

Security Mechanisms

For the Web

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
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- Tokens:
 - access tokens that are difficult/impossible to duplicate
 - can be used for machine-to-machine authentication without passwords

HTTP authentication

Basic HTTP auth:

- Enforced by server
- Server returns “401/Unauthorized” code to client
- Contrast with:
 - “404” - not found
 - “403” - forbidden (no option to authenticate)
- Client must respond with access token as an extra “Header” in next request



Problems with HTTP Basic Auth

- Username, Password effectively sent as plain text (base64 encoding)
 - Some minimal security if HTTPS is used (wiretap is difficult)
- Password will be seen in cleartext at server
 - Should not be needed - better mechanisms possible
- No standard process for “logout”

Digest authentication

- Message digest: cryptographic function
 - eg. MD5, SHA1, SHA256 etc.
- One-way function:
 - $f(A) = B$
 - Easy to compute B given A
 - Very difficult (near impossible) to compute A given B
- Can define such one-way functions on strings
 - String \rightarrow binary number

HTTP Digest authentication

- Server provides a “nonce” to prevent spoofing
- Client must create a secret value including nonce
- Example:
 - $HA1 = MD5(\text{username}:\text{realm}:\text{password})$
 - $HA2 = MD5(\text{method}:\text{URI})$
 - $\text{response} = MD5(HA1:\text{nonce}:HA2)$
- Server and client know all parameters above, so both will compute same
- Any third party snooping will see only final response
 - cannot extract original values (username, password, nonce etc)
 - nonce only used once to prevent replay

Client certificates

- Cryptographically secure certificates provided to each client
- Client does handshake with server to exchange information, prove knowledge
- Keep cert secure on client end
 - Impossible to reverse and find the key

Form input

- Username, Password entered into form
- Transmitted over link to server
 - link must be kept secure (HTTPS)
- GET requests:
 - URL encoded data: very insecure, open to spoofing
- POST requests:
 - form multipart data: slightly more secure
 - still needs secure link to avoid data leakage

Request level security

- One TCP connection
 - One security check may be sufficient
 - other network level issues to consider for TCP security
- Without connection KeepAlive:
 - each request needs new TCP connection
 - each request needs new authentication

Cookies

- Server checks some client credentials, then “sets a cookie”
- Header
 - Set-Cookie: <cookie-name>=<cookie-value>; Domain=<domain-value>; Secure; HttpOnly
- Client must send back the cookie with each request
- Server maintains “sessions” for clients
 - Remember cookies
 - Can set timeouts
 - Delete cookie record to “logout”
- Client
 - must send cookie with each request

API security

- Cookies etc. require interactive use (browser)
- Basic auth pop-up window

APIs:

- Typically accessed by machine clients or other applications
- Command-line etc. possible
- Use “token” or “API key” for access
 - Subject to same restrictions: HTTPS, not part of URL etc.