Activity PKI

1. (I'm a Mac user)
2. (I'm a Mac user)
3.



```
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
            X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
            X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

                Full Name:
                  URI:http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g6.crl

                Full Name:
                  URI:http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g6.crl

            X509v3 Certificate Policies:
                Policy: 2.16.840.1.114412.1.1
                  CPS: https://www.digicert.com/CPS
                Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2

            Authority Information Access:
                OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com
                CA Issuers - URI:http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCA.crt

            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:FALSE
            1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2:
                ......v.......q...#...{G8W.
.R....d6.......q.\.......G0E.!......?o.AO.H.q..BG.U.....a.(.m... I...gs<TE....QAc.....-....4..z...v.\
E..B.E..!ct(hG.
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         9c:ef:8f:33:20:d3:23:61:84:73:17:88:59:6e:87:5c:38:aa:
         f6:14:97:fe:0a:e6:a5:60:f7:78:23:96:38:ca:9a:f0:15:ab:
         f2:aa:ff:e7:8f:4f:fb:d1:a5:8e:73:47:c5:97:1e:7f:a4:b4:
         29:5b:d4:bd:e9:cd:5d:ad:98:9f:0f:0b:bc:17:62:59:49:0e:
         11:83:cd:00:4e:ee:77:d5:3e:5d:68:85:b8:44:6f:84:2e:64:
         f2:66:14:3a:b0:0e:b3:0c:d1:a9:a4:a4:d0:c8:6f:ae:5b:16:
         69:23:93:06:b9:52:ab:a9:ed:74:35:71:70:3a:99:af:03:29:
         84:3d:60:70:00:b9:00:bc:89:0a:3c:c5:b5:97:1b:03:b3:80:
         b7:dd:11:14:1d:f9:44:db:de:28:50:a6:9a:c7:1c:94:7f:8c:
         92:2a:e3:a8:80:d3:c4:71:ab:cd:87:20:62:52:9b:b7:21:86:
         93:0e:80:d9:89:33:60:55:1e:96:75:e7:9b:ad:67:6c:a5:d1:
         78:c1:ba:09:21:07:80:69:c5:cc:b1:ca:90:6e:57:a3:d4:0d:
         6f:54:19:ef:67:81:83:1b:ce:dd:1c:5e:c9:38:2c:81:c7:9c:
         d9:1c:bf:8f:fe:92:2a:ba:00:68:bc:76:27:6c:5c:13:67:97:
         4f:c3:35:68
```

4.

The picture below shows information about the intermediate certificate. The purpose of it is to make people “trust” the subject’s certificate more (in this case, twitter’s).

```
   Authority Information Access:
       OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com
       CA Issuers - URI:http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCA.crt
```

This part indicates issuer’s URI, which is the download link of the intermediate cert



```
$ openssl x509 -in intermediate_twitter.pem  -text
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            04:e1:e7:a4:dc:5c:f2:f3:6d:c0:2b:42:b8:5d:15:9f
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA
        Validity
            Not Before: Oct 22 12:00:00 2013 GMT
            Not After : Oct 22 12:00:00 2028 GMT
        Subject: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:b6:e0:2f:c2:24:06:c8:6d:04:5f:d7:ef:0a:64:
                    06:b2:7d:22:26:65:16:ae:42:40:9b:ce:dc:9f:9f:
                    76:07:3e:c3:30:55:87:19:b9:4f:94:0e:5a:94:1f:
                    55:56:b4:c2:02:2a:af:d0:98:ee:0b:40:d7:c4:d0:
                    3b:72:c8:14:9e:ef:90:b1:11:a9:ae:d2:c8:b8:43:
                    3a:d9:0b:0b:d5:d5:95:f5:40:af:c8:1d:ed:4d:9c:
                    5f:57:b7:86:50:68:99:f5:8a:da:d2:c7:05:1f:a8:
                    97:c9:dc:a4:b1:82:84:2d:c6:ad:a5:9c:c7:19:82:
                    a6:85:0f:5e:44:58:2a:37:8f:fd:35:f1:0b:08:27:
                    32:5a:f5:bb:8b:9e:a4:bd:51:d0:27:e2:dd:3b:42:
                    33:a3:05:28:c4:bb:28:cc:9a:ac:2b:23:0d:78:c6:
                    7b:e6:5e:71:b7:4a:3e:08:fb:81:b7:16:16:a1:9d:
                    23:12:4d:e5:d7:92:08:ac:75:a4:9c:ba:cd:17:b2:
                    1e:44:35:65:7f:53:25:39:d1:1c:0a:9a:63:1b:19:
                    92:74:68:0a:37:c2:c2:52:48:cb:39:5a:a2:b6:e1:
                    5d:c1:dd:a0:20:b8:21:a2:93:26:6f:14:4a:21:41:
                    c7:ed:6d:9b:f2:48:2f:f3:03:f5:a2:68:92:53:2f:
                    5e:e3
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
            X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
            Authority Information Access:
                OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com

            X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
```

