

Hi,贾工:

如刚才沟通,我简要说明一下有关第二份 dump 的分析说明:

1, 从 dump bugcheck 来看, 0x139 的问题与当前大规模蓝屏问题的 dump 日志一致, 属于内存损坏问题

KERNEL\_SECURITY\_CHECK\_FAILURE (139)

A kernel component has corrupted a critical data structure. The corruption could potentially allow a malicious user to gain control of this machine.

Arguments:

Arg1: 0000000000000003, A LIST\_ENTRY has been corrupted (i.e. double remove).

Arg2: ffffff00e29d90a0, Address of the trap frame for the exception that caused the bugcheck

Arg3: ffffff00e29d8ff8, Address of the exception record for the exception that caused the bugcheck

Arg4: 0000000000000000, Reserved

2, 从 call stack 来看, 引发此次蓝屏为 McAfee 触发。

STACK\_TEXT:

```
ffffcc00`e29d8d78 fffff807`1d7d76e9 : 00000000`00000139 00000000`00000003
ffffcc00`e29d90a0 fffff807`1d7d8ff8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
ffffcc00`e29d8d80 fffff807`1d7d7a90 : ffffff0e`80402100 fffff807`1d6411dc 00000000`00000000
fffff807`1d929237 : nt!setjmpex+0x7e79
ffffcc00`e29d8ec0 fffff807`1d7d5e8e : ffffff0e`80402340 ffffff0e`00000002 00000000`00000000
fffff807`1d83f1ea : nt!setjmpex+0x8220
ffffcc00`e29d90a0 fffff807`1d837b5e : ffffff0e`80402924 00000000`00000000 20ca4692`ffffc818
fffff807`358d954e : nt!setjmpex+0x661e
ffffcc00`e29d9230 fffff807`358db6ae : ffffff0e`8afb8db0 fffffb81`00000000 ffffff0e`8afb8db0
fffff807`358db6ae : nt!memset+0x5f25e
ffffcc00`e29d9280 fffff807`358d9825 : ffffff0e`94b98a20 ffffff0e`8afb8db0 ffffff0e`8afb8db0
fffff807`358fe423 : mfeavfk+0x1b6ae
ffffcc00`e29d92b0 fffff807`358db0e3 : ffffff0e`90baecc0 fffffb81`5233c580 ffffff0e`90baecc0
fffff807`358db0e3 : mfeavfk+0x19825
ffffcc00`e29d92e0 fffff807`358da389 : ffffff0e`8db57000 ffffff0e`8afb8db0 ffffff0e`8afb8db0
fffff807`1d6b2d07 : mfeavfk+0x1b0e3
ffffcc00`e29d9310 fffff807`358da90d : ffffff0e`8db57000 ffffff0e`8db57000 ffffff0e`8db57000
fffff807`358d2fb7 : mfeavfk+0x1a389
ffffcc00`e29d9340 fffff807`358db5b3 : ffffff0e`8db57000 ffffff0e`8db57000 ffffff0e`8db57000
fffff807`358cd340 : mfeavfk+0x1a90d
ffffcc00`e29d9370 fffff807`358c7737 : ffffff0e`8c40e010 ffffff0e`8c40e010 ffffff0e`8c40e010
fffff807`358c7b1f : mfeavfk+0x1b5b3
ffffcc00`e29d93a0 fffff807`358c8383 : ffffff0e`8c40e010 ffffff0e`8c40e010 ffffff0e`8c40e010
fffff807`358c8383 : mfeavfk+0x7737
ffffcc00`e29d93d0 fffff807`358c833f : ffffff0e`8afb8df8 fffff807`1d6b1ca2 ffffff0e`8c4f9ef0
fffff807`358c833f : mfeavfk+0x8383
ffffcc00`e29d9400 fffff807`32f18bc7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002
fffff807`32f18bc7 : mfeavfk+0x833f
```

```

ffffcc00`e29d9430 fffff807`32f1b5ff : ffffcf0e`8c4f9e10 00000000`00000000 ffffcf0e`8c4f9ef0
ffffcf0e`8fdbaed0 : mfehidk+0x8bc7
ffffcc00`e29d9460 fffff807`32f1eafb : ffffcf0e`8afb8db0 ffffcf0e`8afb8db0 fffff807`32f1eafb
