Supplemental Materials for:

Territorial Loss and Populism

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Appendices

A Full Model Specifications

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Table A.1: Regression Estimates of Loss Concern Effects on Pooled Voting Preferences

	Support for Populist (All)			Support for Populist (In Power)			Support for Populist (In Opposition)		
	Support for Populist (All)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.267***	0.165***	0.163***	0.142***	0.149***	0.153***	0.197***	0.140***	0.131***
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Age			−0.105**			−0.106			−0.083*
			(0.046)			(0.073)			(0.044)
Completed University			−5.143**			−8.507*			3.264
			(2.565)			(4.373)			(2.240)
Completed Secondary			−0.639			−1.695			5.010**
			(2.721)			(4.320)			(2.414)
Technical/Vocational Education			0.335			−4.747			9.534***
			(2.857)			(4.377)			(2.488)
Male			0.633			−1.309			0.097
			(1.592)			(2.417)			(1.489)
Urban			−4.935**			−4.308			0.308
			(2.490)			(4.306)			(2.294)
Small Town			−2.282			−1.170			−0.228
			(2.188)			(3.542)			(2.055)
Political Interest			3.610***			3.199***			2.641***
			(0.695)			(0.969)			(0.661)
Constant	16.985***	33.385***	31.255***	22.936***	18.563***	20.820***	14.645***	14.875***	5.304
	(1.561)	(1.948)	(4.136)	(3.309)	(2.620)	(6.903)	(1.214)	(1.675)	(3.430)
Fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,386	4,386	4,341	2,147	2,147	2,119	4,386	4,386	4,341

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2: ATE Estimates of Prime Effects on Pooled Voting Preferences

	Dependent variable:								
	Support for Populist (All)			Support for Populist (In Power)			Support for Populist (In Opposition)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Territorial Prime	2.440	2.791*	3.295**	−0.871	−0.397	0.342	2.079	2.863*	2.908*
	(1.848)	(1.652)	(1.626)	(2.768)	(2.650)	(2.584)	(1.577)	(1.544)	(1.535)
Age			−0.102**			−0.121*			−0.081*
			(0.046)			(0.074)			(0.044)
Completed University			−4.966*			−7.870*			3.383
			(2.539)			(4.192)			(2.317)
Completed Secondary			0.181			−0.912			5.581**
			(2.716)			(4.186)			(2.505)
Technical/Vocational Education			1.091			−3.762			9.887***
			(2.799)			(4.149)			(2.529)
Male			1.143			−0.632			0.454
			(1.564)			(2.303)			(1.476)
Urban			−4.675*			−4.361			0.401
			(2.458)			(4.086)			(2.290)
Small Town			−1.586			−0.048			0.186
			(2.187)			(3.487)			(2.065)
Political Interest			3.936***			3.572***			2.927***
			(0.700)			(0.978)			(0.659)
Constant	28.705***	41.891***	36.996***	32.079***	28.155***	28.297***	23.113***	21.673***	9.842***
	(1.530)	(1.522)	(4.100)	(2.457)	(2.044)	(6.504)	(1.194)	(1.350)	(3.649)
Fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,414	4,414	4,369	2,168	2,168	2,140	4,414	4,414	4,369

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.3: Regression Estimates of Interaction Models on Pooled Voting Preferences

	Dependent variable:					
	Support for Populist (Pooled)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.190***	−0.033	0.098**	−0.083	0.100**	−0.063
	(0.048)	(0.165)	(0.046)	(0.145)	(0.045)	(0.139)
Territorial Prime	−4.675	−6.681	−3.051	−4.000	−2.122	−3.122
	(3.535)	(4.296)	(2.961)	(3.457)	(2.876)	(3.325)
Concern^2		0.002		0.002		0.002
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Age					−0.107**	−0.107**
					(0.045)	(0.045)
Completed University					−5.114**	−5.058**
					(2.525)	(2.509)
Completed Secondary					−0.419	−0.378
					(2.701)	(2.695)
Technical/Vocational Education					0.350	0.444
					(2.825)	(2.804)
Male					0.629	0.541
					(1.567)	(1.555)
Urban					−4.954**	−4.868**
					(2.456)	(2.419)
Small Town					−2.223	−2.148
					(2.164)	(2.136)
Political Interest					3.590***	3.568***
					(0.691)	(0.690)
Prime : Concern	0.121**	0.344*	0.104**	0.226	0.095**	0.217
	(0.054)	(0.191)	(0.048)	(0.165)	(0.047)	(0.158)
Prime : Concern^2		−0.002		−0.001		−0.001
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Constant	19.832***	21.836***	35.194***	36.913***	32.616***	34.133***
	(3.185)	(3.914)	(2.965)	(3.475)	(4.827)	(5.145)
Fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,386	4,386	4,386	4,386	4,341	4,341

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Regression Estimates of Interaction Models on Pooled Voting Preferences for Parties in Power

