

Elements of Microeconomics: TA Session

Pinda Wang

Johns Hopkins University

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Mid-term 2

Pick up your exams at the front; they're arranged into four piles in alphabetic order of last names:
A-F, G-M, N-S, T-Z

Mid-term 2, Q2b

Drew is taking Introduction to Robotic science and decided to drop the course after the second week. Drew paid \$200 for the course's textbook, which can be resold for \$70 on dontlikethecourse.com. What is Drew's sunk cost for the textbook and why.

Mid-term 2, Q2b

Drew is taking Introduction to Robotic science and decided to drop the course after the second week. Drew paid \$200 for the course's textbook, which can be resold for \$70 on dontlikethecourse.com. What is Drew's sunk cost for the textbook and why.

Answer: Drew's sunk cost is \$130. A sunk cost is a cost that has already been committed and cannot be recovered. Drew has already committed \$200 but is able to recover \$70 back. Therefore, the remaining \$130 is the amount that cannot be recovered.

Mid-term 2, Q3b


Why does a monopolist never operate on the inelastic portion of the demand curve?

Mid-term 2, Q3b

Why does a monopolist never operate on the inelastic portion of the demand curve?

Answer: In the inelastic region of the demand curve, total revenue falls as quantity rises. Therefore, $MR < 0$ in this region. The monopolist chooses profit-maximizing quantity of production such that $MR = MC$. But MC is always greater than 0, it cannot be that $MR = MC$ in the inelastic region.

Mid-term 2, Q3b



The red part of the demand curve is the inelastic region.

Characteristics of monopolistic competition

Three characteristics of monopolistic competition:



1. Many sellers
2. Product differentiation
3. Free entry and exit

Example: books, video games, restaurants...

Monopolistic competition in the short run

Like monopoly, a monopolistically competitive firm has a downward-sloping demand curve

► $\implies MR < D$



Monopolistic competition in the long run

If firm makes positive profit in the short run, then:


- ▶ More firms enter the market
- ▶ \implies number of products in the market increases
- ▶ \implies Some existing customers turn to new firms
 - ▶ This could be because the products are substitutes
- ▶ \implies Existing firm's demand curve shifts to the left
- ▶ \implies Existing firm's MR curve shifts to the left
- ▶ \implies Existing firm's profit decrease

Notice that the cost curves do not change

Monopolistic competition in equilibrium

If firms make positive profit, more firms will enter; if firms make negative profit, existing firms will exit

In equilibrium, all firms in monopolistic competition make zero profit!



Monopolistic competition in equilibrium

Two characteristics of monopolistic competition in equilibrium:

1. **Excess capacity:** Firms are producing on the decreasing portion of the ATC curve, below the efficient scale
2. **Markup over MC:** $P > MC$ because monopolistically competitive firms have some market power

Free entry and zero profit

Comparing perfect competition and monopolistic competition, we see that **it is the free entry and exit of firms that makes firms earn zero profit**

But the mechanism behind zero profit is different


Under perfect competition, when firms make positive profit:

- ▶ \implies more firms enter the market \implies **market supply shifts to the right \implies price falls**
- ▶ \implies Profit falls \implies zero profit in the long run


Under monopolistic competition, when firms make positive profit:

- ▶ \implies more firms enter the market \implies **firm demand shifts to the left \implies MR shifts to the left**
- ▶ \implies Profit falls \implies zero profit in the long run


Comparison



Perfect competition



Monopolistic competition




Monopoly

Comparison

| | Perf. Competition | Mono. competition | Monopoly |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Price taker or maker? | Price taker | Price maker | Price maker |
| Markup | No markup $P = MR = MC$ | Markup $P > MR = MC$ | Markup $P > MR = MC$ |
| Excess capacity | No | Yes | Yes |
| Deadweight loss | No | Yes | Yes |


Monopolistic competition - exercise

Identify the deadweight loss on the graph for monopolistic competition.



Monopolistic competition - exercise explained

Deadweight loss arises from the fact that a monopolistic competitive firm produces less than it would have under perfect competition. Some consumers with a willingness to pay greater than MC are not served. This corresponds to the grey area on the graph.



