

Activity PKI

1. (I'm a Mac user)
2. (I'm a Mac user)
- 3.

```

$ openssl x509 -in twitter_com.cert -text
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)      Version of the certificate
    Serial Number:        Using SHA256 + RSA to sign the signature
                          0b:58:97:d8:55:29:ec:36:e5:28:be:be:1a:e3:47:65
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA
    Validity
      Not Before: Mar 26 00:00:00 2020 GMT      Country = US, Organization = DigiCert Inc Organization Unit =
      Not After : Mar 25 12:00:00 2021 GMT      www.digicert.com, Common Name = DigiCert SHA2 ...
    Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Twitter, Inc., OU=tyo3, CN=twitter.com
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption      Twitter's own info
      Public-Key: (2048 bit)                   Country = US, State = California, Locality = San Francisco,
      Modulus:                                 Organization = Twitter, Inc.
                                              Organization Unit = tyo3, Common Name = twitter.com
        00:ba:54:2a:a2:8c:5a:3d:3d:51:80:54:74:0d:29:
        eb:34:bb:bd:b0:54:9c:19:df:6a:37:14:f5:9f:8f:
        f8:b3:b0:67:32:0f:25:b3:d8:13:9e:11:62:d5:4d:
        d9:9a:60:4d:5b:a7:63:53:89:64:33:e9:70:23:92:
        ad:48:ef:33:41:96:37:ce:e8:7a:45:9d:d0:89:79:
        67:8d:a5:93:8f:6a:91:2e:a0:a5:e1:09:07:1f:b1:
        4e:e1:d5:a4:d9:99:70:5a:d5:83:35:8a:54:a7:d1:
        4f:da:8b:d2:82:a1:08:22:26:f1:06:4e:0c:f2:de:
        85:d8:59:0b:be:3b:83:9f:7b:cd:4d:ac:8b:94:53:
        a1:81:10:95:76:f1:bd:64:62:4a:6c:b1:16:b0:a8:
        71:be:ca:9e:56:51:1c:0b:84:8c:f4:eb:70:c5:be:
        50:06:42:32:28:e0:94:ed:5d:90:20:f1:da:ae:ef:
        0f:92:4f:ed:0b:27:c9:71:87:09:7a:4e:b5:b5:09:
        7f:ee:cd:6d:b5:f4:7c:dd:e0:10:68:f8:cd:16:39:
        ac:e0:1c:46:22:85:e4:8c:0f:9e:5c:06:f7:80:31:
        fe:21:e4:10:55:20:92:fe:62:83:30:3f:9b:6b:ba:
        9c:30:84:32:3b:91:84:87:8e:3f:8b:72:4c:de:b7:
        9d:1b
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:      X509 cert extensions (each type)
      X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
        keyid:51:68:FF:90:AF:02:07:75:3C:CC:D9:65:64:62:A2:12:B8:59:72:3B

      X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
        E3:4E:09:93:F6:B1:30:83:F5:5E:7E:DA:8C:70:93:68:B9:AE:CF:2F

      X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
        DNS:twitter.com, DNS:www.twitter.com

```

```

X509v3 Key Usage: critical
    Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
    TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

    Full Name:
      URI:http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g6.crl

    Full Name:
      URI:http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g6.crl

X509v3 Certificate Policies:
    Policy: 2.16.840.1.114412.1.1
      CPS: https://www.digicert.com/CPS
    Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2

Authority Information Access:
    OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com
    CA Issuers - URI:http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCA.crt

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
    CA:FALSE
    1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2:
      .....v.....q...#...{G8W.
.R....d6.....q.\.....G0E.!.....?o.A0.H.q..BG.U.....a.(.m... I...gs<TE....QAc.....-....4..z...v.\
E..B.E..!ct(hG.
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
9c:ef:8f:33:20:d3:23:61:84:73:17:88:59:6e:87:5c:38:aa:
f6:14:97:fe:0a:e6:a5:60:f7:78:23:96:38:ca:9a:f0:15:ab:
f2:aa:ff:e7:8f:4f:fb:d1:a5:8e:73:47:c5:97:1e:7f:a4:b4:
29:5b:d4:bd:e9:cd:5d:ad:98:9f:0f:0b:bc:17:62:59:49:0e:
11:83:cd:00:4e:ee:77:d5:3e:5d:68:85:b8:44:6f:84:2e:64:
f2:66:14:3a:b0:0e:b3:0c:d1:a9:a4:a4:d0:c8:6f:ae:5b:16:
69:23:93:06:b9:52:ab:a9:ed:74:35:71:70:3a:99:af:03:29:
84:3d:60:70:00:b9:00:bc:89:0a:3c:c5:b5:97:1b:03:b3:80:
b7:dd:11:14:1d:f9:44:db:de:28:50:a6:9a:c7:1c:94:7f:8c:
92:2a:e3:a8:80:d3:c4:71:ab:cd:87:20:62:52:9b:b7:21:86:
93:0e:80:d9:89:33:60:55:1e:96:75:e7:9b:ad:67:6c:a5:d1:
78:c1:ba:09:21:07:80:69:c5:cc:b1:ca:90:6e:57:a3:d4:0d:
6f:54:19:ef:67:81:83:1b:ce:dd:1c:5e:c9:38:2c:81:c7:9c:
d9:1c:bf:8f:fe:92:2a:ba:00:68:bc:76:27:6c:5c:13:67:97:
4f:c3:35:68

