Unit 8 Collaborative Discussion 2 Cryptography case study: TrueCrypt

Discussion Topic

 TrueCrypt was a popular and well-respected operating system add-on that could create encrypted volumes on a Windows and/or Linux system. In addition, it was also designed to create a complete, bootable volume that could encrypt the entire operating system and data for a Windows XP system. It was discontinued in 2014.

Case Study:

- Read the TrueCrypt cryptanalysis by Junestam & Guigo (2014): (<a href="https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/iSec Final Open Crypto Audit Project TrueCryptoaudit.org/reports/iSec Final Open Cryptoaudit.org/reports/iSec Final Open Cryptoaudit.org/repo
- and then answer the following questions:

- Question 1: The (anonymous) TrueCrypt authors have said "Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues" (http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/, 2014). Does the cryptanalysis provided above prove or disprove this assumption?
- Question 2: Would you be prepared to recommend TrueCrypt to a friend as a secure storage environment? What caveats (if any) would you add?
- Question 3: Present an ontology design which captures the weaknesses of TrueCrypt, and organise them according to their severity. Expand the ontology design by considering the factors which will cause each weakness to become an issue from a user's perspective. For example, if a user wishes to encrypt a disk storing bank details using TrueCrypt, which weakness of the software might cause this specific user goal to be negatively impacted?

- Released by anonymous developers in February 2004, TrueCrypt was vastly used and considered a secure data storage encryption that even FBI hackers failed to crack (Korea IT Times, 2011). However, in 2014, its anonymous developers stopped its updates and development (Zhang et al, 2019), claiming that "TrueCrypt is not secure" (Anon, TrueCrypt website). Despite this, the latest version of the software, considered accessible, user-friendly and secure, still attracts users (Zhang et al, 2019; Hoffman, 2017).
- Yet, many security vulnerability issues of the software were raised in Junestam and Guigo's report: lack of comments, use of insecure functions, inconsistent variable types among others. The report posits that TrueCrypt source code is confusing, making it difficult to understand, read, review and maintain it, thus rendering future bugs harder to find and correct. TrueCrypt is also vulnerable to brute-force and/or dictionary attacks. There might be leakage of sensitive information as sensitive information is not consolidated to one single location and is not locked into memory. Furthermore, it is possible for an attacker to modify the TrueCrypt code to record and save the user's password while the user enters it. Information leakage is another problem as attackers can create a low memory situation on the user's machine, forcing key information that should have been securely wiped to be paged out to the unencrypted system disk (Junestam & Guigo, 2014).
- The security assessment of the TrueCrypt source code for the bootloader and Windows kernel driver by Junestam & Guigo (2014) seems to confirm that TrueCrypt does not meet the expected standards for secure code. If the vulnerabilities are not tackled and the software is not continuously maintained and patched, TrueCrypt cannot be recommended. It would be more judicious to turn to other encryption software such as VeraCrypt (Hoffman, 2017).
- The tables below, created by Junestam & Guigo (2014), give a summary of the 11 vulnerability issues found in TrueCrypt and their level of severity:

Vulnerability Summary						
Total High severity issues	Zero (0)	Zero (0)		Severity Categories		
Total Medium severity issues	Four (4)		Severity	Description		
Total Low severity issues	Four (4)	Four (4)		The issue does not pose an im rity best practices or Defense in	mediate risk, but is relevant to se n Depth	cu-
Total vulnerabilities identified	Eleven (II) (incl. three (3) Informational)		Undetermined	The extent of the risk was not	determined during this engageme	nt
See Section 3.1 for descriptions of t		Low	The risk is relatively small or is	s not a risk the customer has indi	:at-	
Category Breakdown:			Medium	·	is at risk, exploitation would be	bad
Access Controls	0	· · · · ·		for client's reputation, moderate financial impact, possible legal		
Auditing and Logging	0			bad for client's reputation, or seri	ous	
Authentication	0		8	legal or financial implications	- 	
Configuration	0	Vulnerability			Class	S
Cryptography	1 ■	1. Weak Volume Header l	key derivation algorith	ım	Cryptography	N
Data Exposure	4	2 Sensitive information r	2. Sensitive information might be paged out from kernel stacks Dat		Data Exposure	N
Data Validation	3					
Denial of Service	2 ■■	3. Multiple issues in the b	 3. Multiple issues in the bootloader decompressor 4. Windows kernel driver uses memset() to clear sensitive data 5. TC_IOCTL_GET_SYSTEM_DRIVE_DUMP_CONFIG kernel pointer Data Exposure 			N
Error Reporting	1 ■	4. Windows kernel driver				N
Patching	0	5 TC IOCTL GET SYST				I
Session Management	0	disclosure				
Timing	0	6. IOCTL_DISK_VERIFY integer overflow		Data Validation	Ι	
		7. TC_IOCTL_OPEN_TE	ST multiple issues		Data Exposure	L
		8. MainThreadProc() into	eger overflow		Denial of Service	L
		9. MountVolume() device	e check bypass		Data Validation	I
		10. GetWipePassCount()	/ WipeBuffer() can ca	nuse BSOD	Denial of Service	Iı
		11. EncryptDataUnits() la	cks error handling		Error Reporting	I

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Vulnerability Classes		
Class	Description	
Access Controls	Related to authorization of users and assessment of rights	
Auditing and Logging	Related to auditing of actions or logging of problems	
Authentication	Related to the identification of users	
Configuration	Related to security configurations of servers, devices or software	
Cryptography	Related to protecting the privacy or integrity of data	
Data Exposure	Related to unintended exposure of sensitive information	
Data Validation	Related to improper reliance on the structure or values of data	
Denial of Service	Related to causing system failure	
Error Reporting	Related to the reporting of error conditions in a secure fashion	
Patching	Related to keeping software up to date	
Session Management	Related to the identification of authenticated users	
Timing	Related to race conditions, locking or order of operations	

Difficulty Levels	
Difficulty	Description
Undetermined	The difficulty of exploit was not determined during this engagement
Low	Commonly exploited, public tools exist or can be scripted that exploit this flaw
Medium	Attackers must write an exploit, or need an in-depth knowledge of a complex system
High	The attacker must have privileged insider access to the system, may need to know extremely complex technical details or must discover other weaknesses in order to exploit this issue

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1.1 iSEC Risk Summary

The iSEC Partners Threat Matrix chart evaluates discovered vulnerabilities according to estimated user risk. The impact of the vulnerability increases towards the bottom of the chart. The sophistication required for an attacker to find and exploit the flaw decreases towards the left of the chart. The closer a vulnerability is to the chart origin, the greater the risk.