Oligopoly

| | Perf. Competition | Mono. competition | Monopoly | Oligopoly |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|
| No. of consumers | many | many | many | many |
| No. of producers | many | many | one | a few |
| Product differentiation | No | Yes | No | No |
| Barriers to entry | No | No | Yes | Yes |

Strategic interaction

Under perfect competition:

- ▶ An individual seller's actions have no effect on the market \implies Sellers are price takers

Under monopoly:

- ▶ There is only one seller; market production is determined by him alone \implies Seller is price maker

Under oligopoly:

- ▶ With only a few sellers, each seller's action will affect other sellers' profit
- ▶ \implies a seller must take other's possible actions into account when making its own decision
- ▶ \implies Strategic interactions

To study strategic interactions, we need a new tool: **Game Theory**

Prisoners' dilemma

The police arrested two criminals, A and B, who are suspected of committing a major crime, and **questions them separately**

- ▶ If one of them confesses and the other remain silent, the confessed one goes free, whereas the silent one gets 10 years
- ▶ If both of them confess, they both get 5 years
- ▶ If none of them confess, they both get 2 years

| | | B | |
|---|---------|---------|--------|
| | | Confess | Silent |
| A | Confess | -5, -5 | 0, -10 |
| | Silent | -10, 0 | -2, -2 |

Prisoners' dilemma

Nash equilibrium: a situation in which players each choose their best strategy given the strategies that all other players have chosen

- ▶ i.e. a situation where nobody has an incentive to deviate from their choice

| | | B | |
|---|---------|---------|--------|
| | | Confess | Silent |
| A | Confess | -5, -5 | 0, -10 |
| | Silent | -10, 0 | -2, -2 |

Nash equilibrium: both A and B confess

Prisoners' dilemma and welfare

| | | B | |
|---|---------|---------|--------|
| | | Confess | Silent |
| A | Confess | -5, -5 | 0, -10 |
| | Silent | -10, 0 | -2, -2 |

Nash equilibrium: both A and B confess

This outcome is not optimal (for the prisoners)

- ▶ If they could somehow credibly commit to cooperate and remain silent, they'll both get a lighter sentence
- ▶ But, since they're questioned separately, each has an incentive to defect behind the other's back

Prisoners' dilemma and oligopoly

In an oligopoly with two sellers (called **duopoly**)

- ▶ If they can somehow commit to collusion, each can earn half the monopoly profit
- ▶ But, without a way to enforce the collusion agreement, each seller has an incentive to secretly produce more and earn more profit (and make the other earn less)
- ▶ \implies Both firms produce more. But then, their combined production is more than under monopoly, so each earns less than half the monopoly profit

| | | B | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | | High production | Low production |
| A | High production | 150,150 | 240,120 |
| | Low production | 120,240 | 200,200 |

Prisoners' dilemma and oligopoly

| | | B | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | | High production | Low production |
| A | High production | 150,150 | 240,120 |
| | Low production | 120,240 | 200,200 |

Nash equilibrium: both firms choose high production

- ▶ This is why cartels are often unsustainable: each producer in a cartel has an incentive to unilaterally produce more and undermine the cartel

Further applications of prisoners' dilemma

Suppose two candidates, A and B, compete in an exam for a single job

- ▶ If both of them study before the exam, each has 50% chance of being hired
- ▶ If both of them relax before the exam, each has 50% chance of being hired
- ▶ If only one of them studies, he has 100% chance of being hired, and the other has 0% chance

| | | B | |
|---|-------|----------|----------|
| | | Study | Relax |
| A | Study | 0.5, 0.5 | 1, 0 |
| | Relax | 0, 1 | 0.5, 0.5 |

Further applications of prisoners' dilemma

| | | B | |
|---|-------|----------|----------|
| | | Study | Relax |
| A | Study | 0.5, 0.5 | 1, 0 |
| | Relax | 0, 1 | 0.5, 0.5 |

Nash equilibrium: both candidate study before the exam

- ▶ This is not optimal for them: they could have both relaxed, got the same chances of admission, and enjoyed more free time

Further applications of game theory

Game of Chicken: Two teenagers, A and B, drive towards each other on the same lane of the road

- ▶ If one of them swerves away, he is considered a coward and become an object of contempt, whereas the other wins the contest
- ▶ If both of them swerves away, nobody wins but nobody is hurt
- ▶ If both of them drives straight, they both die in a violent collision

| | | B | |
|---|----------|----------|--------|
| | | Straight | Swerve |
| A | Straight | -10, -10 | 1, -1 |
| | Swerve | -1, 1 | 0, 0 |

For this kind of games in popular culture, see, for example, *Rebel Without a Cause* (1955)

Further applications of game theory

| | | B | |
|---|----------|----------|--------|
| | | Straight | Swerve |
| A | Straight | -10, -10 | 1, -1 |
| | Swerve | -1, 1 | 0, 0 |

Two Nash equilibria:

- ▶ A drives straight, B swerves
- ▶ A swerves, B drives straight

Then, which outcome will happen?

- ▶ Without further information, the answer is “either”

What can people do about multiple outcome in the real world?

- ▶ Driver A can force a favorable outcome by tying his hands behind his back, giving B no choice but to swerve
- ▶ **Credible commitment** makes a difference!