rGya dmar ba - *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid*: Translation

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NB: This is a work-in-progress and should be used and referred to as such. Only parts of the texts and the marginal annotations (appearing in orange) have been translated (those that have been edited in the document "edition"). The parts with a grey background consist in preliminary notes and should be disregarded at this stage. The present translation represents our current understanding of the text and is, when necessary, updated upon translating other portions. It may not be exempt of typos and mistakes, which will be corrected in the future. Only preliminary annotations are provided.

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0. Invocation

I bow to those [[[Who? Those who know the two truths. What are they? Here's a simile:]]] who are the sunlight of knowledge and the moonlight of kindness who dwell without abiding [[[at the limits of great wisdom and surpassing compassion]]] in the sky [[[of knowledge]]]—reality devoid of proliferations [[[the ultimate]]]—of a world which is like an illusion [[[conventional]]]. [[[We speak of the center of boundless knowledge like we speak of the center of the sky.(?)]]]

[[[He praises the perfectly and completely Enlightened Ones by recollecting their virtues, and praises his lamas by recollecting their kindness.]]]

I salute the lord,[1] bodhisattva [[[Gangs pa blo gros byang chub]]][2] of [[[endowed with]]] stainless [[[devoid of any defilements, consisting of ignorance and mistaken cognitions]]] discriminative intellect, who has the treasure of boundless virtues, known in the world to be like the sun, an illuminator. [[[Just as the sun is known to all as luminous, this one too is known to those who hear as knowledgeable and virtuous.]]]

1. Statement of Purpose

The root of all faults is attachment to [things having] characteristics and hence is to be eliminated. Wishing to achieve excellences for the sake of oneself and others [[[this is the ultimate purpose]]], I will explain so that the absence of nature of all phenomena [[[this is the topic]]] will be realized [[[this is the purpose (of the treatise). This is indirectly the connection between them.]]][3].

2. The three characteristics within the Two Truths and the division of provisional and definitive meaning[4]

2.1 Summarized explanation

By turning three times the wheel of the dharma consisting in the twelve divisions of the Buddha's words, which are collected in the two or three baskets,[5] (the Buddha) made

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[1] We take *rje btsun dag* as honorific, rather than plural, given the identification of the object of the homage.
[2] The annotator identifies the object of homage as Gang pa blo gros byang chub; the verse uses the latter two parts of this name, *blo gros* ("intellect") and *byang chub,* here part of "bodhisattva."
[3] Cf. Broido 1983: 5: "The *dgos-'brel* of a work is often discussed under five headings, viz. the *text (rjod-byed, abhidhāna), its *topic (brjod-bya, abhidheya), the immediate *purpose (dgos-pa, prayojana) for which it was written, the more *distant purpose (dgos-pa'i dgos-pa or nying-dgos, prayojanaprayojana), and the *connection ('brel-ba, sambandha) between them.".
[4] Elements of this discussion might have their source in the *Madhyamakāloka* (to be investigated further).
[5] Vetturini (2007 : 65) records that Lo dgon pa bSod nams lha'i dbang po (1423-1496), the author of the *bKa' gdams rin po che'i chos 'byung rnam thar nyin mor byed pa'i 'od stong* ("Myriad Rays of the Sun"), mentions three or four turnings of the Dharma Wheel, and "twelve scriptural categories or three baskets (tripiṭaka)

clear the system of the middle, free of the extremes of deprecation and reification [[[It is free of the superimposition of existence because the duality of object and mind, or cognition, and so forth, do not exist ultimately. It is free from the extreme of non-existence because although these things do not exist, we do not call them non-existent.]]], by means of the three characteristics within the two truths.[6] [[[This is the summarized explanation.]]]

2.2 Extended explanation

2.2.1 The three characteristics within the two truths according to the respective philosophical systems

2.2.1.1 Hearers

[[[Hearer]]]* sectarians accept as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes [[[Since they assert object and mind, the dependent character, they do not make the deprecation "non-existence"; insofar as these are devoid of a personal self, they do not superimpose the existence of a personal self]]] the meaning of the three characteristics [[[two are ultimate; the twofold imputational character[7] is conventional]]] being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the initial (turning)]]] positing [[[the duality of]]] object and mind, which are the dependent character [[[these are held to be true as entities, whereby the phenomenal self of object and subject is also asserted to be true]]], [[[as the object in the perspective of being]]] devoid of personal self as the ultimate.

*[[[We accept the following: With regard to the basket of the Hearers, Hearers are practitioners who depend on teachers; Solitary Buddhas do not depend on a guru; bodhisattvas are those who practice in such a way for the welfare of others.]]]

2.2.1.2 Mādhyamikas

[[[Taking into account what is said correctly,]]] Mādhyamikas accept in that way (that is, as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes) the meaning of the three characteristics being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the intermediate (turning)]]] explaining the emptiness of all characters [[[dependent and imputational characters are both conventional; the perfected character is ultimate truth]]], such as real cause and effect, as the ultimate [[[all superimpositions as true on these

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which may be considered the Buddha's word (dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana)." Vetturini (n. 292) lists the twelve as they are identified in the dByangs can lha mo, a dictionary of Buddhist terminology: 1. *mdo* (sūtra), 2. *dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa* (geya), 3. *lung bstan* (vyākaraṇa), 4. *tshigs bcad* (gāthā), 5. *ched brjod* (udāna), 6. *gleng gzhi* (nidāna), 7. *rtogs brjod* (avadāna), 8. *de lta bu byung ba* (itivṛttaka), 9. *skyes rab* (jātaka), 10. *shin tu rgyas pa* (vaipulya), 11. *rmad byung* (adbhūta) and 12. *gtan phab* (upadeśa).

[6] The "three characteristics" (*mtshan nyid gsum*) are here the characterizations 'dependent' (Skt. *paratantra*), 'imputational' (Skt. *parikalpita*) and 'perfected' (Skt. *pariniṣpanna*) related to the model of the Three Natures (Skt. *trisvabhāva*) developed by Indian Buddhist idealist philosophers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both c. 4th–5th c.). See Wood 1991: 31-60 and Thakchoe 2016 (§3.1).

[7] In Chap. V, v. 14, a distinction is made between two kinds of incorrect conventional corresponding to the substantialists' imputational character, namely, conceptualizations and mistaken non-conceptual (i.e., hallucination etc.).
This might also be referring to the division of the imputational character into the "authentic imputational character" (*kun brtags mtshan nyid pa*) and the "conventional imputational character" (*tha snyad tsam du yod pa'i kun brtags*). (REF)

dependent characters that are like illusions are the imputational character. The perfected character is (the emptiness of all characters)]]].

2.2.1.3 Yogācāra

The Yogācāra accept in that way (that is, as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes) the meaning of the three characteristics being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the final (turning)]]] positing the dependent character, mere cognition, [[[Taking that as true, the imputational character superimposes onto that (mere cognition) the duality of object and subject as the phenomenal self and personal self; that (mere cognition) being]]] devoid of the dualism of object and subject, and so forth, as the ultimate.

Table 1: The three characteristics within the two truths				
Conventional Ultimate Definitive meaning (according to the author)				
	turning of the wheel	dependent	imputational	perfected
Hearers	1st	object and mind (asserted to be true as entities)	personal self	object and mind devoid of personal self
Mādhyamikas	2nd	illusion-like cause, effect, etc.	superimposition of dependent characters as true	emptiness of all characters
Yogācāra	3rd	mere cognition	superimposition of mere cognition as dual (subject/object) and as having phenomenal self and personal self	mere cognition devoid of dualism, etc.

2.2.2 Teaching the distinction between the provisional and definitive meanings

The way things are [[[the system]]] is set forth from the perspective of disciples.

[Verse 1]

While the sage spoke in manifold ways [[[cultivating the dharma as antidotes to the 84,000 afflictions]]] in accordance with disciples [[[(as said in *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* X.406) "according to the illness"]]],

It is said that the absence of character [[[the sayings of the intermediate (turning)]]] is the definitive meaning; the rest [[[the initial and final (turnings)]]] are of provisional meaning.

[2.2.2.1] Distinction in terms of establishment/invalidation by reasoning

[[[A further distinction between the definitive and provisional meanings: the nature of things that is established by reasoning is the definitive meaning; scripture that is invalidated by final reasoning is of provisional meaning.]]]
The three characteristics taught within the two truths [[[in the initial and final occasions]]] —namely [[[(according to) the sectarians and Yogācāra]]] the dependent character and perfected character are posited as ultimate; the imputational character alone

is said to be conventional—is a saying of provisional meaning. Indeed, according to the system of others' [[[people]]] thinking, even the ultimate itself [[[which is taught (in that system) but is not true in that way]]] [[[when Mādhyamikas correctly explain, the dependent character they assert]]] is just false conventional.

Both the imputational character—cause and effect [[[being true]]] as ultimate and so forth—and the dependent character—illusion[[[-like cause and effect, which Mādhyamikas themselves accept to be true as such]]]—are posited to be conventional, and the emptiness of all characteristics ultimately is taught. This is a saying of definitive meaning because it does not invite another meaning [[[(when one observes) "it is not true as such"]]] and [[[once it is known]]] it is not to be rejected. This is because it is something [[[the dharma taught in the intermediate (turning)]]] that abides for [[[when analyzed by]]] final reasoning and what has a meaning opposite [[[to the dharma taught in the intermediate (turning)]]] is (to be rejected)[8] [[[is invalidated by reasoning]]]. [[[(This is) of provisional meaning.]]]

[2.2.2.2] *The purpose of the sayings of provisional meaning*

[[[Objection: The intermediate teachings alone suffice; the initial and final teachings are not necessary. Why are they taught through some intention?

(In answer) to that, there are three parts: the purpose of intentional teaching; the intentional ground; and the invalidation of what is literal.[9]]]]

[2.2.2.2.1] The purpose of intentional teaching

[[[It is taught]]] In order for those [[[the sectarians]]] whose perspective is terrified of [[[the teaching of]]] emptiness because they adhere to characters to enter the teaching gradually and in order to safeguard those [[[people]]] who would adopt a nihilistic view by taking the Buddha's words regarding the absence of all characteristics to the letter [[[they understand non-existence in every way through the teaching "from form to omniscient consciousness, [all things] are non-existent"]]][10],

[2.2.2.2.2] The intentional ground

intending the dependent nature [[[illusion-like dependent arising]]] to be existent as correct conventional,

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[8] The literal reading of the text (*bzlog pa'i don can yin*) invites the understanding "and it has a meaning that is opposite," which is does not make sense. In our translation, we solve the problem by relating "*yin*" to the "*ma yin*" in the preceding sentence. It is possible that the text is faulty and should read *bzlog pa'i don can ma yin* ("it does not have an object that is opposed"). But one should observe that the annotations try to make sense of the text as it is, by supplementing "*la rigs pas gnod pa*," leading to the reading "what has an opposite meaning is invalidated by reasoning."

[9] On the trio of the "purpose" (*dgos pa*), the "intentional ground" (*dgongs gzhi*) and "invalidation of what is literal" (*dngos yin pa la gnod pa*) see Seyfort Ruegg 2010, chapters 7 ("Purport, Implicature, and Presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dgongs pa/dgongs gzhi* as Hermeneutical Concepts") and 8 ("An Indian Source for the Tibetan Hermeneutical Term *dgongs gzhi*, "Intentional Ground""). Phya pa makes frequent use of these categories when analyzing passages of Scriptures in his commentary on the *Madhyamakāloka*. Seyfort Ruegg (2010: 198, n. 12) mentions their use by bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182), who had been a student of Phya pa. They are further discussed by Sa skya Paṇḍita (bSod nams rtse mo's nephew) in the *mKhas 'jug* and the *sDom gsum rab dbye*.

[10] Maybe a quote from the **Āryacandragarbhaprajñāpāramitāmahāyānasūtra.*

[2.2.2.2.3] The invalidation of what is literal
[[[The valid cognition that invalidates what is literal should be added.]]]
[the Buddha] taught the initial and final wheel of the dharma [[[the general meaning of the baskets]]].

[2.2.2.3] Specific explanation of the definitive meaning
[[[The specific explanation of the definitive meaning has five parts: the meaning of the term; the division of the scriptural tradition that teaches that; establishing the details [of the scriptural tradition]; negating attachment to entities; and the effects of cultivating emptiness.]]]

2.2.2.3.1 The meaning of the term
[[[The meaning of the term has four parts: the literal meaning of the term [[[This is the intention of the sutra]]]; presenting the genuine one (?); ?; the reason to apply [this term] to the state of affairs and the texts]]]

2.2.2.3.1.1 The literal meaning of the term
The wheel of dharma of the absence of characteristics, the precious sutra collection of definitive meaning, is a meaning that is taught directly in sutras such as the three Perfection of Wisdom, i.e. the extended one, the middle-length one, and the brief one, and a meaning that is to be understood [[[indirectly]]].
[a]   The first: the essence of the path that has an object is condensed in the eight chapters [of the Perfection of Wisdom] into the five paths, the path of accumulation through the path of no more learning.[11] That is also explained in the instructional treatises, along with related texts. [[[This is not taught here.]]]
[b]   The second [[[the essence of the object being condensed in the two truths]]] is explained by the Collection of Reasoning, along with related texts [[[by texts related to the Collection of Reasoning]]]: principally, [[[this is taught:]]] the path [[[whose essence is realizing that]]] and what it perceives [[[i.e., its object]]].
1. The state of affairs, the path and the texts are "the Middle Way"

1.a The state of affairs is "the Middle Way"
What is perceived by the path, the two truths [[[whose duality is found in reality]]], is the state of affairs called the "Middle Way" because, whether [[[the two truths are]]] taken individually or interrelatedly, they are beyond the extremes of reification and deprecation, namely permanence and annihilation and so forth.
[[[As for the conventional, in as much as one accepts that as long as causes exist, effects also exist, one does not subscribe to annihilation. With the elimination of causes, effects cease, and so one does not subscribe to permanence. For this very reason, it is free from reification and deprecation. Since the ultimate is beyond all expression, it is free from permanence and annihilation, as well as reification and deprecation. Based on both (truths), conventionally, since one accepts that effects come from causes, there is freedom from annihilation; ultimately, since one accepts that nothing is established whatsoever, there is freedom from superimpositions.]]]

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[11] The five paths are: tshogs lam, sbyor lam, mthong lam, sgom lam, mi slob pa'i lam (path of accumulation, of joining, of seeing, of meditation, of no more learning)

1.b The path is "the Middle Way"

What takes as its object that previously described state of affairs [[[the wisdom that realizes the two truths]]] is the path that is the "Middle Way" as well, because it realizes the elimination of all extremes.

1.c The texts are "the Middle Way"

The texts [[[sūtras and treatises]]] that express those (two truths) are also the "Middle Way" because they express the elimination of all extremes [[[namely, reification and deprecation]]].

2. The state of affairs, the path and the texts are "the Perfection of Wisdom"

Those [[[three]]] are the "Perfection of Wisdom": the path that is the "Perfection of Wisdom"; the state of affairs that is the "Perfection of Wisdom"; and the texts that are the "Perfection of Wisdom."

2.2.2.3.1.2 Presenting the genuine one

2.a The path is "the Perfection of Wisdom"

As for the path, assigning the genuine wisdom within the stage of ordinary beings [[[it is the inferential cognition that examines the absence of nature]]] or assigning it within the path of seeing [[[it is the wisdom that directly beholds the ultimate]]] differ in many ways. However, master Dignāga assigns it [[[genuine wisdom]]] only to [[[buddhahood (at the end of)]]] the path of no more learning, as it is said:

> The Perfection of Wisdom is non-dual; [[[the wisdom is gnosis]]] that gnosis [[[which is non-dual gnosis]]] is [[[found in]]] the Tathāgata.
> Since the state of affairs, which is the result [[[genuine wisdom]]], is endowed with them [[[texts and the path]]], the path and texts [[[which are wisdom]]] are designated by the word (for) that [[[for that, which is the genuine result]]].[12]

However, in general, genuine wisdom is indeed encapsulated within the path [[[all three (presentations) agree on accepting (genuine wisdom) for the path]]].

2.2.2.3.1.3 ***

[[[How can a conventional cognition be wisdom?]]] Conventional seeing as an illusion is wisdom from the point of view of not conceiving the three spheres (of agent, action, and object), and so there is no contradiction with (the verse ending with) "It is explained for the sake of cognizing the ultimate"[13] [[[cognizing the state of affairs is explained to be wisdom]]]. This is like the saying, "The giving that precedes giving is wisdom."[14] [[[While giving is conventional, when it is encompassed in wisdom it is perfected.]]]

2.2.2.3.1.4 The reason to apply this term to the state of affairs and the texts

2.b The state of affairs is "the Perfection of Wisdom"

As for the state of affairs [[[being the Perfection of Wisdom]]], it is because it is what is perceived by wisdom, because it is explained:

> [I bow to the mother of the Jinas of the three times,]

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[12] Dignāga, *Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṅgrahakārikā*, verse 1.
[13] Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XVI.15c.
[14] **Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*, Tib. *'Phags pa shes rab kyi ph arol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa,* D34-1-5a.

Perfection of Wisdom, who is ineffable, inconceivable, unutterable.
Unborn, unceasing, she is of the nature of space,
[And in the scope of *so so rang rig ye shes*.] [15]

One expresses with the word for that [[[the perceiver]]], that which it (the perceiver) perceives, like *pratyakṣa*, etc.. [[[Like blue, the object of that (i.e., of *pratyakṣa*) is called "blue *pratyakṣa*."]]][16]

2.c The texts are "the Perfection of Wisdom"

As for the texts (being the Perfection of Wisdom), this is because they are the cause of wisdom and they express it, just as one calls the words that are the cause of inference by the name of that [[[i.e., of inference; namely they are called "inference for others"]]][17]; or again, one calls a treatise on [[[that expresses]]] epistemology "epistemology."[18]

2.2.2.3.2 The division of the scriptural tradition that teaches that

i. Setting forth the opponent's position

As for delineating the meaning to be understood in the discourses *(bka')* that are Middle Way texts:
Previous generations made a twofold convention:
- foundational Madhyamaka[[[The scriptures of Nāgārjuna, who received the prophecy of enlightenment, are foundational because they cannot be refuted.]]] and
- Madhyamaka that takes sides.

Madhyamaka that takes sides, are explained [[[by previous generations]]] to be (three) regarding the ultimate:
- Illusion-like,
- Non-Abiding, and
- Paradoxical;[19]

and (three) regarding the conventional:
- Yogācāra,
- Sautrāntika, and

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[15] Kun dga' snying po (*Ānandagarbha), *Prajñāpāramitāmaṇḍalopāyikā*, Tib. *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i dkyi 'khor gyi cho ga* D254b; Ratnakīrti, *Yogacaturdevastotra*, Tib. *sByor ba bzhi'i lha la bstod pa* D247b. Translation: Kapstein 2000: 111.

[16] The word *pratyaksa* in Sanskrit, as well as the word *mngon sum* in Tibetan, can refer either to a perception or a perceived object.

[17] This reference to the metaphorical application of the term "inference" (Skt. *anumāna*) to inference-for-others (Skt. *parārthānumāna*) goes back to Dignāga (PSV ad PS 3.1ab) and Dharmakīrti (PVin 3 ad PVin 3.1ab). The term "inference" refers directly to "inference-for-oneself," which is a mental event. An inference-for-others, on the other hand, consists in a statement meant to indicate to the opponent a triply characterized reason, and thereby enabling her to achieve an inference-for-oneself. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti describe the metaphorical application of the term as that of the effect to the cause (*kāraṇe kāryopacārāt*).

[18] This metaphorical use of the term *tshad ma* speaks in favor of considering the expression *tshad ma* figuring at the beginning of the title of a number of Tibetan epistemological works as a "topic marker." (E.g., Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel*).

[19] More literally:
1. Those who claim [that phenomena are] like illusions (*sgyu ma ltar smra ba*)
2. Those who hold [that phenomena] do not abide whatsoever (*rab du mi gnas par 'dod pa*)
3. Those who hold what is paradoxical to be ultimate (*'gal 'dus don dam par 'dod pa*)

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- "Compatible with Both" or "Unspecified."[20]

[[[The refutation of that:]]]
That is not sound because regarding Paradoxical [[[(for instance, on one hand) since it perceives something as having parts it is not one and since it is not (one), it is not many; on the other hand the perception of something having parts entails being one; therefore (there is a paradox)]]] and so forth, since bad conceptions are limitless,[21] such side-takers would be innumerable [[[since one must count also *nag po rim lu*[22]]]]. [[[Further, regarding the conventional]]], it is not sound because there are those [[[such as Jñānagarbha]]] whose assertions are similar to the Vaibhāṣikas, who are not included among Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras; it is impossible to assert something compatible with both Sautrāntika and Yogācāra; and if one held tenets that were compatible with both, which are incompatible (with each other), it would not be suitable for those who reason to be scholars.[23] Not making a judgement (?) but repeating both systems without taking any position oneself is not found in texts.

ii. Presenting our own position
Thus, regarding the ultimate, there are two: Illusion-like and Non-Abiding; regarding the conventional, there are two:
- Yogācāra [[[these are twofold: True Aspectualists and False Aspectualists]]] and
- Realists.[24]

And [[[regarding Realists]]] objects are asserted in accordance with Sautrāntika or in accordance with Vaibhāṣika.

Table 2: Subdivisions of Madhyamaka		
rGya dmar ba's own position		
According to previous authors		
Foundational	That takes sides	
	Regarding the ultimate	Regarding the conventional
	i. illusion-like ii. non-abiding iii. paradoxical	i'. Yogācāra ii'. Sautrāntika iii'. 'Compatible with both' or 'Unspecified'
According to rGya dmar ba		
	i. illusion-like ii. non-abiding	i'. Yogācāra ii'. Realists ii'a – in accordance with Sautrāntika ii'b – in accordance with Vaibhāsika

2.2.2.3.3 Establishing the details [of the scriptural tradition]
What is to be realized in the sutras of the absence of characteristic will be established as the definitive meaning by delineating the system of the two truths, in accordance with our own way of taking sides, along with refuting others.

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[20] "Not incompatible with both traditions" (*gnyi ga'i lugs dang mi 'gal ba*) or "Those who judge by apprehending in general (?)" (*spyi bzung zhal che ba*).

[21] The phrase "bad conceptions are limitless" is also found on 29a7 after the enumeration of the main four non-Buddhist systems to be refuted.

[22] This is probably the name of philosophical or religious system. It is not found in the famous list of 120 names of doctrines in Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*. If referring to an Indian system, "Nag po" could refer to Kṛṣṇā. In Tibet, "Nag po" could refer to the black Mahākāla. "Rim lu" may indicate a "succession of knots."

[23] rGya dmar ba may here simply call this position unreasonable or he may provide an analogous case, in which "being reasonable" should be associated with "being learned" but here it would not be (because of still being compatible with "not being learned" as well).

[24] Literally: (those holding) the existence of external objects (*phyir rol don yod pa*).

3. Explanation of the division of the two truths

[Verse 2]

> **Here, the explanation of the division of the two truths is to be known through six points: the basis of division, the meaning of the division, the meaning of the terms, the specification of the number, the definitions, and the valid cognitions (that establish the definitions).**

There will six points: the basis of division (I), the meaning of the division (II), the meaning of the terms (III), the specification of the number (IV), the definitions (V), and the valid cognitions (that establish the definitions) (VI).

I. The Basis of Division

Here, we assert the basis of division to be object of cognition without specification (literally, "mere object of knowledge") [[[that is, not qualified by another property]]], (cognized by anyone) from omniscient knowers to the tiniest insects.

II. The Meaning of the Division

[[[Here, from among the three ways (of being distinct)[25]]]] The meaning is that (the two truths) are two in terms of merely negating identity; they are property-possessor and property without division between appearance and emptiness, because one cannot speak of (their) identity or alterity. But it is not the case that they have the exact same defining characteristic or that they are different natures.

Here, (there are four options): (A) there is absolutely no difference; or, if there is (a distinction), (B) a distinction of natures; or (C) a distinction of properties for the same nature; (D) a distinction in terms of merely negating identity.

The first (A) and second (B) are to be refuted by the four respective faults stated in the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra.*[26] The third (C) and fourth (D) are to be examined from the distinction between the Illusion-like and Non-Abiding perspectives.[27]

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[25] The three are (B), (C) and (D) listed below.

[26] The source of the discussion is SNS III.3–5, where one finds the refutation of the view that the characteristic of the conditioned (ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid) and the characteristic of the ultimate (don dam paʾi mtshan nyid) are different (tha dad pa yin), and the refutation of the view that they are not different (tha dad pa ma yin). The sūtra aims at showing that the ultimate transcends the notions of identity and difference with the conditioned. The four faults indicated in the sutra are rephrased here in the form of arguments by consequence. For an analysis of Phya pa's views on the same topic see Hugon 2016: 908–929. A preliminary discussion of rGya dmar ba's views in the *dBu ma de kho na nyid* and his *bDen gynis rnam bshad* is to be found on pp. 925–928.

[27] See n. 78.

1. The view of Geshe pa
[[[According to Geshe pa]]]

1. The view that the two truths are distinct properties for the same nature (C) does not have the four faults stated in the SNS (against the view that there is no distinction)
[[[As for the stated faults (there are four): (i) when seeing the conventional, one would also see the ultimate and therefore it would follow that one would attain nirvāṇa; (ii) just as defilements increase in dependence on the conventional, it would follow that they would also increase in dependence on the ultimate; (iii) just as the ultimate is without distinction, it would follow that the conventional is also without distinction; (iv) just as the conventional cannot be sought apart from seeing and hearing, it would follow that the ultimate also could not be sought apart from seeing and hearing.]]]
For those who accept a distinction of properties for the same nature (C), the four faults of the *Sūtra* (against the view that there is no distinction) do not apply.

(i) There is no fault of attaining nirvāṇa when seeing the conventional
There is no contradiction for there to be superimpositions when seeing the conventional because even though the ultimate is seen, it is not ascertained, just like momentariness [[[just like superimposition of permanence when seeing blue]]]. Therefore, there is no [[[fault of]]] attaining nirvāṇa.[28]

(ii) Three is no fault of increase of defilements in dependence on the ultimate
There is no contradiction for one [[[the conventional]]] to be the support of thorough affliction but for the other property [[[the ultimate]]] which has the nature of that [[[the conventional]]] not to be [[[the support of affliction]]] [[[because they are two distinct properties]]], just like [[[for instance]]] blue is desired but momentariness is despised [[[by someone]]]. Thus [[[for this reason]]], there is no [[[fault of]]] increase of defilements in dependence on the ultimate [[[as there is with the conventional]]].[29]

(iii) It is not the case that conventionalities are not distinct
There is no contradiction for subjects to be mutually distinct but for their properties not to be distinct, as it is said (by Dharmakīrti): "(Similar instances) are things which are similar on account of (possessing) the universal which is the property to be proven [[[e.g., smoke, etc.]]][30]."[31] If it were otherwise [[[if there is no similarity on account of a universal]]], since mutually distinct property-possessors could not have any commonality

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[28] SNS III.3: *gal te ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid **tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na** ni des na byis pa so soʾi skye bo thams cad bden pa mthong ba yin par yang ʾgyur / so soʾi skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med paʾi **mya ngan las ʾdas pa ʾthob par yang ʾgyur** / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs paʾi byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ʾtshang rgya bar yang ʾgyur ro //*
[29] This fault is different from the second fault in SNS III.4: *gal te ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid **tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na** ni / des na ji ltar ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid kun nas nyon mongs paʾi mtshan nyid du gtogs pa de bzhin du don dam paʾi mtshan nyid kyang kun nas nyon mongs paʾi mtshan nyid du gtogs par ʾgyur ro //*
[30] The property to be proven is actually "fire".
[31] PVin 3 D202a2; P299b1; NB_{Tib} D232a1-2. This is Dharmakīrti's definition of "similar instance" (*sapakṣa*) in an inference. For instance, when inferring that there is fire on a mountain pass because one observes that there is smoke, the similar instances are all the loci where there is fire (for instance, a kitchen).

