

ENPM691 Homework 05: Injection of Shell Code

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Abstract—This report documents an observational study of two classic stack-redirection techniques. The first approach demonstrates overwriting a saved return address to redirect control flow to bytes in a local stack buffer (“return-to-stack”); the second approach demonstrates an indirect function-pointer call into a local byte buffer. Using gcc and gdb [1] (with pwndbg [2]), I captured debugger evidence of (i) the location of the saved return address, (ii) the precise instruction that overwrites it (first approach) or the indirect call site (second approach), and (iii) the transfer of control to stack-resident bytes followed by process exit. Interpretation is grounded in the i386 System V ABI [4] and classic background literature [3], with notes on modern DEP/NX protections [5]. The build commands, system configuration, and explanations are included.

I. PURPOSE

The goal is to analyze two stack-hacking techniques using intentionally vulnerable examples:

- 1) **Saved-return overwrite** (“return-to-stack”): a local pointer targets the caller’s saved return slot and sets it to the address of a stack buffer, consistent with the i386 calling convention layout [3], [4].
 - 2) **Function-pointer cast and call**: a local byte buffer’s address is cast to a function pointer and called indirectly [4].

II. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

- **Operating System:** Kali-Linux-2025.2
 - **Compiler:** gcc 14.3.0 (Debian 14.3.0-5) with multilib support
 - **Debugger:** GDB 16.3 with pwndbg extension [1], [2]
 - **Mode:** Compiled and executed in 32-bit mode (i386 ABI) [4]

III. COMPILE COMMANDS AND EXPLANATIONS

```
gcc -m32 -g exit_shell2.c -o exit_shell2 \
    -fno-stack-protector -no-pie -z execstack
```

Flags:

- **-m32:** Produces a 32-bit executable.
 - **-g:** Includes debugging symbols for GDB.
 - **-o:** Specifies the output binary name.
 - **-fno-stack-protector:** Disables stack canaries (for lab observation).
 - **-no-pie:** Fixed image base (addresses are stable in disassembly).
 - **-z execstack:** Marks the stack executable (contrasts with standard DEP/NX policies) [5].

Fig. 1. Program 1 — Break at `main`: mixed disassembly (pwndbg [2]) shows the LEA of `&shellcode` and the store into the saved return slot at `[EBP+4]` per i386 ABI [4].

IV. METHOD (HIGH-LEVEL)

Following standard debugging practice [1], for each program I:

- 1) Compiled with the flags above.
 - 2) In gdb, broke at main and captured baseline registers and mixed source/assembly (pwndbg views where helpful) [2].
 - 3) For Program 1, stepped to the store that writes the saved return slot; captured “before” and “after” snapshots of [$\text{EBP}+4$] (per i386 ABI) [4]; stepped the epilogue to show ret transferring control into stack bytes.
 - 4) For Program 2, observed the indirect call where the computed pointer equals the local buffer address; captured exit status.

V. RESULTS

- A. Program 1: Saved-return Overwrite (exit_shell)
 - B. Program 2: Function-Pointer Call (exit_shell2)

VI. DISCUSSION

- ## A. Mechanics

In Program 1, a local pointer computes the address of the saved return slot relative to the current frame and stores the

Fig. 2. Program 1 — Epilogue and transfer: `ret` reads the overwritten saved return address and jumps into stack bytes; process then exits with code 2. This aligns with classic return-to-stack descriptions [3].

```
[File Actions Edit View Help]
[~] $ gcc -m32 -g exit_shell.c -o exit_shell -fno-stack-protector -no-pie -z execstack
[~] $ ./exit_shell
[~] $ echo $?
2
```

Fig. 3. Program 1 — Terminal run of exit_shell.

Fig. 4. Program 2 — Breakpoints and mixed disassembly: EAX set to &shellcode and indirect call eax. Built with -z execstack to contrast with DEP/NX defaults [5].