	Dependent variable:					
	Support for Populist (In Power Only)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.014	−0.522*	0.025	−0.449	0.038	−0.414
	(0.086)	(0.316)	(0.080)	(0.291)	(0.079)	(0.275)
Territorial Prime	−14.490**	−19.515**	−13.467**	−16.926**	−12.005*	−15.912**
	(6.891)	(8.827)	(6.377)	(8.065)	(6.292)	(7.870)
Concern^2		0.005**		0.005*		0.004*
		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Age					−0.102	−0.097
					(0.072)	(0.072)
Completed University					−8.263**	−7.830**
					(4.108)	(3.973)
Completed Secondary					−1.690	−1.571
					(4.177)	(4.083)
Technical/Vocational Education					−4.839	−4.663
					(4.136)	(4.003)
Male					−1.560	−1.920
					(2.269)	(2.185)
Urban					−4.329	−3.623
					(4.030)	(3.746)
Small Town					−1.073	−0.521
					(3.365)	(3.193)
Political Interest					3.070***	3.011***
					(0.958)	(0.951)
Prime : Concern	0.219**	0.687**	0.210**	0.559*	0.195**	0.557*
	(0.092)	(0.340)	(0.088)	(0.312)	(0.087)	(0.295)
Prime : Concern^2		−0.005		−0.003		−0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)
Constant	31.214***	37.312***	26.372***	31.879***	28.078***	32.923***
	(6.505)	(8.413)	(5.577)	(7.379)	(8.800)	(9.860)
Fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,147	2,147	2,147	2,147	2,119	2,119

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Regression Estimates of Interaction Models on Pooled Voting Preferences for Parties in Opposition

	Dependent variable:					
	Support for Populist (In Opposition Only)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.191***	0.369***	0.143***	0.397***	0.135***	0.374***
	(0.032)	(0.114)	(0.038)	(0.118)	(0.039)	(0.117)
Territorial Prime	0.655	−0.418	2.489	3.051	2.691	2.924
	(2.403)	(2.592)	(2.505)	(2.802)	(2.506)	(2.806)
Concern^2		−0.002		−0.003**		−0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Age					−0.083*	−0.086**
					(0.044)	(0.044)
Completed University					3.117	3.087
					(2.234)	(2.214)
Completed Secondary					4.974**	4.918**
					(2.414)	(2.396)
Technical/Vocational Education					9.469***	9.359***
					(2.470)	(2.442)
Male					0.167	0.347
					(1.480)	(1.465)
Urban					0.327	0.222
					(2.277)	(2.221)
Small Town					−0.216	−0.295
					(2.048)	(2.011)
Political Interest					2.664***	2.706***
					(0.661)	(0.657)
Prime : Concern	0.008	0.068	−0.008	−0.112	−0.010	−0.080
	(0.040)	(0.149)	(0.042)	(0.146)	(0.042)	(0.143)
Prime : Concern^2		−0.001		0.001		0.001
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Constant	14.242***	12.639***	13.386***	10.961***	3.644	1.389
	(1.728)	(1.931)	(2.299)	(2.526)	(3.887)	(3.970)
Fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,386	4,386	4,386	4,386	4,341	4,341

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6: Logistic Regression Estimates of Interaction Models on Pooled Propensity to Name Period of Greatest Historical Extent

	Dependent variable:								
	Name Period of Greatest Historical Extent								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Territorial Prime	0.388***		0.701***	0.389**		0.805***	0.408***		0.830***
	(0.151)		(0.270)	(0.151)		(0.288)	(0.156)		(0.287)
Territorial Loss Concern		0.018***	0.021***		0.013***	0.017***		0.013***	0.016***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Prime : Concern			−0.005			−0.007*			−0.007*
			(0.004)			(0.004)			(0.004)
Age							−0.009*	−0.009**	−0.009**
							(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Completed University							0.352	0.307	0.296
							(0.289)	(0.284)	(0.289)
Completed Secondary							−0.024	−0.095	−0.095
							(0.323)	(0.316)	(0.323)
Technical/Vocational Education							−0.380	−0.454	−0.459
							(0.295)	(0.294)	(0.300)
Male							0.978***	0.930***	0.937***
							(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.163)
Urban							0.034	0.030	0.026
							(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Small Town							−0.219	−0.236	−0.241
							(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.196)
Political Interest							0.068	0.032	0.037
							(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Constant	−2.555***	−3.380***	−3.749***	−2.300***	−2.979***	−3.400***	−2.464***	−2.881***	−3.303***
	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.213)	(0.115)	(0.183)	(0.255)	(0.418)	(0.386)	(0.433)
Fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,889	5,859	5,859	5,889	5,859	5,859	5,837	5,807	5,807
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Effects of Concern and Experimental Prime on Perceived Best Period in National History