[[[something like a mountain (cannot have any commonality) with a kitchen]]], their properties also could not [[[the mere fire on the mountain would have no commonality (with the kitchen)]]]. Thus, it is not the case that conventionalities are not distinct [[[in the way that reality is not distinct]]].[32]

(iv) It is not the case that the ultimate could not be sought apart from seeing and hearing

While we accept that [[[the ultimate]]] is not to be sought as a different entity [[[from the conventional]]], it is a differentiation of characteristic, just as even though one realizes blue, momentariness is (still) to be known [[[the entailment between being of the same nature and not being sought as a different characteristic is not established]]]. Thus, it is not the case that the ultimate is not to be sought apart from seeing and hearing.[33]
[[[Well then, are you positing that the faults of the *Sūtra* are not forthcoming?]]]
Therefore, if one does not accept even a mere distinction of characteristic [[[if one does not accept a mere distinction of exclusion properties]]], there is no doubt that these faults are to be stated.

2. The view that the two truths are distinct natures (B) is liable to the four faults stated in the SNS (against the view that there is a distinction)[34]

If (the two truths) are distinct natures, there are four faults.

(i') Nirvāṇa would not be attained when seeing the ultimate

[35] Even when one manifestly sees the ultimate, since one would (still) perceive the conventional—the support of thorough affliction—separately [[[from the ultimate]]], nirvāṇa would not be attained.

(ii') The ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional

[36] [[[Something that is a distinct entity (from something else) cannot be the true nature (of the latter).]]] Just like the pot (cannot be the true nature of) the blanket, the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional [[[because the ultimate and conventional are distinct entities]]].

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[32] SNS III.5 a: *gal te ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid* **tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na** *ni / des na ji ltar don dam paʾi mtshan nyid ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad la bye brag med pa de bzhin du ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad kyang* **bye brag med pa** *dang /*

[33] SNS III.5 b: *…rnal ʾbyor pa dag ʾdu byed rnams la ji ltar mthong ba dang ji ltar thos pa dang ji ltar bye brag phyed pa dang ji ltar rnam par shes pa las gong du don dam pa yongs su* **ʾtshal bar yang mi ʾgyur ro** *//*

[34] On this set of four arguments and their source in the SNS see Hugon 2016: 925–925.

[35] SNS III.3: *gal te ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid tha da dpa yin par gyur na ni / des na* **bden pa mthong ba** *rnams kyang ʾdu byed kyi mtshan ma dang ma bral bar ʾgyur* (a) */ ʾdu byed kyi mtshan ma dang ma bral baʾi phyir bden pa mthong ba mtshan maʾi ʾching ba las rnam par ʾgrol bar yang mi ʾgyur* (b) */ mtshan maʾi ʾching ba las rnam par ma grol na / gnas ngan len gyi ʾching ba las kyang rnam par ma grol bar ʾgyur* (c) */ ʾching ba de gnyis las ma grol nab den pa mthong bas grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med paʾi* **mya ngan las ʾdas pa thob pa ʾang mi ʾgyur** (d) */ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs paʾi byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ʾtshang rgya bar yang mi ʾgyur ro* (e) */*

[36] SNS III.4: *gal te ʾdu byed ki mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na ʾang / des na ʾdu byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad la don dam paʾi mtshan nyid* **spyiʾi mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma yin par ʾgyur ro** *//*

(iii') The selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional would not be the ultimate

³⁷ Just as the mere non-establishment of a pot is not a blanket [[[because these two are distinct entities]]], the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate [[[because the two are distinct entities]]].

(iv') Afflictions and purification would occur simultaneously in a single continuum

³⁸ Just as the cognition of a pot and a blanket [[[occur at the same time]]], [[[if the two are distinct]]] since their apprehension is established to be individual, thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously [[[they would occur at the same time]]].
[[[So said Geshepa.]]]

2. Analysis of the arguments against view (B) in A.2 above

[[[(The opponent) sets forth rejoinders in order to correct that position (I.e., B) and (we) teach that these rejoinders are not suitable]]]

1. Rejoinders against the four faults against view (B)³⁹

Objection: Such a way of thinking has to be analyzed for the following reasons:

1.1 Rejoinder against the first fault (i')

[[[(As for) the first fault (i'),]]] (it does not apply) even if (the two truths) are distinct natures, insofar as, **(a)** when one sees the ultimate, perceiving the conventional is not ascertained to occur. [[[The logical reason, "the conventional is perceived separately," is not established at the time of seeing the ultimate.]]]
(b) [[[Even if we allow that it is established]]] becoming thoroughly afflicted due to merely perceiving the conventional is not ascertained by the Noble Ones.⁴⁰ [[[This is because although the Noble Ones perceive conventionalities such as form, they do not become afflicted.]]] [[[If one thinks in terms of a more specific logical reason,]]] **(c)** Even if (the logical reason) is "because of perceiving the conventional separately [[[as a

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³⁷ SNS III.5 a: *gal te ʾdu byed ki mtshan nyid dang / don dam paʾi mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na ni / des na ʾdu byed rnams kyi bdag med pa tsam dang ngo bo nyid med pa tsam nyid don dam paʾi mtshan nyid yin par yang mi ʾgyur /*

³⁸ SNS III.5 b: *…kun nas nyon mongs paʾi mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang baʾi mtshan nyid kyang dus gcig tu mtshan nyid tha dad du grub par ʾgyur ro //*

³⁹ In the four subsections that follow, the author analyzes each argument according to the rules of inference set by Dharmakīrti. These require that (a) the logic reason qualifies the subject, and that (b) the logical reason entails the property to be proven. If (a) fails to obtain, the logical reason is termed "non-established." Characteristic (b)—entailment—fails to obtain if a counter-example can be found, i.e., a case that is qualified by the logical reason but not by the entailed property.
In the arguments under consideration, which are arguments by consequence (analogue to *reductio ad absurdum*), what the logical reason entails is not properly speaking a property "to be proven" but rather is part of an "absurd conclusion," something that the opponent is not expected to subscribe to. It is hence referred to in the summarizing tables as "entailed property." While the rules of inference require that (a) and (b) obtain in reality and are ascertained by a means of valid cognition by the cognizing subject, the rules of argumentation by consequence only require that (a) and (b) are accepted by the opponent (which can be the case even if they do not obtain in reality).

⁴⁰ The text literally reads "**by** the Noble ones", but this should probably be understood as "in the case of the Noble ones", as the interlinear note makes clear.

separate nature]]] from the ultimate," it [[[i.e., the more specific logical reason "perceiving the conventional separately"]]] entailing "being thoroughly afflicted" is not established in any case.

Therefore, how do you draw the conclusion that there is no nirvāṇa?

Fault (i') against position B				Rejoinder against (i')
Subject	S	when one manifestly sees the ultimate	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) C1 does not obtain
Logical reason	L	perceiving the conventional		(b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)
Specific logical reason	L'	perceiving the conventional separately from the ultimate	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(c) C2' does not obtain (counterexample: any case)
(Directly) entailed property	K	one would have thorough affliction	Second characteristic of the specific logical reason (C2'): L' entails K	(d) T does not follow
(Indirectly) entailed property	T	nirvāṇa would not be attained		

1.2 Rejoinder against the fourth fault (iv')

For the same reason, the final argument by consequence (iv') (does not apply) because **(a)** there is no ascertainment that they are undoubtedly perceived individually, even though they are different entities. [[[The logical reason, "being perceived simultaneously,"[41] is not established. Even if we allow that it is established,]]]
(b) Due to merely perceiving that [[[that is, the conventional]]] at the time of this [[[of seeing the ultimate]]], there is no ascertainment [[[by the Noble Ones]]] of the consequence that there is thorough affliction [[[due to merely perceiving the conventional]]] at the time of purification.

Fault (iv') against position B				Rejoinder against (iv')
Subject	S	the two truths having distinct natures	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) C1 does not obtain
Logical reason	L	being apprehended individually		(b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)
Entailed property	K=T	thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	((c) T does not follow)

1.3 Rejoinder against the second and third faults (ii'),(iii')

[[[One must analyze to whom the two intermediate faults are addressed, those who accept or do not accept that the two truths are distinct.]]] **(a)** If one accepts that (the two truths) are distinct natures, one would accept the two intermediate arguments by consequence.
(b) If one does not accept that [[[i.e., that they are distinct]]], the logical reason [[["because they are distinct"]]] would not be found in reality or accepted. For whom would such an argument by consequence be voiced? [42]

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[41] Actually, the logical reason is "being perceived individually". The note adds the specification that this perception is simultaneous, which is essential for the conclusion to be drawn, namely, that affliction and purification are simultaneous.

[42] (a) means that an opponent who accepts position B would actually also accept the conclusion drawn in the argument by consequence (Cf. below 2.2 on whether the conclusion could be eliminated by Scriptures

Fault (ii')/(iii') against position B				Rejoinder against (ii')/(iii')
Subject	S	(the two truths)	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) For supporters of B, K=T is accepted
Logical reason	L	having distinct natures		
Entailed property in (ii')	K=T	the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(b) For detractors of B, C1 is not established and not accepted
Entailed property in (iii')	K=T	the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate		

Thus, these faults (i'–iv') are to be rejected. [[[The argument is that the faults of the Sūtra do not apply.]]]

2. Teaching that the rejoinders are not suitable replies

2.1 Regarding the rejoinders against first and last faults (i'), (iv')

(a$_i$*) We accept that the conventional is the support of thorough affliction. [[[The conventional is the *** object of the Noble Ones and the object of ordinary people. Pleasant and unpleasant are superimposed on it.]]] If that [[[i.e., the conventional that is the support of affliction]]] is a different substance from the ultimate, it is not contradictory to perceive it [[[i.e., the conventional]]] separately, even when manifestly seeing the ultimate. [[[Just like, since a pot and blanket are distinct, when one perceives the pot, it is possible to perceive the blanket also.]]]

Therefore, the occurrence of thorough affliction is not prevented [[[because it is possible]]]. Therefore, the conclusion of the first and last arguments by consequence are implied. But they cannot be accepted.

[Argument assuming the acceptance that "there is liberation through having made manifest the ultimate"]
(d$_i$*)
Alternatively, [[[since this is the intention of the Sūtra/if (you) say that this is the intention of the Sūtra]]] the assertion of liberation through the cause consisting in having made manifest the ultimate would be entirely impossible [[[for you]]] because, on account of perceiving the conventional **(L)** [[[which is separate from the ultimate which is being taken directly but separately]]], the support of thorough affliction that has the character of being superimposed as suffering and so forth, is not undermined [[[by this separate apprehension of the ultimate]]]. Just like by ascertaining sound to be impermanent, the apprehension of a pot as permanent is not excluded, because they [[[the two truths]]] are distinct objects.
As it is said (in PV II.222ab):

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or has to be accepted). It follows from (a) and (b) that the arguments (ii') and (iii') are not proper arguments by consequence.

> If its object is not refuted, it is not possible to reject it.[43]

Thus, liberation through the cause consisting in having made manifest the ultimate would be entirely impossible.

Further, even if it were (possible), **(c$_{iv}$*)** having thorough afflictions at the very time [[[of making manifest the ultimate]]] **(K)** would not be contradictory and would be possible, just like superimposition of a pot as permanent [[[is possible]]] at the time of ascertaining sound to be impermanent, because **(a$_{iv}$*)** it is not contradictory to perceive individually **(L)** [[[because the objects are distinct]]].

In summary, in so far as it is not contradictory to apprehend erroneously conventionalities **(a$_i$*)** and to see the ultimate separately **(a$_{iv}$*)**, the mere possibility of the asserted position [[[that there is liberation through the cause consisting of having made manifest the ultimate]]] is refuted (=**d$_i$***) and the undesired position [[[it is not desired that it is possible to perceive thorough affliction separately at the time of seeing the ultimate]]] follows (=**c$_{iv}$***).[44]

(b$_i$*)

[[[Having previously had the doubt that (becoming afflicted due to perceiving the conventional) is not ascertained by the Noble Ones, a specific (logical reason) was taken.]]]

Even without relying on [[[the specific logical reason, i.e.,]]] the specific apprehension of the conventional that is the support of thorough afflictions **(L' in i')**, there is no fault **(b)** that (becoming afflicted due to perceiving the conventional) is not ascertained by the Noble Ones [[[(the fault) "it is not ascertained because even though the Noble Ones see the conventional, they do not become afflicted"]]].

This is for the following reason: Even though there is the mere apprehension of the conventional **(L)** [[[for the Noble Ones]]], [[[the Noble Ones]]] making manifest the emptiness of all characters [[[(making manifest) as empty]]], which is the true nature [[[or, the natural state]]] of conventionalities, is incompatible with apprehension [[[as distinct from the ultimate]]] under a mistaken aspect [[[as having afflictions]]]. But [[[for you it would follow that]]] these [[[that is, the occurrence of false superimpositions on the conventional and making manifest the ultimate]]] are compatible in the position of (the Two Truths) being [[[asserted to be]]] distinct [[[in reality]]].

Fault (i') against position B				Rejoinder against (i')	Rejection of the rejoinder against (i')
Subject	S	when one manifestly sees the ultimate	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) C1 does not obtain (b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)	(a$_i$*) C1 obtains: it is not contradictory for L to occur for S
Logical reason	L	perceiving the conventional			

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[43] C. Pecchia (personal communication) proposes the translation "If its object (the self) is irreproachable/faultless, it is not possible to relinquish it" for this half-verse. "It" refers to affection (*sneha*). Possibly, this verse is cited here to show the parallel with the case of affliction: thorough affliction (K) cannot be relinquished, because its support–the conventional–is not undermined.

[44] Namely, for proponents of B, that nonT is the case for S in (i') is not established, and that K=T follows for S in (iv') is established.

				Rejoinder	Rejection
Specific logical reason	L'	perceiving the conventional separately from the ultimate	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(c) C2' does not obtain (counterexample: any case)	(d_i*) Given S and L, K and T follow; holding S and notT is impossible for proponents of B
(Directly) entailed property	K	one would have thorough affliction	Second characteristic of the specific logical reason (C2'): L' entails K	(d) T does not follow	(b_i*) In reality, for Noble ones K is incompatible with S and L. But for proponents of B, K is compatible with L, thus C2 obtains
(Indirectly) entailed property	T	nirvāṇa would not be attained			
Fault (iv') against position B				**Rejoinder against (iv')**	**Rejection of the rejoinder against (iv')**
Subject	S	the two truths having distinct natures	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) C1 does not obtain	$(a_{iv}*)$ C1 obtains: it is not contradictory for L to occur for S
Logical reason	L	being apprehended individually		(b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)	
Entailed property	K=T	thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	((c) T does not follow)	$(c_{iv}*)$ (Given S and L), K/T is not contradictory and is possible for S

2.2 Regarding the rejoinders against the two intermediate faults (ii'), (iii')

Fault (ii')/(iii') against position B				**Rejoinder against (ii')/(iii')**	**Rejection of the rejoinder against (ii')/(iii')**
Subject	S	(the two truths)	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S	(a) For supporters of B, K=T is accepted	(a) K=T is not accepted. It is eliminated by the reasoning that establishes the opposite (but not by the Scripture that states the opposite)
Logical reason	L	having distinct natures		(b) For detractors of B, C1 is not established and not accepted	
Entailed property in (ii')	K=T	the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional	Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K		
Entailed property in (iii')	K=T	the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate			

[[[If one thinks:]]] One does not accept the middle two consequences (ii', iii'), does one? [[[In this regard, there are two points: refuting others' position and presenting the answer according to our own position.]]]

2.2.1 (Jo btsun's) Refuting others' position[45]

Suppose one [[[Jo btsun]]] would conceive of the following:
If one says that it is not the case (that one accepts the consequences), as this is eliminated by scripture [[[because it is established by scripture that the ultimate is the true nature of the conventional and the mere selflessness of the conventional is the ultimate (=nonK/nonT).]]], (one [i.e., Jo btsun] replies:) [[[We do not accept that one's own scripture establishes one's own scripture.]]] How can you say that the [[[posited]]] consequence (from a logical reason) that is contradictory with scripture is [[[eliminated]]]

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[45] We understand here that the "others' position" that is being refuted is that the conclusion of the consequence can be refuted through Scripture, and that the arguments against this position were put forward by Jo btsun. In spite of the problematic "*rtog na*" at the end of this section (which we translate: "suppose one would conceive"), rGya dmar ba does not reject these arguments.

by scripture? [[[Scripture is not accepted (to have this power); if scripture is accepted (to have this power)]]] It would have sufficed to say [[[in the first place]]], "[[[It is said (in the scripture) that]]] those two [[[i.e., the two truths]]] do not have different natures." Why should one depend on the action of scripture that eliminates something (to be) accepted that follows indirectly (from the premises in an argument by consequence)?[46] [[[Once one has stated, based on scripture, that what is explained to be the subject and its nature, etc., is not like that[47], then what is the use of putting forth an elimination by scripture of what is accepted (following the premise)?]]]

If it [[[the preceding]]] is not the case [[[if nothing is achieved by stating, through scripture, that it is not the case that the natures (of the two truths) are distinct]]], then scripture would not be suitable as a means to eliminate a thesis [[[i.e., as what is presented as eliminating what is accepted (following the premise)]]][48] either.

2.2.2 Presenting the answer according to our own position

That the ultimate is the real nature of the conventional (notT=notK) must be accepted [[[through just reasoning]]] without depending on scripture. Otherwise, [[[because]]][49] it is unsuitable for that very conventional that is different from the ultimate [[[in your assertion]]] not to have some natural state of being just as it is, i.e., as the object of analysis by final reasoning, this [[[natural state]]] precisely, which is the true nature of that [[[[conventional]]], is the ultimate itself.

Therefore, the [[[object]]] separate [[[from the conventional]]] asserted [[[by you]]] to be the ultimate, isn't the natural state of anything, nor the partner of anything, (it is not) the ultimate that is [[[asserted to be]]] the true nature of all phenomena, and is not what is decided upon in the context of analyzing whether the conventional is identical (to) or distinct (from the ultimate) and [[[therefore]]] there is no affirmation or negation [[[of identity or distinction]]] with regard to this [[[i.e. your ultimate]]] that is like something freely imagined.

Therefore, the [[[two]]] consequences apply to (your) combination of incompatible items: when asserting, (i) for the conventional, which is the object of mistaken awareness, that its true nature—[[[the natural state of]]] being just the way that it is, i.e., as the object of analysis [[[by reasoning]]]—is the very ultimate, [[[this has been analyzed above (?)]]] saying that (ii) these two [[[that is, the two truths as you have asserted]]] have distinct natures.

Due to just that [[[the presentation of consequences to one who accepts that (the ultimate) is the true nature of the very conventional and that the two (truths) are distinct (natures)]]], when anyone [[[i.e., any supporter of a philosophical system]]] presents the two truths in terms of being either [[[false, objects]]] of mistaken awareness or [[[true,]]]

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[46] Or: "Why would the elimination of (what the opponent) accepts, which follows indirectly, depend on the action of scripture?"

[47] We understand this to paraphrase the previous sentence, namely, that the first premise is said not to obtain based on scripture (*chos can* and *chos nyid* would be referring to the subject and to the logical reason).

[48] The author of the annotations understand *dam bca'* in the sense of the conclusion of the consequence. But *dam bca' ba'i sel byed du* could also refer to scripture being a means to invalidate a thesis in inference for others, following Dignāga's definition of a thesis.

[49] Without the additional "because" (which appears in the gloss) it is difficult to construe the sentence in Tibetan

objects of non-mistaken awareness, the [[[two intermediate]]] consequences apply (to the two incompatible assertions): (i) insofar as, (for) the object of mistaken (awareness)[[[e.g., (an awareness) apprehending mother-of-pearl to be silver]]], the emptiness of truth as such [[[of being silver in the case of mother-of-pearl]]] is the perfected (character) devoid of the imputational (character), this is generally asserted [[[by the opponent herself]]] without depending on Scripture, and yet (ii) the assertion that these [[[the imputational and the perfected (characters)]]] are asserted to be distinct. Thus, [[[insofar as the elimination of the conclusion (thal ba) does not depend on scripture (in our opinion)]]] (I) think there is no fault [[[that it is not reasonable for scripture to eliminate consequences (thal 'gyur)]]]⁵⁰.

3. Refuting the view of a distinction of properties for one nature (C)
If [proponents of view C] say:
[[[From the perspective of the exclusion property of being the support of afflictions, on the basis of which impurity increases, it is conventional; from the perspective of the exclusion property of being the support of mental purification, on the basis of which it is a basis for the extinction of all obscurations of the embodied, it is ultimate. Therefore,]]]⁵¹ Is it not the case that it (the division between the Two Truths) is a distinction of properties for the same nature, like produced and impermanent? This is explained clearly in the *Commentary to the Eight-Thousand (Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra)*. Also, it is explained in the *Ornament of the Middle Way* that when one sees the conventional, the ultimate appears but is not ascertained. Similarly, in the *Lamp of the Middle Way*, the meaning of the sūtra passage, "Not seeing anything at all," is explained to be a term-bound negation (i.e., in the sense of "Seeing nothing at all"). In that way, it is clear that these (texts/authors) assert that illusion is the ultimate, and so this is [[[must be]]] accepted.
We answer: No, because this [[[the acceptance that illusion is the ultimate]]] is invalidated by scripture and reasoning.

1. Refutation by scripture (that illusion is ultimate)
- The *Diamond-Cutter Sūtra* states, "Any phenomenon for a manifestly, completely Awakened One is neither true nor false." [[[This states that illusion is not the ultimate.]]]
- The *Spell for Entering into the Non-Conceptual* states, "Non-conceptual wisdom [[[of meditative equipoise]]] knows all phenomena to be like the center of the sky; [[[If illusion existed ultimately, it would be correct that it is known by the wisdom of meditative equipoise; but this is not the case.]]] subsequently attained wisdom knows all phenomena to be like illusions."
- Innumerable (scriptures) teach by way of the example (of space exclusively), such as the (*Eight-Thousand Stanza*) *Perfection of Wisdom:* "Sentient beings use the words 'Seeing space.' Consider the meaning of 'like seeing space'."⁵² [[[When

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calling not seeing at all "seeing", if (the ultimate that is seen were) like an illusion, why (does the sūtra say) this cannot be considered through another example?]]]

- (The *Teachings of Akṣayamati Sūtra* states), "There is not even movement of mind pertaining to the ultimate; how much less could it expressed in syllables?"[53]
- [[[Mañjuśrī's Questions to the Conqueror's Children about the mode of existence of the ultimate (states),]]] "Conqueror's children, since it is known to be devoid of stain, it is just said to be pure."[54]

These are to be elucidated in that way.

2. Refutation by reasoning (that illusion is ultimate)

It [[[the assertion that illusion is ultimate]]] is also invalidated by logic because there is nothing that proves it and there is (an argument) that invalidates it.

2.1 There is nothing that proves (that illusion is ultimate)

[[[Of the two (potential) means of proof, there is no perception (that proves that illusion is ultimate); it would have to be an inference through (the reason) 'neither one nor many.']]]

(a)

In the case of the verbally-bound negation of 'one or many' [[[in the sense of not being established because of being non-existent]]] [[[if you assert that to be the logical reason]]], (the reason) would be inconclusive because of rabbit's horns, and so forth. [[[This is because even though the logical reason is actually found in (those), these are not established (?) to be existent as illusions.]]][55]

(b)

In the case of a term-bound negation, namely if one asserts (as a logical reason) "because of appearing while not existing as one or many," then (the reason) is deviant with regard to illusion-as-ultimate. [[[Inferring a specific from the general is deviant, like inferring

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- Conze 1973: 32: "A vision of space is a being, so they declare. A vision like that of space, so should you consider that object! Thus has the vision of Dharma been expounded by the Tathagata. But it is not possible to report on that vision by definite statements [that differ from it]."
- Hopkins 2008: 131:
  "Analyze how space is seen as in the expression
  By sentient beings in words, "Space is seen."
  The One-Gone-Thus teaches that seeing the *dharma* is also like that.
  The seeing cannot be expressed by another example."
- Apple 2016: 709: "Sentient beings call that "seeing space." Through examining this meaning of how to see space, in this manner, the Tathāgata indicates seeing dharma as [8a] well. [This type of] seeing is not relatable through another example"

[53] Eckel (1987: 74, 121) translates: "Ultimate truth cannot even be known, let alone conveyed in syllables."
[54] Or: Since the conqueror's children are known to be devoid of stains, they are said to be pure. But the gloss suggests that the « conqueror's children » are the persons spoken to in the sūtra.
[55] In the *bDen gnyis ti ka*, rGya dmar ba gives the argument in the form: "it would be inconclusive, because it is present in rabbit's horns, etc., which do not exist as illusions."

śiṃśapa from tree-without-specification.]]] [[[This is because correct conventional and so forth, which also do not exist as one or many, appear.]]][56]

(c)
In the case of a characterized [[[logical reason,]]] namely, if one asserts "because of appearing while being neither one nor many and being the object of reasoning," [[[Since 'being the object of reasoning is not found for correct conventionals, there is no inconclusiveness, however]]] the characterized [[[reason]]] is not established due to the nature of the reason [[[devoid of one or many]]] and the characterization [[[appearing and being the object of reasoning]]] being incompatible because objects of reasoning [[[which others positively assert]]] do not go beyond being one or many [[[these are not established to be neither one nor many]]]. [57]

If this were not the case [[[that this (reason, neither one nor many) is not a means of proof]]], [[[namely, if one does not concede (?) this difficult point as a refutation]]] Dignāga's proof of ultimate non-duality [[[as experienced]]] on account of there being an invalidation of duality [[[of subject and object]]] [[[as the Idealist accepts]]] and clear experience [[[as being devoid of the duality of subject and object]]] would become a correct reason [[[that is not invalidated]]] and so Idealism could not be refuted.[58]
Given that the explanation in the *[Madhyamaka-]āloka* refutes (Dignāga's argument), stating, "the experience as true of a nature for which there is the invalidation of duality [[[of subject and object]]] is not established and a proof of the specific [[[instance of experience]]] --ultimate [[[experience]]]-- from the general – experience-without-specification -- is inconclusive," it is also to be stated here (with regard to the putative logical reason for proving that illusion is ultimate).[[[(As said above in (b) and (c):) "This is because if one posits (as the logical reason) appearing-without-specification while not existing as one or many, (the reason) is inconclusive due to the correct conventional and if one posits a characterized (logical reason), appearing and being established by reasoning, (the reason) is not established because the nature of the logical reason and the characterization are incompatible."]]]

