *undisturbed share price* of \$8.96, let alone the Offer Price of \$11.40:

		Discount Rate (Cost of Equity):																	
		8.00%		8.25%		8.50%		8.75%		9.00%		9.25%		9.50%		9.75%		10.00%	
Terminal P / TBV Multiple:	1.50 x	\$	9.15	\$	8.95	\$	8.75	\$	8.56	\$	8.38	\$	8.20	\$	8.02	\$	7.85	\$	7.68
	1.45 x		8.97		8.78		8.59		8.40		8.22		8.04		7.87		7.71		7.54
	1.40 x		8.80		8.61		8.42		8.24		8.07		7.89		7.73		7.56		7.40
	1.35 x		8.63		8.44		8.26		8.08		7.91		7.74		7.58		7.42		7.27
	1.30 x		8.45		8.27		8.09		7.92		7.75		7.59		7.43		7.28		7.13
	1.25 x		8.28		8.10		7.93		7.76		7.60		7.44		7.28		7.13		6.99
	1.20 x		8.11		7.93		7.77		7.60		7.44		7.29		7.14		6.99		6.85

		Discount Rate (Cost of Equity):									
		8.00%	8.25%	8.50%	8.75%	9.00%	9.25%	9.50%	9.75%	10.00%	
CET 1 Target:	10.50%	\$ 8.41	\$ 8.21	\$ 8.02	\$ 7.84	\$ 7.66	\$ 7.49	\$ 7.32	\$ 7.16	\$ 7.00	
	10.00%	8.46	8.27	8.08	7.90	7.73	7.56	7.39	7.23	7.07	
	9.50%	8.51	8.33	8.14	7.97	7.79	7.62	7.46	7.30	7.14	
	9.00%	8.57	8.38	8.20	8.03	7.86	7.69	7.53	7.37	7.22	
	8.50%	8.62	8.44	8.26	8.09	7.92	7.76	7.60	7.44	7.29	
	8.00%	8.67	8.49	8.32	8.15	7.98	7.82	7.67	7.51	7.36	
	7.50%	8.73	8.55	8.38	8.21	8.05	7.89	7.73	7.58	7.44	

- However, with the full Cost Synergies factored in (40% of its Non-Interest Expense, or ~\$400 million per year), the company's implied share price jumps up to approximately \$18.00 ...
- If we attribute 100% of the Cost Synergies to First Niagara and ignore all the other acquisition effects – which is questionable

# Comparable Public Companies

(\$ USD in Millions except for \$ per Share Figures)

- Despite significantly worse Returns-based metrics and capital ratios, First Niagara trades above or in-line with the P / E and P / TBV multiple of its peer companies (Data from one day before announcement date):

## Comparable Companies - U.S.-Based Regional Banks with Between \$20 Billion and \$150 Billion in Total Assets

(\$ in Millions USD Except Per Share Data)

Operating Statistics:	Capitalization & Assets			P / E FY16	P / TBV LTM	ROATCE		ROA LTM	ROE LTM	TCE / Tangible Assets	Common Equity Tier 1 %	Tier 1 Leverage Ratio
	Equity Value	Tangible Book Value	Total Assets			LTM	FY16					
Company Name												
M&T Bank Corporation	\$ 15,079.8	\$ 6,957.0	\$ 122,787.9	14.7 x	2.2 x	13.0%	14.2%	1.16%	8.9%	7.5%	9.8%	10.2%
Comerica, Inc.	7,843.7	6,973.0	71,012.0	14.1 x	1.1 x	7.8%	7.8%	0.76%	7.2%	9.9%	10.6%	10.3%
Zions Bancorporation	6,002.3	5,601.3	58,410.9	15.0 x	1.1 x	6.1%	7.1%	0.69%	5.3%	9.8%	12.2%	11.6%
BOK Financial Corporation	4,499.3	2,946.7	30,600.0	13.9 x	1.5 x	10.3%	10.6%	0.96%	8.8%	9.8%	12.8%	9.6%
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.	4,342.3	2,096.2	28,341.4	14.6 x	2.1 x	14.3%	13.9%	1.09%	10.6%	7.6%	11.6%	7.9%
Associated Banc-Corp	2,971.2	1,846.6	27,467.2	14.9 x	1.6 x	10.6%	10.4%	0.71%	6.6%	7.0%	9.4%	7.5%
First Horizon National Corporation	3,395.9	2,017.7	25,387.3	15.3 x	1.7 x	13.7%	10.8%	1.01%	11.4%	8.0%	10.8%	10.0%
Webster Bank, N.A.	3,526.8	1,700.5	24,069.8	16.0 x	2.1 x	11.9%	12.5%	0.88%	8.7%	7.2%	10.8%	8.4%
Maximum:	15,079.8	6,973.0	122,787.9	16.0 x	2.2 x	14.3%	14.2%	1.16%	11.4%	9.9%	12.8%	11.6%
75th Percentile:	6,462.7	5,940.2	61,561.2	15.1 x	2.1 x	13.2%	12.9%	1.03%	9.3%	9.8%	11.8%	10.2%
<b>Median:</b>	<b>\$ 4,420.8</b>	<b>\$ 2,521.5</b>	<b>\$ 29,470.7</b>	<b>14.8 x</b>	<b>1.6 x</b>	<b>11.3%</b>	<b>10.7%</b>	<b>0.92%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>9.8%</b>
25th Percentile:	3,494.1	1,974.9	26,947.2	14.5 x	1.4 x	9.7%	9.8%	0.75%	7.1%	7.4%	10.4%	8.3%
Minimum:	2,971.2	1,700.5	24,069.8	13.9 x	1.1 x	6.1%	7.1%	0.69%	5.3%	7.0%	9.4%	7.5%
<b>First Niagara Financial Group, Inc.</b>	<b>\$ 3,203.1</b>	<b>\$ 2,401.0</b>	<b>\$ 39,413.0</b>	<b>15.6 x</b>	<b>1.3 x</b>	<b>9.8%</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>0.63%</b>	<b>5.9%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>8.5%</b>	<b>7.6%</b>