```

4.

The picture below shows information about the intermediate certificate. The purpose of it is to make people “trust” the subject’s certificate more (in this case, twitter’s).

```

Authority Information Access:
    OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com
    CA Issuers - URI:http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCA.crt

```

This part indicates issuer’s URI, which is the download link of the intermediate cert

```

$ openssl x509 -in intermediate_twitter.pem -text
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      04:e1:e7:a4:dc:5c:f2:f3:6d:c0:2b:42:b8:5d:15:9f
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA
    Validity
      Not Before: Oct 22 12:00:00 2013 GMT
      Not After : Oct 22 12:00:00 2028 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      Public-Key: (2048 bit)
      Modulus:
        00:b6:e0:2f:c2:24:06:c8:6d:04:5f:d7:ef:0a:64:
        06:b2:7d:22:26:65:16:ae:42:40:9b:ce:dc:9f:9f:
        76:07:3e:c3:30:55:87:19:b9:4f:94:0e:5a:94:1f:
        55:56:b4:c2:02:2a:af:d0:98:ee:0b:40:d7:c4:d0:
        3b:72:c8:14:9e:ef:90:b1:11:a9:ae:d2:c8:b8:43:
        3a:d9:0b:0b:d5:d5:95:f5:40:af:c8:1d:ed:4d:9c:
        5f:57:b7:86:50:68:99:f5:8a:da:d2:c7:05:1f:a8:
        97:c9:dc:a4:b1:82:84:2d:c6:ad:a5:9c:c7:19:82:
        a6:85:0f:5e:44:58:2a:37:8f:fd:35:f1:0b:08:27:
        32:5a:f5:bb:8b:9e:a4:bd:51:d0:27:e2:dd:3b:42:
        33:a3:05:28:c4:bb:28:cc:9a:ac:2b:23:0d:78:c6:
        7b:e6:5e:71:b7:4a:3e:08:fb:81:b7:16:16:a1:9d:
        23:12:4d:e5:d7:92:08:ac:75:a4:9c:ba:cd:17:b2:
        1e:44:35:65:7f:53:25:39:d1:1c:0a:9a:63:1b:19:
        92:74:68:0a:37:c2:c2:52:48:cb:39:5a:a2:b6:e1:
        5d:c1:dd:a0:20:b8:21:a2:93:26:6f:14:4a:21:41:
        c7:ed:6d:9b:f2:48:2f:f3:03:f5:a2:68:92:53:2f:
        5e:e3
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
  X509v3 extensions:
    X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
      CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
    X509v3 Key Usage: critical
      Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
    X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
      TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
    Authority Information Access:
      OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com
    X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

```

Intermediate certificate downloaded and translated

5. The intermediate CA is the same organization as the root CA (digicert.com) as labeled in the pic above.

6. It's a file containing root and intermediate CAs (chain of trusts). Used to ensure the user to trust that particular site.

7. 132 Certificates

Counted by VSCode Search function on “-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----”
 (“-----END CERTIFICATE-----” also yields the same result)

```

cert.pem x
private > etc > ssl > cert.pem

1 # $openBSD: cert.pem,v 1.17 2018/09/12 22:17:08 sthen Exp $
2 ## /C=ES/CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
3
4 == /C=ES/CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
5 Certificate:
6   Data:
7     Version: 3 (0x2)
8     Serial Number: 6047274297262753887 (0x53ec3beefbb2485f)
9     Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
10    Validity
11      Not Before: May 20 08:38:15 2009 GMT
12      Not After : Dec 31 08:38:15 2030 GMT
13    Subject: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
14    X509v3 extensions:
15      X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
16        CA:TRUE, pathlen:1
17      X509v3 Key Usage: critical
18        Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
19      X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
20        65:CD:EB:AB:35:1E:00:3E:7E:D5:74:C0:1C:B4:73:47:0E:1A:64:2F
21      X509v3 Certificate Policies:
22        Policy: X509v3 Any Policy
23        CPS: http://www.firmaprofesional.com/cps