Similarly, by this analysis, the refutation of the four alternatives of arising, etc.,[[[The verbally bound negation, devoid of production from the four alternatives, is inconclusive because of the donkey's horns; (the term-bound negation) appearing-without-specification while being devoid of production from the four alternatives, (in which) something specific is deduced from the general, is inconclusive because of correct conventional; the characterized (reason is not established) because the nature (of the reason) and the characterization are incompatible. This also applies to other cases.]]] are not suitable logical reasons (to prove ultimate illusion), and so there is no means of proof.

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[56] "Appearing" is equated here to "illusion" in general, whereas the property to be proven is illusion-as-ultimate, i.e., a specific instance of illusion.
[57] Presumably "reasoning" refers here to reasoning consciousness, whose object is the ultimate. Therefore such a reason would not characterize correct conventionals.
[58] A parallel is being drawn between the logical reasons considered in (b) and (c) above and the two arguments of Dignāga. If the aforementioned reasons were acceptable, in a parallel way, Dignāga's arguments would be bullet-proof. But, as shown in the next paragraph, they are actually refuted in the *Āloka* (probably Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*).

2.2 There is something that refutes (that illusion is ultimate)

There is something that refutes:

[a]
The meaning of illusion is the collection of being empty of truth and being a dependent arising; from that perspective [[[of being empty of truth and being a dependent arising]]], correct conventional also is (illusion), and so these [[[the two, ultimate illusion and correct convential]]] would be indistinguishable.

Objection: We accept that there is no distinction pertaining to the nature. But as for the defining characteristic, there is a distinction [[[of defining characteristic]]]: when something is seen, it is a support devoid of desires because defilements are extinguished for all the embodied – this is what it is to be ultimate; the opposite is (the defining characteristic) of conventional.

Answer: The ground for positing illusion, based on the concept of a collection of two properties [[[void of truth and being a dependent arising]]] is also the [[[very same]]] ground for (positing something as) correct conventional. Thus, it is not correct (for something) [[[a single concept]]] to be the support of purification [[[from the perspective of ultimate illusion]]] and the very opposite [[[(from the perspective of the) conventional, to be the support of affliction]]], [[[because there is no distinction of concept; for instance:]]] just like based on the (same) concept of being momentary, the state of depression and the state of desire are incompatible.

[b]
[[[The analysis of the negandum also is similar:]]] Furthermore, if illusion is established by reasoning, one must investigate whether it is established as one or established as many and whether it is produced from self or produced from other.

Opponent: The investigation [[[in terms of being one or many]]] does not apply to illusion.

Answer: If it does not bear investigation [[[while it can be illusion]]], (illusion) being something ultimate that is established [[[positively]]] by reasoning is undermined.

[c]
Moreover, [[[the one who accepts in this way (that illusion is the ultimate) is surpassed in view even by the Substantialist Idealists]]], it is said (in the *Thirty Stanzas on Consciousness*):

> [[[The Idealist,]]] Having in thought "These two are 'mind only'"
> If one places anything at all [[[the support of a positive determination]]] before oneself through contemplation,

It [[[the entity that is placed before oneself]]] does not abide in this mere (Consciousness).[59]

[[[rGya said: Some people hold that the two – the perfected and the dependent – are one nature. This also is not correct. Even the Idealists assert that the support of meditation is a simple negation. And the Mādhyamikas also assert that. And so, if it were to be identical with an implicative negation (or, negation with a positive remainder), it would be a mistaken cognition, and therefore would not be suitable as the path.]]]

And (saying, in the *Thirty stanzas on consciousness*)

The established [[[i.e., perfected]]] (Nature) is the complete absence of the preceding one [[[the imagined (cf. v. 20)]]] in that [[[i.e., the dependent]]].[60] (It) [[[this perfected nature (is)]]] is not different [[[and is]]] not non-different [[[from the dependent]]]; it is said to be like impermanence, etc.

Vasubandhu explained the perfected to be inexpressible as the same as or different from the dependent through the example of impermanence consisting in non-existence after destruction being inexpressible as the same as or different from entity.

And Asaṅga said (in the *Collection of the Great Vehicle*),
If the [[[external]]] object were established as the object [[[positively, as the object that is the support of meditation]]]
There would be no non-conceptual cognition [[[because it would be conceptual, there would be no non-conceptual wisdom]]]
In the absence of that, it is not possible to attain Buddhahood.

In that way, even the Substantialist Idealists assert that the support of meditation, the perfected, is a simple negation and so meditating on non-duality is meditation on emptiness. This being the case, meditating on illusion as the support of positive determination [[[I.e., in the case of Jo btsun positing illusion as established by reason]]] is the perfection of the fruition of a weary intellect.

2.3 [Contestation – Jo btsun's claim]
[[[According to Jo btsun, insofar as one asserts the subject to be appearing, because one understands the collection, in terms of the 'elimination of non-relation' (Skt. *ayogavyavaccheda*) between the property 'absence of nature' and the property-bearer, it

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[59] We translate on the basis of the Tibetan and in line with the interpretation of rGya dmar ba according to the interlinear note that follows, namely, that the "non-abiding" of the support of meditation means that it is a simple negation. The canonical version reads "through apprehension" rather than "through meditation". Kellner and Taber (2014: 747) translate the broader passage: "As long as cognition does not abide in mere-cognition the burden of the duality of apprehension does not cease. For even through the apprehension, '[All] this is mere cognition', one does not abide in that [cognition] alone, because one [still] places something before oneself. If, on the other hand, cognition does not apprehend an object-support, then it stands firm in being mere cognition because, due to the absence of that [object] which is grasped, there is [also] no grasping of that [cognition which would grasp the object]."

[60] We translate on the basis of the Sanskrit and the Tibetan canonical version. The Tibetan version in the *dBu ma de kho na nyid*, which reads *dag* instead of *gang,* is problematic.

is not possible to refute the logical reason consisting in the simple negation of one or many.]]]

Having this (i.e., the preceding refutation) in mind, since we assert as a logical reason the simple negation of one or many, the other faults [[[when set forth above]]] do not apply.[61]
And since illusion is the probandum consisting in a universal that is a collection [[[of being a dependent arising and empty of truth]]], what would be the need to explain the pervasion [[[of the reason]]] by that [[[collection]]].
And since the rabbit's horn is endowed with the property to be proven [[[i.e., absence of nature]]], it is a similar instance. Yet, we do not assert positive concomitance in an example that (must) be a universal that is a collection.[62]

Thus, the teacher Dignāga said (in the *Compendium of valid cognition*, 2.11):
　　The logical reason that is [[[a property that is]]] non-deviant from the property [[[to be proven]]] has to be shown elsewhere [[[in an example]]]. When it [[[the logical reason]]] is established in that [[[property possessor]]], (the) property-possessor is made known to be endowed with that (property to be proven).[63]
[[[this property possessor (is made known to be endowed with the property) to be proven]]]
[[[the collection of (the property-possessor) and the [property] to be proven (is made known)]]][64]

[[[Given concomitance with an example that [has] the property to be proven]]] If this wasn't the case, [[[the logical reason]]] 'smoke' would also be inconclusive (with regard to proving fire) because it is found in the kitchen which lacks a fiery mountain.
The answer (to that absurd consequence), that it (i.e. 'smoke') is actually a similar instance [[[and thus there is no inconclusiveness]]], etc., is the same [[[in all cases]]].
[[[(Namely): "The rabbit's horn as well is endowed with the property 'absence of nature', hence it is a similar instance, hence there is no inconclusiveness]]]

Thus, [[[what Jo btsun teaches is:]]] it is extremely difficult to refute illusion itself, which has to be accepted, insofar as the collection consisting in the 'elimination of non-connection'[65] with 'absence of nature' appears in inference.

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[61] That is, the faults mentioned for options [b] and [c] in 2.1 above
[62] In 2.1 (a), the objection against the reason as *med dgag* was that it would be inconclusive because the reason as a simple negation is found in rabbit's horns, which are not illusions.
[63] Translated on the basis of the Tibetan. The Sanskrit reads, rather "the non-deviance of the logical reason with regard to the property has to be shown elsewhere."
Hayes (1980: 256) translates: "It is the invariable relation of the indicator with the (inferred) property that is pointed out elsewhere. When it is established there, it will make the property-locus known to be endowed with that property."
Hayes (1988: 243) translates: "But it is the sign's inerrant occurrence with the property that is pointed out elsewhere. When known there it will make the property-bearer known to be endowed with the property."
[64] The two glosses offer redundant explanation of the sentence, but cannot be read together.
[65] The "elimination of non-connection" (*ayogavyavaccheda*) is one of the three kinds of affirmation distinguished in Indian philosophy, the other two being the "exclusion of connection with that which is

Objection: Then, this [[[simple negation of one or many]]] is a correct logical reason to prove that [[[, yes?]]].
[[[Since Jo btsun is himself mistaken, (here is) the refutation of this.]]]
Answer: Taking as the probandum the collection consisting in the 'elimination of non-connection or of non-collection' [[[as Jo btsun does]]], what is this so-called "non-connection" that is what is to be eliminated [[[, which is a negandum]]]? Is it [[[is this negandum]]] the [[[mere]]] verbally-bound negation of 'connection' or [[[is the negandum]]] a term-bound negation?[66]

(a) In the former case,
    (i) Since the negation of a negation [[[i.e., of the verbally-bound negation of connection]]] is an affirmation [[[of connection]]], it isn't suitable that it (the verbally-bound negation of one and many) is a negating logical reason.
[[[If one thought that it is an affirming logical reason,]]]
    (ii) And it is not suitable that what [[[the logical reason consisting in a verbally-bound negation]]] is taught as entailing a property [[[to be proven]]] that is a verbally-bound negation [[[since you say that the non-collection or non-connection of the subject and 'non-existence of nature' is negated]]] is an affirming logical reason.[67]
    (iii) And there is no other (sort of) logical reason [[[apart from affirming and negating]]].

Objection: [[[If one asserts that (the reason) is a negating reason,]]] [[[There are two forms of negation, verbally-bound and term-bound; from those two, this is the second.]]]
It is a logical reason that negates in that it applies as a term-bound negation.
Answer:
(No,) Because, by saying (in the *Commentary on valid cognition*)
       This is because by this one [[[i.e., non-perception]]], a negation is established for
       an entity without a real part being included (/accepted)
       (And) the previous probans [[[i.e. essential property and effect]]] affirm a term-
       bound negation.
a term-bound negation is explained (by Dharmakīrti) to be affirmed (not negated) (by the logical reason consisting in essential property or effect), and because it is logically correct (that it should be so).
And since this [[[a term-bound negation]]] and the logical reason [[[neither one nor many]]] are not established to be connected, the former [[[the probandum that is a term-bound negation]]] cannot be inferred (from the latter) [[[from the logical reason 'neither one nor many']]]. And if it were inferred although not connection is established, there would be absurd consequences [[[it would follow that 'pot' would be inferred from 'blanket']]].

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other than the qualificand" (*anyayogayavaccheda*) and "exclusion of absolute non-connection" (*atyantāyogavyavaccheda*). See Kajiyama 1973.
[66] We would read: 'brel pa myed par dgag [[[tsam]]] mam [[[dgag bya]]] ma yin par dgag pa zhig.
[67] This might point out to the sādhyadharma 'non-existence of nature' being a verbally-bound negation, or to the phenomenon that is the sādhya being a verbally-bound negation, because of the way the sādhya is conceived of.

(b)
Objection: [[[According to dGe bshes pa, when speaking of "elimination of non-connection"]]] What is to be eliminated (i.e., non-connection) is a term-bound negation because what is to be eliminated is the appearing subject existing as an ultimate entity.
Answer: [[[We also accept that.]]] However, when we speak of "the negation of non-collection or non-connection [[[of the appearing subject and existing as an ultimate entity]]]," it is not the case that a collection, in which non-connection is negated, is established. Since that [[[the probandum which would be the negation of non-connection]]] is a verbally-bound negation, it is not the illusion that is the same nature as dependent arising. [[[Thus, it is actually not the probandum, in which illusion is the property to be proven.]]]

These points will be explained when identifying the five elements (of the inference establishing the definition of conventional truth).[68]

2.4 (Gangs pa's teaching of four faults)
[[[Gangs pa's statement:]]] Moreover, this [[[reason-established illusion]]] has four faults:
  i. It (illusion) is not suitable as the probandum because the characteristic of the negandum applies (to it)
  ii. Absurdity would follow
  iii. Coming together of contradictories
  iv. It is similar to the analysis of 'genuine'

i. It (illusion) is not suitable as the probandum because the characteristic of the negandum applies (to it)
What is the characteristic of the negandum for the Madhyamaka?[69]
(a)
If one holds that it is the intentional object [[[the entity]]] accepted to have a nature that resists analysis and investigation [[[by reasoning]]],[70] the ultimate itself,[71] we answer that it [[[the characteristic of the negandum]]] amounts to the following: the intentional object

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[68] In chapter VI, 1.2.1.
[69] The characteristic of the negandum is:
(a) Established by reasoning
  (1) Veridical = established by reasoning
  (2) Veridical = established by reasoning to be veridical ($\neq$ Established by reasoning)
  (3) Veridical = resisting analysis
  (4) Veridical = genuine
    (4.1) Genuine = capable of causal efficacy
    (4.2) Genuine = ultimately causally efficient
  (5) Veridical = Found to be one or many when analyzing
(b) Basis for eliminating afflictions
[70] The term "brtags" is also linked on f. 16b with the characterization of the negandum as "imputed". But because of the place of "rigs pas", the understanding "imputed by reasoning" is unlikely, and the current translation seems correct. In support, cf. 4a1, on the discussion about investigating whether illusion is produced by itself or other.
[71] This seems to correspond to the position ascribed to Gangs pa in 16b5: *dgag bya ni rigs pas dpyad du snyed pa'i rang bzhin du khas blangs pa'i zhen yul dngos po nyid de*

which is analyzed by final reasoning, which is established by reasoning and not invalidated, called "ultimate entity". Therefore, if illusion also was the object analyzed by final reasoning [[[i.e., established by reasoning (as you claim)]]], it [[[illusion]]] would be the negandum.

Opponent's answer: What is [[[an entity established by reasoning to be]]] *veridical* is the negandum. But illusion is [[[established by reasoning to be]]] falsidical, therefore it is not that [[[i.e., the negandum]]].

Retort: What is the meaning of "veridical"? [[[Since one does not find another (meaning) than 'established by reasoning']]]
Opponent's answer (1): (The meaning of "veridical" is:) Established by reasoning and not invalidated.
Retort: Illusion [[[that you assert]]] also would be the negandum [[[because it is established by reasoning and not invalidated]]].

Opponent's answer (2): [[[Having thought that 'established by reasoning' and 'veridical' are different,]]] What is established by reasoning *to be veridical* is the negandum. But [[[illusion is established by reasoning to be falsidical, hence]]] what is established by reasoning – without specification – is not [[[the negandum]]]. Therefore, there is no fault [[[that it follows that (illusion) is the negandum]]].

Retort: On account of what division between 'established by reasoning' and 'veridical' [[[indeed, the two are synonyms]]] do you characterize ('established by reasoning') with 'veridical' (i.e., saying 'established by reasoning *to be veridical*')? [[[This means that a distinction between these two is not found.]]]

Opponent's answer (3): 'Veridical' means resisting analysis.

Retort: If the meaning of 'resisting analysis' depends on an analyzing awareness [[[one accepts that it resists analysis by some awareness]]][72], is the analyzing [[[awareness]]] final reasoning or something other than that [[[a conventional awareness]]]?
   - In the former case, illusion is established as the negandum [[[because it would resist analysis by final reasoning]]].
   - In the latter case [[[if it is analyzed by a conventional awareness]]], even if one applies the term 'veridical' [[[to the object of conventional awareness]]], it is not the negandum [[[consisting in something genuine]]].

Opponent's answer (4): Veridical means genuine.
Retort: [[[When thinking 'What is the meaning of genuine?']]] Even if you call it by a different name, we consider the characteristic of the meaning. [[[Therefore, the fault remains.]]]
[[[So, if one asks 'what is called genuine?']]]
Opponent's answer (4.1): It is what is analyzed (in the verse of the *Ascertainment of valid cognition* saying:)

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[72] The meaning of "su " in the interlinear note is unclear.

What is capable of causal efficacy, this is here what is ultimately existent.

[[[This is the negandum.]]]

Retort: Is it [[[i.e., this causal efficacy]]] causal efficacy found as an object of reasoning or is it causal efficacy without specification? [[[In the first case,]]] illusion would also be that [[[i.e., a negandum]]] [[[because it has causal efficacy found as an object of reasoning]]] or [[[in terms of causal efficacy without specification]]] (something causally efficient) would not be suitable as a negandum [[[like an entity from the point of view of appearance]]].

[[[Furthermore,]]] if you accept something [[[anything at all (?)[73]]]] that has a nature empty of causal efficacy to be 'veridical', [[[this is also what is asserted by Geshespa]]] it is also the case that it is not the negandum.

Opponent's answer (4.2): [[[Illusion is not ultimately causally efficient. But the negandum, 'what is genuine']]][[[is characterized by that (i.e., 'ultimate')]]] It (i.e., 'what is genuine') is *ultimately* causally efficient.

Retort: If 'ultimate' [[[the property that characterizes causal efficacy]]] is different from 'established by reasoning', you must state the [[[respective]]] definition of that [[[of those two, established by reasoning and ultimate]]].

Opponent's answer (5): [[[The distinction is the following:]]] 'Veridical' [[[is]]] what is found to be one or many when analyzing; 'illusion' [[[is established by reasoning; however, when analyzing whether it is one or many]]] is not established by reasoning *to be these.* [[[It is established by reasoning, however, it is not established by reasoning *to be veridical*]]] And so [[[therefore]]] there is a difference [[[a distinction]]] between 'veridical' and 'established by reasoning.'

Retort: In general, 'object [[[positively]]] established by reasoning' entails (establishment as) 'one or many' [[[therefore it is also 'found to be one or many when analyzing']]]. [[[However,]]] If 'found to resist analysis by reasoning' is not suitable as the characteristic of [[[i.e., to posit as]]] 'veridical', then, one can also not define it [[[i.e., 'veridical']]] by '[[[found when analyzing]]] being characterized as one or many' (i.e., by 'found *to be one or many* when analyzing'). The same arguments [[[as when saying 'found to resist analysis by reasoning' is not sufficient to be 'veridical']]] apply.

[[[Although one applies many names, such as 'veridical', 'genuine', 'causally efficient as an object of reasoning', etc., the meaning is not different from 'established by reasoning'.]]]

[[[If one searches for a difference between 'veridical' and 'established by reasoning', there are faults.]]] Therefore, 'established by reasoning' itself, [[[is]]] the meaning of veridical, [[[but]]] is not established apart from the negandum.

(b)

Opponent's suggestion: As for (illusion being) the negandum, we call 'the ultimate' that which is the intentional object accepted to be the object of pure wisdom, the basis for extinguishing afflictions when it is seen.[74] Hence, illusion is not such (and so is not an ultimate entity) [[[therefore there is a distinction]]].

Retort: [[[No.]]] Any object [[[(such as) illusion]]] that is attested by correct reasoning becomes an antidote for error when correctly meditated upon and so is the very basis for the extinction of afflictions and is also the very object of pure wisdom, which is made manifest (through) the cultivation of just that. Therefore, since illusion would be (for you) an object that is attested by reasoning, its having the characteristic of the negandum is established.

ii. Absurdity would follow
For the very same reason, absurdity would follow.

(Consider the following inference proving that illusion is veridical:)

"What is 'established by reasoning' is 'veridical,' for example, like something established as veridical by reasoning [[[like you yourself assert, to be (established by) reasoning *to be veridical*]]], or like something established conventionally by conventional reasoning, (for instance) that blue is veridical [[[conventionally, blue is veridical]]]. Illusion is established by final reasoning, therefore… [[[it is veridical]]]"

[[[Others say:]]]

('Established by reasoning') is a fallacious logical reason (to establish that illusion is veridical):

i. 'Establishment by reasoning' without specification is [[[an]]] inconclusive [[[reason, thinking that it would amount to inferring a specific from the general.]]]
ii. 'Established [[[by reasoning]]] to be falsidical' is contradictory [[[(because) being falsidical and establishment by reasoning are contradictory]]][75]
iii. 'Established [[[by reasoning]]] to be veridical' is not established.

And so you must state the difference [[[the distinction]]] between 'veridical' and 'established by reasoning.' Just like (stating the difference between 'existent' and 'impermanent'), teaching [[[to one who asserts that gods' or demons' pots exist but are permanent,]]] that, one does not say

    (□ ii) "Because it exists as permanent, it is impermanent" [[[which is contradictory]]]

  nor

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[74] KV: The opponent here is trying to distinguish illusion from the ultimate. It's not that the ultimate is the *dgag bya*, ultimate entity is the *dgag bya*. And the opponent wants to say that illusion is neither. Alternatively: The negandum called 'the ultimate' is the intentional object accepted to be the object of pure wisdom when something is contemplated, namely the basis for the extinction of afflictions.

[75] According to the note, the logical reason is here « contradictory » in itself, not in the sense that it would prove the opposite of what is to be proven.

(☐iii) "Because it exists as impermanent, it is impermanent" [[[(because these) cannot be logical reason and what has the logical reason (I.e., the property to be proven)]]]

Rather, one points out:

(☐i) "That which is asserted to be [[[existent as]]] permanent [[[this flesh-eater's pot]]], because it exists – without specification - …[[[it follows that it is impermanent]]]

[[[(I.e., you should state:) We do not posit 'established to be falsidical' or 'established to be veridical' as logical reason, but we posit 'established by reasoning without specification':]]]

Thus (if no specification is involved), 'established by reasoning' does not go beyond 'veridical', so (these two) cannot be logical reason and what has the logical reason (i.e., property to be proven) [[[namely, positing (as logical reason) for 'veridical' 'because it is established by reasoning' would amount to saying 'it is veridical because it is veridical']]].

[[[But this is not the case for the definiens of 'veridical.']]] Hence, here, from the definiens '[[[due to being]]] established by reasoning', applying the definiendum, the convention 'veridical,' follows. The entailment has already been established.

[[[Some people understand as follows:]]]

Therefore, if it was the case that because (something) is established by reasoning *to be falsidical*, it is *veridical* (=option ii above) somebody could say [[[in a parallel argument]]]:

"because [[[sound]]] is established by reasoning *to be impermanent*, it is *permanent*."
To that, (using the same parallel) one would need to ask (if option i above is chosen, and the argument is made that [[[by positing as a logical reason the definiens, one can infer the convention of the definiendum]]]): Just like the definition of 'veridical' is 'attested when analyzed by reasoning' (without specification) [[[isn't it?]]] [76], the definition of 'permanent' would be 'established by valid cognition without specification,' no?
[[[If this is the case, one could (say) "Because this impermanent thing is established by valid cognition (without specification), it follows that it is permanent". But since this is not the case, it is not parallel[77].]]]
This is nonsense.

[76] The "pas sam » at the beginning of the note is difficult to translate. It may be related to the interrogative particle at the end of the parallel statement.
[77] A possible interpretation of the expression « 'go mi 'gre » would be that the parallel does not hold in the case of illusion. Namely, the opponent would accept that one can conclude from 'illusion being attested when analyzed by reasoning' (without specification)' that 'illusion is veridical'.

iii. Coming together of contradictories

(D1) If 'established by reasoning' [[[positively]]] were not contradictory with 'falsidical' [[[although it is contradictory, then one could make the parallel argument,]]]

> (D2) white would not be contradictory with black.

> (D2') Answer: If something is white, how can it be black?

(D1') Parallel answer: If something is falsidical, how can it be established by reasoning? This is the same!

(Retort:)

(D1) If one said [[[when one says]]], " 'Illusion' is contradictory with 'established by reasoning to be veridical', but why would it (i.e., illusion) be contradictory with 'established by reasoning to be falsidical'?"

> (D2) '*white*' is contradictory with '*non-white* black' but why would it (i.e. white), just by being white, be contradictory with black (without specification)?

> (D2') Answer: It (i.e., white) is contradictory to black precisely in that it is white

(D1') Parallel answer: It (i.e., illusion) would be contradictory with 'falsidical' precisely in that it would be established by reasoning, because the definition of 'veridical' is not different from that [[[established by reasoning]]].

iv. It is parallel to the analysis of 'genuine'
[[[Jo btsun also says this; here are the details:]]] [[[There are two positions.]]]

(a)
(D1) What is the fault in accepting 'genuine, veridical entity' [[[as the negandum]]]? Having stated [[[the faults]]] "(does this veridical entity) [[[exist]]] upon production or [[[exist]]] without being produced" and so forth,

> (D2) one should analyze whether illusion, given that it is established by reasoning, is established by reasoning upon production or without production.

> (D2') If one says: Whether explained as produced or not produced, it (illusion) is falsidical due to its very lack of establishment.

(D1') (We retort, in parallel) It [[[the negadum, what is genuine]]] is genuine due to its very lack of establishment [[[as produced or not produced]]]

(D1) (Opponent's answer) If it is not established [[[as produced or not produced, and so forth]]], this impairs its being veridical, genuine.

> (D2) (In parallel) If [[[illusion also]]] is not established when analyzing, this impairs its being an object to be cognized by reasoning.

(b)
[[[Further, this is the second (view):]]]

[[[If some say: how would the investigation in terms of one or many apply to illusion asserted to be emptiness? (One answers:) If it is asserted to be emptiness, is it established as a simple negation or established as an implicative negation? In the first case, it is like the Non-Abiding (position). In the second case, given that it is asserted positively, it does not surpass the investigation in terms of one or many.]]]

(D1 Opponent) The analysis of produced or not produced does not apply to the illusion that is accepted to be falsidical.

(D2) This analysis would not apply to a genuine entity either.

(D2') A genuine (entity) does not surpass being produced or not produced, being one or many, and so forth.

(D1') This is the same for illusion accepted to be an object cognized by reasoning. In general, falsidical without specification has no basis for analyzing in terms of a veridical one or a veridical many and so forth; the analysis of entities does not apply to such a non-entity. However, as for this very thing [[[falsidical illusion]]] asserted to be an object attested [[[positively]]] by reasoning, it is just the same in every way.

4. Our own position (=D)

Thus, it is not the case either that (the two truths) are distinct properties of a single nature. We assert as a convention that they are two due to the mere negation of identity; in reality, their being two makes no sense. For example, floaters [[[in an appearance that is a mistaken cognition]]] and the void of that [[[i.e., of true floaters]]] are not like that (distinct properties of a single nature) because they are not perceived simultaneously [[[because a non-mistaken cognition perceives the sky devoid of true floaters, but does not perceive floaters]]].

Further, this is because [[[something]]] being one essence [[[with something]]] entails (that they are) properties of entities (or real properties?), like product and impermanence; but here, there are not two properties of entities [[[that we could refer to as "appearance as floaters" and the "void of those"]]].

[[["Aren't they two natures?"]]] They are not distinct either because there are no independent floaters apart from the void [[[of true floaters]]].