Valuation Multiples:	Current Price:	Offer Price:	Public Comps:	Buyer:
Forward Year 1 (2016-12-31) P / TBV:	1.2 x	1.5 x	N/A	1.2 x
Forward Year 1 (2016-12-31) P / BV:	0.8 x	1.0 x	N/A	1.1 x
Forward Year 1 (2016-12-31) P / E:	15.6 x	19.9 x	14.8 x	11.8 x
Forward Year 2 (2017-12-31) P / TBV:	1.2 x	1.5 x	N/A	1.2 x
Forward Year 2 (2017-12-31) P / BV:	0.8 x	1.0 x	N/A	1.1 x
Forward Year 2 (2017-12-31) P / E:	14.6 x	18.6 x	N/A	11.2 x

# Summary of Merger Model Assumptions

## Offer Price and Premium

- \$11.40 / Share (\$4.1 billion Equity Purchase Price); 27% premium

## Cash / Stock Mix

- 20% Cash and 80% Stock; Cash funding via 7.5% Fixed-Rate Debt

## Targeted CET 1 Ratio

- 10.0% (Equity capital infusions assumed if CET 1 Ratio falls below this level)

## Cost Savings

- 40.0% of Seller's Non-Interest Expense (\$426 million); 50% Realization in Year 1 and 100% in Year 2 and beyond

## Restructuring Costs

- 137.5% of fully-phased-in Synergies; \$567 million pre-tax charge in Year 1

## Core Deposit Intangibles

- 1.5% of Core Deposits (\$360 Million); Straight-line amortization over 10 years

## Mark-to-Market Adjustments

- 3.1% Loan Mark; ~1% on Debt, Deposits, and Investments; 6-year amortization for Loan Mark


# Merger Model Output

(\$ USD in Millions except for \$ per Share Figures)

- If the Cost Savings represent 10-20% of the Seller's Non-Interest Expense, the Year 2 EPS accretion declines to 0-5%:

Purchase Premium to Seller's Undisturbed Share Price:	Cost Synergies % Seller's Non-Interest Expense:								
	-	5.0%	10.0%	15.0%	20.0%	25.0%	30.0%	35.0%	40.0%
35.0%	(7.4%)	(4.9%)	(2.4%)	0.1%	2.6%	5.1%	7.7%	10.2%	12.7%
32.5%	(6.9%)	(4.4%)	(1.8%)	0.7%	3.2%	5.8%	8.3%	10.8%	13.3%
30.0%	(6.3%)	(3.8%)	(1.3%)	1.3%	3.8%	6.4%	8.9%	11.5%	14.0%
27.5%	(5.8%)	(3.2%)	(0.7%)	1.9%	4.4%	7.0%	9.5%	12.1%	14.7%
25.0%	(5.2%)	(2.7%)	(0.1%)	2.5%	5.0%	7.6%	10.2%	12.8%	15.3%
22.5%	(4.7%)	(2.1%)	0.5%	3.1%	5.7%	8.2%	10.8%	13.4%	16.0%
20.0%	(4.1%)	(1.5%)	1.1%	3.7%	6.3%	8.9%	11.5%	14.1%	16.7%
17.5%	(3.5%)	(0.9%)	1.7%	4.3%	6.9%	9.5%	12.1%	14.8%	17.4%
15.0%	(2.9%)	(0.3%)	2.3%	4.9%	7.6%	10.2%	12.8%	15.4%	18.1%

- A Relative Contribution Analysis also confirms that the \$11.40 Offer Price makes sense only if full Cost Synergies are realized and attributed to the Seller:



# Are the Cost Synergy Figures Realistic?

- Recent M&A deals, such as BB&T's acquisitions and CIT / OneWest, have had significantly lower projected Cost Synergies as percentages of the Seller's Non-Interest Expense:

BB&T expects to incur pre-tax merger and integration costs of approximately \$100 million and expects to achieve annual cost savings of approximately \$65 million (approximately 30 percent of National Penn's non-interest expenses). BB&T expects this acquisition to be accretive to earnings per share in the first full year excluding one-time charges and expects the transaction to exceed its IRR hurdle.