ffffcf0e`5865666d : mfehidk+0xb5ff
ffffcc00`e29d9490 fffff807`32f1eda2 : ffffcf0e`81b51001 ffffcf0e`8afb8db0 fffff807`32f1eda2
ffffcf0e`8afb8db0 : mfehidk+0xea7b
ffffcc00`e29d94c0 fffff807`32f1f493 : ffffcf0e`81b51000 ffffcf0e`81b51000 fffff807`1d60e000
ffffcc00`e29d9860 : mfehidk+0xeda2
ffffcc00`e29d9520 fffff807`32faddf3 : 01000000`00000002 ffffcf0e`00000000 ffffcf0e`8fdbae00
00000000`00000000 : mfehidk+0xf493
ffffcc00`e29d95b0 fffff807`1d6ffc29 : ffffcf0e`8c128cf0 00000000`00000000 ffffcf0e`8fdbae00
00000000`00000000 : mfehidk+0x9ddf3
ffffcc00`e29d9630 fffff807`1dc8b564 : 00000000`00000001 ffffcf0e`8c128cf0 ffffcf0e`8fdbae00
00000000`00000000 : nt!IoCallDriver+0x59
ffffcc00`e29d9670 fffff807`1dc94d40 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000
ffffcf0e`80b3e0c0 ffffcf0e`8fdbae00 : nt!NtQueryInformationFile+0xd94
ffffcc00`e29d96f0 fffff807`1d6b5269 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000001 ffffcf0e`8c128cf0 : nt!MmCopyVirtualMemory+0x1600
ffffcc00`e29d9750 fffff807`1dc60920 : 00000000`ffff8001 ffffcf0e`80b3e0c0 fffa888`00000000
00000000`00007fff : nt!ObfDereferenceObjectWithTag+0xc9
ffffcc00`e29d9790 fffff807`1dc6519e : ffffcf0e`9440c040 00000000`00000001 00000000`ffffff
00000000`00000001 : nt!ObOpenObjectByNameEx+0x1020
ffffcc00`e29d98d0 fffff807`1d7d7105 : ffffcf0e`92d63040 ffffb81`519c0180 fffff807`1d7d7105
ffffb81`00000000 : nt!NtClose+0xde
ffffcc00`e29d9940 fffff807`1d7c9be0 : fffff807`32f620e3 00000000`00000000 ffff8380`01751370
ffffe799`cf423bb2 : nt!setjmpex+0x7895
ffffcc00`e29d9ad8 fffff807`32f620e3 : 00000000`00000000 ffff8380`01751370 fffff807`32f620e3
00000000`00000000 : nt!KeSynchronizeExecution+0x2b80
ffffcc00`e29d9ae0 fffff807`1d66f6e5 : ffffcf0e`9440c040 00000000`00000080 fffff807`32f62040
00000000`00000000 : mfehidk+0x520e3
ffffcc00`e29d9b10 fffff807`1d7cd34c : ffffb81`519de180 ffffcf0e`9440c040 fffff807`1d66f690
ffffcf0e`912b8ac0 : nt!RtlIpv4StringToAddressW+0x4d5
ffffcc00`e29d9b60 00000000`00000000 : fffff807`32f620e3 fffff807`32f620e3
00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeSynchronizeExecution+0x62ec

```

lmvm mfeavfk

Browse full module list

start end module name

ffff807`358c0000 fffff807`3591d000 mfeavfk (no symbols)

Loaded symbol image file: mfeavfk.sys

Image path: \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\mfeavfk.sys

Image name: mfeavfk.sys

Browse all global symbols functions data

Timestamp: Fri Aug 16 21:39:41 2019 (5D56B21D)

Checksum: 0006149C

ImageSize: 0005D000

Translations: 0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4

Information from resource tables:

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