Intermediate certificate downloaded and translated

5. The intermediate CA is the same organization as the root CA (digicert.com) as labeled in the pic above.

6. It's a file containing root and intermediate CAs (chain of trusts). Used to ensure the user to trust that particular site.

7. 132 Certificates

Counted by VSCode Search function on "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"
("-----END CERTIFICATE-----" also yields the same result)



Search function with -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----



Search function with -----END CERTIFICATE-----

8. I found exactly one line with “Issuers”, suspecting this is the root certificate



Then I convert the crt to pem



```
$ openssl x509 -in rootcert.pem -text
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: 6828503384748696800 (0x5ec3b7a6437fa4e0)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES
        Validity
            Not Before: May  5 09:37:37 2011 GMT
            Not After : Dec 31 09:37:37 2030 GMT
        Subject: CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (4096 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:9b:a9:ab:bf:61:4a:97:af:2f:97:66:9a:74:5f:
                    d0:d9:96:fd:cf:e2:e4:66:ef:1f:1f:47:33:c2:44:
                    a3:df:9a:de:1f:b5:54:dd:15:7c:69:35:11:6f:bb:
                    c8:0c:8e:6a:18:1e:d8:8f:d9:16:bc:10:48:36:5c:
                    f0:63:b3:90:5a:5c:24:37:d7:a3:d6:cb:09:71:b9:
                    f1:01:72:84:b0:7d:db:4d:80:cd:fc:d3:6f:c9:f8:
                    da:b6:0e:82:d2:45:85:a8:1b:68:a8:3d:e8:f4:44:
                    6c:bd:a1:c2:cb:03:be:8c:3e:13:00:84:df:4a:48:
                    c0:e3:22:0a:e8:e9:37:a7:18:4c:b1:09:0d:23:56:
                    7f:04:4d:d9:17:84:18:a5:c8:da:40:94:73:eb:ce:
                    0e:57:3c:03:81:3a:9d:0a:a1:57:43:69:ac:57:6d:
                    79:90:78:e5:b5:b4:3b:d8:bc:4c:8d:28:a1:a7:a3:
                    a7:ba:02:4e:25:d1:2a:ae:ed:ae:03:22:b8:6b:20:
                    0f:30:28:54:95:7f:e0:ee:ce:0a:66:9d:d1:40:2d:
                    6e:22:af:9d:1a:c1:05:19:d2:6f:c0:f2:9f:f8:7b:
                    b3:02:42:fb:50:a9:1d:2d:93:0f:23:ab:c6:c1:0f:
                    92:ff:d0:a2:15:f5:53:09:71:1c:ff:45:13:84:e6:
                    26:5e:f8:e0:88:1c:0a:fc:16:b6:a8:73:06:b8:f0:
                    63:84:02:a0:c6:5a:ec:e7:74:df:70:ae:a3:83:25:
                    ea:d6:c7:97:87:93:a7:c6:8a:8a:33:97:60:37:10:
                    3e:97:3e:6e:29:15:d6:a1:0f:d1:88:2c:12:9f:6f:
                    aa:a4:c6:42:eb:41:a2:e3:95:43:d3:01:85:6d:8e:
                    bb:3b:f3:23:36:c7:fe:3b:e0:a1:25:07:48:ab:c9:
                    89:74:ff:08:8f:80:bf:c0:96:65:f3:ee:ec:4b:68:
                    93:e5:b9:4b:17:40:0f:b1:b6:b9:f5:de:4f:dc:e0:
                    b3:ac:3b:11:70:60:84:4a:43:6e:99:20:c0:29:71:
                    0a:c0:65
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            Authority Information Access:
                CA Issuers - URI:http://www.accv.es/fileadmin/Archivos/certificados/raizaccv1.crt
                OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.accv.es

            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                D2:87:B4:E3:DF:37:27:93:55:F6:56:EA:81:E5:36:CC:8C:1E:3F:BD
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                keyid:D2:87:B4:E3:DF:37:27:93:55:F6:56:EA:81:E5:36:CC:8C:1E:3F:BD

            X509v3 Certificate Policies:
                Policy: X509v3 Any Policy
                  User Notice:
                    Explicit Text:
                  CPS: http://www.accv.es/legislacion_c.htm

            X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

                Full Name:
                  URI:http://www.accv.es/fileadmin/Archivos/certificados/raizaccv1_der.crl

            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
            X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                email:accv@accv.es
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        97:31:02:9f:e7:fd:43:67:48:44:14:e4:29:87:ed:4c:28:66:
        d0:8f:35:da:4d:61:b7:4a:97:4d:b5:db:90:e0:05:2e:0e:c6:
        79:d0:f2:97:69:0f:bd:04:47:d9:be:db:b5:29:da:9b:d9:ae:
        a9:99:d5:d3:3c:30:93:f5:8d:a1:a8:fc:06:8d:44:f4:ca:16:
        95:7c:33:dc:62:8b:a8:37:f8:27:d8:09:2d:1b:ef:c8:14:27:
        20:a9:64:44:ff:2e:d6:75:aa:6c:4d:60:40:19:49:43:54:63:
        da:e2:cc:ba:66:e5:4f:44:7a:5b:d9:6a:81:2b:40:d5:7f:f9:
```