address of a local byte buffer there; on epilogue, ret transfers control into that buffer. This is consistent with the i386 stack layout and return semantics [3], [4]. In Program 2, a function pointer is explicitly set to the address of the local buffer and invoked via indirect call; this highlights the role of calling conventions and executable memory permissions [4], [5].

```
File Actions Edit View Help
0+004196 <_x86_get_pc_thunk.ax>    mov    eax, dword ptr [esp]           [ SOURCE (CODE) ]
In file: /home/kp/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmmt5/exit_shell2.c:6
1 #include <string.h>
2 #include <assert.h>
3
4 //shellcode for sum of 2 numbers/
5 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
6 {
7     char shellcode[] = "\xb0\x31\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x02\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x88";
8     int (*shell)(void) = (void *)shellcode;
9     return shell();
10 }

000000 esp 0xfffffcf0 -> 0-f7fbf400 -> 0-fd680000 -> 0+464c457f          [ STACK ]
010000-024 0xfffffcf0 -> 0
... 4 skipped                                         [ BACKTRACE ]

> 0+004196 main+15  _x86_start_call_main+15
2 0+f7fbf400 -> libc_start_main+136
3 0+00496000 start+40

pwndbg> c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 2, main (&argc1, argv=0xfffffcfd4 `[\247\321\377\377]' ) at exit_shell2.c:9
9     return shell();
LEGEND: STACK | CODE | DATA | NW | RODATA

*#BX 0+004197 main+27  _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ -> 0+2320c /`[0x0c=H' /
ECX 0+e79859e
EDX 0+004197c8 _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ -> 0+2320c /`[0x0c=H' /
ESI 0+004197f4 _do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry -> 0+0049128 (_do_global_dtors_aux) -> endbr32
EBP 0+004197f0 .`[0
ESP 0+004197f4 -> 0-f7fbf400 -> 0+f7fbf400 -> 0+464c457f
EIP 0+004197f4 (main+27) -> mov eax, dword ptr [esp + 0x1c]

0+004197f4 (main+27)      mov    dword ptr [esp + 0x1c], 0+2b000  [0xfffffcf0] < 0+2b000
0+004197f9 (main+35)      mov    dword ptr [esp + 0x1c], 0+800000  [0xfffffcf0] < 0+800000
0+004197ff (main+43)      byte al, 0x01, 0                                [0xfffffcf0] < 0+1b0
0+00419800 (main+44)      inc    eax, 1                                 [0xfffffcf0] < 0+1b0
0+00419801 (main+52)      mov    dword ptr [esp + 0x1c], eax  [0xfffffcf0] < 0+fffffcff -> 0+1b8
0+00419802 (main+56)      mov    eax, dword ptr [esp + 0x1c]  [AX, [0xfffffcf0] > 0xfffffcff -> 0+1b8]
0+00419803 (main+58)      call   eax, 0+fffffcff

breakpoint hit at address = 0+004195 main+63
0+004195 main+63          leave
                          ret
0+004196 _x86_get_pc_thunk.ax>    eax, dword ptr [esp]
0+004199 _x86_get_pc_thunk.ax>    ret

In file: /home/kp/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmmt5/exit_shell2.c:9
8 _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ -> 0+2320c /`[0x0c=H' /
9 int main(int argc, char *argv)
10 {
11     char shellcode[] = "\xb0\x31\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x02\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x88";
12     int (*shell)(void) = (void *)shellcode;
13     return shell();
14 }

000000 esp 0xfffffcf0 -> 0-f7fbf400 -> 0+f7fbf400 -> 0+464c457f          [ STACK ]
010000-024 0xfffffcf0 -> 0
... 3 skipped                                         [ BACKTRACE ]

> 0+004198 main+56
1 0+f7dc0cc3 _libc_start_call_main+115
2 0+f7dc0db8 _libc_start_main+136
3 0+00496000 start+40

pwndbg> c
Continuing.
[Inferior 1 (process 174642) exited with code 0x0]
pwndbg>
```

Fig. 5. Program 2 — At the indirect call site; program exits with status 2. Stepping and register/stack inspection followed standard GDB workflow [1].

```
[kali㉿kali:~/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmnt5]
$ gcc -m32 -g exit_shell2.c -o exit_shell2 -fno-stack-protector -no-pie -z execstack
[kali㉿kali:~/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmnt5]
$ ./exit_shell2
[kali㉿kali:~/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmnt5]
$ echo $?
2
[kali㉿kali:~/Desktop/ENPM691/assignmnt5]
$ [
```

Fig. 6. Program 2 — Terminal run of exit_shell2 and exit status 2.

B. Effect of Protections

Modern systems deploy mitigations like non-executable stacks (DEP/NX) [5], stack canaries, ASLR, and PIE. These impede direct execution of stack bytes and make addresses unpredictable. For pedagogical reasons, Program 2 was compiled with `-z execstack`, `-no-pie`, and `-fno-stack-protector` to create a controlled setting for observing call/return mechanics (debugged with GDB/pwndbg [1], [2]). Such flags should be used only in sanctioned lab environments.

C. Reliability Considerations

Hard-coding a frame offset (e.g., “+6” words) is ABI/compiler dependent and brittle. Mixed source/assembly in gdb provides ground truth for the specific build [1], [4].

VII. CONCLUSION

The captured evidence demonstrates two control transfers to stack-resident bytes and ties observable machine state

(registers, stack words, disassembly) to C-level constructs. The study emphasizes conceptual understanding and the role of modern mitigations [5], while referencing foundational background and official tooling/ABI documentation [1]–[4].

Two passes resolve cross-references. If you switch to a .bib file later, add a bibtex step between passes.

BUILD & DEBUG COMMANDS (FOR REFERENCE)

```
# Program 1
gcc -m32 -g exit_shell.c -o exit_shell \
-fno-stack-protector -no-pie -z execstack

# Program 2
gcc -m32 -g exit_shell2.c -o exit_shell2 \
-fno-stack-protector -no-pie -z execstack

# GDB (pwndbg may autoload)
gdb -q ./exit_shell
gdb -q ./exit_shell2
```

REFERENCES

- [1] GNU Project, “Debugging with GDB,” Free Software Foundation. (GDB manual).
 - [2] pwndbg Project, “pwndbg: A GDB plugin for exploit development,” documentation pages.
 - [3] E. Levy (Aleph One), “Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit,” *Phrack* 49:14, 1996.
 - [4] Intel Corporation, “*System V Application Binary Interface: i386 Architecture Supplement*,” (calling conventions and stack frame layout).
 - [5] General documentation on DEP/NX (Data Execution Prevention / Non-Executable memory) from OS-vendor and PaX resources.

APPENDIX A SOURCE CODE

A. exit_shell.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main( int argc , char *argv ){
    char shellcode[] = "\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00""\xbb\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00""\xcd\x80";
}

int *ret;
ret = (int *)&ret + 6;
(*ret) = (int)shellcode;
}
```

B. exit shell2.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

/*shellcode for sum of 2 numbers*/
int main( int argc , char *argv ){
    char shellcode[] = "\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00"\xbb\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80";
    int (*shell)(void) = (void *)&shellcode;
    return shell();
}
```