

DEVOIR SUR TABLE
Durée : 2 heures
Aucun document autorisé

I. GRAMMAR: (10 points)

I.1.

I.1.1. Décomposer les mots suivants [p. 2] en nommant chaque partie ; donner la nature du radical et du mot formé à partir de ce radical : « *uncomfortable* » [l. 4], « *willingness* » [l. 19] (2 pts)

I.1.2. Former 2 mots à partir de chacun des radicaux suivants (soit 4 mots au total), en ajoutant un préfixe et/ou des suffixes : « nation » et « fortune » (2 pts)

I.2. Donner la nature des mots encadrés dans le texte et expliquer leur fonction dans la phrase de laquelle ils sont tirés (4 pts)

I.3. Remplacer les chiffres entre parenthèses dans l'extrait suivant par le modal qui convient (2 pts)

As the United States prepares to sit at a negotiating table across from Mexico, it (1) recognize that treating Mexico as a respected partner (2) be a good start if it hopes to favorably resolve serious issues over trade, immigration or fighting crime. The U.S. (3) be safer and stronger if it (4) forge even closer cooperation with Mexico while finding solutions to the problems each side wants to fix.

II. READING COMPREHENSION: Read the text again and answer the following questions IN YOUR OWN WORDS. Text copy is marked zero. (10 points)

1. Present the document in ONE sentence. (/0.5)
2. What does the text deal with? Sum it up in a 3-line paragraph. (/0.5)
3. What countries are compared to elephants and ants? Why? (/2)
4. What do Asian countries think of the United States and of China? (/2)
5. What makes Japan different from other Asian countries? (/2)
6. Why has the Trans-Pacific Partnership been abandoned? (/1)
7. What does the example of Vietnam show? (/2)

III. ESSAY WRITING: Freely answer the following question in your own words, in 175 words (± 10%) – Count and indicate the number of words you wrote. (10 points)

Can European companies compete with American and Chinese ones?

Instructions for the essay: when writing your essay, CORRECTLY use the following words and underline them: **those** [pronoun] / **may** / **raise** / **subsidy** (2 pts)

N.B: Overall grammar and vocabulary will be marked 6 points / structure and main ideas will be marked 2 points

When elephants fight: How China's Asian neighbours survive great-power rivalry

FOUR YEARS AGO, after Xi Jinping and Barack Obama had embarked on a “new type of great-power relationship” at a Californian ranch called Sunnylands, the world was soon speculating about a new “G2” or a “Chimerica”; after all, the two leaders’ economies were joined at the hip. Yet China’s Asian neighbours felt *uncomfortable*. “When elephants mate,” says a South-East Asian diplomat, “we ants get trampled.” “But when elephants fight,” an Australian strategist retorts, “the ants get trampled even more.”

Outside China, every Asian country bar North Korea welcomes America’s presence in the region and wants it to remain. Asians value American security, along with the clear rules underpinning post-war prosperity that the security has allowed to be upheld. Asians also value their economic relations with China, but they fear that the alternative to an open American order is a hierarchical Chinese one. Given China’s open ambitions, and its closed authoritarian political system at home, it would be a very different world. Countries in the region, a Singaporean ambassador explains, “don’t want to choose: it gives you more room to play.”

Japan, the region’s second-biggest power, is least troubled by any need to choose: under its prime minister, Shinzo Abe, it has thrown itself firmly into its alliance with America. That is partly because of the growing threat to Japan posed by a nuclear, warlike North Korea under Kim Jong Un. But Mr Abe has also helped convince his people that both the economic and the security threats from China are existential. In words and actions, China has frequently been hostile towards his country. Mr Abe’s political dominance in Japan owes much to his *willingness* to articulate the China challenge.

It was an immense disappointment to Mr Abe that almost as soon as Mr Trump took office, he dumped the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-country grouping including Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam that had over several years put together a “gold-standard” free-trade pact for the Asia-Pacific region. Mr Trump claimed that the deal sold American businesses and workers down the river. Its partners retort that America got everything it asked for in the negotiations, such as longer patent protection for drugs and stronger intellectual-property rights. All the painful adjustments that TPP entailed were to be made by smaller members.

However, Japan’s growing investment and diplomatic activities in South-East Asia increase smaller countries’ options. Indeed, the balance of power in Asia is determined not just by the struggle for primacy between America and China but also by the interplay of lesser powers: Japan and South Korea in North-East Asia; and Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and even India (increasingly looking eastwards) in South-East Asia. But America still needs to be part of the picture.

China big, Vietnam small

Danang airport, a big American base during the Vietnam war, mainly serves Chinese tourists these days. Many of them are shuttled to the Crowne Plaza, a hulking hotel on the city’s crescent-shaped beach flanking the South China Sea. They like to play blackjack in the casino, where the croupiers conduct their games in Mandarin.

About a quarter of Vietnam’s 10m or so visitors a year are Chinese, more than any other nationality. Though locals in Danang grumble about the rudeness of Chinese gamblers, “we welcome everyone,” says a Danang official, with a stiff smile. Many Vietnamese regard China with wariness. Even the state-controlled media run critical stories about Chinese investors buying up large quantities of land near Danang. Yet the Vietnamese are also well aware that China is their country’s largest trading partner, as well as overwhelmingly more powerful than little Vietnam.

Source: Adapted from Anonymous, “When elephants fight: How China’s Asian neighbours survive great-power rivalry”, *The Economist*, 22 April 2017.