Thus, one cannot speak of identity or alterity for emptiness with regard to floaters [[[(appearing) in mistaken cognition]]] or for appearance with regard to mere emptiness [[[of true floaters]]]. In the same way, in reality, [[[conventional]]] appearances apart from the void [[[of a true nature]]] are not established independently and so there is no alterity. Absence of proliferations is also not a conventional entity and so it is not something of the same nature as would be ascertained among two properties of entities. The meaning of the division (is that the two truths are two) in terms of the mere negation of identity; (they are) property-possessor and property without identity or alterity. Since we analyze the meaning of the division in that way, we hold in common with Śāntideva and Jñānagarbha the system of Madhyamaka that takes sides regarding ultimate truth (i.e., the non-abiding position).[78]

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[78] In a parallel passage in his *Byang chub ṭīka* (59b4–5), rGya dmar ba specifies that his position on the meaning of the division relies on the Non-abiding position–which he identifies as Śāntideva's view–

whereas those holding the Illusion-like position subscribe to position (C) (*dngos po cig la chos kyi dbye ba*) (*dbye ba'i don 'di ni rab du mi gnas pa'i lugs la ltos ste rnam par bzhag pa'o // sgyu ma lta bu' ni byas pa dang mi rtag pa bzhin du bden pa gnyis dngos po cig la chos kyi dbye ba gnyis su 'dod mod kyi / slob dpon 'di 'i lugs ma yin pas snga ma ltar yin no //*).

III. The Meaning of the Terms

1. Explanation of the Meaning of the Terms

[Verse 3]

> **Truths are asserted to be two in dependence on the perspectives of erroneous and non-erroneous consciousnesses.**

Concealed

Concealed are consciousnesses that are erroneous in the sense of obscuring [[[reality and the arising of the path]]]; *saṃvṛti* is known to mean what obscures.[79] Since it is true in so far as it is true in that [[[erroneous]]] perspective, it is the true as object of the concealed. That itself is called "what is concealed" in so far as it is the referent of the erroneous concealer; it is not established in reality. It is said [by Nāgārjuna (in *Yuktiṣaṣṭika* 35)]]], "Since the Conquerors have declared that nirvāṇa alone is true, what wise person would not think, 'the rest are wrong.'"

Ultimate
[[[The meaning of the term, ultimate]]]

Since it is to be sought [[[by beings]]] as a goal, it is an object (*don*): a consciousness that is reasoning that sees correctly. Since just that [[[reasoning consciousness]]] is excellent and superior, it is also supreme (*dam pa*);[80] because it is a consciousness that realizes reality, having the nature of being non-delusive regarding the object, reality, it is not invalidated. Since it is true in that perspective [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]], it is true (*bden pa*); it is true as an object of the ultimate (*don dam pa*).

2. Refuting a particular part of the explanation (of others)

2.1. Setting forth the explanation of Gangs pa
[[[Setting forth the explanation]]]

The following is said [[[by Gangs pa]]]:

> Regarding this, there is the mere invalidation of existence [[[, the negandum]]]. The mere non-establishment of existence is taken conventionally to be true from that perspective [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]]; however, there is nothing whatsoever

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[79] rGya dmar pa here offers an explanation of the Tibetan term, *kun rdzob,* with reference to the Sanskrit term, *saṃvṛti,* meaning "what obscures." See *Satyadvayāvatāra* 15ab.

[80] The author explains here the term *don dam pa* ("ultimate") as the conjunction of *don* and *dam pa*. On various explanations of paramārtha in the Madhyamaka tradition see Nagashima 2004. Cf. for instance SDVV ad 4ab: tshul gsum pa'i rtags kyis bskyed pa'i rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni dam pa yang yin la / don yang yin pas don dam pa'o //. See also PsP (494,1): paramaś cāsāv arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ /.

that is attested [[[that is, established]]] [[[in the sense of a positive determination]]] as true as an actual object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]].[81]

Objection: If there is nothing attested as an object, how could reasoning conventionally take anything to be true as an object?

Answer: The invalidation of existence by reasoning, the negation of existence by reasoning, and mere non-establishment are merely just taken conventionally as the object of that [[[reasoning consciousness]]]. In so far as there is nothing attested [[[in the sense of a positive determination]]] as an object, the Conqueror's sons remain silent.

In so far as reasoning merely completes the invalidation of existence, these meanings of the terms conveying "true as the object of ultimate reasoning" merely characterize the etymological explanation; they are not the definition. [[[If they were]]] What is conventional for omniscience [[[which has the nature of gnosis]]] does not entail obscuration [[[which is the meaning of the term, conventional]]]. As for reasoning consciousness also, it amounts to explaining the meaning of the term from the perspective of being a goal to be sought and being superior [[[if being true in that perspective was asserted to be the definition, ultimate truth would not be possible: since it is free of all extremes of existence, non-existence and so forth, ???; if it were possible, it would become the extreme of non-existence.]]]; since in reality it has the nature of being concealed, it is not ultimate.

2.2. The negation of that (i.e., Gangs pa's explanation)

With this in mind, we explain [[[regarding the refutation of a particular part of that explanation, namely, saying that there is nothing attested as the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness, there are two items:]]]: There is actually something attested as the object of reasoning [[[our own position]]] and that there is not something attested is to be negated [[[this is our own position]]].[82]

2.2.1. There is actually something attested as the object of reasoning

This is explained by the following four points: the absence of nature is to be asserted as an epistemic object; it is not the case that realizing that (absence of nature) is not correct; there do not come to be proliferations through realizing; the fact that accords with conventions is attested.

2.2.1.1. The absence of nature is to be asserted as an epistemic object

While it might be the case that the invalidation of existence [[[, the negandum]]] is completed by reasoning and that this is the mere non-establishment of existence [[[we ourselves also accept this]]], while precisely that [[[that is, the absence of nature]]] is not the object of a valid cognition that affirms, why wouldn't it be the object of a valid cognition that negates? The very non-establishment of existence is the definition of non-existence. If one [[[namely, you]]] accepts that the completion of the invalidation of

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[81] This is repeated in Chap. V, 12[1].i
[82] This is repeated in Chap. V, 12[1].ii

existence by reasoning is just the non-establishment of existence, then the definition of non-existence is indeed recognized [[[(there is recognition) as non-existence]]] by reasoning [[[that is, one realizes non-existence]]] [[[Therefore, non-existence is established as the epistemic object of valid cognition]]].

[[[Objection: If it were established as that, it would be the proliferation of non-existence.]]]
There is no [[[setting forth]]] "non-existence" attested in dependence upon existence. Since "dependence" means to be of benefit, is there anything positive [[[a positive non-existence]]] that benefits from existence? Or, would it be the case that [[[complete]]] (non-existence) is the repeated sublation of a passed existence? We do not assert a [[[non-existence that is a]]] companion elicited by its pair [[[for instance, "absence of nature"]]], and so forth, to be the meaning of non-existence; rather, the definition of that [[[namely, non-existence]]] is just the non-establishment of existence. That is attested [[[the definition of that (non-existence is attested) for emptiness]]] even though one does not experience an existent established from the beginning.

- If one accepts that [[[the absence of nature is a non-existence in the sense of the mere non-establishment of existence]]], then if one asserts [[[that there is realization (of that)]]] from reasoning, whereas it is incorrect [[[to realize that]]] from mere words, do you deny [[[saying "there is not (such a thing)"]]] while accepting [[[the absence of nature as an epistemic object]]]?
- If one does not accept the mere non-establishment of existence [[[which is the meaning of non-existence]]] due to its non-existence, then the negandum [[[ultimate nature]]] would become existent [[[because the negation of a negative is a positive]]].

Therefore, "the completion of the invalidation of existence by reasoning, which is the mere non-establishment of existence" is to be recognized as the meaning of non-existence.[83]

2.2.1.2. It is not the case that realizing that (non-existence) is not correct
Objection: There is just the invalidation [[[by reasoning]]] of existence [[[the negandum]]]; there is no realization of non-existence [[[through taking it as an epistemic object]]].

Answer: No one accepts the realization of non-existence in the sense of positively realizing. The mere elimination of the negandum is the definition of non-existence; when reasoning eliminates the negandum [[[(eliminating the negandum being) the definition of non-existence]]], reasoning indeed realizes that. If reasoning did not eliminate it, would it be eliminated by a mistaken cognition? How awful! [[[And further, when reasoning eliminates it, non-existence is established to be the epistemic object of a valid cognition.]]]

2.2.1.3. There do not come to be proliferations through realizing
Objection: There is merely invalidation toward existence, the negandum [[[by reasoning]]]. If it [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] realizes as an object "non-

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[83] Thus rGya dmar ba agrees here with the proponent of 2.1, but holds this not to be just a convention.

establishment" or "mere elimination," then there would be the proliferation of non-existence.

Answer: That would be true if one asserted any positive determination as a referential object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]]. Positive determination is the operation of establishment [[[of a valid cognition]]]. On the other hand, the operation of elimination is the mere elimination toward existence, the "non-establishment of existence." We do not assert [[[valid cognition that is]]] a negative realization other than [[[apart from]]] reasoning eliminating the negandum because there is no other definition [[[for a valid cognition that negates apart from the elimination of existence]]]. If there were proliferations on account of just this [[[on account of the mere elimination of the negandum by reasoning]]], then it would be the same [[[for you, Gangs pa,]]] also [[[that proliferations would ensue]]] in the case of the "mere invalidation of existence" because positive determination is not asserted differently. [[[For two things that have the same definition, it is not reasonable for a fault to apply to one but not the other.]]]

2.2.1.4. The fact that accords with conventions is attested

Objection [[[someone says]]]: If one calls the mere elimination of establishment [[[that is, existence]]] "realizing non-existence," then this has the same meaning as not negating (/the fact that accords is not a negation).

Answer: It is not a mere name because the fact of realization is attested. This is because the very non-establishment of existence in this way [[[that is, in the way things are]]] is attested to have the definition of non-existence; and, the superimposition of it not being attested in that way (as non-existence) is eliminated [[[also by reasoning]]]. The very elimination of the superimposition that is [[[apprehended to be]]] the opposite of something (*x*) is the definition of realizing that (*x*), just as [[[for example, in the context of affirmation,]]] the very elimination of the superimposition [[[as non-blue]]] that is the opposite of blue is the realization of blue. Therefore, valid cognition has the exclusion of what is other as its object. The elimination of the superimposition that is the opposite of, namely, what is other than, existence [[[just as yellow and so forth, (which is other than) blue]]] is the definition of realizing existence. The elimination of the superimposition [[[of existence, the negandum]]] as being other than non-existence is the definition of realizing non-existence. Just as when a valid cognition [[[that realizes fire from smoke]]] positively determines a probandum [[[fire]]] there is realization by a positively determining valid cognition, when a valid cognition eliminates a negandum, why wouldn't there be realization by an eliminative valid cognition? The definition of non-existence is not other than mere elimination. Therefore, if one (still) maintains that it is not an object of realization in accordance with those facts [[[of the realization of non-existence and the realization of existence]]], this would apply the convention [[[saying that a non-entity is not an epistemic object of valid cognition]]] differently but the definition of [[[the eliminative]]] realization [[[of non-entity]]] is attested and so we have no fault.

2.2.2. That there is not something attested is to be negated

As for the negation of there not being something attested as the object of reasoning, we will state [[[two items:]]] the invalidating argument in four points—a reasoning

consciousness would not be a consciousness; it would be an invalid cognition; nature would be established; and your thesis would contradict your own words—and the negation of the proof for the statement of that not being attested.

2.2.2.1. The invalidating arguments

2.2.2.1.1 A reasoning consciousness would not be a consciousness

If the absence of nature is not accepted to be an epistemic object, is it [[[not being an epistemic object]]] due to [[[the absence of nature]]] not being an object of awareness although it is attested as non-existent or is it due to its non-existence not even being attested? In either case [[[that were considered]]], [[[we set forth the faults that]]] a reasoning consciousness would not be a consciousness [[[and it would not be a valid cognition]]] because it would not have an object of cognition, like [[[for example]]] a pot.

It is not the case that that [[[the reason]]] is not established because
- [[[if one thinks it would have an epistemic object]]] in relation to [[[investigating]]] conventional objects, [[[in relation to that]]] it is not a reasoning consciousness [[[for whom would there be a reasoning consciousness that lacked an epistemic object?]]]; and
- [[[according to what you assert]]] the ultimate is not an object of cognition or awareness; and
- there is no other [[[object of cognition apart from those two (conventional and ultimate)]]]; and
- even if there were, it [[[the cognition that investigates (that which is other than conventional and ultimate)]]] would not be a reasoning consciousness in relation to that [[[that is, that consciousness (would not be a reasoning consciousness in relation to) this other epistemic object]]].

[a] Gangs pa
[[[Gangs pa's assertion indicates that there is no cognition without an object of cognition.]]]
[[[The answer to that is said to be the following: If one says that it exists in reality, it could not be a cognitive agent of something to be cognized because it does not have a present object of cognition. If one says that it has an object of cognition, we answer that a cognition that would be a basis is absolutely impossible. This is the genuine answer.]]]
If someone said [[[If someone answered]]] that appearances existing as the nature of dependent arisings (is the object of cognition), you would say that since it is a cognitive agent of something to be cognized [[[that is, (appearances) existing as the nature (of dependent arisings)]]], it [[[the reasoning consciousness]]] is a cognition.[84]
[[[This is not correct; if it was like that (there would be the following consequence from the parallel argument):]]]
A visual cognition that apprehends a pot would be a cognition of everything possible [[[a pot, a blanket, and so forth]]] and impossible [[[self, primordial nature, and so forth]]] in

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[84] The opponent wants a reasoning consciousness—which is held by this opponent to lack any object of cognition—to be counted as a cognition due to the subsequent cognition that appearances are of the nature of dependent arisings.

the three realms; this is because if someone objected that a pot [[[apprehended by a visual cognition]]] exists in the nature of everything [[[possible and impossible]]], you would respond that it is a cognitive agent of something to be cognized [[[by visual cognition]]]. If you agree, [[[then self, primordial nature, and so forth would have the same nature as pot; if one accepts the existent of a knower without an object, we conclude]]] since all things—such as a stick-holder without a stick—would be possible, [[[in that case]]] absurdities would ensue.

Further (suppose the following argument:), regarding the claim that permanent things, such as space, exist as entities, suppose it was said that because they will become causally efficacious [[[which is the definition of entity]]] they [[[space and so forth]]] are called causally efficacious [[[and so exist as entities]]], we argue that it is not suitable for something [[[such as space]]] to be causally efficacious merely because they will become [[[causally efficacious]]].
(*Mutatis mutandis,*) that [[[reasoning consciousness]]] also is established not to be a cognition [[[because regarding the claim that appearances having the nature of dependent arisings serves as the object of cognition, the reasoning consciousness is not established to be a cognition merely because (appearances having the nature of dependent arisings) will be cognized]]].

[b] Lotsawa
[[[Lotsawa's assertion explained in the small commentary on *The Two Truths*]]]
Here [[[suppose the following answer:]]], reasoning consciousness is of two types: [[[utterly]]] non-conceptual [[[gnosis]]] and inference [[[that eliminates actual proliferations]]]. The first operates without distinction from the object of cognition [[[their duality is utterly not established]]], and so is like pouring water into water; it is just accepted [[[in the small commentary on *The Two Truths*]]] that it is not a cognition. Regarding the second [[[that is, inference]]], if one says that it is a cognition [[[because it has an object of cognition]]] in relation to the mistakenly assumed object of positive determination [[[thinking, "I realize the absence of nature"]]] [[[even though in reality the ultimate surpasses objects of cognition]]], is the mistakenly assumed object not an epistemic object of a valid cognition or is it?
- In the prior case [[[if it is not]]], the cognition would not be a valid cognition [[[because the epistemic object is not that (mistakenly assumed object) and there is no other (object)]]].
- In the latter case [[[if it is]]][85],
  - If it [[[the mistakenly assumed object]]] is the object of a valid cognition that investigates the non-concordant ultimate, the ultimate would be established as an epistemic object.
  - [[[Although the non-concordant ultimate is not the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness,]]] If (the mistakenly assumed object) is the object of a conventional valid cognition [[[if one held that option, the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness does not come to be established through establishing the epistemic object of a conventional

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85 The note mistakenly reads *ma yin ba.*

valid cognition; what would be the benefit?]]], then the latter just would not be a reasoning consciousness that investigates the ultimate.

[c]
Objection: The mistakenly assumed object of a reasoning [[[consciousness]]] of the ultimate (or, ultimate reasoning consciousness) is just conventional.

Answer: It is valid cognition with regard to just that because inference engages just the object of thought.

[d]
Objection: When analyzed by another introspective awareness, since the conventional positive determination is attested as the mistakenly assumed object it is a cognition in the perspective of that [[[mistakenly assumed object]]]. However, it itself [[[inferential cognition]]] is deluded by nature regarding its own engagement [[[by way of thinking "I realize the absence of nature]]], and so the positive determination itself [[[when directing the mind]]] is conceived of as a mere elimination [[[of the negandum]]]; therefore, [[[its being valid cognition comes from the elimination, but]]] (inference) is not valid cognition in relation to the positive determination.

Answer: The elimination is established to be the epistemic object, just as, for example, a concept [[[a fiery mountain pass]]] that is just positively [[[inferentially]]] apprehended is conceived of as a particular [[[the fire behind the mountain pass]]] and thereby, the particular is taken to be the epistemic object [[[of inference]]].

Although there are statements that non-conceptual gnosis [[[which is asserted to be like pouring water into water]]] has its continuum cut [[[since there is (this statement)]]], calling a brahmin's son "fire" does not give him a nature of fire. [[[Similarly, even if the convention "gnosis" is applied, it is not correct (that it is actually gnosis?) because (according to the previous statement) that does not exist.]]]

2.2.2.1.2 (A reasoning consciousness) would become an invalid cognition
A reasoning consciousness would become an invalid cognition because of not having an epistemic object, like a cognition arisen from words.

[[[This is established by reasoning.]]] The definition of valid cognition is attested in relation to an epistemic object: being non-delusive in relation to its determined object[86] or illuminating a previously unknown object.[87] [[[This being Lotsawa's system, we assert that (a valid cognition) not having an epistemic object is not established.]]] Thus, there is no denying the entailment. This is said to be correct [[[by followers(?) of Jotsunpa / the Honorable Jotsunpa]]] in other contexts also, as when establishing a convention [[[when establishing (something) as a synonym (of something else)]]][88], [[[it is an invalid cognition]]] on account of its not having an epistemic object. There is absolutely no fault

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of the entailment not being established according to the position [[[asserted by Lotsawa]]] of (these two) not being logical reason and what possesses the logical reason (that is, the property to be proven) [[[(in the proof) "because of not having an epistemic object, it is an invalid cognition"]]].

In the position asserting that the ultimate is not an epistemic object, one must accept that the logical reason [[["because of not having an epistemic object"]]] is a property of the subject, as previously explained [[[there is nothing else apart from conventional truth[89] and ultimate truth]]].[90]

[a]

If it is said, "the negandum itself is not an epistemic object," [[[by way of saying, "This does not exist" when it does not exist,]]][91] (what about the probandum?) The [[[direct]]] epistemic object of inference is the probandum of the logical reason [[[therefore, the logical reason negates that negandum]]]. Therefore, if one negated that [[[(the probandum) asserted to be the epistemic object]]], (the logical reason) would become a contradictory (reason) turning around the probandum [[[and the negandum]]]. The negandum would become a similar instance because it is a probandum [[[this is because the epistemic object of inference is the probandum of the logical reason; that negandum also would be the epistemic object of the inference]]][92], just as fire is something to be proven by smoke.

If [[[one thinks that]]] the epistemic object of inference [[[that has come to be the negandum]]] is not the probandum of the reason [[[but is a convention consisting of a negation]]], [[[well then,]]] why would inference rely on the logical reason?

One might say, "[[[It relies on the logical reason in so far as]]] The logical reason negates that [[[negandum]]]."

Well then, the negation would be established as the epistemic object [[[of inference]]].

[[[Accepting that negation is established to be the epistemic object of inference,]]] One might say, "The negation is a property of the negandum [[[and so the negandum is an epistemic object]]]."

The negation and the negandum would not be contradictory [[[if these two are property and property possessor]]]. The negandum would also be a similar instance because it possesses the property to be proven [[[the negation]]]. If the negandum is a similar instance,]]] A similar instance is not also something to be negated.

2.2.2.1.3. Nature would be established
[[[In connection with the last of the two options given above,]]][93]

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[89] Here, *tha snyad kyi,* rather than *kun rdzob.*
[90] See section III.2.2.1.1.
[91] The note might explain what a negandum is or might refer to the non-existence of a reasoning consciousness's epistemic object.
[92] The note here seems to take the argument in a different direction.
[93] At the start of section III.2.2.1.1.

Objection: It is not just that it [[[the absence of nature]]] is not an object of investigation; it is not attested ultimately even as being non-existent. [[[If it is not attested even as being non-existent,]]]

Answer: Nature would be established, for it is said (in PV 4.221),

> *How would the negation of a negation be anything other than an*
> *affirmation.*

Objection: Even though it is not attested as non-existent, it does not come to be existent because of being free from all extremes.

Answer: Could you negate both of two things [[[namely, the existence and non-existence of nature]]] that are mutually eliminative [[[in the sense that the affirmation of one eliminate the other]]]? In that case, even though one negates that the logical reason is found in dissimilar instances, it would not come to be found [[[in similar instances]]]; [[[since they are direct contradictories that affirm and eliminate each other, by negating that the reason is found in dissimilar instances it is established to be found in similar instances; this is the rule.]]] (If this could be so) it would not have been said [[[by Dharmakīrti (in PV 4.224ab)]]], [[[regarding the logical reason in dissimilar instances,]]]

> *If it is not excluded from that, does one accept that the logical reason*
> *applies [[[to dissimilar instances]]]?*[94]

Objection: It [[[what is said about (the rule of double negation)]]] is conventionally so.

Answer: If the negation of non-existence does not come to be [[[real]]] existence ultimately, it is the same conventionally, as well [[[that is, negating the presence (of the logical reason) in dissimilar instances would not establish its existence in similar instances]]].

2.2.2.1.4. Your thesis would contradict your own words
There would also be a contradiction with your own words: the thesis of non-existence—"it is not existent"—negates "it is not non-existent." For instance, the statement "all inferences that establish epistemic objects are not valid cognitions" negates their having an epistemic object. On the other hand, the inference that negates that, which ascertains on the basis of one's own words, establishes the possession of an epistemic object [[[that is ascertained by way of another (means)]]]. Since that very (inference) is included in the general negation of inference [[[that all (inferences) are not valid cognitions]]], its having an epistemic object has been negated; something else that establishes an epistemic object (would be required) to establish that (the inference) has an epistemic object.

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[94] Dharmakīrti seems to accept that the logical reason would apply, and so this statement supports rGya dmar pa's claim of that one cannot negate both of two things that are mutually eliminative.

2.2.2.2. The negation of the proof for the statement that this is not attested
Having stated in that way the invalidation of (the claim that the absence of nature) is not attested as non-existent,[95] we negate the proof [[[that establishes "non-existence is not attested"]]]. [[[The reason:]]] One or many, production from the four alternatives, and so forth, [[[being devoid of which (the opponent presents as) applying to non-entity not being attested]]] do not pervade non-entity; therefore, being devoid of those [[[being devoid of one and many and so forth]]] does not eliminate being attested as non-entity [[[which is the opposite position from your assertion that (the absence of nature) is not even attested as a non-entity]]] ultimately for form and so forth.[96] And how would dependent arising and so forth, which also are not contradictory with being attested as a non-entity ultimately, negate non-entity? [[[It is not appropriate to state, "(the absence of nature) does not exist even as a non-entity because of being (a dependent arising)."]]] The means of proof for non-entity being not attested ultimately are not different from the means of negating that.

[2.3. Conclusion]
In that way, through (the arguments that) there is something [[[a non-entity]]] attested as the object of ultimate reasoning and through negating that (even a non-entity) is not attested, we do not consider correct what the teachers [[[(Gangs pa)]]] say, namely: the mere invalidation of existence, the negandum, by reasoning is just conventionally taken as true in the perspective of reasoning, but there is no epistemic object of reasoning (cf. III.2.1 above).

Therefore, being true in the perspective of obscuring in merely grounded in the etymological explanation [[[but this is not the definition; this is correct]]]; however, there is no fault in taking "being true in the perspective of reasoning" as the definition [[[of ultimate truth]]].
This [[[accepting "true in the perspective of reasoning" to be the definition]]] is not invalidated either by the fact that reasoning [[[consciousness]]] is a concealing truth. Since reasoning is a goal to be sought by those who (want to) remove obscurations, it is an object (*don*); since it is superior as being characterized as non-delusive with regard to the ultimate, it is supreme (*dam pa*); and so it is asserted to be ultimate (*don dam*).[97] However, it is not asserted to be ultimate truth.

Thus, that [[[a reasoning consciousness]]] which is ultimate from the point of view of eliminating proliferations [[[but]]] is included among the concealed from the point of view of appearances [[[the nature of the awareness that is a reasoning consciousness]]]. [[[Since the awareness that is a reasoning consciousness eliminate proliferations, it is ultimate; in relation to its nature, since it is an appearance, it is concealed. Therefore, while engaging the same entity, truths are two: they are distinct in the sense of not being one because one is appearance and the other is emptiness.]]] However, when dividing the

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definition, being attested as the object of that which is ultimate from the point of view of reasoning [[[this]]] is held to be the definition [[[of ultimate truth]]]; it is absolutely not the case that the definition of ultimate truth is impossible and so forth.

3. Summary
Thus,

[Verse 4]

> **We assert that the mere invalidation of existence, (existence being) the negandum, is the meaning of the non-establishment of existence**
> **Although just that is not an object of affirmation, it is attested as the object of a negating awareness.**
> **Although it is not set forth as the object of a positive determination, one realizes the elimination of the negandum.**

[Verse 5]

> **For this very reason, the absence of proliferations is not merely nominal, because mere elimination is attested to be the definition of realization. Therefore, it (elimination of the negandum) is attested as the object of reasoning.**

[[[These (verses) summarize the position of (elimination) being attested as the object of reasoning.]]]

[Verse 6]

> **If this was not the case, it would be difficult to posit reasoning as a consciousness or a valid cognition.**
> **Because there would be the consequence that nature would be established, because this would contradict your own words, because there are refutations, and because there is no proof, (the absence of nature) is not not attested as the object of reasoning.**

IV. The specification of the number

[Verse 7]

Truths are asserted to be restricted to two because there isn't another (option) apart from the two (types of) consciousness [[[erroneous and non-erroneous]]].

1. Lotsawa's position

1.1 Lotsawa's assertion

[[[According to Lotsawa]]] the restriction of objects of cognition to two is due to the restriction (of consciousness) to exclusively two (types of) consciousness: erroneous and non-erroneous. [[[Question: By what would one know oneself whether it is erroneous or non-erroneous?]]]
The application of a single valid cognition ascertains that another [[[third option]]] is impossible because engaging the object mistakenly and engaging it non-mistakenly are mutually exclusive.
[[[Question: Because the restriction of mind to two – erroneous and non-erroneous – depends on the establishment of the object to be two – veridical and falsidical – there is mutual dependence.]]]
There isn't mutual dependence either, because their understanding is simultaneous; indeed, the restriction of consciousness to two amounts to the restriction of objects to two [[[but one does not posit them as probandum and probans, by putting forward one of them as a logical reason]]].
In this regard, the object of non-erroneous (cognition) is not invalidated by the emergence of another cognition [[[that is a valid cognition]]], therefore it [[[this object]]] is called [[[referred to as]]] "enduring".
The object of erroneous (cognition) is invalidated [[[by the emergence of another cognition that is a valid cognition]]], thus it is conventionally referred to as "non-enduring."
Because 'enduring' and 'non-enduring' are mutually exclusive, another option is eliminated. Therefore, the specification of the number is established.
[[[If one states this much, it is said to be correct]]]

1.2. Objections with regard to that (i.e., Lotsawa's assertion) and his answer to them

Dispute with regard to that [[[Lotsa's (assertion)]]]:

Objection: Cognition that is non-erroneous and (something) that is veridical as its object are impossible for (the supporters of) the view that "a nature [[[that is ultimately true]]] is not established in any way" [[[the position of Utterly Non-abiding]]], because if they [[[non-erroneous (cognition) and veridical objects]]] were possible, a nature would be established [[[thereby invalidating its non-existence]]].