```

Search function with -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

```

cert.pem x
private > etc > ssl > cert.pem

44 K18xVvTyQKmtFLKbp7Q8UIJm+K9Lv9ny1qdVF8xM6HdjAeI9BZweLgSuewVf
45 6NkBIKdL4ZkQdU7hwXu+g/GvUgUvz1N1J5Bto+WHW0Wk9mVBngxaJ43BjuaIUvH
46 0SPHG8SjFeUc+JIWuIDAQAB04HVMHsMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQEEwDgYD
47 VR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQMBBRlzeurNR4APn7VdMActHNDhpKlzCBpgYD
48 VR0B1GEMIGBgRVHSAAMIgPC8GCCcGAQUFBwIBFIzodHRwOi8vd3d3LmZp
49 cm1hcHJvZmVzaW9uYWwvY29tL2NwczBcBggrrBgEFBQcCAjBQHK4AUABHAIHAZQBV
50 ACAAZAB1ACAAAbABhACAAQgBvAG4AYQBuAG8AdgBhACAAANAA3ACAAQgBhAIAYwBL
51 AGwAbwBuAGEAIAAwADgAMAAxADcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggIBABd9oPm03cXF
52 661LJLWHAqvdpYHks9V5ytXjDvLmd3+xDLx51tklYyG0yLMnfX40S2wBeggLk9
53 am58m90t/MPWo+ZkKXzR4Tgeg1v/J2Wv+xyVx5xh0W1//qKR71kMrv2JYSiJ0L1
54 ILDCExARzRAVukKQktJE4Zym6zFIEv0Q2skGz30eqUvVhyj5eTSSP15E6PaPT481
55 PyWz0dxjKpBrIF/EUjJ0lywqrJ2X3kjyo2bbwtKDlaZmp54LD+kLM5F1CLd2VQ5
56 3a/DTg4fJ14N3LQW7NMBcn7STyQf82x09Ux3Z03R/9ILJUF1/1GExkkvgaTP0H5k
57 SeTy36LssUzAKh3ntLFlosS88Zj0qnAHY7542jtm+kA1MFsRpvAFDsYCA01rhpuF
58 3dv6qJ2ghN99ZwExEWN57kci57q13XRcrHedUtnQn31VZt93Jm8PYMo6oCTjcVM
59 ZcFwgBg4/EMxsvYDEeyrPs1Bsse3RdHf9mudMaotoRsaS8I8nkvoF/uZ52+F0g
60 StRf571oe2XyFR750qkt6dhrJKyXWERHrVKY8SFLcn7ONGCoQPHzPKTDKCOM/1cz
61 Q0CgFzr6jUwcqajUUpLXhZi9LK8yIySxZ2frH12vDSANGup15LAuBft7HT9SQB
62 jLM16Et8Vcad+qMUu2WfBm5PeN4KPJ2V
63 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
64
65 ## AC Camerfirma S.A.
66
67 == /C=EU/L=Madrid (see current address at www.camerfirma.com/address)/serialNumber=A82743287/0=AC Camerfirma S.A./CN=Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008

```

Search function with -----END CERTIFICATE-----

8. I found exactly one line with “Issuers”, suspecting this is the root certificate

```

$ cat cert.pem | grep "Issuers"
CA Issuers - URI:http://www.accv.es/fileadmin/Archivos/certificados/raizaccv1.crt

```

Then I convert the crt to pem

```

$ openssl x509 -inform der -in raizaccv1.crt -out rootcert.pem
~/Downloads