BB&T expects to incur pre-tax merger and integration costs of approximately \$250 million and expects to achieve annual cost savings of approximately \$160 million (approximately 32% of Susquehanna's non-interest expenses). BB&T expects this acquisition to be accretive to earnings per share in the first full year excluding one-time charges and expects the transaction to exceed its IRR hurdle.

## Key Transaction Assumptions

Approximately 5% of OneWest's Non-Interest Expense.

Synergies

Cost

- \$20 million pre-tax per annum
- Fully phased-in by 2016



# Are the Cost Synergy Figures Realistic?


- Even in much frothier periods, such as the pre-Lehman decade, the average expected Cost Synergies in bank M&A deals was only ~25% of the Seller's Non-Interest Expense

## Significant Value Created from Cost Savings

Unlocked value from cost synergies provides strong upside for shareholders

- High degree of market overlap accelerates benefit realization
  - > 30% of FNFG branches within two miles of a Key branch
- FNFG's technology infrastructure largely outsourced → Key has opportunity to efficiently scale our existing platform
- KeyBank's logic doesn't make much sense; even if 30% of FNFG's branches are within two miles of a KeyBank branch, that won't result in 30% cost savings – some employees must be retained
- And the details of the technology/infrastructure scaling are too vague to factor into the analysis – which *specific* expenses can KeyBank cut from the combined company?
- Based on this, we find the 40% Cost Synergy estimate highly unrealistic; 20-25% might be more reasonable

## Synergy run rate (1997-2007)



Source: Synergies announced by Banks in Analysts presentations – 1997 to 2007

# Our M&A Metrics vs. KeyBank's Estimates

	Our Estimates	KeyBank's Estimates
ROTCE, FY 18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2% Improvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2% Improvement</li> </ul>
Cash Efficiency Ratio, FY 18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 6% Improvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 3% Improvement</li> </ul>
EPS Accretion, FY 18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 15%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5%</li> </ul>
IRR (10 Years, Slowing Dividend Growth, 10x P / E)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 11-13%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 15%</li> </ul>
Post-Deal TBVPS Dilution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 11%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 12%</li> </ul>
Regulatory Capital Ratios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>CET 1:</b> 9.5%</li> <li>▪ <b>Tier 1:</b> 10.5%</li> <li>▪ <b>Leverage:</b> 9.3%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>CET 1:</b> 9.5%</li> <li>▪ <b>Tier 1:</b> 10.0%</li> <li>▪ <b>Leverage:</b> 9.5%</li> </ul>

# Why the Discrepancies?

- Broadly speaking, our Balance Sheet and regulatory figures line up with the company's, but most of our Income Statement metrics significantly exceed theirs
- The most likely **explanation** is that we have factored in items that the company did not, such as true Debt funding, the impact of the Federal Funding Differential, the Amortization of the Mark-to-Market Adjustments, and possible Equity Capital Infusions
- However, if we removed the Income Statement impact of all those items, the EPS accretion would still be ~15%
- **Our Best Guess:** It's some combination of those factors, potentially a different tax rate (35% in investor presentation vs. 25% historically), and different Income Statement projections for both companies
- If anything, the company's numbers make the deal look even worse – at 5% EPS accretion, 20% Cost Synergies rather than 40% would almost certainly make the deal dilutive to FY 18 EPS
- To further address these discrepancies, we would need more detailed projections and schedules from KeyBank

# Summary and Recommendations

#1

We Recommend  
AGAINST This Deal

\$11.40 Offer Price overvalues First Niagara by ~45%, the deal is dependent on unrealistically high Cost Synergies (40% of FNFG Non-Interest Expense), and FNFG doesn't add much to KEY's core business and long-term strategy

#2

Cost Synergies Are  
Unrealistically High

Similar, recent deals (BB&T's acquisitions) have had ~30% projected Cost Synergies; KeyBank's logic for the 40% number doesn't make sense, and there aren't enough specifics to justify it

#3

FNFG Delivers Few, If  
Any, Benefits

It is smaller than KEY, has lower Asset Growth, lower ROE, ROA, ROTCE, and lower capital ratios; only benefit is modest geographic/loan diversification

#4

Deal is Unlikely to Meet  
Financial Criteria

At 30% Synergies, IRR drops to 10.1% vs. KEY's 9.5% Cost of Equity; at 20%, it falls to 8.1%; Year 2-3 EPS accretion/dilution is closer to neutral as well