Although they [[[non-erroneous (cognition) and veridical object in reality]]] are not possible, if one posits the truths to be two based on what is imagined [[["if one says that (a cognition) exists as non-erroneous, something veridical as the nature of that also exists"]]], [[[then,]]] the specification of the number [[[of the truths as two]]] would be invalidated, because a third one also should be posited [[["if one says a third cognition exists, a veridical object of that (cognition) also exists]]].

[[[If one makes an extensive answer as follows,]]]

Answer: If one asserts that, since non-erroneous cognition *is* possible, the truths [[[i.e., ultimate truth, which is the object of that, as well as conventional (truth)]]] are two, and one asserts that, since a third [[[(type of) cognition]]] is impossible, a third truth [[[something veridical as the object of that consciousness]]] is not possible, [[[saying what precedes]]] destroys the truth(/gets rid of one truth); but it [[[the assertion of Lotsawa]]] is not like that.

Then what? [[[What is Lotsawa's assertion?]]]
It is because something other than the two possibilities [[[to be accepted with regard to objects of knowledge]]] is not possible.

And how so?
[[[If one thinks: Since cognitive appearance is unrestricted, it is also possible to accept something that is both 'analyzed and examined' and 'unanalyzed and unexamined', and it is possible as well to accept something to be neither. Therefore, the specification of the number to two would be undermined.
It is not the case. If another cognition that reflects on the nature of these two (additional options) considers (them), if the object of the acceptance as both or as neither is found to be veridical, then, it (the cognition that accepts) comes to be examined and analyzed. And if the object is not veridical, it (the cognition that accepts) comes to be unexamined and unanalyzed. Therefore, the specification of the number is not undermined.]]]

[[[Explaining as follows: "because the cognitions that accept are restricted to two"]]]
A conventional valid cognition [[[i.e., reflexive awareness]]] determines [[[a second cognition, i.e.,]]] that there is nothing apart from the two: (i) the cognition "to be accepted after having analyzed and examined in reality" and (ii) the cognition "accepted without analyzing".
Thus, in that way, the object—which is the alternative to be accepted—of these conceptual cognitions that accept also [[[as (these cognitions) have been restricted to two, (the object) of these]]] is established not to go beyond two.
Thus, one calls "object of non-erroneous (cognition)" the alternative to be accepted upon analysis, and the opposite is called "object of erroneous (cognition)". Thereby, the specification of the number stands.
An alternative to be accepted that would be a reality beyond these two alternatives, is to be negated.
The preceding and other things have been explained [[[by Lo tsa (=rNgog Blo ldan shes rab)]]].

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2. Evaluation of the above

Considering what precedes:

It is the position of others that the negandum is the ultimate in the contexts of the analyses in terms of

(1) the meaning of the words for the two truths that we assert (cf. Chap. III),
(2) considering their mutual distinction [[[whether they are 1 or (distinct)]]] (cf. Chap. II),
(3) the specification of the number (cf. Chap. IV),
(4) their definition (cf. Chap. V), and
(5) the valid cognition that ascertains (the latter) (cf. Chap. VI).

Therefore, (this examination has two parts:)

[[[KA (=§2.1)]]] the specification of the number (of the two truths) based on the negandum is not correct, and

[[[KHA (=§2.2)]]] the presentation of the specification of the number based on the probandum (i.e., the absence of nature).

2.1 Specification of the number based on the negandum is incorrect

According to the former point [[[2.1]]], there are two points:

    (2.1.1) it is not correct in consideration of our own system and that of others, and
    (2.1.2) it is improper in a shared system.

2.1.1 Incorrect in reliance on our system or that of others

As follows: It is because in the context of our own system of explaining the meaning of the words for the two truths, etc., teaching the specification of the number of our [[[the (supporters of) Utterly Non-abiding (Madhyamaka)]]] conventional or of the others' [[[the substantialists]]] ultimate does not come up as a topic.

And it is also because it is not necessary. The specification of the number is the condition of realization. If it [[[presenting the specification of the number]]] were necessary, realization would be impossible because there is no specification of the number (based on neganda), like (for) the two, the child of a barren woman and conventional [[[in these two examples, since there is no specification of the number in reality, there is also no condition of realization]]].

Objection: [[[Even though specification of the number beyond two[98] is not possible in reality]]] It is possible in the perspective of the other [[[the substantialists]]].

Answer: This [[[specification of the number from (that) perspective]]] is what is to be negated.

Objection: It [[[the negation "this is incorrect"]]] is via the specification of the number [[[, from (that) perspective,]]] of what is to be negated.

Answer: Is it so that one is unable to negate if the specification of the number [[[from that perspective]]] is not established?

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[98] Alternatively, read *de 2 la*, "for the two".

Retort: This is saying something that is accepted [[[by us, the substantialists on account of the establishment of the specification of the number]]].

Answer: Because this [[[the assertion "we assert that"]]] is stated in accordance with the negandum being the [[[substantialist]]] ultimate, it is acceptable.
But what is the purpose of explaining the specification of the number together with the rejection of objections?
The other [[[the substantialist]]] asserts precisely a cognition that is non-erroneous and an object of that that is veridical [[[in reality]]]. Therefore, a specification of the number based on the consideration of two alternatives [[[to be accepted as examined and unexamined]]] is not a statement of what the others [[[the substantialists]]] assert.

2.1.2 Improper in a common system

Objection: All proponents of philosophical tenets accept that all objections of cognition (are encompassed) in the two truths: the objects of erroneous [[[conventional]]] and non-erroneous (cognition) [[[ultimate]]], because it is said [[[even by the Vaiśeṣika[99]]]]:

> The nature *(prakṛti)* having the three qualities [[[energy, inertia, power]]] [[[which is the ultimate truth, this]]] is supreme.
> This is not an object that is perceived.
> Whatever is an object that is perceived
> Is completely unreal, like a mirage. [[[This is what is asserted to be conventional]]][100]

etc.. Thus, having made the specification of the number on the basis of a general system [[[(common to) all proponents of philosophical tenets]]], an ultimate nature [[[of this one (i.e., rNgog Lo)]]] is not contradictory in our own system [[[Madhyamaka]]], insofar as it is negated.

Answer: If we did not assert a non-erroneous awareness [[[an ultimate]]] and a veridical object [[[of that (awareness)]]], it (this way of specifying the number of the two truths) would only be on the part of the system of others [[[because it would not encompass our system]]], but how would it become a general system [[[(common to) all proponents of philosophical tenets]]]?
[[[If one says, it is the general system of the substantialists]]]
[[[In the context of presenting the specification of the number of the two truths of our own system]]] A general system of the substantialists does not come up as a topic, and is also not necessary.
[[[Further]]] [[[the others assert that ultimate truth is established by valid cognition, but]]] Understanding the presentation (of the specification of the number) by considering the alternatives is not something that is asserted by the other [[[the substantialist]]].
Therefore, it is not even a general system of the substantialists.

Therefore, a specification of the number [[[of the two truths]]] based on the negandum is incorrect. Otherwise, [[[if it was correct]]] the consideration of distinction [[[and unity]]],

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[99] The verse cited here refers, rather, to the Sāṃkhya model.
[100] Atīśa, *Dharmadhātudarśanagīti.*

etc. [[[i.e., object of words, definition, etc.]]] also should be explained based on this [[[the ultimate that is the negandum]]].

2.2 Presenting the specification of the number based on the probandum

[[[The last of what was previously divided into two:]]] [[[2.2]]]

It is presented based on the probandum [[[absence of nature]]] precisely. This is explained in three points:

    (2.2.1) Status of object and subject based on the probandum [[[by realizing a mere exclusion]]]

    (2.2.2) No invalidation [[[for Madhyamaka]]] due to the absence of inference of the ultimate

    (2.2.3) The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning

2.2.1 Status of object and subject based on the probandum

Thus, because there is a particular instance of non-erroneous cognition that eliminates proliferations, [[[actual]]] inference and so forth, [[[utterly non-conceptual gnosis]]], how would it [[[the existence of subject and object]]] not be possible?[101] [[[It is possible.]]]

As for [[[understanding the meaning of]]] non-erroneous, it is here asserted to be valid cognition; therefore, if this was not possible [[[If he were to think that it is not possible]]], would the extreme of ultimate proliferations be eliminated by mere words [[[namely, by saying "there are no proliferations"]]]?

[[[Thus, it is necessary that there is a valid cognition that eliminates proliferations.]]] The very elimination of proliferations, [[[is]]] the epistemic object of reasoning [[[because it investigates it as a mere elimination]]], [[[and this epistemic object precisely]]] is the non-concordant ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka. Thus, there is such a thing as a non-erroneous cognition [[[reasoning that eliminates proliferations]]] and a veridical object [[[that exists as just the elimination of proliferations]]].

[[[If one thinks that there is no examination, in the sense of positive determination, of it]]] Because positive determination is impossible, the Madhyamaka's ultimate [[[reasoning consciousness of mere exclusion]]] and truth [[[the mere elimination that is the object realized by that (reasoning consciousness)]]] are not undermined. [[[Substantialists, having accepted erroneous and non-erroneous cognitions, assert the object of these two to be ultimate and conventional.]]]

Objection: There is no such thing as calling "non-erroneous" the reasoning that investigates the absence of nature [[[having made it its epistemic object]]] [[[and (calling) the object "veridical"]]], owing to the mere negation of a nature.

Answer:

The mere negation [[[of a nature]]] is the characteristic of non-entity, the object of elimination. And it has been explained [[[above]]] how this [[[non-entity]]] is attested as an epistemic object[102] and how its [[[i.e., absence of nature]]] being non-attested is

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[101] See Chap. III, 2.2.2.1.1, [b] for the position of Lotsawa about there being 2 types of reasoning consciousness: non-conceptual gnosis and inference cutting actual proliferations.

[102] cf. Chap. III 2.2.1: rigs pa'i yul du gyur pa'i don gnyid gnyas pa

negated[103]. Consider the reply in the following verses (previously stated in conclusion of Chap. III):

> **We assert that the mere invalidation of existence, (existence being) the negandum, is the meaning of the non-establishment of existence**
> **Although just that is not an object of affirmation, it is attested as the object of a negating awareness.**

etc.
In such a way we are pleased.

2.2.2 Not invalidated due to the lack of ultimate inference

Objection: [[[If everything is just without a nature]]] Since inference itself is not established ultimately, non-erroneous cognition cannot be conceived; thus, it is asserted that it is impossible for an object [[[of that]]] to be veridical [[[therefore, the specification of the number also is impossible]]].

Answer: Who are the Madhyamikas who divide the states of the two truths ultimately [[[in any explanation]]]? If that was the case, nothing could be said concerning the meaning of the terms [[[of the two truths]]] and so forth [[[because all those would be unestablished in any explanation]]].
Furthermore, [[[as for inference]]] conventionally, there is an understanding by inference arisen from its own cause [[[the apprehension of the logical reason]]] having relied on taking as an object the non-concordant ultimate [[[having eliminated proliferations]]]; therefore there is indeed non-erroneous (cognition) and a veridical object. By eliminating ultimate inference [[[a cognition]]], one does not eliminate ultimate truth.

Objection: If there is no ultimate [[[inference]]], a veridical object that depends on this [[[inference]]] is impossible.

Answer: [[[How would the latter be invalidated by the former?]]] It may be the case that because an ultimate son of a barren woman is impossible, being true as the object of that [[[ultimate son of the barren woman]]], i.e., an object relying on that, is impossible. However, [[[There is no invalidation for our ultimate and conventional]]] inference arisen from its own cause conventionally, whose nature is included among the conventional, is both the goal *(don)* [[[inasmuch as it is what people should seek]]] in consideration [[[from the perspective]]] of eliminating proliferations and supreme *(dam pa)* [[[because just that is non-delusive]]]. What is attested as what is to be examined by that, namely, as the mere elimination [[[of the negandum]]], is not undermined.

2.2.3 The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning

[[[The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning]]]
Objection: The reasoning that removes proliferations [[[as accepted by Lotsawa]]] takes as its epistemic object the negandum [[[by way of saying "it does not exist"]]]. But it is stated (in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.7):

> The two means of valid cognition have an entity for their object.

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[103] Chap. III, 2.2.2: mi gnas pa dgag par bya ba

and (in the *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.210)

> Those who are not deceived by verbal objects...[consider exclusively entities].[104]

etc.

Thus even though there is a reasoning [[[inference]]] arisen from a cause [[[the apprehension of the logical reason]]], there isn't something veridical as the probandum called "ultimate veridical [[[absence of nature]]]."

Answer: One should say, in summary:

[Verse 8]

<div align="center">

What is to be inferred is the probandum of the logical reason
[[[Thus, this negation of the negandum by the logical reason comes to be the negation of the probandum, and so]]]
What negates this becomes a contradictory reason
And the negandum would become a similar instance.

</div>

[Verse 9]

<div align="center">

If what is to be inferred [[[the epistemic object of inference]]] [[[this negandum]]]
were not the probandum of [[[what is to be proven by]]] the logical reason
Reliance on a logical reason [[[of inference]]] that makes it inferred would be difficult [[[what is the cause for this?]]].
If one says that [[[there is reliance on a logical reason]]] it is because it [[[the epistemic object of inference, the negandum]]] is negated by the logical reason,
(We answer) A negative would be established as the epistemic object [[[of inference]]]

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[Verse 10]

<div align="center">

And if [[[it is suggested that]]] the negative were a property of the negandum,
The negative would not be contradictory with the negandum [[[because they would be property and property possessor]]], and
Since the negandum is established to be a similar instance,
It would not be correct [[[for the logical reason]]] to negate (it) [[[the similar instance]]].

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So, we do not consider correct what is stated when elaborating on the rejection of objections (i.e., the answer to the objections in §1.2 above).

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[104] Karṇakagomin glosses *śabdārthānapavādin* « not deceived by verbal objects » as *arthakrīyārthi*, i.e. « seeking causal efficacy. »

V. Definitions

[1. The actual definitions of the two truths: the respective definitions of the two truths according to our own position and explaining the teachers' statements]

1.1 The respective definitions of the two truths according to our own position

[[[illegible note (Finally, presentation of one's own position)]]]

[Verse 11]
> **For the sake of explaining: non-veridical objects of cognition**
> **are the concealed (/conventional); the opposite is the other**

1.1[1] On the Definition of Concealed (/conventional)
Objects of cognition that do not withstand analysis are concealed (/conventional). This very meaning [[[that is, that objects of cognition that do not withstand analysis are concealed (/conventional)]]] is captured by the statement, [[[that is, the root text,]]] (of SDV 3cd):

> *Just that which is as it appears is concealed (/conventional)*

in so far as it expresses the object of apprehension engaged in terms of unanalyzed appearances, because of the explanation [[[in the commentary]]] (SDVV ad 3cd), "concealed (/conventional) truth exists in that way, not genuinely. [[[If (it is not genuine), it is clear that it does not withstand analysis.]]]"

[[[If one takes 'object of cognition without specification' to be the definition of concealed (/conventional),]]] Object of cognition, that is, object of awareness, without specification [[[as Jo btsun said]]] is not accepted to be the definition [[[of concealed (/conventional)]]] because

- it [[[that is, object of cognition]]] is a distinct phenomenon [[[that is, it has a (distinct) intension]]][105] from "concealed (/conventional)" and [[[or, alternatively,]]]
- the definition would be over-extensive, applying to the ultimate.

[a]
Objection [[[If one said that the definition (of "concealed (/conventional)") consisting in object of cognition without specification is not over-extensive, applying to the ultimate]]]:
Is not the ultimate beyond all cognition and expression? [[[If, therefore, it is not an object of awareness, it is not correct that anything non-existent would be that; however, it is

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[105] *don ldog*

nowadays unanimously accepted that awareness takes as its object the horn of a rabbit covered in mud, although it is not existent when analyzed.]]]

Answer: We have already explained [[[in verse 4]]][106] that (the ultimate) exists [[[and is established]]] as it is as an object of cognition; we negate that it does not exist as such.

[b]

Objection: It [[[that is, the definition of concealed (/conventional)]]] is empty [[[of truth]]] when analyzed [[[comment: shes bya mi dges par "if not satisfied (dgyes pa) with object of cognition" or "without bifurcating (dgas pa) object of cognition (into conventional and ultimate)"]]] without specification.

Answer: (No) because while (empty when analyzed without specification) can define ultimately void [[[of truth]]] without specification,

- it [[[that is, void of truth]]] is a distinct phenomenon [[[that is, it has a (distinct) extension]]][107] from "concealed (/conventional)" and
- it is over-extensive, applying to the ultimate [[[truth]]].
- [[[It would follow that a sharp horn existing on the head of a rabbit, because of being empty when analyzed, would be concealed.]]]

[c]

Objection: The aggregate [[[of the two, 'empty when analyzed' and 'being an object of cognition']]] also would over extend, applying to the ultimate [[[because the two individual parts apply]]].

Answer: What is empty when analyzed, which itself is also an object of cognition, [[[that is, a common basis (of the two)]]] definitely over extends.

Therefore, [[[the unspecified aggregate is not suitable and]]] we do not accept the above as definitions individually, but (we accept) the specified aggregate [[[namely, that object of cognition taken as a common basis that itself is not veridical when analyzed]]]: any object of cognition, not veridical, in that way, [[[namely, in the way that would be correct from the point of view of analysis]]] when explained.

[[[Nevertheless, [[[according to some, a restriction applied to object of cognition]]] 'non-veridical when explained itself' suffices (to define concealed). Indeed, the ultimate is true when analyzed; it is not established to be non-veridical. If that alone is not proper and 'object of cognition' is added, there still would be over-extension because it would be present in real phenomena. **Reply**: Absurdities would ensue because phenomena are limitless. [108]]]]

All proponents of philosophical systems assert that as the definition of concealed (/conventional).

[[[**Objection**: Well then, what are the dissimilarities among philosophical systems?]]]

The only dissimilarity [[[namely, (a dissimilarity) in the definitional basis]]] is due to Mādhyamikas asserting that it [[[the definiens of concealed (/conventional)]]] is also

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[106] Reference to verse 4, first cited in Chapter III, 3, and cited again in Chapter IV, 2.2.1.

[107] *don ldog*

[108] Argument unclear. Possibly the opponent is arguing that the definition applies to real phenomena, that substantialists take to be ultimate (see below). It is unclear how the answer counters this objection.

found in the dependent. [[[Idealists assert that it is found in the personal self and phenomenal self and the duality of subject and object. Vaibhāṣikas[109] assert that it is present in personal self as either of the two, (objects or minds).]]][110]

Therefore, this agrees with what is said [[[by Lotsawa]]] about the valid cognition that determines the concealed (/conventional), namely that it consists in [[[or, established by]]] the operation of the two valid cognitions that negate veridical and [[[(as said) by the Lotsawa in his small commentary on the two truths]]] determine on the level of appearance,[111] because (the two aspects of concealed thus determined, 'non-veridical' and 'object of cognition') are precisely the epistemic object of the valid cognition that determines the definition. [[[Thus, their taking 'object of cognition' as the definition is mistaken.]]]

1.1[2] Ultimate
(The word "the opposite" in verse 11 means) "the opposite of an object of knowledge that does not exist in that way when analyzed." [[[The meaning of the root text's (verse SDV 3cd) "what is different is the other of the pair" is just this.]]] It remains in reality, when a mind [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] analyzes it. It is said [[[by (Jñānagarbha) in his *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, when commenting on that]]] "What is ultimately veridical is ultimate truth; this means just truth that is concordant with reasoning."

That is the definition of the ultimate according to all proponents of philosophical systems. [[[Indeed, Idealists assert that it applies to consciousness that is empty of the duality of object and subject. Vaibhāṣikas[112] assert that it is found in both object and mind empty of personal self.]]] The only dissimilarity [[[with Substantialists]]] is due to Mādhyamikas asserting that it [[[that is, the definition]]] is found in the absence of proliferations, whereas (the) others assert it [[[that is, the definiendum]]] for real phenomena. Thus, it is said to be attested by reasoning to be devoid of all extremes, such as non-existence, which are drawn from the pairs, permanence and annihilation, existence and non-existence [[[this is what is called ultimate truth]]].

[a]
Objection: How can the void of all extremes be the object of reasoning?
Answer: This is because reasoning eliminates all extremes [[[it (that is, devoid of all extremes) is attested (by reasoning to be the elimination of all extremes)]]]; this was already explained. [[[If one thinks, "Is it not this contradictory with the statement that objects of awareness are concealed (/conventional)?"]]] (The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.2cd) states,

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[109] Text reads *bye brag pa* instead of the usual *bye brag du smra ba*.
[110] Cf. 2.2.1, Table 1
[111] Or, "that it consists in the negation of veridical and the operation of the two valid cognitions that determine appearances." In either case, the two-part mental operation would encompass the two parts of the definition of concealed, non-veridical and object of cognition. See also Section VI.1.1.
[112] Text reads *bye brag pa* instead of the usual *bye brag du smra ba*.

The ultimate is not in the scope of awareness; awareness is asserted to be concealed.[113]

In as much as all objects of awareness that are referents are concealed (/conventional), and in as much as an entity of awareness that does not engage by way of feeling and positively determining is impossible, just so this [[["awareness is concealed (/conventional)"]]] is said because of the mind's mode of self-experiencing. In that way, all awareness is pervaded by being concealed (/conventional). However, some awarenesses, from the point of view of eliminating proliferations, are both "object" (*don*) and "supreme" (*dam pa*) and so there is a distinction of definition.[114] [[[The nature of an awareness that is a reasoned insight and concealed (/conventional) are of the same nature; therefore, ultimate and concealed (/conventional) are of the same nature. However, ultimate truth and concealed (/conventional) are not of the same nature because it would be contradictory for real and unreal to be of the same nature.]]]

1.2 Explaining the statements of the teachers

12[1] [[[Refuting others (i.e., Gangs pa)]]]

12[1].i [[[Stating (others' view)]]]
[[[If one analyzes Gangs pa's assertion, the definitions of the two truths are presented as follows in a way that would not align with the conventions of the text of the commentary.]]]
Consider the following explanation of the definitions in terms of "what accords with appearances and what accords with reasoning":

- [[[As for "what accords with appearances"]]] the objects of the eye, and so forth, that are engaged without analysis, from cowherds to the omniscient.
- [[[As for "what accords with reasoning"]]] the objects of inference that eliminates actual proliferations or the object in the gnosis that does not conceive ever. [[[When speaking of what accords with reasoning]]] "Object of reasoning" amounts to merely the elimination of existence [[[the object of negation]]]. [[[In the case of reasoning]]][115] there is nothing attested as an object.[116]

12[1].ii [[[Negating others' view]]]
We accept the definition of the ultimate in that way [[[according to Gangs pa]]], providing the answer that explains [[[as above]]] that the mere elimination is attested as an object that accords with reasoning but negating that (an object) is not attested.[117]

[[[Refutation (of the proposed definition of the concealed):]]]

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[113] Text reads *blo ni kun rdzob yin par 'dod* for *blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod.*
[114] Namely, a distinction between the definitions of "ultimate" and "ultimate truth." rGya dmar pa here plays with the etymology of *don dam pa,* "ultimate," taking apart the two words, *don* and *dam pa,* to show that some awarenesses qualify as *don dam pa.* The annotation will show, however, that those awarenesses that qualify as ultimate still are not ultimate truths.
[115] The annotation reads only *rigs pa,* which might suggest that "reasoning" itself does not exist as an object.
[116] This concords with the position ascribed to Gangs pa in Chap. III, 2.1.
[117] This is clarified in section III, 221 and 2.2.2, in which rGya dmar ba presents his own position and refutes the position ascribed to Gangs pa.

As for what is concealed (/conventional) being "what accords with appearances," [[[the (proposed) definition of concealed (/conventional)]]] that is, being an object of a non-analytical awareness, while this would amount to being non-erroneous, if non-erroneous without specification was the definition, it would be the case that 'produced' could be the definition of 'impermanent.' Thus, in the case of 'appearance' without specification and being concealed (/conventional), which are distinct [[[intension]]] exclusion properties [[[(they) are (distinct exclusion properties), and (in the case of) distinct exclusion properties]]], it is not suitable for one to define the other because [[[if it was suitable, as in the case of 'produced' and 'impermanent']]] absurdities would ensue.

[[[Furthermore,]]] If pleasure, form, and so forth were established as appearing [[[without specification]]] without analysis, then the meaning of concealed (/conventional) [[[namely, appearance without specification]]] would already be established [[[without negating 'veridical' being necessary]]]; [[[one thinks, "What would be the need for a valid cognition that ascertains being concealed (/conventional), which consists in negating veracity?"]]] therefore, an argument establishing that they are concealed, via negating their being ultimate, would be pointless. [[[One thinks, "Without negating veracity, appearance without specification is not established as what it is."]]]

Objection: "Non-analytical appearance" or "appearance without specification" is indeed established [[[without negating veracity]]].
Answer: What is the meaning of "non-analytical"? If it is "in the perspective of erroneous," [[[because an object cannot be established as erroneous without negating veracity]]] then you accept the invalidation of veracity. Similarly, if by merely saying "appearance without specification" you negate veracity, we agree. [[[Insofar as you agree with the thought of tradition, we offer no refutation.]]]

12[2] [[[Setting forth Jo btsun's system]]]
[[[Furthermore, completing (the discussion),]]] The teachers, spiritual friends, [[[Khyung and Lotsawa]]] state as follows:[118] [[[setting forth Jo btsun pa's system]]] the definition of ultimate truth surpasses even object of knowledge without specification; it is not an object of awareness in any way, such as 'empty' or 'not empty.' Thus, (Śāntideva) said

> *The ultimate is not in the scope of awareness.*

12[3] [[[Refuting objections to our own system (i.e., Jo btsun's system)]]] (dGe bshes pa's answers)

[a]
Objection: It is contradictory to set forth object of knowledge without specification as the basis of division (of the two truths)[119] and [[[when explaining the meaning of the

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[118] The view presented here finds an echo in Phya pa's *sNying po* (T p. 18), where it is ascribed to « Some logicians » : *rigs par smra ba kha cig don dam pa'i mtshan nyid ni shes bya'i mtshan ma las 'das ste | yod pa dang med pa dang gnyi ga dang gyi ga ma yin pa ji ltar shes par byas kyang spros pa yin la spros pa yin la spros ma mtha' dag dang bral bas na shes bya'i mtshan ma las 'das pa'o ||...*
[119] Section I, "The basis of division".

terms]]][120] it is contradictory for reasoning (consciousness) to be ultimate and its object to be veridical.

