

A Fast Eavesdropping Attack Against Touchscreens

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
How sensitive data is compromised

- Direct attacks
 - Well-known in both literature and industry
 - Very active research community
- Other types of attacks
 - Social engineering attacks
 - Side-channel attacks
 - Difficult to mitigate (if not through awareness)

Side-channel Attacks

- Less known yet very effective
- Digital side-channels
 - Example: decrypting SSL through wifi LAN sniffing
- **Physical-world observation**
 - Direct observation
 - Shoulder surfing
 - Indirect observation
 - Sound emanations
 - Reflections
 - Magnetic radiations
 - Desk surface vibrations

Physical-world Observation



Automated Shoulder Surfing

- First attempt of **automatic** shoulder surfing
- Recovery of long texts



Ubiquitous Touchscreen Mobiles

- **2010** survey on 2,252 US citizens
 - 72% use a mobile phone for **texting**
 - 30% use a mobile phone for **instant messaging**
 - 38% use a mobile phone for Web **browsing**
- **(1970) touchscreen** technology was invented
 - 2010: **5 billion** US dollars market
 - **159%** market **grow** rate
 - Q3 2010: **417 million** of touchscreen devices sold

Automated Shoulder Surfing

- Non-automated
 - not interesting
 - time consuming
- Automated
 - Is it feasible?
 - Mobile context poses several constraints



Mobile Settings Constraints

- Moving target
- Fixed observation point not always feasible
- Very small keyboards
- No visibility of pressed keys
- No visible key occlusions


Touchscreen to the rescue

- Lack of tactile feedback
- Early soft keyboards were hard to use
- UI engineers came up with **usable keyboards**





9:42 AM



Cancel

Re: Jenny's Birthday

Send

To: Rob Tucker

CC:

Subject: Re: Jenny's Birthday

Great p4
pick :)

Q W E R T Y U
A S D F G H J
Z X C V B N M
return
space
.123



Usability vs Security

- Old dilemma
- More secure, less easy to use
- Example: Google's 2-step authentication
 - Very secure
 - Very unusable
 - Wait for the verification code every time you do email
- Apply also in this context
 - Feedback-less touchscreen keyboards
 - hard to type on
 - Feedback-rich keyboard keyboards
 - easy to type on
 - eyes follow the feedback naturally during typing



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




Our approach

Simple Threat Model


- **Requirement 1**
 - iPhone-like visual feedback mechanism
- **Requirement 2**
 - Template of the target screen known in advance

Requirement 1 is often satisfied




Requirement 2 is very easy to satisfy

SCREEN TEMPLATE



KEY TEMPLATES



MAGNIFIED LAYOUT



(screenshot)

(synthetic, hi-res)

(x,y-coordinates)

Outline of the Approach

- **Phase 1**
 - Screen detection and rectification
- **Phase 2**
 - Magnified key detection
- **Phase 3**
 - Keystroke sequence reconstruction

Phase 1


- **Input**
 - Image depicting the current scene (current frame)
- **Output**
 - Synthetic image of the rectified, cropped screen
- **Procedure**
 - Screen detection
 - Screen rectification

Screen Detection

- The current frame is searched for the screen template (Requirement 1)



+




SCREEN TEMPLATE

CURRENT FRAME


MATCHING PATCH

Screen Detection via Template Matching



- SURF features
 - Edges
 - Corners
- Invariant to:
 - Rotation
 - Scale
 - Skew
 - Occlusions
- Homography estimation

Screen Rectification via Homography



CURRENT FRAME

- Estimate during screen detection
- Successfull matches improve matches in subsequent frames




RECTIFIED FRAME

Phase 2

- **Input**
 - Image of the rectified screen
- **Output**
 - Areas where magnified keys appeared
- **Procedure**
 - Background subtraction

Pixelwise Background Subtraction



CURRENT FRAME




SCREEN TEMPLATE



FOREGROUND

Spurious output



HIGHLIGHTED KEY (MAGNIFIED-KEY CANDIDATE)

OTHER FOREGROUND
ELEMENTS (NOISE)

FOREGROUND


Phase 3

- **Input**
 - Magnified-key candidates
- **Output**
 - Sequence of typed symbols
- **Procedure**
 - Approximate neighbors lookup
 - Best matching key identification
 - Fast pruning
 - Key sequence analysis




Approximate Neighbor Lookup

- Known keyboard layout (Requirement 2)
- Centroid identification
- Match centroids with keyboard layout

Known keyboard layout




Centroid identification




Match centroids with layout


CENTROID 1



CENTROID 2



CENTROID 3



E



R



T



G



H



J



N




M



Key similarity

- Region of interest
- Key template (Req. 2)



E R T G H J N M

LOW

HIGH

LOW

LOW

MED




LOW

LOW

MED


Fast Pruning

- Computing the key similarity is **expensive**
- Black-white distribution of the ROI
- **%B/W-heuristic** is way faster



Key Sequence Analysis

- Find maxima of the key similarity function



Implementation Details

- **Phase 1**
 - C++
 - OpenCV
- **Phase 2-3**
 - Matlab
 - Compiled into C
- **Threshold estimation**
 - Confidence interval (mean, variance)
 - Video samples collected in “no typing” conditions

DEMO

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPuS8kNI3oU>

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgBxB3dOoKQ>

Experimental Evaluation

- Types of text
 - Context-free
 - Context-sensitive
- 3 attackers, 3 victims
- Goals
 - Precision and speed
 - Resilience to disturbances

Overall evaluation procedure

- **Typing**
 - 3 victims are given the input text
 - Victims type text on their iPhones
- **Recording**
 - A recording camera was used for repeatability
- **Attack**
 - 3 attackers are provided with the videos
 - Attackers have “infinite” time to analyze videos
- **Comparison**
 - Automatic attack vs. human attackers


Context-free text

spent chapter foundation identified because first which material notation summarized time spent volume much technical little system reference figured number measurement lorem referring abstract text introductory shown in the we observing request second objective books relationship astute formidable quantile convenient remainder between utilizable tool law resident minutes exemplified the product then temporarily number will per systematic average accumulated south specialty terminal numerous introduce

Context-sensitive text


close your eyes and begin to relax take
a deep breath and let it out slowly
concentrate on your breathing with
each breath you become more relaxed
imagine a brilliant white light above
you focusing on this light as it flows
through your body allow yourself to
drift off as you fall deeper and deeper
into a more relaxed state of mind now
as i

Almost as precise as a human



Way faster than a human

Decoding speed: context-free text 
context-rich text 




Extreme conditions

ABERRATION	PHASE 1	PHASE 2-3	
		$h\%$	$\epsilon\%$
1) Permanent occlusion	difficult	44.44	33.33
2) Shake device	feasible	67.74	8.70
3) Shake camera	feasible	96.00	4.00
4) Shake device + camera	unfeasible	0.00	-

Limitations

- **Non-magnifying keys**
 - Space (on iPhone only)
 - Layout-switching keys
 - **Mitigation**
 - Device-specific heuristics
 - E.g., on iPhone, exploit color-changing spacebar
- **Alternative layouts** (minor limitation)
 - **Mitigation**
 - Detect switch
 - Loop through different templates during detection

Alternative layouts



iSpy: A Happy Coincidence

- [Raguram, CCS 2011]
- Appeared at the same conference
- Completely different approach
 - Classification-based
 - They require training
- Really, the very same accuracy 97~98%

Conclusions

- Touchscreen mobile devices are widespread
- Shoulder surfing is automatable
- Automatic shoulder surfing is precise too
- Counteract these attacks with privacy screens
- But...

Finger tracking

- Challenge
 - How to detect tapping?



THANKS!

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