Comparing to twitter's certificate,

- This one has much longer valid duration (up until 2030) and
- Is issued by another company. In fact this certificate signed by itself as the issuer and the subject is the same organization.
- Has 4096 bit public key

9. (Already has .pem readable file)

10. twitter.com, google.com, and chula.ac.th all can be verified with this program. Though classdeedee has no intermidate certificate and yields verify error result when trying to connect to it with option -showcerts



Twitter, google, and chula verified



No intermidiate certificate URI (left) and verifiying failed (right)

11.

Class 1 Certificate

Assurance Level: Class 1 certificates shall be issued for both business personnel and private individuals use. These certificates will confirm that the information in the application provided by the subscriber does not conflict with the information in well-recognized consumer databases.
Applicability: This provides a basic level of assurance relevant to environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance.

Class 3 Certificate

Assurance Level: This certificate will be issued to individuals as well as organizations. As these are high assurance certificates, primarily intended for e-commerce applications, they shall be issued to individuals only on their personal (physical) appearance before the Certifying Authorities.
Applicability: This level is relevant to environments where threats to data are high or the consequences of the failure of security services are high. This may include very high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk.

Conclusion: Class 1 is more of a basic certificate with easier process of getting approved, while class 3 is more complicated but also provide more ensurance of the trustworthiness of the website.

Source: https://www.e-mudhra.com/Class-of-certificates.html

12. The attacker could impersonate to be one of the so-called trusted Root CA, granting a reliable certificate to their own malicious websites and still showing the safety of certificate in the browser as if nothing happened. If the hacker created a fake, malicious banking websites, this could lead to a huge lose for the banks themselves as well as the users.

CRL (Certificate revocation list) isn't reliable enough in this case as there is no certificate being revoked. All the attacker need to do is to create a fake certificate for their own websites. As the problem said, no one knows about this breach so there is no way the real CA will put the fake certificate in the CRLs as well.

Source about CRL: https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Certificate-Revocation-List

OSCP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) while is an optimized version of CRL by letting the user connect directly to Cas to ask for the revocation status of the certificate, still can't check if the target Root CA has been hacked, as the fake certificate is still there and still not being revoked.

Source about OCSP:
https://docs.microfocus.com/NNMi/10.30/Content/Administer/NNMi_Deployment/Advanced_Configurations/Cert_Validation_CRL_and_OCSP.htm