	Hungary		Romania		Turkey		Germany	
	Pre 1918	Post 2010	1918-1938	Post 2007	Pre 1922	Post 2002	Pre 1918 or 1933-1945	Post 2009
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Territorial Prime	0.727*	−0.468	0.931	−0.005	2.155***	−0.368	1.883*	0.293
	(0.435)	(0.366)	(0.576)	(0.452)	(0.833)	(0.453)	(1.118)	(0.298)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.009*	0.015***	0.018***	−0.004	0.013	−0.012***	0.067***	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Prime : Concern	−0.002	0.002	−0.011	0.002	−0.018	0.005	−0.038**	−0.009
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.009)
N	1,671	1,671	1,532	1,532	1,192	1,192	1,412	1,412

Note: All coefficients are from binary logistic regression models with heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC1) standard errors and inverse probability population weights. Standard demographic controls and regional fixed effects are included in all models.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.8: Effects of Concern over Loss on AUR Support

	Voted for AUR	Close to AUR	Loss Concern (W4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loss Concern (W1)	3.421**	18.873***	0.590***
	(1.409)	(3.710)	(0.065)
COVID Policy Approval (W1)	−3.379*	−20.598***	
	(1.911)	(6.907)	
Age	−0.055*	−0.234**	0.002
	(0.032)	(0.116)	(0.002)
Name Bessarabia	0.250	−4.401	
	(0.808)	(2.799)	
Woman	0.021	−0.860	−0.022
	(0.759)	(2.536)	(0.045)
University Educated	−1.014	−0.436	0.059
	(0.720)	(2.753)	(0.048)
Urban	−0.045	−4.998*	−0.036
	(0.728)	(2.546)	(0.046)
Voted for AUR			−0.052
			(0.168)
Constant	−1.143	29.979***	0.046
	(1.968)	(7.108)	(0.101)
N	303	302	164

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
All models include regional fixed effects as well as demographic and attitudinal controls.
Standard errors are HC1. Model (1) is a logistic regression.
Loss Concern and COVID Approval are rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

B Results by Party

Table B.1: Effects of Territorial Loss Attitudes on Party Ratings

	Jobbik	Fidesz Hungary	MSZP	PSD	PMP	USR Romania	PNL	AKP	CHP Turkey	IYI	AfD	SPD Germany	CDU
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Territorial Prime	0.204	−0.700	−0.680	2.460	1.843	−12.730***	−7.103	−10.735	4.327	12.602**	2.486	1.704	−1.240
	(2.747)	(2.931)	(2.435)	(3.503)	(3.601)	(3.973)	(4.814)	(7.742)	(7.216)	(5.583)	(2.245)	(3.078)	(3.395)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.042	0.306***	−0.077***	0.060	0.144***	0.036	0.121**	−0.108	0.169***	0.269***	0.217***	0.049	0.096
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.070)
Prime : Concern	0.035	0.006	0.004	−0.020	−0.002	0.159**	0.125*	0.134	−0.029	−0.175**	−0.110	−0.064	−0.065
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.093)
N	1,671	1,666	1,670	1,531	1,532	1,529	1,530	1,185	1,189	1,191	1,410	1,407	1,403

Note: All coefficients are from OLS regression models with heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC1) standard errors and inverse probability population weights. Standard demographic controls and regional fixed effects are included in all models.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2: Territorial Loss Attitudes and Vote Choice

	Jobbik	Fidesz Hungary	Other Party	Dancila (PSD)	Paleologu (PMP)	Barna (USR) Romania	Iohannis (PNL)	AKP	CHP Turkey	IYI	AfD	SPD Germany	CDU
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Territorial Loss Concern	0.009***	0.006*	−0.005**	0.010	0.004	0.006	−0.001	−0.003	−0.003	0.009	0.014**	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,019	1,019	1,019	1,101	1,101	1,101

Note: All coefficients are from binary logistic regression models with heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC1) standard errors and inverse probability population weights. Standard demographic controls and regional fixed effects are included in all models.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Additional Figures



Figure 1: Predicted probability of having voted for a populist party by loss concern



Figure 2: Predicted probability of naming the period of greatest territorial extent as the best time in the country's history.

D Survey Experiment Transcript

Table D.1: Summary of Question Order in Each Treatment Condition

	Version			
	Both First	Territorial Prime First	Both Last	Diaspora Prime First
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	**Territory**	**Territory**	Best Historical Period	**Diaspora**
2	**Diaspora**	*National ID*	Political	Best Historical Period
3	*National ID*	Best Historical Period	Risk	Political
4	Best Historical Period	Political	Demographic	Risk
5	Political	Risk	**Territory**	Demographic
6	Risk	Demographic	**Diaspora**	**Territory**
7	Demographic	**Diaspora**		
Observations	1,965	2,082	2,142	2,037

D.1 Territorial Loss Treatment

There have been a number of dramatic changes to Europe's borders in the past century, and much land that belonged to [Country] in previous generations has now been lost to other countries. Please use the field below to enter the first such territory that comes to mind, or, if you cannot remember its name, then enter the country to which it now belongs. [Text field] [New Page] Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 is 'very concerned' and 0 is 'not at all concerned', how concerned you are about the loss of this territory.