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Education

PhD In Economics, New York University, 2017-2023 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization*.
M.Sc. Applied Mathematics, Ecole Polytechnique, 2016-2017
Engineering Degree, Ecole Polytechnique, 2014-2017

References

Professor Guillaume Fréchette
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Professor Daniel Waldinger
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Teaching and Research Fields

Fields: Industrial Organization, Education Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Teaching Experience

Fall 2021	Mathematics for Economics (graduate) at NYU for Prof. Irasema Alonso

Research Experience and Other Employment

Summer 2020, Spring 2021	RA for Guillaume Fréchette
Spring 2020	RA for Corina Boar and Sharon Traiberman

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2022-2023	NYU GSAS Dean's Dissertation Fellowship
2021	CV Starr Center Data Grant ($2500)
2017-2022	NYU MacCracken Fellowship

Research Papers

Dynamic Spatial Competition in Early Education: an Equilibrium Analysis of the Preschool Market in Pennsylvania (Job Market Paper)

High-quality preschool is one of the most cost-effective educational interventions, yet the United States invests little in early childhood education. Recent policy discussions call for increasing preschool enrollment and raising the quality provided, especially for disadvantaged children, but equilibrium responses of private providers which make up most of the market generate trade-offs between these objectives. Supply expansion may lower incentives to invest in quality, and price responses to demand subsidies can increase the costs faced by non-subsidized parents. This paper develops a dynamic model of the preschool market to evaluate the effectiveness of policies at achieving these objectives. The model nests a static equilibrium model of spatial competition and preschool choice within a dynamic model of providers' entry, exit and quality investments. I estimate this model using data on the universe of child-care centers in Pennsylvania. I use the model to simulate the aggregate and distributional consequences of proposed approaches to early education expansion. I find that policies focused on expanding supply raise access but decrease the quality children attend due to parents' value for proximity. Demand subsidies generate market expansion, but on their own do not create sufficient incentives for providers to invest in quality. Among the simulated policies, the most cost-effective at expanding high-quality enrollment combine demand subsidies targeted to low-income families with financial support to providers serving disadvantaged children. These policies increase access by reducing exit of providers, and expand high-quality enrollment for low-income children through subsidies. In addition, these targeted policies generate spillovers to the educational quality of non-targeted families by creating incentives for centers to invest in quality.

Research In Progress

Incorporating Wait Times in Health Insurance Design (with Michael Dickstein and Guillaume Fréchette)

Wait time is a key factor of health-care services, yet data is rare, often unreliable, and inconsistently measured across systems. The scarcity of data prevents systematic analyses of allocative inefficiency and inequality in access to health. We propose a measure of wait times - detection to treatment (DTT) - solely based on medical variables, which are both widely available and standardized. DTT records the time elapsed between the detection of a patient as being high-risk of receiving a surgery, and the date of the procedure. We use recurrent neural networks to represent patients' high-dimensional medical trajectories as a risk profile over time. We first show that DTT increases with supply constraints: patients enrolled in more restrictive insurance plans have longer DTT, as do patients assigned to busier doctors.Using variation in providers' load within insurance plans, we show that longer wait times results in multiple adverse outcomes post-surgery:patients are more likely to be readmitted in inpatient care, pay higher costs, and have a higher use of addictive drugs such as opioids.We use this novel measure to provide guidance for insurance design.

News Media Concentration and Content Diversity (with Nicolas Longuet Marx and Marguerite Obolensky)

The rise in political polarization over the recent years has fostered scrutiny of the structure of the news industry' s influence on political outcomes. How should policymakers regulate news producers when they value news diversity and large publishers shape the ideological landscape? To answer this question, we develop an empirical model of competition for readership and advertisers between news producers. We recover the topic content and ideological positions of 200 major U.S. daily newspapers using recent advances in Natural Language Processing on millions of published articles. We find that over the period 2007-2017, the median newspaper in our sample got closer to the ideology of the Democratic party. Second, we embed these topics and ideal points in a demand model for differentiated products with heterogeneous readers. Our model shows that rich readers lean democrat and consume more news about social and political questions while the elderly are more conservative and care more about local news. Using the estimated demand model and data on advertising contracts and readership, we can recover the cost of producing each type of content. Given this model of news supply, we intend to use our framework to provide recommendations on antitrust rules weighing both consumer welfare and ideological diversity.

Presentations & Seminars

2022: Monash-Zurich-Warwick Text as Data Workshop*, Cornell Tech Text as Data Conference*, Stern IO Seminar, NYU Applied Micro, CEPR IO
* = coauthor

Other Information

Programming: Python, R, C++, LaTeX
Languages: English, French (native), Spanish (basic)
Citizenship: France