```

```

openssl x509 -in rootcert.pem -text
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number: 6828503384748696800 (0x5ec3b7a6437fa4e0)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: CN=ACCRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES
    Validity
      Not Before: May  5 09:37:37 2011 GMT
      Not After : Dec 31 09:37:37 2030 GMT
    Subject: CN=ACCRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      Public-Key: (4096 bit)
      Modulus:
        00:9b:a9:ab:bf:61:4a:97:af:2f:97:66:9a:74:5f:
        d0:d9:96:fd:cf:e2:e4:66:ef:1f:1f:47:33:c2:44:
        a3:df:9a:de:1f:b5:54:dd:15:7c:69:35:11:6f:bb:
        c8:0c:8e:6a:18:1e:d8:8f:d9:16:bc:10:48:36:5c:
        f0:63:b3:90:5a:5c:24:37:d7:a3:d6:cb:09:71:b9:
        f1:01:72:84:b0:7d:db:4d:80:cd:fc:d3:6f:c9:f8:
        da:b6:0e:82:d2:45:85:a8:1b:68:a8:3d:e8:f4:44:
        6c:bd:a1:c2:cb:03:be:8c:3e:13:00:84:df:4a:48:
        c0:e3:22:0a:e8:e9:37:a7:18:4c:b1:09:0d:23:56:
        7f:04:4d:d9:17:84:18:a5:c8:da:40:94:73:eb:ce:
        0e:57:3c:03:81:3a:9d:0a:a1:57:43:69:ac:57:6d:
        79:90:78:e5:b5:b4:3b:d8:bc:4c:8d:28:a1:a7:a3:
        a7:ba:02:4e:25:d1:2a:ae:ed:ae:03:22:b8:6b:20:
        0f:30:28:54:95:7f:e0:ee:ce:0a:66:9d:d1:40:2d:
        6e:22:af:9d:1a:c1:05:19:d2:6f:c0:f2:9f:f8:7b:
        b3:02:42:fb:50:a9:1d:2d:93:0f:23:ab:c6:c1:0f:
        92:ff:d0:a2:15:f5:53:09:71:1c:ff:45:13:84:e6:
        26:5e:f8:e0:88:1c:0a:fc:16:b6:a8:73:06:b8:f0:
        63:84:02:a0:c6:5a:ec:e7:74:df:70:ae:a3:83:25:
        ea:d6:c7:97:87:93:a7:c6:8a:8a:33:97:60:37:10:
        3e:97:3e:6e:29:15:d6:a1:0f:d1:88:2c:12:9f:6f:
        aa:a4:c6:42:eb:41:a2:e3:95:43:d3:01:85:6d:8e:
        bb:3b:f3:23:36:c7:fe:3b:e0:a1:25:07:48:ab:c9:
        89:74:ff:08:8f:80:bf:c0:96:65:f3:ee:ec:4b:68:
        93:e5:b9:4b:17:40:0f:b1:b6:b9:f5:de:4f:dc:e0:
        b3:ac:3b:11:70:60:84:4a:43:6e:99:20:c0:29:71:
        0a:c0:65
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:
      Authority Information Access:
        CA Issuers - URI:http://www.accv.es/fileadmin/Archivos/certificados/raizaccv1.crt
        OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.accv.es

      X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
        D2:87:B4:E3:DF:37:27:93:55:F6:56:EA:81:E5:36:CC:8C:1E:3F:BD

      X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
        CA:TRUE

      X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
        keyid:D2:87:B4:E3:DF:37:27:93:55:F6:56:EA:81:E5:36:CC:8C:1E:3F:BD

      X509v3 Certificate Policies:
        Policy: X509v3 Any Policy
        User Notice:
          Explicit Text:
            CPS: http://www.accv.es/legislacion_c.htm

      X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

        Full Name:
          URI:http://www.accv.es/fileadmin/Archivos/certificados/raizaccv1_der.crl

      X509v3 Key Usage: critical
        Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

      X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
        email:accv@accv.es
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    97:31:02:9f:e7:fd:43:67:48:44:14:e4:29:87:ed:4c:28:66:
    d0:8f:35:da:4d:61:b7:4a:97:4d:b5:db:90:e0:05:2e:0e:c6:
    79:d0:f2:97:69:0f:bd:04:47:d9:be:db:b5:29:da:9b:d9:ae:
    a9:99:d5:d3:3c:30:93:f5:8d:a1:a8:fc:06:8d:44:f4:ca:16:
    95:7c:33:dc:62:8b:a8:37:7d:8b:09:2d:1b:ef:c8:14:27:
    20:a9:64:44:ff:2e:d6:75:aa:6c:4d:60:40:19:49:43:54:63:
    da:e2:cc:ba:66:e5:4f:44:7a:5b:d9:6a:81:2b:40:d5:7f:f9:

```

Comparing to twitter's certificate,

- This one has much longer valid duration (up until 2030) and
- Is issued by another company. In fact this certificate signed by itself as the issuer and the subject is the same organization.
- Has 4096 bit public key

9. (Already has .pem readable file)