Answer: This is like, for instance, the following: The inferential cognition (of fire from smoke) merely conceives as [[[the external]]] fire itself something superimposed [[[that is, a concept appearing to awareness itself]]] through the force of the ripening of tendencies of conceptual cognitions as fire and so forth from the beginningless past. However, it [[[inferential cognition]]] does not take as its object a particular [[[that is, an external fire]]]. This [[[that a particular is not the object of inferential cognition]]] is what is asserted when analyzing by introspection.[121] And yet it is asserted that, from the perspective of the [[[the inferential]]] awareness itself, [[[that is, since (this very cognition) wrongly assumes that it realizes a particular, based on that]]] it has a particular for its object. [[[Similarly, from the perspective of reasoning, the absence of nature is taken as an object. However, when analyzing by introspection (of the reasoning cognition), the ultimate is not set forth as an object once reasoning has completed the invalidation of existence, the negandum. Therefore, there is no contradiction in setting forth a division of objects of cognition based on this perspective.]]]

[b]
Objection [[[it is said]]]: By way of saying
> When one sets forth (the ultimate) as an object from the perspective of what is asserted within a reasoning consciousness [[[that is, (reasoning) claiming "I take the absence of nature as an object"]]], then when analyzing by introspection [[[the setting forth of (the ultimate) as an object]]] reasoning [[[merely]]] invalidates existence [[[the negandum]]] but there is no such thing called "the ultimate" that is an epistemic object [[[of an inferential cognition]]], that would become an object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]].

[[[ultimate truth as]]] a division of objects of cognition from that perspective [[[based on a reasoning consciousness thinking "I realize the absence of nature"]]] is [[[merely]]] set forth. [[[But you say that when analyzing by introspection, the ultimate is not set forth as an object]]]. [[[However,]]] When introspection searches, it applies the convention "ultimate" to what is beyond all cognition and expression [[[what is beyond the object of that reasoning consciousness]]] and in doing so introspection takes as its object what is beyond all cognition and expression [[[that is, the ultimate]]]; (the latter) [[[ultimate truth]]] becomes its [[[that is, introspection's]]] object of cognition.

Answer: Do the words [[[that express]]], "a particular is not a referent of words," express [[[that is, refer to]]] that [[[a particular]]] which is not a referent? [[[If someone answers, "This (statement) merely negates a particular being a referent of words; it is not the case that a particular is taken as an object by these words," then by parallel reasoning,]]] Thus, that [[[introspection]]] merely negates (ultimate truth) being attested as an object of cognition [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]] but [[[introspection]]] does not set forth

[120] Section III, "The meaning of the term".

[121] *rang bzhin sems dpa'* (translated here as "introspection") seems to be a variant of *rang bzhin sems pa,* the latter translating *svabhāvacintā.* The term could refer to a cognizer, rather than a cognition, and perhaps stems in part from the term, *byang chub sems dpa'. svabhāvacintā* occurs in *PV* III.350 and *PVin* I, p.37.7. Phya pa chos kyi seng ge's commentary to the latter cites the expression as *rang bzhin sems dpa'.*

(ultimate truth) as an object. In so far as it is merely a matter of negating its being established, the Conqueror's sons remain silent.

This (i.e. the answers to [a] and [b]) is what is said [[[by dGe bshes pa]]].

12[4] Refutation of dGe bshes pa's answers
[[[The refutation:]]] Analyzing what precedes (there are five points): the example is not established; since the object is not fitting, one cannot dispel objections; there are errors regarding the very reasoning that dispels objections; the meaning that is explained [[[here]]] contradicts other statements [[[stated in epistemological treatises]]]; and, this is invalidated by previously explained reasoning.

12[4]1 The example is not established:
[[[Thus, the meaning of saying "inferential cognition is both valid cognition and not valid cognition" is as follows:]]]

- Since there is no experience of the particular fire, and so forth, (the latter) [[[a particular fire]]] does not come to be the apprehended object [[[of the inferential cognition]]]. Since it conceives of what is superimposed [[[that is, the apprehended object]]] as being external [[[that is, as a particular fire]]], (it) [[[inferential cognition]]] is erroneous concerning what is apprehended.
- On the other hand, [[[inferential cognition is a valid cognition with regard to the intentional object, thus]]] it cannot be negated that the particular is the very epistemic object that is conceived because the two valid cognitions are similar in having the definition of valid cognition with regard to the intentional object [[[because these both have epistemic objects from their respective perspectives]]].

[[[Objection: If one thinks that this is because it is not the case that inference takes a particular as an object when introspectively analyzing,]]] we ask

Is this introspective awareness valid cognition or not?
- If it is, how could inference whose object is negated by that be posited as valid cognition? [[[That is, since (inference's object is negated by that, how could it be posited as valid cognition?)]]] It could be (valid cognition) in relation to what is apprehended [[[if it is posited (in this way, inference would be) erroneous]]] or from the perspective of what is conceived [[[in relation to (what is conceived, inference) is posited as valid cognition because it has an epistemic object]]]. If it is [[[still]]] posited [[[to be valid cognition]]] from the latter perspective, even though introspection negates the intensional object, [[[the absurd consequence would ensue that]]] all awareness would be valid cognition.
- If it [[[that is, introspection]]] is not valid cognition, inference is established to just have a particular as its object [[[because what is not valid cognition cannot negate the epistemic object of the valid cognition, inferential cognition]]].

Therefore, the example is not established.

12[4]2 Since the object is not fitting, one cannot dispel objections
[[[2. The object is not fitting]]] Similarly, if introspection negates [[[the intensional object,]]] the elimination that is mistakenly assumed [[[and conceived]]] to be realized

from the perspective of what is asserted within a reasoning consciousness, then it is not proper for reasoning [[[consciousness]]] to be valid cognition [[[because the intensional object has been negated by another awareness (namely, introspection) and]]] there is no occasion for inference being a valid cognition regarding something [[[that is, the apprehended object]]] other than the object of thought [[[that is, the intensional object]]].

Objection: It is in regards to the mere elimination of existence [[[that inference is valid cognition]]].

Answer: Just that being the epistemic object has been explained many times already [[[for example, (1) the mere non-establishment of existence is the definition of non-existence and (2) the awareness that understands in that way is understanding non-existence]]].[122]

Therefore [[[for this very reason]]], one cannot dispel objections.

12[4]3 There are errors regarding the very reasoning that dispels objections
[[[3.]]] [[[It would follow that this introspection would be the valid cognition that delineates the non-concordant ultimate and teaching the invalidation of asserting that]]] [[[With regard to the latter, there are four parts: devoid of proliferations would be established to be the epistemic object of introspection; it would become an affirming awareness; there would be infinite regress; and it would not be necessary.]]]

12[4]3[1]
[[[It would follow that this introspection would be the valid cognition that delineates the non-concordant ultimate]]]
Otherwise, if one conceives of (the ultimate) as the object of a reasoning consciousness, by saying that introspection surpasses even the object of that [[[that is, of a reasoning consciousness]]], this very introspection that eliminates all proliferations would be [[[it must be]]] the reasoning that delineates the non-concordant ultimate.

Objection: Why not?

Answer: Because (of the following):

12[4]3[2]
[[[Teaching the invalidation of asserting that]]]

12[4]3[2.1]
[[[Devoid of proliferations would be established to be the epistemic object of introspection]]]

- The very elimination of all proliferations, such as the object of reasoning and so forth [[[by way of saying that (introspection) surpasses even (the object of

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[122] See sections III.1.1 and III.1.2.

reasoning)]]], would be established as the epistemic object of that [[[that is, of this introspection]]]. Alternatively [[[while that might be the case]]],

12[4]3[2.2]
[[[It would become an affirming awareness]]]

- If [[[it were the case]]] that [[[introspection]]] negates what reasoning eliminatively takes as its object, it becomes an affirming awareness [[[because the negative of a negation is an affirmative]]].

(In the event that introspection has no object at all,)

- If it [[[that is, introspection]]] does not posit any object, it would not be suitable to be a consciousness [[[because it would not have an object of cognition]]] or a valid cognition [[[because it would not have an epistemic object]]].

It is also because (of the following):

12[4]3[2.3]
[[[There would be infinite regress]]]

- It is not suitable for just this [[[that is, introspection]]] to be perception [[[for those of limited vision]]] and so it must be inference. In so far as this is the case, what is wrongly assumed to be the object of that [[[[introspection (which is an inference)]]] would need to be negated by another introspection, which is (also) an inferential cognition. Therefore, there would be no end [[[in so far as each wrongly assumed object of introspection would need to be negated by a second introspection (thinking), "it does not exist in that way"]]].

12[4]3[2.4]
[[[It is not be necessary]]]

- If it [[[(that is, the mistakenly assumed) object of introspection]]] does not need [[[to be negated by a second (introspection)]]], then the object of the former [[[that is, of a reasoning consciousness]]] also does not need (to be negated) [[[by introspection]]], due to parity of reasoning.

Objection: The object that is mistakenly assumed by this very introspection is included among the objects of inference in general [[[since it is claimed that (introspection) is beyond all objects of inference in general]]]; therefore, there is no need for another negation [[[apart from (the negation) we set forth; therefore, it is not the case that there is no end]]].

Answer: If one applies the negation having included its own [[[that is, introspection's]]] epistemic object [[[that is, the object that is mistakenly assumed]]] among the objects negated [[[(thinking), "I am beyond even my own object"]]], it is possible that the

unlearned could hold that it is not an inference, or that it is not the case that it is a valid cognition that has an epistemic object for its object, or that all statements are false [[[there is a contradiction between previous and subsequent words]]]. It is not possible that valid cognition itself could apply [[[that it could apply when its own object is negated]]]. All valid cognitions invalidate an opposing object [[[because they have an exclusion for their objects]]]; it is not possible that they would negate their own object.

12[4]4 The meaning that is explained [[[here]]] contradicts other statements [[[stated in epistemological treatises]]]

[[[4.]]] Additionally, it would be contradictory [[[for yourself, Jo btsun,]]] with the statements:

- [[[In the context of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* determining the number of valid cognitions]]] The fact that a consciousness that is different from perception and inference does not have an epistemic object serves as a valid reason to negate (that consciousness) being valid cognition.
- Since it is correct that the epistemic object of non-apprehension is a non-entity, reasoning that negates a cause, and so forth, does not invalidate [[[a non-entity being an epistemic object]]].[123]

[[[These statements are contradictory with (your asserting) here a valid cognition that lacks an epistemic object and not stating that a non-entity can be an epistemic object of a valid cognition.]]]

[a]

Objection: [[[Even without an epistemic object,]]] The mere non-establishment of existence is taken conventionally to be the epistemic object.

Answer: If (a consciousness) lacking an actual epistemic object were a valid cognition, then language and comparison would be also [[[valid cognition in so far as they lack actual epistemic objects]]].

[b]

Objection: Since it [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] mistakenly assumes that it cognizes an absence, it has an epistemic object.

Answer: [[[Does (what is mistakenly assumed) have or not have (the definition of epistemic object)?]]] If what is mistakenly assumed has the definition of epistemic object in that way, devoid of proliferations [[[such as the wrong assumption of realizing the absence of nature]]] also would be established as an epistemic object. If you accept that [[[to be valid cognition], through taking it as an epistemic object from the perspective of thought even though it does not have the definition (of epistemic object), then it would also be the case for language and comparison [[[that they are valid cognition]]].

Therefore, we do not subscribe to positing a consciousness that does not cognize an object of cognition or a valid cognition that does not realize an object. [[[Since the Lotsawa accepts that not being a valid cognition and not having an epistemic object are synonyms, this other case also is not valid cognition.]]]

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[123] This second statement suggests Dharmottara's position that a non-entity serves as the probandum of a non-apprehension inference.

[[[5.]]] Additionally, if devoid of proliferations is not an object of awareness, it would be difficult for you to provide an answer to the following:

> **We accept that the mere invalidation of existence, the negandum, is an object [[[that is]]] not established to exist [[[to be an (existent) entity]]];**
> **Even though it is not an object of an affirmation, it is found to be an object of an awareness that negates [[["it does not exist"]]].**[124]

2. Divisions
What is the division for each of those that have these definitions?

Intermediate verses:

[Verse 12]
Concordant and non-concordant [[[truths]]] are distinctions of the conventional itself and are merely *taken to be* divisions of the ultimate.
There is not even the slightest division [[[(that could be identified, saying) "this is it"]]] with regard to the ultimate [[[truth]]] of the Madhyamaka system.

[Verse 13]
The two of [[[i.e., asserted by]]] the substantialists [[[as the ultimate]]] – 'dependent' and 'perfected' – are asserted in the Madhyamaka system to be the twofold [[[divisions pertaining to the]]] conventional: correct and incorrect.
The substantialists do not accept a correct [[[conventional]]].[125]
[[[The idealist (only assert as conventional) what is 'imagined', i.e., what is superimposed as a personal self and as phenomenal self. Vaibhāṣika…personal self]]]
[[[Nevertheless]]] [[[regarding the incorrect conventional]]] **'Conceptual' and 'non-conceptual' are mere divisions of error [[[into two]]].**

Thus, what are the definitions of correct and incorrect conventionals in the Madhyamaka system? What are the things that have these definitions?[126]

3. Definition of the respective kinds of conventional

[Verse 14]
Non-veridical objects of cognition, as they appear, that are causally and non-causally efficient when one explains thus, are the definitions of correct and incorrect (conventional). [[[This is the definition of rGya's own system.]]]
The teachers explain differently.

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[124] This is verse 4 (chapter III), which is cited again in Chapter IV, 2.1.
[125] Their conventional is the *parikalpita*, which is only incorrect.
[126] These questions are answered, respectively, in §3 and §4.

3.1 The definition of the respective kinds that we assert

 [[[The definition of correct conventional is:]]] a non-veridical object of knowledge as it appears that is causally efficient when one explains as such, and [[[the definition of incorrect conventional is:]]] a non-veridical object of knowledge [[[as it appears]]] that is incapable of causal efficacy when one explains as such.

3.2 Analyzing the assertions of the teachers

A-Jotsün

1 Jotsün's views
The teachers [[[Jotsün]]] say the following:
This[127] just in accordance with the statement [[[by Lotsawa]]] that "it [[[teaching these three]]] is in order to refute [[[three]]] wrong conceptions, namely:[128]

(1) Asserting the void of the imagined (nature) that is the perfected to be the ultimate, according to [[[what is said in the *Satyadvaya* (SDV 8ab)]]]:

> A [[[causally active]]] *mere thing that is void of an imagined object,*
> *which arises in dependence (is to be known as correct conventional)*

(2) Asserting [[[(what is causally efficient) to be the ultimate]]] (as stated by Dharmakīrti, PV 1.166ab, PVin 2.56ab):

> *What is capable of causal efficacy, this, here, is what is ultimately*
> *existent.*

(3) Asserting, as Sthīramati, etc., that "because it is interdependent, it exists ultimately."[129]

[[[This is correct, but categorizing unilaterally is not correct:]]]
Thus, because it can be defined by either [[[individually]]] (i) 'causally efficient', which indicates as [[[as correct conventional consisting in]]] a *cause* or by (ii) 'arising in dependence', which indicates as [[[as correct conventional consisting in]]] an *effect*, (iii) the conjunction (of these two, i.e., 'interdependent') is not necessary. This being the case,

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[127] Jotsün might be referring to the definition of correct conventional in terms of causal efficacy, or, as the rest of the statement seems to imply, to three alternative definitions of correct conventional, namely "arising in dependence," "causally active," and "interdependent."

[128] A parallel passage in Phya pa's commentary on the SDV (15b8-16a2) explains the necessity to formulate the three in order to refute three wrong understandings:
(i) to counter the idealists who hold that the dependent void of the imagined is the ultimate
(ii) to counter proponents of conventional means of valid cognition who hold that what is causally efficient is ultimate (the same passage of PV/PVin is cited)
(iii) to counter Sthīramati who holds that 'interdependent' is pervaded by 'ultimate entity'
To counter these three, 'correct conventional' (for the Madhyamaka, what was the 'ultimate' for these three) is identified as (I) void of imagined, (ii) causally efficient, (iii) arisen in dependence.
In the *Snying po* as well (T p. 23–24), the three options are described as "characterizations" meant to each eliminate one mistaken understanding of the ultimate (without text-passages being cited).
Phya pa can thus be understood to follow rNgog Lo's interpretation on the interpretation of these three options.

[129] Perhaps a reference to *Triṃśikāvijñāpti-bhāṣya*, 16.15–16: *vijñānaṃ punaḥ pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'stīty abhyupeyaṃ*

a fourth option that the previous generations[130] assert, (iv) 'commonly appearing' in addition to these three, is absolutely not the case.

2 Refutation of Jotsün (assessment)
[[[Refutation of that]]]
Considering what precedes, 'capable of causal efficacy' (i) defines something as an 'entity' and 'arising in dependence' (ii) defines something as 'produced', but they do not define something as 'correct conventional', because these [[[what is defined as 'entity' or 'produced' and what is defined as 'correct conventional']]] are different concepts, like 'produced' and 'impermanent'.

[[[If one thinks: correct conventional is defined by 'non-erroneous']]]
If the definiens is 'non-erroneous' without specification, there would be absurd consequences [[[that 'produced' (would define) 'impermanent']]]. Further, [[['entity' and 'correct conventional' would not be distinct concepts, so]]] when establishing something [[[pleasure, form, etc.]]] to be an entity, that would already be established to be correct conventional. Therefore, the reasoning consisting in proving something [[[conventional]]] to be conventional by negating that it is ultimate [[[truth]]] would be pointless.[131]
But it has also been stated [[[by Jotsün]]] that the proof that something is conventional depends on (such) an argument [[[it is said that the negation of the four alternatives of arising, etc., establishes something to be conventional]]].

B.Gangpa

1- Gangpa's position
In this regard also, [[[Gangpa ('s position):]]], it is said [[[by Gangpa]]]:
> It can be defined by either 'void of an imagined (nature)' taken as an implicative negation, 'capable of causal efficacy', or 'arisen in dependence'. Thus, the teaching of the three is a 'characterization'.[132] [[[He is not saying that 'void of an imagined (nature)' taken as a simple negation is the definiens.]]]
> Thus, [[[the ancient generations]]] making 'commonly appearing' the definiens, having taken as a definitional basis what is endowed with these three properties, is [[[true, but]]] merely suitable to be found in Scriptures, but is like before [[[(like) the three, 'void of an imagined nature' taken as an implicative negation, etc., by any of which it can be defined]]].

2- Assessment (by Gyamarwa)
It is agreed [[[I agree with him]]] that the implicative negation of 'imagined' [[[having previously presented himself the so-called to be a "characterization"]]] is 'causally

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[130] Track source of this position.
[131] A similar argument is made in 121.ii when discussing the definition of 'conventional' as 'what accords with appearances'.
[132] The author opposes here *upalakṣaṇa* to *lakṣaṇa* - there can be only one *lakshana* per definiendum. *Upalakṣaṇa* could also be translated as "illustration." In consideration of the conclusion (§4 below), Gangpa's position would be that each of the three, individually, is a definiens, but that the three (together) are an "illustration."

efficient that is void when analyzed' [[[this one is posited as the definiens]]]. But the last two [[['capable of causal efficacy' and 'arisen in dependence']]] are definienda of other phenomena [[[than conventional, namely "produced" and "entity", like said in the example]]].

3 (C-)Lotsawa

3.1 Lotsawa's position

Further [[[Lotsawa]]] 'void of imagined (nature)' etc. are *characterizations* of the nature of correct conventional [[[there is a single nature, in which one makes distinctions of correct and mistaken phenomena]]] [[[they are not definienda]]][133]

- because what is established substantially does not depend on being posited by a definiens [[[the nature of correct conventional is established substantially, thus (it does not depend on) a definiens for that]]]
- and because 'void of [[[conceptually]]] imagined (nature)' [[[if taken to be the definiens of correct conventional]]] extends to objects of non-conceptual erroneous cognition.

Thus, [[['void of imagined (nature), etc.]]] are called individual "characterizations" of the nature itself.

What is stated (in SDV 12ab):

> Because they are, although similar in appearance, capable and not capable of causal efficacy

[[[For this nature, which has many properties, there are the two properties one refers to conventionally as "correct" and "mistaken"]]]

are the definienda of the respective properties, correct and mistaken.

[a]

Objection: What is the difference [[[regarding what is capable and incapable of causal efficacy]]] between correct—mere entity, etc., that are properties characterizing correct conventional—and mistaken—the opposite of this, non-entity, etc [[['completely imagined' being the definiens of mistaken conventional is explained in the *Small Commentary*, but....]]]? Indeed, both [[[what is capable and incapable of causal efficacy, ultimately]]] are mistaken because they are inadmissible by valid cognition and because they [[[these two]]] are similarly the support of error.

Answer: In worldly conventions, it is said that 'deceiving' and 'non-deceiving' are the states of affairs that are (respectively) mistaken and correct and that their definienda are causally efficient and not causally efficient.

3.2 Assessment

When one reflects upon this, it may be true that the nature [[[of correct conventional]]] established substantially does not depend on a definiens, but what fault is there for [[[the

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[133] In Phya pa's commentary on the SDV (16a2-16a5), the refutation of their being "definiens" relies on the rejection that each can be a definiens individually, that pairs of two of them cannot be a definiens, and that the association of the three cannot be a definiens. Similarly in *sNying po* (T p. 23), Phya pa rejects these seven options.

implicative negation 'void of imagined nature' etc.]]] to be the definiens that posits something as being taken conventionally as 'correct conventional'?

[[[If it is the case that, because the nature (of) conventional is established substantially, a definiens is not necessary even for being taken conventionally (as 'conventional'), it is contradictory? with saying that (correct conventional?) can be defined by either 'capable of causally efficacy' or 'arisen in dependence' individually ▮▮▮▮]]]

Otherwise, why would one need [[[as definiens]]] 'generated by causes and conditions' for what is produced, which is established substantially?

[[[Furthermore,]]] just like this, why would one need [[[as definiens]]] 'capable of causal efficacy' for entity without specification, which is established substantially?
Retort: It is the property [[[the definiens]]] for being taken conventionally as 'existing entity'
Parallel: It would be the same as well [[[for being taken conventionally as 'correct conventional']]].

In the same way, positing something as 'mistaken conventional' also relies on a definiens.

4. Conclusion (of Gangs pa)
Thus, either of the following is suitable [[[as definiens]]]
- Void of imagined nature and entity without specification [[[insofar as one defines as 'correct conventional' from the perspective of consisting as a cause]]]
- Void of imagined nature and arisen in dependence [[[thereby (from the perspective) of an effect]]]
- The implicative negation 'void of imagined nature'

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Thus, I have explained the definiens of the varieties of conventional by (1) the respective definiens of varieties that I assert, and (2) analyzing the position of the teachers.

4. What has this definition
What has these definitions [[[that are asserted by the respective proponents among the philosophical systems]]]?

[[[Among the two items: (4.1) refutation of other positions by Gya(marwa) and (4.2) presentation of his own position, the refutation:]]]

4.1 Refutation of other scholars
If we explain some of the many systems of those (Mādhyamikas) who adopt a philosophical position,

411 Presentation of Jotsün's position
[[[Regarding Jotsün's statements, among the two items, the presentation of his own position]]]

411.1 Jotsün's own position – Madhyamikas should not adopt any philosophical system on the conventional level

The teachers say as follows: It is impossible to present (i) the duality of object and mind or (ii) Yogācāra, or specifically, [[[for (i)]]] Sautrāntika or in agreement with Vaibhāṣika, or [[[for (ii)]]] True- or False-representationalism. When they are posited, one refutes them.

411.2 Jotsün's refutation of philosophical positions

[[[...(titles and subdivisions of this section are given here, with reference to the first word of each subsection)...]]]

411.21 Refutation of Lotsa's non-representationalism
411.211 Presentation of Lotsa's view

As follows:

411.211.1 The authoritative text that establishes that correct conventionalities are just like they appear

Distinct things are the object of respective determinations of the own continuum.
This is clarified by the following:

- Regarding the statement that (regarding the nature of the imagined) "it is just [[[mind itself]]] that appears as such," it is said (in the SDV-V) "is rejected by the world" [[[i.e., saying "this is incorrect thus"]]] (in answer to the suggestion that the imagined is just mind being agitated by ignorance), and

- like it is explained in the *Commentary on the Treatise on the Two Truths*[134] in answer to [[[the objection (in SDV-V]]] "There is vision in dreams and so forth [[[even if the object is non-existent]]]" [[[consequently, say the idealists, "external reality is not real"]]]:

"If it were true" that what is [[[merely]]] seen [[[an object in a dream]]] is an existent object "to you, the wicked, who cling" to the philosophical system of the idealists [[[you became wicked because of clinging]]], it appears falsely that '[[[in a dream, even though there is no object]]] mind itself appears as such" [[[this object of dream, which is not mind is (wrongly taken to be)[135] mind.]]]

411.211.2 Establishment by reasoning
[[This is the (position) of Lotsa]]
In this case, this is precisely like this:
[[[Lotsa explains that dream objects also are true as external objects, conventionally.]]]
All things that are examined by reasoning [[[whether mind or extra-mental objects]]] are not found.
However, as for "merely appearing as such", since there is establishment as something causally efficient, etc., as precisely distinct [[[i.e., external from the mind]]], dreams

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[134] This might refer to Śāntarakṣita's SDV-pañjikā, but this is not a literal citation.
[135] Although the manuscript reads "dang", we translate in the sense of "du", i.e., "taking what is not mind to be mind", as explaining what is wrong about the opponent's position.

etc. also are endowed with an [[[existent]]] object [[[insofar as it is distinct from the mind]]] – this is the Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika.

411.211.3 Rejecting the objection that the apprehender is not established
[[[In this regard, there is the presentation of the objection and its rejection]]]

(a) Presentation of the objection (I.e., of standard objections against Vaibhashika)
This position [[[of Vaibhāṣika]]] [[[those who accept external objects conventionally]]] is not invalidated by [[[arguments]]] such as
(i) since they (object and cognition) are distinct and simultaneous, there can be no relation (between them); [[[since they are distinct, identity does not apply, and since they are simultaneous, there is no relation of causality either]]] hence they cannot be apprehender and apprehended, or
(ii) [[[for (a cognition) that apprehends without there being a relation (with an apprehended)]]] there is no immediate cause for the respective awareness of objects [[[visual cognition realizes form but does not realize sound]]], etc

(b) Rejection of the objection
Ultimate apprehender and apprehended that are not invalidated when analyzing by such [[[arguments]]] [[[one that is not invalidated would be ultimate, but such one]]] is not asserted. Thus, it [[[the conventional]]] is like an illusion.
For this very reason, it is just like it is explained in the *Pañjika* (the SDV-dka' 'grel)[136] in answer to the objection that when one dreams of a big mountain in a small house, it is not correct that a big bodily thing [[[the mountain]]] fits in a small place [[[the house]]], namely, that if one explains thus [[[if one accepts an ultimate mountain, the invalidation would apply, however]]], there is no ultimate mountain, but it [[[the big mountain in the small house]]] is attested just as it appears.

