

Security mindset

Security threats, vulnerability;
risk and security controls

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Roadmap

- Defining computer security
- Goals of computer security: CIA model
- Security policy in a system
- How do security violations happen in practice?
- Basic risk analysis

Security: Many definitions

- “The *protection of data* and resources from *accidental and malicious acts*, usually by taking appropriate actions ...These acts many be modification, destruction, access, disclosure or acquisition if not authorized.”

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- Building Systems to remain dependable in the face of *malice, error or mischance*

-- Ross Anderson

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Properties of a secure system (CIA model)

- Confidentiality
 - Non-public information should be accessible only to authorized parties (*access control, encryption, procedural means*)
- Integrity
 - System and data should remain unaltered, except by authorized parties (*error correction code, cryptographic hashes or checksums*)
- Availability
 - Information and system should remain accessible for authorized use (*protection against DDOS, related to usability*)

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
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- Accountability
 - Identifying entities responsible for past actions (blockchain, append-only logs)


Putting it all together




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Security policy

- Key question: **Who** is authorized to access **what**?
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 - Violated if there is unauthorized access/modification

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Used to find Security violations

Threat and control

- **Threats:** Entities performing steps/methods which will violate security (enable unauthorized access)
 - Steps/methods == **Attack vector**
- **Controls and Countermeasures:** Prevent / detect unauthorized access

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Security violations / threats / vulnerabilities in practice

- Source: "A Summary of Computer Misuse Techniques," by Peter G. Neumann and Donn B. Parker, 1989
 - External misuse
 - Hardware misuse
 - Masquerading
 - Setting up subsequent misuse
 - Bypassing intended controls
 - Active misuse
 - Passive misuse
 - Inactive misuse
 - Indirect misuse


A brief look at these misuses

- External misuse

- Generally nontechnological (physical scavenging, visual spying, deception)

- Hardware misuse

- Passive (logical scavenging, eavesdropping)
- Active (trojan horse, introducing faults)



A brief look at these misuses

- Masquerading
 - Impersonation; playback and spoofing attacks; may be indistinguishable from legitimate activity
- Setting up subsequent misuse
 - Logic bombs, zero days, malicious worms, botnets, ransomwares, viruses
- Bypassing intended controls
 - Using trapdoors (e.g., known bugs), authorization attacks (cracking passwords)

A brief look at these misuses

- **Active misuse** : Modifying data, DoS attacks
- **Passive misuse**: Browsing, analyzing collected data without changing the system
- **Inactive misuse**: Misuse because user was too lazy (e.g. giving phone to repair shop without erasing data)
- **Indirect misuse**: Breaking cryptographic keys and then use it for listening to encrypted communications

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 - How?

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Risk due to an attack

=

Probability That an attack will happen

X

Probability that the vulnerability exists

X

Value of the targeted asset (tangible + intangible)

Fundamental questions for building any secure system

1. What assets are most valuable, and what are their values?
2. What system vulnerabilities exist?
3. What are the relevant threat agents and attack vectors?
4. What are the associated estimates of attack probabilities, or frequencies?

Next class

- Basic security analysis
 - Threat modelling
 - Adversary modelling
- Design principles for security