10. twitter.com, google.com, and chula.ac.th all can be verified with this program. Though classdeedee has no intermediate certificate and yields verify error result when trying to connect to it with option -showcerts

```

verify.py
1 import sys
2
3 def verify(cert_path, intermediate_path):
4     with open(cert_path, 'r') as cert_file:
5         cert = cert_file.read()
6     with open(intermediate_path, 'r') as int_cert_file:
7         int_cert = int_cert_file.read()
8
9     pem = pem.parse_file(cert_path)
10    trusted_certs = [certificates.load_certificate(cert_path)]
11    for mpm in pem:
12        trusted_certs.append(mpm)
13    verified = verify_chain_of_trust(cert, trusted_certs)
14    if verified:
15        print('Certificate (cert_path) verified')
16
17 def verify_chain_of_trust(cert_path, trusted_cert_pem):
18     certificate = certificates.load_certificate(cert_path)
19     certificate = certificates.load_certificate(cert_path)
20
21 # Create a X509Store with trusted certs
22 store = X509Store()
23 for trusted_cert_pem in trusted_cert_pem:
24     trusted_cert = certificates.load_certificate(cert_path)
25     store.add_certificate(trusted_cert)
26
27 # Create a X509StoreContext with the cert and trusted certs
28 # X and verify the chain of trust
29 store_ctx = X509StoreContext(store, certificate)
30 # Return None if certificate can be verified
31 result = store_ctx.verify_certificate()
32
33 if result is None: return True
34 else:
35     return False
36
37 to_verify = [
38     ('twitter.com', 'intermediate_twitter.pem'),
39     ('google.com', 'intermediate_google.pem'),
40     ('chula.ac.th', 'intermediate_chula.pem')
41 ]

```

Twitter, google, and chula verified


```

$ openssl x509 -in classdeedee.cert -text
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      d0:2a:f8:9f:33:b9:a2:cd:50:c0:43:f1:3c:66:fa:61
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: O=Acme Co, CN=Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
    Validity
      Not Before: Sep  5 14:19:10 2020 GMT
      Not After : Sep  5 14:19:10 2021 GMT
    Subject: O=Acme Co, CN=Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      Public-Key: (2048 bit)
      Modulus:
        00:c3:a1:e2:33:7b:2f:eb:09:85:97:44:b6:c1:bf:
        4b:d4:8a:b7:81:7b:8c:42:62:2b:3a:a4:c9:ac:60:
        0c:fd:b2:d4:de:36:a8:47:89:18:b4:b3:f8:55:82:
        66:be:28:f2:52:9d:f4:c9:47:acc:c7:f3:f3:ba:a2:
        ade:3:73:6d:47:74:c8:45:90:ec:38:ba:3b:b0:52:
        c9:32:34:3f:5d:16:df:74:a7:87:d5:1c:12:14:b0:
        ce:bd:6c:f5:b9:9d:55:29:36:d7:c2:e9:38:18:87:
        2f:3b:47:a0:09:41:9d:f8:a3:5b:d9:re:7:43:f7:00:
        ef:2c:a1:81:00:5b:5f:09:01:b9:b0:ec:45:ac:17:
        b1:40:1e:cb:41:ca:6f:aa:7d:6d:7f:5d:b7:12:ab:
        e2:13:f8:1a:7a:a6:07:b4:d1:da:ea:6a:fa:64:9a:
        42:78:f3:41:b5:2c:f5:0e:47:24:df:ed:4d:72:0f:
        1b:f9:46:48:39:3b:13:83:7a:05:8f:7c:0b:c9:f0:
        1e:f2:5e:10:3b:f9:81:d3:27:88:d1:bc:b4:b2:47:
        ab:18:b0:ea:38:f2:78:10:f5:d9:58:a7:68:46:c9:
        6f:65:b0:86:62:76:71:16:79:89:f3:28:77:eb:53:
        26:3b:29:71:26:54:33:3f:e7:78:16:d3:72:27:18:
        84:c7
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
  X509v3 extensions:
    X509v3 Key Usage: critical
      Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
    X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
      TLS Web Server Authentication
    X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
      CA:FALSE
    X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
      DNS:ingress.local

$ openssl s_client -connect classdeedee.cloud.cp.eng.chula.ac.th:443 -showcerts
CONNECTED(00000006)
depth=0 0 = Acme Co, CN = Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 0 = Acme Co, CN = Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
verify error:num=21:unable to verify the first certificate
verify return:1
-----
Certificate chain
 0 s:/O=Acme Co/CN=Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
 1:/O=Acme Co/CN=Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDcDCCAligAwIBAgIRANAq+J8zuaLNUmBD8Txm+mEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
SzEQMA4GA1UEChMHQWNTZSBDb2ZEMDUGA1UEAxMzViZXJlcyBjbmdyZQZANz
IENvbRyB2xsZXIgmFrZSB0ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTAeFw0yMDA5MDUxNDE5MTBaFw0y
MTA5MDUxNDE5MTBaMEsxEADAQgNVBAQTB0FjbWUgQ28xNzA1BgNVBAMTLkt1YmVy
bmV0ZXJlcyB5cmVzcyBDb250cm95bGVyIEZha2UgQ2VydGlmakNhdGUwggEiMA0G
CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQQD0eIzey/rCYwXRLbBv0Vui reBe4xC
Yis6pMmsYAz9stTeNqHhIRi0s/hVgma+KPJSnFTJR6zH8/06oq3jc21HdMhFK0w4
ujuwUskyND9dFt90p4fVHBIUsM69bPW5nVUpNtfc6TgYhy87R6BpQZ34o1DZ50P3
A08soYGwW18JAbm97EwsF7FAHstBym+qfw1/XbcSq+IT+Bp6pge00dGuavpkmkJ4
80G1LPU0RyTf7U1yDxv5RkA50x0DeoWpFavJ8B7yXhA7+YHTJ4jRvLSyR6sYs0o4
8ngQ9dLYp2hGyW9lsIZidnEweYnzKHfrUyY7KXEmVDM/53gW03InGITHAgMBAAg
TzBNMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDATBgNVHUEDDAKBgg rBgEFBQcDATAMBGNVHRMB
Af8EAjAAMBGA1UdEQQRMA+CDWluz3Jlc3MubG9jYWwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
ggEBAJiY4tELZap3TCFkLDX8IKMPNCHSRbCsIarEi7MtWEZ2qhbPfp0mDcd4GTx
YivxmLuC4sDhI8GJSyfmAryi+B8JLZsw77rAWR/SdA0Tvt95mcoxLxw5s5bXI0Z
D80cecvYHz11kLn5LE8Klj4H8DgtSaP34Fux1cZisrDNZL3fivBfCtmAjG80i81j
HzJyFmqE/K0MFmPDbaFcc2VIDFH26sqj7F1D3e90yigegMz3zWQVTeJDAFMsh7L8
CD7W0zekcYQZ/NqGD+2WNgRhZ/XiK7d9pt1FeZzB1yNPVQkxVljgzLDwtwNHX4FN