411.211.4 Otherwise it would be the same in the case of aspects
[[[These arguments invalidate their acceptance and assertion ultimately]]]
Otherwise,[137] for the one who accept aspects [[[like the Sautrāntikas]]], it would not be the case that there is no invalidation [[[(not the case that one is) liberated from the faults]]]. Indeed, it is refuted by the refutation stated for instance (in the SDV [[[aspect does not entail an extra-mental object]]]:

> *[A cognition that does not have the form of an object cannot cognize the object]. Neither can the opposite, because the aspect is not a valid*

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[136] This is not a literal citation from the Panjika, and the discussion in this passage actually has another scope: refuting idealists who use the "dream argument" to refute external reality and argue in favor of false appearances being just the agitated mind.
[137] Alternatively, one could correct *khas blangs pas* to *khas blangs pa* and translate "those who assert aspects would not be free from invalidation"

*cognition (of the object) and because it cannot be (the cognition of
an object).*

411.211.5 There is no means of proof for aspects (-> for external reality/for object distinct from mind) not existing

"Certitude of co-apprehension" etc. is not a correct logical reason (to prove idealism/to disprove external reality) because externality is established by perception [[[because (perception) eliminates the thesis that (the object) is not distinct from the mind]]].

The above-stated position [[[of Lotsa]]] is extremely difficult to hold:

[[[This is because the following three are said to be … ignorance by Jo btsun: (i) According to Lotsa, everything up to the object of dreams is asserted to be ultimately a basis (/always asserted to be ultimate); (ii) according to the Sautrāntikas, aspects are accepted; (iii) according to the idealists, one accepts (objects) to be the mind.]]]

411.212 Refutation of Lotsa's view by Jotsün

[[[Regarding this refutation of Lotsa, there are two rebuttals: (i) it undermines the accepted presentation, and (ii) it follows that something that is not accepted is established]]]

411.212.1 (C1) It undermines what one accepts

This (dreams being true) is refuted by these explanations of Vinītadeva in the commentary on the *Sāntanāntarasiddhi:*

Thus [[[the object of dreams being true]]], when dreaming that one kills a man in a dream, it would be a capital offence, or [[[if one thinks that the factors are not complete, even in that case]]] there would be a fundamental sin [[[of taking a life]]], and [[[when sleeping here]]] when one dreams that one goes to another country, one would become two continua [[[one is in the bed, and one is walking elsewhere]]]. If being [[[the continuum that is]]] in another country was true because just what appears is true, [[[when one dreams of having gone somewhere else]]] even if the body inside the house is being cut and chopped up, it would not be a fundamental sin (for the killer) and the person [[[although killed]]] would [[[later]]] return from elsewhere [[[from the place where it had gone]]].

And further, the discreet results of actions would not be definite [[[saying that the result of virtue is happiness, etc.]]], because the dreamed obtaining of a bad rebirth as the result of virtue also would be true as such.
Similarly, the dreamed arising of something that has the characteristic of smoke from something that is not fire also would be true, therefore it would also be the end of logical reasons qua effect etc., conventionally.

411.212.2 (C2) It establishes what one does not accept

[[[Something that is not accepted is established]]]

[Parallel argument between Dream-objects (D1) and God (D2)]

Further, if one asserts [[[Lo tsa, etc.'s (position)]]] that "all appearances are true as such [[[as they appear]]], and all statements [[[to non-aspectualists]]] of refuting arguments merely negate ultimately [[[because they invalidate something accepted to be ultimate]]]", [[[it would follow that]]] the doubt that all things such as God [[[which you assert not to exist conventionally]]], etc. [[[a permanent entity asserted to be creator of sound etc.]]] would also exist as correct conventionalities would not be removed.

[[[If it (God) is asserted to be the cause of sound etc.. does it generate it at once or sequentially?

- in the former case (i.e., at once), having generated all effects at one time, it does not generate later, thus previously it would be something that generates and subsequently, it would be something that does not generate, therefore it would follow that it is not permanent
- In the latter case (i.e., sequentially) also it would follow that it is not permanent.

Objection: [[[If one negates (God) by saying:]]] [[[it does not exist conventionally]]] because it is not the cause of sound at once (or sequentially either) [[[(indeed), God, if it exists as a permanent singularity, is one (and being a cause invalidates singularity)]]].

Answer: This [[[a refutation by this argument]]] is merely a refutation of ultimate God. [[[Just like for instance the above presentation by him [[[Jñānagarbha]]] of a refutation against objects of dreams is a refutation of something ultimate]]]

Then, there is a contradiction between the teaching that even the object of dreams is true and the statement of the Teacher Jñānagarbha himself:

> (Buddhas) see one thing [[[an effect]]] following from another [[[a cause]]].
> [[[This explains that the effect of actions is definite.]]]

[[[Thus, the explanation of the Commentary that asserts that even the object of dreams is true is said (by Ngok) to be the intention of Jñānagarbha (but it is not).]]]

411.22 Refutation of Sautrāntika representationalism by Jotsün

[[[Regarding the refutation of the representationalist Sautrantika, there are two points: (B1) there is no means of proof and (B2) it follows that an object that is not asserted, such as God, etc., would be established]]]

(B1) There is no means of proof

Objection: What about the apprehension of objects by means of aspects?

Answer: [[[Jo btsun said that this also is incorrect]]] When everything that appears is mind, there is no means of proving an [[[external]]] object distinct (from the mind) [[[that projects an aspect]]].

[[[**Objection**: External (objects) are established by contraposition.]]]

Their having specificity of place and time [[[appearing here/now, and not appearing elsewhere/at another (time)]]], etc. (and other features that could be associated with external objects projecting an aspect), is due to traces [[[that are stable or not stable]]], like it is asserted in the case of dreams [[[although there is no object it is asserted to appear]]].

Thus, saying "something external is established by contraposition" [[[according to the Sautrantika, saying "if one excludes an external object, appearance of form, etc., is excluded; therefore, external objects exist"]]] is inconclusive [[[because it is uncertain whether (appearance) is excluded due to the exclusion of an external object or (due to) the exclusion of traces]]]. Therefore, this [[[external object]]] also lacks a means of proof, just like God.

(B2)(Parallel argument: External object (D1) is parallel to God (D2)
[[[Second point]]]
[[[If one accepts external objects in spite of there being no means of proof, one has to accept also God, etc.]]]
Objection (D2): Because it is not correct that a permanent God would be causally active sequentially or at once, it is refuted [[[there is a refuting argument against God]]]. Therefore, it [[[God]]] is determined to be non-existent. [[[Therefore, it is not similar to (external) objects]]]
Parallel (D1): An [[[external]]] object also [[[is accepted to be non-existent]]] because it is neither one nor many.
Answer to the parallel (D1): This [[[a logical reason such as "neither one nor many"]]] is an ultimate examination [[[therefore it refutes an ultimate external object; it does not invalidate something conventional]]].
Parallel answer (D2): This is the same [[[(in the case of) God]]].
One has to state the difference pertaining to the characteristic of the examination [[[as having the aspect of ultimate or of conventional]]].
[[[Namely, (one has to state) the specificity of the distinction between arguments that concern the ultimate and those that concern the conventional - The invalidation of God is the invalidation of something conventional, but the invalidation of an (external) object is the invalidation of something ultimate.]]]

411.23 Refutation of idealism (by Jotsün)
[[[Further, third point, (considering) idealism:]]]
(A)
Objection: [[[It is said:]]] [[[Because there is no difference between the arguments pertaining to (external) objects and to God, it is true that it is not possible to posit objects, nevertheless,]]] since it is established by experience, mere consciousness is accepted to exist as a correct conventional.
Answer: [[[Given that the establishment of mere consciousness requires negating objects]]] Mere consciousness without negating (external) objects is not proper, therefore it is necessary to negate [[[objects]]]. Given that,
[[[Objection: Objects are refuted by the neither-one-nor-many (argument), etc.]]]
This [[[the argument refuting (external) objects]]] is the same for mind as well,
[[[As follows, Objection: something external is not true, but consciousness is true. Answer: nevertheless]]], the difference between [[[logical]]] analysis concerning the conventional or the ultimate [[[in terms of "the logic of this argument is a logic that

negates ultimately, but the logic of that is conventional"]]] is not found. This has already been said.

Therefore, if one accepts that (things are) true as they appear [[[in the way it is asserted by Lotsa, that things up to the object of dreams are true]]], there are major absurd consequences [[[due to dream objects]]].
[[[If one thinks, "is it then consciousness"? It is not either.]]]
The teaching of a means of refutation [[[namely, 'neither one nor many']]] for some things [[[God and (external) objects]]], is the same also for others [[[proponents of mind-only]]],[[[the cases of God and of (external) objects are the same, and the cases of objects and mind also are the same; thus in the end, the cases of God and mind also come to be the same]]] because a difference between arguments is not found. Thus [[[according to Jotsün]]] one cannot put forward [[[unilaterally]]] (the view) [[[whether for representationalism or non-representationalism]]] "it [[[the conventional]]] is just like that."

If one says: [[[Even though a difference between arguments is not found]]]
Scriptures put forward [[[one of them as true]]]
Answer: [[[Because there is similar support for both in one scripture or another]]]
A (pro idealist scriptures)
According to the saying of the Protector Maitreya, etc., that the 'vessel-like world' conforms to pure mind (Ref.? Prob. sutralamkara), Yogācāra is true. Just like [[[for example]]] when one person cultivates the path it is not another that becomes liberated, [[[Are objects true? If they are true]]] those [objects] which are [true] as they are in the mind of one person also would not become objects for another. [[[Mind is true because of what precedes.]]]
In the same way, this [[[view of mind only]]] is also established by the saying that for hungry ghosts, water appears as pus and blood, etc. (ref? Jñānacatuṣkasūtra?)
B (pro realist scriptures)
[[[Scripture that concords with the statement that external objects exist]]] But according to the statement that "the animate world having emptied gradually, the [[[empty]]] vessel is destroyed gradually by seven fires (/suns), one water, etc." (ref. Sattasūriya sutta, Aṅguttara-Nikāya 7.66?), an external object is attested, because a vessel in which something animate is not attested could not appear to mind [[[because it is contradictory for there to be appearance to mind in the absence of mind]]].

Therefore, a single [[[unilateral]]] presentation is not established [[[to be true]]] [[[by scriptures]]].

411.3 Summary
Thus, when analyzing by these analyses [[[the above arguments]]] according to which none of these positions can be established, the division pertaining to the conventional for Madhyamaka is undecided.
So says Jotsün.

Evaluation of what precedes:

412.0 Summary (of Jotsün's arguments)

(i) (cf. 411.21) Regarding the position [[[of Lo tsa]]] that even the object of dreams is true,

- The (asserted) presentation would be destroyed (cf. 411.212.1), because -presentations of the result of actions, etc., all of them would be destroyed. -and if all refutation-statements pertaining to the object of dreams merely refute an ultimate object, it would also be impossible to refute that God, etc., all of them, are correct conventionalities [[[because when refuting (God etc), one would refute an ultimate (God, etc.)]]].
- And there would be absurd consequences (cf. 411.212.2) [[[because dreams – that are asserted to be correct conventionalities – and God – which is not asserted to be so – are similar]]]

Non-aspectualism is refuted [[[by these two]]].

(ii) (cf. 411.22)
- Representationalism [[[Sautrāntika]]] is refuted since there is no means of proving [[[external]]] objects (B1), and there is a refuting argument parallel to the one refuting God (B2).

(iii) (cf. 411.23)
- Idealism is refuted because the refuting argument for objects is parallel [[[for those who accept mind]]] (A).
This is the summary of the statements as they are.

[[[Regarding the refutation of Jotsün there are two points: Brief presentation of the division between correct and incorrect (arguments) and extensive explanation of that.
As for the first:]]]

412.1 Brief explanation = Examining which of Jotsün's arguments against philosophical systems are correct

Thus, just like the refutation of an (external) object is parallel with that of god, the apprehension of an (external) object is to be refuted (by) what is said (in the SDV):

> *A cognition that does not have the aspect (of the object) cannot be the cognizer of the object.*
>
> *Neither can the opposite, because the aspect is not a valid cognition (establishing the object) and because it cannot be (the cognition of an object).*

The argument (refuting aspects) is parallel to the following one (refuting Space [or God] in the PV:)

(Space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other conditions) because they (these other conditions) are not all at once causes of sound, etc.

because [[[In addition, as for the parallel with god, if one refutes god by this argument, then in parallel, for the aspectualists also (there would be the refutation by) "because aspects are not valid cognitions", etc.
And if one says that (the refutation of) god is a conventional argument and the refutation of aspects is ultimate, then also for these arguments,]]]
one does not find a distinction of analysis (between the 2 levels of reality).

[[[Moreover]]] the awareness of pleasure, etc. also is similar to the case of God [[[for both there is no means of proof and there is a refuting argument]]], because it is said that the refutation of God and external objects is parallel, and it is also said that (the cases of) external objects and consciousness [[[which is parallel to God]]] are parallel.

In this regard, the following is said:

(i) If dreams were true, the asserted presentations would be destroyed (1), and there would be overreaching consequences that are not accepted (2).

(ii) There is no means of proof for (external) objects (for) aspectualists (3).

(iii) The remainder (of the arguments) invoke the fault of not distinguishing between arguments that are not clarified (?).
Therefore, the distinction is to be known.

This is the brief presentation of correct (arguments) [[[1-3]]] and incorrect ones [[[the remainder]]].

412.2 Extensive explanation = Refuting the rejection of philosophical systems in favor of worldly conventions
[[[The second point, extensively:]]]
[[[If, like Jotsün one does not accept a specific tenet-system]]] [[[There are two options to investigate:]]] Is this [[[specific tenet-system]]] not apprehended ever? Or [[[although asserted (in general?) in the context of epistemology]]] [[[just not accepted]]] in the Madhyamaka context?

[[[If one does not accept ever a context in which there is a specific tenet-system, there are four faults:
i. Something generic is not possible [[[cf, i]]]
ii. If one accepts common appearance, non-aspectualism is established [[[cf. ii]]]

412.21 It is contradictory to reject specific positions in the Madhyamaka context while not rejecting the presentations of epistemology, etc.

The first (not apprehended ever) is not the case,

i. Something generic is impossible

Those who say "Let us not decide on a convention!" [[[Jotsün himself]]] do actually maintain the presentation of means of valid cognition conventionally, in the case of proving fire by smoke, and (perceiving) pleasure, and blue etc..

Then [[[when one maintains conventional means of valid cognition]]] does one infer the latencies of fire from the appearance as smoke, or does one infer fire itself from [[[external]]] smoke itself?

In the same way, in what system does one posit valid cognition and its result [[[one where what is external is taken as epistemic object, or one where mental appearance is taken as epistemic object]]]?

Something generic that does not reach one specific distinction is not possible.

[[[Thus, if one infers fire from smoke itself, or if one infers the appearance as fire from the appearance as smoke, then, respectively, the tenets of realists and those of idealists apply.]]]

Objection: [[[If one said]]] In the case of entities, not touching the specific is not possible, but since we do not decide as to the specific [[[tenet]]], we do not accept [[[any specific one]]].

Answer: If this [[[not deciding as to a specific]]] comes from the preceding statement of refutation against all positions [[[specific tenets]]], then [[[given the refutation of all specific tenets]]] an investigation of (valid cognition and its) effect, etc. is not to be accepted at all, just like [[[it would be contradictory for]]] a genus [[[of man]]] [[[to be possible]]] that cannot exist in all the instances [[[of the genus of man, such as merchants, etc.]]]. [[[Just like it is contradictory to have 'tree' without specification when all the specific trees have been negated.]]]

Objection: It is not the case [[[that something generic is negated]]] by refuting specific (tenets). Rather, because a specific (tenet) is not established. [[[We do not accept (a specific) because it is not possible to establish, but we accept something generic.]]]

Answer: [[[Asserting that fire in general is inferred from smoke would be discarded]]] if no specific 'non-delusive with regard to real [[[external]]] fire (inferred) from smoke' or 'being non-delusive with regard to the latency (of fire)' is established, a generic [[['non-delusive with regard to fire']]] cannot be accepted, because [[[the generic]]] 'non-delusive' itself exists as an object of mind in dependence upon the specifics [[[non-delusive with regard to what is external or with regard to latencies]]].

ii. [[[If one accepts common appearance]]] A specific (tenet) – non-aspectualism – is established

Objection: [[[If one said, without accepting any tenet whatsoever]]] In accordance with any tenet system, (inferring fire from smoke) is commonly established (for everyone) down to the cowherds; because a logical reason qua effect [[[that is decided]]] is asserted, even without adopting any particular tenet, the generic and the specific are correct.

Answer: Then an extra-mental object is established [[[in accordance with Vaibhashika]]].
Those [[[worldly people]]] know that because smoke exists in [[[some]]] particular external place, fire exists there; thus, from a distinct smoke, a distinct fire is understood. If they [[[the worldly people]]] are not influenced by a tenet system, there would be no understanding of objects being apprehended via aspects.

It makes understood as an object what appears as distinct (from cognition) itself. Therefore the effect of valid cognition, etc., all of them, are asserted (from the point of view) of Madhyamaka that is in agreement with the Vaibhāṣika that apprehend the object without aspects.
[This is to be presented in this regard. What is it? "It shoul dnot be the case that there is not valid cognition": Because what is established as such by a conventional valid cognition <for instance extramental objects, etc.>, this cannot be invalidated by another valid cognition. Because it has been explained (by Jo btsun himself that), conventionally, there is establishment of extramental objects, without aspects, and, <when analyzing> ultimately, emptiness is true.
-> this is Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika]
This is because, there is no other definition of Vaibhāṣka-Madhyamaka apart from (the understandig of) the two truths in terms of "conventionally, an object is established without aspects, and ultimately, emptiness (is established)."

iii. This claim is contradictory with what you say yourself
Then not deciding for any system, one must also account for the refutation of God and other (i.e. extramental objects) and the non-obtaining of a correct distinction (of levels): Even if one tame the doubt whether God is refuted conventionally or ultimately, one cannot apply a refutation to an extramental object that is established conventionally by a valid cognition. If one doubts in this regard like one doubts with regard to God, this would infirm establishment by valid cognition (of blue, pleasure, etc.).
Therefore, finally, teaching that consciousness is similar to God (i.e., both are subject to the same refutation) is contradictory with you saying that mind is established conventionally by a valid cognition.
iv. Impossibility of common appearance rejecting specific positions
(iv.1 Same fault as stated before)
Objection: We accept the *mundane* common appearance, we do not decide based on a philosophical system; in what is it contradictory with teaching the similarity with the case of God?
Answer: The mundane common appearance, not influenced by a philosophical system, is the understanding that a real object is apprehend without aspect, does not exist for madmen/is not a lie (smyon du med?): if it (this common appearance) exists conventionally as a valid cognition, it cannot be opposed, therefore, extramental object

are established conventionally, and ultimately, there is emptiness – As already stated, apart from these two, what characteristic is there for those who opt for the philosophical position of the Madhyamaka who agree with the Vaibhāṣika?

(iv.2 Common appearance is not possible when rejecting specific positions)

Further, the so called "mundane common appearance", if it is a commonality of the understanding of the individual (persons), one does not go beyond the question whether it is established as common in reality or established as common as mental. Therefore there is no common appearance that does not embrace a position among mind and object dualism and Yogācāra. Because there is no other characteristic for these two apart (subscribing to the view that) conventionally the object (respectively) cognition, is established, and ultimately, emptiness.

(iv.3 What determines this)

Otherwise, this (person) would accept a Madhyamaka that does not [take] position among the philosophical positions of Madhyamaka, because he does not accept the adoption of a position due to their faults and (accepts Madhyamaka insofar as he) accepts the division of the conventional based on common appearance and, ultimately, emptiness.

But it is also said that, for the conventional, the adoption of the philosophical positions of the Madhyamaka are exhaustive.

Therefore, it is difficult to present a conventional consisting in common appearance apart from these philosophical positions.

412.22 In general, refutation of the rejection of establishment in the Madhyamaka context

Objection: in general, we accept the presentation of valid cognition etc. based on the distinction of object and mind, based on common appearance. But in the context of what the Madhyamaka accept, we do not distinguish positions that posit philosophical positions of Madhyamaka.

Answer: Regarding the very establishment of object or cognition by a commonly appearing valid cognition, the distinction of correct and incorrect (according to whether the) object is determined or superimposed, and, when explaining, that emptiness is the ultimate, this establishes the position regarding the two truths. However, would the establishment of object or cognition by a conventional valid cognition be infirmed in another context because it amounts to the acceptance of a philosophical position of madhyamaka? Or if it not infirmed, it amounts to the establishment of the position that posits object or cognition as conventional reality.

When smoke proves fire in another context, one should accept that it does so as well in the Madhyamaka context.

And when something is not established by a valid cognition in another context, one should also not apply to it the convention of common appearance in terms of "common understanding".

The inference that eliminates proliferations also would not apply if its basis, etc., were not established.

Objection: Thus, it appears necessary to accept something in general. But, because of the similarity with God, it is difficult to hold (a specific position), therefore one does not decide on one.

Answer: How is an object that is established in general by a valid cognition similar to God? If one says that "just like there is the doubt that the reasoning "because God, etc., is not a complex of cause of immediate sound" applies conventionally, there is the doubt that "neither one nor many" etc. is a means of refutation conventionally (for extramental objects), because one does not find a difference (of levels)", since it is contradictory that a thesis established by a valid cognition should be infirmed, one should not even establishment by valid cognition.

Sa bcad of 412.2
This is explained by the two points:
412.221 If one does not reject the presentation of valid cognition, etc., in general, it is contradictory to reject in particular the adoption of a position for [[[in the context of]]] Madhyamaka. There are four points:

    I. Something general [[[that does not touch the specific]]] is not possible [[[for this, tshad mar? Spang?...is not possible]]]

    II. [[[If one accepts common worldly appearance]]] Something specific, non-aspectualism, is established

    III. [[[If one says that this might be the case]]] It is contradictory with what is stated [[[namely, that "no specific tenets whatsoever are determined"]]]

    IV. [[[If one says that even though one accepts common appearance, there is no determination that depends on tenets]]] Common appearance that eliminates tenets is not possible

412.222 [[[If one thinks that it is established in general but refuted in the Madhyamaka context]]] The refutation that there is establishment in general but refutation in the Madhyamaka context

Versified summary
    If perception – of blue, etc. - and inference – (based on) smoke, etc. are necessary, one has to opt for some specific (system). Otherwise, something generic (idea of 'validity') is impossible.

If one accepts in agreement with people not influenced by philosophical systems, non-aspectualist realism is established, therefore a specific system taking a position is established.
This also refutes that one can (simultaneously) not decide in general, and not have the distinction between incorrect and correct regarding, respectively, God and others. Although faults are expressed with regard to philosophical systems, if there is no contradiction with accepting common appearance, one agrees with non-aspectualist realism, therefore, as explained before, the adoption of a position is established.
And since a mundane common appearance apart from cognition of an object or consciousness is impossible, it is not possible to reject all the philosophical positions consisting in the adoption of an external object or Yogācāra.
Common appearance that is an object established by a valid cognition cannot be rejected in all cases, but would be difficult to posit in the Madhyamaka system. If one rejected in

the Madhyamaka system an object established elsewhere by a valid cognition, wouldn't it bring about the philosophical position eliminating appearance?

Thus, if the object is established by a valid cognition, a system of the conventional must be posited. In the scope of elimination, it is established as emptiness. This is the definition of Madhyamaka that adopts a position.}

...

413 Presentation of Gangpa's position

413.1 Gangpa's refutation of other scholars

   a. *Gangpa's refutation of non-representationalism akin to Lotsa's position*

   b. *Gangpa's refutation of Jotsün's adoption of worldly conventions and rejection of all philosophical systems*

   c. *Gangpa's refutation of the rejection of a division between correct and incorrect conventional*

413.2 Gangpa's own position

414 Refutation of Gangs pa by Gyamarwa

4.2 Gyamarwa's own position

VI. The means of valid cognition

1. The means of valid cognition establishing the definiens of conventional truth

1.1 The direct means of valid cognition establishing the definiens of conventional truth

[Verse]

{Just the conventional nature is established by perception that apprehends form etc. or by inference. But awareness being mistaken and the object being like a mirage is established indirectly via the action of these two means of valid cognition, relying on the negation of truth. However, [[[for "those who look on this side"]]] a valid cognition that directly evaluates falcidity is not possible.}

1.2 Rejecting the rejoinder that there is the same fault as the one posited with regard to illusion
…

1.3
…

1.4 Rejecting the rejoinder that appearance would become ultimate

{Thus, the following [[[rejoinder]]] is also rejected:

> Since appearance is not the negandum, it is not invalidated by reasoning. And it is established by the reasoning that evaluates appearance itself. Therefore, since it is established by reasoning and not invalidated by reasoning, it would be ultimate.

Indeed, the awareness that evaluates appearance is, in this context, not established by reasoning; by negating a veridical object, on establishes (awareness) to be mistaken.}
[[[Up to here, this is the statement of Zangs pa Jo btsun.

[[[Here, what dGe bshes Gangs pa says is correct, namely: the awareness that evaluates appearance, from the point of view of reasoning consciousness, does not bear on mistaken objects. But it just positing a convention ?)
Objection: …]]]

Also, other teachers [[[Gangs pa]]] explain: …
Thus, it is not necessary to reject the rejoinder. [[[One does not admit that it is mistaken]]]

2 The means of valid cognition of those of limited vision – Following Gangs pa she'us account

Thus, it must be understood to be established from the action of the two means of valid cognition of those of limited vision.

The reasoning that negates 'veridical' itself is what determines 'ultimate'. And it is itself [[[to be understood by]]] the inference of "those [[[people]]] who look to this side". Therefore, I will present it based on the practice of other teachers [[[She'u]]] who state:
(2.1) The identification of the five members: subject, etc.
(2.2) How to apprehend inference based on those
(2.3) …
(2.4) The result of practice: the non-conceptual wisdom that corresponds to appearance

2.1 The identification of the five members: subject, etc.

i. The subject

The subject can be either what is termed "internal or external" or what is termed "stated by myself or others", namely, according to appearance.

[[[Jo btsun]]] It is the appearance without specification, not characterized as being true or false. Not being characterized as true or false, common appearance is established…

The following explanation [[[… by Gangs pa]]] has the same meaning.
> What appears and what is imputed, taken together, is not established for us [[[Buddhists]]]; and what is distinct from imagined is not established for the opponent [[[the Tirtika]]]. … is not the subject. One posits as subject appearance without distinction of what appears and what is imputed.

But the previous convention [[[that of Jo btsun]]] is the correct one.
…

ii. The negandum

(1) Khyung rin chen grags: The negandum is what is imputed
The negandum [[[according to Rin (chen) grags, is what is imputed. And it is imputed as follows:]]] is what is accepted by those who conceive something to be real to have a nature that is found to resist analysis.
If one analyses [[[this negandum]]],
- it is not an awareness [[[the latter is established by reflexive awareness, therefore it cannot be negated]]]
- it is not what appears to it (i.e., to awareness) [[[this also cannot be negated]]]
- it is not external [[[because what is established as a particular also cannot be negated]]]
- It is not what is superimposed [[[because it exists insofar as it is superimposed, it is not to be negated either]]]
[[[Then what is it?]]]

It is what is determined to be [[[a particular]]] external to the superimposition. It is thus characterized as 'imputed' [[[insofar as it is determined to be an object external to superimposition]]].

> Thus, here [[[in the context of the negandum]]], it is correct to negate
> just what is imputed in this way [[[the determination of something
> superimposed to be external]]]. (SDV 30ab)[138]

> The negation of imputation is characterized by the negation as
> "genuine." (SDV, intermediate verse following v. 30)[139]

[[[In this way,]]] These (verses), etc. explain that what is imputed is the negandum. It is what one oneself superimposes as being veridical in the sense of resisting analysis, and has the characteristic of being determined to be external [[[without knowing it to be superimposed]]].

