# Morellian Analysis for Browsers: Making Web Authentication Stronger With Canvas Fingerprinting

Pierre Laperdrix, Gildas Avoine, Benoit Baudry, Nick Nikiforakis











#### Introduction – Web attacks and data breaches

Attacks on the web happen more and more frequently and are getting bigger.

'Collection #1' reveals 773 million email addresses, passwords in one of largest data breaches ever

You can check to see if your username and password have been leaked.











Senior Editor, PCWorld | JANUARY 17, 2019 01:25 PM PT

January 10, 2019

Credential stuffing attack prompts Reddit to force password reset

**Bradley Barth** 

#### DailyMotion discloses credential stuffing attack

DailyMotion falls to credential stuffing attack two weeks after Reddit had the same fate.



By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | January 27, 2019 -- 12:02 GMT (12:02 GMT) | Topic: Security

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


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
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Can browser fingerprinting be a viable alternative?











A bigger and richer web



- Audio
- Video
- 3D rendering
- Real-time communications
- Web payments
- Virtual reality

•••




1995	2019
Browser: Netscape Language: Fr	Browser: Chrome v74 OS: Linux Screen: 1920x1080 Language: Fr Timezone: GMT+1 Graphic card: GTX 1080Ti

A bigger and richer web



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What happens when we start collecting all the information available in a web browser?

## Introduction - Definition of browser fingerprinting

#### **Definitions**

• A browser fingerprint is a set of information related to a user's device from the hardware to the operating system to the browser and its configuration.

• Browser fingerprinting refers to the process of collecting information through a web browser to build a fingerprint of a device.

## Introduction - Example of a browser fingerprint

Attribute	Value	
User agent	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Fedora; Linux x86_64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0	
HTTP headers	text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 gzip, deflate, br en-US,en;q=0.5	
Plugins	Plugin 0: QuickTime Plug-in 7.6.6; libtotem-narrowspace-plugin.so; Plugin 1: Shockwave Flash; Shockwave Flash 26.0 r0; libflashplayer.so.	
Fonts	Century Schoolbook, Source Sans Pro Light, DejaVu Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Serif, URW Palladio L, Bitstream Vera Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Sans,	
Platform	Linux x86_64	
Screen resolution	1920x1080x24	
Timezone	-480 (UTC+8)	
OS	Linux 3.14.3-200.fc20.x86 32-bit	
WebGL vendor	NVIDIA Corporation	
WebGL renderer	GeForce GTX 650 Ti/PCle/SSE2	
Canvas	Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, @  Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, @	























One major problem: what if the user's fingerprint is stolen (i.e. collected)?

Fingerprints can be manipulated in JavaScript. An attacker can send any information to the authentication server.


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
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An attacker can also try to reconstruct the environment of his victim to bypass verification.

One major problem: what if the user's fingerprint is stolen (i.e. collected)?

>Traditional fingerprinting scripts always collect the same attributes.

What is the user agent?	What is the language?	What is the browser?
What is the list of plugins?	What is the list of fonts?	What is the screen resolution?
What is the timezone?	What is platform?	Are cookies enabled?
	•••	


≈20 questions


## A look into the past



#### Giovanni Morelli (1816-1891)

- Studied medicine and taught anatomy
- Identified the characteristic "hands" of painters through scrutiny of minor details in paintings





#### **Example from the AmIUnique.org website**

```
canvas = document.createElement("canvas");
canvas.height = 60;
canvas.width = 400;
canvasContext = canvas.getContext("2d");
canvas.style.display = "inline";
canvasContext.textBaseline = "alphabetic";
canvasContext.fillStyle = "#f60";
canvasContext.fillRect(125, 1, 62, 20);
canvasContext.fillStyle = "#069";
canvasContext.font = "11pt no-real-font-123";
canvasContext.fillText("Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, \ud83d\ude03", 2, 15);
canvasContext.fillStyle = "rgba(102, 204, 0, 0.7)";
canvasContext.font = "18pt Arial";
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Use the Canvas API as a drawing board for a morellian analysis.

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Dynamic

Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, ⊕
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
Draw an orange rectangle of size 63x45 at position (7,89)

Render the string "stnalpehtretlaw" with a size 30pt at position (1337,42) with the font Arial in purple

Draw a green circle with a circumference of 24 pixels at position (4,8)


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Incredibly high number of questions

Generation of a new test at each connection

Hard to spoof

OS Hardware

Bootstrapping phase

Server



Client



Bootstrapping phase

Server


"Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, \ud83d\ude03" RGB(4,8,15)


Generating a new canvas challenge c1





#### Client















Connection phase

Server





Client



























If the rendering is verified, we generate and send a new challenge c2







Storing both the challenge c2 and the response r2 for the next connection




Loop n°1 with c1,r1: verify the current connection


Loop n°2 with c2,r2: verify the next connection

#### Incredible diversity of challenges

Extensive testing to tune canvas fingerprinting for authentication







#### Incredible diversity of challenges

Parameter	Description	Number of combinations
String content	[A-Z] [a-z] [0-9]	62^10
Size	From size 30 to 78	49
Rotation	Precision up to the tenth digit	360°x10 = 3600
Color with gradients	RGB color model encoded on 8 bits	((2^8)^3)^2 = 2^48
Shadow color	RGB color model encoded on 8 bits	2^24
Shadow strength	From 0 to 50	51

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
- $62^10 \times 49 \times 3600 \times 2^48 \times 2^24 \times 51 \approx 2^154$  challenges
- 2.3x10^50 bits of space with an average of 10kb per response

#### Great diversity of results

• Many different responses for the exact same set of instructions


#### Great diversity of results


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- Protection against configuration recovery



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




Distribution of

#### Great diversity of results

- Many different responses for the exact same set of instructions
- Protection against configuration recovery
- Having the same device as your victim does not guarantee that it can reproduce the expected rendering with stolen credentials.



#### Attacks blocked or mitigated by our scheme


- Replay attack
- MITM or relay attacks
- Preplay attack (collecting all possible values beforehand)
- Guessing or building the right response
- Configuration recovery




#### Privacy risks associated with fingerprinting

- In this work, canvas fingerprinting is used in a first-party context to augment authentication.
- It complements the use of traditional cookies as an extra layer of protection but it does not provide websites with any additional linking power (we collect only randomly generated canvas fingerprints ).

Traditional fingerprinting



Our scheme with canvas fingerprinting




- Using canvas fingerprinting to augment authentication
- Fast, transparent and frictionless for the user
- Resiliency to a lot of different attacks because of the high diversity of challenges and results
- Code and demo: <a href="https://plaperdr.github.io/morellian-canvas/">https://plaperdr.github.io/morellian-canvas/</a>



# Thank you! Any questions?

Contact





Websites

https://amiunique.org

https://plaperdr.github.io/morellian-canvas/