

PIERRE BODÉRE
pierrebodere.github.io
pmb412@nyu.edu

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Address 19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
Phone 917-293-4651 (home)

Placement Director: David Cesarini david.cesarini@nyu.edu 646-413-8576
Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson ian.johnson@nyu.edu 212 998-8901

Education

PhD In Economics, New York University, 2017-2023 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization*.
M.Sc. Applied Mathematics, Ecole Polytechnique, 2016-2017
Engineering Degree, Ecole Polytechnique, 2014-2017

References

Professor Guillaume Fréchette
Dept. of Economics
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
212-992-8683 (office)
guillaume.frechette@nyu.edu

Professor Christopher Conlon
Kaufman Management Center, 7-77
44 West Fourth St.
New York, NY 10012-1119
646-389-3895 (office)
cconlon@stern.nyu.edu

Professor Daniel Waldinger
Dept. of Economics
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
212-992-8967 (office)
danielwaldinger@nyu.edu

Teaching and Research Fields

Fields: Industrial Organization, Education Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Teaching Experience

Fall 2021 Mathematics for Economics (graduate) at NYU for Prof.
Irasema Alonso

Research Experience and Other Employment

Summer 2020, Spring 2021 RA for Guillaume Fréchette
Spring 2020 RA for Corina Boar and Sharon Traiberman

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2022-2023 NYU GSAS Dean's Dissertation Fellowship
2021 CV Starr Center Data Grant (\$2500)
2017-2022 NYU MacCracken Fellowship

Research Papers

Designing Early Childhood Education Policies: a Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis of the Preschool Market (Job Market Paper)

Evidence of the benefits of high-quality preschool programs for disadvantaged children has fueled recent proposals for massive investments in Early Childhood Education (ECE). A successful scale-up of these programs requires creating incentives for providers to operate in low-income neighborhoods and to invest in high-quality without pricing disadvantaged parents out of the formal market. This paper develops a dynamic model of the preschool market to evaluate the effectiveness of ECE policies at creating these incentives. On the demand side, heterogeneous families trade-off price, quality, and distance in choosing whether and to which center to send their child. On the supply side, providers decide whether to enter, remain open and which quality to offer, and compete on price to attract parents. I estimate this model using data on the universe of child-care centers in Pennsylvania. I use the estimated model to simulate the short and long-run effect of 3 types of ECE expansion: start-up grants, expansion of demand subsidies, and quality add-on rates raising revenue for high-quality providers serving low-income children. Start-up grants lead to excessive entry of low-quality providers and decrease incentives for centers to upgrade. Expanded subsidies increase the quality supplied by raising demand from high-income, quality-sensitive parents, but leads to higher prices due to providers' market power. The most effective policy tools are the add-on rates, increasing the quality attended by children across the income distribution.

Research In Progress

Detection to Treatment: a Medical Measure of Wait Times to Study Heterogeneity in Access to Health (with Michael Dickstein and Guillaume Fréchette)

Wait time is a key factor of health-care services, yet data is rare, often unreliable, and inconsistently measured across systems. The scarcity of data prevents systematic analyses of allocative inefficiency and inequality in access to health. We propose a measure of wait times - detection to treatment (DTT) - solely based on medical variables, which are both widely available and standardized. DTT records the time elapsed between the detection of a patient as being high-risk of receiving a surgery, and the date of the procedure. We use recurrent neural networks to represent patients' high-dimensional medical trajectories as a risk profile over time. As expected for a measure of wait times, we find that DTT increases with supply constraints. Patients enrolled in more restrictive insurance plans experience longer DTT and an increase in the load of medical providers increases the wait time. Using provider loads as exogenous variation in wait times, we show that an increase in DTT results in higher medical expenditures, longer hospitalization, and increased use of addictive drugs.

News Media Concentration and Content Diversity (with Nicolas Longuet Marx and Marguerite Obolensky)

The rise in political polarization over the recent years has fostered scrutiny of the structure of the news industry's influence on political outcomes. How should policymakers regulate news producers when they value news diversity and large publishers shape the ideological landscape? To answer this question, we develop an empirical model of competition for readership and advertisers between news producers. We recover the topic content and ideological positions of 200 major U.S. daily newspapers using recent advances in Natural Language Processing on millions of published articles. We find that over the period 2007-2017, the median newspaper in our sample got closer to the ideology of the Democratic party. Second, we embed these topics and ideal points in a demand model for differentiated products with heterogeneous readers. Our model shows that rich readers lean democrat and consume more news about social and political questions while the elderly are more conservative and care more about local news. Using the estimated demand model and data on advertising contracts and readership, we can recover the cost of producing each type of content. Given this model of news supply, we intend to use our framework to provide recommendations on antitrust rules weighing both consumer welfare and ideological diversity.

Presentations & Seminars

2022: Monash-Zurich-Warwick Text as Data Workshop*, Cornell Tech Text as Data Conference*, Stern IO Seminar, NYU Applied Micro, CEPR IO

* = coauthor

Other Information

Programming: Python, R, C++, LaTeX

Languages: English, French (native), Spanish (basic)

Citizenship: France