(a) (Khyung's) criticism of Śaṅkara(nandana)'s position: the negandum is what is real [[[Analysis of Shankaranandana's position]]] Thus, the Brahmin Śaṅkara(nandana) explains that the entity itself is the negandum, because it is said [[[in this way]]] (in PV 1.210/PVin 3.57):

> Those who do not deny the verbal object consider only the entity by way of the
> distinction between the options: existent or non-existent, for the emergence of
> an effect is dependent on this.

[[[If what is intended is like this, it is correct.]]] If (this explanation amounts to) "the negation of determining as an entity when determining as anything," that is not correct.[140] Moreover, in the context of negating the object of superimposition [[[while not asserting (awareness) to be determining as an entity, since it is superimposed, (one asserts) it (the object of the superimposing awareness) to be an entity that is the negandum]]], if one asserts this [[[the negandum]]] to be just the entity, it is extremely unfortunate because (1) if the object [[[of awareness]]] is an entity, the awareness cannot be superimposing [[[because it cognizes it as an entity]]], and
(2) [[[if awareness were superimposing, it would be correct that its object, which is imputed, is negated, however]]] it is not proper for what is not the object of a superimposing [[[awareness]]] [[[i.e., an entity]]] to be negated. [[[because through this (negation of an entity which is not the object of the superimposing awareness) the superimposition is not eliminated.]]]

Thus, what is imputed [[[by mind]]] through superimposition [[[upon the object of the superimposing (awareness)]]] to be existing as resisting analysis, [[[this, which exists as

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[138] Eckel translates: It is right to use [reason] to deny just what is imagined.
[139] Eckel translates: When we negate [the things] that [others] imagine, [the qualification] "in a real sense" does not qualify the negation.
[140] We understand this to mean that when determining something as an entity in the case where a real entity exists, there is no ground for negating the determination as an entity.

resisting analysis,]]] this, which is imputed as an external particular, precisely is the negandum.

(2) Rejection of a rejoinder against Jo btsun (=Khyung) himself, by dGe bshes [[[Rejection of rejoinders against Jo btsun himself]]]
Objection: If this imputation [[[that is (according to you) the negandum]]] is devoid of one or many, since the logical reason ('neither one nor many') would occur in the negandum, it would be inconclusive. And if it [[[the negandum]]] is not devoid of [[[one or many]]] it would become an entity [[[which is one or many]]]. [[[This is the rejoinder.]]]

Answer [[[of dGe bshes: "]]] (a) It is not inconclusive, because when considering its nature [[[or mode of existence]]], in reality, (what is imputed) is neither one nor many. In reality, it is grouped with the *similar instances*, what is devoid of nature.[141] (b) As for (what is imputed) being the negandum from the point of view of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness), since it is thus understood to be one or many [[[to the extent that it is imputed as an entity]]], the logical reason ('neither one nor many') does not occur (in it).[[["]]][142]

(3) Refutation of Jo btsun (by Gangs pa (?))
Let us consider this (what preceded); what is imputed is not the negandum. [[[Here, there are seven points:]]]

(i) The logical reason 'neither one nor many' would be inconclusive in reality
Otherwise [[[if what is imputed were the negandum]]]:
If (according to your answer to the objection in §2 above) what is [[[asserted to be]]] the negandum from the perspective of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness) (cf. option b), this precisely, from that perspective, is one or many, and [[[Considering this idea: In reality, something is either devoid of one and many, or not devoid. If it is devoid (of one and many) the logical reason applies (to the negandum), therefore, the reason is inconclusive. If it is not devoid (of on and many), (the negandum, what is imputed) becomes an entity.]]][143]
it is in reality devoid of one and many (cf. option a), since the logical reason is in reality inconclusive, what help would there be from the fact that it is not inconclusive [[[in general]]] from the perspective of superimposition?

(ii) The logical reason 'neither one nor many' can be inconclusive from the perspective of superimposition
[[[Further,]]] It is also possible that a superimposing (awareness) itself [[[—since conceptual appearance is not fixed, one can conceive in any way whatsoever; therefore, sometimes]]] would impute [[[as devoid (of one and many)]]] as an entity that is neither

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[141] The logical reason qualifies the subject, and is present in similar instances. It would have been inconclusive if it were present in **dissimilar instances**.
[142] Therefore, the logical reason does not occur in it; it does not even satisfy the characteristic of *pakṣadharmatā*. A fortiori, it connot be inconclusive.
[143] This gloss rephrases the objection against Khyung formulated in (2).

one nor many. Therefore, from this perspective (cf. b) also, (the logical reason) would be on occasion inconclusive.

(iii) A third alternative beside affirmation and negation would not be eliminated
[[[Moreover]]], if
- the subject 'imputed' alone itself is, from the perspective of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness) (cf. b), a *dissimilar instance* because it is a negandum (from that perspective).
- and [[[this (subject,) 'imputed']]], in reality (cf. a), is a *similar instance* given that it is grouped with what lacks a nature,
[[[i.e., if it was both the negandum, and a similar instance]]], there would be a third option which would be a class that is both[144], therefore, one could not eliminate a third alternative by these two [[[affirmation and negation (of the property to be proven)]]].

(iv) The negandum would not be eliminated when the probandum is established
For this very reason [[[that there is no excluded middle]]], it is not contradictory for probandum and negandum to be co-referential. Therefore, even when the probandum [[[lacking a nature]]] is established, the negandum would not be eliminated [[[because it is not contradictory for the two to be found in one basis]]].
[[[Furthermore, when one negates smoke via negating fire, is real smoke negated or is imputed smoke negated?
- In the first case (negating real smoke), here also it would be the same, namely, the negandum would be real.
- In the second case (negating imputed smoke), in what would one establish that imputed smoke entails imputed fire?
  Thus, one negates real smoke via the absence of real fire on the basis of establishing that real smoke entails real fire.
  Similarly, in the case of existence entailing one or many, in conformity with the establishment of the entailments 'real existence entails a real one or many', the negandum is a real entity.
Furthermore, there is no fault that when the negandum is an entity, it follows that (the awareness that perceives it) is not a superimposing awareness[145], like in the case of a perceptible (negandum).[146]]]

(v) The negandum is not a similar instance
Further yet, it is not proper (as you suggest above in option a) that [[[the negandum]]] would be a similar instance [[[in reality]]] even though it is in reality devoid of nature, because since [[[according to you]]] a real entity is not the negandum, by being devoid of that [[[real (nature) that is not the negandum]]] (something) cannot be a phenomenon to be proven.[147]

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[144] Literally, a "positive class."
[145] This fault was pointed out by Khyung above in (1).
[146] For instance when negating smoke, the negandum is an entity, but that the awareness is not superimposing is not problematic.
[147] Being a phenomenon to be *proven* presupposes being devoid *of the negandum*.

And as for the imputed negandum [[[that you assert]]], since then it [[[real (nature) that is superimposed]]] would not be negated, from what perspective would it be included in similar instances?[148]

Therefore, it [[[the negandum]]] is found in dissimilar instances exclusively; and since the logical reason occurs in it (i.e., the negandum), it (the logical reason) is just inconclusive.

(vi) If the negandum ('one or many') in the logical reason ('neither one nor many') is real, the negandum in the thesis ('devoid of nature') would also be real

Furthermore, [[[(considering) the object that is the logical reason for you]]] the logical reason is either (i) "devoid of a [[[true]]] real entity that is one and many" or (ii) "devoid of the imputation as one and many."

<div style="margin-left:2em">

i   In the first case, if the one [[[i.e., the negandum]]] of the valid cognition grasping the logical reason [[[devoid of true one and many]]] is a real entity, then what fault is there if the negandum of the inference [[[also]]] is precisely a real entity? [[[If one makes this parallel, it is the same.]]]

ii   In the second case, since 'imputed one and many' does not pervade either 'imputed entity' or '[[[true as]]] entity itself', how would (entity) be what is to be negated by (the logical reason) devoid of that [[['imputed one or many' which is not the pervader (of entity)]]] [[[because it cannot negate the two – imputed (entity) or entity (itself) – which are not pervaded (by it)]]].

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(vii) (a) Something imputed cannot be the negandum of perception, but (b) if the negandum of perception is real, the negandum of inference also would be real

Furthermore,

(a) when one negates a pot in a certain place via perception, if something imputed were the negandum of perception, then since it [[[what is imputed]]] is not suitable to appear to perception, how could it be negated?

[Opponent's answer:] "It is because it [[[the pot]]] is imputed as indistinguishable from the place."

[Answer:] While it is imputed as the nature of the place [[[or imputed as apprehended)]]] because they are indistinguishable, it is not suitable to appear to perception [[[as long as the characteristic of being imputed is not lost]]].

(b) In this case [[[i.e., negating pot]]], if the entity itself [[[a pot]]] were the negandum, what fault would there be in accepting that in all cases [[[i.e., in the context of negating via a logical reason]]]?

Summarizing verses
Therefore:

> **(Cf. i)** The logical reason would occur in just this that is the negandum,
> (and hence) would be inconclusive in reality.
> **(Cf. ii)** Even from the point of view of superimposing awareness it would be
> that [[[i.e., inconclusive]]] on occasion.

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[148] Because it would not be established to be devoid of reality.

(Cf. iii) A third option beside negation and affirmation would not be eliminated.
(Cf. iv) Even if it [[[the probandum]]] is established, the negandum would not be negated.
(Cf. v) Furthermore, it (the negandum) would not be a similar instance whatsoever.
(Cf. vi) If the negandum of (the valid cognition) apprehending the logical reason is a real entity,
The negandum of the thesis is established to be a real entity.
If it is not (a real entity), it (the logical reason) would be inconclusive.
(Cf. vii) If the negandum of perception is a real entity –
Because something imputed is not suitable to appear –
One should accept that the other also [[[the negandum of inference]]] is a real entity.

These are the summarizing verses.

(4) Own position = The correct position stated by other scholars (=Gangs pa)
Then what is it?

(4.1)
What is called "negandum" is not asserted to exist [[[as something established in reality]]]. If it existed, it would not be suitable to be negated.
It is not what is imputed, because it (the latter) is a similar instance.

Thus, what is called "negation" is the identification of non-existence for what is non-existent.
Then, when something/someone is non-existent, there is no entity. Therefore, it is said that "entity is the negandum".

Thus, saying
    "when taking entity is the negandum, if it is established it cannot be
    negated; if it is not established, why would one need to negate it?"
is ignorance of the way valid cognition negates; it is understood as the destruction of something established.

Thus what other scholars [[[Gangs pa]]] state is to be known to be correct:
    "The negandum is the intentional object accepted to be established by
    reasoning and not invalidated, whose nature resists analysis".

The intentional object that is asserted [[[in terms of "the place is with a pot; appearance has a nature"]]] is not established as a real entity, therefore since one identifies the non-existence for this very entity that is non-existent, one speaks of "negating the intentional object of this."

This is because all imputed things are the apprehended objects of [[[conceptual cognitions that are]]] assertions.

[[[**Objection**: This is contradictory with the explanation (of Jñānagarbha's verse)128 that something imputed is the negandum.
Answer: This is the signified of the word that expresses the negandum.]]]

Thus, [[[our own position:]]] The explanation (of Jñānagarbha) that what is imputed is the negandum is done in consideration of the intentional object of the superimposing cognition [[[being the negandum]]], and in consideration that when a determining cognition [[[by a cognition of non-existence]]] arises [[[having identified the negandum which is a non-entity, as non-existent]]], the superimposing (cognition) [[["there exists something that is a veridical ultimate nature"]]] ceases [[[having considered this, he explained what is superimposed to be the negandum]]].

(4.2)[149]
In this regard,
[[[(Rejection of objection) of Gangs pa she'u]]]

(i) Rejection of illusion established by reasoning
The assertion that illusion is established by reasoning also is refuted by (the argument that) when identifying the negandum, there is overextension (to illusion), etc. [[[He says that the statement "because the definition of illusion applies to the negandum, there is overextension" is a refutation discarding illusion.]]][130]

(ii) Rejection of the position that subject and negandum are one nature without conceptual distinctions
Also, in addition [[[appearance is eliminated, etc.]]], the following [[[assertion]]] is also refuted:
Some say:

> The subject is asserted to be without conceptual distinction from the negandum. If this [[[subject]]] is not negated, the appearance as subject does not cease, therefore [[[when the appearance does not cease]]], the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed, therefore [[[when they are not suppressed]]] one is not liberated from the bondage of obtaining a bad state. For this reason, this very [[[subject]]] is what is to be negated.

Namely, when the logical reason is established for this [[[subject]]] it would be inconclusive [[[because, since the subject is the negandum, the logical reason would occur in the negandum]]]. And if it were not inconclusive [[[the logical reason does not occur in the subject]]], the logical reason would not be established for this [[[subject that is the]]] negandum.
Therefore, if one accepts the method of negating the pervader in the case of the subject that is what is to be negated [[[the negandum]]] [[[i.e., (negating what is pervaded by one

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or many,) the mere existence as true nature via (the reason) neither one nor many]]], it becomes inconclusive [[[because the logical reason occurs in the negandum that is the subject]]].
And [[[for those who assert the subject to be the negandum]]] if one accepts the method of absence [[[of the logical reason]]] in dissimilar instances, it [[[the logical reason]]] would be unestablished [[[in the subject]]].
Therefore, these would be contradictory assertions. [[[It comes to be that the logical reason must be established for the subject, and also must be unestablished (for the subject), because what is the subject is also the negandum.]]]

Objection: [[[If he says:]]] From the perspective of the subject the logical reason is established [[[therefore there is no fault of being unestablished]]]; but from the perspective of the negandum, [[[the logical reason]]] does not occur [[[thus there is no fault of being inconclusive]]].

Answer: If they are conceptually non-distinct [[[in the case no conceptual distinction whatsoever is accepted]]], this is unsuitable!

If [[[Objection:]]] it is suitable [[[that the logical reason occurs and does not occur]]] in reliance upon two cognitive perspectives [[[cognizing appearances and reasoning consciousness]]],

[[[Answer:]]] Because the 'relying phenomena' [[[that rely on two 'bases of reliance']]] would need to be two, it would infirm their being conceptually non-distinct [[[because they would come to be distinct]]].

Objection: [[[Again he objects:]]]
It is the same [[[the faults presented with regard to the negation of the subject]]] for the things that are both imagined and the negandum, because the logical reason 'absence of tree' occurs on a stone cliff that is imputed to be endowed with a śiṃśapa.

Answer: Because this [[[what is imputed, is empty and]]] is a similar instance, how would (the logical reason) be inconclusive?
[[[**Objection**: This would be contradictory with the explanation that what is imputed is the negandum]]]
[[[**Answer**:]]] The explanation that what is imputed is the negandum is made from the conviction that that which the superimposing cognition apprehends something to be, this [[[superimposition]]] precisely is eliminated by an ascertainment [[[when the true intentional object is negated]]] [[[according to Gangs pa]]].

Thus (tenets) such as "if appearance itself [[[the subject]]] is not negated, the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed" are also discarded:
Since [[[appearance that is]]] something [[[accepted to be]]] veridical [[[i.e., accepted to be established]]] is not negated, [[[if one says that]]] it [[[the logical reason]]] is not established.

And since (appearance) as a mere appearance is not negated [[[if one says that the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed]]], it (the logical reason) is inconclusive. This is because if attachment to something veridical is eliminated by negating "veridical," [[[apprehension as veridical with regard to the eliminated "veridical" (is eliminated)]]] it is impossible that love and hate, etc. would not be eliminated. [[[This is because love and hate arise on account of the apprehension as veridical.]]]

(iii) Rejection of the view that subject and negandum are one nature but conceptually distinct from the perspective of appearance
Also, some assert that it [[[the negandum]]] is one nature with the subject, but they are conceptually distinct. Since [[[veridical]]] is negated from the perspective of reasoning, the nature of appearance is negated [[[as well]]].

As for this also, since not existing from the perspective of reasoning and [[[being merely]]] the nature of appearance are not contradictory, negation [[[of appearance]]] is not established [[[by negation from the perspective of reasoning]]]. Not only this, but if [[[the subject]]] is one nature with the negandum,
[[[The logical reason either is established or is not established for a subject which is one nature with the negandum. If it is established]]] because the logical reason occurs in what has the negandum it is inconclusive. And if it does not occur [[[in the subject which is one nature with the negandum]]], it [[[the logical reason]]] is [[[would come to be]]] unestablished.

Objection [[[by the same]]]: [[[In a dispute about the proof such as "sound is impermanent because it is produced"]]] When 'produced' is to be established to be a (proper) logical reason due to its being endowed with the three characteristics, [[[for you also, as it would be the same,]]] since (the logical reason) 'endowed with three characteristics' occurs in 'what has impermanence' that is not a (proper) logical reason, it is inconclusive.[129]

Answer [[[Gangs pa's answer is the following]]]: "Endowed with three characteristics" is put forward in relation to what is to be proven. How would 'endowed with three characteristics in relation to impermanence" occur in 'impermanent'? Because, pervasion by 'impermanent', etc., exist only for 'produced' [[[since it is contradictory that 'impermanent' itself is pervaded by itself]]].
There is no occurring of "endowed with three characteristics in relation to impermanence [[[that is pervaded by 'produced'[130]]]]" in another subject (than 'produced') that is not a logical reason (such as 'endowed with impermanence'), etc.. [[[such as 'cognizing objects of cognition']]][131]

(iv) Rejection of the position that subject is and is not the negandum entirely, depending on perspective
Further, some assert that the subject is twofold [[[in its entirety on both sides]]], i.e. "only being (the negandum) and only not being (the negandum)", [[[they assert (the subject) to be twofold in relation with the context]]] saying that "this very subject is exclusively

[[[entirely]]] a negandum from the perspective of reasoning, and is exclusively [[[entirely]]] not negated as a mere appearance."

[[[Answer:]]] If that is the case, it would follow from the negation "the pot of the potter's house is absent here [[[on this spot]]]" that the pot of this [[[of the potter's]]] house does not exist.

Because it is not contradictory not to be in this place and to be in this house, it [[[the pot of the (potter's) house]]] would not be negated.

[[[Answer:]]] Because it is not contradictory for a conventional appearance to be non-existent from the perspective of reasoning and to be existent in general [[[as a mere conventional appearance]]], it is the same [[[appearance would also not be negated]]].

Objection: By the negation "This conventional (appearance) is non-existent from the perspective of reasoning," it (the conventional appearance) is a negandum in this way.

Answer: [[[By the negation]]] "This very pot of this house is absent here", it [[[the pot of the house]]] would be negated in this way.

Objection: When saying "This is absent here", (a pot) characterized by 'presence here' is negated, but the pot of this house is not [[[negated]]].

Answer: [[[Appearance]]] characterized by 'existence from the perspective of reasoning' is negated [[[This negation is a negation of existence from the perspective of reasoning]]], but a [[[mere]]] conventional [[[appearance]]] in general is not the negandum.

The unlearned's statement that "The pot of this house is exclusively a negandum" is invalidated by [[[valid cognition consisting in]]] perception in this house.

(v) Rejection of the position that the negandum is what is called "ultimate", the object that is not incompatible when analyzed

Some [[['Phur ston (?)]]] assert the following:

> The negandum is the object that is not incompatible when analyzed, what is called "ultimate".
> The assembly of incompatible items coming from the negation of that (negandum), is what is to be proven.[129]
> For instance, the following contradiction: on the one hand, because 'many', such as parts, etc., are observed it is necessary that 'one,' which is the pervader of the former [[[i.e., 'many']]], exists;[130] on the other, because 'one' is incompatible with [[[the observed]]] 'many', it is necessary that it [[[one]]] does not exist.
> Or: Whereas it is useless for something existent to arise, insofar as what is non-existent must arise, 'non-existence' and 'arising' would be co-referential.[131]

This completely incorrect: if (two items) are incompatible, they cannot be assembled in a single subject, and if they are assembled then they are not incompatible.
In general, it is as follows:

If wise people assert that "insofar as (two items) are incompatible, (assembly) is not possible", what a well-spoken statement it would be to say "insofar as (two items) are incompatible, (even still) they exist as assembled"!

[[[According to those who assert that the assembly of incompatible items is ultimate, 'what is incompatible' must be the negandum.]]]¹⁵⁰

Further, according to you, what is not-incompatible could not be negated: 'not-incompatible' and 'incompatible' also would be assembled, because the assembly of incompatible items is the nature of knowables.

(3.3) Gangs pa's own assertion
Thus, it is explained [[[Gangs pa's own assertion]]]:
The negandum is the very entity that is the intentional object that is accepted to have a nature that is obtained when analyzed by reasoning.
{If one says that it exists}¹³⁰
Since it is pervaded by one or many, this is precisely what is to be negated by the inference (that infers) the non-conception as that which is the pervaded (property) [[[i.e., as a true nature]]] from the non-conception as that which is the pervading (property) [[[i.e., as one or many]]].

5) Partial refutation of Gangs pa's explanation
Considering what precedes, if negandum and subject are conceptually distinct but one nature, since the logical reason occurs in [[[the subject]]] what has the negandum, it would [[[according to Gangs pa]]] become inconclusive [[[this may be true]]].¹⁵¹
However [[[when rejecting the fault]]]¹⁵², in the context of proving that 'produced' is a proper logical reason (to infer 'impermanent'), the position [[[of Gangs pa]]] that the logical reason ('three characteristics') does not occur in something impermanent that is not a proper reason does not appear among the words of logicians.¹⁵³
Indeed, could a person be a Brahmin because of being endowed with the properties that makes one a Brahmin, and also not be a Brahmin because of having some other property [[[such as being an object of cognition]]]?
[[[It is as follows:]]] If something is void of the property to be proven, it is a dissimilar instance. It does not become a dissimilar instance because of being a phenomenon different [[[from what is to be proven]]].
Otherwise, try to get rid of the fault that [[[the reason]]] 'smoke' would be inconclusive when it occurs (on the fiery mountain) [[[in the kitchen]]]¹⁵⁴, because it (the fiery mountain) is a phenomenon different from the concept 'kitchen' [[[from the similar instances]]] [[[because 'fiery mountain' and 'kitchen' are conceptually distinct]]]

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¹⁵⁰ This comment seems to belong to the next argument, hinting at the parallel idea that: "According to you, who assert that what is not-incompatible when analyzed is ultimate, non-incompatible is what is to be negated."
¹⁵¹ Cf. The argument in (3) above.
¹⁵² This refers to Gangs pa's answer to the objection of "khong".
¹⁵³ Alternatively, this could be an ironic remark: "does not appear to be the speech of a logician!"
¹⁵⁴ This note is misleading. For the sake of logic one should read, as indicated in the preceding parentheses "on the fiery mountain".

[[[Further, (as in) the context of the proof that 'produced' is a proper reason]]] in this case precisely also , if [[[it is argued that]]] for the other [[[those who assert (that subject and negandum are) one nature and distinct concepts]]] the logical reason is inconclusive because it occurs in the subject that is one nature [[[with the negandum]]], which is endowed with the negandum,
(in parallel)
[[[For Gangs pa himself]]], for those who accept [[[that impermanent]]] is a dissimilar instance, [[[the logical reason]]] 'endowed with three characteristics' [[[to prove that 'produced' is a proper reason]]] occurs [[[in the subject]]] in that which has the same nature [[[i.e., the subject has the same nature as impermanent (but is conceptually distinct)]]] as 'that which has impermanence': it would be exactly the same [[[hence, here, it would be inconclusive]]].

iii. The probandum

[[[According to Gangs pa]]] the probandum is a simple negation, the mere elimination of a veridical entity. The assertion that an implicative negation – such as 'illusion' or 'joined incompatible items' - is the probandum has already been refuted.
In this regard, making the positive determination of absence the probandum by negating reality is similar to the case of illusion, etc., therefore it becomes ultimate.

Objection: But the simple negation consisting in mere elimination also is the deed of reasoning, therefore, it would become ultimate.
[[[The idea is the following: "negation" is general, but "negation of the negandum by reasoning" is specific, therefore they are conceptually distinct.]]]
….
… this was explained [[[by Gangs pa]]].

[[[rGya (says):]]]…
Negation of the negandum and negation are the same thing. The specification "negation by reasoning" is not mistaken with regard to ultimate, because here there is invalidation with regard to the reasoning that analyses, and even though negation is not affirmation, it is an object of investigation [[[because is it being investigated as being eliminated]]].
It has already been said that for this very reason [[[investigation as eliminated]]], there are no proliferations, etc.

iv. Logical reason

The object consisting in the logical reason. In general, there are (the ones) putting forth a proof and (the ones) putting forth a refutation. The former is, for instance 'dependant arising', the latter is, for instance, the Diamond-cutter that negates via the distinctive explanation of the cause, or the negation of (the four options of) production, annihilation, existence, non-existence, that negates via the explanation of the effect, or the negation of the four options of arising, that negates via the analysis of both cause and effect, or the neither-one-nor-many that negates via the analysis of the own nature. They are innumerable.
With regard to them because there are extensive places that analyze, for each, by what valid cognition pervasion and qualification of the subject are established, we will not tell that.

Now, because.. we will analyze it. It has two (points): qualification of the subject and pervasion.
1.
[[[The position of Khyung]]]]
…
2. rGya

v. The example
The object consisting in the example is, for instance, a reflection, etc.…

2.2 How inference relies (on these 5 items)
{The way inference relies (on these 5 items): the analysis of whether the subject appears or does not appears.

> Note: This debates involves mainly 2 positions:
> A – the subject **does not** appear (in the inferential cognition) (the position of the proponents of non-abiding)
>   A' – it does not appear because it is the negandum
>   A'' – it does not appear because it is not an object
> B – the subject **does** appear (in the inferential cognition) (the position of the illusionists)
>
> 1. (221)Jo btsun, who supports B, refutes A, and in particular A'' (supported by Gangs pa)
> 2. (222) Gangs pa, who supports A (more specifically, A''), rejects the faults brought forward by Jo btsun. He first rejects four of the faults common to A' and A'' (1-3+5) in general, then four of them (1-4) via an analysis taking into account the view B and in particular the rejection of objections against B.
> rGya considers B's answers against objections to be correct in general.
> 3. (223) rGya dmar ba refutes Gangs pa

…
For them, among (the two options): it does not appear due to its being the negandum and it does not appear due to its not being an object,
2.2.1.1 Refutation of the former (by Jo btsun)
The refutation of the former (by Jo btsun) (is as follows)
2.2.1.11 There is a means of refutation
…
22.1.12 There is a means of proof

2.2.1.2 Refutation of the latter (by Jo btsun)
2.2.1.2.1 Opponent's (=Gangs pa) position
The position of some people (stated by Gangs pa) is the following:
… because it is not the object of this it does not appear, just like sound to the eye…
Thus it might well be the case that it is not the negandum, but it (still) does not appear due to not being an object.
2.2.1.2.2 Statement of the refutation

(6 points)
2.2.1.3 Common (refutation) of the two

2.2.2 Rejection of the faults (by Gangs pa)

2.2.2.1 Rejection of the faults in general
2.2.2.2 Rejection (of the faults) via analysis
…
[[[according to rGya]]] Thus the answer given by explaining that the subject appears is, in general, correct.
2.2.2 The position of Gangs pa according to which it does not appear
2.2.3 Refutation of Gangs pa by rGya

(?) 2.2.2.3.4 Negating attachment to entities

(29a5)

…

2.2.2.3.5 The effects of cultivating emptiness
(30b1)

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