```

No intermediate certificate URI (left) and verifying failed (right)

11.

Class 1 Certificate

Assurance Level: Class 1 certificates shall be issued for both **business personnel and private individuals use**. These certificates will confirm that the information in the application provided by the subscriber does not conflict with the information in well-recognized consumer databases.

Applicability: This provides a **basic level of assurance** relevant to environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance.

Class 3 Certificate

Assurance Level: This certificate will be issued to **individuals as well as organizations**. As these are high assurance certificates, **primarily intended for e-commerce applications**, they shall be **issued to individuals only on their personal (physical) appearance before the Certifying Authorities**.

Applicability: This level is relevant to environments where threats to data are high or the **consequences of the failure of security services are high**. This may include very **high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk**.

Conclusion: Class 1 is more of a basic certificate with easier process of getting approved, while class 3 is more complicated but also provide more assurance of the trustworthiness of the website.

Source: <https://www.e-mudhra.com/Class-of-certificates.html>

12. The attacker could impersonate to be one of the so-called trusted Root CA, granting a reliable certificate to their own malicious websites and still showing the safety of certificate in the browser as if nothing happened. If the hacker created a fake, malicious banking websites, this could lead to a huge lose for the banks themselves as well as the users.

CRL (Certificate revocation list) isn't reliable enough in this case as there is no certificate being revoked. All the attacker need to do is to create a fake certificate for their own websites. As the problem said, no one knows about this breach so there is no way the real CA will put the fake certificate in the CRLs as well.

Source about CRL: <https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Certificate-Revocation-List>

OSCP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) while is an optimized version of CRL by letting the user connect directly to Cas to ask for the revocation status of the certificate, still can't check if the target Root CA has been hacked, as the fake certificate is still there and still not being revoked.

Source about OCSP:

https://docs.microfocus.com/NNMi/10.30/Content/Administer/NNMi_Deployment/Advanced_Configurations/Cert_Validation_CRL_and_OCSP.htm